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Is -Revealed by Anolaert-713,9 D NEW YORK MAR 1 1964 UN 7 osmi,o Is Ntow Goz;2,c$ -■ a . _Is -Revealed by AnolaerT1 -713,9 D By Peter Deriabin FEAR OF PUBLICITY The recent defection of Soviet intelligence Officer Yuri. I- Nosenko has again focused the attention of the world on I recall that I had as almost patle,:loeleal :zee of . the subject at deeectors from communism. Asa former Soviet ;mei:city. which even now, in retroencet, is dtffieceic to ex- - intelligence officer, now a United States citizen, and a rest- plait. My only experience with press media was in the • der.t of the United States for the last, ten years, I naturally Soviet Union. where the press is the official yea:cc of the have more than a passing interest in such events. / government and•the Communist party. As naive as It may vicariously relive each new defection as each one takes me. sound, I could not be convinced that Arnerican press corn- back to the time. almost exactly IQ years ago, when I made menes on my defectiOn did not reflect official U. S. eoveen- ray own anal. Irrevocable decision to reject communism, ment reaction to my defection. But with the passzez oe the the Soviet system and the Soviet way of life. I remember; last le years I have come to a better ur.derstarelinz of so well that feeling of deep loneliness which accompanied Western democracy and to appreciate the true meaning the decision to leave all that I knew and embrace the un-. of the expression "free press." I think it safe to any that ' known. It was some conifort that the unknown West had the life blood of Western newspapers is current news. The at least been explored by me somewhat during my stay in; defection of a Soviet. citizen. and particularly of a. Soviet Vienna, I knew that It might hold hardship for me In the. Intelligence officer. is "hoe news," and as coon as it happens. future. but 11 could hold no horrors comparable to those; there is pressure to get something about it into print. I was leaving. e But unfortunately the time of the greatest pressure, or Yet I was leaving much that was good and much desire, if you will, on the part of news mccea for information-- which I loved. This knowledge only made me more bitterly about a defector and his defection, coincides exactly with hate the inhuman reetme which had made It impeseibie the time of the greatest resistance to the release of any for me to retain both my heritage and my self-respect. ;news on the part of the defector hinizelf and on ;hc part - I think that Nesenko must be experiencing similar of the defector's Western 'Mende who :172 hartoeir.1 him. : -feelings. Even now I vividly remember. In the weeks fol. Lacking factual information, and under pressure prere . - lowing my own defection. how I was alternaeely depressed duce copy. our enterprising reporters will often nelee what- and elated; now filled with a tremendous drive to unburnen ever wimpy facts they can unearth, aeed. en:ben:eh •T:ce:":1 - myself, to clear-se myself of the filth which had forced me Indulgine In fancieul, unrealistic grid reerrezeimes acenzliy to break away, now lethargic, disinterested. overcome by harmful speculation regarding the mot-ea:ion and value of "weleschnierz." -such defectors. The most dLteult transition of all was to realize the Certainly Nosenko's Immediate value to Ghe Amer:ran freedom with which Americans criticize themselves and :counteretntelligence services will be great. However, ha their institutions. In the controlled state society of the lone-range value to the West is infinitely greater and . .Soviet Union. criticism i3 either an undercurrent, dangerous loneer-lasting. Essentially Nosenko as a Soviet intelligence to express, or It is used as a device of the regime-- either officer personifies the elite of the Soviet Union. As an *rectal self-critiesm designed to relieve tension-in a aen- telligence officer he was fIrst a political realist who, due to .sltive arcs or the sort of provocation intended to ferret out his privileged access to information and right to travel ' "troublesome" people. Suspicion within the highest levels abroad, best understood conditions as they really *ore in • _or the Soviet state Is Intense, and half your waking hours the Soviet Union without the gloss put on them by the are spent speculating on the real motives behind relatively Soviet propaganda machine. simple acts; you begin to worry about the inflection of As a member of the HGB. which is the pre:reg.-7 instra- casual greetings. So le was deeply unsett ir. to me, at nest. ' ment for implementing lehrushchev's 'peaceful coenistenec" to hear the normal comments of Americans about every- poeecy abroad, he beat-understood the inherent hypoceesy of thing from the Presidency to the_price of etas. At ft.