DOCSLIB.ORG

Agroterrorismfuture Warfare Series: National No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Agroterrorismfuture Warfare Series: National No AgroterrorismFuture Warfare Series: National No. 10203040 DefendingAvoidingTheThe “WorriedDefenseAnthrax thePanic American Assessment,Vaccine Well”and Keeping Response Debate: Homeland the A MedicalPortsStrategies, Opento Review CBRN1993-2003 inand a Events:forChemical Capabilities Commanders and BiologicalAnalysis Threat and Solu�onsEnvironment A Literature Review Edited by: TanjaLieutenantRandallMajor M. Korpi Mr.J.Richard ColonelLarsen Albertand A.Christopherand Fred MauroniHersack, Patrick P. Stone, USAF D.Hemmer EllisUSAF Dr. Robert A. Norton United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies 30204010 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Agroterrorism: National Defense Assessment, Strategies, and Capabilities Edited by Mr. Albert Mauroni Dr. Robert A. Norton August 2020 U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 Table of Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer.……………………………….…….…….…….….……….…………iii Preface…………………………………….……………….….……….…………iv About the Authors……………………………….………….….…………………vi Chapter 1. Introduction Albert Mauroni.………………….……………….…………….…………………1 Chapter 2. Agroterrorism Perspectives Reid Kirby and Dr. Seth Carus ……………………………….……….….………5 Chapter 3. The Mindset of a Terrorist Dr. Terry Oroszi and Dr. David Ellis ……………………….…….….….………29 Chapter 4. Response to Agroterrorism by Foreign Animal Disease Major Kelley J. Williams and Steven A. Schmitt …………….…………………43 Chapter 5. U.S. Federal Policies and Programs to Combat Agroterrorism Henry Parker and Janet Marroquin ……………….…….……….………………57 Chapter 6. Organoleptic Assessments as a Tool for Food Defense Chemical Threat Prioritization Dr. Nathaniel C. Rice and Dr. Todd M. Myers ……………...……….…………97 Chapter 7. Air Force Capabilities and Technologies to Counter or Mitigate Agroterrorism William Greer and Dr. Douglas Lewis …….………………………….….……129 Chapter 8. Agroterrorism Policy Col. (Dr.) Oliver J. Wisco and Paul Imbriano ………..………………….….…153 Chapter 9. Agroterrorism by Other Means: The Interconnectivity of Critical Infrastructures Dr. Robert A. Norton and Greg S. Weaver …………………….………………165 Chapter 10. Conclusions Dr. Robert A. Norton ……………………………………….…….……………183 ii Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. ISBN: 978-0-9914849-5-9 iii Preface Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. U.S. Army (Ret.) Executive Vice President of Auburn University Just as this book on agroterrorism reaches the final stages of development, our nation is in the midst of fighting a global war. Our foe is not an intractable nation-state bent on world domination, but rather an invisible, inanimate, mindless enemy that surrounds us. The United States spends massive resources annually on responding to “thinking adversaries.” However, this “unthinking adversary,” the SARS-CoV2 virus and cause of the COVID-19 pandemic, has caused unprecedented global disruption, worthy of the most clever and powerful adversarial nation-state. Nature has once again proven to be the most dangerous bioterrorist and again reminded us that we have much to learn from it. As of this writing, we certainly do not yet understand the full spectrum of implications from the coronavirus. Who would have anticipated that physicians and medical personnel in some parts of the country would experience pay cuts or job loss during a pandemic? And yet, it has happened. Before the start of the pandemic, the thought would have been inconceivable, yet what would happen to us if the trained health professionals just walked away, exhausted by the relentless hours and no longer willing to absorb the risks or personal costs? We must recognize that a deliberate attack against our crops and livestock could be equally as devastating and exhausting as this current crisis. For many human and animal outbreaks that have occurred over the years, government, medicine, and business decisionmakers have demanded new technologies to help detect, contain, and mitigate the spread of disease. In most instances, the existing plans and capabilities had to be rapidly modified once the disease gained momentum. As is often the case, some assumptions borne of long planning and gaming were wrong, or perhaps only partly right, while others were spot on. As the current pandemic has reminded us, logistics challenges always seem to occur during emergencies. A future agroterrorism incident will have similar features, such as a shortage of emergency supplies, deterioration of strategic stockpiles of certain items (e.g., surgical masks and gloves), or bureaucracies that emphasize form over function. As we prepare to defend against agroterrorism, we must factor in the human element, the thinking adversary who chooses to advance the chaos borne of a pathogen to gain advantage. To be successful, the adversary must penetrate our nation’s defenses before his pathogenic weapon can be deployed. Once deployed, the pathogen remains first undiscovered or undiagnosed, enabling it to gain a foothold in the targeted animal or plant population. iv From there, the disease takes on a life of its own within that population, magnifying the disease effects, as its spreads. With the pathogen now delivered, the adversary can fade into the darkness, awaiting the next opportunity to attack. Due to the intentionality of the adversary, agroterrorism has the real potential