DOCSLIB.ORG

Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk Richard A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk Richard A University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2006 Efficient Responseso t Catastrophic Risk Richard A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Posner, "Efficient Responseso t Catastrophic Risk," 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 511 (2006). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk Richard A. Posner* The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 has focused attention on a type of disaster to which policymakers pay too little attention-a disaster that has a very low or unknown probability of occurring but that if it does occur creates enormous losses. Great as the death toll, physical and emotional suffering of survivors, and property damage caused by the tsunami were, even greater losses could be inflicted by other disasters of low (but not negligible) or unknown probability. The asteroid that exploded above Siberia in 1908 with the force of a hydrogen bomb might have killed millions of people had it exploded above a major city. Yet that asteroid was only about two hundred feet in diameter, and a much larger one (among the thousands of dangerously large asteroids in orbits that intersect the earth's orbit) could strike the earth and cause the total extinction of the human race through a combination of shock waves, fire, tsunamis, and blockage of sunlight wherever it struck. Other catastrophic risks, besides earthquakes such as the one that caused the recent tsunami, include natural epidemics (the 1918-1919 Spanish influenza epidemic killed between twenty and forty million people), nuclear or biological attacks by terrorists, certain types of lab accidents (including one discussed later in this Article), and abrupt global warming. The probability of catastrophes resulting, whether or not intentionally, from human activity appears to be increasing because of the rapidity and direction of technological advances. It is natural to suppose that the prediction, assessment, prevention, and mitigation of catastrophes is the province of science, but in this Article, which is based on my book Catastrophe: Risk and Response, I will argue that economic Richard A. Posner is a judge on the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago law school, and the author of Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford 2004). This Article is adapted from the text of a talk that was delivered at the AEI- Brookings Joint Center on Regulation on March 1, 2005. The author thanks Meghan Maloney for her excellent research assistance. HeinOnline -- 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 511 2005-2006 ChicagoJournal of InternationalLaw analysis has an important role to play, as well.' Able scientists can commit analytical errors when discussing policy that economists would easily avoid. Thus Barry Bloom, dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, has criticized the editors of leading scientific journals for having taken the position that "an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits."' (The specific reference is to publications from which terrorists could learn how to create lethal biological weapons.) Bloom calls this "a chilling example of the impact of terrorism on the freedom of inquiry and dissemination of knowledge that today challenges every research university."3 He appears to believe that freedom of scientific research should enjoy absolute priority over every other social value. Such a belief comes naturally to people who derive career advantages from being able to engage in a particular activity without hindrance, but this belief arbitrarily refuses to weigh costs and so consider the need to make tradeoffs. Bloom is particularly incensed at limitations on allowing foreigners to study science in American universities. Under the rubric of "Advancing Openness," he advocates changes in existing regulations to enable any foreigner who obtains a visa for studying science in the United States to pursue any area of scientific research, however sensitive and whatever the student's likely motive.4 Bloom's concern is understandable in terms of professional self-interest. American universities, and especially their graduate programs, are heavily dependent on foreigners. According to Bloom, 24 percent of the graduate students at Harvard are foreign.' But professional self-interest is not a sure guide to sound public policy. I will begin my analysis of the catastrophic risk problem with the recent tsunami. Suppose that a tsunami as destructive as the one that struck the Indian Ocean occurs, on average, once a century and kills 250,000 people. That is an I For a general discussion, see Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 139-98 (Oxford 2004). 21 Barry R. Bloom, Bioterroism and the Universiy: The Threats to Securi y-and to Openness, Harvard Magazine 48, 51 (Nov-Dec 2003), quoting an uncited agreement among editors of thirty-two major biological science journals. 3 Id. 4 Id at 52 ("It is my view that anyone here for training, from any country, who is bright enough and promising enough to be admitted... and who is cleared by the government agency that has been set to screen applicants.., ought to be able to pursue any area of study and research under faculty supervision in the university."). I take it that by "cleared by the government agency that has been set to screen applicants" Bloom simply means that the applicant has received a visa permitting him or her to study science, as distinct from having received a security clearance. Obviously the government cannot conduct a full background investigation of every foreign student who wants to study science in the United States. 