Cracking the glass ceiling

The representation of women and men in political and public decision making in the Council of Europe’s member states

Åsa Ekberg Fredell and Drude Dahlerup

Department of Political Science Stockholm University

Working Paper Series 2006:1

The Research Program on Gender Quotas

Prepared for the Council of Europe May 2006. Contents

1. Introduction...... 1 1.1 Aim and data collection ...... 3 1.2 Main work in this field by the Council of Europe ...... 3 1.3 Why balanced representation? ...... 4 1.4 Historical background...... 4 2. Legislative power: women in parliaments ...... 14 2.1 National parliaments ...... 14 2.2 Regional parliaments ...... 17 2.3 Local Councils ...... 17 2.4 International Assemblies...... 18 3. Measures and practices for promoting women’s political representation in legislative bodies...... 20 3.1 Electoral gender quotas: A global trend – and maybe a future European trend 20 3.2 Legal gender quotas in Europe ...... 23 3.3 Voluntary party quotas in Europe...... 25 3.4 Countries without quotas ...... 28 3.5 Are gender quotas discrimination of men? ...... 31 3.6 Quotas and plurality-majority systems – a bad equation? ...... 32 4. Executive power...... 34 4.1 Heads of state...... 34 4.2 National governments ...... 35 5. Diplomatic service ...... 39 6. Women in the Judiciary (High/Supreme and Constitutional Courts) ...... 41 7. Challenges for increasing women’s representation ...... 46 7.1 Why women’s under-representation? ...... 46 7.2 A new global challenge for Europe ...... 47 8. Conclusions and recommendations...... 50 8.1 The glass ceiling ...... 50 8.2 Cracking the glass ceiling - recommendations ...... 51 Bibliography ...... 56

Charts

Chart 1. Women in the national parliaments, s/l house, according to electoral system.9 Chart 2. Electoral systems in the Council of Europe’s member states...... 10 Chart 3. Women and men in national parliaments, single / lower house...... 15 Chart 4. Women and men in national parliament, upper house...... 16 Chart 5. Women and men in regional parliament...... 17 Chart 6. Women and men in local councils...... 18 Chart 7. Head of state, percent…...... 34 Chart 8. Head of Government, percent...... 34 Chart 9. Women and men in government...... 36 Chart 10. Women and men in diplomatic service, percent...... 39 Chart 11. High / supreme court judges, women and men, percent...... 42 Chart 12. Women and men in constitutional courts. Percent...... 44 Chart 13. The representatives, percent...... 50 Chart 14. The leaders, percent...... 50

Tables

Table 1. Women in parliament, single/lower house, 1990-2005...... 5 Table 2. Women’s enfranchisement and parliamentary representation...... 8 Table 3. Women in government, 1980-2000...... 11 Table 4. Women judges 1980-2000. Percent...... 12 Table 5. Countries in Europe with constitutional quota and/or election law quota regulation for candidates to national parliaments, lower/single house...... 23 Table 6. European countries with voluntary party quotas. Lower/single house...... 27 Table 7. European countries with no type of quotas for parliamentary elections to lower/single house...... 28 Table 8. Women’s parliamentary representation...... 48 Table 9. The top of the world rank order of women in parliament...... 49 1. Introduction

Two contrasting discourses on women’s representation can be identified. According to the optimistic discourse, the representation of women in political and public decisions-making will gradually and constantly increase until gender balance is achieved. Thus, it is seen primarily as a matter of time until gender balance is reached. In contrast, the more pessimistic discourse rejects the idea of constant progress and points to historical examples of backlash in women’s representation, like the situation in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe after the change. Further, in some of those countries where women’s representation in recent decades has constantly increased and reached a high level of about 30 percent, the development seems to have come to a standstill. In countries like Denmark, Norway and Finland an invisible class ceiling seems to prevent further advancement of women in public life. Consequently, in Europe as well as in the rest of the world, active measures to change women’s under- representation are on the agenda today. Women’s access to decision-making arenas around the world is limited. As an example, women’s representation world-wide in lower/single houses has increased from 3 percent in 1945 (Pintat 1998) to 16.8 percent in April 2006 (IPU 2006), i.e. an increase of less than 14 percentage points in 60 years. Globally, the present share of legislative seats, lower and upper houses combined, is 16.6 percent for women and 83.4 percent for men (IPU 2006). In recent years, however, many countries have started to take action to increase women’s representation. One such measure involves different types of affirmative action, and today legal and/or voluntary party quotas have been adopted in a total of 97 countries around the world (IDEA and Stockholm University 2006). In 2003 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers made the recommendation that the representation of each sex “in any decision-making body in political or public life should not fall below 40%” (Council of Europe 2003:7). As this report will show, most of the institutions in the member states examined have a long way to go before realizing this ambition. In spite of European women’s high level of education and extensive labour market participation, an invisible glass ceiling seems to prevent women’s political empowerment. Gender balance in politics does not seem to occur by itself.

1 This report is entitled Cracking the Glass Ceiling. A ‘glass ceiling’ is an analogy for the structural (and hence not legal) barrier that brings women’s careers to a standstill. This concept is usually applied in research on women’s (lack of) promotion and career opportunities. However, it is also an appropriate concept in the study of women’s under-representation in elected political institutions. The glass ceiling represents the almost invisible structural barriers and indirect discrimination, which stops women from gaining access to some positions as well as becoming more than a minority in decision-making positions. The concept of “glass ceiling” first appeared about 20 years ago, most often ascribed to two journalists at the Wall Street Journal examining the lack of corporate women in high positions. In the last 20 years extensive research have made use of this metaphor to describe how structural barriers secure women’s under-representation and men’s numerical dominance in decision- making and in high positions. The concept has been used in a variety of situations to describe this vertical segregation. As an example, in the 1990’s the US Department of Labor Glass Ceiling Commission studied the barriers that keep both women and minorities from reaching higher positions in different workplaces, organizations and government (Cornell University 2006). A recent example is a bill in the House of Commons introduced in March this year seeking to remove the glass ceiling that keeps women from becoming bishops in Church of England (Ekklesia 060322). Almost all formal, legal barriers against women have now been removed. But various types of structural barriers still set limits on women’s opportunities. Consequently, it is necessary to use active measures in order to reach the goal of gender balance (FWCW 1995; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:29). Apart from the concept of ‘glass ceiling’, this report will apply some additional central concepts from research on women in politics and leadership positions: the’ time lag’ thesis, the law of increasing disproportion (the higher up, the fewer women), the ‘acceptable minimum’ of women, the ‘leaking pipeline’, and the ‘fast track’ versus the ‘incremental track’ discourse and practice. Such concepts are helpful when describing and explaining women’s under-representation.

2 1.1 Aim and data collection The aim of this report is to describe the current situation in the Council of Europe’s 46 member states1 as regards the representation of women and men in political and public decision making and to make recommendations in this regard. Areas covered in this study are the national and regional parliaments and the local councils as well as the national governments, the high/supreme and constitutional courts and the diplomatic service. The basis for the presentation and analyses is empirical material gathered in the form of the Council of Europe’s “Questionnaire on gender segregated data on the participation of women and men in political and public decision-making”, answered by 36 of the 46 member states2. The questionnaire was answered by the Council of Europe’s member states during September 2005, and additional data was collected in the following months. The additional data has been gathered through official websites of the member states as well as Electionworld (2005), International IDEA & Stockholm University (2005), Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005) and Reynolds et al (2005). In cases of inconsistency between the questionnaire and the official websites, information from the official websites has been used. Data from the questionnaire about political representation and electoral systems have been checked against the websites mentioned above.

1.2 Main work in this field by the Council of Europe Previous recommendations from the Council of Europe in this matter are listed in Recommendation (2003)3 on balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making. In the same year, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1348 (2003) Gender-balanced representation in the Parliamentary Assembly, where the new rules of procedure include regulations regarding the composition of national delegations: “National delegations should include the under- represented sex at least in the same percentage as is present in their parliaments and in

1 As of November 2005: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia &Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldavia, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, TFYR of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and UK. 2 The following member states did not answer the questionnaire: Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Georgia, Malta, Poland, Republic of Moldavia, Romania, Russian Federation and San Marino. Some of the member states that answered the questionnaire only answered a few of the questions. In general, the quality of the answers varied a great deal and, consequently, all data used were double checked with other sources whenever possible. In a few cases, however, problems derived from unclear formulations in the questionnaire.

3 any case one representative of each sex.” In 2004 Resolution 1360 (2004) Contested Credentials of the parliamentary delegations of Ireland and Malta suspended the voting rights of the two countries in the Assembly due to non-compliance with the previously mentioned Rule 6.2.

1.3 Why balanced representation? There are a number of common arguments in favour of making efforts to raise women’s share of political and public decision-making positions. Three frequent sets of arguments in this regard are connected to the areas of justice, interests and democracy. The justice argument proposes that a society does not attain real equality as long as women only have limited access to positions of power. Here, gender balance in politics is a goal in itself. The argument regarding interests claims that women’s presence in legislatures is needed when making policies on the basis of women’s interests. (Squires 2004:51) Two different positions are included in the interest argument. Either women are seen as a natural identity group, or as an interest group constructed via economic or other positions in society (Squires 1996:77-80). Arguments based on the democracy concept propose that a balanced share of power between women and men should vitalize democracy (Squires, 2004:51). Another democracy argument suggests that women’s exclusion from political institutions is in itself a basis for questioning the legitimacy of democratic governance (Montgomery 2003:4). The interest argument as well as the democracy argument are based on equal representation as a means of achieving certain aims.

1.4 Historical background

Table 1 shows the development of women’s representation during the past 15 years.

4 Table 1. Women in parliament, single/lower house, 1990-2005.

Women in Women in Women in Women in Member state parliament parliament parliament parliament Change (%) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 2005-1990 Albania 29 6 5 6 -23 Andorra .. 4 7 29 +25 Armenia 36 .. 3 5 -31 Austria 12 24 27 33 +21 Azerbaijan .. 2 12 10 +8 Belgium 9 12 23 35 +26 Bosnia& Herzegovina 5 4 29 14 +9 Bulgaria 21 13 11 21 0 Croatia 6 6 8 21 +15 Cyprus 2 4 5 10 +8 Czech Republic 30 10 15 16 -14 Denmark 31 33 37 37 +6 Estonia 6 13 18 20 +14 Finland 32 34 37 38 +6 France 7 6 11 12 +5 Georgia 6 6 7 10 +4 Germany 21 26 31 33 +12 Greece 7 6 6 13 +6 Hungary 21 11 8 9 -12 Iceland 21 25 35 33 +12 Ireland 8 13 12 14 +6 Italy 13 15 11 7 -6 Latvia 15 15 17 18 +3 Liechtenstein 4 8 4 24 +20 Lithuania 10 7 18 21 +11 Luxembourg 13 20 17 20 +7 Malta 3 2 9 9 +6 Monaco 11 6 22 21 +10 Netherlands 21 31 36 35 +14 Norway 36 39 36 37 +1 Poland 14 13 13 20 +6 Portugal 8 9 19 25 +17 Republic of Moldova 2 5 9 22 +20 Romania 34 4 7 11 -23 Russian Federation 9 13 8 10 +1 San Marino 12 12 13 17 +5 Serbia & Montenegro .. 3 5 10 +7 Slovakia 12 15 13 15 +3 Slovenia 13 14 8 13 0 Spain 15 16 22 36 +21 Sweden 38 40 43 46 +8 Switzerland 14 18 23 27 +13 TFYR Macedonia 4 3 8 20 +16 Turkey 1 2 4 4 +3 Ukraine 3 4 8 5 +2 United Kingdom 6 10 18 20 +14 Average 14 13 16 20 +6 Note: Regarding the figures for 1990: Andorra held its first election under parliamentary democracy in 1993 (no figure available from that election). Azerbaijan held its first independent election in 1995. No figure available from the first election in Serbia & Montenegro. The figure for Latvia is from 1993; the figures for TFYR of Macedonia and Republic of Moldova are from 1994. Hence, the figures in the column to the right hence show the change between 1995 and 2005 for Andorra, Azerbaijan and Serbia

5 & Montenegro. Regarding the sources, it is unclear whether the figures come from elections or from other dates. Sources: 1990: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, TFYR of Macedonia, Ukraine: Montgomery (2003). The remaining countries: United Nation Statistics Division (2005b). 1995: United Nations Statistics Division (2005a). The figures represent 1 July 1995. 2000: United Nation Statistics Division (2005b). 2005: Council of Europe (2005), official websites of the member states and IPU (2005).

