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Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans

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Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans 3 Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Final – January 2017 Final-January 2017 0 Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Handling Instructions Information contained in this draft annex is subject to the restrictions outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. Distribution of this document is limited and not releasable to the public or to any public web site (public availability to be determined under 5 U.S. Code §552). Although this is an interagency annex, dissemination must be approved by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Use of this Document This annex provides guidance and serves as a reference for federal agency planning efforts involving biological incidents. Other stakeholders (e.g., local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; nongovernmental organizations; voluntary agencies; and the private sector) engaged in their own planning will find this document useful in enhancing their understanding of how the Biological Incident Annex will be implemented and how their planning efforts can be complementary. Distribution, transmission, and destruction of this annex will be in accordance with DHS Management Directive 11042.1, which is publicly available. Questions pertaining to the distribution, transmission, or destruction of this annex or to obtain a copy of DHS Management Directive 11042.1 should be submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency Response Directorate, Planning and Exercise Division, National Planning Branch at response- [email protected]. Thank you for your continued support of DHS and assistance throughout this process. Rescission Notice Publication of this Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans thereby rescinds the following documents: 2008 Biological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework. Final-January 2017 ii Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Document Change Control Version Date Summary of Changes Name Final-January 2017 iii Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Table of Contents Handling Instructions ................................................................................................................... ii Use of this Document .................................................................................................................... ii Rescission Notice ........................................................................................................................... ii Document Change Control.......................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv Annex Overview .......................................................................................................................... vii Base Annex .................................................................................................................................... 1 Situation ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Scope..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations .................................................................................................. 4 Mission ...................................................................................................................................... 11 End State ............................................................................................................................................................. 11 Primary Authorities and Relevant Declarations .................................................................................................. 12 Execution ................................................................................................................................... 14 Concept of Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 14 Administration, Resources, and Funding .................................................................................. 41 Administration .................................................................................................................................................... 41 Resources ............................................................................................................................................................ 41 Funding ............................................................................................................................................................... 42 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications .................................................... 44 Oversight ............................................................................................................................................................. 44 Coordinating Instructions .................................................................................................................................... 44 Telecommunications and Operational ................................................................................................................ 44 Appendix 1: Authorities and Other References ....................................................................... 46 Public Health and Medical Authorities and References............................................................ 46 Other Authorities and References ............................................................................................. 52 Appendix 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies with Primary Authority for Federal Response to a Biological Incident ................................................................................ 59 Federal and Regional Government Offices ............................................................................... 59 Department of Health and Human Services ........................................................................................................ 60 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments .................................................................... 73 Healthcare Coalitions ................................................................................................................ 73 Private Sector ............................................................................................................................ 74 Appendix 3: Intelligence and Surveillance ............................................................................... 75 Information, Surveillance, and Sources .................................................................................... 75 Final-January 2017 iv Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans Initial Incident Identification ..................................................................................................... 75 Appendix 4: Support and Coordination Elements .................................................................. 83 Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center ................................................... 83 Environmental Clearance Committee ....................................................................................... 83 Domestic Emergency Support Team......................................................................................... 84 Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group ........................................................................ 84 Consequence Management Coordination Unit ......................................................................... 85 Appendix 5: Incorporation of Public Health Functional Elements within Incident Management for a Biological Incident Response ..................................................................... 86 Medical and Health Incident Management ............................................................................... 87 Medical and Health: “Operations Section” ............................................................................... 88 Medical and Health: “Planning Section” .................................................................................. 92 Medical and Health: “Logistics Section” .................................................................................. 93 Appendix 6: Federal Response Capability Inventory – Biological-Specific Assets, Resources, and Teams ................................................................................................................ 94 Appendix 7: Training to Support Biological Response and Incidents ................................. 105 Appendix 8: Logistics ..............................................................................................................
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