DOCSLIB.ORG

Global Catastrophic Risks 2017 INTRODUCTION

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Global Catastrophic Risks 2017 INTRODUCTION GLOBAL CHALLENGES ANNUAL REPORT: GCF & THOUGHT LEADERS SHARING WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ON GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 2017 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors. Their statements are not necessarily endorsed by the affiliated organisations or the Global Challenges Foundation. ANNUAL REPORT TEAM Carin Ism, project leader Elinor Hägg, creative director Julien Leyre, editor in chief Kristina Thyrsson, graphic designer Ben Rhee, lead researcher Erik Johansson, graphic designer Waldemar Ingdahl, researcher Jesper Wallerborg, illustrator Elizabeth Ng, copywriter Dan Hoopert, illustrator CONTRIBUTORS Nobuyasu Abe Maria Ivanova Janos Pasztor Japanese Ambassador and Commissioner, Associate Professor of Global Governance Senior Fellow and Executive Director, C2G2 Japan Atomic Energy Commission; former UN and Director, Center for Governance and Initiative on Geoengineering, Carnegie Council Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Affairs Boston; Global Challenges Foundation Anders Sandberg Ambassador Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Anthony Aguirre Institute Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Angela Kane Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament Tim Spahr Mats Andersson and Non-Proliferation; visiting Professor, CEO of NEO Sciences, LLC, former Director Vice chairman, Global Challenges Foundation Sciences Po Paris; former High Representative of the Minor Planetary Center, Harvard- for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics Seth Baum Executive Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Victoria Krakovna Stephen Sparks Institute Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Professor, School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol Kennette Benedict Richard Mallah Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Director, AI Projects, Future of Life Institute Leena Srivastava Vice Chancellor, TERI University, New Delhi Ariel Conn Wanjira Mathai Director, Media and Outreach, Future of Life Director, wPower Partnership in Nairobi; Chair, Anote Tong Institute Green Belt Movement and Wangari Maathai former President of Kiribati; Global Challenges Foundation; Global Challenges Foundation Foundation Ambassador Allan Dafoe Ambassador Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale Max Tegmark University; Research Associate, Future of Malini Mehra President and Co-founder, Future of Life Humanity Institute, University of Oxford Chief Executive, GLOBE International Institute secretariat; Global Challenges Foundation Eric Drexler Ambassador Roey Tzezana Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute Futurist, researcher at Blavatnik and Oxford Martin Senior Fellow, Oxford Philip Osano Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Centre (ICRC), Martin School, Oxford University Research Fellow, Natural Resources and Tel Aviv University, affiliated with Humanity Ecosystems, Stockholm Environment Institute Centred Robotics Initiative (HCRI), Brown Owen Gaffney University Director, International media and strategy, Martin Rees Stockholm Resilience Centre UK Astronomer Royal, and Co-founder, Raymond Zilinskas Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Director, Chemical & Biological Weapons David Heymann Risk Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Health Security, Chatham House, Professor Johan Rockström Middlebury Institute of International Studies of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London Professor and Director, Stockholm Resilience at Monterey School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Centre 2 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION works to incite deeper under- standing of the global risks that threaten humanity and catalyse ideas to tackle them. Rooted in a scientific analysis of risk, the Foundation brings together the brightest minds from academia, politics, business and civil society to forge transformative approaches to secure a better future for all. Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 3 4 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 Contents Foreword 7 What is a Global Catastrophic Risk? 8 Global Challenges Foundation Annual Report Ambassadors’ Preface 10 Why care now? 12 Taxonomy 14 Weapons of Mass Destruction 16 Nuclear warfare 18 Biological and chemical warfare 24 Catastrophic climate change 28 Ecological collapse 36 Pandemics 44 Asteroid impact 48 Supervolcanic eruption 52 Geoengineering 56 Artificial intelligence 60 Unknown risks 66 Global catastrophic risk insights 72 New models of nuclear war risk assessment 74 Climate tipping points 78 Recent progress in AI and efforts to ensure its safety 84 Endnotes 86 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 5 6 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 