AgroterrorismFuture Warfare Series: National No. 10203040 DefendingAvoidingTheThe “WorriedDefenseAnthrax thePanic American Assessment,Vaccine Well”and Keeping Response Debate: Homeland the A MedicalPortsStrategies, Opento Review CBRN1993-2003 inand a Events:forChemical Capabilities Commanders and BiologicalAnalysis Threat and Solu�onsEnvironment A Literature Review Edited by: TanjaLieutenantRandallMajor M. Korpi Mr.J.Richard ColonelLarsen Albertand A.Christopherand Fred MauroniHersack, Patrick P. Stone, USAF D.Hemmer EllisUSAF Dr. Robert A. Norton United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies 30204010 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Agroterrorism: National Defense Assessment, Strategies, and Capabilities Edited by Mr. Albert Mauroni Dr. Robert A. Norton August 2020 U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 Table of Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer.……………………………….…….…….…….….……….…………iii Preface…………………………………….……………….….……….…………iv About the Authors……………………………….………….….…………………vi Chapter 1. Introduction Albert Mauroni.………………….……………….…………….…………………1 Chapter 2. Agroterrorism Perspectives Reid Kirby and Dr. Seth Carus ……………………………….……….….………5 Chapter 3. The Mindset of a Terrorist Dr. Terry Oroszi and Dr. David Ellis ……………………….…….….….………29 Chapter 4. Response to Agroterrorism by Foreign Animal Disease Major Kelley J. Williams and Steven A. Schmitt …………….…………………43 Chapter 5. U.S. Federal Policies and Programs to Combat Agroterrorism Henry Parker and Janet Marroquin ……………….…….……….………………57 Chapter 6. Organoleptic Assessments as a Tool for Food Defense Chemical Threat Prioritization Dr. Nathaniel C. Rice and Dr. Todd M. Myers ……………...……….…………97 Chapter 7. Air Force Capabilities and Technologies to Counter or Mitigate Agroterrorism William Greer and Dr. Douglas Lewis …….………………………….….……129 Chapter 8. Agroterrorism Policy Col. (Dr.) Oliver J. Wisco and Paul Imbriano ………..………………….….…153 Chapter 9. Agroterrorism by Other Means: The Interconnectivity of Critical Infrastructures Dr. Robert A. Norton and Greg S. Weaver …………………….………………165 Chapter 10. Conclusions Dr. Robert A. Norton ……………………………………….…….……………183 ii Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. ISBN: 978-0-9914849-5-9 iii Preface Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. U.S. Army (Ret.) Executive Vice President of Auburn University Just as this book on agroterrorism reaches the final stages of development, our nation is in the midst of fighting a global war. Our foe is not an intractable nation-state bent on world domination, but rather an invisible, inanimate, mindless enemy that surrounds us. The United States spends massive resources annually on responding to “thinking adversaries.” However, this “unthinking adversary,” the SARS-CoV2 virus and cause of the COVID-19 pandemic, has caused unprecedented global disruption, worthy of the most clever and powerful adversarial nation-state. Nature has once again proven to be the most dangerous bioterrorist and again reminded us that we have much to learn from it. As of this writing, we certainly do not yet understand the full spectrum of implications from the coronavirus. Who would have anticipated that physicians and medical personnel in some parts of the country would experience pay cuts or job loss during a pandemic? And yet, it has happened. Before the start of the pandemic, the thought would have been inconceivable, yet what would happen to us if the trained health professionals just walked away, exhausted by the relentless hours and no longer willing to absorb the risks or personal costs? We must recognize that a deliberate attack against our crops and livestock could be equally as devastating and exhausting as this current crisis. For many human and animal outbreaks that have occurred over the years, government, medicine, and business decisionmakers have demanded new technologies to help detect, contain, and mitigate the spread of disease. In most instances, the existing plans and capabilities had to be rapidly modified once the disease gained momentum. As is often the case, some assumptions borne of long planning and gaming were wrong, or perhaps only partly right, while others were spot on. As the current pandemic has reminded us, logistics challenges always seem to occur during emergencies. A future agroterrorism incident will have similar features, such as a shortage of emergency supplies, deterioration of strategic stockpiles of certain items (e.g., surgical masks and gloves), or bureaucracies that emphasize form over function. As we prepare to defend against agroterrorism, we must factor in the human element, the thinking adversary who chooses to advance the chaos borne of a pathogen to gain advantage. To be successful, the adversary must penetrate our nation’s defenses before his pathogenic weapon can be deployed. Once deployed, the pathogen remains first undiscovered or undiagnosed, enabling it to gain a foothold in the targeted animal or plant population. iv From there, the disease takes on a life of its own within that population, magnifying the disease effects, as its spreads. With the pathogen now delivered, the adversary can fade into the darkness, awaiting the next opportunity to attack. Due to the intentionality of the adversary, agroterrorism has the real potential of needing an even more complex response than an outbreak of a naturally produced virus. The very real possibility of intentional chemical contamination of food further complicates matters, because response time and medical management would almost certainly prove inadequate. Agroterrorism differs greatly from natural disease outbreaks and disasters for many reasons, primarily because Americans have not known widespread hunger since the Great Depression. Government and agribusiness are supposed to be vigilantly on the lookout for adversaries. However, as has been proven many times since the Sept. 11, 2001, (9/11) terrorist attacks, those in charge of surveillance have to be right every time while the adversary gains advantage by only having to be right once. The primary goal of the adversary, beyond diminishing the availability of the actual food supply, is stoking fear about what remains. Is it safe to eat? Amidst the problems encountered in emergencies, people emerge by discovering expedient solutions to problems unimagined in white papers or mathematical models. People and their intellectual prowess will always remain our greatest assets and yet we often do not treat them as such with the freedom to think, question and challenge. Countless times in our nation’s history, these people have proven essential to our survival. The selections in this book demonstrate that we can listen to them and prepare for these crises, rather than have such crises come upon us unannounced. v About the Authors Dr. W. Seth Carus is Emeritus Distinguished Professor of national security policy at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. He was on the NDU faculty from 1997 through 2017, serving from 2003 to 2013 as the deputy director of the Center. From 2001 to 2003, Dr. Carus was detailed to the Office of the Vice President at the White House, where he was the senior advisor to the vice president for biodefense. Before joining NDU, Dr. Carus worked at the Center for Naval Analyses (1994 to 1997), the Policy Planning staff in the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1991 to 1994), and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Carus’ work has focused primarily on issues related to biological and chemical warfare. His current research focuses on the history of chemical and biological warfare. He is author of A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century (2017), “The History of Biological Warfare: What We Know and What We Don’t” in Health Security (2015), and Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ Revised and Updated (2012), as well as the working paper Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (2001). He is the co-author of The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 (2014). Dr. Carus has a doctorate in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. David Ellis is a research toxicologist at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and an adjunct faculty member in the Department of Pharmacology & Toxicology, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Wright State University, Ohio. Dr. Ellis earned a bachelor of science degree in toxicology from Ashland University, a master of science degree in pharmacology and toxicology and doctorate in biomedical sciences from Wright State University. He has worked in industry (Kao, Procter & Gamble, HMR Pharmaceuticals, Wil Research), government (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency HERL, Aerospace Research Laboratories, Air Force Research Laboratory, Naval Medical Research Unit), and academia (Wright State University), giving him strong scientific expertise. He is also a member of Dayton Infragard, FBI Cincinnati Citizen’s Academy Alumni Association, AAAS, the Ohio Academy of Science, the Aerospace Medical Association, and the International Society for Gravitational Physiology. Mr.