One general indication from the average figures in Table 1 is that the process of increasing women’s legislative representation in the past 15 years has been rather slow. The average percentages in 1990 and in 2005 are quite similar, and less than 20 percent of the seats are held by women today. But, as Table 1 also shows, there are a few remarkable changes in women’s representation in some of the member states that are not apparent in the average figures. Since 1990 the largest increases have occurred in Western European states, such as Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Liechtenstein and Spain, where women’s share of the seats in the parliaments has risen about 20 percentage points in 15 years. On the other hand, in some Eastern European states, such as Albania, Armenia and Romania, women’s share of the legislative seats has declined by more than 20 percentage points during the same period of time. Previous research on the critical turn from communist to democratic regimes in Eastern Europe has shown this to be a clear pattern; the decline in women’s representation is massive in most of these countries (Matland and Montgomery 2003). Kathleen A. Montgomery labels the transitionary period from communist to democratic regimes ‘democratic consolidation’ (Montgomery 2003:2) and refuses to accept some researchers’ definition of the decline in women’s representation as a post-communist phenomenon. Montgomery’s argument is that the low share of seats for women is not isolated to post-communist areas, since very few of the Western countries in the world reach the level of 30 percent in relation to women’s representation in parliament (2003:5). For some of the countries in Table 1, the major changes in women’s representation occurred before 1990. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden had already reached the 30 percent level and have continued to increase these figures during the following 15 years (Bergqvist 1999). Iceland and Netherlands had reached the 20 percent level in 1990. In Western Europe, the political institutions have historically been more open to women in the protestant North than in the Catholic South. While women gained

6 suffrage around the First World War in the North, women did not become enfranchised until after the Second World War in the South, Liechtenstein being the last country in Europe to give women the vote (1984). It is possible to demonstrate a close link between the level of women’s representation and the number of years women have been enfranchised. However, the introduction of new active measures, such as quota provisions, are challenging our traditional theoretical explanations of what factors lead to a high representation of women. Due to a recent move, Spain with 36 percent women in parliament is about to surpass the countries in the North (Threlfall 2005). The remarkably high level of women’s representation in the Nordic countries is usually explained by a successful combination of structural factors (extended welfare states, social democracy, high level of education and labour market participation for women, secularism) and strong interventions by women’s organisations within the political parties and by the autonomous feminist movements (Freidenvall et al 2006). However, the previous constant increase in women’s parliamentary representation in Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland seems to have come to a halt at the one third level. In the last elections in Denmark and Iceland, women’s representation even decreased. Perhaps the prevailing time lag discourse explains the lack of public outcry following the actual drop, contrary to the extended debate in Sweden in 1991 after the first decrease in women’s representation in Sweden since the 1920s, a debate that resulted in Sweden surpassing the 40 percent threshold in the following 1994 election (Freidenvall 2003).

The time factor While Denmark, Finland and Norway seem to have hit a high level glass ceiling at about 30 percent, other countries are stuck at a much lower level, a low level glass ceiling, defined as constantly below 15 percent: Cyprus, Greece, France, Georgia, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. Are these differences related to the length of time that women have been enfranchised in the various countries?

7 Table 2. Women’s enfranchisement and parliamentary representation. Country The year women The year women The first woman Women in received the right received the right to elected or parliament, 1 to vote stand for election appointed Sept 2005, % 1900-1919 Finland 1906 1906 1907 E 38.0 Norway 1907 1907, 1913 1911 E 37.0 Denmark 1915 1915 1918 E 36.9 Iceland 1915, 1920 1915, 1920 1922 E 33.3 Austria 1918 1918 1919 E 33.0 Estonia 1918 1918 1919 E 19.8 Georgia 1918, 1921 1918, 1921 1992 E (current) 9.5 Germany 1918 1918 1919 E 32.8 Hungary 1918 1918 1920 E 9.1 Ireland 1918, 1928 1918, 1928 1918 E 13.9 Latvia 1918 1918 … 18.0 Poland 1918 1918 1919 E 20.4 Russian Fed. 1918 1918 1993 E (current) 9.8 United Kingdom 1918, 1928 1918, 1928 1918 E 19.7 Belgium 1919, 1948 1921, 1948 1921 A 34.7 Luxembourg 1919 1919 1919 E 20.0 Netherlands 1919 1917 1918 E 34.7 Sweden 1919, 1921 1919, 1921 1921 E 46.4 Ukraine 1919 1919 1990 E (current) 4.7 Average: 24.8 1920-1939 Albania 1920 1920 1945 E 5.7 Czech Republic 1920 1920 1992 E (current) 16.0 Slovakia 1920 1920 1992 E (current) 14.7 Armenia 1921 1921 1990 E (current) 5.3 Azerbaijan 1921 1921 1990 E (current) 10.4 Lithuania 1921 1921 1920 A 20.6 Romania 1929, 1946 1929, 1946 1946 E 11.2 Turkey 1930, 1934 1930, 1934 1935 A 4.4 Portugal 1931, 1976 1931, 1976 1934 E 25.2 Spain 1931 1931 1931 E 36.0 Average: 15.0 1940-1959 Bulgaria 1944 1944 1945 E 21.3 France 1944 1944 1945 E 12.3 Croatia 1945 1945 1992 E (current) 21.3 Italy 1945 1945 1946 E 6.8 Slovenia 1945 1945 1992 E (current) 13.3 Bosnia & Herz. 1946 1946 1990 E (current) 14.3 Macedonia 1946 1946 1990 E (current) 20.0 Malta 1947 1947 1966 E 9.2 Greece 1949, 1952 1949, 1952 1952 E 13.0 San Marino 1959 … … 16.7 Average: 14.8 1960- Cyprus 1960 1960 1963 e 10.0 Andorra 1970 1973 … 28.6 Switzerland 1971 1971 1971 e 26.5 Moldova 1978 1978 1990 e 21.8 Liechtenstein 1984 … … 24.0 Average: 22.2 Notes: “Current” means the first year a woman was elected in the current parliamentary system. When two years are presented, the first included some restrictions in voting rights.

8 Sources regarding women’s rights to vote, women’s rights to stand for election and the first woman elected/appointed: San Marino, Andorra and Liechtenstein: IPU (2006). The rest of the countries: UNDP (2005). Source for Women in parliament 1 sept 2005: Council of Europe (2005).

Table 2 provides an overview of women’s enfranchisement in Europe. Comparing women’s present representation in countries of the first wave of enfranchisement, 1990-1919, to the second, 1920-1939, and the third, 1940-1959, shows that women on the average are best represented in countries with early suffrage. The countries that deviate from this pattern are mostly, though not entirely, countries that have gone through major historical changes in the political system. When reading Table 2, it should be noted that it is not possible to isolate the effect of the length of women’s franchise from other important factors that influence women’s representation. This also becomes obvious when looking at the last countries to give women the right to vote and stand for election, 1960-. These countries have a relatively high average representation of women, 22.2 percent, and here women started in a totally different gender regime than those around the First World War.

Electoral systems and women’s representation Research has shown that a proportional electoral system has a better chance of securing women’s representation than other systems (Matland 2002). International IDEA:s figures regarding women’s representation on the basis of majoritarian and proportional systems shows an increasing gap in PR:s favour since the 1970:s (Matland 2002).3 This general finding is confirmed for Europe by the figures in Chart 1, which shows that women’s representation is by far the highest in Council of Europe member states which use a PR electoral system.

Chart 1. Women in the national parliaments, s/l house, according to electoral system.

25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% PR P/M Mixed

3 Norris (2004:188) has, however, shown that this correlation holds true mainly for industrialized countries, not for developing countries.

9 Note: Figures as of 1 September 2005. Key to electoral systems: PR = Proportional Representation systems; P/M = Plurality/Majority systems. Mixed = Mixed PR and P/M systems. Some of the systems in the P/M family do not demand that the winner obtain a majority of the votes, only more votes than any other candidate (e.g. the FPTP system). Source: Council of Europe (2005), official websites, Reynolds et al (2005).

Almost 70 percent of the Council of Europe’s member states use PR electoral systems, see Chart 2.

Chart 2. Electoral systems in the Council of Europe’s member states.

P/M Mixed4% 26% PR 70%

Sources: Council of Europe (2005), official websites, and Reynolds et al (2005).

The advantage of PR is confirmed when comparing the ranking of the member states regarding women’s representation in lower / single houses (see Chart 1). Of the top 10 countries in the ranking, 9 have PR systems, and these are the first 9 on the list. Of the 10 member states on the bottom of the ranking, 7 have mixed systems. Thus PR systems seem to represent a relative advantage for women. One advantage of PR systems is high district magnitude, i.e. the number of seats in the districts. This leads to high party magnitude, which is the anticipated number of elected per party in the districts. In plurality-majoritarian systems the district magnitude is low, often just one seat, and the party has to choose just one candidate to represent the party. (Matland 2002:6ff) This means that women and men compete against each other for the post, and since women are considered an “electoral risk” they are not likely to be chosen (Norris and Lovenduski 1995:195). When the district magnitude is higher and, hence, also party magnitude, the parties can ‘balance’ their lists, with less risk of losing votes. A third advantage of PR systems is ‘contagion’. Parties that compete over votes tend to adopt policies from other parties, e.g. policies concerning the number of women in top positions on party lists. (Matland 2002:6ff) Some PR systems have further advantages, such as closed lists: no preferential voting is available that can stop women in the top positions from being elected. (Krook 2005:7, Matland 2002:8) But in some Scandinavian elections voters do vote for women, and here the voters can be more progressive than the parties.

10 Sainsbury (1993) reformulate the effects of PR systems in relation to increased representation for women. It is not the PR systems as such that increase women’s representation, but they are more open to change: “Because of its multiple numbers of candidates, the proportional representation system is less resistant to change than the plurality-majority system, where each party only has one candidate” (Freidenvall et al 2006:59). The choice of PR as the electoral system is, however, just one factor, though different electoral systems do present different opportunities for interventions in order to enhance women’s political representation. The difficulties in applying any gender quota system in a plurality/majority electoral system (see below) may in the future lead to even bigger differences between women’s representation in the two systems. In the future, the dividing line in Europe in terms of the level of women’s representation will probably not follow any North/South or East/West line but will rather follow from variations in active measures to identify and overcome the barriers that prevent women’s equal representation with men.

Table 3. Women in government, 1980-2000. Member state Women in gov. Women in gov. Women in gov. Change (%) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 2000-1990 Armenia --- 0 0 0 Austria 12 15 36 +24 Croatia 0 10 11 +11 Cyprus 0 9 0 0 Czech Republic ------0 --- Denmark 21 35 45 +24 Estonia --- 13 13 --- Finland 28 39 39 +11 Georgia ------11 --- Iceland 9 10 33 +24 Ireland 7 13 20 +13 Latvia 0 7 7 +7 Lithuania 0 5 8 +8 Netherlands 14 29 29 +15 Norway 47 42 42 -5 Republic of Moldova ------7 --- Romania ------24 --- Slovenia 7 11 20 +13 Spain 11 19 12 +1 Sweden 36 50 50 +14 Turkey 3 6 0 -3 United Kingdom 8 10 29 +21 Average 10 15 20 +10 Note: --- No figures available. The figure for Romania is from 2001. Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005). The figures for Denmark and Sweden in 1980, 1990 and 1995: Bergqvist (1999). The figure for Denmark in 2000: Council of Europe (2002). Data not available for all countries.

