Business&Finance

The Threat of Agroterrorism Economics of Bioterrorism Mark G. Polyak

Bioterrorism and its potential as an instrument of terrorist Mark G. Polyak is Senior Analyst in the groups have dominated the minds of Americans since the Division of Integrated anthrax attacks in the autumn of 2001. These attacks exacer- Biodefense, Imaging Science and Informa bated the traumatic shock of 9/11 and resurrected fears that tion Systems Center, terrorists might deploy sophisticated biological weapons in Georgetown University order to wreak societal havoc. In the process, these weapons Medical Center. might kill or injure thousands of people and severely compro- mise our livestock, food chain, and water supplies. Particularly worrisome, from an economic perspective, is a particular type of bioterrorism: agricultural terrorism. Agroterrorism is defined as attacks against livestock and crops, but this article will focus on livestock-targeted attacks, which, if successful, present a multibillion dollar challenge to the economy of the United States. Agroterrorism is a relatively affordable way for a terrorist group to undercut a nation’s economy, undermine its political system, cause nationwide panic, and generate enormous publicity for the organization or individual responsible for the attack.1

Development of Agroterrorism. Bioweapons, includ ing agricultural biological weapons (ABW), have been used in conventional warfare since World War I, when German agents in the United States inoculated horses and cattle with the infectious disease, glanders, before the animals were shipped

Summer/Fall 2004 [31] THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM to France.2 Two decades later, in 1939, ing had dropped to 0.74 percent of the the French bioweapons program inten- falling GDP. In 2002, funding was 0.35 sively bred potato beetles in order to percent of the GDP; in real prices budget undermine the German food supply.3 spending on R&D decreased by 90 per- During the Cold War, the Soviet Union cent.6 Many of the scientists employed in experimented with ticks in order to these projects have since found themselves transmit foot-and-mouth disease in reduced circumstances and may be (FMD), bovine pleuropneunomia, avian open to alternative sources of support.7 influenza, and other infectious diseases capable of infecting both animals and How Real is the Threat? Attractive humans.4 These instances illustrate the features of agroterrorism include its rel- ABW expertise developed and main ative affordability or cost-effectiveness, tained by governments for the past nine the difficulty in detecting bioagents, the ty years. However, attempts by non-state high concentration of livestock in limit- actors to acquire that knowledge are rela- ed number of places, and the high tively new phenomena. mobility of animals and animal products. The threat of agroterrorism expanded In addition, the terrorist who deploys the exponentially during the 1990s for a bioagent faces limited risks because the number of reasons. While, in the past, pathogens that attack cattle usually do not bioweapon experimentation was limited affect humans. to a few countries, political develop Non-state actors may resort to ments—particularly the breakup of the agroterrorism due to its low costs. Soviet Union, the end of South Africa’s According to a recent Heritage Founda- apartheid regime, and the fall of Saddam tion report, “Over one hundred states Hussein—and recent, wide-scale, natural- have the capability to manufacture bio- ly-occurring epidemics have created logical weapons on a large scale,” and a opportunities for terrorist groups world basic biotoxin-producing facility can be wide to collect bioagents.5 The collapse of built and operated for less than $10 mil- strong military-industrial complexes in lion.8 When one considers that the assets these countries may allow terrorists to of Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo sect were worth entice unemployed or underemployed between $200 million and $1 billion in

Over one hundred states have the capability to manufacture biological weapons on a large scale. experts in biological warfare and other 1995-96 and assets of al Qaeda are esti- related fields through monetary payments mated to be between $30 and $300 mil or promises of revenge. For example, in lion of dollars, the creation of such facil- 1986, the Soviet government was spending ities would be eerily feasible, financially 3.8 percent of its GDP on research and speaking, for these wealthy terrorist development (R&D), but, by 1992, fund groups.9 Furthermore, these same facili-

[32] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs POLYAK Business & Finance ties can produce drugs, usually ecstasy, treaty in 1994. An example of this sus- which can be sold to fund other terror ceptibility is the 1996 North American ist or criminal activities.10 outbreak of cyclosporiasis, an infection The availability of open-source scien- linked to the consumption of raspberries tific literature and the relatively low imported from Guatemala. This out degree of sophistication required to pro- break resulted in 1,465 cases in North duce viable agents are additional factors America, including cases reported in that may make bioterrorism attractive to twenty U.S. states and the District of radical, non-state actors. A terrorist Columbia.12 If terrorists attack food