5 Id. Vol. 6 No. 2 HeinOnline -- 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 512 2005-2006 Effident Rerponses to CatastrophicRisk Posner average of twenty-five hundred deaths per year. Even without attempting a sophisticated estimate of the value of life to the people exposed to the risk, one can say with some confidence that if an annual death toll of twenty-five hundred could be substantially reduced at a moderate cost, the investment would be worthwhile. A combination of educating the residents of low-lying coastal areas about the warning signs of a tsunami (tremors and a sudden recession in the ocean); establishing a warning system involving emergency broadcasts, telephoned warnings, and air raid-type sirens; and improving emergency response systems would have saved many of the people killed by the Indian Ocean tsunami, probably at a total cost below any reasonable estimate of the average losses that can be expected from tsunamis. Relocating people away from coasts would be even more efficacious, but except in the most vulnerable areas or in areas in which residential or commercial uses have only marginal value, the costs would probably exceed the benefits. This is because the annual costs of protection must be matched with annual, not total, expected costs of tsunamis. I can be a little more precise about how one might determine the costs of catastrophes. There is now a substantial economic literature inferring the value of life from the costs people are willing to incur to avoid small risks of death; if from behavior toward risk one infers that a person would pay $70 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 risk of death, his value of life would be estimated at $7 million ($70/0.00001), which is in fact the median estimate of the value of life of an American.6 The value of this transformation is simply that when we calculate a risk, we can immediately read off its cost by multiplying it by the value of life. But there is significant non-linearity to be considered at both ends of the risk spectrum. At the high end, ask yourself what you would demand to play one round of Russian roulette; the answer is probably a good deal more than 1/6 of $7 million. At the other, low-probability end of the risk spectrum, there may be a tendency to write the cost of the risk down to or near zero. In other words, the studies from which the $7 million figure is derived may not be robust with respect to risks of death either much larger, or much smaller, than the 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000 range of most of the studies-and we do not know what the risk of death from a tsunami was to the people who were killed, though it was probably toward the low end of the range. Moreover, because value of life is positively correlated with income, the $7 million figure cannot be used to estimate the value of life of the people killed by 6 W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 63 (2003). 7 Id at 40. Winter 2006 HeinOnline -- 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 513 2005-2006 ChicagoJournal of InternafionalLaw the Indian Ocean tsunami-or at least most of them.8 Additional complications arise from the fact that the deaths were only a part of the cost inflicted by the disaster. The injuries, the suffering, and the property damage that resulted from the tsunami have to be estimated in conjunction with the efficacy and expense of precautionary measures that would have been feasible. In addition, the risks of smaller but still destructive tsunamis that such measures might protect against must be factored in; nor am I confident about my "once a century" risk estimate.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Pathogens As Weapons Gregory Koblentz the International Security Implications of Biological Warfare
    Pathogens as Weapons Pathogens as Weapons Gregory Koblentz The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare Biological weapons have become one of the key security issues of the twenty-ªrst century.1 Three factors that ªrst emerged in the 1990s have contributed to this phenomenon. First, revelations regarding the size, scope, and sophistication of the Soviet and Iraqi biological warfare programs focused renewed attention on the prolifera- tion of these weapons.2 Second, the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters sent to media outlets and Senate ofªces in the United States during the following month, demonstrated the desire of terror- ists to cause massive casualties and heightened concern over their ability to employ biological weapons.3 Third, signiªcant advances in the life sciences have increased concerns about how the biotechnology revolution could be ex- ploited to develop new or improved biological weapons.4 These trends suggest that there is a greater need than ever to answer several fundamental questions about biological warfare: What is the nature of the threat? What are the poten- tial strategic consequences of the proliferation of biological weapons? How ef- Gregory Koblentz is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Robert Art, Thomas Christensen, Linda Fu, Jeanne Guillemin, Kendall Hoyt, Milton Leitenberg, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Julian Perry Robinson, Harvey Sapolsky, Mar- garet Sloane, Jonathan Tucker, and Stephen Van Evera for their support and discussion of previous drafts. I am also grateful for comments from the participants in seminars at the Massachusetts In- stitute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, Harvard University’s John M.