11 Women’s share of the executive power in the form of government posts in the 20 member states, see Table 3, has seen a small rise in the years 1980 - 2000. The average figure for women’s representation in minister posts has increased during the years mentioned, but only by 10 percentage points in total. For some of the countries, the 20 and 30 percent levels had already been reached in 1990. One big change, not visible in this table, occurred in Norway between 1980 and 1990, where women’s share of the minister posts increased from 12 percent to 47 percent in ten years (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2005). Major changes also occurred in the rest of the Nordic countries, as well as in Austria, Netherlands and United Kingdom. Austria, Iceland and UK all saw increased representation for women of about 20 percentage points between the years of 1995 and 2000. Some other countries have seen both a rise and a decline of women in executive power, for example Cyprus and Spain. The present situation will be dealt with in Section 4.

Table 4. Women judges 1980-2000. Percent. Member state Women Women Women Women judges (%) judges (%) judges (%) judges (%) 1980 1990 1995 2000 Armenia 19 19 13 21 Austria ------19 23 Croatia 31 45 53 61 Cyprus 0 5 15 21 Czech Republic 47 56 62 63 Estonia ------62 Finland 28 46 51 --- France ------43 Georgia ------15 34 Germany 14 19 26 28 Hungary ------70 68 Iceland ------27 27 Ireland ------13 16 Lithuania --- 26 45 51 Netherlands ------34 41 Norway ------27 Republic of Moldova 16 13 13 30 Romania ------63 69 Slovenia 45 55 62 68 Spain --- 27 31 36 United Kingdom ------16 Average 25 31 36 40 Note: --- No figures available. The figures for Norway and United Kingdom are from 2001. Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005)

For some of the member states, figures for the previous distribution of judicial power are available. Table 4 shows the average distribution among judges between women and men. In some of these 21 member states, women’s share has been stable at around

12 20 percent. But in Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia, women’s share has been lifted to between 51 and 69 percent during these years. The average figures show a modest increase between each given year, but they also demonstrate that a 40-60 distribution in these occupations is possible. To sum up: Women are still strongly under-represented in political and public life in Europe. The last decades have, however, witnessed some progress, even if the speed of the increase has been very modest and some backlashes have occurred.

13 Analyses of the current situation

2. Legislative power: women in parliaments

2.1 National parliaments

The share of seats in the lower/single houses of national parliaments today is, as evident from Chart 3, still unbalanced between women and men. In the Council of Europe’s member states, women’s average share of the legislative seats is 19.8 percent. In other words, of the total seats in lower/single houses in all member states, men hold more than 80 percent. Women reach 30 percent in only ten of these 46 states, and the Council of Europe’s target of 40 percent women has only been attained in one state.

14 Chart 3. Women and men in national parliaments, single / lower house.

Sweden Finland Norway Denmark Spain Netherlands Belgium Iceland Austria Germany Andorra Switzerland Portugal Liechtenstein Rep of Moldova Bulgaria Croatia Monaco Lithuania Poland Luxembourg TFYR of Macedonia Estonia United Kingdom Latvia San Marino Czech Republic Slovakia Bosnia & Ireland Slovenia Greece France Romania Azerbaijan Serbia & Montenegro Cyprus Russian Federation Georgia Malta Hungary Italy Albania Armenia Ukraine Turkey

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Sources: The figures for Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Georgia, Malta, Poland, Republic of Moldavia, Romania, Russian Federation and San Marino: IPU (2005) and official websites of the member states. The remaining figures: Council of Europe (2005).

16 of the Council of Europe’s member states have bicameral parliaments. In relation to the lower houses presented previously, there is an even more distorted balance

15 between women and men in the upper houses. The average share of seats for women is 17.3 percent in upper houses.

Chart 4. Women and men in national parliament, upper house.

Belgium Netherlands Austria Spain Switzerland German y United Kingdom France Ireland Poland Czech Republic Romania Slovenia Italy Bosnia & Herzegovina Russian Federation

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Sources: The figures for Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Russian Federation: IPU (2005) and official websites of the member states. The rest of the figures: Council of Europe (2005).

The 40 percent target, set by Council of Europe, has not been reached by any of the member states, and in only two of these states do women constitute 30 percent of the members. Some of the members in upper houses are appointed, like in the Belgian case. These nominations could have been used as a counterbalance to the elections in relation to women’s representation, but the nominations in Belgium’s upper house still do not provide women with an equal share of the seats. In the most recent composition of the upper house, 34 of the 74 members were appointed; 10 of these were women and 24 were men.

16 2.2 Regional parliaments

The number of regional parliaments in each state ranges from 1 to 26, with a total of 103. In these parliaments women hold 2162 of the 7814 seats, which is equivalent to 27.7 percent. In the top three countries, women have obtained 30 percent of the seats, but the 40 percent goal set by Council of Europe is not met by any of the states (see Chart 5). Azerbaijan and Portugal have the lowest number of women in their regional assemblies.

Chart 5. Women and men in regional parliament.

Spain Germany Belgium Austria Switzerland Bosnia & Herzegovina Serbia and Montenegro Italy Portugal Azerbaijan

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Source: Council of Europe (2005).

2.3 Local Councils

The average figure for women in local government is 24.7 percent, but the situation in the member states varies greatly, as seen in Chart 6. On the one hand, nearly 80 percent of the Hungarian municipality councillors are women. On the other hand, in 11 of the 27 countries, more than 80 percent of the municipal councillors are men. Except for the extraordinary situation in Hungary, only two other member states reach the Council of Europe’s target of 40 percent women (see Chart 6). A comparison of women’s representation in national and local assemblies (see Chart 3 and 6) shows that women in general do better at the local level, even if there are exceptions to this, as in the cases of Denmark, Belgium and Croatia.

17 Chart 6. Women and men in local councils.

Hungary Sweden Latvia Finland Norway Monaco Iceland Estonia Liechtenstein Denmark Belgium Spain Germany Serbia & Lithuania Cyprus Ireland Luxembourg Italy Bosnia & Netherlands Portugal Slovenia Czech Croatia Armenia Azerbaijan

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Source: Council of Europe (2005). Data not available for all countries.

2.4 International Assemblies

On the supra-national level, the European Parliament has held elections since 1979. The MEP:s are elected for a five-year period, and six elections have been held during the 26 years. Before the first election in 1979, the non-elected parliament consisted of 6 percent women and 94 percent men (European Parliament 2005). Over the 6 elections between 1979 and 2004, women’s representation has increased from 16 percent to 28 percent (European Parliament 2004, 2005). Over the last three elections, women’s representation in the European Parliament seems to have stabilized at approximately one third of the seats. The top result of 30 percent in 1999 was followed by a small decrease in women’s representation in the election of 2004 (European Parliament 1999, 2004). It is, however, difficult to make comparisons between these election results, since the number of member states has changed

18 between each election. Because of the inclusion of 10 new member states, serious concern was expressed prior to the 2004 election. There was a general fear that women’s representation would drop. That the result was only this minor decline may be due to the campaigns to prevent this from happening, as well as the fact that women’s representation in general is not lower in the Eastern than in the Western part of Europe. In this election to the European parliament, Slovenia and Italy for the first time introduced gender quotas by law. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly consists of representatives from each of the current member states, with a total of 630 Assembly members. The size of the country determines its number of representatives and, hence, its number of votes. The delegations are appointed by the parliament in each member state and they consist of representatives of the national political parties. The number of representatives in the national delegations currently ranges from two to eighteen. In 2003 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted the Resolution 1348 (2003) Gender-balanced representation in the Parliamentary Assembly establishing that “[n]ational delegations should include the under-represented sex at least in the same percentage as is present in their parliaments and in any case one representative of each sex.” As Ireland and Malta did not comply with this rule in 2004, Resolution 1360 (2004) Contested Credentials of the parliamentary delegations of Ireland and Malta suspended their voting rights in the Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly can, therefore, be said to use a form of active measure for the national delegations, including implementing sanctions for non-compliance.

19 3. Measures and practices for promoting women’s political representation in legislative bodies

Today, many international bodies recommend that active measures be applied in order to reach gender balance in politics. The target of such recommendations is the member states and their political parties as well as the international organizations themselves. Such recommendations have rendered legitimately to the claims for more women in public life made by women’s organizations and other NGOs. As the focus is increasing the quantitative representation of women in political institutions, electoral gender quotas are increasingly becoming an option.

3.1 Electoral gender quotas: A global trend – and maybe a future European trend Electoral gender quotas are being introduced all over the world today with amazing speed. Although highly controversial, the use of gender quotas in public elections is a new global trend. During just the last decade and a half, slightly more than 40 countries in the world introduced legal quotas, e.g. quota rules inscribed in constitutional or electoral law. In more than 50 other countries major political parties have introduced gender quotas for their own list for public elections, e.g. voluntary party quotas. This is an amazing new development, which challenges our previous theories that improvement in women’s education and women’s access to the labour market is a prerequisite for an increase in women’s political representation. In this section we will look at the extent to which electoral gender quotas have been introduced in Europe, and what quota type is the preferred in a European context. Quotas represent a challenge to the “time lag” discourse, so well known in Europe. According to the time lag thesis, women’s under-representation will correct itself as time goes by, in connection with the social and economic development of society and, consequently, no specific or only very modest measures are needed in this regard. But, as Mona Lena Krook argues, “women’s representation in some rich countries remains well below that achieved in many poor countries, suggesting that political measures to increase women’s representation appear even in absence of previously assumed social and economic prerequisites” (Krook 2005:3). Today, we are witnessing historical leaps in women’s representation, most often in post-conflict societies and in countries in transition to democracy. The

20 Scandinavian countries’ previous world record in women’s representation is being challenged by South Africa, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Argentina – not to speak of Rwanda, which now has the highest share of women in parliament in the entire world, 48.8 percent. Gender quotas are part of the explanation behind the exceptional historical leaps in women’s representation in the countries mentioned. Where does Europe stand in this development?