A terrorist group, equipped with a competent team of graduate students and a small facility could field a program for a few hundred thousand dollars or less. group, equipped with a competent team shipments that originate in countries of graduate students and a facility no that have not previously been linked to larger than a few hundred square feet, terrorism, unsuspecting customs officers could field a small-scale program for a may not sufficiently and rigorously few hundred thousand dollars or less. inspect inbound products. Aum Shinrikyo’s quest to produce a bio logical weapon illustrates the ease of this A Complicated Cleanup. Agroter process. Its effort to produce botulinum rorism presents a particularly difficult and anthrax toxins was led by Seichi challenge for the response community and Endo, a young microbiologist who per therefore appeals to non-state actors and formed research at Kyoto’s University’s state sponsors of terrorism alike. Accord- Viral Research Center. The sect was able ing to Dr. Peter Chalk, a RAND bioter- to freely purchase equipment for rorism analyst, “agroterrorism has a con bioweapons production, including a coil- siderable utility in terms of cost-benefit method heat exchanger, pump motor, payoffs that would be of particular interest vinyl chloride pipes, air filtration media, to any substate group that is faced with molecular modeling software, and lasers. overcoming significant power asymmetry, Further investigation revealed that this such as Al Qaeda.”13 This is not merely a group unsuccessfully attempted to dis hypothetical situation: groups like the perse botulinum in 1990 and aerosolized Arab Revolutionary Palestinian Comman- anthrax in Central Tokyo in 1993.11 dos and Mau Mau insurgents used biolog Globalization is yet another factor that ical weapons against livestock in Israel and increases our vulnerability to agroterror- British colonial Kenya, respectively.14 ism, as the volume of imported food Detecting an unnatural outbreak of a shipments has increased approximately zoonotic disease is an epidemiologic five-fold since the passage of the WTO challenge. Diseases caused by weaponized

Summer/Fall 2004 [33] THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM biological agents with nonspecific clinical Collins of Maine recently stated, “In the features could be difficult to diagnose war on terrorism, the fields and pastures and identify as a biological attack.15 Fur- of America’s farmland might seem at first thermore, if the target area is geographi- to have nothing in common with the tow cally endemic for the pathogen used in ers of the World Trade Center or our busy the attack, the chance that the response seaports. In fact, however, they are mere- team will suspect an act of agroterrorism ly different manifestations of the same is unlikely. high-priority target, the American econ Another difficulty in responding to a omy.”19 Indeed, American agriculture biological attack on livestock is the high and food industry is a $1 trillion econom concentration of animals in one area. ic sector, which accounts for 13 percent of Cows are fattened on large feedlots that the U.S. gross national product. A suc sometimes hold between 150,000 and cessful agroterrorist attack would deal a 300,000 head of cattle, and approxi crippling blow to the U.S. economy. mately 78 percent of the U.S. beef stock The economic impact of agroterrorism passes through just 2 percent of the feed- is multilayered: direct costs are associated lots. Similarly, swine farms often hold with containment and eradication proce- more than 10,000 hogs, and some dures, while indirect costs stem from busi- chicken farms pen 100,000 birds ness losses to industries directly or indi- together.16 Thus, if a disease is intention rectly supported by agriculture, from com- ally introduced in any of these massive pensation paid to farmers, and from the feedlots, the outbreak could force the cost of international embargoes imposed government to destroy hundreds of as protective measures by major trading thousands of livestock. partners.20 More significant, however, is Improvements in and expansion of the psychological impact of successful food transportation in the past forty years agroterrorism on the world economy and have created a rapid dissemination system, politics, for populations respond acutely to in which a pound of meat generally travels any manifestations or even rumors of ter about 1,000 miles between the slaughter rorism. For example, in 1985, the U.S. house and the consumer’s dinner table.17 embassy in Chile received phone calls sug- Furthermore, animals are usually not gesting that Chilean grape imports to the raised in the place of their birth, rather United States were poisoned with cyanide. they travel to other farms until they This unverified implication resulted in mature and are then transported to a $333 million in lost revenue for Chilean slaughterhouse.18 These movements facili grape-importing companies.21 Any attack tate rapid expansion of contagious agents, against livestock would undoubtedly lead among different farms and feedlots. people to lose confidence in the safety of the food supply. If an attack affected a sig Wreaking Economic Havoc. nificant percentage of livestock, the Although terrorist attacks against humans remaining available meat products would result in profound psychological effects, become prohibitively expensive.22 The in terms of economic damage, such economic impact of an attack, therefore, attacks pale in comparison to the poten would be vast and may result in stagnation tial damage wrought by attacks against of many industries and sectors of economy agriculture targets. As Senator Susan due to public fear and mistrust.