    [Show full text]
  • Mitchell & Kilner
    THE NEWSLETTER VOLUME 9 OF THE CENTER NUMBER 3 FOR BIOETHICS AND SUMMER 2003 HUMAN DIGNITY Inside: Remaking Humans: The New Utopians Versus a Truly Human Future1 Remaking Humans: The New Utopians Versus a Truly Human C. Ben Mitchell, Ph.D., Senior FeIIow,The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity 1 John F. Kilner, Ph.D., President,The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity Future If the nineteenth century was the age of the mentally by making use of reason, science, The Genetics of Mice and Men: machine and the twentieth century the infor and technology. In addition, respect for the Can—and Should—We mation age, this century is, by most accounts, rights of the individual and a belief in the 2 the age of biotechnology. In this biotech cen power of human ingenuity are important ele Intervene? tury we may witness the invention of cures for ments of transhumanism. Transhumanists genetically linked diseases, including also repudiate belief in the existence of super Movie Review natural powers that guide us. These things 4 Alzheimer’s, cancer, and a host of maladies News from the Field that cause tremendous human suffering. We together represent the core of our philosophy. may see amazing developments in food pro The critical and rational approach which duction with genetically modified foods that transhumanists support is at the service of the 6 Book Review actually carry therapeutic drugs inside them. desire to improve humankind and humanity in all their facets.” Bioterrorism and high-tech weaponry may 7 Center Resources also be in our future. Some researchers are even suggesting that our future might include Again, the idea of improving society through the remaking of the human species.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical Look at Catastrophe Risk Assessments
    CERN-TH/2000-029 DAMTP-2000-105 hep-ph/0009204 A critical look at catastrophe risk assessments Adrian Kent Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Cambridge, Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EW, U.K. (September 15, 2000) Recent papers by Busza et al. (BJSW) and Dar et al. (DDH) argue that astrophysical data can be used to establish small bounds on the risk of a \killer strangelet" catastrophe scenario in forthcoming collider experiments. The case for the safety of the experiments set out by BJSW does not rely on these bounds, but on theoretical arguments, which BJSW find sufficiently compelling to firmly exclude any possibility of catastrophe. However, DDH and other commentators (initially including BJSW) have suggested that these empirical bounds alone do give sufficient reassurance. We note that this seems unsupportable when the bounds are expressed in terms of expected cost | a good measure, according to standard risk 8 analysis arguments. For example, DDH's main bound, pcatastrophe < 2 10− , implies only that the expectation value of the number of deaths is bounded by 120. × We thus reappraise the DDH and BJSW risk bounds by comparing risk policy in other areas. 15 We find that requiring a catastrophe risk of no higher than 10− per year is necessary to be consistent with established policy for risk optimisation from radiation≈ hazards, even if highly risk tolerant assumptions are made and no value is placed on the lives of future generations. A respectable case can be made for requiring a bound many orders of magnitude smaller. We conclude that the costs of small risks of catastrophe have been significantly underestimated in the physics literature, with obvious implications for future policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness
    Order Code RL32521 Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness Updated March 12, 2007 Jim Monke Analyst in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness Summary The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability. The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at risk if contaminated food reaches the table or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). While agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first choice because it lacks the “shock factor” of more traditional terrorist targets, many analysts consider it a viable secondary target. Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique vulnerabilities. Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations, and transported or commingled with other herds. Many agricultural diseases can be obtained, handled, and distributed easily. International trade in food products often is tied to disease-free status, which could be jeopardized by an attack. Many veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal diseases that are eradicated domestically but remain endemic in foreign countries. In the past five years, “food defense” has received increasing attention in the counterterrorism and bioterrorism communities. Laboratory and response capacity are being upgraded to address the reality of agroterrorism, and national response plans now incorporate agroterrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Bioterrorism, Biological Weapons and Anthrax