of needing an even more complex response than an outbreak of a naturally produced virus. The very real possibility of intentional chemical contamination of food further complicates matters, because response time and medical management would almost certainly prove inadequate. Agroterrorism differs greatly from natural disease outbreaks and disasters for many reasons, primarily because Americans have not known widespread hunger since the Great Depression. Government and agribusiness are supposed to be vigilantly on the lookout for adversaries. However, as has been proven many times since the Sept. 11, 2001, (9/11) terrorist attacks, those in charge of surveillance have to be right every time while the adversary gains advantage by only having to be right once. The primary goal of the adversary, beyond diminishing the availability of the actual food supply, is stoking fear about what remains. Is it safe to eat? Amidst the problems encountered in emergencies, people emerge by discovering expedient solutions to problems unimagined in white papers or mathematical models. People and their intellectual prowess will always remain our greatest assets and yet we often do not treat them as such with the freedom to think, question and challenge. Countless times in our nation’s history, these people have proven essential to our survival. The selections in this book demonstrate that we can listen to them and prepare for these crises, rather than have such crises come upon us unannounced. v About the Authors Dr. W. Seth Carus is Emeritus Distinguished Professor of national security policy at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. He was on the NDU faculty from 1997 through 2017, serving from 2003 to 2013 as the deputy director of the Center. From 2001 to 2003, Dr. Carus was detailed to the Office of the Vice President at the White House, where he was the senior advisor to the vice president for biodefense. Before joining NDU, Dr. Carus worked at the Center for Naval Analyses (1994 to 1997), the Policy Planning staff in the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1991 to 1994), and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Carus’ work has focused primarily on issues related to biological and chemical warfare. His current research focuses on the history of chemical and biological warfare. He is author of A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century (2017), “The History of Biological Warfare: What We Know and What We Don’t” in Health Security (2015), and Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ Revised and Updated (2012), as well as the working paper Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (2001). He is the co-author of The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 (2014). Dr. Carus has a doctorate in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. David Ellis is a research toxicologist at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and an adjunct faculty member in the Department of Pharmacology & Toxicology, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Wright State University, Ohio. Dr. Ellis earned a bachelor of science degree in toxicology from Ashland University, a master of science degree in pharmacology and toxicology and doctorate in biomedical sciences from Wright State University. He has worked in industry (Kao, Procter & Gamble, HMR Pharmaceuticals, Wil Research), government (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency HERL, Aerospace Research Laboratories, Air Force Research Laboratory, Naval Medical Research Unit), and academia (Wright State University), giving him strong scientific expertise. He is also a member of Dayton Infragard, FBI Cincinnati Citizen’s Academy Alumni Association, AAAS, the Ohio Academy of Science, the Aerospace Medical Association, and the International Society for Gravitational Physiology. Mr.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Microscopic Threat to the United States: Biological Weapons, Biological Terrorism, and Their Multifaceted Implications for U.S
    “THE MICROSCOPIC THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM, AND THEIR MULTIFACETED IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY” by Angelina Camacho A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies Baltimore, Maryland May, 2014 © 2014 Angelina Camacho All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT From 1943 to 1969 the United States had a thriving biological weapons program to develop new ways of targeting its adversaries. With the 1972 creation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States relinquished its program and sought to prevent other countries from possessing these lethal weapons. While previously the United States mainly worked with other states and the international community to minimize the threat from biological weapons, the 2001 anthrax attacks changed this landscape by adding a domestic dimension. This thesis explores three major aspects of the biological threat to the United States: domestic lone wolf actors, possible future state threats, and the failing aspects of the Biological Weapons Convention. An analysis of each aspect of the biological threat is performed to identify the role they each may play in future U.S. security decisions. Among the multitude of threats that can arise from biological terrorism and weapons, these particular threats are the most likely to shape future U.S. decision making, both domestically and at the international level. Through an analysis of a specific aspect of the biological threat towards the United States, each chapter illustrates the biological threat to the United States is real, menacing, and must be addressed for the future of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Equine Biosecurity and Biocontainment Practices on U.S
