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1324638 STEPHAN, ROBERT WILLIAM

DEATH TO SPIES: THE STORY OF SMERSH (SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR II)

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY M.A. 1984

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University Microfilms International

DEATH TO SPIES: THE STORY OF SMERSH

(SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DURING WORLD WAR II)

by

Robert W. Stephan

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and

International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Affairs

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman :

Dean .of ege . 19/

1984 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 n c m»im i3 H i v s s s m © COPYRIGHT

BY

ROBERT W. STEPHAN

1984

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED DEATH TO SPIES: THE STORY OF SMERSH

(SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DURING WORLD WAR II)

by

Robert W. Stephan

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the role, function, organization, and operations of the Soviet mili­ tary counterintelligence organization during World War II, nicknamed by Stalin Smersh, short for Smert' Shpionam, or

"Death to Spies." The study places Soviet military coun­ terintelligence in a historical context, and shows how

Smersh evolved into an instrument of political repression, as well as a genuine counterintelligence organization.

Recently declassified U.S. government documents, captured

German records, and Soviet primary sources were used in or­ der to analyze the operations, functions, and organization of Smersh. These documents show that the character of

Smersh is "independent of war and peace" and that its func­ tion of ensuring the loyalty of the Soviet Armed Forces is inseparable from its conduct of traditional counterintelli­ gence operations. Although Smersh was abolished in 1946, its functions are still carried out by the present-day KGB.

11 PREFACE

This study analyzes the role, operations,

organization and functions of Soviet military counter­

intelligence during World War II. The study places Soviet

military counterintelligence in a historical context in

order to show the evolution of political security and

counterintelligence operations within both the Russian and

Soviet Armed Forces. The Library of Congress transliter­

ation system for rendering Russian words into the Roman

alphabet has been used throughout this paper. I would like

to take the opportunity to thank Dr. F . Jackson Piotrow of the American University, Dr. John Dziak, Adjunct Professor,

George Washington University; Dr. Amy Knight of the Library of Congress; Raymond Rocca of Falls Church, Virginia; Tim

Mulligan, Elly Melemed, George Wagner, and John Taylor of the National Archives; William Baxter, L t . Colonel, USA

(ret); and Major John Markowicz, United States Army.

Without their help this thesis could not have been written.

Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... i i

PREFACE...... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... vi

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

II. FORERUNNERS OF SMERSH...... 10

Military Counterintelligence Under the Tsars...... 10 Military Counterintelligence Under the VeCheka, GPU and OGPU...... 34 Military Counterintelligence Prior to 1941...... 48

III. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WITHIN SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1941-1943...... 53

IV. SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AT WAR 1941-1945 (00/NKVD and GUKR-NKO-Smer sh )...... 60

Reasons for Establishment of Smersh...... 61 Organization of Smersh...... 71 Size of Smersh...... 84 Functions of Smersh...... 86 Recruitment, Training and Rank Structure of Smersh Staff Officers...... 94

V. SMERSH OPERATIONS...... 107 Counterespionage Operations...... 107 Interrogation of Foreign Agents...... 117 The Informant System...... 121 Rear Area Security Operations and Combatting Desertion...... 127 Reporting...... 136 The Search for Hitler's Body...... 139

IV VI. DISSOLUTION OF SMERSH...... 144

VII. THE PRESENT-DAY THIRD CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB...... 153

VIII. CONCLUSION...... 166

APPENDICES A. Basic Evolution of Tsarist Security Organizations...... 175

B. Basic Evolution of Soviet Security Organs...... 177

C. Chiefs of Soviet State Security Organs...... 178

D. Basic Evolution of Russian and Soviet Military Counterintelligence.... 180

E. List of Abbreviations and Foreign Terms...... 183

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 187 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Organization of GUKR-NKO-Smer sh...... 76 2. Organization of Smersh at Front...... 77 3. Organization of A Rear-Area Security Regiment.. 80 4. Organization of Smersh at Division...... 82

VI CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We look upon the Soviet government as if it were any other government— but it isn't, because it is essentially a counterintelligence apparatus. It was conceived in 1903 by Lenin as an opera­ tion in counterintelligence against the Czarist regime, and it has remained a conspiracy ever since . . . the government is there. It's a front, it performs certain functions. But, when a major change takes place, it is within the context of the intelligence apparatus which is identical with the Communist Party.

Issac Don Levine, May 23, 1960

The character of Smersh is independent of war and peace.

U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps Report, March 24, 1947

The purpose of this study is to analyze the role, organization, and functions of Soviet military counter­ intelligence during World War II. The organization was given the name Smersh, a shortened version of the Russian

Smert' Shpionam, or Death to Spies, by Stalin in April

1943. In order to understand how Smersh evolved into an instrument of political repression, as well as a genuine military counterintelligence service, this study will in­ clude chapters on the role of military counterintelligence under the tsars and the role of Soviet military counter- 2 intelligence before and after World War II. Information on the operations, functions, organization, and training of Soviet military counterintelligence during World War II has been gleaned from a variety of sources, including defectors, German Army intelligence reports, recently declassified U.S. government documents, U.S. Army Counter­ intelligence Corps (CIC) debriefings of German Abwehr officers, and a few Soviet histories, book reviews, and articles concerning military counterintelligence during

World War II.

The overwhelming bulk of source material dealing with the actual operations of Soviet military counter­ intelligence during World War II is primarily devoted to the description and analysis of Special Department counterespionage operations, and the structure and functions of the informant system within the Red Army.

Most German intelligence documents, declassified U.S. Army

Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) reports, and primary

Soviet sources focus on agent operations directed against the German Intelligence Services (GIS-Abwehr, Sicher- heitsdienst (SD), Gestapo, Geheimefeldpolizei (GFP), and the intelligence staffs of the German Armies) operating against Soviet forces, as well as the functions and struc­ ture of the informant system within the Red Army.

The reasons for this concentration on Special De- 3 partment counterespionage operations and on the political surveillance of the Red Army are many. However, the pri­ mary reason for this bias lies in the fact that the GIS operating on the Eastern Front were far more concerned with Soviet agent activity and subversion in their opera­ tional area than with NKVD Frontier Troops, or with com­ batting desertion within the ranks of the Red Army. Thus, since the Allies relied heavily on captured German intel­ ligence documents for information on 00 operations, and the Soviets, to date, have published little data on deser­ tion rates during World War II, or their own rear area security activities, the bulk of the source material on the Special Departments during World War II concerns coun­ terespionage operations.

Although the source material on Smersh (and

00/NKVD. See Appendices D and E) operations concentrates primarily on counterespionage, this could provide a valu­ able insight into how Soviet military counterintelligence might conduct agent operations in a future war. World War

II now provides the only opportunity available whereby

Soviet military counterespionage operations can be ana­ lyzed in a combat environment, as open source material on

Soviet military counterintelligence, in Czechoslovakia in

1968 and in Afghanistan is not yet available.

Since the founding of the Soviet secret police on 4

December 20, 1917, the Soviet State Security organs have been charged with the responsibility of performing three vital tasks: conducting espionage, counterespionage, covert and subversive operations abroad; ensuring the political reliability of the civilian population at home through the use of a sophisticated informant system and punitive measures; and conducting intelligence and politi­ cal security operations within the armed forces.'

Most Western analysts have placed a great deal of emphasis on the foreign espionage activities of the Soviet state, as well as on the mechanisms within the security organs that carry out internal repression of the civilian population. Although partly a function of the paucity of readily available sources, few or no in-depth studies have been done on the Imperial Russian or Soviet military coun­ terintelligence organizations.

Most of the literature on political control and sur­ veillance of the Soviet military centers on the Main Po­ litical Administration of the Armed Forces. Such works as

Roman Kolkowicz's The Soviet Army and the Communist Party:

Institutions in Conflict, Michael J. Deane's Political

Control of the Soviet Armed Forces, and Timothy Colton's

'George Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police: The All Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922) (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. xxi. 5

Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Struc­

ture of Soviet Military Politics, serve as excellent

studies on the Main Political Administration.^ The wealth of information available on the MPA is partly due

to the fact that the Soviets themselves publish a great

deal of information on the work of the party organs within the military. The Soviet bimonthly military journal of the MPA, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, contains numerous articles on political work in the armed forces.

However, through the use of declassified U.S. government documents, captured World War II German Army intelligence (primarily Fremde Heere Qst (FHO), or Foreign

Armies East) records, and Soviet open sources, a basic understanding of the role, organization, and functions of the Soviet military counterintelligence organization during World War II, Glavnoye Upravlyeniye Kontrrazvedki

Narodnoqo Komissariata Oborony - Smersh (Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of

Defense, or GUKR-NKO-Smersh), can be achieved.

^Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict (Santa Monica, C A : Rand Corporation, R-446 P r , 1966); Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Michael J. Deane, Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Crane, Russak and Co. Inc. 1977). 6

Information on the present-day Soviet military coun­ terintelligence organization, the Third Chief Directorate of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB or Com­ mittee for State Security) is scant.^ Of approximately forty Soviet intelligence officers who have defected to the West since World War II, only one. Captain Aleksei

Myagkov, author of the book. Inside the KGB, spent his entire career in military counterintelligence.*

^There is some controversy over whether Soviet military counterintelligence is a directorate or a chief directorate of the KGB. Peter Deriabin, a former KGB of­ ficer, has consistently maintained that Soviet military counterintelligence is a chief directorate of the KGB. In his book The Secret World, Ballantine Espionage Intelli­ gence Library, No. 21 (New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1982) originally published in 1959, he states on page 392 that Soviet military counterintelli­ gence was a chief directorate. Deriabin, in his article, "Fedorchuk, the KGB and the Soviet Succession," (ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs [Fall 1982]: 614), stated again that Soviet military counterintelligence is a chief di­ rectorate of the KGB. John Barron, in his most recent book, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974), p. 451, and in his book The KGB : The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975), pp. 15-16 has consistently maintained that Soviet military counterintelligence is only a direc­ torate of the KGB. Aleksei Myagkov, in his book Inside the KGB, Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 8 (New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1981), consistently refers to Soviet military counterintelligence as the Third Directorate of the KGB. This writer feels that given the importance of military counterintelligence within the security apparatus, it is probably a chief directorate of the KGB and will in the future be referred to as the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB.

*Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB, Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 8 (New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1981). 7

However, by obtaining a basic understanding of the operations and structure of Smersh during World War II, it may be possible to shed some light on the role, opera­ tions, and structure of the present-day Third Chief Direc­ torate of the KGB.

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines counter­ intelligence or kontrrazyedka simply as "the activity carried out by special organs of the state with the aim of combatting the intelligence activities of other states."

It goes on to say that "in socialist countries, counter­ intelligence activities are directed toward the fight against espionage, saboteurs, terrorists, ideological saboteurs and other subversive activities . . . of capi­ talist states." Soviet military counterintelligence activities are defined as "consisting of ensuring the security of the armed forces from the subversive activi­ ties of capitalist states," and of "exposing and foiling attempts by enemy spies, saboteurs, terrorists, traitors of the Motherland, and other enemy elements to inflict damage on the combat might of the armed forces."^

These definitions of counterintelligence represent a complete and comprehensive view of the counterintelligence

^Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol 4, s.v. "Kontrrazvedka." 8 problem. In one sentence, the Soviet definition elimi­ nates any conceptual or theoretical separation of the security function of counterintelligence (passive, or defensive Cl) and the counterespionage function of coun­ terintelligence (active, or offensive Cl). This compre­ hensive view of counterintelligence is consistent with the

Soviet military concept of combined arms operations, and is also consistent with the idea that the role of the KGB is to function as the sword and shield of the Party.

Thus, in a broader context, Soviet military counter­ intelligence actually becomes an extension of a counter­ intelligence system designed to keep the Soviet civilian population in check. The concept of imposing a counter­ intelligence system on the military is a logical manifes­ tation of the conspiratorial nature of the prerevolution­ ary Bolshevik party. It is surely never forgotten by

Soviet leaders that the USSR nearly lost two wars due to the poor performance of the Soviet army, and in World War

I, the government was overthrown. In World War II, the regime was severely shaken and communism was almost de­ stroyed. Hence, the most insignificant security function, such as guarding a railroad crossing, or running a high- level penetration agent such as Kim Philby, or ferreting out "ideological saboteurs" within the military, all com­ bine to form an in-depth, multilayered approach to coun- 9 terintelligence operations.

This study will show that this comprehensive, multi­ layered approach to counterintelligence is not just an abstraction, but is operationally applied to all facets of

Soviet military counterintelligence activities, and that

Soviet military counterintelligence is a major component of the counterintelligence system of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). CHAPTER II

FORERUNNERS OF SMERSH

Military Counterintelligence Under the Tsars

Prior to the establishment of the Special Depart­ ments (Osobye Otdely, or 00) of the VeCheka (or Vseross- iiskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya po bor'be s Kontr- revolyutsiey, Spekulyatsiey j, Sabotazhem, or the All-

Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-

Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage, on December 19,

1918, no effective centralized separate organization solely dedicated to conducting counterintelligence and political security operations existed within the Russian army, or within the various Russian security police organ­ izations.® However, this does not mean that counter­ intelligence and political security operations were neglected within the Imperial Russian army prior to the

Bolshevik revolution.

When non-Russian territories had been conquered,

Muscovite rulers would settle ethnic Russians among the native population, divide the territory into adminis­ trative units, and appoint officials who were strangers to

'Leggett, The Cheka, p. 97.

10 11

the area to govern the inhabitants. These governors were

changed frequently, in order that they would not become

too friendly with the indigenous population and develop a power of their own. Two persons were generally assigned to govern conquered territories: one of higher nobility to hold the title, and a deputy from the lower nobility to control the former. Overseers were periodically sent directly from Moscow to spy on both the governor and his deputy. This system of political surveillance was also practiced in the army. Persons of higher nobility were appointed commanders of large army units, and their depu­ ties, usually of lower nobility, were required to spy on their superiors as well as carry out their military duties.

Most historians credit Ivan the Terrible and the influence of the Mongol invasion with having founded the first centralized Russian secret police organization.

Given the ruthlessness attributed to Ivan the Terrible's

Oprichnina (1562-1572), he, no doubt, used this organiza­ tion on occasion to rid the army of his enemies. In

1650, the Secret Office, the political police of Tsar

Alexey, furnished agents to supervise Russian ambassadors in foreign countries, and also generals in time of war.’'

’'Dinko Tomasic, The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953), p. 67; Ronald Hingley, The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, 12

In addition to co-opting lower nobility, who served

as deputy commanders of large army units to spy on their

superiors, and using small political police organizations to suppress dissent, the tsars relied heavily from Peter the Great onward on elite guard units, such as the

Sememovsky, Preobrazhenskiy, and Izmailovsky Guard Regi­ ments, as well as foreign mercenaries, to protect them­ selves, not only from uprisings from the populace, but also from revolts or coups by units of the regular army.

One of the first cases of a coordinated secret police and guard unit operation to suppress a revolt occurred in 1698 when the streltsy regiments staged a mutiny near the Sea of Azov.

Peter the Great (1690-1725), while on an eighteen- month tour of Western Europe, was informed that the

Streltsy regiments had revolted in order to protest their being used to build fortifications near the Sea of Azov.

Upon arrival in Moscow, Peter discovered that the revolt had been quelled by several thousand foreign mercenaries, and the ringleaders of the mutiny had already been

Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 1-8; Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from Tsars to Commissars, 2nd ed. (Frederick, M D : University Publications of America, 1984), pp. 104-111. 13

executed.®

The Preobrazhenskiy Office, Peter the Great's secret

police organization, had a permanent staff of two chief

clerks and five to eight assistants, and was primarily set

up to serve as an administrative office for the Preobra­

zhenskiy and Semenovksy Guard Regiments. The "Office"

soon expanded, and in addition to being tasked with tradi­

tional secret police duties, it was also entrusted with

such diverse functions as controlling the newly developing

tobacco trade. The Semenovsky and Preobrazhenskiy Guard

Regiments served as executive agents for the Preobra­

zhenskiy Office. Members of the regiments were required to act as couriers and to carry out arrests for the secret police. Peter also commissioned guards officers to inves­ tigate and prosecute political crimes. A staff of twelve to fifteen assistants would be at the disposal of the guards officer so that the case could be more efficiently handled.^

The Streltsy were rounded up, probably with the aid of the guards regiments, tortured and beheaded in public.

“Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p. 50; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 10-11.

“Sidney Monas, The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961) p. 32; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 16; Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p p . 51, 115. 14

with some of the beheadings being carried out by Peter the

Great himself. To hasten the processing of interroga­

tions, the Preobrazhenskiy Office set up thirteen torture

chambers and generally supervised the reduction of the

Streltsy from a formidable force of 50,000 to a few com­ panies. Thus, Peter the Great conducted one of the first known large-scale purges of the Russian army by relying on the combined efforts of the secret police, elite guard units, and foreign mercenaries. Although he did not

institutionalize a secret police presence in the army, according to available evidence, Peter the Great did esta­ blish a precedent for secret police intervention in army affairs.'°

After several reorganizations (see Appendix A), the

Preobrazhenskiy Office was abolished and the Chancery for

Secret Investigations was established in 1731. This

Chancery was unpopular with the politically ambitious guards officers.Although no direct evidence exists to indicate that this Chancery spied on the army on a regular basis, it is reasonable to assume that since the guard units had engineered several palace coups, the var-

‘°Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p. 51; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 11.

‘‘Monas, The Third Section, p. 35; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 16-18. 15

ious tsarist secret police organizations (prior to 1801)

were instructed, at least on an ad hoc basis, to conduct

political security operations within the army and guard

regiments.

Catherine the Great continued using the secret police to police the army on an ad hoc basis. In 1764,

Ivan VI, who had been imprisoned by Catherine, was mur­ dered by his guards in Schluesselburg Castle when a group of guard officers unsuccessfully tried to liberate him in order to place him on the throne. Once the conspirators were caught, Stepan Sheshkovsky, chief of Catherine's secret police (the Secret Chancery), interrogated the conspirators and had them duly executed or exiled to

Siberia.

Although Catherine the Great did not systematize police surveillance in the army, the fact that the elite guard units often played a vital role throughout Russia history in "kingmaking," and the fact that Catherine her­ self had extensive foreign contacts, strongly indicate stationed political police activity within Russian army units, stated in St. Petersburg and Moscow, increased over previous periods, although it was still conducted on an ad hoc basis.‘“

‘“p.S. Squire, The Third Department: The Political Police in Russia of Nicholas I (Cambridge, England: 16

In February 1801, Tsar Paul appointed Count Ludwig von Pahlen, a Kurlander, Governor General of St.

Petersburg. Adding insult to injury by appointing a

foreigner to the Governor Generalship of St. Petersburg,

Paul also slighted the Semenovsky and Preobrazhenskiy

Guard Regiments by allowing his own personal group of soldiers, whom he trained at Gatchina, to become the per­ sonal bodyguards to the tsar. Paul dismissed General

Alexander Suvorov and all calvary guard officers, sus­ pecting that they were members of secret societies.

As Governor General of St. Petersburg, von Pahlen commanded all the guard units. Even though Prince

Kurakin, the Procurator General, actually ran the secret police, von Pahlen was entrusted with acting as the exec­ utive agent for the secret police in his capacity as com­ mander of the guard regiments. Having been previously embarrassed and abused on several occasions by Tsar Paul, von Pahlen conspired with Alexander I and several discon­ tented guard officers to depose the tsar. On March 12,

1801, Tsar Paul was strangled by von Pahlen and a group of guard officers in Mikhailovsky Palace. Had Paul esta­ blished a systematic informant network within the army, he

Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 17.; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 16-26; Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, pp. 66-67, 118-119. 17 might have been able to uncover the plot against him.

Tsar Paul's overthrow marked the last time that the guard

regiments played such an active part in a palace coup.

When Tsar Alexander I took power in 1801, one of his

first official acts was to abolish the Secret Chancery and release several hundred political prisoners. For twenty-

five years the tsarist secret police organization was in total disarray.

The Military Governor of St. Petersburg possessed his own informant network and cooperated extensively with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, established in 1802.