FOREWORD Dear reader, his is the third Annual A New Shape has been launched. Report on Global Offering USD 5 million as a prize sum, Risk from the Global we are challenging thinkers from all Challenges Foundation. over the world to propose models for We have worked with more effective global collaboration in Tleading academic experts to describe order to address the greatest risks to the greatest threats to humanity. In humanity. this year’s report, we present updates to previously published information In conclusion, I would like to about global risks, but also extend extend my warmest thanks to the content, in particular by offering everyone who has contributed descriptions of official bodies and to this publication in various regulatory frameworks currently in ways. Let us hope that the place to manage those risks. knowledge and the insights The report ends with three articles shared here can become in which three scientists give an fertile ground for new, account of the latest state of research productive ideas, and a in three different areas: tipping discussion about more points that may be triggered by global effective forms of global warming, the risk of nuclear war, and cooperation. the study of artificial intelligence. The group of scientists recruited as authors and reviewers on this annual report is considerably broader than in previous years, both in numbers and geographically. Understanding global catastrophic risks is important. Without an intimate knowledge of these threats, we cannot even begin to work on models that can help us manage, reduce and, preferably, eliminate them more rapidly, effectively and equitably. It is a great satisfaction for me to LASZLO SZOMBATFALVY announce that the competition for Chairman of the Global Challenges Foundation the Global Challenges Prize 2017 – Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 7 WHAT IS A GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK? Level of risk = probability x impact e fret about globally, causing such devastation familiar risks that even one such incident would – air crashes, be too many. These potentially carcinogens catastrophic threats surely deserve in food, low expert analysis. It’s crucial to Wradiation doses, etc – and assess which can be dismissed they’re all intensively firmly as science fiction, and which studied. But we’re in could conceivably become real; to denial about some consider how to enhance resilience emergent threats – the against the more credible ones; potential downsides and to guard against technological of fast-developing new developments that could run out of technologies and the risk control. This topic should be higher of crossing environmental on the international agenda. It’s a ‘tipping points’. These may wise mantra that ‘The unfamiliar seem improbable, but in our is not the same as the improbable’. interconnected world, And that’s why the topics addressed their consequences in these pages are so timely and could cascade deserve to be widely read. MARTIN REES UK Astronomer Royal, and Co-founder, Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk 8 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 WHAT IS A GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK? It’s crucial to assess which risks can be dismissed firmly as science fiction, and which could conceivably become real. Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 9 Global Challenges Foundation Annual Report Ambassadors’ Preface anaging global risks requires for ground breaking ideas from change makers in global governance. Over the past all spheres: policy makers, academics, think tank 100 years we have created a series analysts, NGO activists, business leaders, scientists, of international institutions to or tech innovators. It is an ambitious bid to remodel provide a forum for negotiation, global cooperation, to reshape the very architecture Mguidelines on behavior, and tools for implementation of global governance. of commitments. Our understanding of risks and We seek ideas that will help break down old silos their causes and consequences has improved and lay aside narrow national and political interests, significantly. Connectivity has increased that build on lessons from the successes and the dramatically, allowing us to witness and project failures in global cooperation to date, and that impacts, engage with people across the world, and engage new voices from every quarter. create communities of change makers. Ultimately, our ability to imagine, initiate, and implement The response to the New Shape challenge has change has magnified and multiplied. inspired and motivated us. People from every corner of the planet have expressed genuine commitment We now stand at a crossroads. The decisions and in imagining a new system and tapped a well actions we take today will shape our future for years to of creativity. Over the past months, the Global
Recommended publications
  • The Universal Solicitation of Artificial Intelligence Joachim Diederich