Defining electoral gender quotas Electoral gender quotas are here defined as written regulations, in law or in party statutes, which establish a fixed percentage or number for the representation of women for public election. ‘Soft quotas’ may be used about less strict rules, such as targets or recommendations. In this section we focus on formally decided and written fixed quota provisions in law or party statutes. Quotas for internal party structures are also important but are not dealt with in the following. There is, however, some confusion as to what constitutes different quota regimes. In the book Women, Quotas and Politics we distinguish between two separate dimensions in the definition of quota systems: The first dimension covers the question of who has mandated the quota system, while the second dimension indicates what part of the selection and nomination process is targeted by the quota. As for the mandating, legal gender quotas and voluntary party quotas are the two main types. Legal quotas are mandated either by the constitution (as in France, Burkina Faso, Nepal, the Philippines and Uganda) or by the electoral law (as in many parts of Latin America as well as, for example, in Belgium, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Serbia and Sudan). But quotas may also be decided on voluntarily by political parties themselves, voluntary party quotas. In some countries, including Sweden, Norway, Italy, Germany and outside Europe, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, a number of political parties have introduced quotas. In many others, though, only one or two parties have opted to use quotas such as Spain. However, if the leading party in a country uses a quota, such as Spain or the ANC in South Africa, this may have a significant impact on the overall rate of female representation. Yet most of the world’s political parties do not employ any kind of quota at all. Concerning the second dimension, quotas may target the first stage of the selection process, the stage of finding aspirants, e.g. those willing to be considered for nomination, either through a primary or by a nominating committee or other parts of

21 the party organization. Gender quotas at this stage are rules that require a certain number or percentage of women or of either sex be represented in the pool of candidates that are up for discussion, such as the controversial ‘women’s short lists’ in Great Britain. The second stage is the actual nomination of candidates to be placed on the ballot by the party. This frequently used quota system involves a rule (legal or voluntary) being established according to which, for instance, 20, 30, 40 or even 50 percent of the candidates must be women. This may also be formulated in a gender- neutral way, stating that no sex should have less than 40 percent and no more than 60. At the third stage, those elected, we find quotas as reserved seats. Here it is decided that a certain percentage or number of the members of a parliament or local council must be women. Increasingly, gender quotas are being introduced using reserved seat systems, although not in Europe. The difference between legal quotas and voluntary party quotas should not be exaggerated. Within both systems we find effective as well as purely symbolic cases. However, legal quota systems may include some legal sanctions for non- compliance, which are absent when quotas are voluntary. In their investigation of quotas in the Balkan region, Milica Antic and Sonja Lokar conclude that women’s organizations had to start demanding quotas by law, since during the first period of voluntary party quotas, initiated by the parties on the left, the parties were not willing to respect the quota rules of their own statutes (Antic and Lokar 2006)

The preferred gender quota types in Europe By combining the two above mentioned dimensions, firstly, the question of mandating and, secondly, the question of where in the nomination process quotas are placed, one can identify different types of gender quotas in use in various regions of the world. That different regions in the world prefer different gender quota systems is no doubt a consequence of variations in electoral systems and political systems in general (Dahlerup 2006, figure 14.1, p. 294, see also IDEA and Stockholm University 2006). Whereas legal reserved seat systems are in use in countries with gender quotas in the Arab world, in Africa and in South Asia, this quota type is today not in use in Europe. Latin America is the leading region when it comes to using legal candidate quotas. Where does Europe stand?

22 3.2 Legal gender quotas in Europe As Table 5 shows, legal candidate quotas are used by only six European countries. Only six of the world’s more than 40 countries with legal quotas are found in Europe. The post-conflict region of the Balkans represents three of these six European cases. It could be added that even the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has operated a gender quota system (33%) since 2001 for its regional assembly.

Table 5. Countries in Europe with constitutional quota and/or election law quota regulation for candidates to national parliaments, lower/single house. Country Elect. System Year of Intro Percent Quota Women in Parl. % (1 Sept 2005) Armenia Parallel 1999 5% 5.3 Belgium List PR 1994, 2002 50% 34.7 Bosnia-Herz. List PR 1999 33% 14.3 France Two Rounds 1999, 2000 50% 12.3 Macedonia List PR 2002 30% 20,0 S&M: Serbia List PR 2004 30% 11.3 Note: Year of introduction is the year the law or constitution was passed, not the year of the first election after the passage of the quota regulations. The figure for Serbia is from the last election (2003). For the 2004 election to the European Parliament, Slovenia and Italy introduced legal quotas. Greece has legal quotas only for the local level (Leyenaar 2004:227). Italy operated a quota law for national, regional and local levels from 1993 to 1995. Source: Council of Europe (2005); Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005, updated); Antic and Lokar (2006).

The quotas regulations range from 5 to 50 percent of the electoral candidates. Even so, the only one of these member states that actually reaches the legally prescribed quota is Armenia, the country with the lowest limit (5 percent). Women’s share of the seats in the Armenian national parliament is 5.3 percent, just above the legal quota prescription. Even if such a low quota requirement might pave the way for the first representation of women in a country, there is a risk that this becomes not just a minimum but also a maximum limit, a low level glass ceiling for women’s representation in the future. Table 5 reveals that a quota provision of, say, 30 percent does not automatically result in one third women being elected. Women’s representation in these member states varies from 5.3 to 34.7 percent, and the average share of parliamentary seats is 16.3 percent. It is thus important to look at some of the critical factors for a successful quota system.

23 Additional rules: Sanctions for non-compliance and rank order Research on legal gender quotas has pointed to the importance of having sanctions in case of non-compliance in the law. Otherwise, quotas may be just a symbolic gesture. A crucial issue has also proven to be whether there are any rules concerning the rank order on the party lists. A requirement of, say, 40 percent may not result in any women being elected, if all women candidates are placed at the bottom of the list. The crucial question is whether the women nominated are placed in a position with a real chance of election. Five of the six countries mentioned (all but Armenia) have legally prescribed sanctions for non-compliance, and there are also rank-order rules present in four of these six states. Yet, it is apparent from Table 5 that something is missing or going wrong in the implementation processes. One possible explanation is that the sanctions are not implemented or that they are too timid. The financial penalty in the case of France at the national level was evidently not a problem for the parties, and women’s representation only increased from 10.9 to 12.3 percent. In contrast, a big change occurred at the municipal level in France, where women’s representation rose as much as 22 percentage points (from 25 percent to 47 percent), almost reaching the parity target. The reason for this was that the electoral commission in local elections has the authority, and used it, to reject party lists that did not comply with the law. Consequently, the political parties searched seriously for women candidates, which is in fact the raison d’être of the quota system! (Sineau 2002; Norris 2004:196, Krook et al 2006). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, a PR system was introduced before the national elections in 2002 and was one of the factors behind the increased share of seats for women, along with stern lobbying action (Antic and Lokar 2006:156). The fact that the 30 percent quota law has still not been met, despite clear regulations regarding sanctions for non-compliance, is explained by the lack of rank order rules, according to Antic and Lokar (2006:156) Women’s share of the seats in the current Macedonian parliament is 20 percent, in contrast to the 30 percent quota law. Compared to France, Belgium’s quota regulation has been successful. As a consequence of a fruitful interplay between the voluntary party quotas adopted during the last decade and ever more radical legislation, Belgium has now move up among the top of the world rank order in terms of women’s parliamentary representation (Meier 2004). Today Belgium matches countries like Denmark, Norway and Finland

24 – countries that had all moved over the 30 percent threshold in 1990 when Belgium had only nine percent women in parliament (see Table 1). The 2002 law in Belgium requires that no sex can have more than one more than the other on a party’s list for election. For smaller lists this requirement can result in less than 50 percent women on the list. In terms of rank order, the 2002 law demanded that for the 2003 election the top three on the list shall not be of the same sex, for the following election the top two shall not be of the same sex. The result of 35.3 percent women (see Table 5) is not in contradiction with the law. Despite a zipping-rule regarding the top two positions on the lists, there is no rank ordering for the rest of the list, except for the total number of either sex. One should also keep in mind that candidate quotas are about the composition of the list that is presented to the voters, in contrast to reserved seats quota systems that prescribe the number of women to be elected. An additional factor for the Belgian result is the fact that the district magnitude has been reduced from 20 to 11 districts in recent years, leaving fewer seats available for the parties to compete over (Krook et al 2006:209). In the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina, rank-order rules and closed lists (no preferential voting) increased women’s representation in the election of 1998, but the implementation of open lists in the following election was clearly a factor when women’s representation decreased again (Antic and Lokar 2006:155). Today, women hold 14.3 percent of the seats, in contrast to the legal quota of 33 percent. The parliament and the state union of Serbia & Montenegro have existed for two years since the beginning of 2003, when the states of Serbia and Montenegro formed a State Union. The new unicameral Assembly is composed of the previous state assemblies of the two states, indirectly elected for an “initial period”, and women hold 10.3 percent of the seats in this new parliament. Consequently the new legal quota regulations have not been tested yet (Serbia and Montenegro official website 2005). In the Serbian national parliament a 30 percent quota did not result in more than 11.3 percent women being elected.

3.3 Voluntary party quotas in Europe

The most widespread type of gender quotas in Europe is voluntary party quotas, that is quota rules implemented by individual parties themselves. Studying Western Europe, USA, New Zealand and Australia, Krook, Lovenduski and Squires make the distinction between party and legal quotas, on the one hand, and ‘soft’ quotas, on the

25 other. Soft quotas are measures that seek to increase women’s representation, either indirectly through internal party quotas, for instance for the steering board, or more directly through informal targets and recommendations (2006:195-196). Studying Sweden’s political parties, Lenita Freidenvall has also identified several strategies for political parties when trying to reach an increased representation for women. Her study shows the adoption of three different strategies: general goals, recommendations, and quotas. General goals include written statements regarding the importance of a balanced representation between women and men but have no specific figures or time limits. This is a rhetorical change, a way to affect the understanding of the current situation. Recommendations, on the other hand, include specific percentages and sometimes defined time frames for the process. However, the recommendations are voluntary and not a part of the party regulations. Finally, quotas can, as shown here, be adopted in a range of versions, and one way is to introduce legal quotas or - which may prove just as efficient - formal and compelling regulations decided by the parties themselves. Party quotas can be used for external representation, i.e. electoral quotas (party lists), and/or for internal elections and appointed positions within the party. (Freidenvall forthcoming). In the following sections the use in Europe of voluntary party quotas, that is regulations formally included in the party statutes, are studied. Are the effects of voluntary party quotas in fact better than the effects of legal quotas discussed in the previous section? In more than 20 of the Council of Europe’s 46 member countries, political parties have themselves decided to introduce quota rules concerning their selections and nominations for public election (see Table 6). In no European country without legal quotas do we see all of the political parties having passed quota laws. Party quotas are most used are party quotas in Norway, where five out of seven parties apply gender quotas (40%). In Sweden three parties, all on the left, have quota rules that are compulsory for the local parties in their nominations, while most other Swedish parties work on recommendations and targets, so called ‘soft quotas’ (Freidenvall 2003, Freidenvall et al 2006). In Germany and Austria a majority of the parties represented in parliament use gender quotas for their electoral lists.

26 Table 6. European countries with voluntary party quotas. Lower/single house 1) Country Electoral system Year of Quota % Women in parl. introduction (as of 1 Sept 2005) Austria List PR 1980-90s 33-50% 33.9 Croatia 2) List PR 1990s 40% 12.1 Cyprus List PR N/A 25% 10.0 Czech Republic List PR N/A 25% 16.0 Germany MMP 1980-90s 33-50 32.8 Greece List PR N/A 40% 13.0 Hungary MMP N/A 20% 9.1 Iceland 3) List PR 1990s 40% 33.3 Ireland STV 1990s-2000s 25-40% 13.9 Italy MMP N/A 20-50% 6.8 Lithuania Parallel 1990s 33% 20.6 Luxembourg List PR N/A 33-50 20.0 Malta STV N/A 20% 9.2 Moldova List PR N/A N/A 21.8 S&M:Montenegro List PR 1999 20% 10.6 Netherlands List PR N/A 50% 34.7 Norway List PR 1970 40% 37.0 Poland List PR 1990s 30% 20.4 Portugal List PR N/A 33% 25.2 Romania List PR N/A 25-30% 11.2 Slovakia List PR N/A 20-50% 14.7 Slovenia List PR N/A 25-33% 13.3 Spain List PR 1990s 40% 36.0 Sweden List PR 1980-90s 50% 46.4 Switzerl. List PR N/A 40% 26.5 United Kingdom FPTP 1980-90s N/A 19.7 1) Countries with legal quotas in Table 5. 2) The United Lists of Socialists applied a 40% quota only for the 1996 election. 3) In 1983-99 a Women’s Party (100% women) was represented in the Icelandic parliament with a maximum of 10% of the seats. Source: Council of Europe (2005); Antic & Lokar (2006); Freidenvall et al (2006); IDEA and Stockholm University (2006); Matland and Montgomery (2003).