Alexander placed political security matters into the hands to two specially created committees, those of September 5,

1805, and January 13, 1807. These committees were de­ signed to put political police and law-and-order matters in the hands of subordinates while the tsar was away fighting Napoleon. The Committee of Higher Police, esta­ blished September 5, 1805, was entrusted with maintaining internal security. The secret police subordinate to the

Governor General in St. Petersburg and the secret police subordinate to the Governor General in Moscow (established in 180-7) operated alongside the Committee of Higher Po­ lice, as well as the Committee of Public Safety, which had 18 been set up on January 13, 1807 (see Appendix A ) .'“

The Committee for Public Safety, consisting of the

Ministers of Justice, Internal Affairs, and Land Forces, two senators, the Privy Councillors, and Field Marshal

Saltykov, was established for the same reasons as the

Higher Police Committee in 1805. Both committees contin­ ued to operate alongside the other police organizations in

St. Petersburg and Moscow. Given the overall responsi­ bilities of the Committee for Public Safety, and the fact that it was the highest police authority in the realm

(this committee became a Chancery in 1809), it can reason­ ably be inferred that the Committee for Public Safety had the authority to conduct political security and counter­ intelligence operations in and around the Russian army.‘“*

From 1812 until his death in 1825, Alexander's political apprehensions were focused on the army. This can be illustrated by the appointment of Ya. I. de

Sanglen, a prominent official in Alexander's security establishment, as Director of Military Police of the 1st

Army. De Sanglen held a subsequent post in army counter-

‘“Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, pp. 68-70, 120-121; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 22-23; Monas, The Third Section, pp. 37-44; Squire, The Third Department, pp. 17-25.

‘“Monas, The Third Section, pp. 38-39; Squire, The Third Department, pp. 33, 37. 19 espionage, which was attached to the General Staff, and served as Army Provost General until his retirement in

1816. This is one of the first cases in Russian history where a member of the tsarist secret police held a posi­ tion in the army military police organization as well as army counterespionage.*“

In 1815, one of the first formal military police organizations was established (see Appendix D). The

Gendarme Regiment was formed from the Borisoglebsky

Dragoon Regiment and dispersed among several army corps.

There is little information on the operations of the Army

Gendarme Regiment, although the regiment did receive double pay and enjoyed a privileged position within the

Russian army. Approximately 110 years later, Soviet security police officers attached to the Red Army were to receive considerably better pay than their regular army counterparts, and were to enjoy privileges far superior to those of the regular army. The Army Gendarme Regiment did have investigatory powers, but their authority in no way matched that of the Special Departments (or 00s) of the

VeCheka, established in 1918.

The Army Gendarme Regiment was established in an environment of considerable confusion. In addition to the

‘“Monas, The Third Section, p. 44; Squire, The Third Department, pp. 33, 37. 20 committees that coordinated political security operations and the activities that were required to maintain public order, as well as the activities of the Governor Generals of St. Petersburg and Moscow, a Ministry of Police oper­ ated from 1811-1819. One of its branches, the Special

Chancellery, was responsible for the general surveillance of the population. When the Ministry of Police was abol­ ished in 1819, the Special Chancellery reverted to the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see Appendix

A) .

On October 10, 1820, the Semenovsky Guard Regiment staged a mutiny in protest against the brutal treatment they had received from their commander. Colonel

Schwartz.Alexander refused to believe that the mutiny was caused by a harsh commander and as a result, he ordered General Vasilchikov, commander of the Corps of

Guards, to draft a plan for the establishment of a secret political police within the Imperial Russian Army. This plan is apparently the first documented recognition by tsarist security officials that political security opera­ tions within the army must be systematic and conducted on

‘“See John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas 1 : 1825-1855 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 273-295, for repression in the tsarist army. 21 more than an ad hoc basis.It is also a clear recog­ nition that political security operations within the army will involve extensive coordination with the secret police and involve civilians. To quote Vasilchikov:

Even if regimental commanders were to be in­ formed of everything that went on in their regi­ ments . . . it would still not be enough. The officers go visiting in society. They have con­ nections. The restless stirring of minds in all Europe, especially since recent events, may insinuate itself even among us . . . Foreign powers may even plant secret agents in society . . . It is natural that the closest attention of such people would turn to the Guards . . . All information gathered by secret agents should relate to the military and civilian affairs should be touched on only when they might directly influence the armed forces, as for example rumors spread with regard to the armed forces, discussions concerning the orders of command.‘“

The "military police" were to remain secret, were to be well paid, and the tsar should allocate 40,000 rubles a year to run and maintain these "secret military police."

General Gribovsky was selected to run an organization where fourteen individuals were assigned per army corps.

There were nine observers per corps for enlisted men, three observers per corps for officers, one clerk, and one individual whose identity was to remain entirely secret.

'“Squire, The Third Department, pp. 40-45; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 23; Monas, The Third Section, pp. 45-46.

'“Monas, The Third Section, pp. 46-47. 22

On January 4, 1821, this plan was approved and introduced

into the Corps of Guards. A similar plan was instituted

in the 2nd Army, at the request of its chief of

staff.Thus, the first secret police organization

inside the Russian army was born. Even though the

Imperial Russian Army Under Alexander I defeated Napoleon, the fact that a large portion of the Russian army had been exposed to the West, as a result of the Napoleonic wars, created an environment in which unrest and discontent could breed. This was evidenced by the increased number of army officers who joined secret societies in the

1820s . “ °

For Tsar Alexander I, the institution of a political surveillance system within the Imperial army was too lit­ tle too late. The army surveillance system was forced to operate under highly decentralized conditions. No cen­ tral police authority existed within the realm to effec­ tively coordinate all political security operations. The ineffectiveness of the security system within the military can be demonstrated by the fact that the Decembrist Revolt in 1825 was planned with virtual impunity. Although the revolt was crushed under Tsar Nicholas I, the fact that so

'“Monas, The Third Section, p. 47; Squire, Third Department, p. 44.

““Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 24-25. 23 many army officers could conspire to overthrow the tsar in a country riddled with spies without incurring any punish­ ment is a direct reflection of the inability of Alexander

I and his decentralized police apparatus to efficiently suppress dissent.“'

Having realized the ineffectiveness of maintaining a multiplicity of police organizations, often operating at cross purposes. Tsar Nicholas I, in an ukaz of July 3,

1826, established the Third Section of his Imperial

Majesty's Own Chancellery. General Count von Benckendorff was appointed to head both the Third Section and the Corps of Gendarmes. Both civilians and members of the military came under his jurisdiction, even though the Army Gendarme

Regiment continued to operate much as it did under

Alexander I. The initial staff of the Third Section con­ sisted of only sixteen officials, divided into four sec­ tions, with military members probably falling under the jurisdiction of the First Section, which had the responsi­ bility for collecting information on people under police surveillance.““

“‘Squire, The Third Department, p. 45; Monas, The Third Section, p. 52.

““Squire, The Third Department, pp. 45, 60-61; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 31. 24

Nicholas I, having suppressed the Decembrist Revolt, gave the Third Section a virtual carte blanche to inter­ fere in any sphere of Russian life. Clause 5 of the Third

Section's responsibilities seated that "the Third Section will have the authority to exile and arrest suspicious or dangerous persons," and clause 8 stated that the Third

Section will "inform the tsar of all events without excep­ tion." Third Section activities were now concentrated on the military and the intelligentsia, and from 1826 onward

"the most important function of all ranks serving in the

Gendarmes was political surveillance." This included the ranks of the Army Gendarme Regiment as well.““

During the reign of Nicholas I, the organization of the police forces remained stable. Information on the operations of the Third Section inside the army, as well as operations of the Army Gendarme Regiment, is meager.

However, recruitment efforts as practiced by the Corps of

Gendarmes may provide a glimpse into how the Army Gendarme

Regiment filled its ranks. The Corps of Gendarmes was designed to be a highly visible and incorruptible police force, and the executive agent for the Third Section.

Gendarme officers wore sky blue uniforms and white gloves.

““Squire, The Third Department, pp. 62-63; Monas, The Third Section, p. 63. 25 were highly visible, and were required to ferret out dis­ sent and measure public opinion. They were also required to run informant networks. In order to attract good quality gendarme officers, the Corps recruited officers solely from the army, offered them three times the rate of pay for the same position in the regular army and offered better privileges and living conditions than those of the regular army.“^ On the basis of this information, it is logical to assume that recruiting for the Army Gendarme

Regiment was much the same. Special inducements had to be offered in order for good officers to engage in "distaste­ ful" police activities. One hundred years later, the

Soviet secret police instituted the same type of recruit­ ing practices on a more stringent basis, and offered bet­ ter benefits and privileges to its Special Department officers within the Red Army.

Officially the Army Gendarme Regiment became di­ rectly subordinate to the Third Section on March 5,

1842.““ This marked the final step toward the militari­ zation of Russia's political police force, and formally

“'’Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 34; Monas, The Third Section, pp. 60-61, 105; Squire, The Third Department, pp. 60, 80; Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p. 123.

““Squire, The Third Department, p. 99. 26

made the Army Gendarme Regiment the executive arm of the

Third Section within the Imperial Army. It is interesting

to note that although present-day KGB staff officers within the Soviet military do not wear distinctive uni­

forms, and KGB officers concerned with both internal

security and foreign intelligence collection do not wear

"sky blue uniforms and white gloves," Soviet State Secur­

ity officers, as well as officers of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs, still retain a rank structure similar to the regular Soviet army. The militarization of the polit­

ical police in the mid-1800s by Nicholas I has carried over to the present-day KGB and Ministry of Internal

Affairs (MVD).

Although there is little information on political security operations of the Third Section in the army and the Army Gendarme Regiment, regular reporting on army morale was submitted by the Third Section to the tsar.

The First Annual Report submitted to the tsar by the secret police in 1827 stated, "Only the army's morale is satisfactory." In 1829, the annual report issued to the tsar contained derogatory information on the Minister of

War. Army morale was considered one of the most important problems of the day. The Third Section kept a close watch on army affairs, even to the extent of recommending the abolition of the brutal practice of the shpitsrutyeny (rod 27 beatings through the ranks).““

No information appears to be available on what input the Army Gendarme Regiment had into the Third Section's

"state of the empire" annual reports to the tsar. Since the Army Gendarme Regiment was charged with the political surveillance in the army, as well as general military police duties, it is reasonable to assume that the Army

Gendarme Regiment and the Chief Provost Marshal of the

Army provided the Third Section with some information regarding the "state of the army."

The Third Section apparently did not rely entirely on the Army Gendarme Regiment to conduct security opera­ tions inside the army, as the regiment was designed to fulfill primarily military police duties. On an ad hoc basis, active-duty military members were used for under­ cover work in the army. An NCO of the 3rd Ukranian Uhlan

Regiment named I.V. Shervud, who later received a commis­ sion as a captain in 1831, did extensive reporting on the state of morale in the military colonies in the southern

Ukraine.““

From 1855, after the death of Nicholas I, to approx­ imately 1880, the Russian secret police experienced no

““Squire, The Third Department, pp. 201-206.

““Squire, The Third Department, p. 84; Monas, The Third Section, p. 114. 28 major organizational upheavals. The paucity of informa­ tion on political security operations in the army during this period may reflect the following:

1. That after the Decembrist Revolt, Nicholas I effectively crushed all opposition to the tsar within the military and by setting up a formal military police force, ensured that a revolt from that quarter would not recur.

2. That the Third Section had very little do to with army political security operations because these matters may have been left largely to the Army Gendarme

Regiment and its attendant informant network.

3. That the generals were adverse to interference in their affairs by the Third Section, preferring to deal with anti-tsarist activity internally.

4. That since the army as a whole occupied a privi­ leged position in society (at least in the 1870s), direct police interference in its internal affairs was not encouraged.““

5. That political police resources may have been stretched to the limit in combatting dissent and such terrorist groups as the People's Will within the civilian

““Gary Richard Waxmonsky, "Police and Politics in Soviet Society 1921-1929" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982), p. 36. 29 population, and in ensuring censorship. Therefore, the political police could ill afford to waste resources on large-scale political surveillance of the armed forces, especially since the Army Gendarme Regiment had already been entrusted with this task.““

On March 1, 1881, Alexander II was killed by a terrorist's hand grenade on the Catherine Quay in St.

Petersburg. As a result of the assassination of Alexander

II, Loris-Melikov, Minister of the Interior, was duly fired and replaced by Nikolay Ignatiyev. Ignatiyev insti­ tuted several reforms, one of which was to establish special police units to investigate political crimes in

St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Warsaw. These units were called okhranyye otdeleniya, or protective sections. The term Okhrana, loosely used to connote the later nineteenth century political police, stems from the introduction of these units in 1881.“°

For thirty-six years the Okhrana battled terrorists, suppressed dissent, and generally tried to keep anti- tsarist forces at bay. One of the most controversial

““Monas devotes almost one-third of his entire book on the Third Section to censorship. Deriabin in Watchdogs of Terror, also devotes considerable space to terrorist activities. See also Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 54-68.

““Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p. 132; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 66-68. 30

tasks of the Okhrana concerned its activities within the

armed forces. Prior to 1914, the Okhrana had established

a police informant network within the army. This infor­

mant network probably supplemented as well as spied upon

any network that had already been established by the mili­

tary. The tsarist General Staff's Third Section was

responsible for positive military intelligence collection

as well as for some counterespionage operations, but it

appears not to have concerned itself with combatting political subversion inside the military. In 1914,

General V. F. Dzhunkovsky, Deputy Minister of the Inte­

rior, abolished Okhrana political security operations within the army, stating that "the practice was prejudi­ cial to military honor, morale, and discipline.

Dzhunkovsky's decision seriously hampered the Okhrana's ability to gather political information on the state of

Russia's armed forces on the eve of a major war.

Dzhunkovsky's act becomes even more difficult to compre­ hend when viewed in light of the fact that the Germans

“‘J. F . N. Bradley, "The Russian Secret Service in the First World War," Soviet Studies: A Quarterly Journal on the USSR and Eastern Europe 10 (April 1959): 375-383; United States, Department of the Army, General Staff, United States Army (GSUSA), Intelligence Division, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, January 9, 1948, declassified NND 77011, p. 28; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 108. 31 were financing counterrevolutionary activities inside

Russia, thereby forcing the ill-equipped military itself to engage in political surveillance of its own troops on

an unprecedented scale.The ineptitude of the mili­ tary to conduct political security operations within the

army is demonstrated by the following examples:

1. In 1914, at the outbreak of the war, the Depart­ ment of Police created the 9th Secretariat, which dealt with matters of police interest in the districts occupied by the army. This clearly shows that the tsarist security establishment did not feel that the military could carry out successful occupation policy on its own.““

2. The military often could not determine which denunciations for various crimes were irresponsible or credible.

3. The army arrested, on occasion, the Okhrana's own spies in the zone of occupation.

4. The army often expelled enemy agents from the

““a . T. Vassilyev and Rene Fueloep-Miller, The Ochrana: The Russian Secret Police (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1930), pp. 122-123; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 109.

““Frederick S. Zuckerman, "The Russian Political Police at Home and Abroad (1880-1917): Its Structure, Functions, and Methods and Its Struggle with Organized Opposition" (Ph.D. dissertation. New York University, 1973), p. 19; Vassilyev, The Ochrana, p. 116. 32

war zone without proper debriefings or interrogations.

Friction between the army and the Okhrana under the

aforementioned circumstances was inevitable. The military had the right to expel anyone from the zone of occupation, but the Okhrana had to take into consideration the polit­

ical and economic impact that such deportations would have on the remainder of the country. Agreements were grudg-

ingly reached, but this lack of cooperation, no doubt, hindered the successful accomplishment of seburity opera­ tions during World War I. By March 1917, there was no formally constituted police force in Russia, and the con­ duct of political security operations in St. Petersburg was entrusted to Colonel B. V. Nikitin, Chief of the

Counterespionage Bureau of the Petrograd Military Dis­ trict. By his own admission. Colonel Nikitin could not keep his counterespionage bureau solely focused on German intelligence activity, primarily because the Germans were heavily supporting counterrevolutionary activities“

Thus, the line between political subversion and tradi­ tional counterintelligence duties became increasingly blurred and forced Nikitin's counterespionage bureau to

“‘'Vassilyev, The Ochrana, pp. 117-120.

““Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 109-116; Vassilyev, The Ochrana, p. 115. 33

act as a political police force. Present-day Soviet

political security operations, both within the military

and the civilian population, obliterate the line between

anti-Soviet activity and traditional espionage, as sus­ pects are often charged with both crimes. Friction be­ tween the Special Departments of the KGB and the military still exists, at least at the working level.

On the whole, the tsarist secret police forces left the military to ferret out spies and saboteurs within its own ranks, through the General Staff intelligence sections and the Army Gendarme Regiment. During periods of extreme unrest, such as during the Decembrist Revolt, and the terrorist activity prior to 1914, political surveillance by the secret police was conducted in a more systematic fashion; however, the intensity of these operations does not appear to have been consistent. Thus, it can be stated that in earlier periods, prior to the establishment of the Third Section by Nicholas I in 1826, political sur­ veillance of the army was done on an ad hoc basis and directed primarily against certain individuals in the officer corps. With the establishment of the Army

Gendarme Regiment and the institution of the informant network in the army in the 1820s, political surveillance became somewhat more regular, but it never reached the 34

scale of the present-day Soviet Special Department of the

KGB. The functions of the informant network within the tsarist army were largely limited to "observation and

reporting," rather than deterrence of anti-tsarist activ­

ity. The tsars, of course, established a precedent for political police presence in the military, but its pre­ sence was not overwhelmingly oppressive. Based on avail­ able evidence, there have been no true tsarist antecedents of the Special Departments of the KGB.

Military Counterintelligence in the VeCheka, GPU, OGPU

The advent of the Bolshevik revolution marked a dramatic change in the relationship between the secret political police and the Russian army. For the first time in recent Russian history, the entire army had completely disintegrated in the middle of a major war. Desertion was rampant, discipline had eroded among the rank and file, and the Bolshevik government had to rebuild an effective fighting force with nothing but disillusioned soldiers and a large number of pro-tsarist officers at its dis­ posal. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk proved to be a disaster, and the new Soviet government found itself faced

““Lennard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1976), p. 91. 35 with having to repel determined German attacks. In short, the situation called for drastic measures.

On October 30, 1917, just after the Bolsheviks seized power, the Sovnarkom (Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov, or the Council of People's Commissars) established the

Voenno-Revo1iutsionny Komitet (Military Revolutionary

Committee— MRC) on October 26, 1917, and entrusted it with the "safeguarding of revolutionary order." the "combatting of counter-revolution," and the protection of the Sovnar­ kom and the Petrograd Soviet.The MRC functioned as the guarantor of Bolshevik power prior to the establish­ ment of the VeCheka on December 20, 1917. The MRC esta­ blished several commissions in order to ensure its secu­ rity, one of which was titled the Military Investigation

Commission. This commission had the responsibility of dealing with arrested military personnel and the investi­ gation of counterrevolutionary activity in general.

Although the Soviets do not consider the Military Investi­ gation Commission a military counterintelligence organiza­ tion, many of its functions ran parallel to those of the

VeCheka and its Special Departments (see Appendix D).

““Leggett, The Cheka, p. 6

““Ibid., p. 7 36

On December 20, 1917, the VeCheka was created,

thereby effectively abolishing all of the commissions set up by the MRC.““ The military counterintelligence

function was distributed among the MRCs of the Petrograd

and Moscow Soviets, the revolutionary committees of the

army and navy, and various other Party and military organ­

izations, including the VeCheka itself.

It was not until a meeting of the Presidium of the

VeCheka on April 9, 1918, that Felix Dzerzhinskiy, first chief of the Soviet secret police, began to discuss the possibility of placing under one roof all the organiza­ tions that were responsible for counterintelligence work within the Red Army and Navy. The organizations entrusted with security operations in the army included a registra­ tion service attached to Red Army headquarters, a counter­ intelligence section attached to the operations officer of the Higher Military Council, and a registration service attached to Navy headquarters. A military counterespio­ nage organization, Voyenkontrol (Voyenny Kontrol; or Mili­ tary Control), was established in May 1918. In September

““Mervyn Matthews, ed. Soviet Government : A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. Inc., 1974), pp. 237-238.

*°S. Ostryakov, Military Chekists, trans. Defense Intelligence Agency no. LN-290-80, September 29, 1980 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), p. 7. 37

1918, all these organizations were placed under the Mili­ tary Supervision Department of the Registration Office of the Revvoyensovet (Revolyutsionny Voyenny Sovet, or Revo­ lutionary War Council), headed by M. G. Trakman."*'

Prior to the amalgamation of these diverse organiza­ tions in September 1918, the Sovnarkom in a resolution dated July 16, 1918, ordered Martyn Janovich Latsis, a high ranking VeCheka official, to organize an extraordi­ nary commission for the purpose of combatting counterrevo­ lution in the rear area of the Eastern Front. Another

Front Cheka was established on the Western Front at the same time. The duties of these Front and Army Chekas were to combat counterrevolution and espionage in the rear area of the Red Army. They were also established to unify the work of all Chekas in the front zones and to "purge the rear area of counterrevolutionary elements." On July 29,

1918, the VeCheka itself established a Military Sub-De­ partment, subordinate to the Department for Combatting

Counterrevolution and Sabotage. The Military Sub-Depart­ ment was created to coordinate the work of all Front and

Army Chekas, and was raised to the status of a full department in November 1918. Mikhail S. Kedrov was

'*'Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 22; Leggett, The Cheka, p. 84. 38 appointed to head the department.

