A Paradox of Zoonotic Disease
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Tropical Medicine and Infectious Disease Communication The Convergence of High-Consequence Livestock and Human Pathogen Research and Development: A Paradox of Zoonotic Disease Julia M. Michelotti 1,* ID , Kenneth B. Yeh 1 ID , Tammy R. Beckham 2, Michelle M. Colby 3 ID , Debanjana Dasgupta 1, Kurt A. Zuelke 4 and Gene G. Olinger 1 1 MRI Global, Gaithersburg, MD 20878, USA; [email protected] (K.B.Y.); [email protected] (D.D.); [email protected] (G.G.O.) 2 College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66503, USA; [email protected] 3 Institute of Food Production and Sustainability, National Institute of Food and Agriculture, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20250, USA; [email protected] 4 Strategic Biosecurity and Biocontainment Facility Management Consultant, Kurt Zuelke Consulting, Lenexa, KS 66220, USA; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-240-361-4062 Received: 23 April 2018; Accepted: 23 May 2018; Published: 30 May 2018 Abstract: The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that zoonotic diseases transmitted from animals to humans account for 75 percent of new and emerging infectious diseases. Globally, high-consequence pathogens that impact livestock and have the potential for human transmission create research paradoxes and operational challenges for the high-containment laboratories that conduct work with them. These specialized facilities are required for conducting all phases of research on high-consequence pathogens (basic, applied, and translational) with an emphasis on both the generation of fundamental knowledge and product development. To achieve this research mission, a highly-trained workforce is required and flexible operational methods are needed. In addition, working with certain pathogens requires compliance with regulations such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Select Agent regulations, which adds to the operational burden. The vast experience from the existing studies at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, other U.S. laboratories, and those in Europe and Australia with biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facilities designed for large animals, clearly demonstrates the valuable contribution this capability brings to the efforts to detect, prepare, prevent and respond to livestock and potential zoonotic threats. To raise awareness of these challenges, which include biosafety and biosecurity issues, we held a workshop at the 2018 American Society for Microbiology (ASM) Biothreats conference to further discuss the topic with invited experts and audience participants. The workshop covered the subjects of research funding and metrics, economic sustainment of drug and vaccine development pipelines, workforce turnover, and the challenges of maintaining operational readiness of high containment laboratories. Keywords: biosafety; biosecurity; BSL-3-Ag; high-consequence pathogen research; zoonotic disease 1. Introduction High-consequence pathogens are viruses and bacteria that have epidemic or biothreat potential where an effective therapeutic or vaccine does not exist. Animal studies on high-consequence pathogens affecting the agricultural livestock industry must be performed in biosafety level 3 Agriculture (BSL-3-Ag) or BSL-4 facilities that can accommodate large animal research (Figure1)[ 1]. Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2018, 3, 55; doi:10.3390/tropicalmed3020055 www.mdpi.com/journal/tropicalmed Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2018, 3, 55 2 of 13 BSL-3-AgTrop. Med. facilities Infect. Dis. are 2018 unique, 2, x FORto PEER agriculture REVIEW because of the necessity to protect the environment2 of 13 from the biosecurity and economic risks that could occur from an accidental release of a high-consequence pathogen.BSL-3-Ag In facilities these facilities, are unique the to barriers agriculture for eachbecause room of the serve necessity as the to primary protect the biocontainment, environment from sothey the biosecurity and economic risks that could occur from an accidental release of a high-consequence require almost all the features used for BSL-4 facilities in addition to the standard BSL-3 facility pathogen. In these facilities, the barriers for each room serve as the primary biocontainment, so they requirements [2]. Facilities that are configured to carry out research studies on large livestock (e.g., cows, require almost all the features used for BSL-4 facilities in addition to the standard BSL-3 facility horses,requirements and sheep) [2] are. Facilities equipped that withare configured oversized to equipment, carry out research such as studies downdraft on large procedure livestock tables (e.g., and autoclaves.cows, horses, In addition, and