Table 6 reveals that the political parties in Europe apply a variety of quota requirements, from 20 to 50 percent. Women’s representation in these member states ranges from 6.8 percent in Italy to 46.4 percent in Sweden, and the average share of seats is 21.1 percent. When only one figure is shown for a country in Table 6, this might indicate either that only one party in that country has used gender quotas, as is the case in Spain, Portugal and Greece, where the Social Democratic parties have introduced gender quotas for their lists, or, notably in the Nordic countries, that all parties in those countries which apply party quotas use the same percentage, be it 40 percent as in Norway (5 of 7 parties) or 50 percent in Sweden (3 of 7 parties). This should be interpreted as a result of competition, a case of contagion from one party to another.

27 If both party quotas and legal quotas are in use, as in Belgium, the country is listed under legal quotas. A party quota system in a country with legal quotas is only of interest if the party’s quota provision is higher than that required by law, which has been the case in Belgium (Meier 2004). In most countries with party quotas, the initiative came from the left parties, and in many countries only the socialists and, if represented, the Greens, use gender quotas, as in the Netherlands, Lithuania, Spain and Greece. In the ‘zipper system’ used by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and most European Green parties, two nomination list combined, one with women candidates and one with men candidates, and, consequently, the only question left to decide is whether the list is to be topped by the first man or the first women. In the case of small parties and/or small constituencies, such a decision may, however, be decisive for the general gender profile of the party in parliament.

3.4 Countries without quotas

In Europe, 15 countries do not apply any gender quotas. As Table 7 reveals we find countries with the highest representation of women, like Denmark and Finland, in this category side by side with countries with very low women’s representation, like Georgia and Turkey (Bergqvist 1999; Arat 2000; WPRC 2004). The average share of legislative seats for women in these countries is 18.7 percent, ranging from 4.4 percent in Turkey to 38 percent in Finland.

Table 7. European countries with no type of quotas for parliamentary elections to lower/single house. Country Electoral System Women in parliament (as of 1 Sept 2005) Albania MMP 5.7 Andorra Parallel 28.6 Azerbaijan Parallel 22.1 Bulgaria List PR 21.3 Denmark a) List PR 36.9 Estonia List PR 19.8 Finland b) List PR 38.0 Georgia Parallel 9.5 Latvia List PR 18.0 Liechtenstein List PR 24.0 Monaco Parallel 20.8 Russia Parallel 9.8 San Marino List PR 16.7 Turkey List PR 4.4 Ukraine Parallel 4.7 Notes:

28 a) In the 1980s, 3 Danish parties introduced gender quotas but abolished them again in the 1990s. One smaller party, however, has recently introduced gender quotas. b) Finland (and Norway) have a 40% gender quota for local committees and boards, incl. the steering board of local councils. c) Both Italy and Slovenia introduced legal quotas for the election to the European Parliament in 2005. Source: Council of Europe (2005); Freidenvall et al (2006); Matland and Montgomery (2003); IDEA and Stockholm University (2006), IPU (2006).

The post-Soviet countries are overrepresented among the European countries having no quota provisions at all. There is strong resistance to any quota provision in countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. This resistance, which is also well- known in all Central and Eastern European countries, partly rests on a wish to dissociate oneself from the quota systems of the Soviet past. It is often heard that under communism a quota system of 30 percent women was established. One can, however, argue that this type of resistance to quota systems today partly rests on a contemporary construction of a myth about the past. The political institutions in the Soviet period were as male dominated as in the West. Moreover, the systems of nomination and election varied considerably between the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s and 80s, women’s representation increased slowly in Eastern Europe, as it did in Western Europe.4 Table 7 includes countries with a long history of very high women’s representation, first and foremost the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland. Consequently, we must ask what factors led to this results. Studies have shown that in all three countries women’s movements, including women’s sections within the political parties, worked hard ever since women’s enfranchisement to further women’s political representation (Bergqvist 1999; Leyenaar 2004; Freidenvall et al 2006). In spite of strong resistance to formal gender quotas, many other forms of measures have been implemented. Present actions in the Netherlands can serve as an example. Monique Leyenaar describes how all political parties since the 1990s have

4 Under communism, women’s representation in the powerful Central Committees of the Communist Parties was negligible but somewhat higher in the mostly symbolic parliaments. A few figures may contradict the myth of a stable quota provision for women of thirty percent: In the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, women’s representation (full members) was eight percent in 1981, increasing only to thirteen percent in 1986, an historical high (Lapidus 1978; Browning 1987). Women had thirty-one percent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and as many as forty-eight percent in the local Soviets in 1975. Women’s representation in the parliaments in many Eastern European countries increased during the 1970s and 1980s, but the system of selection or appointment varied from country to country (Wolchik and Meyer 1985). Research from the 1980s shows no sign of a stable and widespread 30 percent quota for women. Maybe it is time to rewrite the script of the quota discussion in these countries.

29 practised some kind of affirmative action policy for women. Several parties set up contracts between the national party leadership and the local and regional party branches concerning an ‘intended percentage’ of women’s representation. From the mid 1980s organisations could even apply for government grants to hire a consultant with the job of advancing women’s position in the organisation (Leyenaar 2004:173- 175). It should be added that in all European countries with a high representation of women, the women’s movement has successfully challenged the nomination criteria, the composition of the nomination committees (the demand for 50 percent women in these bodies) and criticised the many night-time meetings and in general the male political culture of politics. However, after decades of constant increase, women’s representation in Finland and especially in Denmark, the only Nordic countries with no electoral gender quotas for the national parliament, has come to a standstill. Women’s representation seems to have hit a glass ceiling at one third in Danish national elections and one fourth in regional and local elections, which is low compared to Sweden’s over 40 percent.5 Comparing the discourses on gender equality in Denmark and Sweden, Drude Dahlerup concludes that the lack of pressure for more equality in the case of Denmark is based on a general understanding (outside the feminist movements) that equality has more or less been achieved, or it will no doubt come soon, an example of the time lag thesis. In contrast, the general discourse in Sweden is that women are still ‘oppressed’ and that active measures are needed (Dahlerup 2004). Summing up: A comparison of the three tables in this section reveals that gender quotas are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for gender balance in politics. Nevertheless, some remarkable historical leaps in women’s representation have taken place because of quotas. The conclusion is that gender quotas can enhance women’s political representation in numerical terms under certain conditions. Important are sanctions for non-compliance and rules about the rank order of male and female candidates on the lists, or public criticism and sanctions by the voters in case of voluntary party quotas. The most important consequence of successful quota regulations is that the political parties start to search seriously for women candidates for their list.

5 Norway and Finland have passed laws requiring 40 percent of both genders in public boards and committees in local politics (Guldvik 2005;77f).

30 In general, Europe has represented the incremental track – in its quota discourses as well as in its actual historical development. Recently, however, some countries like Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Spain have joined the new trend to move into the fast track. Other examples of fast track policy are found in some post- conflict societies and countries in transition to democracy. Mozambique and South Africa (party quotas) as well as Rwanda, Uganda, Iraq, Costa Rica and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh at the local level (all legal quotas) have succeeded much faster in reaching a high representation for women in legislatures than many of the older democracies (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006, see IPU 2006; International IDEA and Stockholm University 2006).

3.5 Are gender quotas discrimination of men? Should gender quotas be gender neutral or gender specific regulations? The consequences of this choice may be different, according to Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005). A gender-specific quota, i.e. ‘women-based’, are more explicit about defining women’s under-representation in relation to men but might also place a stigma on the women elected. One reason for the gender-neutral quota formulation is thus that it might avoid some conflicts and stigmas. A gender-neutral quota regulation will set a minimum and a maximum percent for both women and men, but a known consequence is that men in some cases have been helped to better positions in party lists. There is a way, though, to avoid these consequences, and that is to adopt a 50-50 system. “In a 50-50 per cent quota system, the question of stigmatization of the elected women (‘elected just because you are a woman’) is not relevant, since both men and women are there as a result of the quota” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:39). In 1984 a Danish male politician was elected as a member of the European parliament because of his party’s gender quotas. He was lifted up and placed as number two on the list of the Socialist People’s Party for the election, after the internal referendum on candidates among the party membership had placed four women at the top of the list. Consequently, the man was elected as one of two for the party (closed lists). Nobody asked him if he had problems being elected as a ‘quota man’! The resistance to gender quotas seems to be stronger in Europe than in most other regions of the world, which may be a consequence of the dominant liberal

31 concept of democracy and citizenship: “Let the best man (sic) win”. Within this frame, gender quotas are considered ‘artificial’ and discrimination against men. This argument rests on the assumption that society is already fair and that the overwhelmingly male dominance in politics is just a result of a fair selection process. If, however, discrimination and mechanisms of exclusion are the main diagnosis of women’s under-representation, then gender quotas are not discrimination of men, but compensation to women for actual discrimination – and a measure to prevent future discrimination (Bacchi 2006). “The core idea behind quota systems is to recruit women into political positions and to ensure that women are not only a few tokens in political life” (Dahlerup 2002:1).

3.6 Quotas and plurality-majority systems – a bad equation? The recent introduction of gender quotas may even further widen the gap between women’s representation in PR systems versus plurality-majority systems. This is due to the fact that quotas work differently under different electoral systems. Only a few countries operating under a plurality-majority system have introduced gender quotas – for how to deal with, for instance, 30 percent of one? Consequently, majority systems using quotas operate mostly on the level of aspirant quotas, as the UK short lists, or use reserved seat systems, as in India and Bangladesh at the local level (Matland 2006). Quota systems might also interfere with the prerogatives of the local party organisations to nominate the candidates they want without interference from the central party organisation. But even in a PR system, because of the few candidates elected, small parties and parties in small constituencies experience difficulties in implementing quotas without interference from the central party organization. For the election to the new Scottish parliament quotas were introduced by the Labour Party. Here the problem of combining single-member districts and quotas were solved by ‘twinning’ two constituencies that taken together should nominate one man and one woman. This system had the result that women’s representation in the Scottish parliament far overtook the Westminster parliament. The Scottish example reveals that quotas in plurality-systems are in fact possible. One could also imagine a legal quota system, in which the parties must nominate a candidate from the under-represented sex for every free seat, following the

32 withdrawal of the incumbent MP. Such quota measures are not yet in use in public elections. Similar equality measure are, however, in use concerning appointments to positions in a sex-segregated labour market - though always heavily contested.

33 4. Executive power

4.1 Heads of state

In the Council of Europe’s 46 member states, 6 women and 40 men hold the position of Head of State. As Chart 7 shows, this is equivalent to 13 percent and 87 percent, respectively. The member states where women hold this post are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

Chart 7. Head of state, percent. Chart 8. Head of Government, percent.

Wom en Wom en 2% 13%

Men Men 87% 98%

Sources: Council of Europe (2005), official websites. Sources: Council of Europe (2005), official websites.

There are differences between the appointed, elected and inherited positions as head of state. Regarding the inherited seats, 10 of the member states are monarchies and in 8 of these women can inherit the crown. In Denmark, Netherlands and United Kingdom we find the present 3 women monarchs. Regarding the appointed positions, 9 men are appointed and no women. The elected positions also have a distorted distribution between the sexes; 3 women and 24 men are elected Heads of State. The 3 countries that have elected women heads of state are Finland, Ireland and Latvia. But the most obvious example of unbalanced power between women and men is the position of head of government (see Chart 8), where all but one in the member states

34 are men. The only exception is Germany, where Angela Merkel became Head of Government in 2005. In fact, we have not seen so few women prime ministers in Europe for a long time. During the last three decades, the following countries in Europe have had a woman prime minister: United Kingdom (1979-1990), Portugal (1979-1980), Norway (1981, 1986-89, 1990-96, 1998), Yugoslavia (1982-86), Lithuania (1990-91, 1999), France (1991-92), Poland (1992-93), Turkey (1993-96), Bulgaria (1994-95), Finland (2003), Macedonia (2004), Ukraine (2005) and Germany (2005-) (Christensen 2006).

