journal of international humanitarian legal studies 11 (2020) 295-310 brill.com/ihls
Apocalypse Now? Initial Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic for the Governance of Existential and Global Catastrophic Risks
Hin-Yan Liu, Kristian Lauta and Matthijs Maas Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Abstract
This paper explores the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic through the framework of exis- tential risks – a class of extreme risks that threaten the entire future of humanity. In doing so, we tease out three lessons: (1) possible reasons underlying the limits and shortfalls of international law, international institutions and other actors which Covid-19 has revealed, and what they reveal about the resilience or fragility of institu- tional frameworks in the face of existential risks; (2) using Covid-19 to test and refine our prior ‘Boring Apocalypses’ model for understanding the interplay of hazards, vul- nerabilities and exposures in facilitating a particular disaster, or magnifying its effects; and (3) to extrapolate some possible futures for existential risk scholarship and governance.
Keywords
Covid-19 – pandemics – existential risks – global catastrophic risks – boring apocalypses
1 Introduction: Our First ‘Brush’ with Existential Risk?
All too suddenly, yesterday’s ‘impossibilities’ have turned into today’s ‘condi- tions’. The impossible has already happened, and quickly. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, both directly and as manifested through the far-reaching global societal responses to it, signal a jarring departure away from even the
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1 For a discussion of new, reconceptualised approaches to biosecurity governance, see Sam Weiss Evans et al, ‘Embrace Experimentation in Biosecurity Governance’ (2020) 368 Science 138. 2 Nick Bostrom, ‘Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Haz- ards’ (2002) 9(1) Journal of Evolution and Technology
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It is clear that the collective failure to prepare for and respond to Covid-19 – despite ample warnings – demonstrates the lack of preparedness for globally catastrophic risks. This in turn suggests general under-preparedness for ‘truly’ existential risks. The overarching aim of this paper is to extract lessons from the Covid-19 experience for the governance of existential risk. Given the brev- ity of this paper, we present a necessarily cursory argument that covers a lot of ground even as events continue to unfold. Thus, our aim here is to indicate the paths that existential risks scholarship can, and should, proceed in the wake of Covid-19. We will first elaborate upon the direct lessons for existential risk governance, with reference to the international legal framework by treating Covid -19 as a ‘first’ case. We then proceed to contextualise these lessons by examining their generalisability. Finally, we ask how Covid-19 and its responses might change both the risk and governance landscape and what lessons we might draw for the futures of existential risk governance.
2 The Case of Covid-19: Failure of International Institutions and Lessons for Existential Risks Responses
Covid-19 has brought the world to a standstill. Rarely has a hazard so effec- tively and profoundly impacted lives and livelihoods on a global scale. Thus, Covid-19 appears to be a key test of our present institutional setup that deals with risks, both in organisational and legal terms. Institutionally, the World Health Organisation (‘who’) is responsible for the global response to pandemics with reference to the International Health Regu- lation (‘ihr’). The ihr was originally adopted in 1969 to replace the Interna- tional Sanitary Regulations, and was last modified in 2005 at the Fifty-eighth World Health Assembly.8 The ihr aims ‘… to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease’.9 The ihr is mainly a coordination and information sharing mechanism, impos- ing obligations to notify other parties of potential public health threats emerg- ing within one’s jurisdiction (see Articles 5–8). One of the innovations of the
also Toby Ord, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity (Hachette Books 2020). 8 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005) – Third Edition (who 2005) (‘ihr’). 9 Ibid art 2.
