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Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 Report 2021

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Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 Report 2021 Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 Report 2021 Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 – Report 2021 1 Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 Counter Terrorism 5 Report 2021 is published by the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN). Preparedness Network CTPN is an international collaboration governed by the CTPN International Board, facilitated by London Resilience Group and hosted by the 1 Executive Summary 6 London Fire Commissioner. Context and Terminology 8 Lead Author Alex Townsend-Drake 2 Naturally Occurring Diseases Head of Programme v Weaponised Bioagents 10 Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network Diseases and Pandemics 10 The Evolution of Bioweapons 14 Co-Authors Dr Donell Harvin Bioweapons and Terrorism 16 Chief, Homeland Security and Intelligence Executive Director, National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, 3 Bioterrorism: Washington DC An Accelerating Threat 18 Dr Chloe Sellwood Attacks on Humans Deputy Head of Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (London) and Communities 19 UK National Lead for Pandemic Influenza, Attacks on Livestock or Crops 22 National Health Service, England Summarising the Threat Profile 25 Independent Reviewers Daniel Cartwright Deputy Assistant Commissioner, London Fire Brigade 4 Enhancing Preparedness UK Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience Deputy for Bioterrorism 30 Lead for CBRN(e) Political and Strategic Leadership 36 Graham Finnigan Capabilities Advisor and NILO Coordinator Multi-Agency Preparedness UK National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) and Public Health 43 Rachel Flowers Informing and Influencing Director of Public Health Community Behaviours 51 London Borough of Croydon Dr Michèle Gemünden Senior Researcher, Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 5 Conclusion 58 Dan Kaszeta Recommendations 62 Associate Fellow Royal United Services Institute Lee Kendrick 6 References 64 Head, National CBRN(e) Centre UK National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ Jeffrey Muller CBRN(e) Expert Consultant United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism Professor Nick Tyler CBE Chadwick Professor of Civil Engineering Director, Centre for Transport Studies University College London Wiktor Wojtas Policy Analyst, Counter Terrorism Unit European Commission Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 – Report 2021 3 Who we are Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network The Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN) is an international collaboration that brings together strategic leaders, practitioners and academics to inform city-level policies and practices that build resilience to help keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism. CTPN aims to influence and develop the multi-agency arrangements of cities in preparing for, responding to and recovering from terrorism. What we do CTPN aligns with strategies and priorities at local, national and international levels to deliver: Research We bring together academic literature and official reports with the knowledge and experience of CTPN members. We combine these with analyses from subject-matter experts and incorporate case studies to propose recommendations for city authorities. Events We convene and facilitate international conferences, bespoke seminars and scenario-based exercises that enable the exchange of learning and practices, develop connections, and inform approaches to counter terrorism preparedness, resilience and consequence management. Projects We deliver projects according to the CTPN work programme, report recommendations and emerging needs (including those generated by wider strategic partnerships and commissions) as governed by the CTPN international board. Member Cities Why we do it Terrorism is a global, networked and persistent threat that requires a global, networked and persistent response. CTPN fills a need for a multi-national, multi- agency and multi-disciplinary network at the city level. Cities are the backbone of urban security. The response Barcelona Boston Dublin Greater Manchester London Montreal to terrorist attacks, as with most emergencies, happens first and foremost at the local or city level. Cities are essential building blocks for achieving the delivery of grand strategy. Cities that develop arrangements and policy in an integrated manner can use this as a lever in developing resilience. Security and development are mutually dependent; one demands the other. This requires an integrated Munich New York Rotterdam Stockholm Washington DC Zurich and holistic approach at all levels. 4 Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 – Report 2021 Bioterrorism: Applying the Lens of COVID-19 – Report 2021 5 1 Executive Summary The weaknesses Terrorism remains at the top of the This is underscored However, COVID-19 could heighten political agenda locally, nationally and by the Global Health the potential of bioweapons as a and lack of internationally. This is accompanied terrorist methodology because of Therefore, the main objectives of this report are to: preparedness by the ever-present threat posed Security Index, which the preparedness gaps that have by the intentional or unintentional found health security to been exposed. Argue that the threat of bioterrorism is accelerating against 1 exposed by this release of bioagents or outbreaks be fundamentally weak the backdrop of COVID-19 and advances in technology This is a view endorsed by both the pandemic provide of naturally occurring diseases. The around the world, with and biosciences; World Health Organisation (WHO) United Nations Secretary General over 80% of countries 8 a window onto how tracks approximately 7,000 signals and the Council of Europe. scoring in the bottom tier Contrast the vulnerabilities and consequences exposed by of potential outbreaks every month,2 a bioterrorist attack It is important to emphasise early 2 COVID-19 with those of bioterrorism to highlight the similarities and pandemic influenza has been for indicators related to 5 on that the threat of bioterrorism is and differences; might unfold and rated as a high risk for years. Yet malicious biothreats. generally considered to be relatively many nations have struggled to may increase its low. Terrorism is, of course, just one Propose that preparedness for bioterrorism will inevitably raise respond effectively to the coronavirus COVID-19 has unveiled vulnerabilities of many threats to contend with and 3 capabilities to cope with public health crises and vice versa, risks. Non-state disease (COVID-19) pandemic.3 on a global scale, and it is generally bioterrorism just one component. if an integrated approach is applied; accepted as a generation-defining groups could gain The WHO declared COVID-19 It must be kept in perspective and moment with an impact even more be considered proportionately. access to virulent a Public Health Emergency of varied and profound than 9/11. The Present recommendations for city authorities to enhance International Concern (PHEIC) on Bioterrorism has, however, been 4 preparedness and capabilities for bioterrorism and therefore strains that could widespread loss of life has been highlighted as a concern,9 driven by 30 January and a pandemic on joined by a major economic downturn public health crises. pose similar 12 March 2020. COVID-19 is of an array of strategic consequences and drastic changes in societal accelerated by COVID-19 and global and historic significance and norms. International relations are devastation to continues to exert a significant impact advances in technology and the changing, as is the balance between biosciences. The means, motives and societies around on geopolitical and socio-economic 6 To facilitate this, the report will citizens and their governments. opportunities are apparent; ensuring realities as well as government explore the differences between the globe. This is against the backdrop of global an appropriate level of preparedness decision-making. It has arguably naturally occurring diseases and the population growth, urbanisation is clearly justified. become the biggest crisis the planet and globalisation. There are also intentional release of weaponised has faced since the Second World the risks associated with biological The point here is that COVID-19 bioagents; review the threat of War and it will probably have impacts and technological advances; must be recognised as a lesson bioterrorism; and analyse the on international security in ways that Antonio Guterres, shifting health challenges including in the potentially potent impact of vulnerabilities demonstrated by are difficult to anticipate and are not 7 growing antimicrobial resistance; weaponised bioagents. Although COVID-19 to consider these in the United Nations yet fully understood. 1 political uncertainty; the spread of not intending to overstate or mislead context of a bio-attack (on the basis Secretary General that bioterrorism could cause a A recent report highlighted misinformation; and climate change. in terms of the threat, this report public health crisis far more impactful that COVID-19 offered an outlines the need and opportunity All these factors accelerate the threat than COVID-19). It subsequently opportunity to test and assess the for a comprehensive, robust and profile and complexities in the context underlines the importance of political strength of national security and integrated approach towards of public health crises and terrorism. and strategic leadership; multi- governance but exposed profound preparedness
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