Front and Army Chekas operated in a state of virtual administrative anarchy. Simultaneous operations in the same area by Provincial Chekas, one or two Army Chekas, and District Chekas, all of which were supposedly opera­ ting under a Front Cheka, caused a high degree of confu­ sion and conflict. In some areas of the front, secret police operations came to a near standstill due primarily to the lack of coordination and direction from the cen­ ter. To complicate matters further. Front Chekas, although operating outside of the authority of the Terri­ torial Chekas, received their funds from the Political

Department of the Red Army Staff. For these reasons, the

Military Sub-Department of the VeCheka was raised to the status of a full department in November of 1918.

One of the major targets of the VeCheka Military

Department was Voyenkontrol, established in May 1918 under the Commissar of War to protect the Red Army from espio­ nage. Soviet sources state that this organization was nothing more than a "branch of the English General Staff" and "in essence the counterespionage and counterintel­ ligence apparatus of the old tsarist army," and that it was not structured to "combat counterrevolutionary activ­ ity" within the army. In July 1918, Soviet sources claim that one of the major reasons for Red Army setbacks in the 39

Urals and in Vologda was due to "improper screening of officers assigned to command positions due to the fact that Voyenkontrol had ignored the enlistments in the Red

Army of a large number of "counterrevolutionary offi­ cers." As a result "military chekists" executed twenty

"White Guard spies" and Dzerzhinskiy was appointed to investigate the entire Voyenkontrol apparatus.*^

The state of military counterintelligence within the

Red Army was nothing short of chaotic. In addition to administrative and subordination problems, during 1918 alone 22,000 ex-tsarist officers were enlisted in the Red

Army. From June 12 to August 15, 1920, 48,409 former tsarist officers were taken into the ranks of the Red

Army. In the fall of 1918, the Red Army constituted over

1,000,000 men, and by 1919 four-fifths of Red Army comman­ ders were former tsarist officers. The personnel of the

Front and Army Chekas numbered only 2,000 by January 1,

1919. Trotsky, Commissar for War, took drastic measures to ensure officer loyalty by using families of former tsarist officers as hostages, and forcing all former tsarist officers to register with the Military Registra-

“^Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 95-97, 270; Gerson, The Secret Police, pp. 92-94; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p p . 22—23. 40

tion Department of the VeCheka. ** ^

Since Voyenkontrol was perceived by the Bolsheviks

to be a "nest of spies" and nothing more than a "branch of

the English General Staff," this left the Red Army without

an effective counterintelligence organization. Thus the

amalgamation of the Front and Army Chekas with Voyen­

kontrol and the Military Department of the VeCheka on

December 19, 1918, to form the Special Departments (Osobye

Otdely, or 00s) of the VeCheka was approved by the Central

Committee. Although several dates could be used to cele­

brate the first day of Soviet military counterintelli­

gence, General Georgi Tsinev, 1st Deputy Chairman of the

KGB, stated that December 19, 1918, is the birthday of

Soviet military counterintelligence

According to Soviet sources, the duties of the newly

formed Special Departments of the VeCheka were as follows:

“^Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 96-97, 100; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 25-31; Gerson, The Secret Police, p . 94.

'‘'’Georgiy Tsinev, "Na Strazhe Interesov, Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 24 (December 1978): 27, translated by United States Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 73037, USSR Military Affairs, no 1421, March 20, 1979, p. 3. Other sources state that the first step was taken on July 16, 1918. See Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 95-97; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 23-31; and Gerson, The Secret Police, p. 94. 41

1. Carry out the fight against counterrevolution

and espionage in the Army and Navy (Front and Army Chekas

had already been assigned this function since July 1918) .

2. VeCheka Special Departments were to supervise the work of all local 00s and organize intelligence opera­ tions abroad and in regions occupied by the Whites.

3. The Special Departments of the VeCheka must carry out the orders of the Revvoyensovet of the Repub­

lic. This move effectively made the 00s operationally subordinate to the political organs of the military.

However, the 00s had the right to make arrests, conduct searches, and carry out investigations in the case of counterrevolutionary crimes, as well as run espionage operations and conduct traditional counterintelligence duties. Under certain circumstances the 00s could also carry out executions.

With the merger of all military counterintelligence and counterespionage functions, the line between political security operations and combatting bona fide enemy agents became blurred. From December 19, 1918, on, the Soviet practice of counterintelligence, at least in the opera­ tional areas, not only encompassed the idea that enemy

^Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 20-24, 31-34; Gerson, The Secret Police, pp. 92-93; Leggett, The Cheka, p. 206. 42

spies must be rooted out of the Red Army and Navy, and

enemy espionage organizations destroyed or neutralized, it

also entrusted the 00s with feretting out "counterrevolu­

tionary elements" within the Red Army. For sixty-six years this concept has never changed. The present-day

Third Chief Directorate of the KGB is charged with ensuring the political loyalty of the Soviet Armed Forces as well as thwarting hostile intelligence service attempts to penetrate the ranks of the Soviet military. The mili­ tary counterintelligence organization of the KGB has never been entrusted with performing solely traditional counter­ intelligence duties. It has always been used as an instrument of political repression, or at the very least as an instrument to enforce a "corporate discipline" of sorts. Soviet military counterintelligence was an out­ growth of the VeCheka, which in its first few years func­ tioned solely as a counterintelligence and political security organization. Thus, military counterintelligence as practiced by the Soviets is a manifestation of the conspiratorial nature of the Bolshevik party. It was also designed to ensure that the process of "sovietization" proceeds smoothly. It has always been used to uncover corruption in the military as well as for traditional counterintelligence functions. The above concept can best 43 be illustrated by reiterating some of the examples of 00 operations during the course of revolution and civil war.

1. Special Departments of the VeCheka were charged with ensuring that the Red Army received adequate sup­ plies. Several operations were conducted to root out corruption and black marketeering in the military supply system. VeCheka Special Departments devoted considerable efforts to prevent stealing of such vital supplies as ammunition and weapons, as well as overcoats and fuel.

2. VeCheka Special Departments participated in alleviating the shortage of medical personnel in the army. A concerted effort to draft doctors for military service resulted in the army gaining an additional 1,500 doctors in the Moscow area alone.

3. In addition to drafting doctors for military service, the VeCheka Special Departments investigated

"criminal negligence" within the medical supply system.

Thirty percent of Red Army personnel suffered from typhus, and as a result the VeCheka on November 2, 1919, esta­ blished a medical commission to supervise medical matters within the armed forces.

4. The 00s uncovered a plot by the "Volunteer Army"

^Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 64-65, 79-75; Gerson, The Secret Police, pp. 98-100; Leggett, The Cheka, p. 240. 44

of the Moscow region to overthrow the regime in mid-

September 1919. This organization, consisting of former

tsarist officers, had managed to conceal a rather impres­

sive array of weapons including artillery and armored

cars. Before it could seize power, the "army chekists"

rounded up and imprisoned 1,000 conspirators. The

National Center conspiracy was also uncovered by the

Special Departments, and resulted in the arrests of

approximately 700-1,000 conspirators. This organization operated both in Moscow and in Petrograd. It is inter­ esting to note that the present-day Third Chief Director­

ate of the KGB has an entire department dedicated to the political surveillance of the Moscow Military District.

5. Once areas were occupied by the Red Army, the

Special Departments were instructed to purge the area of

"anti-Bolshevik" elements. Civilian access to the front zone was also severely restricted. This was to be a major function of Smersh security units in the rear area of

Soviet forces during World War II

6. Special Department activities became so impor­ tant that Lenin replaced M. S. Kedrov as head of the

VeCheka 00s with Felix Dzerzhinskiy himself on August 18,

‘‘’Gerson, The Secret Police, pp. 96-98, 157; Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 285-386; Barron, The KGB, p. 15. 45

1919, and required that Dzerzhinskiy in this new capacity report to the Orgburo (Organizational Bureau of the

Central Committee, established March 1919) once a week on the state of the army. By 1920, one-third of the total

VeCheka budget, 1,500,000,000 rubles, excluding the monies allocated for VeCheka troops, was allocated to the Special

Departments.

7. As a result of military setbacks in the

Petrograd area in June 1919, Trotsky ordered I. P.

Palunovskiy, Deputy Chief of the 00 VeCheka, to shoot the entire military staff responsible for the defense of

Petrograd at that time.**

8. The Special Departments were also responsible for the liquidation of such conspiracies as the Tactical

Center, the Petrograd Fighting Organization, the Tagantsev

Conspiracy, and participated in combatting the Tambov guerilla movement. For its efforts in the revolution and civil war, the 00 VeCheka received the Order of the Red

Banner on December 20, 1922, its fourth anniversary.

9. Combatting desertion was a major function of the

Special Departments during the civil war and revolution.

This would be a major function of Soviet military counter­ intelligence during initial phases of World War II.

‘Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 207, 285. 46

10. According to Soviet sources, 00 officers carried out missions abroad during the "Trust Operation." This operation, which began in 1921, and ran for approximately eight years, was designed to lure White emigres back into the Soviet Union where they could be "dealt with." The trust operation was also designed to destroy foreign and white emigre opposition to the Soviet state. This is one of the first references to 00s carrying out missions abroad.* *

Although the 00s as an organizational entity and their functions have not changed since their creation in

December 1918, problems of subordination have plagued the

Special Departments since their inception. The basic dilemma of the regime has been whether to subordinate the

00s to military authority or to Party authority. For example, during the latter part of the revolution and civil war, the 00s were subordinate to the Political

Department of the Revvoyensovet, as well as the VeCheka itself. It was not until September 1931, that operational control of the Special Departments by the Revvoyensovet was taken away. This problem was to recur in World War II.

After the civil war, the 00s settled down to consol-

*®Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 76-78, 100; Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 207-208; Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1960), pp. 1-118. 47

idate their position and to improve the combat effective­

ness of the Red Army. In 1925, the first school was set up to train "chekist cadres for the army."*° This marks the first step toward the institutionalization of profes­

sionalism within the ranks of the 00s. Though the secret police were reorganized three times between 1917 and 1934, the Special Departments always remained essentially subordinate to the state security element of the Soviet police apparatus during this period.

The revolution, the civil war and the suppression of bandits and various conspiracies against the new Soviet state provide the only opportunity for historians to view, in some detail, Soviet military counterintelligence at war prior to World War II. An analysis of the operations and activities of the 00s from 1918 to 1934 clearly shows that the majority of their activities involved the conduct of political security operations, rear area security duties, the investigation and prevention of corruption, and lastly the conduct of traditional counterintelligence opera­ tions. If one argues that the combatting of White Guard spies in the ranks of the Red Army constitutes the carrying out of traditional counterintelligence functions against a hostile intelligence service, then 00s did this

*°Leggett, The Cheka, p. 206; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 92-100. 48

on a wide scale. However, the distinction between coun­ terrevolutionary activity and being an agent of a hostile

intelligence service was obliterated in the operational environment. Liquidation of the "class enemy" became paramount, and the "army chekists" played an instrumental part in eliminating all enemies of the Bolshevik regime, not just spies and traitors who were actually in the employ of a hostile intelligence service. This pattern would repeat itself during World War II, especially when the Soviet army takes the offensive in 1942.

Military Counterintelligence Prior to 1941

From 1923 until 1934, the Special Departments of the

OGPU (Ob"edinyennoye Gosudarstvyennoye Politicheskoye

Upravlyeniye, or Unified State Political Administration) suppressed numerous "uprisings," uncovered a multitude of

"conspiracies," investigated and brought to justice hundreds of "wreckers" and "counterrevolutionaries," and generally protected the Red Army, as well as the regime, from subversion. During this period the Soviet secret police was no longer viewed as an "extraordinary commis­ sion" but as an integral and necessary component of the

Soviet State.* *

*‘Ostryakov, Military Chekists, pp. 96-114; Gerson, The Secret Police, pp. 221-223. 49

The stabilization of the secret police organization was assured in the governmental structure of the Soviet

Union when on July 20, 1926, Felix Dzerzhinskiy, who had headed the secret police for almost ten years, died of natural causes, and no major reorganization or purge took place inside the police apparatus.**

A reorganization of the police did not take place until July 10, 1934, when the Central Committee renamed the OGPU the GUGB, (Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy

Bezopasnosti, or the Main Administration for State Secu­ rity) and subordinated the GUGB to the NKVD (Narodny

Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, or The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). The Special Departments themselves did not undergo any major substantive changes other than to be subordinated to the newly created GUGB and be renamed 00/NKVD. Special Department representation in

NKVD troop formations such as the Internal Troops was institutionalized (see Appendices A and D).*‘

Little is known of the role of the Special Depart­ ments of the NKVD from 1934 to 1941. Soviet historians rarely discuss the activities of the 00s during the purges. This period has been blandly dismissed as "a

**Leggett, The Cheka, p. 254.

**Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 136; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 114. 50 number of steps were taken to restore the legal standards and principles for legality in the work of the NKVD organs. The falsifiers and the violators of Soviet laws received their deserved punishment." Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated that the 00s helped to implement the purge of

20 to 30 percent of the Soviet officer corps.**

Prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union on

June 22, 1941, the Special Departments were engaged in combat during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 to 1940, on the Manchurian and northern Chinese Borders from 1937-1939

(sporadically), and carried out counterintelligence and political security operations when Soviet troops marched into Poland in September 1939. Although the 00s had undergone a reorganization in 1934, their methods of operation and their personnel changed little, as can be demonstrated by the following examples:

1. Special Departments suppressed the "Finnish

Schutzkorps," a fascist organization founded in 1917, in order to suppress the revolutionary-democratic movement in that country. The Schutzkorps had, during the Russo-

Finnish War of 1939-1940, inserted several agents and saboteurs in the rear of the Red Army.

**Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge : Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 74-76; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 114. 51

2. Soviet military counterintelligence of the

Northwest Front during the Soviet-Finnish War had exposed forty agents of hostile intelligence services and large numbers of saboteurs.

3. A conspiracy uncovered by the "military chek­ ists" in Poland netted 135 "agents of Polish intelli­ gence" and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition intended for use against the Red Army.

4. The NKVD, in April 1940, murdered 15,000 Polish army officers at Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The Special

Departments must have played a role in identifying these officers and interning them in Poland before deporting them to the USSR, as Poland was an occupied country at the time.* *

These few examples shed some light on Special

Department operations during the 1934-1941 period. An analysis of these operations indicates that they are consistent with the idea that the 00s were not designed solely to carry out counterintelligence or counterespio­ nage functions. The military counterintelligence organi­ zation of Soviet State Security has always been given the

**Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 186; Ostryakov,. Military Chekists, pp. 116-121. See also Ismail Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin's GRU: A Tatar's Escape from Red Army Intelligence (Frederick MD: University Publications of America, 1984), for an insider's account of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1940. 52 task of ferreting out "anti-Soviet elements" within the military's area of operations. There can be no doubt that

individuals other than Soviet security authorities who came into contact with the "Finnish Schutzkorps" were executed as well as the members of the organization

itself. The Polish officers murdered at Katyn Forest were probably hunted down and arrested by officers of Soviet military counterintelligence. This kind of activity would have fallen well within the charter of the 00s. CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WITHIN SOVIET MILITARY

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1941-1943

The performance of the Soviet State Security organs

in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, in the skirmishes on the Chinese border from 1937 to 1939, and in the occu­ pation of Poland in September 1939 must have had an impact on Stalin's decision to separate the GUGB from the NKVD.

On February 3, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet separated the GUGB from the NKVD and established an inde­ pendent People's Commissariat for State Security (Nardony

Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or NKGB). A few days later, on February 8, 1941 the 00/NKVD was formally dissolved as the central military counterintelligence organization of the Red Army, and separate organizations were set up as follows: The Third Directorate of the

People's Commissariat for Defense (Narodny Komissariat

Oborony, or NKO) was responsible for security and counter­ intelligence work in the army (note that this did not become a main directorate at this time); and the Third

Directorate of the People's Commissariat for the Navy

(NKVMF, or Narodny Komissariat Voyenno-morskogo Flota) was responsible for counterintelligence and security work

53 54

in the Red Navy. A Third Directorate of the NKVD

remained, which was charged with counterintelligence and

security work within NKVD troop formations such as the

Border Guards and the Internal Troops. As before, the personnel and the methods of operation of the Special

Departments did not change.*®

Soviet military counterintelligence from 1934 to

February 8, 1941, had always been subordinated to the state security component of the police apparatus (see

Appendix D ) . For seven years the 00s enjoyed a high degree of centralization and little or no turmoil as far as organizational changes were concerned. With the pros­ pect of a major war with Germany at the Soviet Union's doorstep in 1941, Stalin made the decision to subordinate the Special Departments to the Armed Forces. Soviet sources have pointed out that although the 00s were subordinate to the military, a dual chain of command existed. Regular military commanders would co-opt "mili­ tary chekists" to carry out duties far removed from their

*®United States, Department of Army, Information Section, Counterintelligence Branch, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters U.S. Group C.C., Russian Counterintelligence Organizations. August 14, 1945. File ID No. 191047. Record Group 319, Entry 85. declassified NND 745076, February 6, 1978, p. 1; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 188; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 128. 55 counterintelligence and political security missions.*’

When the German Army attacked the Soviet Union on

June 22, 1941, the USSR was caught by surprise. By August

8, a little over one month after the German invasion, a total of 1,250,000 Soviet troops had been captured. Army

Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Feodor von Bock, captured the most prisoners, with a total of 580,910 POWs by July 30, 1941. the Soviets had at their immediate disposal on June 22 a total of 4,700,000 troops. As can be seen from the aforementioned figures, one-third of these troops had been captured by August. By November 26,

1941, the Russians had lost 490,000 dead, 1,112,000 wounded, 520,000 missing, and 3,806,867 troops had been captured by the Germans,**

Stalin faced a disastrous situation. Almost as an automatic bureaucratic reflex, the NKGB became the GUGB and was remerged with the NKVD on July 17, 1941, with the

*’Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 129.

**Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East, trans, Ewald Osers (Toronto and Boston: Little Brown and Company, 19 64), p. 55; Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1978) pp. 268, 311; David Irving, Hitler's War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), pp. 286, 287; Colonel E. Lederey, Germany's Defeat in the East: The Soviet Armies at War 1941-1945 (London: The War Office, 1955), p. 46; Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A Study in Occupation Policies, 2nd rev. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 427. 56

Special Departments being resubordinated to the GUGB and

its officers adding the title of state security to their ranks (see Appendices B and D ) . The problem of dual subordination of the 00s that ensued after the reorgani­ zation in February 1941 was thus corrected, at least on paper. One declassified U.S. Army Counterintelligence

Corps (CIC) report stated that "when the Soviet army began to reel under the blows of the German Wehrmacht, it was principally the work of the 00/NKVD, the forerunner of

Smersh, which saved it from collapse."** There is some disagreement over this statement. Alexander Werth, in his book, Russia at War 1941-1945, states:

Whether or not there was any serious need for giving the officer a "Party Whip," there was even less need for the NKVD's "rear security units" to check panic through the use of machine gunners ready to keep the Red Army from any unauthorized withdrawals. What initial fears there might have been that the troops would not fight were soon dispelled by the stubborn and bitter defense which the Red Army put up against the German, fighting as Haider observed to the "last man and employing treacherous methods in which the Russian did not cease firing until he was dead." These "rear security units" were a revival of a practice inherited from the Civil War, and proved wholly unnecessary in 1941, the

**United States, Department of Army, 7707th Military Intelligence Service Center (MISC), The Counterintelligence Organization "SMERSH" of the Red Army, March 24, 1947, Counterintelligence Special Report No. 42 (CI-SR/42), declassified NNDG 843513, June 5, 1984, pp. 4, 30 . 57

Army itself dealt rigorously with any cases of cowardice.®°

When one takes into consideration the fact that the

Germans made some serious blunders in strategy, tactics, and occupation policy, and that mass desertions and sur­ renders of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops took place at one time, there was little a small NKVD "rear security unit" could do. Werth's statement does not appear unreasonable on the surface. However, Werth fails to grasp the principles on which Soviet military counter­ intelligence was based. Combatting desertion, of course, is a major function of Soviet military counterintelligence organs, but it is not their sole function. The 00s were designed as an instrument of political repression, as well as to combat espionage and sabotage in the operational area of the Red Army. In order to carry out his func­ tions, a Soviet military counterintelligence officer must have an executive agent to effect arrests and generally carry out the unpleasant tasks associated with the

"chekist work in the military." During the war, 00 officers were often in command of NKVD "rear security units," which were made up of elements from the Border

Guards and the Internal Troops. The missions of these

®“Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945 (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1964), p. 227. 58 troops consisted of not only combatting desertion, but

capturing enemy agents, setting up roadblocks, arresting

suspicious persons in the operational area of the Red

Army, and several other duties necessary to provide secu­

rity for elements of the Soviet Armed Forces.®' To bluntly state that "rear security units" were "wholly unnecessary" in 1941 is a gross misunderstanding of the functions of these units. Even if the 00s did not single- handedly save the Red Army from collapse in 1941, recen­ tralization of the Special Departments, at the very least, enabled them to regroup and attempt to reestablish the framework whereby offensive counterintelligence and political security operations could be conducted at a later date. By centralizing the 00s within the NKVD, informant networks that were left behind during the German advance could be more easily managed, as these agents would now have to be run by 00 officers instead of offi­ cers of the KRU (Kontrrazvedyvatel'noye Upravlyeniye, or the Counterintelligence Administration of the GUGB, which was the rough equivalent of today's Second Chief Director­ ate of the KGB, responsible for running the informant net­ works in the civilian population as a whole. Coordination

®'The functions of these units will be discussed in detail in Chapter V under the heading of Rear Area Security Operations. 59 of information probably improved as a result of the recen­ tralization of military counterintelligence within the

NKVD system. As a result of this recentralization, 00 officer effectiveness probably improved, as they were no longer beholden to regular army commanders, and could concentrate more on State Security work.