4.2 National governments

The distribution of ministerial positions can be analyzed in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. Regarding the numerical distribution of women and men, the 45 member states presented in Chart 9 show quite varied distributions. The average figure for women in government in the member states is 17.8 percent, but the distribution of women ranges from 0 percent to 52.4 percent. As evident in Chart 9, only 6 of the member states reach the Council of Europe target of 40 percent women, and as many as 8 countries have no women at all in their governments. A majority of the governments consists of 80 percent or more men.

35 Chart 9. Women and men in government.

Sweden Spain Austria Norway Finland Germany Netherlands Croatia Denmark Iceland UK Latvia Belgium Andorra Ireland Liechtenstein France Slovenia Bulgaria Czech Republic Macedonia Estonia Lithuania Malta Luxembourg Switzerland Portugal Romania San Marino Hungary Poland Moldova Bosnia & Herzegovina Greece Italy Georgia Turkey Armenia Azerbaijan Cyprus Monaco Russian Federation Serbia & Montenegro Slovakia Ukraine

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Note: Figures for Albania are not available. Sources: The figures for Andorra, Bulgaria, Georgia, Malta, Poland, Republic of Moldavia, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, TFYR of Macedonia, Ukraine and United Kingdom: official websites of the member states. The figure for Russian Federation is from 2004; Source: Russia Profile (2005). The remaining figures: Council of Europe (2005).

36 Men and women are also given separate responsibilities when allocating ministerial posts. In the Council of Europe study “The Situation of Women in the Political Process in Europe” published in 1984, a traditional allocation of ministries between women and men was noted. At that time, women in the member states governments in general held posts in the ministries of Health, Social Affairs, Education and Consumer Affairs, and only a few exceptions were noted (Council of Europe 1984). That kind of stereotyping of political posts in relation to gender has been a relatively common aspect of European governments, according to Joni Lovenduski (1986). “Women leaders tend still to be assigned to posts in the ‘soft’ ministries of family, welfare, culture and /…/ education” (Lovenduski 1986:241). This quotation was written almost 20 years ago, but is still to some extent relevant in 2006. In the top 16 countries in the table, i.e. the countries where the governments consist of at least 20 percent women, men and women have rather different responsibilities. According to official websites of the member states, men in general hold posts as ministers of finance, defence and justice, while women in general are ministers of social affairs and health. It would, however, be wrong to underestimate the importance of the social affairs portfolios, which usually have very large budgets. Perhaps one should also stop applying the frequently used concept ‘soft’, which in fact is often applied not to positions as such but to positions that women hold. However, there is a clear pattern, but there are also some exceptions to the gendered allocation, and today in Europe one sees a few cases of “the first women” in positions as ministers of defence, finance and traffic. The traditionally male office of Foreign Affairs still has male ministers in most of these countries, but there are currently women ministers of Foreign Affairs in Austria, Croatia, Liechtenstein and Sweden. The defence and finance ministries are more male dominated at this point. Even in the top 6 countries, where women constitute more than 40 percent of the governments, this pattern is visible. Some conclusions that can be drawn from this situation is that women have entered most of the governments, currently in 37 of the member states, that the ‘acceptable minimum’ of women ministers is increasing, but that women do not seem to have access to all government positions. This notable distribution of posts between women and men can be explained by the stereotyping of women and men in politics and by previous competences and positions. It may even be explained by the uneven distribution of power that is the glass ceiling, the informal barrier that keeps women

37 from entering some posts in governments. Research has shown that in the Nordic countries there has been an increase in the ‘acceptable minimum’ of women in any government. After the second Wold War, a new norm included one woman in any government. During the following decades, the number of women in cabinets increased, and by the beginning of the 1990’s, the Nordic countries governments, except for the Icelandic, would always consist of no less than 30 percent women. The ‘acceptable number of women’ had increased, that is, the minimum share of women a government should have without being subject to severe public criticism. (Dahlerup 1988, Bergqvist 1999) This success story was, however, challenged, when the new Danish government in 2001 appointed only 29 percent women – without much public outcry.

38 5. Diplomatic service6

“As things stand, Europe would now appear to be the continent with the lowest proportion of women employed in diplomacy” (Ketokoski-Rexed 2004:29). As Chart 10 shows, women’s share in the diplomatic service in the member states is undersized in comparison to men’s share. Only with regard to minister counselors is women’s share more than 30 percent.

Chart 10. Women and men in diplomatic service, percent

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% General Consuls Minister Ministers Councelors Envoys and Envoys Ambassadors

Women Men

Note: The first bar on the left illustrates the average figures for women and men Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in these 27 member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The second bar illustrate the average figures for women and men Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary in these 18 member states: Azerbaijan, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The third bar illustrates the average figures for women and men Minister Counselors in these 20 member states: Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey. The fourth bar illustrates the average figures for women and men General Consuls in these 24 member states: Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

6 This study is based on the Council of Europe’s “Questionnaire on gender segregated data on the participation of women and men in political and public decision-making” from 2005, where the questions on diplomatic service only included the number of women and men in these positions. The diplomatic field in the Council of Europe member states, hence, requires further research in the future.

39 In the Council of Europe seminar on women in diplomacy in 2004, the unbalanced share of positions between women and men was discussed, as well as what actions can be taken to change the situation. The importance of networking to support women in the diplomatic field was one of the notions discussed in the seminar (Council of Europe 2004). One argument for building a women’s network is that men have always been networking in this field and that networking for women would be an important source of advice and would provide a possibility for sharing experiences and solutions for common problems (Petrides 2004). Advising women in diplomatic service to build a network to support each other could be seen as a way to place the entire responsibility in facilitating their working environment on women. But as Petrides points out, the building of such a network might as well, or even better, be started by a large organization (as the Council of Europe), perhaps supported by some of the member states (2004:84). In Germany a range of other measures have been taken to change the current imbalance, according to Annette Sévery (2004). For example, the German government has placed a gender equality position in the Foreign Office with the purpose of examining the recruitment processes of the training program. Furthermore, the Foreign Office has arranged visits to universities, where women diplomats have had the opportunity to tell to students about their experiences in the field. Besides allowing women diplomats to become role models, the office has also included gender mainstreaming questions in the entrance exams to increase awareness of gender issues. According to Sévery, the new measures adopted by the government and the Foreign Office have had a positive result (2004:49-51). In 2004, for the first time ever, an equal number of women and men were entering the diplomatic training program in Germany. To make the combination of work and family life easier for the employees in the diplomatic field, part-time schedules have been adopted as an option for some of the German diplomatic positions (Sévery 2004:51). The German case shows that the problem can be posed both as a recruitment issue and as a matter of concern for women and men already employed in diplomatic service. The measures suggested by this seminar are focusing on both of these issues. Actions regarding the unbalanced share of diplomatic positions for women and men, as well as efforts regarding the combination of work and family for those already employed, are both important.

40 6. Women in the Judiciary (High/Supreme and Constitutional Courts)

As shown in Chart 11, the gender distribution in the high/supreme courts varies greatly between the member states. The Council of Europe’s target of 40 percent women has been reached in the high/supreme courts by 6 of the 34 member states, and another 4 have crossed the 30 percent threshold for women. In Hungary, the top country in the Chart, women hold as much as 71.9 percent of the judicial positions. On the other hand, in 5 of the member states men hold more than 90 percent of the positions. The average distribution for women within the Council of Europe‘s member states is 23.7 percent, which means that men hold 76.3 percent of the judicial positions.

41 Chart 11. High / supreme court judges, women and men, percent.

Hungary Croatia Latvia Sweden Slovakia Luxembourg Slovenia Finland Ireland Norway Denmark Serbia & Montenegro Czech Republic Turkey Iceland Switzerland Armenia Germany Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina Liechtenstein Lithuania Austria Estonia Netherlands France Azerbaijan Ukraine Italy Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain Monaco

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 % Women Men

Source: Council of Europe (2005).

The situation for women in judicial positions could be compared to another hierarchy: academia. The vertical segregation between women and men in academia has sometimes been referred to as a pipeline; when enough women have entered the pipeline it is just a matter of time before they will reach the other end of the line. So when more women enter academia, a proportion will eventually reach top positions (Henningsen and Højgaard 2002). This could be described as a version of the time lag argument where the problem is expected to be solved by time as society develops. In the 1990’s the pipeline idea was challenged by the fact that women in top positions in academia did not proportionally increase at the same rate that they entered the

42 “pipeline”. A new metaphor was coined, “the leaking pipeline”, which described the exclusion of women all the way through the hierarchy (Henningsen and Højgaard 2002). The leaking pipeline is a concept related to the glass ceiling concept, describing structural and institutional barriers that prevent women from reaching top positions. Why is a gender balance in the judiciary desirable? According to the justice argument, it is important that women have the same access to power positions as men (Squires 2004:51). Women judges are also role models for other women seeking similar high positions. Since judicial positions are appointed, the process of appointing new judges must be in focus when making efforts to change the situation. Constitutional courts are not present in all of the member states, and Chart 12 shows the 31 states where Constitutional courts are to be found. Women’s average share of the judicial positions on these courts is 20 percent.

43 Chart 12. Women and men in constitutional courts. Percent.

Luxembourg Slovenia Czech Republic Moldova Macedonia Croatia Portugal France Latvia Austria Serbia and Montenegro Bulgaria Germany Bosnia & Herzegovina Lithuania Poland Cyprus Spain Ukraine Turkey Azerbaijan Romania Liechtenstein Hungary Slovakia Italy Armenia Belgium Monaco Albania

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Women Men

Note: --- no figures available. Sources: The figures for Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania and TFYR of Macedonia: Official websites of the member states. The remaining figures: Council of Europe (2005).

As evident in Chart 12, only 2 of the countries reach the Council of Europe’s 40 percent target. The distribution in the courts could be affected by the rule in some of these countries that judges can access the courts purely by seniority. In all of these member states, except for Croatia and Hungary, the constitutional court judges are appointed by the Head of State, the parliament, the government or by a specific council. In addition to these figures, the Council of Europe has the European Court of Human Rights. This court consists of 12 women and 34 men, which means that the

44 women judges constitute 26.1 percent of the judicial positions, just above the average for the member states. The 40 percent target is, hence, not met by the Council of Europe’s own judicial institution. The new International Criminal Court in Hague operates a ‘soft quota’ system to increase women’s representation. “[T]he ICC aims to achieve fair representation of women and men for all positions” (ICC 2006).