-st, trying to fit American outspokenness-trap the norms of Soviet society, I brooded about "provocations" or "counter- - .-e aeropaganda." It Look me almost a year to realize the die- - /erences between a society where free speech is taken for granted- and the statist society which I had left. I would venture to say that the experience of a free speech eociety 4 is the most difficult adjustment any Soviet defector must , v 40 . , re roritfatled Ck_ Soviet foreirn policy. As he was a Core-nuniat party tr.era- Brazil. Stziganov to Uruguay. neecley .eiekeeeev A:Tit:- bcr. Le experienced the moral and spiritual baniereptcy of tins, and Alresander Alenzenev in Cuea. No aente; Nazien.o the ruling political party in the Soviet Union. Aa a member will know others. of the KGB. charged with maintatninz the iron-fisted sub- I am coneineed that we shoele.ner rive Ne.nenee 114a:ion of his own people, he was not deceived by "Potem- fection as a spec:an:11r cr unntee. of -nee Le; • ee kin Villages" and other fancy showplaces erected to deceive net rather as a viae:e se.rantom of a mere deep-sese i and and delude the foreign tourists who malts. the "borscht serious disease wrech is epid.errec witnin the Sven; evey circuit." tour through the USSR. politic. For Nosenlo's defection is certainly not an irelarne. ?restrike probably was daily confronted with and re.. .case. Only recently we learned of the case of Col. On; voiced by the Soviet government's need to suppress the ime Penkovsky, who was executed for woesing for Western. In- patience and frustration of Its own people. raniele.g under telligence services inside the Soviet In-non for over rezee 46 years of broken promises. He doubtless often wondered reir3. Who was Col. Feekovsky? how long Tenzushchev could distract the attention of his citizens from these broken-promises with saber-rattling and . TOP STRATA OF SOCIETY denunciations of alleged capitalist encirclement of the. USSR._ But finally Nosenko and a growing segment of Soviet 'First, he was a senior eSceizt• ireelegence society carne to realize the simple fact that the Soviet sys- officer. To any present or former Se tit citieans. :his simple tem simply does not work. It cannot even. feed. its own. statement of fact conveys a world of Ir.:arm:Ion aecet the citizens! statue in Soviet society of Co!. Pereinisey. It places him un- Thus. inwelcomlng Yuri I. Nosenko to our shores, let us' mistakably among. the chosen few neer the top of zee pyra- think of him as a. window in the false front, a hole in the mid. Second, he was the sorein-law of a prominent ?.evict facade, which will permit us a view of the reality behind e' general. who had been a member of '.:hz elosecee elintaeY the wall of Soviet propaganda. The reality which he. as a. -Council during World War II and weo was a rneneecr of member of the Soviet elite, can reveal to us, is never seen the Supreme Soviet of the rssa.. nis reerriree put td and seldom appreciated by Westerners. • - him higher up the pyramid, into coreect •rite ehe amen, =Wig class of the Soviet Union. :neatly, he was tire cnne - THE RED APPARATUS. family heeled and protege of the' Soviet =meal In char;e of tactical rockets for the entire Soviet army. Thus, by Our Kreralinoloeists might also learn from Nosenko Virtue of his profession, his marriage, sod his friendshion that the Soviet phenomenon cannot be intelligently studied he was confer, tried and recorfuened as a member of the or understood without a thorough understandir.g 'nf the privileged elite which occupies the top .strata of Soviet Soviet security and espionage apparatus For.it is this puni- Society. tive apparatus which makes up an inordinate portion of Yuri Noseneo. too, unquestionably belonged to the Soviet °Meal bureaucracy and is directly and solely re- highest levels. the "creme de la creme," cf Soviet. society. sponsible for the continued existence of the Communist sys- Ho was a respected member of the sareneeenet paineve tem In Russia. It is this punitive-espionage and subversive orzan—the KGB—which even polices the Soviet rennig apparatus, which is most directly charged will) the imple- Class. mentation of lOu-ushetiev's foreign policy abroad. Now, ironically, the Soviet s.ystere, which ter years ha; In this regard I would be derelict if I did not note that labored to obliterate Individ gouty, conscience, religion and in the more than eff countries outside the Communist bloc. morality, is suddenly haunted by the specter of a super where the USSR has official diplomatic =presentation.
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