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Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a break—including diagnosis, surveillance, highly contagious viral infection that pri- depopulation, cleaning, and disinfec marily attacks cattle, pigs, and sheep, tion—was approximately $4 billion.28 offers an excellent example of how this Within one week of the outbreak, Tai- might happen. FMD comprises over 70 wanese exporters saw swine prices drop by different strains and, when aerosolized, is 60 percent, and 50,000 workers lost capable of spreading over 170 miles from their jobs. Exports to foreign markets fell its source.23 According to both U.S. and dramatically, and losses from trade New Zealand experts, intentional terror embargoes were estimated to cost $15 bil- ist and/or criminal introduction of FMD lion over the next three years.29 represents the most likely source of The 2001 outbreak of FMD in Great agroterrorism over the next 20 years.24 Britain was equally devastating—its indi FMD can be transmitted intentionally or rect cost was $1.6 billion in compensa- naturally through direct or indirect con- tion to farmers. The lost revenue due to tact with infected animals, spread through decreased tourism—a partial manifesta- the air from infected animals, contami tion of the psychological impact of the nated cattle feed, or artificial insemina epidemic—was an estimated $4 billion.30 tion.25 If intentionally introduced in only Multiple industries, including agricul one U.S. state, FMD could reach twenty- ture-related industry, manufacturing, three states within five days. The ensuing construction, wholesale and retail, trans- government action could be as severe as portation, communication, hotels, and destroying an estimated 23 million ani restaurants were adversely affected. Yet,

The estimated cost of an FMD attack in California alone for the first few weeks is between $6 and $13 billion. mals. Response operations, including the naturally occurring outbreaks in livestock treatment and disposal of animals, could can only partially indicate the true costs of require up to 700,000 people.26 Organi an intentional release of a biological agent. zational issues aside, the economic conse The 1983 outbreak of highly patho- quences of such an attack would be enor genic avian influenza (HPAI) in Pennsyl- mous. The estimated cost of an FMD vania took two years to control, during attack in California alone for the first few which time about 17 million birds were weeks is between $6 and $13 billion.27 destroyed. Direct costs amounted to $62 million, and indirect costs have been International Examples: From estimated at more than $250 million.31 Taiwan to Pennsylvania. The FMD Similarly, the Italian outbreak of HPAI outbreak in Taiwan in 1997 induced both in 1999–2000 caused infection in 413 massive direct costs and a long-lasting flocks and resulted in the destruction of shock to the country’s food and agricul around 14 million birds. Compensation ture industry. The direct cost of the out- to farmers amounted to $63 million,