The 00/NKVD remained subordinate to the GUGB/NKVD until April 14, 1943, when Stalin again placed the Special

Departments under the People's Commissariat for Defense and elevated Soviet military counterintelligence to the status of a Main Directorate of the NKO. It was this reorganization that gave the Special Departments the name

"Death to Spies," or Smersh.® *

® * Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol. 2, s.v. "Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki." CHAPTER IV

SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WAR 1941-1945 (00/NKVD and

GUKR-NKO-SMERSH)

As already observed, Soviet military counterintelli­ gence during World War II consisted of two successive organizations: The Special Departments of the NKVD

(00/NKVD) until April 14, 1943, and after that date Soviet military counterintelligence was known as the Third Main

Directorate for Counterintelligence of the People's

Commissariat of Defense (GUKR-NKO). This latter organiza­ tion was given the nickname Smersh, or Smert' Shpionam

(Death to Spies) by Stalin himself. Although some differ­ ences can be detected in the operations of the 00/NKVD and

Smersh, they are directly related to the military situa­ tion at different times and are not a result of organiza­ tional changes. For example, an analysis of 00/NKVD operations reveals a high degree of concern over desertion

(although this was, of course, not their sole concern) and lack of discipline, while an analysis of Smersh operations reveals a higher degree of emphasis on political relia­ bility, both within the Red Army and among civilians within the Red Army's area of operations. No discernible

60 61 change in military counterintelligence operations has been noted, as captured German documents consistently refer to the continuity in operational methods, organization, and functions of 00/NKVD and Smersh at the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this chapter will treat actual Soviet military counterintelligence operations, functions, and organization from front to regiment in

1941-1945 as though there were no changes. A separate section of this chapter will deal with the organizational changes that occurred in 1943.

Reasons for Establishment of Smersh

On April 14, 1943, the State Defense Committee (GKO, or Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony) abolished the 00/NKVD

(an 00 directorate, as in February 1941, remained with the

NKVD to carry out counterintelligence and security work within NKVD troop formations) and placed the entire Spe­ cial Department structure under the People's Commissariat of Defense. The status of the Special Departments was raised to that of a Main Directorate within the NKO.

Thus, Soviet military counterintelligence became the Third

Main Directorate for Counterintelligence of the People's

Commissariat of Defense— "Death to Spies" (GUKR-NKO-

Smersh).® * A Main Directorate for Counterintelligence

®‘Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol 2, p. 564. 62 was also established in the People's Commissariat for the

Navy (GUKR-NKVMF). Viktor S. Abakumov, former chief of the 00/NKVD, became a Deputy Minister of Defense, probably with direct access to the State Defense Committee.®* It is worth noting that the Soviet Military Encyclopedia does not give any reason for the resubordination of the Special

Departments to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

However, based on the aforementioned sources, a partial list of reasons can be provided:

1. According to one Soviet history of the Special

Departments, the establishment of Smersh was done "in order to unify the defense leadership of the country during the final stages and to ensure the security of the armed forces, to make the army command pay more attention to work of army security officers." By establishing

Smersh and placing it under the organizational umbrella of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin effectively assured his control over the entire war effort. All secu­ rity functions, industry and the military now came under

Ostryakov on page 156 cites the date Smersh was established as April 19, 1943, and the GSUSA Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence cites the date on page 43 as May 10, 1943. The reference in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia of April 14, 1943, will be used as the official date for the establishment of Smersh.

6 4‘A. I. Romanov, Nights are Longest There: A Memoir of the Soviet Secuity Services (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 55, 67, 69. 63 the direct control of the Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony

(State Defense Committee, or the GKO) and its staff, the

Stavka■ Stalin of course was head of the GKO,®® as well as the People's Commissar for Defense.

2. According to a U.S. government document, "The directiye establishing GUKR-Smersh in 1943 specifically stressed the unsatisfactory performance of the

00/NKVD."® ®

3. The subordination of the 00s to the NKO followed another reorganization of the Soviet police apparatus. In

April 1943, the GUGB/NKVD were again separated and recon­ stituted as the NKGB and the NKVD (see Appendix B ) . The

Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was elevated to the status of a Main Directorate of the General Staff, also in 1943.

4. The GUGB/NKVD apparatus was too large and the

NKVD could not cope with the problems of military counter-

®®Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 156; Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsikliopediya, vol. 2, s.v. "Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony." For a detailed description of how the GKO and the Stavka functioned see Kenneth Charles Taylor, "The Reorganization of the Soviet Command System for Total War 1939-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973).

®®GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintel1igence, p. 15. 64

intelligence. ® ’’

5. Smersh was established in order to streamline

Special Department reporting channels and in order to

facilitate more objective political security and counter­

intelligence and counterespionage information evaluation.

Since Smersh officers were separated from the operational

control of regular military officers, and its reporting

channels streamlined, this had the effect of making per­

sonnel assigned to counterintelligence and counterespio­ nage duties directly responsible for the effectiveness of their operations. This can be seen by the fact that after the reorganization, information on agents and investiga­ tive card files on individuals were maintained by the 1st

Special Section of the NKVD central office in Moscow, as well as Smersh units at the army level.®*

®’'Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, The Secret World, Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 21 (New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1982), p. 67; GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counter­ intelligence, pp. 31-32.

®“Germany, Oberkommando des Heeres, Fremde Heere Ost, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionaqe im Operationsqebiet der Ostfront (1943), Contained in United States National Archives, Collection of Captured German Records, Record Group 242, Microfilm Publication T78, Roll No. 562, Item No. H3/323, p. 5; United States, Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Espionage-Sabotaqe-Conspiracy: German and Russian Operations 1941-1945: Excerpts from the Files of the German Naval Staff and other Captured German Documents, April 1947, Washington, D.C., p. 11 of Appendix II. 65

6. Although the reorganization of the 00/NKVD to

GUKR-NKO-Smersh was part of a larger reorganization of the police system, the subordination of the 00/NKVD to the NKO and the renaming of the 00/NKVD to Smersh had the effect, according to Soviet sources, of confusing the Abwehr, as the Abwehr had good information on the 00/NKVD, but little information on Smersh.®*

7. Due to its need to combat desertion, 00/NKVD had achieved a high degree of notoriety among the Red Army.

The term 00, or Special Department, had been in existence for over twenty-five years, and was synonomous with poli­ tical repression and internal surveillance. The term

Smersh, and the subsequent redesignation of subordinate

Smersh units as counterintelligence departments and sec­ tions, was designed to emphasize the counterintelligence nature of Smersh and conceal from the average soldier the fact that Smersh was to be used as a "vitally important instrument of political repression.

8. Prior to the establishment of Smersh, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded

Stalin on March 6, 1943, the rank of Marshal of the Soviet

®*D. P. Nosyrev, ed., V poyedinke s abverom: Dokumental'ny ocherk o chekistakh Leninqradskoqo fronta 1941-1945 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 193.

■'“7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 2. 66

Union. Andrei Zhdanov had also recently been made a

general. Tsarist shoulder straps and insignia of rank had

been reintroduced into the army in 1943. These moves

strongly suggest that Stalin assumed greater personal

control of the conduct of the war, and that the Red Army,

had achieved some prominence, at least temporarily, over

the NKVD. ‘

9. After the battle of Stalingrad, Stalin was

planning major offensives against the Germans. With the

separation of the GUGB/NKVD into the NKGB and NKVD, the

appointment of General V. N. Merkulov as Chief of the

NKGB, and V. S. Abakumov as Chief of Smersh, Lavrenti

Beriya, formerly Chief of the entire GUGB/NKVD apparatus, had ceded some of his security empire to other organiza­ tions. These moves by Stalin had the effect of diminish­

ing the security assets over which Beriya had direct con­ trol and of promoting both Abakumov and Merkulov.

Merkulov went from a "deputy of sorts" as head of a Main

Directorate (the GUGB) of the NKVD, to the head of a full- fledged Commissariat, the NKGB. Abakumov went from being a deputy to Merkulov to head the entire security organiza-

’‘United States, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, Creation of Stalin as Marshal of the Soviet Union, March 12, 1943, Serial No. 996, declassified NND 750140 (OSS 31006), pp. 1-3. 67 tion inside the Red Army, and was awarded the title of

Deputy Minister of Defense, since Smersh was the Third

Main Directorate of the NKO.^*

As has been shown, Smersh was not established in a vacuum or on the sole whim of Stalin. One indication of the thoroughness with which this move was carried out can be illustrated by the story of how GUKR-NKO received the title of Smersh. According to a Soviet history of the

Special Departments, there were several suggestions at a meeting with Stalin on what to call the new organization.

One of the suggestions was Smernesh, or Smert' nemetskim shpionam, or "Death to German Spies." Stalin replied:

"And why as a matter of fact should we be speaking only of

German spies? Aren't other intelligence services working against our country? Let's call it Smert' Shpionam."

Hence the name "Death to Spies" was given to the

GUKR-NKO.’*

It is interesting to note that in May 1919, during the advance by the Whites on Petrograd from Estonia, Iakov

Khristoforovich Peters, a deputy to Felix Dzerzhinskiy,

’*Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror : The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970, trans. H . A. Piehler (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1972), p. 174; GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, pp. 31-33.

^“Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 157. 68 was charged with conducting the defense of Petrograd.

Mikail S. Kedrov, first head of the Special Departments was tasked with supporting Peter's efforts. The military situation became so desperate that an evacuation of

Petrograd was suggested. On May 19, 1919, Stalin was sent to alleviate this "defeatist attitude." Widespread treachery was suspected by both Lenin and Stalin. On May

31, 1919, a proclamation entitled "Beware of Spies" was printed in Pravda. The first paragraph of this proclama­ tion started with the exclamation "Death to Spies," and both Lenin's and Dzerzhinskiy's signatures appeared in the article.Stalin must have remembered this incident when he coined the term Smersh for Soviet military coun­ terintelligence in 1943.

This incident clearly suggests that Smersh was indeed to be used as a "vitally important instrument of political repression," This, coupled with the fact that the status of Smersh would be raised to a Main Directorate and that reporting channels both for lower-echelon Smersh units and for Abakumov would be greatly streamlined, are probably the major reasons for placing Smersh under the

NKO. Another factor involved in subordinating the 00s to the NKO has to do with the jurisdictions of the Soviet

‘Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 284-285. 69 police system. The only organization specifically created to run espionage operations, conduct political security operations both within the Red Army and in occupied areas, and to ensure that the rear of the Red Army was secure was the military counterintelligence organization. All other state security and NKVD organizations with the exception of the foreign intelligence mission of the GUGB and Soviet military intelligence, which is subordinate to the General

Staff and collects positive military intelligence, were originally designed to operate outside the military sphere and generally on Soviet home territory. Although Border

Guard units and NKVD Internal Troops accompanied Soviet troops on foreign soil, these units were often employed in a strict military capacity while fighting alongside the

Red Army. Smersh was the only Soviet security organ that could neutralize and secure areas recently occupied by the

Red Army without relying on extensive coordination and support from other Soviet security organizations. In addition to these advantages, the Red Army in 1943 num­ bered some fifteen to seventeen million men, and for this reason a greater importance was, no doubt, attached to military counterintelligence. A simplified chain of com­ mand was certainly needed for an organization that was responsible for the security of fifteen to seventeen million men and the success of the Soviet war effort in 70

general. ’’ ®

One could argue that by 1941 Stalin had engineered

"an unprecedented centralization of the entire Party-State

mechanism about his person," which "provided him with a

vehicle for true monolithic dictatorship after the

war."’® It seems more reasonable to assume that this

was achieved by the end of April 1943. With the subordi­

nation of the 00s to the NKO, with military intelligence

elevated to the status of a Main Directorate of the

General Staff, and with the awarding to Stalin of the rank

of Marshal of the Soviet Union in March 1943, the entire

Soviet war machine theoretically possessed the organiza­

tional attributes that could enable it to fight the entire

war with little or no help from Beriya's NKVD. Beriya

would only be required to ensure that no major distur­

bances occurred inside the Soviet Union proper while the

Red Army was busy fighting Germans. In any case, whatever

Stalin's motivations for reorganization of the police

system in 1943, he solved two problems simultaneously.

Since Abakumov probably reported directly to the State

Defense Committee, as well as to Stalin in his capacity as

Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 69.

’®Kenneth Charles Taylor, "The Reorganization of the Soviet Command System for Total War: 1939-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973), p. iv.; Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 69. 71

Commissar of Defense, the military counterintelligence

command line was greatly simplified in contrast to the previous cumbersome 00/NKVD structure. This reorganiza­

tion also took place when Soviet forces were guaranteed that they would be on the offensive for a long period of time. Secondly, should Beriya have harbored any ambitious tendencies to grab more power for himself, they were duly checked by Stalin making the GUGB into a full-fledged

independent Commissariat for State Security with Merkulov as chief and resubordinating 00/NKVD to the People's

Commisariat of Defense. To paraphrase Charles Taylor,

"For the Soviet system the destruction of communism was the price of failure, and the domination of Eastern Europe was likely to be the price of victory."”

Organization of Smersh

The subordination of the Special Departments in 1943 to the NKO does not appear to have fundamentally changed the basic organizational structure of the 00s. Based on an analysis of Smersh organization, the functions assigned to it were not different than those of the 00/NKVD.

Reporting channels, except for those at the Main Director­ ate level, likewise did not change. A 1948 U.S. Army study on Soviet intelligence during World War II shows the

’’Ibid., p. 19. 72

following organization of Smersh at the national level

(GUKR-NKO);

1. Staff Surveillance Directorate: Responsible for surveillance over military staff officers (such as the

General Staff) headquartered in Moscow. This directorate also controlled the activities and operations of staff surveillance offices at lower echelons from front to army.

2. Troop Surveillance Directorate: This director­ ate was charged with the surveillance of troops stationed in and around Moscow. It also controlled and coordinated lower-echelon Smersh elements assigned to carry out this function.

3. Counterespionage Directorate: Charged with conducting operations in enemy territory, this directorate controlled and coordinated all counterespionage operations of lower echelon Smersh counterespionage departments down to and including army level.

4. Partisan Directorate: This directorate was concerned with employing partisans for counterespionage and sabotage purposes, and ensuring the loyalty of parti­ san bands.

5. Investigation Directorate: This directorate carried out investigations and interrogations of indivi­ duals who had been "deemed suspicious" by the Staff Sur­ veillance Directorate, the Troop Surveillance Directorate, 73

or the communications security organization.

6. Personnel Directorate: The Personnel Director­

ate handled all the records of Smersh employees. It also

selected Smersh personnel for promotions, training, and

assignments. The Personnel Directorate may have been

responsible for the supervision Smersh doctors, nurses,

and restaraunts for its employees.

7. Technical and Signal Surveillance Department:

This department was responsible for communications secu­

rity, intercepting enemy agent communications, and jamming

of enemy agent communications.

8. Military Censorship Department: This department basically censored military mail.

9. Security Control Department: This department ensured that security regulations were properly carried out.

10. Information Department: The evaluation of

information and dissemination of reports was carried out by this department.

11. Cipher Department: This department coded, decoded, and logged messages and orders, and ensured the security of crypto-systems and equipment.

12. Komendatura: Responsible for guarding Smersh installations and administering the day-to-day operations of Smersh prisons. 74

13. Troika: This organization was essentially a

military court and could "punish lesser offenses" without

hearing of the accused. These Troikas were present from

division level up.

14. Administrative Bureau and Secretariat: These

two entities served as the personal staff of the Smersh

commandeer, and the Secretariat was the CPSU organization with Smersh.

15. Special Inspection Department: This department

investigated all offenses committed by Smersh personnel

and important agents.’®

Since no organizational chart of Smersh has ever been published by the Soviets in open sources, there are numerous contradictions concerning the numbering system for the various directorates under the GUKR. Captured

German documents, declassified CIC reports, and defector information reflect a high degree of confusion on the exact directorate numbering system. However, all sources agree on the nature of the functions assigned to the var­ ious directorates. In addition to the high degree of con­ fusion over the directorate and department numbering

’®GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intel11igence and Counter intel1igence, pp. 49-51; Romanov, Nights are Longest There, pp. 71-72; U.S. Army, Russian Counter­ intelligence Organizations, No. 191047, p. 3; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 19. 75

system, the terms department, directorate, administration,

and section tend to be used interchangeably in German and

U.S. intelligence documents. It seems reasonable to assume that major Smersh functions such as troop surveil­

lance, staff surveillance, counterespionage, personnel, partisan liaison, and investigations were called director­ ates under the GUKR. Smaller entities such as the tech­ nical and signal surveillance organizations, censorship, and the information service were probably called depart­ ments .

The national-level organization of Smersh shows that

Soviet military counterintelligence was organized along command and functional lines. Although there was a simi­ lar Smersh organization in the NKWIF, Smersh was clearly not organized along service lines (see Figure 1).

The next level of organization within Smersh are the

Smersh units attached to a front or military district.

(U.S. documents often refer to this level of command as an army group. It is roughly equivalent to a Soviet front or military district.) The organization of the Smersh entity at this level remains basically the same as the national level (see Figure 2). Captured German documents place the number of Smersh personnel attached to the front at be­ tween seventy to one hundred individuals plus a one-hun- STALIN (NKO)

Secretariat GUKR-Smersh Adminlstratior Bureau __ _

Directorate Directorate Directorate Directorate Directorate Directorate Staff Survei­ Counterespionage Partisans Personnel llance______Investigations

0 \

Dept Tech/Signal Dept of Security Dept of Department of lode and Cipher ipecial Investiga­ Surveillance Department tion Department Information Censorship

Troika (omendatura/Guard Unit

Fig. 1. Organization of GUKR-NKO-Smersh Secretariat ktiinistretion Bureau___

Censorship Guard Technical Troika Surveillance De; Dept Unit

Staff Surveill- Counterespionage Investigation Inspection Personnel ance Dept Department Department Section Department

Hq Surveillance Subord Smersh Igent Training and Political Inves- Supply Section Ligation Section O ffices Section Recruitment Sect Section

Surveillance of Surveillance Direction of CE Agent Interroge- All other Hq o f Support Units Operations Sect Lion Section

Prison

Codes/Ciphers Section

Fig. 2. Organization of Smersh at Front 78 dred-man guard company.^®

In addition to the guard company, Smersh officers had at their disposal "security troops," formed from elements of the NKVD Internal Troops and the Border

Guards. These units were often commanded by 00 officers.

Technically and administratively these rear-area security units were probably subordinate to the Main Administration for Security Troops of the Rear Area, but operationally often controlled by Smersh. The infamous "blocking detachments," which were notorious for machine-gunning retreating Soviet troops in the early stages of the war, were formed from the "rear-area security units."*° At the front level, five to six regiments were assigned to carry out rear-area security duties. Each regiment consisted of three rifle battalions, a machine-gun

^®Germany, Oberkommando des Heeres, Fremde Heere Ost, Abteilung Ilb, Truppenverbaende und truppenaehnliche Organizationen des roten Volkskommissariats der Inneren ("NKWD"), January 16, 1943. Contained in United States National Archives, Collection of Captured German Records, Record Group 242, Microfilm Publication T78, Roll No. 563, Item No. H3/398, p. 9.