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2005 regulation was a general obligation to take particular safeguards relating to ensuring sufficient preparation of public health response capacities (see Article 13), decision-making, and communication. The burden of the actual response, however, remains with the parties. The ihr outlines eight core capacities that contracting parties need to keep up and strengthen, and evaluates and tests these capacities regularly (see ihr, Annex A).10 The burden of, and to a wide extent the decisions inherent in, the actual response, however, again remains with the parties (see Article 3(4)). More practically, a number of concrete decisions must be based on particu- lar grounds or procedural steps: according to Article 43(2), any additional health measures must be based on ‘(a) scientific principles; (b) available scien- tific evidence of a risk to human health, or where such evidence is insufficient, the available information including from who and other relevant intergovern- mental organizations and international bodies; and (c) any available specific guidance or advice from who’.11 Beyond this core institutional mechanism, however, the pandemic obvi- ously engages diverse disputes within other regimes of international law, rang- ing from human rights to trade law, and from peace and security law, to the law of development finance.12 The ongoing Covid-19 response seems to indicate that this global system has largely failed. At a broad scale, many states, including the US,13 Denmark,14
10 Ibid annex i. 11 Ibid art 43(2). 12 See Armin von Bogdandy and Pedro Villarreal, ‘International Law on Pandemic Re- sponse: A First Stocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis’ (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (mpil) 2020) 2020–07
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2.1 All That is Solid Melts into Air The first interpretation would hold that the Covid-19 pandemic reveals how international law and global governance are intrinsically ill-suited for address- ing a crisis of this scale. This interpretation fits in with previous arguments to the effect that many instruments of (State-consent-based) international law are not conducive to addressing looming catastrophic risks.18 Indeed, some
15 See, eg, Joelle Grogan, ‘Right Restriction or Restricting Rights: the UK acts to Address covid-19’ (Verfassungsblog, 17 April 2020)
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2.2 A New 1945? A contrary reading suggests that international law and global governance as they presently stand are insufficiently developed or empowered to deal with Covid-19, but this is exactly an argument for refitting them to ensure they could, and should, be developed to step up to this challenge. This explanation holds that there is not some deep, intrinsic shortcoming or fragility in existing governance. Instead, it would hold that we simply have not found the specific suitable governance tools to address the issue globally. If true, this would mean that the Covid-19 pandemic might, and should, provide the impetus for fur- ther global and regional institutionalisation, just as the failure of the League of Nations to avert the global crisis of World War ii did not lead to a disappointed rejection of these international instruments, and instead to a rejuvenation
19 cf Lionel P Fatton, ‘The Impotence of Conventional Arms Control: Why Do International Regimes Fail When They Are Most Needed?’ (2016) 37 Contemporary Security Policy 200. 20 M S Armstrong, N Bostrom and C Shulman, ‘Racing to the Precipice: A Model of Artificial Intelligence Development’ (2016) 31 AI & Society 201; Allan Dafoe, ‘AI Governance: A Re- search Agenda’ (Center for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute 2018)
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2.3 Nothing Stops Exponentials In a third reading, the Covid-19 pandemic does not reveal the inherent fragil- ity of the global governance system, but instead simply illustrates how certain hazards may be of an exponential type that simply make a coordinated and timely global response near-impossible. The shortcoming of the existing sys- tem can also be accounted for by the nature of the hazard. One can understand this with reference to the Collingridge dilemma, as articulated in studies on technology governance: ‘When change is easy, the need for it cannot be fore- seen; when the need for change is apparent, change has become expensive, difficult, and time-consuming’.21 In the initial stages, Covid-19 could poten- tially have fizzled into nothing, and accurate foresight (discerning the signal from noise) was hard, yielding an information problem. Once Covid-19 was recognised as a serious global threat, however, it was too late to devise a coor- dinated global response, yielding a power problem (for instance, because some parties were loath to admit early failings). The lessons here might be that Collingridge dilemmas are not confined to technogenic risks, and that risks with exponential functions exacerbate this conundrum. While this explana- tion appears to be aligned with our first explanation it differs by type, rather than intrinsically by scale, of the hazard. Where the failure of international law and institutions in our first explana- tion lay with a mis-categorisation of the hazard (as a national security threat) that triggers national states of exception responses, the implication of our third explanation is that international legal and institutional responses are ef- fectively locked out as appropriate responses to certain types of hazard. The characteristics of the hazards capable of excluding global coordinated re- sponses include those that exhibit exponential functions and those which are technogenic. Since a significant portion of existential risks possess one or both of these characteristics, the efficacy of international law and institutions to respond to these are severely curtailed. A more straight-forward way for a pandemic to lock-out coordinated glob- al responses is to change the frame of reference: there is never ‘just one’ global pandemic, but rather an interconnected complex of epidemics as each nation attempts different response strategies that are in turn shaped by historical leg- acies, political culture, and social mores. Whether these ‘national epidemics’
21 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Palgrave Macmillan 1981) 11.