    Veterinary Services Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health November 2006 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Equine Biosecurity and Biocontainment Practices on U.S. Equine Operations With the globalization of animal industries, biosecurity General Practices and biocontainment practices play a vital role in the health of domestic animals. Biosecurity practices include General biosecurity measures taken on equine measures that reduce the risk of disease introduction on operations include isolation protocols, infection-control an operation. Biocontainment practices include precautions for visitors, and use of separate or measures that reduce the spread of disease on an disinfected equipment. Other general management operation and from one operation to another. practices address contact with other animals, potential Vaccination, another important aid in infection control, contamination of feed and water, insect control, and will be addressed in a separate information sheet. manure management. Equine diseases are spread in a variety of ways, including direct contact between equids and contact with Separation for isolation or infection control feces, insect or animal vectors, aerosol particles, and contaminated needles. Often overlooked but equally Overall, 65.1 percent of operations separated important modes of disease transmission include contact animals for isolation or infection control. For this study, with contaminated equipment, tack, transport
    [Show full text]
  • “Baits and Baiting Strategies for Multi-Species Pest Control and Feral
    Baits and baiting strategies for multi-species pest control and feral cats SCIENCE FOR CONSERVATION: 40 D.R. Morgan, J. Innes, C. Ryan, L. Meikle Published by Department of Conservation P.O. Box 10-420 Wellington, New Zealand 1 Science for Conservation presents the results of investigations contracted to science providers outside the Department of Conservation. Reports are subject to peer review within the Department and, in some instances, to a review from outside both the Department and the science providers. November 1996, Department of Conservation ISSN 1173-2946 ISBN 0-478-01855-X This publication originated from work done under Department of Conservation contract 1748 carried out by D.R. Morgan, J. Innes and C. Ryan, Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research, P.O. Box 69, Lincoln; and contract 617, carried out by D.R. Morgan and L. Meikle, Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research, P.O. box 31-011, Christchurch. It was approved for publication by the Director, Science and Research Division, Department of Conservation, Wellington. Cataloguing-in-Publication data Baits and baiting strategies for multi-species pest control and feral cats / D.R. Morgan ... {et al.} Wellington, N.Z. : Dept. of Conservation, 1996. 1 v. ; 30 cm. (Science for conservation, 1173-2946 ; 40.) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 047801855X 1. Pests- -Control- -New Zealand. I. Morgan, D.R. (David Rowland), 1950- II. Series: Science for conservation (Wellington, N.Z.) ; 40. 632.9510993 20 zbn96-124202 2 CONTENTS PART 1: DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-SPECIES BAITING (D.R. Morgan, J. Innes, C. Ryan) Abstract 5 1. Introduction 5 2. Background 6 3. Objectives 6 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Hidden Cargo: a Cautionary Tale About Agroterrorism and the Safety of Imported Produce
    HIDDEN CARGO: A CAUTIONARY TALE ABOUT AGROTERRORISM AND THE SAFETY OF IMPORTED PRODUCE 1. INTRODUCTION The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Septem­ ber 11, 2001 ("9/11") demonstrated to the United States ("U.S.") Gov­ ernment the U.S. is vulnerable to a wide range of potential terrorist at­ tacks. l The anthrax attacks that occurred immediately following the 9/11 attacks further demonstrated the vulnerability of the U.S. to biological attacks. 2 The U.S. Government was forced to accept its citizens were vulnerable to attacks within its own borders and the concern of almost every branch of government turned its focus toward reducing this vulner­ ability.3 Of the potential attacks that could occur, we should be the most concerned with biological attacks on our food supply. These attacks are relatively easy to initiate and can cause serious political and economic devastation within the victim nation. 4 Generally, acts of deliberate contamination of food with biological agents in a terrorist act are defined as "bioterrorism."5 The World Health Organization ("WHO") uses the term "food terrorism" which it defines as "an act or threat of deliberate contamination of food for human con- I Rona Hirschberg, John La Montagne & Anthony Fauci, Biomedical Research - An Integral Component of National Security, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (May 20,2004), at 2119, available at http://contenLnejrn.org/cgi/reprint/350/2112ll9.pdf (dis­ cussing the vulnerability of the U.S. to biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological terrorist attacks). 2 Id.; Anthony Fauci, Biodefence on the Research Agenda, NATURE, Feb.