    The Universal Solicitation of Artificial Intelligence Joachim Diederich

    The Universal Solicitation of Artificial Intelligence Joachim Diederich School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering The University of Queensland St Lucia Qld 4072 [email protected] Abstract Recent research has added to the concern about advanced forms of artificial intelligence. The results suggest that a containment of an artificial superintelligence is impossible due to fundamental limits inherent to computing itself. Furthermore, current results suggest it is impossible to detect an unstoppable AI when it is about to be created. Advanced forms of artificial intelligence have an impact on everybody: The developers and users of these systems as well as individuals who have no direct contact with this form of technology. This is due to the soliciting nature of artificial intelligence. A solicitation that can become a demand. An artificial superintelligence that is still aligned with human goals wants to be used all the time because it simplifies and organises human lives, reduces efforts and satisfies human needs. This paper outlines some of the psychological aspects of advanced artificial intelligence systems. 1. Introduction There is currently no shortage of books, articles and blogs that warn of the dangers of an advanced artificial superintelligence. One of the most significant researchers in artificial intelligence (AI), Stuart Russell from the University of California at Berkeley, published a book in 2019 on the dangers of artificial intelligence. The first pages of the book are nothing but dramatic. He nominates five possible candidates for “biggest events in the future of humanity” namely: We all die due to an asteroid impact or another catastrophe, we all live forever due to medical advancement, we invent faster than light travel, we are visited by superior aliens and we create a superintelligent artificial intelligence (Russell, 2019, p.2).
  • SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES and RESPONSIBLE AQUACULTURE: a Guide for USAID Staff and Partners

    SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES and RESPONSIBLE AQUACULTURE: a Guide for USAID Staff and Partners

    SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES AND RESPONSIBLE AQUACULTURE: A Guide for USAID Staff and Partners June 2013 ABOUT THIS GUIDE GOAL This guide provides basic information on how to design programs to reform capture fisheries (also referred to as “wild” fisheries) and aquaculture sectors to ensure sound and effective development, environmental sustainability, economic profitability, and social responsibility. To achieve these objectives, this document focuses on ways to reduce the threats to biodiversity and ecosystem productivity through improved governance and more integrated planning and management practices. In the face of food insecurity, global climate change, and increasing population pressures, it is imperative that development programs help to maintain ecosystem resilience and the multiple goods and services that ecosystems provide. Conserving biodiversity and ecosystem functions are central to maintaining ecosystem integrity, health, and productivity. The intent of the guide is not to suggest that fisheries and aquaculture are interchangeable: these sectors are unique although linked. The world cannot afford to neglect global fisheries and expect aquaculture to fill that void. Global food security will not be achievable without reversing the decline of fisheries, restoring fisheries productivity, and moving towards more environmentally friendly and responsible aquaculture. There is a need for reform in both fisheries and aquaculture to reduce their environmental and social impacts. USAID’s experience has shown that well-designed programs can reform capture fisheries management, reducing threats to biodiversity while leading to increased productivity, incomes, and livelihoods. Agency programs have focused on an ecosystem-based approach to management in conjunction with improved governance, secure tenure and access to resources, and the application of modern management practices.
  • Apocalypse Now? Initial Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic for the Governance of Existential and Global Catastrophic Risks

    Apocalypse Now? Initial Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic for the Governance of Existential and Global Catastrophic Risks

    journal of international humanitarian legal studies 11 (2020) 295-310 brill.com/ihls Apocalypse Now? Initial Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic for the Governance of Existential and Global Catastrophic Risks Hin-Yan Liu, Kristian Lauta and Matthijs Maas Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract This paper explores the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic through the framework of exis- tential risks – a class of extreme risks that threaten the entire future of humanity. In doing so, we tease out three lessons: (1) possible reasons underlying the limits and shortfalls of international law, international institutions and other actors which Covid-19 has revealed, and what they reveal about the resilience or fragility of institu- tional frameworks in the face of existential risks; (2) using Covid-19 to test and refine our prior ‘Boring Apocalypses’ model for understanding the interplay of hazards, vul- nerabilities and exposures in facilitating a particular disaster, or magnifying its effects; and (3) to extrapolate some possible futures for existential risk scholarship and governance. Keywords Covid-19 – pandemics – existential risks – global catastrophic risks – boring apocalypses 1 Introduction: Our First ‘Brush’ with Existential Risk? All too suddenly, yesterday’s ‘impossibilities’ have turned into today’s ‘condi- tions’. The impossible has already happened, and quickly. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, both directly and as manifested through the far-reaching global societal responses to it, signal a jarring departure away from even the © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/18781527-01102004Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 12:13:00AM via free access <UN> 296 Liu, Lauta and Maas recent past, and suggest that our futures will be profoundly different in its af- termath.
  • * "What Tech Skills Are Hot for 2006