Summer/Fall 2004 [35] THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM while costs to the poultry and associated Additionally, Congress has approved industries were estimated to be an addi- Project Bioshield’s budget of $5.6 billion tional $620 million.32 to purchase the fruits of impending biodefense research. Funding for Biodefense. The direct and indirect costs of funding a Future Needs. Both the potential potential response network are consider- economic impact of a bioattack against an ably lower than the costs that would ensue agricultural target and the cost of the from an actual biological attack. In com response to this threat suggest a need for parison to the aforementioned costs of better organizational models from the natural outbreaks (which would be con- response community. The United States siderably less than those of a real attack), also needs to train more biodefense prevention costs are low. If unchecked, experts. Last year, the Partnership for the economic danger of agroterrorism is Public Service and RAND issued reports enormous; President Bush’s appropria- examining the vulnerability of the agri- tion of $89 billion for one year of mili culture and food industries and the fed- tary operations and reconstruction oper- eral government’s ability to defend ations in Iraq and Afghanistan roughly against a bioterrorist attack. The conclu equals the costs of uncontrolled FMD in sions of these reports as well as those of California for a period of only 14 weeks.33 biodefense and emergency preparedness Currently, direct expenditures on experts and officials in other branches of agricultural biodefense include the the U.S. government are clear: the U.S. FY2005 budget request of $5 million to economy and infrastructure are insuffi- finance the role of the Food and Drug ciently prepared for a biological attack.35 Administration (FDA) in the bio-sur- Furthermore, as another expert notes, veillance initiative for early detection of “the focus of our bioterrorism response an intentional release of deadly policy ought to be on programs that make pathogens into food, water, or the envi sense even if the nation never experi ronment.34 This request would bring the ences a single bioterrorism attack.”36 total FDA counter-terrorism budget to The response initiatives that do make $181 million, and is designed to enhance sense are increased “farm to fork” sur- government-wide cooperation between veillance (to detect a disease before it the White House Homeland Security spreads throughout livestock herds); Council and the FDA, the Food Safety automated remote sensing capabilities; and Inspection Service (FSIS), and the increased funding for vaccine research; Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. data archiving in geographic information Department of Agriculture. New budget systems (GIS), which provides experts appropriations call for a Food and Agri- with easy access to spatial representation culture Defense Initiative that will pro- of diseases or pathogens; advanced live vide $381 million, which is expected to stock transportation, disease transmis- augment current monitoring and sur- sion, and pathogen endemnicity model veillance of pests and diseases in plants ing; risk assessments and identification and animals, as well as increase the avail- of particularly vulnerable areas; and rig- ability of vaccines and establish a system orous terrorism response training and to track select disease agents of plants. exercises.37

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A Plan of Action. Policymakers may materials database. The government defuse public anxiety and the concerns agencies involved in this stage will monitor over the lack of U.S. emergency pre- its offensive and defensive bioweapons paredness through a simplified, five- programs and keep in check disgruntled fold, and functional strategy. The first and underemployed scientists formerly stage requires immediate attention to employed in sophisticated chemical and

The conclusions are clear: the U.S. economy and infrastructure are insufficiently prepared for a biological attack. those concerns of the anti-agroterrorism biological weapons programs in countries community regarding the efficiency of an like Iraq, Russia, and South Africa. The emergency anti-bioterrorism response. U.S. government would rely on this tier to This stage calls for a well-defined system prevent intentional and unintentional of response and organization of all U.S. leakage of expertise and materials to ter anti-agroterrorism emergency pre- rorist groups and rogue states. paredness networks. It would also include Finally, the physical security tier would local and national training exercises and assume responsibility for the physical development of agroterrorism experts. integrity of our borders, seaports, air- The second tier should be given a dif ports, and food and water safety. This last ferent—but not lower—level of impor- layer would entail appropriate training of tance. It incorporates responses to long- experts within the law enforcement com- term analytical challenges of emergency munity so that they understand and rec- preparedness. This level would consider ognize threats of agroterrorism. Enhanc- the enhancement of available means of ing customs surveillance will require a biosurveillance, as well as the improve combination of improved officer training ment of graphic, logistical, and spatial and better biosurveillance equipment. representation of data streams in GIS. Each of these security measures is of The third stage corresponds to the equal importance, yet one may be more resource and development component of essential than others depending on the a successful emergency response system. specific agroterrorist threat. After a suc- It would involve maintaining a vaccine cessful intentional release of a bioagent, stockpile to guard against known biolog- the methods and resources developed in ical agents, as well as increasing the abili- the third tier may be more important ty of the anti-agroterrorism and defense than the other levels; on the other hand, communities to monitor the world for the fourth and fifth layers would play a the emergence of new diseases that could crucial role in preventing such attacks in potentially serve as bioagents. the first place. Still, the successful imple The fourth tier of this system would mentation of all five tiers would not guar accept responsibility for the security and antee that terrorists could not attempt integrity of the existing knowledge and and successfully deploy a biological