®“United States, War Department, Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces, Technical Manual TM30-430, November 1945, pp. IV-4-IV-6; Vyacheslav P. Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces", Military Review 53 (September 1963): 30; James T. Reitz, "The Soviet Security Troops: The Kremlin's Other Armies" in David R. Jones ed., Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 6 (1982): 297-298; FHO, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, p. 11. 79 company, a reconnaissance company, a submachine-gun company, an engineer platoon, a signal communications company, and antitank company, and maintenance, chemical warfare and transportation units. The strength of each regiment was approximately 1,650 officers and men. Source material on the subordination and organization of these security units is at best confusing. However, there is no doubt that these rear-area security units, at least in part, and the guard units assigned directly to Smersh at all levels down to division acted as executive agents for

Soviet military counterintelligence (see Figure 3).“*

The Smersh organization at army level consisted of approximately 25 officers and 50 men, plus a guard company of 100 to 150 soldiers; it closely paralleled the organi­ zational structure of the Smersh unit at front level and was usually commanded by a colonel or brigadier gen­ eral.*^ The division-level Smersh organizations were the linchpin of the surveillance and counterintelligence

“‘United States, War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, Counterintelligence in the Army, October 24, 1945, Military Attache Report, No. R-540-45, declassified, NNDG 745076, February 6, 1978, M.l.S. No. 216593, pp. 1-3; War Department, Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces, pp. 1V-4-1V-6. The operations of these units will be discussed in Chapter V.

““FHO Abteilung IIB, Truppenverbaende, p. 9; FHO Abteilung 1, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, p. 7; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 22. Hachinegun Submachinegun Signal Reconnaissancf Anti-Tank Engineer Platoon Company Company Company Company Company

Transportation Chemical Rifle Platoon 00 Platoon Battalions o

Fig. 3. Organization of a Rear-Area Security Regiment 81 system in the armed forces. They consisted of approxi­ mately 15-20 men and a guard unit of 20-30 troops (see

Figure 4). Smersh officers were deployed in regiments, battalions, and independent units of all types (this also applies to corps). The Smersh organization from corps to battalion had no capability to conduct offensive counter­ intelligence (counterespionage) operations against German forces. Generally only one officer was assigned to a regiment and one officer to each battalion. The officers deployed to the battalions and regiments were counted in the overall division total.®’ The size of a division

Smersh unit was revealed recently by the Soviets in a book concerning the history of the 00s on the Leningrad front.

Pictures of 00 contingents of various divisions were depicted in this history. All pictures of the 00 officers contained from fifteen to twenty individuals.®'* The officers deployed to battalions were the primary indivi­ duals responsible for directly running the informant net­ works in the armed forces. Each battalion officer

®’United States, Department of the Army, Headquarters 66th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, "00" NKVD 45th Guards Infantry Division 1942-1943 (Organization and Personalities), November 17, 1949. File ID No. 619916, declassified NNDG 735038, NARS Date: June 9, 1983, p. 3; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, p. 3.

®‘*Nosryev, V poyedinke s abverom, passim. Coninander

Operations Investigation Administrative Guard Group Section Section Platoon

Smersh Rep at Regiment 00 to

Smersh Rep at Battalion

Resident Agents

Informants

Fig. 4. Organization of Smersh at Division 83 recruited resident agents, and these resident agents in turn recruited several informants who would then observe and watch other troops.

Although GUKR-NKO-Smersh was considered the Third

Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and on paper subordinate to the NKO, regular army field commanders had virtually no operational control over

Smersh units attached to their respective commands. Each

Smersh echelon was operationally controlled by the next higher Smersh unit. Smersh officers reported to their superiors and were in no way beholden to regular army commanders.® ®

It can be readily seen through the detailed examina­ tion of the organization of Smersh at all levels of com­ mand that the bulk of counterespionage operations were carried out by army level and above, and the majority of counterintelligence and political security operations were carried out from corps level through battalion. This arrangement afforded the corps and division Smersh comman­ ders the opportunity to concentrate their assets almost exclusively on defensive counterintelligence operations and troop surveillance.

The 00/NKVD was only a directorate of the GUGB prior

“®GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counter intel1igence, pp. 49-51. 84 to April 14, 1943, and its chief therefore had to report through the chief of the GUGB. The chief of the GUGB would then have to report to Beriya, who was chief of the

NKVD. Beriya would then report to Stalin. The Smersh organizational set-up streamlined Special Department reporting channels, since V. S. Abakumov, a Deputy

Minister of Defense, would report directly to Stalin, as

Stalin held the position of the People's Commissar of

Defense.® ®

Size of Smersh

The Soviets have never published in open sources the number of personnel who were assigned to Smersh or even to

00/NKVD during World War II. The best available evidence indicates that "between 7,000-8,000 agents for the deten­ tion [sic] of counterespionage and agent provocateurs behind enemy lines during the war were employed by Soviet

Armed Forces Counterintelligence."®’ This statement is rather vague, but it seems to imply that in Smersh coun­ terespionage down to army level (as army was the lowest echelon at which counterespionage operations were run),

7,000-8,000 Soviet military counterintelligence officers

®®Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 69.

®’GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counter intel1igence, p. 51. 85

were engaging in or supporting the running of agents

against German intelligence services operating on the

Eastern Front. One Soviet historian has stated that within the first two years and nine months of war, 6,000

Special Department employees were killed in action.®*

The number of Smersh staff officers carrying out political security operations and defensive counterintel­

ligence duties was probably greater. If the figure of

fifteen to seventeen million men for the total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1943-1944 is correct, and a rough figure of 12,000 troops per division is used with a total of twenty Smersh personnel per division, then the total size of Smersh (not including informants and agents) was approximately 28,320.®® That figure could be on the high side. Boris Levytsky in his book Uses of Terror stated that the size of Smersh staff was kept purposely low in order not to "hurt the pride of the soldiers." A former Smersh officer lends some credence to Levytsky's statement by claiming that Smersh was always plagued with a "catastrophic shortage" of officers.®°

®®Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 209.

®®Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co. Inc., 1982), p. 112; Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 69.

®“Levytsky, Uses of Terror, p. 75. 86

Although the figure of 28,320 can be considered

high, it must be remembered that Smersh, like its prede­

cessor the 00/NKVD, was a widely dispersed organization.

The Special Departments exercised their virtual carte

blanche to ensure that the war effort both in the military

and in the defense industry proceeded unhindered by

"fascist spies" or "anti-Soviet elements." Given the numerous and diverse functions assigned to Smersh, it must have been far larger than today's Third Chief Directorate of the KGB. In the absence of any reliable Soviet figures, the best estimate can only state that Smersh numbered between 15,000 and 30,000 personnel.

Functions of Smersh

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia has blandly described GUKR-NKO-Smersh during World War II as, "the organ to combat the subversive activities of the intelli­ gence services of the imperialist states within the Soviet

Army."®* Another Soviet source stated that "the main duty of the 00s during the war, as indicated in the deci­ sion of the State Committee on Defense, is the decisive war on espionage and desertion within the ranks of the Red

Army and the liquidation of desertion in the frontal

®*Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia, vol. 2, s.v. "Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki." 87 zone."®* These authoritative Soviet descriptions of the mission of the Special Departments during World War II are significant for what they do not say. A recently declas­ sified US Army CIC report, which was based on original

Soviet documents obtained by Abwehr Leitestelle III Ost officers during the war, provides more detailed informa­ tion on the scope of 00/NKVD and Smersh functions. The

Soviet documents state that the general mission of Smersh was to ensure a high standard of reliability within the army to protect it from "injurious internal or external influences, as well as from espionage of any sort."

According to the CIC report, the Soviet documents go on to say that Smersh will:

1. Discover and prevent counterrevolutionary ten­ dencies and observe all counterrevolutionary elements.

2. Prevent desertion, self-infliction of wounds, panic provocation, and sabotage.

3. Report any laxity in any discipline, or "sabo­ tage in the preparedness of the Red Army for its fight against fascism."

4. "Observe and eliminate all defects which might lower the preparedness of the Red Army." This includes but is not limited to poor conditions in Red Army garri-

'Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 193. 88

sons, poor quarters and messing facilities, and inadequate

training. The protection of munition sites and the gen­

eral supervision of medical conditions in the Red Army

were tasks also assigned to the Special Departments of the

VeCheka during the revolution and civil war.

5. Improve discipline, valor, and obedience in

battle, and eliminate low morale and cowardice.

6. Determine defects in the leadership of troops as well as "faulty conditions which might adversely affect

the outcome of any operations."

7. Execute and supervise "special measures" behind

Soviet lines to prevent retreat and desertion.

8. Expose "Russian traitors who collaborated with the enemy during the occupation of Soviet territory."

9. Protect secret material.

10. Protect headquarters of military units, espe­ cially military intelligence, from foreign agents and saboteurs.

11. Root out foreign agents within the military as well as the civilian population that comes into contact with the troops.

12. Interrogate agents in order to exploit their knowledge about foreign intelligence services.

13. Conduct security checks of agents of military intelligence before their commitment to "determine their 89

Bolshevist resistance against the capitalist world and its

intelligence services, and after their return determine whether or not the agents were doubled by a hostile intel­

ligence service, or were infested with capitalist or

fascist ideas." Although the screening could not be con­ ducted on 100 percent of all individuals, military person­ nel who were caught in encirclements, captured and escaped

from a POW camp or an occupied area, or returned from a

foreign country were at least to be watched for the same

reasons mentioned above.

14. Distribute wanted lists of agents who had not returned to their parent unit by the appointed date.

15. Evaluate all enemy documents of intelligence value.

The counterespionage missions of Smersh were as follows :

1. Obtain information on foreign intelligence services, primarily those working against Soviet forces.

2. Undermine the operations of foreign intelligence services through the infiltration of agents.

3. Deceive foreign intelligence services through agent radio playbacks.

4. Surveillance of Soviet agents in foreign countries (probably meaning occupied areas), especially those considered not completely reliable and those on 90 particularly important missions.

In addition to these duties, Smersh has been

reported to "have the stated duty of guarding Stalin himself"; it was instrumental in providing input into political officer lectures, it decided whether or not criminals released from the labor camps were fit for military service as well as politically reliable, it ensured the security of partisan operations by assigning

Smersh officers to partisan units, and also conducted special operations behind enemy lines.Virtually all military institutions and installations, even including conscript reception centers and NKVD installations, had

Special Department officers assigned to them. Special

Department officers also sat on promotion boards, at the very least as observers. In short, according to a cap­ tured Soviet document, Smersh was to "safeguard the striking power of the Red Army for its role as the vanguard in the world revolution."®^

®®7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, pp. 6-7.

®‘‘Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror, p. 304; Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, pp. 73, 94; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 146; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 191047, p. 3.

®®Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, ed., Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954), p. 75; GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, p. 51; Romanov, 91

As has been demonstrated, Smersh was much more than a mere "organ to combat the subversive activities of the intelligence services of the imperialist states." On the whole, Smersh was deliberately given wide latitude to carry out its functions. It operated inside the People's

Commissariat of Defense as a sort of "state within a state." Although Abakumov was officially integrated into the NKO, he was beholden to no one except Stalin, as

Stalin held the position of Commissar of Defense. Beriya, as NKVD Chief, had at the very least a coordination func­ tion, yet the operational chain of command of the 00s ran from Stalin directly to Abakumov. Smersh officers had powers of arrest, and within its bureaucracy it had the mechanisms to play the roles of investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.

Although Smersh was organizationally set up to operate as a "state within a state," it could not accom­ plish its mission in a vacuum. A captured German intelli­ gence document states that "auxiliary organs of the NKVD such as the security troops, border guards, internal troops, militia, the partisans and the paramilitary anni­ hilation battalions were the link between the central

Nights Are Longest There, p. 81; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42 p. 2 . 92 organs of counterintelligence, the civilian population, and the Red Army.®® Soviet studies on the Special

Departments in World War II tend to bear this out. One

Soviet 00 historian stated that the "counterintelligence work of the chekists was conducted in accordance with the instructions of the NKO, and the central organs of state security and the unremitting control and leadership of the political organs of the Soviet Army."®® By tending not to credit "military chekists" with single-handedly winning the Great Fatherland War, the Soviets are not only at­ tempting to legitimize the role of the 00s within the military, but are also stating that even an organization that can operate as a "state within a state" cannot claim the majority of the credit for the success of the war effort. Although Smersh could conduct the large majority of its operations independently of the NKVD and state security organs, it still needed some cooperation from other government bodies as well as other security organs to carry out its functions.

Whatever the case, Smersh was assigned a wide range of duties, possessed a great deal of power, and was instrumental in liquidating numerous "enemies" both real

®®FHO, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, pp. 4-5.

®®Nosryev, V poyedinke s abverom, p. 297. 93 and potential of the Bolshevik regime in areas of the USSR previously occupied by the Germans and in areas outside the borders of the USSR that were occupied by Soviet forces. A Soviet historian of the Special Departments has emphasized the dual character of Smersh: "Thus with the transfer of Soviet forces to a policy of general offensive moves against the enemy, a new direction came to light for the army security officers: the search for the discovery of agents in liberated territory."®* Captured German documents confirm this dual character by stating that "one can never distinguish quite clearly between police spying for the protection of the regime and combat of foreign activities."®® It is clear from both Soviet and German statements that the mission of Smersh involved a great deal more than merely rooting out of German spies within the Soviet army. Smersh was created, designed, and organized to carry out, in addition to traditional counterintelligence duties, political security operations, not only within the Red Army but in areas outside the borders of the USSR occupied by Soviet troops. Smersh was

®“Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 171.

®®ONI, Espionage-Sabotaqe-Conspiracy, Appendix II, p. 4. 94

a key factor in the subjugation of Soviet-occupied Eastern

Europe in 1945.

Recruitment, Training, and Rank Structure Of Smersh Staff Officers

Immediately after the German invasion of June 22,

1941, the Special Departments suddenly found themselves in

the midst of a life-or-death struggle for survival.

According to one Soviet source, "Matters were complicated

by the fact that more than half of the workers of the 00s

at the beginning of the war did not have sufficient

experience in "chekist work."‘°° This is a blatant

admission that the purges in the late 1930s severely

affected the capability of the Special Departments to

carry out their mission. As has already been mentioned, more than 6,000 00 officers were killed in the first two years and nine months of the war. The high casualty rate

among 00 officers was also due to the German order to

liquidate all political commissars. This order would have also included members of Soviet military counterintelli­ gence.In light of the catastrophic situation at the front in 1941 and 1942, the State Security organs were in

'°°Nosryev, V poyedinke s abverom, p. 28.

'°‘Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 30. 95

desperate need of experienced military counterintelligence

officers.

Additional training schools were established and

existing ones expanded. Course lengths for 00 staff

officers were generally shortened, and screening and

admission procedures, although designed to scrupulously

ensure political reliability, do not appear to have been

standardized. The Smersh (and 00/NKVD) staff officer training establishment had to start virtually from scratch

in order to assure that the Red Army and partisan bands were staffed with enough counterintelligence officers. As stated before, one Soviet defector who had been a Smersh officer during the war complained that there was always a

"catastrophic shortage" of Special Department officers during the course of the entire Soviet-German conflict.

However, some general principles can be applied to military counterintelligence staff officer training.

Generally an applicant for a Smersh staff position had to have the following:

1. Party membership and Party recommendation

(Komsomol membership could probably be substituted for

Party membership)

2. No "black marks" in an applicant's background

3. The applicant's name and the names of his parents must not be in the files of the 1st Special 96

Section of the NKGB

4. The applicant must never have been in a foreign

country

5. The applicant must have military ability or a good service record

6. The applicant must have completed seven grades

in school'

The aforementioned criteria for an 00 applicant represent only a very basic list of requirements. Other requirements can be gleaned from examining the types of individuals the Special Departments generally accepted into its ranks on a highly selective basis:

1. Political officers

2. Members of the Red Army

3. Members of the NKVD troops

4. Members of NKVD annihilation battalions and selected individuals who had previous experience as NKVD informants

5. Staff officers of the NKVD and NKGB

6. Reserve Special Department officers

7. After establishment of Smersh, the NKVD and the

NKGB did not furnish replacements, except in special cases. The vast majority of replacements came from the

7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 10. 97 army and from the ranks of political officers.

According to available evidence, it appears that an applicant who had been associated with the NKVD prior to his acceptance did not have to undergo examination. One former Soviet Smersh officer who took an exam to gain entry into an army counterintelligence school in Moscow stated that out of 150 people who took the exam in 1944, only 18 passed.'®*

Once an applicant was accepted for army counter­ intelligence duty, his training could have taken place at one of several schools and locations. Although data on

Special Department training schools are highly contra­ dictory with regards to course length and school location, all sources agree that the training of Special Department officers was conducted generally under the auspices of either the GUGB or the NKGB, i.e., the state security element of the Soviet police system. Once the Special

Departments were subordinated to the NKO, it appears that two schools, one in Moscow and one in Novosibirsk, were the major training sites for Smersh personnel. The

Special Department training school, located 10-11

'°*Nosryev, V poyedinke s abverom, p. 28; Deriabin, Secret World, pp. 62-63; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/ 42, pp. 10-11; Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, pp. 30-44; Brzezinski, Political Controls, pp. 73-74; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 191047, p . 4 . 98 kilometers northeast of Moscow, at Losinoostrovsky

Station, near Babushkin, may have merged in 1944 with a

State Security school located at 19 Stanislavsky Street in

Moscow proper. In 1938, one of the 00/NKVD training schools was located on Moscow at Kisselny Perelyok No.

11 Thus an incomplete but basic chronology of the

00/NKVD and Smersh training schools and their course lengths can be established:

School Location Date Course Length Comments

Moscow: Kisselnny August 1938 3-7 months Perelyok 11

10-11 kilometers Prior to 1944 2 years northeast of Moscow, Los i noos t rovskaya Station, Babushkin

Moscow: 19 Stanis­ 1944 6 months to lavskaya Street one year

'°‘‘See Romanov, pp. 4 5 and 53, and Deriabin, Secret World, p. 69. Romanov entered the school near Babushkin in 1943 and attended two years. Deriabin entered the school on 19 Stanislovskaya St. in Moscow in June 1944. Deriabin mentions on p. 69 a merger of schools but does not give a location. Romanov mentions nothing about his school moving at any time.

'“^Germany, Auswaertiges Amt, Photocopies of Correspondence and Reports in Russian with Some Translations in German Pertaining to the Autobiography of Captured NKVD Lieutenant Tschigunow and his Exploitation by German Authorities, April 1941-April 1943, contained in United States, National Archives, Miscellaneous German Records Collection, Record Group 242/1048, Microfilm Publication No. T78, Roll No. 287, Frame 879, Item No. EAP-3-a-ll/2. 99

School Location Date Course Length Comments

Novosibirsk 00 Training 7 months Present day establishment Third Chief during war Directorate KGB Training School No. 311, Course length 2 years.

By October 1944, according to a US Army CIO report, two classes of Smersh officers emerged. This first group, which included chiefs of sections, departments, and directorates and more important "operative" personnel, originated from the ranks of 00/NKVD. These individuals were considered the "backbone" of Smersh and formed a cadre of experienced counterintelligence officers at the higher levels of Soviet military counterintelligence.

Once the Special Departments were subordinated to the NKO, replacements generally came from the ranks of the Red

Army. These individuals were trained quickly, probably from three to six months, and were placed in lower- and medium-echelon positions within Smersh, i.e., battalion representatives, and as technical and support personnel.

Due to the influx of inexperienced officers, Soviet documents indicated that military counterintelligence

'°®Myagkov, Inside the KGB, pp. 61, 74; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, p. 4. 100 effectiveness decreased in 1943, but soon reached its old standard due to the guidance of the more experienced former 00/NKVD officers.*®®

According to a captured German interrogation report of a former Soviet 00/NKVD officer. Special Department training in 1938 included the following subjects.

Subject Hours

History of CPSU 80 hours

International Politics 40 hours

Military Science 10 hours

World War I 20 hours

Marksmanship 60 hours

Self-Defense 20 hours

General NKVD Functions 20 hours

Introduction to German Intelligence 30 hours

Introduction to Japanese Intelligence 30 hours

Introduction to English Intelligence 30 hours

Introduction to Polish Intelligence 30 hours

Emigres (Russian) 30 hours

Party Opposition and Nationalism 40 hours

Churches 20 hours

Investigative Methods 20 hours

'7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, pp. 10-11. 101

Subject Hours

Files 20 hours

Industry and Railroad Protection 10 hours

Observations and Surveillance 10 hours

Technical Surveillance, Photography, Coding,

Decoding, Forgery and Breaking and Entering 20 hours

Agent Operations in Concentration and

Prison Camps 10 hours

TOTAL 550 hours*®

This curriculum represents approximately a three-month course of instruction. The former NKVD officer who provided this information to the Germans also stated that upon completion of the three month course, he spent approximately four months in "practical training."