sheep) these are facilities equipped have wit specializedh oversized cagingequipment areas, such and as utilize downdraft advanced procedure handling techniquestables and for autoclaves. animals, In such addition, as horses, these facilities that may have be specialized stressed in caging the high-containment areas and utilize advanced laboratory environment.handling techniques The challenges for animals are that, such BSL-3-Ag as horses, and BSL-4that may facilities be stressed are expensive in the high to build,-containment operate and maintainlaborat andory requireenvironment. a highly The trained challenges and are consistent that BSL- workforce.3-Ag and BSL Facility-4 facilities operations are expensive also require to build, robust biosafetyoperate and and biosecurity maintain and programs require a and highly personnel trained reliabilityand consistent programs workforce. that Facility assure safetyoperations and also security in therequire workplace robust andbiosafety surrounding and biosecurity areas. Forprograms example, and high-consequencepersonnel reliability pathogen programs researchthat assure on the Aphthaesafety epizooticae and securityvirus, in whichthe workplace causes foot-and-mouth and surrounding disease areas. (FMD),For example, is currently high-consequence geographically isolatedpathogen in the research U.S. at on the the Plum Aphthae Island epizooticae Animal virus Disease, which Center causes facility foot-and in New-mouth York disease [3]. To(FMD) date,, is there currently geographically isolated in the U.S. at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center facility in New are a limited number of high-containment facilities in countries such as Brazil, India, Guinea, Sierra York [3]. To date, there are a limited number of high-containment facilities in countries such as Brazil, Leone, and Liberia that have recently experienced high-consequence pathogen outbreaks. The lack of India, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia that have recently experienced high-consequence pathogen laboratory support in these settings means that international collaborations are critical for successfully outbreaks. The lack of laboratory support in these settings means that international collaborations respondingare critical to for the successfully next emerging responding or re-emerging to the next disease emerging outbreaks or re-emerging that may disease affect outbreaks their populations that andma economies.y affect their populations and economies. FigureFigure 1. 1.Worldwide Worldwide map map illustratingillustrating the locations of of high high-containment-containment laboratories laboratories that thatcan can accommodateaccommodate agricultural agricultural livestock. livestock. There are are currently currently four four BSL BSL-3-Ag-3-Ag facilities, facilities, one oneBSL BSL-3-3 for for agriculturalagricultural studies studies (HSADL), (HSADL), andand three BSL BSL-4-4 facilities facilities [1]. [ 1The]. Thenumber number of research of research animals animals that can that canbe accommodated accommodated at atone one time time is noted is noted in the in thetable table when when available. available. Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2018, 3, 55 3 of 13 Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 13 ItIt has has been been shown shown thatthat manymany emergingemerging high-consequencehigh-consequence pathogens for for agriculture agriculture and and public public healthhealth originate originate in in wildlife, wildlife, including including wild wild pigs, pigs, birds, birds, and and bats. bats. Additionally, Additionally, some some pathogens pathogens can can be be carried asymptomatically by livestock and may or may not be infectious to humans (Figure 2) [4– carried asymptomatically by livestock and may or may not be infectious to humans (Figure2)[ 4–8]. 8]. As people continuously migrate to new areas, particularly near recently de-forested areas, closer As people continuously migrate to new areas, particularly near recently de-forested areas, closer proximity to insect or animal populations carrying pathogenic viruses and bacteria increases the risk proximity to insect or animal populations carrying pathogenic viruses and bacteria increases the risk of disease to those not previously exposed. In response to these challenges many international health of disease to those not previously exposed. In response to these challenges many international health organizations are promoting the adoption of the One Health concept. The U. S. Centers for Disease organizations are promoting the adoption of the One Health concept. The U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines One Health as a ‘collaborative, multi-sectoral, and trans-disciplinary Control and Prevention defines One Health as a ‘collaborative, multi-sectoral,