    Bioterrorism, Biological Weapons and Anthrax Part IV Written by Arthur H. Garrison Criminal Justice Planning Coordinator Delaware Criminal Justice Council Bioterrorism and biological weapons The use of bio-terrorism and bio-warfare dates back to 6th century when the Assyrians poisoned the well water of their enemies. The goal of using biological weapons is to cause massive sickness or death in the intended target. Bioterrorism and biological weapons The U.S. took the threat of biological weapons attack seriously after Gulf War. Anthrax vaccinations of U.S. troops Investigating Iraq and its biological weapons capacity The Soviet Union manufactured various types of biological weapons during the 1980’s • To be used after a nuclear exchange • Manufacturing new biological weapons – Gene engineering – creating new types of viruses/bacteria • Contagious viruses – Ebola, Marburg (Filoviruses) - Hemorrhagic fever diseases (vascular system dissolves) – Smallpox The spread of biological weapons after the fall of the Soviet Union •Material • Knowledge and expertise •Equipment Bioterrorism and biological weapons There are two basic categories of biological warfare agents. Microorganisms • living organic germs, such as anthrax (bacillus anthrax). –Bacteria –Viruses Toxins • By-products of living organisms (natural poisons) such as botulism (botulinum toxin) which is a by- product of growing the microorganism clostridium botulinum Bioterrorism and biological weapons The U.S. was a leader in the early research on biological weapons Research on making
    [Show full text]
  • Agricultural Bioterrorism
    From the pages of Recent titles Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat Agricultural in the McNair MCNAIR PAPER 65 Bioterrorism: Paper series: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat 64 The United States ignores the The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran Agricultural potential for agricultural bioter- Kori N. Schake and rorism at its peril. The relative Judith S. Yaphe Bioterrorism: ease of a catastrophic bio- weapons attack against the 63 A Federal Strategy American food and agriculture All Possible Wars? infrastructure, and the devastat- Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security to Meet the Threat ing economic and social conse- Environment, 2001–2025 quences of such an act, demand Sam J. Tangredi that the Nation pursue an aggres- sive, focused, coordinated, and 62 stand-alone national strategy to The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric combat agricultural bioterrorism. Threats and the Next QDR The strategy should build on Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. counterterrorism initiatives already underway; leverage exist- 61 ing Federal, state, and local pro- Illuminating HENRY S. PARKER grams and capabilities; and Tomorrow’s War Martin C. Libicki involve key customers, stake- PARKER holders, and partners. The U.S. 60 Department of Agriculture The Revolution in should lead the development of Military Affairs: this strategy. Allied Perspectives Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University About the Author NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY President: Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN Henry S. Parker is National Program Leader for Aquaculture at the Vice President: Ambassador Robin Lynn Raphel Agricultural Research Service in the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Singularity Warfare: a Bibliometric Survey of Militarized Transhumanism
    A peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies ISSN 1541-0099 16(1) – June 2007 Singularity Warfare: A Bibliometric Survey of Militarized Transhumanism Woody Evans Tarrant County College ([email protected] ) http://jetpress.org/v16/evans.html Abstract This paper examines a number of terms related to transhumanism, and their prevalence in military and government publications. Transhumanism and the technologies attendant to the movement have clear implications for militaries and insurgencies. Although strategists in all camps must begin to plan for the possible impacts of such technologies if they wish to stay relevant and ready on a global scale, the impact of transhuman values is all but nonexistent in the military literature. This paper concludes that the lack of transhuman terms in military journals illustrates an ignorance of transhumanism amongst military thinkers and policy makers. 1. Introduction Transhumanism, the philosophical movement which employs advanced technologies to further rational humanism (Bostrom, 2005, 2), has something to say about many fields of human inquiry and activity, including medicine, information science, sociology, and, even military science. In the United States, spending on military and defense is very large – over $400 billion dollars in 2005 (Office of Management and Budget, 2006). Indeed, research and development funds for defense have been increased by over 50% since 2001 (OMB, 2006). The connection between technology and the military is clear; the relationship between transhuman terms and military science may reveal, more broadly, the military’s attitude toward transhuman thought. As we shall show, transhumanism does not strongly impact military or defense literature.