An analysis of the above curriculum shows that the NKVD itself had an impact on the Special Department officer training by including such subjects as religion and industry and railroad protection. In 1943, the curriculum consisted of the following subjects;

1. Organization and activities of State Security bodies

2, Organization and activities of foreign intelligence services

*®'Record Group 242, Microfilm Publication T84, Roll No. 287, EAP 3-a-ll/2. 102

3. Operational work

4. Law of the Soviet State, including military

statutes, the criminal code, and special statutes for

Internal Troops of the NKVD (note that this subject

appears to be absent in 1938)

5. Operational equipment

6. Shortened basic infantry course: graduates had to be able to take command of a battalion if necessary

7. Driving test (also absent in 1938)

8. History of the CPSU (Communist Party of the

Soviet Union)*®®

In 1944 a few adaptations were made. The thirty hours of instruction on Japanese and Polish intelligence appears to have been dropped, world politics may have been reintroduced, and a "charm course" to teach Soviet military counterintelligence officers social etiquette was added.**® This was probably done in order to ensure that 00 officers had proper training for their anticipated peacetime occupation duties, and contact with Western officers. It is also interesting to note that in 1938 ten hours were spent on military science, in 1943 a basic infantry training course was added, and in 1944, when most

*®®Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 61; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 11.

**®Deriabin, Secret World, p. 70. 103

Smersh officers came from the ranks of the Red Army, military science and basic infantry training were dropped.

The quality of training of Smersh officers is difficult to assess. Students were given the opportunity to put their knowledge gained in the classroom to work in the field by conducting surveillance of foreigners in

Moscow. The best estimate that can be made is that the course curricula were adequate to cover the needs of army counterintelligence at any given time, but the quality of instruction and training was uneven due to the pressures of the war to replace counterintelligence officers quickly. Cadets who were expelled from a Special

Department training school were posted to assignments as

00s in corrective labor camps. One Soviet defector has indicated that this, however, was quite rare.

One of the major objectives of Soviet military counterintelligence training was to instill a sense of elitism within army security officers, and encourage them to feel different from their comrades in arms. This process was accomplished in such subtle ways as the following :

1. The quality and quantity of food given to 00 officers was considerably better than the average army officer received. 104

2. 00 officers were paid roughly twice the amount of a regular army officer of the same rank.

3. Immediately upon entry into training courses, students received new issues of uniforms.

4. Smersh cadets were informed of the actual world situation rather than badgered with standard Party propaganda.

5. Schools instilled a high degree of esprit de corps among the cadets by emphasizing the importance of their work.* * *

Once a cadet graduated from a course, he was generally commissioned as a lieutenant (or given the rank of sergeant of state security). In 1943 the title of

State Security after the rank of an 00 officer was dropped when the 00s were subordinated to the NKO.*‘* The rank structure of the State Security organs and the Red Army were as follows:

State Security Rank Army Rank

Sergeant (or Jr. Lt.) Sr. Lt. (or Pol. Off)

**‘Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, pp. 61-67; Deriabin, Secret World, pp. 70-71.

‘‘'Germany, Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab, Hauptabteilung Fremde Heere Ost Ilb, Die Ueber- wachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat, Merkblcitt Geheim 11/5, December 1, 1945, Annex 15, contained in United States National Archives, Collection of Captured German Records, Record Group 242, OKH H3/753, p. 15. 105

State Security Rank Army Rank

Lieutenant Captain

Senior Lieutenant Major

Captain Colonel

Major Major General

Senior Major Lt. General

Commissar 2nd Rank Colonel General

Commissar 1st Rank General of the Army

General Commissar Marshal.'**

In 1943 this would mean that if a cadet graduated from a Smersh school as either a sergeant of state security or a junior lieutenant of state security, he would receive the rank of senior lieutenant in the regular army, and wear the corresponding uniform. V. S. Abakumov has been referred to as colonel general when he was head of Smersh. * *

***M.A. Belousov, Ob etom ne soobshchalos': Zapiski armeyskoqo chekista (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978), p. 35; 66th CIC Det, "00" NKVD 45th Guards Infantry Division, p. 2. Belousov leaves out the state security ranks of commissar of state security 1st rank, and commissar of state security 2nd rank, and does not mention that the rank of sergeant of state security existed. He uses only junior lieutenant of state security. Captured German documents show that Soviet orders have been signed by individuals with the rank of sergeant of state security.

**‘‘Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 60. There seems to be some confusion as to Abakumov's rank. CI-SR/42 on p. 19 shows his rank as a lieutenant general. This would equate to a senior major of state security. A 106

From available evidence it appears that 00 training on the whole from 1938 to 1945, did not undergo any major changes. Although emphasis on certain subjects may have shifted, the principle of isolating "military chekists" from the rest of their "comrades in arms" did not change.

By elevating the status of an 00 officer, and raising his stake in the system, Stalin ensured that his watchdogs in the army would not be integrated into the mainstream of the regular military. colonel general equates to a commissar of state security 2nd rank which seems more likely. When Abakumov took over the MGB in 1946 he may have been promoted to army general, which would equate to a commissar of state security 1st rank. See Hingley, p. 203. CHAPTER V

SMERSH OPERATIONS

Counterespionage Operations

Counterespionage operations conducted by the Special

Departments during World War II were the responsibility of

Smersh units at army level and above. The primary goal of

Soviet military counterintelligence operations was to identify and then destroy or neutralize GIS activities.

The main targets of Soviet military counterintelligence were :

1. GIS installations

2. GIS training sites and schools

3. German police installations

4. GIS personnel and their organization and functions

5. Persons and groups who work for the GIS as clerks, interpreters, assistants or agents

6. POW and labor camps run by the Germans'*®

**®GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, p. 51; FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, pp. 22-5; ONI, Espionage- Sabotage-Conspiracy, p. 10; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 191047, p. 3.

107 108

Although Smersh certainly committed a large portion

of its resources from army level up to neutralize or

destroy bona fide GIS operations launched against Soviet

forces, the infiltration of agents by Smersh into German

administrative agencies in occupied Russia, or into POW

camps where the GIS were known to recruit agents for missions behind Soviet lines, served a political purpose

as well. By identifying "potential German agents" in POW camps, or even among the Soviet population in the rear area of the German Army, Soviet military counterintelligence laid the groundwork for massive political repression once these areas were reconquered by

Soviet forces. The civilian population, partisans, and military personnel caught behind German lines were, at best, considered highly suspect and potentially unreliable. The "fear of agents" was the pretext used by

Soviet military counterintelligence not only to intensify surveillance of the military population but also to terrorize the entire population.**® The dual character of Soviet military counterintelligence becomes evident

* *®United States, Department of the Army, 7707th Military Intelligence Service Center (MISC), Operations and Experiences of Frontaufklaerunq (FA) III Ost During the Eastern Campaigns, January 27, 1947, Counter­ intelligence Special Report No. 32 (CI-SR/32), declassified 765038, June 16, 1984, p. 16. 109 when under the guise of rooting out German spies,

"anti-Soviet elements" are liquidated.

Aside from the political overtones of some Soviet counterespionage operations, the major operational characteristics of Smersh activities against the GIS were as follows:

1. Persistent intensity and mass use of agents:

According to the reports of interrogations of former

Abwehr officers, during the entire war on the Eastern

Front the Soviets committed a total of approximately

130,000 trained agents against the GIS. Ten thousand

Soviet agents were deployed every three months. According to GIS statistics, 12 percent of this total were agents in the employ of the 00s. Based on this data, Soviet military counterintelligence committed 15,000 agents against the GIS during the course of the entire war, with an average of 1,200 every three months. This figure does not include agents committed by the 00s of partisan units.* * ®

* *®United States, Department of the Army, Headquarters U.S. Forces European Theater, Military Intelligence Service Center, German Methods of Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Service, September 9, 1945, Counterintelligence Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 16 (CI-CIR/16), declassified NND 760041, November 1, 1978, p. 6; 7707th MISC CI-SR/32 pp. 33, 52. CI-SR/32 gives Soviet agent commitments as follows: military intelligence, 35 percent; NKGB, 15 percent; Smersh, 12 percent; Partisans, 38 percent on p. 33. 110

2. The employment of tens of thousands of poorly trained agents so that despite heavy losses, a sufficient number would return to provide the required information.

This tactic was probably employed more by Soviet military

intelligence than by Smersh. Smersh agents were, no doubt, on the average better trained, given the fact that they were required to penetrate GIS targets, as opposed to ordinary military targets.* * ®

3. The employment of thousands of well-trained agents whose careful schooling ensured the success of their mission. Smersh agents probably fell into this category.* * ®

4. Former German intelligence officers who served on the Eastern Front stated that the Soviets generally had an accurate picture of the GIS but the primary goal of

Soviet military counterintelligence was not to acquire order of battle information on the GIS, but to disrupt its work by "suborning, misleading, and turning GIS officers into collaborators and agents."*'®

5. In the German occupied areas, Soviet military counterintelligence relied extensively on informant

* *®7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, p. 33

* * ®Ibid.

*'®7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 30; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, p. 52. Ill

networks that were in place and run by KRU/NKGB (or its predecessor) prior to June 22, 1941, for information on

German forces. These agents were also used to penetrate

the German civil administration, military establishments,

and GIS installations, as well as to pave the way for the partisans. Once these areas were reconquered by Soviet

forces, the agents were handed back over to the

KRU/NKGB.*'*

6. As soon as the Soviets believed that they were able to stop the activities of German agents, they devoted all the resources of their intelligence services toward the reconquest of German-occupied territories. Soviet sources state that the 00s started to take the offensive in the beginning of 1942. Given the fact that the German offensive ground to a screeching halt by December 1941, the Soviet military counterintelligence offensive could have started as early as January or February of 1942.

However, former German counterintelligence officers place the Soviet intelligence offensive as beginning in the winter of 1942-1943. By this time, according to GIS sources, out of every 100 German agents committed to missions behind Soviet lines, only ten would return.*''

*'‘7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, pp. 16, 21.

* "7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, pp. 32-33; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 147. 112

7. Soviet military counterintelligence was

instrumental in organizing and mobilizing the population

both in the rear area of the German army, and in the rear

area of Soviet forces to fight against the Germans. One method of mobilizing the population against the Germans

involved committing acts of sabotage and terrorism behind

German lines. Agents would be employed to blow up theaters frequented by German troops, bomb German officer clubs, and murder German administrative and military personnel. German reprisals would be swift and severe, thereby driving the population wholeheartedly to support partisan and Soviet intelligence-agent operations.*'*

8. Debriefings of former GIS officers indicate that the GIS realized as early as autumn 1941 that the war could only be won if it were turned into a Russian civil war. Based on an analysis of the available data on Soviet military counterintelligence operations, formations in the service of the Germans such as the Vlasov Army do not appear to have been a primary Soviet military counter­ intelligence target. The 00s appear to have been

*'*United States, Department of the Army, Military History Institute, Historical Division, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe, Foreign Military Study Branch, German Counterintelligence in Occupied Soviet Union 1941-1945, by Wladimir Posnjakoff, ed. George C. Vanderstadt, trans. Wladimir Posdnjakoff, No. MS-P-122, 1952, p. 124; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, p. 16. 113

interested in these formations only to the extent that was

required to neutralize GIS espionage activity against

Soviet forces. Smersh was probably not overly concerned with Soviet troops in the employ of the German Army, as they were destined for the firing squads or labor camps

anyway.‘^“

9. According to a GIS study in 1943, Soviet military counterintelligence, through the infiltration of

GIS training schools, effected numerous desertions and defections of German agents. These operations, combined with Smersh emphasis on doubling agents of the GIS, played a vitally important role in the neutralizing of GIS operations against Soviet forces. German intelligence documents repeatedly mention the Soviet military counterintelligence targeting of GIS agent training schools. Agent training schools were a major target of

Smersh due to the fact that infiltration of agent training schools could secure advance notice of missions, it could identify numerous enemy agents, could provide a valuable insight into agent training, and the infiltration of enemy training schools could also provide the groundwork for successful double-agent operations.‘^®

'^“U.S. Army, CI-CIR/16, p. 2; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 198.

'^®FHO, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agenten- 114

10. Although Smersh placed a great deal of emphasis

on doubling GIS agents and on deceiving the GIS, Soviet

military counterintelligence also engaged in operations

designed to liquidate "enemy agents." Smersh "special

operational groups" carried out such missions as the

liquidation of agents who refused to cooperate, the

seizing of key objectives prior to the advance of main

Soviet forces, kidnapping of German officers, destruction

of GIS and German military targets, cutting communications

lines, and collecting information of interest to Smersh.

These types of operations are now carried out by the

special purpose forces assigned to Soviet armies and

fronts. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the present-day KGB, and specifically the Third Chief Direc­ torate, retains special purpose forces of its own to be employed in a wartime situation or when hostilities are imminent.‘^ ®

11. Soviet military counterintelligence exhibited a high degree of resourcefulness in combatting GIS opera- abwehr, p. 36; ONI, Espionaqe-Saqotaqe-Conspiracy, Appendix II, p. 23.

'^®FHO, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Aqenten- abwehr, pp. 28, 34, 37; ONI, Espionaqe-Sabotaqe- Conspiracy, Appendix II, p. 14; Nosryev, V poyedinke s abverom, p. 181; Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 173; Romanov, Niqhts Are Lonqest There, pp. 94-98. 115 tions. For example, although German rear-area security forces often limited the validity of identification papers to one month, this gave Soviet military counterintelli­ gence ample time to equip their agents with forged papers, the quality of which were generally good. In the early stages of the war, the most common cover used to infiltrate the GIS agent network was that of a deserter.

In the latter part of the war the most common method of infiltrating the GIS was to recruit individuals who were already in the employ of the GIS, as when the Soviets were winning the war, the GIS probably would have been highly suspicious of an agent using the cover story of a deserter.‘^’

12. Soviet military counterintelligence succeeded in reorienting GIS efforts toward counterintelligence to such an extent that the captured enemy document section of

Leitestelle III Ost closed down by 1944 due to lack of material.

The Soviets were so successful that, by the winter of 1942, the GIS had to rely extensively on doubling captured Soviet agents rather than on agents initially

'^^U.S. Army, CI-CIR/16, p. 7; U.S. Army, German Counterintelligence MS P-122, p. 112. 116

recruited by the GIS.'^®

These operational characteristics show that Smersh

was highly resourceful, utterly ruthless, and possessed

considerable tenacity in its fight with the GIS. In

addition to these attributes Soviet military counter­

intelligence wasted little time in exploiting GIS weaknesses. Due to the diffusion of authority among the

GIS operating on the Eastern Front, and the almost

cavalier attitude exhibited by large numbers of German

troops toward rear-area security, Soviet military counterintelligence as well as other Soviet intelligence organizations were able to organize partisan bands and carry out extensive agent operations in the German rear area. German resources were so inadequate to combat partisan units that German communications intercept units could listen to agent traffic, obtain the location and identities of agents, but due to inadequate security forces could do nothing. In short, the mass use of agents by the Soviets to overwhelm GIS resources was an effective strategy. Since the GIS were not centralized and the coordination between the Abwehr, the Gestapo, the SD, the intelligence sections of the army staffs, the GFP and FHO became close to impossible as the war went on, the Soviets

':*7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, pp. 33, 60; U.S. Army, CI-CIR/16, p. 16. 117 exploited this vulnerability to the extent that the GIS by

1944 had considerable difficulty acquiring positive intelligence on a tactical or operational level. Their strained resources had to be directed toward the appre­ hension, neutralization, or liquidation of Soviet agents in the rear of the German Army.^ ^ ^

Interrogation of Foreign Agents

Smersh sections at division level and above were staffed with 00 officers who specialized in investigations and interrogations. Although it seems reasonable to assume that most Smersh officers were able to conduct interrogations, there is no evidence to suggest that a great deal of time was spent in 00 training schools on interrogation techniques. However, the Soviets must have considered interrogation important since they created a separate section for this express purpose. "Investigation attorneys" at the divison level were responsible for the interrogation and investigation of soldiers accused of

‘^®U.S. Army, CI-CIR/16, p. 5. For excellent accounts of problems encountered by the Germans see United States, Department of the Army, U.S. Military History Institute, Historical Division, European Command, The Secret Field Police, by Wilhelm Krichbaum, ed. George C. Vanderstadt, trans. M. Franke, No. MS-C0029, May 18, 1947; Heinz Hoehne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was A Spy: The Truth About General Gellen and His Spy Ring (New York: Coward McCann and Geohegan, 1971), as well as the various reports cited throughout this study. 118 political crimes. Interrogations of captured foreign agents by the division Smersh units were not detailed, but designed to ascertain the agent's mission and the names of other agents deployed in the division's area. Once a foreign agent had been apprehended and a basic preliminary investigation had been conducted by the nearest Smersh unit at division level or below, the agent was forwarded to the Smersh unit at army level, where a detailed interrogation was carried out. A German intelligence study of the effectiveness of a Smersh interrogation stated that Smersh interrogations were "extraordinarily thorough" and it was "extraordinarily difficult" to mislead a skilled Smersh interrogator.

An interrogation of a known or suspected foreign agent at any level was conducted in a separate location from the Smersh office (opposite to the German practice) for security reasons. Interrogations and investigations of foreign agents were often carried out by officers of both the investigation/interrogation section and the counterespionage section. Both sections however coor­ dinated closely on investigations, and once the interrogations began, questions were asked on the following subjects:

1. Mission of the agent 119

2. Personal history of the agent, including

relatives

3. Parent organization

4. GIS personnel and its schools

5. Operational methods of the GIS and its training procedures

6. Other GIS agents who might be susceptible to

Soviet influence

7. Foreign political economic and military situations

Upon completion of the interrogation, reports were written and duly forwarded to the appropriate head­ quarters. The decision on whether or not to double the

GIS agent had to be approved by GUKR in Moscow. Should the agent not be suitable for playback purposes, his relatives were arrested and exiled for five years in accordance with NKVD order number 01552 issued on December

10, 1940. The final disposition of cases was worked out by various security authorities in Moscow. Agents of no use to Soviet intelligence generally were shot. Although torture was undoubtedly used during interrogations, GIS documents and declassified CIC reports reflect no information on the use of torture by Smersh interro­ gators. According to a former Smersh officer, military counterintelligence officers were forbidden to display 120 weapons in front of prisoners for obvious security reasons.* * °

A cursory analysis of the administrative and operational mechanisms for the handling of captured foreign agents would indicate that the interrogation procedure used on captured foreign agents by Smersh units was devoid of political considerations. However, given the fact that the vast majority of agents employed by the

GIS were Soviet citizens, and that Soviet interrogators were told in no uncertain terms to be skeptical of captured agent cover stories, Smersh officers must have considered GIS agent activity as inherently "anti-

Soviet." Thus it would have been relatively simple for political enemies of the Soviet state who were not actually in the employ of the GIS to have been processed through the foreign agent handling system of Smersh. It has already been stated that individuals who had been in areas occupied by the German Army, including partisans, agents, Soviet soldiers caught in encirclements, as well as the civilian population, were highly suspect and considered unreliable. Under these conditions mere contact of any sort with German soldiers could have

‘*°FHO, Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, p. 24; 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, pp. 19-22, 27-29; ONI, Espionage-Sabotaqe-Conspiracy, pp. 7-8; Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 73. 121 provided the pretext for an arrest as a GIS agent. Given the chaotic situation that prevailed for the first two years of the war, any critical statement about the Soviet regime could have been construed as being pro-German and anti-Soviet. Soviet sources generally group espionage and sabotage in one category. Should the individual not be an agent of the GIS, a charge of sabotage, "wrecking," or engaging in subversive activities against the Soviet state would have sufficed. In short, suspected GIS agents who were captured were guilty until proven at least useful to

Soviet military counterintelligence. Again, the line between being a political dissident or being an agent of a foreign power became blurred. Smersh was an offensively oriented political security organization, as well as a genuine counterintelligence service. This characteristic was also indicative of other elements of Soviet State

Security organs operating outside the Soviet Armed Forces, especially the KRU of the NKGB.

The Informant System

The majority of Smersh resources were devoted to carrying out political security operations within the Red

Army and Navy. All Smersh units from division to GUKR headquarters in Moscow were charged with conducting political surveillance of all Soviet military formations 122 and their respective staffs, as well as, all paramilitary units such as the partisans.

The military counterintelligence informant system even today, is the mechanism through which the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) can monitor and ensure the political loyalty of the Soviet Armed Forces. The majority of Soviet military counterintelligence resources have historically been dedicated to the primary goal of ensuring the political loyalty of the armed forces; in wartime, however, this function, which in the Soviet view is virtually inseparable from traditional counterintelli­ gence and counterespionage operations, takes on increased importance.