45 7. Challenges for increasing women’s representation

7.1 Why women’s under-representation?

Any choice of strategy to enhance women’s political representation must start with an analysis of why women are under-represented and why men are over-represented. The argument made in this report is that strategies to enhance women’s political representation should be chosen on the basis of a general perception of what the problem is. This may also be expressed as a question of how the problem of women’s under representation is understood – the diagnosis of the problem. If the problem of women’s under-representation is understood as first and foremost a consequence of women’s lack of resources, then the strategy to enhance women’s political representation will typically offer educational opportunities for future or present women politicians, that is establishing capacity building programmes. However, especially in a European context, this diagnosis seems mistaken, since today women in Europe are as well-educated as men and have high labour market participation. If, on the other hand, the main problem is understood to be discrimination of women, that direct and indirect mechanisms of exclusion are at work in the political system, then the strategy must be to change the way the political institutions function and work. Thus, the main responsibility to change the situation is placed on the institutions themselves. Research has show that in political systems based on political parties, it is the political parties that are the gatekeepers (Lovenduski 2005). The nomination process is one such institution that needs to be scrutinized. The Beijing Platform for Action from 1995 represents an important change in discourse towards this second understanding of the problem. The Beijing Platform has been very influential, and women’s movements all over the world make use of this new discourse in their work to enhance women’s political representation. Firstly, the Beijing Platform talks about ‘discriminatory attitudes and practices’ and ‘unequal power relations’ that lead to the under-representation of women in arenas of political decision-making. Secondly, the demand for a certain minimum level of representation for women is being challenged by a new discourse of equal representation, often expressed by the term gender balance. Somewhat contradictorily, however, the Beijing Platform also speaks of securing a ‘critical mass’, the latter often associated

46 with figures of 20 or 30 percent women (Dahlerup 1988, 2005; FWCW 1995: Art. 181-95). Thirdly, affirmative action is suggested as a possible means of attaining the goal of women’s equal representation in political decision-making, although the controversial word ‘quotas’ is not used directly in the Platform for Action. For governmental and public administration positions, it is recommended that the world’s governments use ‘specific targets and implementing measures … if necessary through positive action’ (FWCW 1995: Art. 190.a). The Beijing Platform for Action challenges what Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall (2005) have identified as the incremental track discourse, according to which gender balance in politics will be achieved eventually; it is just a matter of time. The current problem is perceived as prejudices against women as well as women’s limited access to resources. Efforts advocated to reach equal representation are hence to give women access to resources, e.g. in the form of education and child care institutions. The responsibilities of the political parties should include mentors for women and active planning to facilitate the combination of work and family responsibilities. Quotas are not considered to be an appropriate measure in this regard, since it is understood as discriminatory. (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:29) In contrast, the Beijing Platform for Action represents the fast track discourse, which suggests that equal representation will not become a reality without active measures. Time per se will not accomplish a balanced representation, and there is a genuine risk of backlashes. The problem is that women are excluded from decision making positions, and glass ceilings limit their access to high posts. The invisible glass ceiling stops women from both accessing some positions and becoming more than a minority in decision-making positions.

7.2 A new global challenge for Europe

We use to find the highest percentage of women in parliaments in the Nordic countries, and, in general, Europe taken together used to be in the forefront in terms of women’s political representation, although with large variations between individual European countries. Today, Europe is being challenged. Rwanda has overtaken the position of Sweden as number one in the world when it comes to representation of women in national parliaments. While Sweden reached 45.3 percent women in the last election (2002), Rwanda reached an impressive 48.8 percent in the 2003 election as a result of a new constitutional arrangement which includes electoral gender quotas

47 written into the new constitution. Recently, Costa Rica, which operates a 40% legal candidate quota, moved up as number three on the world’s rank order. Table 8 shows that women’s representation in the single houses/lower houses in Europe comes close to the world average, especially if the Nordic countries are excluded. In general, the world’s regions are in a process of convergence: Europe, Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia all are close to the world average of 16.2 percent, while only the Pacific (12.0 percent) and the Arab States (8.2 percent) are located at a considerably lower level. However, today we also see a slight positive movement among the Arab states. The percentage is, as Table 8 reveals, remarkably high, as for the upper houses in the Pacific regions. Many of these upper houses are, however, indirectly elected or appointed.

Table 8. Women’s parliamentary representation Single / lower Upper house or Both houses house senate combined

Nordic countries 40.0% -- 40.0%

Americas 20.6% 21.2% 20.7%

Europe – OSCE member countries, 19.9% 17.4% 19.4% including the Nordic countries

Europe – OSCE member countries, 17.7% 17.4% 17.6% excluding the Nordic countries

Sub-Saharan Africa 16.5% 17.6% 16.6%

Asia 16.3% 14.7% 16.1%

Pacific 11.8% 26.5% 13.8%

Arab States 8.2% 5.9% 7.7%

Source: IPU (2006) situation as of 30 April 2006.

Today, we see the old world record in women’s representation in the Nordic countries and in the Netherlands being challenged not only by Rwanda but also by South Africa, Costa Rica, Mozambique and Argentina. The recent introduction of electoral gender quotas are part of the explanation behind the exceptional historical leaps in women’s representation in all the countries mentioned. (Dahlerup 2006) Table 9 shows the top of the world rank order in terms of women’s representation. Three main features are revealed in this table. Firstly, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, for so long alone on the top of the world rank order in

48 terms of women’s representation are, as mentioned, now being challenged by several developing countries. Secondly, many of the countries that have more than 30 percent women in parliament make use of some kind of quota, be it legal or voluntary party quotas. Thirdly, the table shows that most of the countries with the highest women’s representation elect their representatives under the PR system. However, the table also reveals that gender quotas are not the only way to achieve a high percentage of women, as the examples of Denmark and Finland show. In conclusion, of most importance seems to be that some kind of active measures are introduced to identify the barriers women meet and to put pressure on the political parties to actively recruit more women into politics. The invisible glass ceiling will not be cracked by itself as time goes by!

Table 9. The top of the world rank order of women in parliament

Women in national parliament Quota type Electoral system Country lower/single house (%) Rwanda 48.8 (2003) Legal quotas (C) List PR Sweden 45.3 (2002) Party quotas List PR Costa Rica 38.6 (2006) Legal quotas (L) List PR Norway 37.7 (2005) Party quotas List PR Finland 37.5 (2002) No quota List PR Denmark 36.9 (2005) No quota List PR Netherlands 36.7 (2003) Party quotas List PR Cuba 36.0 (2003) No quota Two Rounds Spain 36.0 (2004) Party quotas List PR Belgium 35.3 (2003) Legal quotas (L) List PR Argentina 35.0 (2003) Legal quotas (C) List PR Mozambique 34.8 (2004) Party quotas List PR Austria 33.9 (2002) Party quotas List PR South Africa 32.8 (2004) Party quotas List PR Germany 31.8 (2005) Party quotas MMP Guyana 30.8 (2001) Legal quotas (C) List PR Burundi 30.5 (2005) Legal quotas (C) List PR Tanzania 30.4 (2005) Legal quotas (C) FPTP Iceland 30.2 (2003) Party quotas List PR Key to electoral systems: PR= Proportional Representation. MMP= Mixed PR and plurality/majority system. Two Rounds= a system which seeks a winner with a majority of the votes. FPTP= the candidate who gets most votes wins, and it does not have to be an absolute majority of the votes. Key to quota type: Legal quotas: Quotas introduced by constitution (C) or electoral law (L). Party quotas: voluntary quotas introduced by individual political parties. Source: International IDEA and Stockholm University (2006); official statistics. Election day results, changes after the election not included.

49 8. Conclusions and recommendations

8.1 The glass ceiling The current situation in the Council of Europe’s member states shows a clear pattern; the political and public institutions examined in this report are massively male dominated. Men hold more than 80 percent of the parliamentary positions, lower and upper houses, as well as more than 80 percent of the governmental positions (see Chart 13). The leadership positions are even more male dominated. Chart 14 shows that men hold almost 90 percent of these positions.

Chart 13. The representatives, percent.

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Parliament Lower/Single House Parliament Upper House Government

Women Men

Sources: Parliament L/S H: see Chart 3. Parliament UH: See Chart 4. Gov: See Chart 9.

Chart 14. The leaders, percent.

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Gov LH CC UH State HSC Mayors Head of Head of Head Head of Head Reg Gov Reg President President President President

Women Men

Note: Single/lower house: 8 women, 38 men. Upper house: 1 woman, 15 men. Head of State: 6 women, 40 men. Head of Government: 1 woman, 45 men. Heads of the Regional governments: 24 women, 110 men. Mayors: 3799 women, 31811 men. President high/supreme court: 2 women, 32 men. President Constitutional Court: 3 women, 27 men. Sources: Council of Europe (2005) and official websites of the member states.

50

These new data thus confirm the well established theory called “the law of increasing disproportion”, or, the higher up, the fewer women. The glass ceiling is keeping women from reaching high positions. There are, however, exceptions to this law. While in the 1940s, 50s and 60s the ‘acceptable minimum’ of women in a government usually amounted to only one woman, today women have obtained 17.8 percent of today’s governmental positions, not far from their share of parliamentary seats. When it comes to the position of prime minister, however, the law of increasing disproportions is confirmed, see Chart 14. In fact, the number of women prime ministers have not been as low as it is now in Europe for a long time. Other regions of the world show more progress in this area.

8.2 Cracking the glass ceiling - recommendations

There is a commitment to equality between women and men in Europe, as expressed in the Council of Europe’s resolutions. It is the conclusion of this study that the present developments in Europe and in the world represent a challenge to the dominant European understanding that equality will come about eventually as societies develop; it is only a matter of time. Today, this time lag thesis is increasingly being challenged by researchers – but also by actual examples of standstill and even backlash in Europe in terms of women’s political representation. This report has listed many important factors in working to increase women’s representation. In this summary, the electoral systems, the political parties’ power to change their strategies and practices and the need for special measures such as quotas are discussed. It should be noted that the pressure by women’s movements has always been and still is crucial for the development of women’s political and public representation and for realizing the recommended changes. Active measures are also needed in order to recruit more women to public offices, like judges. In this field more comparative research on career patterns and mechanisms of recruitment is recommended.

Electoral systems The majority of the Council of Europe member states use Proportional electoral systems, mostly in the form of List-PR. Women’s representation is higher in these

51 countries than in countries using mixed or plurality/majority systems. Despite the fact that women have better possibilities of becoming elected in PR-systems, the chances are obviously still low, and there are great differences between the member states. The main difference between the opportunities for women in PR systems versus plurality- majority systems should be reformulated into a question of which system is most open to change when under-represented groups, be it women or immigrants, begin to demand their fair share of the political representation. In this respect the PR system is no doubt most favorable, and it is amazing that a change from PR to plurality-majority systems in some European countries is being discussed today with no reference to the importance for women’s representation. The unbalanced legislative power can in some PR cases partially be explained by open lists and low district magnitudes (see Matland 2002). As an example, in Bosnia & Herzegovina the newly adopted preferential voting possibility, in the form of open lists, proved to be a problem for the women candidates on the party lists (Antic and Lokar 2006). Irrespective of the election outcome, open lists can be said to let the parties “off the hook” in this matter, since they are not responsible for the voters preferences (Matland 2002). On the other hand, in some open list elections as in some of the Nordic countries, the voters have sometimes increased women’s representation by their preferential voting seen in relation to the original nomination of the party (Haavio-Mannila 1985). The fact that women’s representation is as low as 22.3 percent in lower/single houses in the member states using PR systems shows that the electoral system is only one factor of importance. However, it seems important to develop new methods to increase the nomination of women in plurality-majority systems, as it is being done in Scotland and Westminster. In contemporary electoral systems, changes are taking place quite rapidly. The conclusion is, consequently, that no electoral system change should be decided on without carefully scrutinizing the effect on the representation of women and other under-represented groups.

Political parties Research has shown that the political parties all over Europe are the real gate-keepers in relation to political nominations and elections. In Europe, women are well-educated and present in large numbers in the labour market. Women’s lack of resources – a well-known argument throughout history – is, hence, not the problem behind the

52 unbalanced share of power. Instead, the focus should be redirected toward the selection process, the norms and practices of the political parties, which are the gate- keepers to the elected political institutions. Nothing prevents the political parties from altering their lists and starting to recruit many more women for safe seats in the elections. Moreover, political parties are also heavily involved in many processes of appointment to positions within the state. It is recommend that all political parties make plans for the recruitment of more women, including immigrant women, to the party leadership and as candidates for elections in winnable seats. The working environment in the parties, as well as in other political institutions, is affecting women’s possibilities. In spite the fact that women constitute 45.3 percent of the Swedish parliament, women MPs have recently complained about male techniques of domination and institutional discrimination, and the speaker of the house has initiated an investigation in order to understand and to change the hidden structures of discrimination that seem to exist even within one of the world’s most gender balanced parliaments (SvD 2005). One should not forget that politics is also a workplace, and like any other workplace the political arena needs to be analysed from a gender perspective in terms of facilitating the combination of family responsibilities and work for women as well as for men, for example by changing working and meeting hours. In order to enhance the presence and influence of women in the public sphere, it is recommended that the political institutions start analysing their own norms and practise and introduce active measures to change present practices of exclusion.