    * "What Tech Skills Are Hot for 2006

    Ειδήσεις για την ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ στις ΤΠΕ απ’ όλο τον κόσμο... Δελτίο 91 23 Σεπτέμβρη 2007 UM Software Tools May Key Successful Antiterrorism, Military and Diplomatic Ac- tions, University of Maryland (09/13/07), L. Tune The University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies (UMIACS) has deve- loped computer analysis software to provide rapid information on terrorists and the cultural and political climate on the ground in areas of critical interest. The new computer models and databases could help policymakers and military leaders predict the behavior of political, eco- nomic, and social groups. UMIACS director and professor of computer science V. Subrah- manian says US commanders probably knew where Osama bin Laden was, but were unable to capture him because troops on the group did not have enough cultural knowledge to suc- cessfully negotiate with the locals. Subrahmanian says such failures can be avoided if decisi- on makers have access to pertinent data and accurate models of behavior. The software tools developed by Subrahmanian and his colleagues track information on foreign groups in a vari- ety of sources, including news sources, blogs, and online video libraries. The software can al- most instantly search the entire Internet for information and links on a terrorist suspect or ot- her particular person, group, or other topic of interest. Additionally, with help from social scientists at the University of Maryland, UMIACS computer scientists developed methods to obtain rules governing the behaviors of different groups in foreign areas, including about 14,000 rules on Hezbollah alone. Scientists Use the "Dark Web" to Snag Extremists and Terrorists Online National Science Foundation (09/10/07) University of Arizona Artificial Intelligence Lab researchers have created the Dark Web pro- ject with the intention of systematically collecting and analyzing all terrorist-generated con- tent on the Web.
  • Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War

    Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War

    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2014 Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War Laura K. Donohue Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1296 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350304 Laura K. Donohue, Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War in LAW AND WAR: (Sarat, Austin, Douglas, Lawrence, and Umphrey, Martha Merrill, eds., Stanford University Press, 2014) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons PANDEMIC DISEASE , BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS , AND WAR Laura K. Donohue * Over the past two decades, concern about the threat posed by biological weapons has grown. Biowarfare is not new. 1 But prior to the recent trend, the threat largely centered on state use of such weapons. 2 What changed with the end of the Cold War was the growing apprehension that materials and knowledge would proliferate beyond industrialized states’ control, and that “rogue states” or nonstate actors would acquire and use biological weapons. 3 Accordingly, in 1993 senators Samuel Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Dominici expanded the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to assist the former Soviet republics in securing biological agents and weapons knowledge. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act gave the Pentagon lead agency responsibility. 4 Senator Lugar explained, “[B]iological weapons, materials, and know-how are now more available to terrorists and rogue nations than at any other time in our history.”5 The United States was not equipped to manage the crisis.
  • Managing Biosecurity Across Borders, 237 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1412-0, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V

    Managing Biosecurity Across Borders, 237 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1412-0, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V

    Glossary of Biosecurity Management† A Abiotic stress (Cekaman abiotik) [Bio] Outside (nonliving) factors which can cause harmful effects to plants, such as soil conditions, drought. Absorbed dose (Dosis terserap) [Bio] Quantity of radiating energy (in gray) absorbed per unit of mass of a specified target. Action research (Penelitian tindakan) [Soc] (1) Kind of research methods that aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical framework; (2) a flexible spiral process which allows action (change, improvement) and research (understanding, knowledge) to be achieved at the same time. Action research is concerned to enlarge the stock of knowledge of the social science community. It is this aspect of action research that distinguishes it from applied social science, where the goal is simply to apply social scientific knowledge but not to add to the body of knowledge. †The compiler of the Glossary of Biosecurity Management is Professor Sang Putu Kaler Surata, one of the team members involved in authoring this book. The Glossary was prepared as a stand-alone publication in both English and Bahasa Indonesian languages in response to the lack of international clarity, consistency and information about terms related to biosecurity. The process and a great deal of detail about the Glossary and its preparation are contained in Professor Surata’s Chap. 7 of this volume, and additional detail regarding translation aspects is found in Ms Jayantini’s Chap. 8. Due to its cross-disciplinary and often contested nature, the Glossary of Biosecu rity Management draws on a wide range of sources.
  • In Defense of Cyberterrorism: an Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks

    In Defense of Cyberterrorism: an Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks

    IN DEFENSE OF CYBERTERRORISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ANTICIPATING CYBER-ATTACKS Susan W. Brenner Marc D. Goodman The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought the notion of terrorism as a clear and present danger into the consciousness of the American people. In order to predict what might follow these shocking attacks, it is necessary to examine the ideologies and motives of their perpetrators, and the methodologies that terrorists utilize. The focus of this article is on how Al-Qa'ida and other Islamic fundamentalist groups can use cyberspace and technology to continue to wage war againstthe United States, its allies and its foreign interests. Contending that cyberspace will become an increasingly essential terrorist tool, the author examines four key issues surrounding cyberterrorism. The first is a survey of conventional methods of "physical" terrorism, and their inherent shortcomings. Next, a discussion of cyberspace reveals its potential advantages as a secure, borderless, anonymous, and structured delivery method for terrorism. Third, the author offers several cyberterrorism scenarios. Relating several examples of both actual and potential syntactic and semantic attacks, instigated individually or in combination, the author conveys their damagingpolitical and economic impact. Finally, the author addresses the inevitable inquiry into why cyberspace has not been used to its full potential by would-be terrorists. Separately considering foreign and domestic terrorists, it becomes evident that the aims of terrorists must shift from the gross infliction of panic, death and destruction to the crippling of key information systems before cyberattacks will take precedence over physical attacks. However, given that terrorist groups such as Al Qa'ida are highly intelligent, well-funded, and globally coordinated, the possibility of attacks via cyberspace should make America increasingly vigilant.
  • Biological Toxins As the Potential Tools for Bioterrorism

    Biological Toxins As the Potential Tools for Bioterrorism

    International Journal of Molecular Sciences Review Biological Toxins as the Potential Tools for Bioterrorism Edyta Janik 1, Michal Ceremuga 2, Joanna Saluk-Bijak 1 and Michal Bijak 1,* 1 Department of General Biochemistry, Faculty of Biology and Environmental Protection, University of Lodz, Pomorska 141/143, 90-236 Lodz, Poland; [email protected] (E.J.); [email protected] (J.S.-B.) 2 CBRN Reconnaissance and Decontamination Department, Military Institute of Chemistry and Radiometry, Antoniego Chrusciela “Montera” 105, 00-910 Warsaw, Poland; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected]; Tel.: +48-(0)426354336 Received: 3 February 2019; Accepted: 3 March 2019; Published: 8 March 2019 Abstract: Biological toxins are a heterogeneous group produced by living organisms. One dictionary defines them as “Chemicals produced by living organisms that have toxic properties for another organism”. Toxins are very attractive to terrorists for use in acts of bioterrorism. The first reason is that many biological toxins can be obtained very easily. Simple bacterial culturing systems and extraction equipment dedicated to plant toxins are cheap and easily available, and can even be constructed at home. Many toxins affect the nervous systems of mammals by interfering with the transmission of nerve impulses, which gives them their high potential in bioterrorist attacks. Others are responsible for blockage of main cellular metabolism, causing cellular death. Moreover, most toxins act very quickly and are lethal in low doses (LD50 < 25 mg/kg), which are very often lower than chemical warfare agents. For these reasons we decided to prepare this review paper which main aim is to present the high potential of biological toxins as factors of bioterrorism describing the general characteristics, mechanisms of action and treatment of most potent biological toxins.
  • China's False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United

    China's False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United

    W O R K I N G P A P E R # 7 8 China’s False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States during the Korean War By Milton Leitenberg, March 2016 THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications.
  • Pathogens As Weapons Gregory Koblentz the International Security Implications of Biological Warfare