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3 ‘Boring Apocalypse’ Now? Understanding Covid-19 as a Case for Model-Testing and Refinement
How could recent frameworks and models from existential risk scholarship be brought to bear on interpreting and understanding Covid-19 as it relates to existential risks? How can we understand this particular catastrophe in com- parison to other catastrophic (or fully existential) threats? How can we put this case in the broader context of underlying, or more general societal vulnerabili- ties that contributed to our vulnerability and exposure in this case, and could also do so in future disasters? The field of existential risk has developed rapidly in recent years, with researchers breaking new grounds in exploring, amongst other things, the psy- chology of existential risk perception;22 methodological considerations for es- timating or quantifying such risks;23 explorations of the concept’s intellectual history and heritage;24 considerations for scientific ‘creativity’ in the face of the unique epistemic situation thrown up by studying uncertain and by their nature unprecedented existential risks;25 and new conceptual frameworks or narratives – including ‘turbochange’, ‘great challenges’, a ‘vulnerable world’, or ‘existential security’26 – which societies could use to approach and frame poli- cy for such risks. While early scholarship on these risks ‘focused mainly on tracing a causal pathway from a catastrophic event to global catastrophic loss
22 Stefan Schubert, Lucius Caviola and Nadira S Faber, ‘The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction’ (2019) 9 Scientific Reports 1. 23 Simon Beard, Thomas Rowe and James Fox, ‘An Analysis and Evaluation of Methods Cur- rently Used to Quantify the Likelihood of Existential Hazards’ (2020) 115 Futures 102469. 24 Thomas Moynihan, ‘Existential Risk and Human Extinction: An Intellectual History’ (2020) 116 Futures 102495. 25 Adrian Currie, ‘Existential Risk, Creativity & Well-Adapted Science’ (2019) 76 Studies in the History & Philosophy of Science 39. 26 Daniel Deudney, ‘Turbo Change: Accelerating Technological Disruption, Planetary Geo- politics, and Architectonic Metaphors’ (2018) 20 International Studies Review 223; Phil Torres, ‘Facing Disaster: The Great Challenges Framework’ (2018) 21 Foresight 4; Nick Bostrom, ‘The Vulnerable World Hypothesis’ [2019] Global Policy 1758; Sears (n 4).
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27 Shahar Avin et al, ‘Classifying Global Catastrophic Risks’ (2018) 102 Futures 20. 28 Karin Kuhlemann, ‘Complexity, Creeping Normalcy and Conceit: Sexy and Unsexy Cata- strophic Risks’ (2018) 21(1) Foresight 35; David Manheim, ‘The Fragile World Hypothesis: Complexity, Fragility, and Systemic Existential Risk’ (2018) 122 Futures 102570. 29 Owen Cotton-Barratt, Max Daniel and Anders Sandberg, ‘Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction: Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter’ (2020)
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32 Vincent Cheng et al, ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus as an Agent of Emerging and Reemerging Infection’ (2007) 20(4) Clinical Microbiology Reviews 660; see also Broberg (n 12) 202–3. 33 Jennifer B Nuzzo et al, ‘Preparedness for a High-Impact Respiratory Pathogen Pandem- ic’ (The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 2019)
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4 The Case for the Future? Covid-19 and the Futures of Existential Risk Governance
Thirdly, we take a future-oriented perspective and ask what lessons we can extract from Covid-19 and our responses to it for the treatment of existential risks as a whole, going forward. We suggest two clusters of challenges must be met: first, that certain cognitive biases make us more susceptible to certain types of existential risks; and second, that there are certain classes of existen- tial hazards that become more perilous when perceived through these biases. Beyond these observations, we also explore possible path dependencies that might follow from being confronted with a pandemic for general existential risk preparedness.
4.1 Covid-19, and an Examination of Cognitive Biases Affecting Judgment and Policy on Existential Risks Scholars have previously identified diverse cognitive and epistemic biases that hinder our accurate judgment in diverse contexts.36 It has been argued that many of these biases adversely undercut our accurate assessments of future
35 Yasmine Bjornum, ‘“If It Comes, It Will Be a Disaster”: Life in One of the Only Countries without Coronavirus’ The Guardian (7 April 2020)
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37 These include: the availability bias, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, confirmation bias, anchoring, affect heuristic, scope neglect, overconfidence and bystander apathy. See gen- erally, Eliezer Yudkowsky, ‘Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks’ (2008) 1 Global Catastrophic Risks 13. 38 Jonathan B Wiener, ‘The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse’ (2016) 7 Global Policy 67. 39 See Ali Nouri and Christopher F Chyba, ‘Biotechnology and Biosecurity’ in Nick Bostrom and Milan M Cirkovic (eds), Global Catastrophic Risks (Oxford University Press 2008). 40 Wiener (n 38) 75–76.