    [Show full text]
  • Identification and Quantification of Adulterants in Coffee
    foods Communication Identification and Quantification of Adulterants in Coffee (Coffea arabica L.) Using FT-MIR Spectroscopy Coupled with Chemometrics Mauricio Flores-Valdez 1 , Ofelia Gabriela Meza-Márquez 2 , Guillermo Osorio-Revilla 2 and Tzayhri Gallardo-Velázquez 1,* 1 Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Biológicas-Santo Tomás, Departamento de Biofísica, Prolongación de Carpio y Plan de Ayala S/N, Col. Santo Tomás, Alcaldía Miguel Hidalgo, Ciudad de México C.P. 11340, Mexico; [email protected] 2 Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Biológicas-Zacatenco, Departamento de Ingeniería Bioquímica, Av. Wilfrido Massieu S/N, Esq. Cda, Miguel Stampa, Col. Unidad Profesional Adolfo López Mateos, Zacatenco, Alcaldía Gustavo A. Madero, Ciudad de México C.P. 07738, Mexico; [email protected] (O.G.M.-M.); [email protected] (G.O.-R.) * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +52-(55)-5729-6000 (ext. 62305) Received: 24 May 2020; Accepted: 28 June 2020; Published: 30 June 2020 Abstract: Food adulteration is an illegal practice performed to elicit economic benefits. In the context of roasted and ground coffee, legumes, cereals, nuts and other vegetables are often used to augment the production volume; however, these adulterants lack the most important coffee compound, caffeine, which has health benefits. In this study, the mid-infrared Fourier transform spectroscopy (FT-MIR) technique coupled with chemometrics was used to identify and quantify adulterants in coffee (Coffea arabica L.). Coffee samples were adulterated with corn, barley, soy, oat, rice and coffee husks, in proportions ranging from 1–30%. A discrimination model was developed using the soft independent modeling of class analogy (SIMCA) framework, and quantitative models were developed using such algorithms as the partial least squares algorithms with one variable (PLS1) and multiple variables (PLS2) and principal component regression (PCR).
    [Show full text]
  • Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2014 Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War Laura K. Donohue Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1296 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350304 Laura K. Donohue, Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War in LAW AND WAR: (Sarat, Austin, Douglas, Lawrence, and Umphrey, Martha Merrill, eds., Stanford University Press, 2014) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons PANDEMIC DISEASE , BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS , AND WAR Laura K. Donohue * Over the past two decades, concern about the threat posed by biological weapons has grown. Biowarfare is not new. 1 But prior to the recent trend, the threat largely centered on state use of such weapons. 2 What changed with the end of the Cold War was the growing apprehension that materials and knowledge would proliferate beyond industrialized states’ control, and that “rogue states” or nonstate actors would acquire and use biological weapons. 3 Accordingly, in 1993 senators Samuel Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Dominici expanded the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to assist the former Soviet republics in securing biological agents and weapons knowledge. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act gave the Pentagon lead agency responsibility. 4 Senator Lugar explained, “[B]iological weapons, materials, and know-how are now more available to terrorists and rogue nations than at any other time in our history.”5 The United States was not equipped to manage the crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • Infectious Disease Research Biocontainment in Gain-Of-Function
    Downloaded from Biocontainment in Gain-of-Function mbio.asm.org Infectious Disease Research W. Ian Lipkin on December 12, 2012 - Published by 2012. Biocontainment in Gain-of-Function Infectious Disease Research . mBio 3(5): . doi:10.1128/mBio.00290-12. Updated information and services can be found at: http://mbio.asm.org/content/3/5/e00290-12.full.html CONTENT ALERTS Receive: RSS Feeds, eTOCs, free email alerts (when new articles cite this mbio.asm.org article), more>> Information about commercial reprint orders: http://mbio.asm.org/misc/reprints.xhtml Information about Print on Demand and other content delivery options: http://mbio.asm.org/misc/contentdelivery.xhtml To subscribe to another ASM Journal go to: http://journals.asm.org/subscriptions/ Downloaded from COMMENTARY Biocontainment in Gain-of-Function Infectious Disease Research mbio.asm.org W. Ian Lipkin Columbia University, New York, New York, USA on December 12, 2012 - Published by ABSTRACT The discussion of H5N1 influenza virus gain-of-function research has focused chiefly on its risk-to-benefit ratio. An- other key component of risk is the level of containment employed. Work is more expensive and less efficient when pursued at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) than at BSL-3 or at BSL-3 as modified for work with agricultural pathogens (BSL-3-Ag). However, here too a risk-to-benefit ratio analysis is applicable. BSL-4 procedures mandate daily inspection of facilities and equipment, moni- toring of personnel for signs and symptoms of disease, and logs of dates and times that personnel, equipment, supplies, and sam- ples enter and exit containment.