    [Show full text]
  • Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism Information for the Public Health Workforce
    Instructor’s Manual 1 Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism Information for the Public Health Workforce Introduction to Bioterrorism Developed by Jennifer Brennan Braden, MD, MPH Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism: Information for the Public Health Workforce Introduction to Bioterrorism Developed by Jennifer Brennan Braden, MD, MPH Northwest Center for Public Health Practice University of Washington Seattle, Washington *This manual and the accompanying MS Powerpoint slides are current as of December 2002. Please refer to http://nwcphp.org/bttrain/ for updates to the material. Last Revised December 2002 Acknowledgements This manual and the accompanying MS PowerPoint slides were prepared for the purpose of educating the public health workforce in relevant aspects of bioterrorism preparedness and response. Instructors are encouraged to freely use portions or all of the material for its intended purpose. Project Coordinator Patrick O’Carroll, MD, MPH Northwest Center for Public Health Practice, University of Washington, Seattle, WA Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Atlanta, GA Lead Developer Jennifer Brennan Braden, MD, MPH Northwest Center for Public Health Practice, University of Washington, Seattle, WA Design and Editing Judith Yarrow Health Policy Analysis Program, University of Washington, Seattle, WA The following people provided technical assistance or review of the materials: Jeffrey S. Duchin, MD: Communicable Disease Control, Epidemiology and Immunization Section, Public Health – Seattle & King County
    [Show full text]
  • Download Global Catastrophic Risks 2020
    Global Catastrophic Risks 2020 Global Catastrophic Risks 2020 INTRODUCTION GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION (GCF) ANNUAL REPORT: GCF & THOUGHT LEADERS SHARING WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ON GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 2020 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors. Their statements are not necessarily endorsed by the affiliated organisations or the Global Challenges Foundation. ANNUAL REPORT TEAM Ulrika Westin, editor-in-chief Waldemar Ingdahl, researcher Victoria Wariaro, coordinator Weber Shandwick, creative director and graphic design. CONTRIBUTORS Kennette Benedict Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Angela Kane Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; visiting Professor, Sciences Po Paris; former High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations Joana Castro Pereira Postdoctoral Researcher at Portuguese Institute of International Relations, NOVA University of Lisbon Philip Osano Research Fellow, Natural Resources and Ecosystems, Stockholm Environment Institute David Heymann Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House, Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Romana Kofler, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs Lindley Johnson, NASA Planetary Defense Officer and Program Executive of the Planetary Defense Coordination Office Gerhard Drolshagen, University of Oldenburg and the European Space Agency Stephen Sparks Professor, School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol Ariel Conn Founder and
    [Show full text]
  • January 2006-2.Indd
    Vol. 35, No. 1 January 2006 PHYSICSHYSICS& SOCIETY A Publication of The Forum on Physics and Society • A Forum of The American Physical Society EDITOR’S COMMENTS Anybody willing to look beyond the point of their nose will tween science and society. A prime, much debated, possible recognize that the question of supplying suffi cient energy for solution to the problem is the wide spread use of nuclear a growing world, hungry for universal prosperity, without energy. The problems inherent in such a solution are long choking that world on the byproducts of the production and run resource availability, safety, waste disposal, and the use of that energy, is the major problem at the interface be- continued on page 2 IN THIS ISSUE IN THE OCTOBER WEB ISSUE EDITORS’ COMMENTS ELECTIONS Candidate Statements. Please Vote! FORUM NEWS Vote via the Web at: http://physics.wm.edu/ballot.html. Please Vote! 3 Election Results, by Marc Sher 3 Project on Elements of an Energy Strategy, by Tony Nero EDITOR’S COMMENTS ARTICLES ARTICLES 4 The Status of Nuclear Waste Disposal, by David Bodansky Introduction to a Sequence of Articles in Physics & Society on 7 Nuclear Power and Proliferation, Science Input to Government, W.K.H. Panofsky Scientifi c Integrity in Government and Ballistic Missile Defense, by Gerald E. Marsh and George S. Stanford Edwin E. Salpeter 9 4S (Super Safe, Small and Simple LMR), by Akio Minato Physics in Theater, Harry Lustig 12 Strawbale Construction — Low Tech vs. High Tech or Just Better Physical Properties? by Ken Haggard The Great Fallout-Cancer Story of 1978 and its Aftermath, Daniel W.
