FLAMEOUT: THE RISE AND FALL OF MISSILES IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE, 1957-1967 A Dissertation by DAVID WILLIAM BATH Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Joseph G. Dawson, III Committee Members, Terry H. Anderson Olga Dror Angela Pulley Hudson James Burk Head of Department, David Vaught December 2015 Major Subject: History Copyright 2015 David William Bath ABSTRACT This dissertation documents how the U.S. national perspective toward ballistic nuclear missiles changed dramatically between 1957 and 1967 and how the actions and attitudes of this time brought about long term difficulties for the nation, the Air Force, and the missile community. In 1957, national leaders believed that ballistic missiles would replace the manned bomber and be used to win an anticipated third world war between communist and capitalist nations. Only ten years later, the United States was deep into a limited war in Vietnam and had all but proscribed the use of nuclear missiles. This dissertation uses oral histories, memoirs, service school theses, and formerly classified government documents and histories to determine how and why the nation changed its outlook on nuclear ballistic missiles so quickly. The dissertation contends that because scientists and engineers created the revolutionary weapon at the beginning of the Cold War, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were struggling for influence and power, many national leaders urged the military to design and build nuclear ballistic missiles before the Soviet Union could do so. This pressure prompted the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to compete for the new mission and wasted billions of dollars as the services built duplicative, unreliable and unsafe liquid fueled missiles that were only in use for a few years. Then, as the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the true threat of nuclear conflict, the perspective towards nuclear missiles changed considerably. ii The dissertation also argues that the Air Force garnered control of the new capability, primarily to retain and protect their manned strategic air mission, so it chose not to deal with inherent problems of missile duty that were revealed almost immediately, such as loneliness, boredom, tedium, and an inability to find a sense of accomplishment. Once U.S. political leaders turned their focus away from nuclear war and toward the Vietnam conflict, the Air Force relegated the missileers -- those selected to operate the new missiles -- to secondary status, allowing their concerns to fester for decades. Missileers created a proud, but dysfunctional organization that rewarded what Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James in 2014 called unrealistic test scores rather than operational experience and expertise. At the same time, the Air Force intensified an unhealthy focus on manned flight that prevented the service from most effectively incorporating and using advances in technology to defend the nation. iii Dedicated to my wife, Beth, and my children, Kristen and Sean. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am extremely grateful for the guidance and advice of the many people who have helped me complete this dissertation, especially my advisor, Joseph Dawson III, who guided this study from start to finish, and the members of my dissertation committee: Terry Anderson, Olga Dror, Angela Hudson, and Jim Burk. I would also like to express my appreciation to Lawrence Spinetta, who voluntarily reviewed the dissertation while serving as the commander of the Air Force's 69th Reconnaissance Group. I also owe appreciation to the Smith Richardson Foundation and Texas A&M University for the generous grants that provided for several indispensable research opportunities. Thanks go to Ken Hanushek from East Texas State University for starting me on this path many years ago and to Jonathan Lee from San Antonio College for nudging me to begin the Ph.D. program. Thanks also to Bill Collopy and Rachel Gunter for their friendly guidance and encouragement from the trenches. Without the support of Charlie Simpson and the members of the Association of Air Force Missileers, along with the other former "missilemen" who provided their stories, this dissertation could not have been started. Thank you. The outstanding historians at U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Global Strike Command, and Air Force Space Command History Offices guided my study and provided critical sources and feedback. The superb staff and archivists at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, v the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, and the Mudd Manuscript Library ensured I found the documents I needed, while the wonderful librarians at the National Defense University and the Air University libraries helped locate theses and studies written in the 1950s and 1960s by officers whose lives were tied to the new missiles. Thank you to Neil Sheehan, along with Jeffrey Flannery from the Library of Congress, for allowing me access to interviews used for A Fiery Peace in a Cold War. I also want to give a special thank you to Carolina DeLeon and the staff of the Texas A&M Interlibrary Services and to Joel Kitchens, the History Reference Librarian, who cheerfully responded to so many requests that they now know me by name. Finally, I would like to thank God for placing me in a position where I could complete the doctoral program, my wife, Beth, and my parents for encouraging me through this journey, and my children, Kristen and Sean, who served as assistant editors -- mostly voluntarily -- during the writing process. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION.......................................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ vii LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. viii 1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY ........................................................................ 1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 Significance and Historiography ..................................................................................... 7 2. LIFTOFF: RACE FOR SURVIVAL ..................................................................................... 18 3. TURBULENCE: INTERSERVICE AND INTRASERVICE CONFLICTS .................................... 64 4. RUSH TO ALERT: INTENSIFYING MISTRUST AND ENMITY .......................................... 106 5. APOGEE: AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS FOMENTS CHANGE ........................................ 147 6. FREEFALL: THE AIR FORCE RESPONSE ....................................................................... 198 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 231 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 259 vii LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1. Official map showing threat rings for Soviet missiles in Cuba. ...................... 155 Figure 2. Map of Air Force bases with first generation missiles. .................................. 158 Figure 3. Map of Air Force bases with second generation missiles. ............................. 159 Figure 4. Official U.S. Army Heraldic Division image of guided missile insignia. .......... 215 viii 1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY Introduction In December of 1957, many people in the United States perceived the nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile as the "ultimate weapon."1 By tying the newly developed hydrogen bomb to the ballistic missile and giving it intercontinental range, scientists had created a revolution in military affairs as great as that of gunpowder or the rifled barrel. The ballistic nuclear missile could devastate portions of an enemy country in minutes and there was no defense against it.2 Although only one working ballistic missile with intercontinental range had been successfully launched at the time, an early Atlas missile, the hopes of many Americans' future peace and security lay in this missile and its successors, already under development.3 The Air Force planned to recruit capable and highly educated men to operate and maintain these awesome weapons for the defense of the nation and, American leaders proclaimed, for the protection of Europe, Asia, and other areas. These men were to guide the Air Force and the United States into a future of stability and international harmony through strength. Their own futures seemed boundless.4 Less than ten years later, the Atlas missile was being decommissioned, along with the Titan I, the Thor, and the Jupiter, other nuclear missiles that were developed at about the same time as the Atlas. The follow-on Minuteman and Titan II missiles 1 were retained, but held only as a necessary deterrent to the use of enemy nuclear weapons while the nation focused on a "limited war."5 In fact, on September 18, 1967, the official who oversaw the largest