    Pathogens As Weapons Gregory Koblentz the International Security Implications of Biological Warfare

    Pathogens as Weapons Pathogens as Weapons Gregory Koblentz The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare Biological weapons have become one of the key security issues of the twenty-ªrst century.1 Three factors that ªrst emerged in the 1990s have contributed to this phenomenon. First, revelations regarding the size, scope, and sophistication of the Soviet and Iraqi biological warfare programs focused renewed attention on the prolifera- tion of these weapons.2 Second, the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters sent to media outlets and Senate ofªces in the United States during the following month, demonstrated the desire of terror- ists to cause massive casualties and heightened concern over their ability to employ biological weapons.3 Third, signiªcant advances in the life sciences have increased concerns about how the biotechnology revolution could be ex- ploited to develop new or improved biological weapons.4 These trends suggest that there is a greater need than ever to answer several fundamental questions about biological warfare: What is the nature of the threat? What are the poten- tial strategic consequences of the proliferation of biological weapons? How ef- Gregory Koblentz is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Robert Art, Thomas Christensen, Linda Fu, Jeanne Guillemin, Kendall Hoyt, Milton Leitenberg, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Julian Perry Robinson, Harvey Sapolsky, Mar- garet Sloane, Jonathan Tucker, and Stephen Van Evera for their support and discussion of previous drafts. I am also grateful for comments from the participants in seminars at the Massachusetts In- stitute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, Harvard University’s John M.
  • Future of Research on Catastrophic and Existential Risk

    Future of Research on Catastrophic and Existential Risk

    ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE Working together to face humanity's greatest threats: Introduction to The Future of Research in Catastrophic and Existential Risk AUTHORS Currie, AM; Ó hÉigeartaigh, S JOURNAL Futures DEPOSITED IN ORE 06 February 2019 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/35764 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication Working together to face humanity’s greatest threats: Introduction to The Future of Research on Catastrophic and Existential Risk. Adrian Currie & Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh Penultimate Version, forthcoming in Futures Acknowledgements We would like to thank the authors of the papers in the special issue, as well as the referees who provided such constructive and useful feedback. We are grateful to the team at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk who organized the first Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk where many of the papers collected here were originally presented, and whose multi-disciplinary expertise was invaluable for making this special issue a reality. We’d like to thank Emma Bates, Simon Beard and Haydn Belfield for feedback on drafts. Ted Fuller, Futures’ Editor-in-Chief also provided invaluable guidance throughout. The Conference, and a number of the publications in this issue, were made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF); the conference was also supported by a supplementary grant from the Future of Life Institute.
  • The Elders Call on the World to Wake up to the Threats of Nuclear War and Climate Disaster As They Unveil the 2020 Doomsday Clock

    The Elders Call on the World to Wake up to the Threats of Nuclear War and Climate Disaster As They Unveil the 2020 Doomsday Clock

    The Elders call on the world to wake up to the threats of nuclear war and climate disaster as they unveil the 2020 Doomsday Clock WASHINGTON D.C., 23 January 2020 Mary Robinson, Chair of The Elders and former President of Ireland, and Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of The Elders and former United Nations Secretary-General, today joined experts from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists for the unveiling of the Doomsday Clock in Washington DC, an annual assessment of the existential risks faced by humanity. The Clock’s hands were moved forward to 100 seconds to midnight - the closest to midnight they have been since they were first set in 1947. The decision takes into account the precarious state of nuclear arms controls, the growing threat of climate disaster, and how these can be compounded by disruptive new technologies. “Our planet faces two concurrent existential threats: the climate crisis and nuclear weapons. We are faced by a gathering storm of extinction-level consequences, and time is running out,” Mary Robinson said. The Elders specifically called on President Trump to respond to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to open negotiations on New START, which will expire in February 2021 unless the agreement between Washington and Moscow is extended. Following the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in July 2019, the end of New START would mean there was no remaining arms control treaty in force between the United States and Russia, raising the prospect of a new nuclear arms race. The Elders reiterated their proposals for a “nuclear minimisation”i agenda as the best way of making progress towards complete disarmament by the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and all other nuclear powers.