Active measures When gender balance cannot be assumed to come about ‘by itself’, as this report concludes, active measures by the states and by the political parties and other institutions are needed and therefore strongly recommended. The choice of active measures should be adapted according to each country’s own context. Setting up targets and making recommendations are important tools, but such measures have often proved to be too ‘soft’. However, the very discussion of active measures may in itself contribute to changing the traditional norms of what women can and want to do, even if the danger of provoking a backlash should not be overlooked in contemporary society.

53 Although controversial, the introduction of gender quotas is a new trend, representing the fast track discourse and practice. However, many factors influence outcomes. Evident in the tables and charts of this report is the discrepancy between the prescribed legal quotas and the actual results in elections. The legally prescribed quotas have been resisted and counteracted by the political parties in some of the member states. There are currently leeks in the implementation of the quota laws that create loopholes for the parties, and the parties have been able to preserve the traditional male institutions. The absence of rank-order rules and efficient sanctions are some of these loopholes. The importance of rank-order rules for the party lists is evident in the cases of the Republic of Macedonia (Antic and Lokar 2006) and Belgium, where rank-order rules exist only for the top two candidates on the lists, and the rest of the women candidates can, without breaking the law, be placed at the bottom of the lists with a largely reduced chance of actually being elected (Krook et al 2006). The implementation of sanctions is a related factor in avoiding loopholes. The actual use of sanctions is a critical factor, as well as the efficiency of the sanctions. The case of France shows a clear downside of financial penalties in this context. The political parties in France have chosen to accept the penalties instead of altering their lists to comply with the 50% quota law. As women have to meet institutional barriers in politics, a fixed quota percentage can also function as a glass ceiling for women’s representation. In Armenia, the quota law prescribes 5% women. As of 1 September 2005, women constitute 5.3% of the parliament, which is just above the legal quota. A fixed percentage could hence become both a lower and an upper limit for women’s share of the seats. The conclusion is that electoral gender quotas on a world scale have proven to be one of the most efficient equal opportunity measures, provided that the quota system actually matches the electoral system in a country, provided rules regarding the rank order are installed and provided that sanctions for non-compliance are included in the laws in cases of legal quotas. Voluntary party quotas may prove as successful as legal quotas. The Dutch practise of making a contract between the central party organisation and the regional and local party branches seems to be effective in overcoming local resistance to central directives in general. A dialogue between the local and the central party organizations in cases of voluntary party quotas is essential. Soft quotas as well as

54 more formal quota provisions, legally or in the form voluntary party provisions, are recommended in order to change women’s historical under-representation without further delay. If the glass ceiling, the low level as well as the high level, is not cracked without further delay, Europe will soon lag behind the rest of the world.

55

Bibliography Antić, M.G. and Lokar, S. (2006) “The Balkans: From total rejection to gradual acceptance of gender quotas”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Arat, Y. (2000) “From Emancipation To Liberation: The Changing Role of Women in Turkey’s Public Realm”, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2000, 54, no.1, pp. 107-123. Bacchi, C. (2006) “Arguing for and against quotas. Theoretical issues”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Bergqvist, C. (ed.) (1999) Equal Democracies? Gender and Politics in the Nordic Countries, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Browning, G.K. (1987) Women & Politics in the U.S.S.R. Consciousness Raising and Soviet Women’s Groups. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books. Christensen, K. I. (2006) “Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership”, Online: www.guide2womenleaders.com, accessed 2006-05-04. Cornell University (2006) “Glass Ceiling Commission (1991-1996)”, Online: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/glassceiling/, accessed 2006-05-04. Council of Europe (1984) “The Situation of Women in the Political Process in Europe, Part II; Women in the political world in Europe”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe (2002) “Women in Politics in the Council of Europe’s member states”, information document, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe (2003) “Balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making: Recommendation Rec (2003)3 of the Committee of Ministers and explanatory memorandum”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe (2004) “Women in diplomacy - seminar proceedings”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe (2005) “Questionnaire on gender segregated data on the participation of women and men in political and public decision-making”. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2003) “Resolution 1348 (2003) Gender- balanced representation in the Parliamentary Assembly”. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2004) “Resolution 1360 (2004)

56 Contested Credentials of the parliamentary delegations of Ireland and Malta”. Dahlerup, D. (1988) “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics”, in Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 11, no. 4, pp.275-298. Dahlerup, D. (2002) “Using Quotas to Increase Women’s Political Representation”, updated version of a chapter originally published in Karam, A. (ed.) (1998) Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Stockholm: International IDEA. Online: http://www.idea.int, accessed 2005-11-22. Dahlerup, D. (2004) “Feministisk partipolitik? Om skillnader i dansk och svensk Jämställdhetsdebatt”, in Florin, C. and Bergqvist, C. (eds) Framtiden i samtiden. Könsrelationer i förändring i Sverige och omvärlden. Stockholm: Institutet för framtidsstudier, pp. 234-263. Dahlerup, D. (2006) “Conclusion”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Dahlerup, D. and Freidenvall, L. (2005) “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women – Why Scandinavia is no longer the model”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7:1, March 2005, pp: 26-48. Ekklesia (2006) “Bill introduced to shatter 'stained glass ceiling' over female clergy”, Online: http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/ article_060322women.shtml, accessed 2006-05-04. Electionworld (2005) “The world database on elections”, Online: http://www.electionworld.org, accessed 2005-11-10. European Parliament (1999) “Women in the European Parliament”, Online: http://www.europarl.eu.int/election/newep/en/tcwm.htm, accessed 2005-11-21. European Parliament (2004) “Women in the EP”, Online: http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/women/ index.html, accessed 2005-11-21. European Parliament (2005) “International Women’s Day – 8 March 2004”, Online: http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/femm/womensday/default_en.htm?textMod e=on, accessed 2005-11-22. Freidenvall, L. (2003) ”Women’s Political Representation and Gender Quotas – the Swedish Case”, The Research Program on Gender Quotas, Working Paper Series 2003:2, Stockholm University: Department of Political Science. Freidenvall, L. (forthcoming) Vägen till varannan damernas. Om

57 kvinnorepresentation, kvotering och politiska partier i Sverige 1970-2002, PhD dissertation, Stockholm University: Department of Political Science. Freidenvall, L, Dahlerup, D. and Skjeie, H. (2006) “The Nordic countries. An incremental model”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Guldvik, I. (2005) Takt og utakt, sagt og usagt – Kjønnsrettferdighet og kvotering i lokalpolitikken, Doktoravhandling, NTNU 2005:155 Haavio-Mannila, E. et al. (eds) (1985) Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics, New York: Pergamon. Henningsen, I. and Højgaard, L. (2002) ”’The Leaking Pipeline’ – Øjebliksbilleder af kønnede in- og eksklusionsprocesser i Akademia”, Køn i den akdemiske organisation, Arbejdspapir nr. 9, 2002, Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet. International Criminal Court (2006) “Recruitment”, Online: http://www.icc- cpi.int/recruitment.html, accessed 2006-05-05. International IDEA and Stockholm University (2005) “Global Database of Quotas for Women”, Online: www.quotaproject.org, accessed 2005-11-15. International IDEA and Stockholm University (2006) “Global Database of Quotas for Women”, Online: www.quotaproject.org, accessed 2006-05-01. IPU (2005) “Women in National Parliaments”, situation as of 31 October, Online: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm, accessed 2005-11-08. IPU (2006) “Women in National Parliaments”, situation as of 30 April, Online: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm, accessed 2006-05-01. Ketokoski-Rexed, A. (2004) “From Women in Diplomacy to Women’s Diplomacy?”, in Council of Europe “Women in diplomacy - seminar proceedings”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Krook, M. (2005) Politicizing Representation: Campaigns for Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide, PhD-dissertation, Columbia University. Online: http://krook.wustl.edu/pdf/krook-dissertation.pdf, accessed 2005-11-24. Krook, M., Lovenduski, J. and Squires, J. (2006) “Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Gender quotas in the context of citizenship models”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Lapidus, G. W. (1978) Women in Soviet Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

58 Leyenaar, M. (2004) Political Empowerment of Women. The Netherlands and Other Countries. Leiden / Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Lovenduski, J. (1986) Women and European Politics. Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy, Sussex: Harvester Press. Lovenduski, J. (2005) Feminizing Politics, Cambridge: Polity. Matland, R.E. (2002) “Enhancing Women’s Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Electoral Systems”, updated version of a chapter originally published in Karam, A. (ed.) (1998) Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Stockholm: International IDEA. Online: http://www.idea.int, accessed 2005-11- 01. Matland, R.E. (2006) “Electoral quotas: frequency and effectiveness”, in Dahlerup, D. (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge. Matland, R. E. and Montgomery, K.A. (2003) Women’s access to political power in post-communist Europe, New York: Oxford University Press. Meier, P. (2004) “Why study gender quotas in a broader comparative perspective”, European Political Science, 3.3, Summer 2004, pp. 99-105. Montgomery, K.A. (2003) “Introduction”, in Matland, R. E. and Montgomery, K.A. Women’s access to political power in post-communist Europe, New York: Oxford University Press. Norris, P. (2004) Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (1995) Political Recruitment. Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University press. Petrides, T. (2004) “Network of women diplomats?”, in Council of Europe “Women in diplomacy - seminar proceedings”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Pintat, C. (1998) ”Democracy through Partnership: The Experience of the Inter- Parliamentary Union”, in Karam, A. (ed.) Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Stockholm: International IDEA. Online: http://www.idea.int, accessed 2005-11-23. Reynolds, A., Reilly, B. and Ellis, A. (2005) Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm: International IDEA. Russia Profile (2005) “Federal Structure”, Online: http://www.russiaprofile.org/ resources/structure/index.wbp, accessed 2005-12-07. Sainsbury, D. (1993) ‘The Politics of Increased Women’s Representation: The

59 Swedish Case’, in J. Lovenduski and P. Norris (eds) Gender and Party Politics, Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 263–90. Serbia and Montenegro Official Website (2005) “The Official Internet Presentation of SCG”, Online: http://www.gov.yu, accessed 2005-11-29. Sévery, A. (2004) “Promoting equality between women and men – The role of women diplomats”, in Council of Europe “Women in diplomacy - seminar proceedings”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Sineau, M. (2002) “Institutionalizing Parity: The French Experience”, in Ballington, J. and Protais, M. J. (eds) Les femmes au parlement: Au-dela du nombre, Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 121-32. Squires, J. (1996) “Quotas for Women: Fair Representation?”, in Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) Women in Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Squires, J. (2004) “Gender quotas: comparative and contextual analyses”, in European Political Science, 3:3, summer 2004, pp. 51-58. Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) (2005) “Män har fortsatt makt i riksdagen”, 2005-01-18. Online: http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/inrikes/did_8934557.asp, accessed 2005- 12-16. Threlfall, M. “Explaining gender parity in Spain: the internal dynamics of parties”, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September, 2005. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) “Human Development Report 2005”, Online: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/ HDR05_complete.pdf, accessed 2006-05-01. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005) Gender Statistics Database. Online: http://w3.unece.org/stat/scriptsdb/showResults.asp, accessed 2005-11- 17. United Nations Forth World Conference on Women (FWCW) (1995) “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action”, 15 September. United Nations Statistics Division (2005a) “Statistics and indicators on women and men”, Online: http://unstats.un.org, 2005-11-17. United Nations Statistics Division (2005b) “Millennium Development Goal Indicators Database”, Online: http://millenniumindicators.un.org, 2005-11-17. Wolchik, S.L. and Meyer, A. G. (eds) (1985) Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe. Durham: Duke University Press.

60 Women’s Political Resource Center (WPRC) (2004) “Gender Aspects of Elections (1995-2004)”, Tbilisi: WPRC.

61