    [Show full text]
  • Applying Traditional Jurisdictional Frameworks to a Modern Threat
    PROSECUTING CYBERTERRORISTS: APPLYING TRADITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORKS TO A MODERN THREAT Paul N. Stockton* & Michele Golabek-Goldman** The United States faces a growing risk of cyberterrorism against its finan- cial system, electric power grid, and other critical infrastructure sectors. Senior U.S. policymakers note that building U.S. capacity to prosecute cyberterrorists could play a key role in deterring and disrupting such attacks. To facilitate pros- ecution, the federal government is bolstering its technical expertise to attribute attacks to those who perpetrate them, even when, as is increasingly the case, the perpetrators exploit computers in dozens of nations to strike U.S. infrastructure. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to another prerequisite for prosecuting cyberterrorists: that of building a legal framework that can bring those who attack from abroad to justice. The best approach to prosecuting cyberterrorists striking from abroad is to add extraterritorial application to current domestic criminal laws bearing on cyberattack. Yet, scholars have barely begun to explore how the United States can best justify such extraterritorial extension under international law and assert a legitimate claim of prescriptive jurisdiction when a terrorist hijacks thousands of computers across the globe. Still less attention has been paid to the question of how to resolve the conflicting claims of national jurisdiction that such attacks would likely engender. This Article argues that the protective principle—which predicates prescrip- tive jurisdiction on whether a nation suffered a fundamental security threat— should govern cyberterrorist prosecutions. To support this argument, the Article examines the full range of principles on which States could claim prescriptive ju- risdiction and assesses their strengths and weaknesses for extending extraterrito- rial application of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • New Strangelet Signature and Its Relevance to the CASTOR Calorimeter
    214 octants. Each octant is longitudinally segmented into 80 layers, the first 8 (~ 14.7 Xo) comprising the electromagnetic section and the remaining 72 (~ 9.47 A/) the hadronic section. The light output from groups of 4 consecutive active layers is coupled into the same light guide, giving a total of 20 readout channels along each octant. Fig. 1: General view of the CASTOR calorimeter construction *""•••••-....... including support. The outer plates (one omitted for clarity) constitute the support for the light guides and photomultip- liers. This work has been supported by the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research (grant No 2P03B 121 12 and SPUB P03/016/97). References: 1. A.L.S. Angelis, J. Bartke, M.Yu. Bogolyubsky, S.N. Filippov, E. Gladysz-Dziadus, Yu.V. Kharlov, A.B. Kurepin, A.I. Maevskaya, G. Mavromanolakis, A.D. Panagiotou, S.A. Sadovsky, P. Stefanski, and Z. Wlodarczyk, Proc. 28-th Intern. Symposium on Multi- particle Dynamics, Delphi (Greece), 1998, to be published by World Scientific; A.L.S. Angelis et al., 10-th ISVHECRI, Gran Sasso, 1998, to be published in Nucl. Phys. B, Proc. Suppl.; 2. E. Gladysz-Dziadus, Yu.V. Kharlov, A.D. Panagiotou, and S.A. Sadovsky, Proc. 3-rd ICPA- QGP, Jaipur, 17-21 March 1997, eds B.C. Sinha et al., Narosa Publishing House, New Delhi, 1998, p. 554; 3. A.L.S. Angelis, J. Bartke, J. Blocki, G. Mavromanolakis, A.D. Panagiotou, and P. Zychowski, ALICE/98-46 Internal Note/CAS, CERN, 1998. PL9902552 New Strangelet Signature and Its Relevance to the CASTOR Calorimeter E.
    [Show full text]