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stronger case for precaution than mere uncertainty as such.41 This is directly pertinent to pandemics, given the ample historical record of plagues that re- peatedly killed off significant proportions of the human population. Given accessible records of past catastrophe, our collective susceptibility to such known hazards is especially incongruous from an existential risks perspective: it is one thing to be caught out by a wholly novel threat, and quite another to be toppled by something that we knew about all along. Thus, the failure to have a global asteroid defence programme in place is congruent with our failure to prepare for Covid-19: these are both statistically rare events at any given time, despite a clear record of such events taking place in the past with cataclysmic effect. Turning to the second cluster of challenges that certain classes of existential hazard can become more perilous due to biases, Covid-19 suggests that we may be especially susceptible to existential risks that cut certain profiles. These involve hazards that can self-replicate, and which are small or imperceptible, dispersed or fragmented. While it is too early to know how our responses play out, self-replicating risks appear to be straining national responses as subse- quent waves of infection destabilise those Asian countries that appeared to cope well in the face of the initial wave of Covid-19. The prospect for an exis- tential threat to auto-propagate connects with the cognitive biases that under- play tangential, second-order or cumulative threats because of the tendency to understand existential threats as a singular and spectacular threat to humani- ty. Self-replication of the hazard obviously makes it difficult to decisively over- come such threats: response strategies must necessarily revolve around mini- mising exposure and vulnerability over a long-term basis, but the difficulty of sustaining effective responses in longitudinal war of attrition suggests that failure rates would be high. Some other postulated (technogenic) sources of existential risks, such as AI, nanotechnology (particularly in the form of mo- lecular manufacturing),42 and biotechnology, also have self-replication quali- ties that suggest we would similarly struggle with framing adequate responses to these as well. Closely aligned are risks that emanate from dispersed or fragmented sourc- es. In contradistinction to existential risks such as asteroid strikes that repre- sent singular hazards that allow us to respond to the underlying cause, with dispersed risks we are only able to respond to the symptoms and thus can
41 Ibid 75–77. 42 Chris Phoenix and Mike Treder, ‘Nanotechnology as Global Catastrophic Risk’ in Nick Bostrom and Milan M Circkovic (eds), Global Catastrophic Risks (Oxford University Press 2008).
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4.2 How Could Covid-19 Change the Governance Landscape Going Forward? Finally, a series of questions pertain to how the experience of the Covid-19 will shape the governance landscape going forward, in ways that might alter
43 See, eg, Bostrom, ‘The Vulnerable World Hypothesis’ (n 26).
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5 Conclusion
Where will this leave us? Perhaps the question going forward will not be how the world will end, but rather how we will muddle through and how, gradual- ly, the complexity of our societies will outstrip their abilities to solve problems, thereby leading to civilizational collapse.45 As we set out in the first section of this paper, there are at least three failure modes of (or perhaps three possi- ble understandings of the failure to respond to) contemporary international legal and institutional framework, and the most problematic are the two in- stances where the challenges posed ‘lock-out’ our available suite of responses. In addition to new strains of disease as with Covid-19, there are three differ- ent paths to future pandemics: the resurgence of diseases that have been elimi- nated but revived such as smallpox; the artificial creation of more virulent strains of infectious diseases; and the declining efficacy of available treat- ments, as catalysed through antibiotic resistance.46 One concrete step we could take now would be to consider whether contemporary international law and institutions are ill-suited to the challenges posed by these avenues to
44 Norris R Johnson, ‘Panic and the Breakdown of Social Order: Popular Myth, Social Theory, Empirical Evidence’ (1987) 20 Sociological Focus 171; Ann E Norwood, ‘Debunking the Myth of Panic’ (2005) 68 Psychiatry 114. 45 Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge University Press 1988). 46 Nouri and Chyba (n 39) 455–458.
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future pandemics, and whether their nature would render these as intractable hazards in the specific context of global coordination. While our second expla- nation, that international institutions are not sufficiently developed or em- powered, is easier to rectify insofar as incremental improvements can be made with the benefit of Covid-19 experience, it seems as though we might be fac- ing a legal ‘mystery’:47 not only do we not know what the solutions might be, we also are not able to formulate the problems in a manner that can be tackled in incremental and progressive fashion. In other words, where our present in- ternational legal and institutional constellation is ‘locked-out’ by the parame- ters and characteristics of a future pandemic (or existential risk, writ large), we face the additional issue of not knowing what the precise problems are that we are required to solve. The case of Covid-19 may also suggest a fundamentally different approach to existential risks. Rather than the conventional view as low-probability but severe-outcome events, we might revise this presumption along two dimen- sions. In terms of probability, the historically-recurring nature of pandemics suggests a degree of certitude rather than low probability (the difference lies with respect to the time-frame against which such events are measured). The event-focus is also misaligned because of the implication of discrete trauma and subsequent recovery. Instead, it might be useful to model this as an accel- erated process that affects lasting change. As such, the path dependencies forged in this process will shift our vulnerability and exposure profiles, for ex- ample by increasing resilience to future pandemics, at least over the near-term at the costs of overlooking AI and nanotechnological development at a critical juncture that increases our vulnerability and exposure to these other develop- ments and their applications. From a cynical perspective, we can already see the roots of such developments in the growing acceptance of Covid-19 under- girding states of exception that consolidate political power and legitimating ever-increasing surveillance. But these appear to pose familiar problems that are at least amenable to international legal and institutional responses.
47 Hin-Yan Liu, ‘From the Autonomy Framework towards Networks and Systems Approach- es for “Autonomous” Weapons Systems’ (2019) 10 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 89.
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