Approximately twenty Smersh personnel were attached to each Soviet division. Smersh case officers (or representatives, these are staff officers as opposed to agents) were deployed to subordinate units, with one representative being attached to each regiment (three regiments to a division and one representative attached to each battalion, three battalions to a regiment or nine battalions to a division plus support units). The remaining Smersh officers were assigned to the division staff. Each battalion Smersh representative would recruit a resident agent. These resident agents were generally recruited based on their political reliability (but they 123 could not be politically active) and on their position within the battalion or company. Cooks, first sergeants, medics, clerks, mechanics, supply sergeants, platoon commanders, and squad leaders often served as resident agents due to the fact that during the normal course of their military duties they would come into contact with or could observe large numbers of soldiers without attracting undue attention. These resident agents would in turn recruit six to eight informants under the supervision of the Smersh representative, and the informants recruited by the resident agents would then in turn observe six to eight Soviet soldiers for "anti-Soviet behavior." A deputy, or reserve resident, would be appointed in order to assume the duties of resident should the resident become a casualty. Surveillance of military staff elements generally was carried out by the commanders or deputy commanders of Smersh units at division level through the recruitment of informants with various staff elements. Officers of Belorussian, Ukrainian, or Baltic backgrounds and personnel who either had relatives behind

German lines or who had previously been in the German rear area were to be watched carefully.

Each resident agent was to provide his case officer with a written report on all he saw and heard of significance about twice a month, in addition to any 124

reports on individuals already under investigation. The.

resident was also required to meet with the Smersh rep­

resentative regularly, as well as with informants. All

informers, including residents, were bound by a written

agreement and sworn to secrecy.

The division Smersh unit commander had to approve

all recruitments by Smersh officers of all resident

agents, and probably had some influence over the process of recruiting informers by the residents. Methods of

recruiting residents and informants generally fell into

the following categories:

1. Volunteering to be a resident or an informant.

2. Individuals under investigation, or accused of crime, who exhibit a willingness to "sell out" their peers.

3. Use of blackmail and entrapment to enlist the cooperation of a resident or an informant.

4. The positive recruitment of a resident or an informant based on a systematic analysis of his back­ ground, character, and personnel file. In this method the individual recruited probably committed no crime and was not on any watch list.

5. Informants and resident could be transferred from one unit to another and could thereby be included in the 00 informant network of the gaining unit. 125

6. Since 00 officers were assigned to induction

centers, the transfer of civilian informants of the

KRU/NKGB to the 00 networks in the armed forces was made

easier.

The guiding principle of Smersh surveillance

networks was secrecy. Residents knew only the 00 case

officer who recruited them, and informants knew only their

respective residents. For security reasons all residents

and informants were given codenames, which were used in

reports. This operational security measure enabled Smersh

officers to check on the reliability of their networks by

tasking one informant to spy on another, without compro­ mising sources. Not only secrecy but redundancy was a characteristic of Smersh networks in the armed forces.**'

Through information provided by the informant net­ work to Smersh representatives, 00 officers were required to keep unit commanders as well as their Smersh superiors

informed of the following matters:

1. Information about personnel who intend to desert or to inflict wounds upon themselves to avoid combat duty

'*'This entire section was based on 7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, pp. 25-28; Brzezinski, Political Controls, pp. 64-65; GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, p. 52; U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 191047, pp. 5-6. 126

2. Information on personnel who did not want to serve in the armed forces

3. Dissatisfaction of the enlisted men concerning negligence of the officers with regards to food and clothing

4. Unhealthy relations between officers and enlisted men

5. Physical abuse of enlisted me by officers

6. All cases of looting'

According to a declassified U.S. Army General Staff study on Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence in

World War II, 10 to 12 percent of the Soviet armed forces were informers and residents for military counterintelli­ gence. Given the approximate figure of 17,000,000 men for the size of the Soviet Armed Forces during World War II, this would mean that more than 2,040,000 troops within the

Soviet military were employed as informants or resident agents of Smersh. These figures break down to an average of 1 informer for every 10 soldiers, or one informer in every rifle squad.'**

'*^U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 19047, p. 6.

'* * GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counter intelligence, pp. 9, 157; Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 69. 127

These figures suggest that once Soviet military counterintelligence recovered from the blows inflicted on

it by the Wehrmacht in 1941-1942, the surveillance network in the Soviet military again became highly sophisticated and tightly controlled. In the absence of heavy casu­ alties, this sophisticated informant system prevented successful GIS infiltration of large numbers of agents or widespread desertions. The existence of an extensive informant network combined with the mass use of agents against the GIS and the infiltration of GIS training schools significantly degraded GIS agent operations against Soviet forces in the later part of the war. Thus, a system designed primarily to ensure political loyalty also served to protect the Soviet military from the threat posed by the GIS.

Rear Security Operations and Combatting of Desertion

One of the most confusing aspects of Smersh activities behind Soviet lines involved the conduct of comprehensive rear-area security operations. However, despite contradictory information the basic outline for

Soviet security operations in the rear area can be established.

From analysis of available evidence it appears that the commander of a Soviet front had attached to his 128

formation approximately five to six regiments of "security

troops" (roughly equivalent to two divisions, with three

regiments to a division) who were subordinate to the Chief

of Security Troops of the Rear Area. The commander of the

Security Troops of the Rear Area was an NKVD officer, and he was in turn subordinate to the Main Administration of

Security Troops of the Rear Area of the NKVD. These rear

area security forces were composed of elements and units of both the Frontier Troops and the NKVD Internal Troops.

The organization of these regiments has already been discussed in Chapter IV, and will not be repeated here.

It is unknown whether six regiments were assigned to a front and one regiment to each army, or whether the six regiments assigned to a front were deployed to army level. Based on the standard organization of a Soviet front, which would contain three armies, one regiment could have been deployed to each army, with three security regiments (or one security division) held in reserve at the front level.

Assuming that one regiment of security troops was available to an army, Smersh officers had operational control over security regiment dispositions, and often security regiment commanders were former 00 officers.

When the functions of the security regiments are analyzed, it becomes abundantly clear that the security regiments 129 were assigned duties that effectively enabled them to act

as executive agents for Soviet military counterintelli­ gence. The security regiment was charged with appre­ hending enemy agents, preventing desertion (often by machine-gunning retreating Soviet soldiers), guarding rear-area installations, maintaining checkpoints and roadblocks, aiding in the evacuation of civilians from the rear area, and checking identification papers. Also, the security units, in addition to the guard contingent assigned to Smersh units at all levels, participated in arrests when necessary.'**

A regiment of security troops was required to cover an area approximately seventy-two miles long, and approxi­ mately seventy miles deep, where the Internal Troops of the NKVD took over. Within this zone various degrees of identification and permission were required for zone entry, depending on the distance from the front. The complexity and sophistication of Soviet security measures in the rear area can be demonstrated with the following examples :

'**U.S. War Department, Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces, pp. IV-2-IV-6; FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, pp. 11, 18, 43; FHO Abteilung Ilb, Truppenverbaende, pp. 8-11; Artiemiev, "OKR", p. 31; ONI, Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy, Appendix I, pp. 9-10, Appendix II, pp. 5-6; Romanov, Nights Are Longest There, p. 74. 130

1. In the sector between the divisional headquar­ ters and the front line, all persons must have a special pass issued by the division staff.

2. At certain intervals in the rear area of opera­ tions, new passes were introduced or old passes were supplemented by added pages or official stamps.

3. Subtle markings, blanks, and other measures known only to Soviet security authorities were used to identify the validity of the documents and the period in which they were issued.

4. Unless permission was obtained from the local military commander, strangers were prohibited from taking up residence in all towns and villages occupied by Soviet forces. An informant system ensured compliance with this requirement.

5. Civilians must have special passes to travel between towns.

6. All civilians were evacuated from towns housing

Soviet military staff.

These measures, of course, made it extremely diffi­ cult for the GIS to operate in the Soviet rear area. In addition to the above regulations, security units were to arrest immediately any Soviet soldier without his identi­ fication papers and take him to the nearest Smersh unit. 131

as well as captured GIS agents or other suspicious per­

sons. In order for a security unit to operate over such a wide area, a high degree of mobility would be required.

Available order of battle data for a security regiment does not reflect an extensive mechanized capability for security regiments, other than a mention of a transport unit assigned to a regiment. Given the fact that former

GIS officers have repeatedly stated that the Soviets made

it almost impossible for the GIS to operate effectively in the rear area of Soviet forces during the later part of the war, it seems reasonable to assume that whatever transport was available to a Soviet security regiment was adequate to successfully accomplish its mission.'*^

During the early part of the war 00/NKVD (and later to a lesser extent Smersh) resources were dedicated to the combatting of desertion. Although the sole function of

'*^United States, Department of the Army, Headquarters U.S. Forces European Theater, Military Intelligence Service Center, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Special Report to Deputy AC of S G-2 USFET: The Secret Services of the USSR, November 3, 1945, File ID No. 961385, declassified March 14, 1978, pp. 1-3; FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, pp. 18, 42; GSUSA Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counter­ intelligence, p. 150; ONI Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy, Appendix II, p. 6. Appendix II, p. 6 of the ONI document states that rear-area security units may have only operated to a depth of 25 kilometers. All sources agree on the figure of 72 miles (120 km) for the length of an operational front for security units. 132

the 00/NKVD was not to combat desertion, desertion was a

major problem for the Soviet armed forces. Captured

German records show numerous orders by Soviet security

authorities that stress the need to fight desertion,

cowardice, and lack of discipline. An excerpt from a top

secret order issued by the Chief of the 00/NKVD of the

19th Army, Colonel Korolev, dated August 3, 1941, states:

4. The Chiefs of the 00s will organize special detachments for the purpose of suppressing desertion from the front-line units. Agent nets will concentrate their efforts on investigation and elimination of defeatists provocateurs, deserters and saboteurs, who are to be handed over to the 00/NKVD.

5. In cases of mass desertions, when circum­ stances permit, a few of the criminals should be singled out on the spot and in view of the assembled deserters [and probably shot].'* ®

Another order, issued by the political-propaganda section of the 31st Rifle Corps to the 193rd Rifle Division, dated

July 14, 1941, detailed several instances of lack of discipline among the troops. These instances included:

1. Shooting prisoners of war: This was termed as a

"political detriment to the Red Army," due to the fact that it would "embitter the soldiers of the fascist army" and "impede the process of subversion."

7707th MISC, CI-SR/32, p. 19. 133

2. Robbing German POWs was viewed as "undermining the dignity as well as the authority of the Red Army."

3. The document pointed out that soldiers of the

Red Army were wounding and stabbing themselves to avoid combat duty.

4. Red Army soldiers, including lower-ranking commanders, were losing or throwing away their weapons during retreat.

5. Wounded soldiers were left on the battlefield and medics were hiding in the rear area, not performing their assigned duties.

The remedial actions to be taken essentially involved the reporting of incidents, swift prosecution of offenders, and the education of troops on why such actions are detrimental to the Red Army. Since the above order was issued by the political department of the 31st Rifle

Corps, the disciplinary actions and the investigation of the types of incidents cited in the above order demanded extensive 00 involvement.'* ^

Statistics on desertion rates are not readily avail­ able and of course have not been published in open Soviet

'*’United States, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Historical Division, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, PW Project Study Number Five, 1950, No. MS-P018e. No page numbers are given for this translation. 134

sources available to the West. Mass surrenders of Soviet troops have often been confused with mass desertions,

rendering the statistical problem even more difficult.

However, one captured German document stated that accord­

ing to an 00/NKVD report of an unidentified army, within four months twelve "spies", twenty-seven "traitors" and

"twenty-three anti-Soviet" elements were arrested.

Colonel Korolyev, Chief of the 00 of the 19th Army, rounded up 1,000 deserters, and in the front of the assembled regiment immediately shot seven men. The methods of reprisal were widely publicized in order to deter desertion. Publicizing actions taken against GIS agents was also common. These measures were of course designed to intimidate both the troops and the civilian population.'** According to a declassified CIC study, desertion was reduced to a minimum by 1942, "since every soldier, whether he was a member of a front-line unit or a rear echelon, felt himself under constant observa­ tion."*** Based on an analysis of the extensive rear-

***John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 176; FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, pp. 17, 24.

***United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Soviet Activities in Estonia, January 31, 1945, Report No. A-54556, declassified NND 750140, L55669; Levytsky, Uses of Terror, p. 162; Hingley The Russian Secret Police, p. 197; 7707th MISC CI-SR/42, p. 30. 135

area security operations conducted by the security units,

this statement seems oversimplified. Although no figures

are available, it can be assumed that desertion rates

dropped significantly sometime in 1942 for a number of

reasons other than the existence of an informant network.

The German offensive was bogged down by the winter of

1941, and this gave the Soviet military time to rebuild

its offensive capability. Informant networks were no doubt badly hurt due to the enormous casualties inflicted on Russian troops by the Wehrmacht. The stalled German offensive gave Soviet military counterintelligence time to regroup and rebuild its counterintelligence capability.

Ruthless measures applied by the security units, combined with an extensive informant network and the stalled German offensive, served to significantly reduce the desertion rate. The existence of the informant network by itself could not have reduced desertion without the necessary terror applied by the security units, or the notorious tribunals (troikas) of Soviet military counterintelligence.

By 1943 the function of these security units, shifted from combatting desertion to apprehending GIS agents, as well as real and potential enemies of the

Soviet state. Once the security units were under the operational control of Smersh, the political character of their mission became increasingly evident, since a large 136 part of their function in the last eighteen months of the war involved rounding up former Soviet POWs, refugees, and partisans for Smersh "screening" purposes.

Reporting

As in any intelligence organization, reporting of

information was of vital importance for Soviet military counterintelligence in order to stay abreast of the enemy situation. Soviet military counterintelligence officers and their respective agents were required to submit the following reports (this list is not all-inclusive) to their superiors:

1. Activity reports on daily and semimonthly basis.

2. A report was issued requesting permission to recruit an informant and a report approving or disap­ proving the recruitment was likewise written.

3. Resident agents had to submit reports to their case officer twice a month.

4. If an informant discovered a suspicious person, he must submit a report (using his codename) to his resi­ dent agent. This includes writing a report even for minor derogatory comments. If the report contained information indicating that the subject had been GIS agents it was forwarded to the Smersh unit at army headquarters.

5. Prior to an interrogation for a political offense, a Smersh officer had to submit an interrogation 137

plan to his superior and upon completion must issue an

interrogation report.

6. Reports were to be issued upon the arrest of a

suspected GIS agent.

7. Upon conclusion of interrogations of enemy

agents at army level a detailed interrogation report was

issued complete with recommendations for further disposi­ tion of the case.'*'

In order for a subject to be placed under increased

scrutiny a "prepatory report" were required to be sub­ mitted containing the following information:

1. Personal history of the subject

2. Interrogation report excerpts and other perti­ nent data

3. Character evaluation

4. A description of the subject's experiences behind German lines if applicable

5. A paragraph containing a description of how the subject behaved in battle'**'

The daily reports of Smersh officers included infor­ mation on the following subjects: number of proposed meetings with all types of agents, actual number of

'*'7707th MISC, CI-SR/42, pp. 16, 25-29.

'**'ONI, Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy, pp. 68-69. 138 meetings conducted, number and types of reports received, number of recruited agents of all types, information that was passed to the commanding officer of the Smersh unit concerned, and the number of contacts made and their suitability for recruitment.'*^

The aforementioned types of reports, which were only a small portion of the amount of reporting generated by

Smersh, were used as an instrument of control. To quote a

U.S. CIC study: "The daily report offers an opportunity for critical observation of experiences, successes, and failures. A semimonthly report on agent operations per­ mits an extensive study of the enemy intelligence service for the preparation of an effective counterblow from our side."'** A captured German intelligence study stated that evaluations of GIS agent interrogation reports were used to further counterintelligence and counterespionage information on the GIS, as well as to support Soviet mili­ tary counterintelligence and counterespionage missions in

German occupied areas.'*®

Soviet military counterintelligence appears to have

'*^U.S. Army, Russian Counterintelligence Organizations, No. 191047, p. 5.

'**77G7th MISC, CI-SR/42, p. 16.

'*®FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische' Agentenabwehr, p. 24. 139

had an appreciation for accurate reporting. This would

suggest that Smersh officers, at least when a GIS agent was involved, proceeded with the investigation in a

thorough manner, and did not arbitrarily throw large numbers of agents against GIS targets without approval

from at least an army-level commanding officer of a Smersh unit or a higher Smersh headquarters. According to GIS

sources, Soviet military counterintelligence had an excel­

lent picture of the GIS establishment as a whole and had knowledge not only of GIS missions already completed and whether they were successful, but also advance knowledge of GIS missions in the planning stages.'*® Based on

Smersh effectiveness against GIS targets, it can be safely said that Soviet military counterintelligence had an even more accurate picture of the condition of the Soviet armed forces than that of the GIS. It can be assumed that

Smersh reporting was effective enough to carry out its dual mission of political security and counterintelligence.

The Search for Hitler's Body

Smersh was extensively involved in the search for the body of Adolph Hitler and other Nazi leaders in Berlin in 1945. On the afternoon of May 2, 1945, Lt. Colonel

'*®FHO Abteilung I, Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr, p. 36 . 140

Ivan Klimenko, Chief of the Smersh unit of the 79th Rifle

Corps, 3rd Shock Army, was conducting interrogations of

German prisoners captured in the vicinity of the Reich-

skanzlei in order to determine the whereabouts of Hitler

and other Nazi leaders. Klimenko was soon informed that a body had been found and that it resembled Hitler's. Vice-

Admiral Voss, Admiral Doenitz's representative on Hitler's

staff, who had identified the body of Goebbels and his family, readily identified the body as that of Hitler's.

On closer inspection, however, this proved false. After a few days, and numerous interrogations later, Klimenko, on the morning of May 5, 1945, returned to the Reichskanzlei garden and dug up two bodies and two dogs in a bomb crater. These bodies were duly marked, loaded in wooden boxes and shipped to the 3rd Shock Army Headquarters in

Buch northeast of Berlin. Upon further investigation,

Klimenko discovered that an SS soldier by the name of

Mengerhausen had witnessed the cremation of the bodies of

Hitler and Eva Braun and could identify the bomb crater in which the bodies were located. A previous interrogation of a certain Private Churakov had indicated that Hitler's corpse may have been in the bomb crater. Mengerhausen's testimony matched that of Private Churakov.'*’

'*’John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, Vol. 2 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 141

Twenty years after the end of World War II, the USSR

published an unofficial account of Hitler's death. The

author, Yelena Rzhevskaya, was the interpreter for Colonel

Vasily Ivanovich Gorbushin, Deputy Chief of Smersh of the

3rd Shock Army.

According to her account, the Soviets were aware

that Hitler probably committed suicide prior to May 1,

1945. Numerous interrogations were conducted, and all

reports confirmed that Hitler had committed suicide. This

included testimony by one of Hitler's dentists, Helmut

Kunz, that he had heard from the commander of Hitler's detective guard that the Fuehrer's body had been set afire

in the garden outside of the bunker. Rzhevskaya's account

also revealed that the SS soldier Mengerhausen had seen the bodies of Hitler and Eva Braun carried into the garden

and set afire. On May 9 and 10, 1945, Smersh located two dental technicians in Berlin who had worked on Hitler's teeth. Upon showing these dental technicians a set of teeth that Rzhevskaya was carrying around in a cigar box

1983), pp. 618-620; United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Secuirty Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1971-1972: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with some Additional Titles from Other Sources, Volume II, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 50, 59. 142

stuffed inside a satchel, they identified the teeth with the help of x-rays seized from the Reichskanzlei as those of Hitler. L t . Colonel Klimenko's investigation report was completed on May 13, 1945. The report identified the body of Adolph Hitler based on the autopsies conducted by

Soviet military doctors, and concluded that Hitler had committed suicide by poisoning and was later shot through the mouth by an aide acting on the Fuehrer's orders.

Controversey continued to swell over what happened to Hitler's body. Rzhevskaya's account went largely unnoticed in the West. In August 1968, the Soviets pub­

lished an unofficial autopsy report on Adolph Hitler, titled The Death of Adolph Hitler, by Lev Bezymensky, a journalist, who was reported to be a former intelligence officer. This report quoted extensively from L t . Colonel

Klimenko's original investigation report, and reiterated that Hitler had poisoned himself and was later shot by one of his aides.

The involvement of Smersh in the search and identi­ fication of Hitler's body shows the status that Soviet military counterintelligence enjoyed in the structure of the Soviet security apparatus. Although it could be

'*“Donald McKale, Hitler: The Survival Myth (New York: Stein and Dat Publishers, 1981), pp. 177-185; Senate, Soviet Intelligence, above. 143

argued that Smersh was the only organization that had the

authority to carry out such an investigation, it must be

remembered that Stalin appointed no special commission or high-ranking officers to conduct the search. According to

John Erickson, Smersh L t . Colonel Klimenko, who happened to be on hand and in the vicinity of the Reichskanzlei at the particular time on May 2, 1945, was charged with the

investigation. This suggests that individual Smersh officers were given politically sensitive assignments by the Soviet security establishment, probably with the approval of Stalin. Such a politically sensitive issue as the whereabouts of Adolph Hitler was entrusted to an officer of Soviet military counterintelligence who had no particular qualifications for the task other than the fact that he was a member of Smersh and the commanding officer of a Smersh unit of a rifle corps. Based on the above information, it can be summarized that Smersh probably had considerable influence at the higher levels of the Soviet state. CHAPTER VI

DISSOLUTION OF SMERSH

With the cessation of hostilities, Soviet security forces began immediately to search for members of the Nazi

Party, known war criminals, high-ranking members of the

German Army, Russian emigres, and members of the SD,

Gestapo, and Abwehr and other German police agencies.