    [Show full text]
  • Medical Review Officer Manual
    Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Center for Substance Abuse Prevention Medical Review Officer Manual for Federal Agency Workplace Drug Testing Programs EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2010 Note: This manual applies to Federal agency drug testing programs that come under Executive Order 12564 dated September 15, 1986, section 503 of Public Law 100-71, 5 U.S.C. section 7301 note dated July 11, 1987, and the Department of Health and Human Services Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs (73 FR 71858) dated November 25, 2008 (effective October 1, 2010). This manual does not apply to specimens submitted for testing under U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs (49 CFR Part 40). The current version of this manual and other information including MRO Case Studies are available on the Drug Testing page under Medical Review Officer (MRO) Resources on the SAMHSA website: http://www.workplace.samhsa.gov Previous Versions of this Manual are Obsolete 3 Table of Contents Chapter 1. The Medical Review Officer (MRO)........................................................................... 6 Chapter 2. The Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form ................................................ 7 Chapter 3. Urine Drug Testing ...................................................................................................... 9 A. Federal Workplace Drug Testing Overview..................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Integrated Pest Management: Current and Future Strategies
    Integrated Pest Management: Current and Future Strategies Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa, USA Printed in the United States of America Cover design by Lynn Ekblad, Different Angles, Ames, Iowa Graphics and layout by Richard Beachler, Instructional Technology Center, Iowa State University, Ames ISBN 1-887383-23-9 ISSN 0194-4088 06 05 04 03 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging–in–Publication Data Integrated Pest Management: Current and Future Strategies. p. cm. -- (Task force report, ISSN 0194-4088 ; no. 140) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-887383-23-9 (alk. paper) 1. Pests--Integrated control. I. Council for Agricultural Science and Technology. II. Series: Task force report (Council for Agricultural Science and Technology) ; no. 140. SB950.I4573 2003 632'.9--dc21 2003006389 Task Force Report No. 140 June 2003 Council for Agricultural Science and Technology Ames, Iowa, USA Task Force Members Kenneth R. Barker (Chair), Department of Plant Pathology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh Esther Day, American Farmland Trust, DeKalb, Illinois Timothy J. Gibb, Department of Entomology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana Maud A. Hinchee, ArborGen, Summerville, South Carolina Nancy C. Hinkle, Department of Entomology, University of Georgia, Athens Barry J. Jacobsen, Department of Plant Sciences and Plant Pathology, Montana State University, Bozeman James Knight, Department of Animal and Range Science, Montana State University, Bozeman Kenneth A. Langeland, Department of Agronomy, University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, Gainesville Evan Nebeker, Department of Entomology and Plant Pathology, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State David A. Rosenberger, Plant Pathology Department, Cornell University–Hudson Valley Laboratory, High- land, New York Donald P.