Summer/Fall 2004 [37] THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM weapon. It would, however, guarantee that release of a bioagent may result in pro- the national and localized response to an duction losses, trade embargoes, the loss agroterorist attack would be expedient and of domestic customer base, and an the damages minimized. increased unemployment rate. Thus, it is Bioterrorism directed against agricul- imperative that policymakers carefully tural targets is a serious threat to any state’s examine the recommendations of leading economy. The experiences of other coun biodefense professionals and establish a tries with FMD, HPAI, and other animal quick and efficient response program to diseases confirm that an intentional prevent and respond to a biological attack. NOTES

1 Graham Pearson et al., "Biological Weapons Pro- Agroterrorism (19 November 2003). liferation: Reasons for concern, Courses of Action," 20 Testimony of Peter Chalk. Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 18 (1998): 30. 21 Ban, 4. CBACI, Bioterrorism in the United States: Threat, Preparedness 22 Testimony of Dr. McGuinn, U.S. Senate Gov- and Response (November 2000), 20–24. ernmental Affairs Committee Hearing on Agroter 2 U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infec- rorism (19 November 2003). tious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological 23 McNair Paper #65, "Agricultural Bioterrorism: Casualties Handbook, 4th ed. (2001), 9. A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat," Institute for 3 Jonathan Ban, "Agricultural Biological Warfare: National Defense Policy (2003): 4. An Overview," Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 24 Terrance M. Wilson, A Review of Agroterrorism, Bio no. 9 (2000): 2. logical Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture, 4 Ibid, 3. forthcoming, 21. 5 David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Toxic Ter 25 Committee on Foreign Animal Diseases ror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (CFAD) of the United States Animal Health Associa- Johnathan Tucker, ed. (Boston: MIT Press, 2002). tion, Foreign Animal Diseases (1998). 6 Lyubov Sobolevskaya, "Why Russian Scientists 26 Testimony of Dr. McGuinn. Do Not Protest," Johnson's Russia List 8132 (2004). 27 Wilson, Terrance, et al., 23. 7 Ken Alibek, Biohazard (Random House Inc, 28 CFAD; Wilson, 23; Ban, 5. 2000), 271–276. 29 Peter Chalk, “Hitting America's Soft Under- 8 James Carafano, "Improving the Federal belly,” RAND (2004), 20. Response to Catastrophic Bioterrorist Attacks: The 30 1983 dollar value. Marianne Hopp, "Avian Next Steps," Heritage Foundation, 13 November Influenza-Eastern Asia," Promed Mail (2 March 2004). (2003). 32 Ibid. 9 Kaplan; Tony Karon, "Al Qaeda's in the mon- 33 13 billion per three weeks, and $1 billion per ey." Time (29 August 2002). day in day sanctions. Statistics on FMD citied in Wil- 10 Both Aum Shinrkyo's facilities and South son, Terrence, et al., 23. Africa's Project Coast Bioweapon Program were pro- 34 "FDA's Budget Proposal for FY 2005 Requests ducing large quantities of ecstasy. See Kaplan; Truth Increase for Food Safety," M2Presswire (3 February and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation 2004). Commission Report, vol. 2, ch. 6. 35 "USFDA's Budget Proposal for FY 2005 11 Kaplan; Cherkasski,32. Requests Increase for Food Safety," Biotech Week (25 12 The Gale Group, “Food and Water Safety,” February 2004). American Dietetic Association (2003). 36 "President's Agriculture Budget Proposes 13 Testimony of Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation, Increased Funding to protect the Nation's Food Sup- U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hear ply and Conserve Nature," PR Newswire (2 February ing on Agroterrorism (19 November 2003). 2004). 14 Ban, 4. 37 U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 15 U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infec- Hearing on Agroterrorism (2003). tious Diseases. USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological 38 Carus, 42. Casualties Handbook, 4th ed. (2001), 13. 39 Jim Wilson and C.J. Tucker, "Use of Remote 16 Ban, 4. Sensing in Epidemic Surveillance and Response," 17 Testimony of Peter Chalk. World Meteorological Organization Bulletin 51, no 2.; Private 18 Ban, 5. Interview with James Wilson, Division of Integrated 19 Testimony of Senator Susan Collins, U.S. Sen- Biodefense, ISIS Center, 25 March 2004.; Testimo- ate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing on ny of Dr. McGuinn.

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