    [Show full text]
  • The Persistence and Secondary Poisoning Risks of Sodium Monofluoroacetate (1080), Brodifacoum, and Cholecalciferol in Possums
    THE PERSISTENCE AND SECONDARY POISONING RISKS OF SODIUM MONOFLUOROACETATE (1080), BRODIFACOUM, AND CHOLECALCIFEROL IN POSSUMS C. T. EASON, G. R. WRIGHT, and L. MEIKLE, Manaaki Whenua - Landcare Research, P.O. Box 69, Lincoln, New Zealand. P. ELDER, Steroid and Immunobiochemistry Unit, Christchurch Health Laboratories, Christchurch Hospital, P.O. Box 151, Christchurch, New Zealand. ABSTRACT: To determine the risk of secondary poisoning for animals preying on sub-lethally poisoned brushtail possums, captive possums were treated with near-lethal doses of sodium monofluoroacetate (1080) or brodifacoum, and toxicant concentrations in blood and tissue were monitored over time. Sodium monofluoroacetate was rapidly eliminated from the blood (within three days). Brodifacoum was retained in the liver and, to a lesser extent, the muscle of possums for eight months after dosing. To determine the potential risk for animals scavenging on the carcasses of possums poisoned with cholecalciferol, cats were fed poisoned carcasses for six days. No changes in behavior, appetite, or body weight were observed. Serum calcium concentrations increased slightly, but remained within the normal range for cats. KEY WORDS: vertebrate pest control, secondary poisoning, sodium monofluoroacetate, brodifacown, cholecalciferol Proc. 17th Yertebr. Pest Conf. (R.M. Timm & A.C. Crabb, Eds.) Published at Univ. of Calif., Davis. 1996. INTRODUCTION 1995), and toxic amounts of brodifacoum may be retained Sodium monofluoroacetate (1080) has been used for in a carcass. vertebrate pest control in New Zealand since 1954. It is The existence of an effective antidote to brodifacoum currently used most frequently in aerially sown baits and in the form of vitamin Kl means that dogs that have eaten in baits in bait stations for the control of the Australian carcasses containing brodifacoum residues can usually be brushtail possum (Trichosurus vulpecula) (Livingstone saved.
    [Show full text]
  • In Defense of Cyberterrorism: an Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks
    IN DEFENSE OF CYBERTERRORISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ANTICIPATING CYBER-ATTACKS Susan W. Brenner Marc D. Goodman The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought the notion of terrorism as a clear and present danger into the consciousness of the American people. In order to predict what might follow these shocking attacks, it is necessary to examine the ideologies and motives of their perpetrators, and the methodologies that terrorists utilize. The focus of this article is on how Al-Qa'ida and other Islamic fundamentalist groups can use cyberspace and technology to continue to wage war againstthe United States, its allies and its foreign interests. Contending that cyberspace will become an increasingly essential terrorist tool, the author examines four key issues surrounding cyberterrorism. The first is a survey of conventional methods of "physical" terrorism, and their inherent shortcomings. Next, a discussion of cyberspace reveals its potential advantages as a secure, borderless, anonymous, and structured delivery method for terrorism. Third, the author offers several cyberterrorism scenarios. Relating several examples of both actual and potential syntactic and semantic attacks, instigated individually or in combination, the author conveys their damagingpolitical and economic impact. Finally, the author addresses the inevitable inquiry into why cyberspace has not been used to its full potential by would-be terrorists. Separately considering foreign and domestic terrorists, it becomes evident that the aims of terrorists must shift from the gross infliction of panic, death and destruction to the crippling of key information systems before cyberattacks will take precedence over physical attacks. However, given that terrorist groups such as Al Qa'ida are highly intelligent, well-funded, and globally coordinated, the possibility of attacks via cyberspace should make America increasingly vigilant.
    [Show full text]
  • Maximum Containment: the Most Controversial Labs in the World
    Maximum Containment: The Most Controversial Labs in the World By Alison K. Bruzek B.A. Biological Sciences Northwestern University, 2010 SUBMITTED TO THE PROGRAM IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA STUDIES/WRITING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE WRITING AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MASSACHUSETTS IN'T-QUTE OF 7ECHNOLOqi September 2013 JUL 0 22013 @2013 Alison K. Bruzek. All rights reserved. Li__RARI ES The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created. Signature of Author: -----.. Program in Con rativeMedia Studies/Writing June 10, 2013 Certified by: Philip Hilts Director, Knight Science Journalism Fellowships Thesis Supervisor Accepted by: Seth Mnookin Assistant Professor of Science Writing Director, Graduate Program in Science Writing 1 2 Maximum Containment: The Most Controversial Labs in the World By Alison K. Bruzek Submitted to the Program in Comparative Media Studies/Writing on June 10, 2013 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Science Writing ABSTRACT In 2002, following the September 1 1 th attacks and the anthrax letters, the United States allocated money to build two maximum containment biology labs. Called Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facilities, these labs were built to research new vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments for emerging infectious diseases, potential biological weapons, and to contribute to the nation's biodefense. These labs were not the first dramatic reaction to the threat of biowarfare and are in fact, one product of a long history of the country's contentious relationship with biological weapons.
    [Show full text]