These searches were initially conducted on a random basis, and at least some security units possessed no lists of persons to be arrested, and some Soviet security unit commanders had little or no knowledge of the heirarchy of the Nazi Party or the structure of the German government.

Due to the lack of information, these security units arrested individuals on an ad hoc basis and interrogated them on the whereabouts of Nazi Party members. Business­ men were arrested on a widespread basis in order to obtain information on the most recent Western inventions and on the German war industry in general. Such information would be of use to the USSR during the period of recon­ struction. An OSS (Office of Strategic Services) report on the operational methods of the security units of the

Red Army stated that "whoever had special ability or was

144 145

particularly prominent would be useful in Russia."'*®

Soviet security units also canvassed Berlin for

White Russian emigres and for Soviet soldiers who served

in the German Army or other German government or Nazi

Party organizations. Smersh security units employed

rather shrewd methods to obtain information on Soviets who

had been in the employ of the Germans. Some prisoners in

this category were shot outright. Others with German

language fluency were used as interpreters under the con­

dition that they supply Smersh with five names of Soviet

citizens who had served the Germans. These individuals were then arrested, interrogated, and released upon providing Soviet military counterintelligence with the name of more Soviets who had been in the employ of the

Nazis.

By the end of May 1945, mass arrests by Smersh secu­ rity units ceased; however, arrests no doubt proceeded on a more selective basis. In addition to rounding up former

Nazis, Smersh also became interested in collecting infor­ mation on what the Americans knew about the strength, composition, and disposition of the Red Army. The Cold

'*®United States, Office of Strategic Service (OSS), Operational Methods of Security Units of the Red Army, September 12, 1945, Report No. A-61642, declassified NND 750140, XL 19175, pp. 1-2. 146

War had begun even before the dust settled on the remnants

of the Third Reich.'®°

One of the major tasks carried out by Smersh and its

attendant security units was the "screening" of approxi­

mately five and one-half million Soviet citizens in the western zones of Germany and Austria and in other parts of

Western Europe that were repatriated to the USSR by the governments of the Allied Powers over a period of four years from 1943 to 1947. The bulk of the "screening" took place between 1945 to 1946.'®* Although Smersh was officially dissolved in May 1946, its functions and meth­ ods did not change. Soviet military counterintelligence was merely transferred from the People's Commissariat of

Defense to a newly formed Ministry for State Security

(Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or MGB). The

screening and processing of repatriated Soviet citizens by

Soviet military counterintelligence continued until 1947, unimpeded by higher-level reorganizations.'®“

'®“Office of Strategic Service (OSS), Operational Methods of Security Units of the Red Army, Report No. A-61642, September 12, 1945, declassified NND 750140, XL 19175, pp. 1-2.

'®'Nikolai Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal 1944-1947 (Glencoe 111: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 38, 408-409.

'®“Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol. 2, s.v."Glavnoe Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki"; GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, p. 33. 147

The exact number of repatriated Soviet citizens will

probably never be known. According to Soviet sources in

1945, 5,236,130 Soviet citizens were liberated and repa­

triated. Secondary sources state that of the 5,754,000

Russian prisoners taken by the Germans after 1941,

1,150,000 were still alive in May 1945. In addition to this figure, 2,800,000 Soviet citizens were driven into

forced labor by the Germans, 2,000,000 of which were still

alive in 1945. These figures do not include refugees.

Based on an analysis of the aforementioned figures, Smersh had to "screen" almost 3,150,000 Soviet citizens from 1945 to 1947 . '® “

The task of "screening" 3,150,000 "enemies of the state," most of whom had spent a substantial part of the war in the employ of the Germans, strained Smersh resources. Other Soviet security organizations were called upon to assist Smersh in processing such a huge number of people.'®*

Smersh demonstrated incredible barbarity and ruth­ lessness in dealing with repatriated Soviet citizens.

Informant networks were immediately set up in internment camps in Allied occupied zones. The British allowed

'®“Tolstoy, Secret Betrayal, pp. 28, 408.

'®*Ibid., p. 405. 148

Smersh officers into their zone of occupation in Austria

to participate in the hunting down of Soviet citizens who

escaped being transported to the Soviet zones of occupa­ tion and certain death. Once in the Soviet zone, repatri­

ated Russians were temporarily housed in former German

labor camps prior to their deportation to labor camps in

Siberia, or to their execution by Smersh machine guns.

Executions took place when Allied officers were out of earshot of the machine-gun fire.'®®

By 1947, the breakdown of sentences meted out to the five and one-half million repatriated Soviet citizens since 1943 was approximately as follows: 20 percent received a death sentence of 25 years in a labor camp;

15-20 percent received 5-10 years in a labor camp; 10 percent were exiled to the frontier regions of Siberia for a period of not less than six years; 15 percent provided labor for the devastated areas of Donbas, Kuzbas, and others, but could not return home even after the expira­ tion of their sentence; 15-25 percent were allowed to return home but could not find work; and the remaining 15-

25 percent escaped, died in transit, or were unaccounted for.'®® Soviet sources blandly dismiss this wholesale

'®®Tolstoy, Secret Betrayal, pp. 220, 265, 403, 405, 409.

I 5 6 Ibid., p. 409. 149

murder of millions of people by stating, "In the first

postwar years, in a number of instances, a tendency was

observed to regard servicemen returning from German capti­

vity with certain mistrust. Sometimes even military coun­

terintelligence agents made such mistakes."'®’ The

aforementioned figures speak for themselves, and are an

excellent indication of the ruthlessness with which Smersh

carried out its mission, not only during the war, but also

in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe.

In addition to machine-gunning innocent women and children whose only crime was to have been slaves for the

German war machine, Smersh officers conducted espionage operations against Allied forces as well as Soviet citi­ zens, using the umbrella of the Repatriation Mission as

legal cover from which to operate. Soviet espionage became so blatant that in Austria members of a group of

Smersh agents were found disguised as American military police. Most Soviet Repatriation Mission representatives that dealt with Allied officers were staff officers of

Soviet military counterintelligence. Kidnappings of refugees, emigrants. Western agents, and other "anti-

Soviet elements" from not only the Soviet zone of Austria,

'Ostryakov, Military Chekists, p. 228. 150 but the Western zones as well, was rampant.'®®

Almost immediately after the war, major reorganiza­ tions took place at the higher levels of the Soviet

state. The State Defense Committee was dissolved in

1945. On July 10, 1945, Lavrenti Beriya, Chief of the

NKVD, became a Marshal of the Soviet Union; on January 15,

1946, he resigned as Chief of the NKVD and became coordi­ nator of all intelligence and counterintelligence activi­ ties. On February 25, 1946, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was subordinated to the Commissariat of Defense.

Strategic naval intelligence was transferred to GRU

(Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye, Main Intelligence

Directorate of the Soviet General Staff), and naval coun­ terintelligence was transferred to GUKR-Smersh. On March

15, 1946, all the People's Commissariats became minis­ tries. Smersh was abolished in May 1946 and transferred to the newly formed MGB (formerly NKGB) as a Third Main

Directorate. The acronymn Smersh, however, was used up to

1948. Viktor S. Abakumov, wartime chief of Smersh, became head of the MGB in October 1946, replacing Colonel General

Merkulov. Colonel General S. N. Kruglov replaced Beriya in January 1946 as head of the NKVD. Kruglov had been a deputy to Abakumov during the war. During the transfer to

'®“Tolstoy, Secret Betrayal, pp. 361, 400; Deriabin, "Fedorchuk the KGB," p. 618. 151 the MGB Smersh lost its tribunals and abolished its inves­ tigative administration. Ordinary case officers were now required to carry out this function. The tribunals were transferred to the Main Military Collegium of the

Procuracy of the USSR.'®®

Based on the above information, the dissolution of

Smersh and the subsequent transfer of its functions to the

MGB suggests that this resubordination was related to general demobilization and a reorganization of the secu­ rity and defense establishments for peacetime operations.

However, since V. S. Abakumov became head of the MGB in

October 1946, Stalin could have transferred Smersh to the

MGB for two political reasons. The first reason could have been to appease generals who, after four years of having security officers murder their troops for the most minor infractions, were tired of having a security officer in their midst holding the rather prestigious rank of

Deputy Minister of Defense. Second, Stalin may have moved

Soviet military counterintelligence into the State Secu­ rity apparatus in order to give Abakumov a complete secu­ rity organization (the NKVD, which had become the MVD in

'®®GSUSA, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, p. 33; Deriabin, "Fedorchuk the KGB," p . 619; Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol. 2, s.v. "Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki"; Romanov, Nights are Longest There, p. 193; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, p. 203. 152

1946, was still separate when he took over) as a reward

for superior performance during the war. Beriya was also promoted from candidate membership to full membership on the Politburo and became a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The fact that by the end of 1946 the former head of Smersh, V. S. Abakumov, and Colonel General S. N.

Kruglov, formerly Abakumov's deputy in Smersh, were in charge of the entire security machine in the Soviet Union strongly suggests that Soviet military counterintelligence was well paid for its ruthlessness during the war.

After several reorganizations from 1947 to 1954, and the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Soviet security apparatus finally settled into its present form. On March

13, 1954, the KGB was established, with Ivan Serov ap­ pointed as Chairman and Lt. General Dimitri Sergeevich

Leonov being appointed as head of the Third Chief

Directorate of the KGB. For thirty years Soviet military counterintelligence has, to date, undergone no major organizational changes, and its position as part of the

State Security apparatus (as opposed to the MVD or the

Ministry of Defense) has remained stable since the esta­ blishment of the MGB in 1946.'®°

*®“Deriabin, Secret World, p. 391; Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p. 273; Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, pp. 203, 224-225; Deriabin, "Fedorchuk, the KGB," p. 614. CHAPTER VII

THE PRESENT-DAY THIRD CHIEF

DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB

The present-day Third Chief Directorate of the KGB remains a critical component of the Soviet State Security apparatus. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia blandly defines the purpose of the Special Departments as "the organs of military counterintelligence assigned to safe­ guard the security of the Soviet Army and Navy from machi­ nations of the imperialist intelligence services."*®'

As with its predecessor, Smersh, the Third Chief Director­ ate of the KGB engages in a wide array of activities, most of which involve the conduct of political security opera­ tions within the Armed Forces. A former Third Chief

Directorate Officer, Aleksei Myagkov, who defected to the

British in Berlin in 1974, has provided the West with military counterintelligence regulation number 00270, classified secret, and issued on September 8, 1961, by the

Chairman of the KGB, titled "Rights and Duties Governing

Relations with Local Unit Commanders," which specifies in

*®'Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya vol 6, "Osobye Otdely", (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978), p. 142.

153 154

detail the duties of the Special Departments. An analysis

of this list shows that the Special Departments are more

than just a military counterintelligence organization. In

addition to ferreting out "imperialist agents" and "anti-

Soviet elements" within the armed forces and their immedi­

ate surroundings, and protecting military secrets, the

regulations requires the 00s to carry out such functions

as "special measures for disinformation of the enemy, for

recording and for camouflaging especially important mili­

tary objectives" in coordination with the elements of the

KGB and the Ministry of Defense. Other functions outside

the realm of traditional counterintelligence duties in­ clude "the protection of the state borders of the USSR," the "protection of the leadership of the CPSU and the

Soviet government," the "suppression of hostile actions of anti-Soviet and nationalist elements within the country" and to "carry out special missions for the Central Commit­ tee of the CPSU and the Soviet government“ Although it is not stated as such in the regulation, the 00s proba­ bly ensure, or at least have an informal responsibility to oversee, the physical security of nuclear weapons. 00 involvement with special weapons is not unprecedented.

Special Department officers probably had a role to play in

'Myagkov, Inside the KGB, pp. 175-176. 155

ensuring the security of the Katyushka Rocket launchers

during World War II.*®“ The practical impact of this

regulation on the Soviet Armed Forces can be demonstrated

by the fact that the 00s are present on military promotion

boards, at least as observers. Without Special Department

approval no officer can attend a military academy (this is

probably no more than a formality), and in addition to

recruiting informants within the Soviet military, 00s have

the authority to recruit informants in the immediate

vicinity of Soviet military installations abroad. Within

the GSFG (Group Soviet Forces Germany), Third Chief

Directorate officers can in some instances run counter­

espionage operations against the FRG (Federal Republic of

Germany) and other Allied forces stationed in West

Germany. The Third Chief Directorate does not have the power to prosecute, try, and sentence soldiers for offenses committed within the military, although special department officers probably have the power to carry out the death sentence for desertion, even during a period of relative peace.*®*

*®“Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p. 271.

*®*Myagkov, Inside the KGB, pp. 28-42; Brzezinski, Political Controls, p. 76; Viktor Suvorov, The Liberators My Life in the Soviet Army (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), pp. 198-200. Suvorov describes the execution of a Soviet deserter by a KGB major. 156

An analysis of the organization of the Third Chief

Directorate, based on open source material, illustrates

the breadth and scope of its operations, and reflects the

increased complexity of the Soviet Armed Forces since

World War II. According to John Barron, the Third Chief

Directorate is broken down into twelve departments as

follows: Ministry of Defense and General Staff, GRU,

Ground Forces, Border Guards, Militia, Internal Troops,

Strategic Rocket Forces, Aeroflot, Air Forces, Air Defense

Forces, Navy, and the Moscow Military District.*®®

Smersh was not organized along service lines but primarily according to function. In addition to these departments, elements for such functions as mail censorship, technical surveillance, personnel, and communications probably exist within the Special Departments in order to provide spe­ cialized support of their day-to-day operations. However, no information is available on the existence of these elements. It is also highly probable that the 00s are involved in the security of the Soviet defense industry, although the available organizational data do not reflect an 00 responsibility in this area.*®®

*®®Barron, The KGB, pp. 15-16.

*®®Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Random House Inc., 1983), p. 90. 157

Data on the numbers of personnel assigned to the

Third Chief Directorate are virtually nonexistent.

Aleksei Myagkov has stated that 600 00 officers are

assigned to the GSFG, 150 of whom are concerned solely with counterespionage against NATO intelligence ser­ vices.*®’ It has often been postulated by Western

analysts that the GSFG, and Groups of Forces in general,

are the rough equivalent of Military Districts. With 16

Military Districts in the USSR, four Groups of Forces

abroad, and four Fleets, and using the figure of 60 0 as an

average for 00 officers assigned to a Military District,

Fleet or Group of Forces, the number of personnel assigned to the Third Chief Directorate could reach upward of

14,400.*®“ This figure would not include 00 officers in

Aeroflot, the Internal Troops, the Border Guards, and the defense industry. When these components are taken into consideration, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB may employ close to

20,000 personnel. This, no doubt, is a high estimate; however, the estimate of 10-12,000 given by Dr. Amy Knight in her article in ORBIS, titled "The KGB's Special

'Myagkov, Inside the KGB, p. 37

*®“Harriet‘Harriet Fast Scott and William Fast Scott, The Armed Forces:ces of the UUSSR, 2nd ed. (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 173. 158

Departments," appears to be on the low side, given the

fact that Soviet military forces are deployed over a wide area both in the USSR and abroad, and that the 00s are responsible for more than just political surveillance of the armed forces.* ® ®

The GSFG, given the size of its mission and geo­ graphical location, and the Moscow Military District pro­ bably have the highest number of 00 officers assigned.

Therefore, an average figure of 600 00 personnel assigned to the GSFG and the Moscow Military .District seems appro­ priate. Other Military Districts, Groups of Forces, and

Fleets, due to their size, location, and mission, may not have as many as 600 00 officers assigned. This would mean that the 14,400 00 officers deployed to strictly military formations is an exaggeration. Taking into consideration variations of the number of Soviet military counterintel­ ligence officers assigned to Fleets, Military Districts, and Group of Forces, it still seems reasonable to assume that the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB employs approximately 14,400 personnel when organizations such as the Border Guards, and the Internal Troops are consi­ dered. If the Soviet Armed Forces number roughly

5,8000,000 men, and the Third Chief Directorate employs

'Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p. 270. 159

14,400 staff officers, this would mean that there is one

00 officer for every 402 Soviet soldiers.*’® In other words, this breaks down to one 00 officer for every battalion-size unit. Given the available data, the best that can be said is that the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB employs somewhere between 12,000 and 20,000 staff officers.

The day-to-day operations of the 00s have not changed substantially since their inception in 1918, with the exception that the mass application of arbitrary terror has abated. Informants are still recruited in the same manner, albeit with more sophistication, and the fundamentals of counterespionage operations essentially have not changed. Timothy Colton has stated in his book.

Commissars Commanders and Civilian Authority: The

Structure of Soviet Military Politics that :

within the Red Army the Special Departments now appear to concentrate on genuine counterintel­ ligence activity. There is no evidence that they pose a major presence in the military units or staffs, or that they carry out effective continuous monitoring of daily activities. That they no longer apply force on a wide scale is evidenced by the absence of arbitrary arrests or dismissals since Stalin's death.*’*

*’“Cockburn, The Threat, p. 105.

*’*Colton, Commissars, pp. 226-227. 160

Colton's statement is in stark contrast to Captain

Myagkov's experiences. Myagkov states that General Titov,

Chief of the Special Departments in the GDR (German

Democratic Republic) in 1970 stated bluntly in a meeting

that "if there are no spies then you must unmask anti-

Soviets and other internal enemies. They are always to be

found and if you can't find any, then create them."*’“

Captain Myagkov recounts several incidents in his book

Inside the KGB in which "enemies of the state" were

created. Even after forty years of peace, the offensive

character of 00 political security operations has not

changed. The dual character of Soviet military counter­

intelligence has not eroded during peacetime.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet military counterintelligence, no doubt, has been called upon to "safeguard the security of the Soviet Army and

Navy from the machinations of the imperialist intelligence services." Based on an analysis of Smersh operations during World War II, some generalizations can be made about the functions of the Third Chief Directorate in

Afghanistan. 00 officers probably provide a high level of operational security for agent operations of the GRU, as well as other KGB elements that may be operating in

'Myagkov, Inside the KGB, p. 105. 161

Afghanistan. Any operations conducted by special-purpose

forces are probably dependent on intelligence reports from

the 00s concerning the intelligence threat in their area

of operations. It must also be remembered that 00

involvement in special operations is not unprecedented.

During World War II, Smersh used "operations groups" to

execute sabotage as well as intelligence collection missions against GIS targets. It is also possible that in

the event of a war in Central Europe, the Soviets would not have at their disposal large numbers of partisans as

in World War II. Therefore, the Third Chief Directorate could be allocated, or may presently have control over, some KGB special-purpose troops to carry out missions similar to the ones carried out by Smersh "operations groups" during World War II.*’“

Soviet military counterintelligence officers are probably investigating the amount of drug use by Soviet soldiers, combatting desertion, interrogating POWs, providing some training and guidance to the Afghan security service, and running counterespionage missions

*’“Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," International Defense Review 16 (1983): 1209-1216; Dr. John Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the 1980's: The Paramilitary Dimension," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterinte11igence, ed. Roy Godson (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pp. 95-125. 162

against the Afghan guerillas.*’* In short, it would be

reasonable to assume that the same type of activities that

Smersh engaged in during World War II are being conducted by the present-day Third Chief Directorate.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have conducted a concentrated campaign to repair or, at least upgrade, the

image of its military counterintelligence establishment.

Approximately nine books have been published by the

Soviets since the middle 1960s specifically glorifying the exploits of Soviet military counterintelligence.*’®

Five of these books have been published since 1979.

Most of the books are devoid of any direct reference to

*’*"The Plight of the Soviet Prisoner: Afghan Rebels Find Red Army Captives a Burden," Financial Times Limited, 23 May 1984, p. 20; "Soviets in Danger of Overextending Themselves," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 December 1983, p. 14; Henry S. Bradsher, "Afghanistan," The Washington Quarterly 7 (Summer 1984): 42.

*’®F. T. Fomin, Zapiski starogo chekista (Moscow: n.p., first edition 1964, second edition 1968); I. G . Lisochkin, Soldaty nezrimogo fronta, (Leningrad: Leninizdat, 1965); Major General Nosyrev, V poyedinke s abverom (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968); M. I. Sboychakov, Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1969); M. A. Belousov, Ob etom ne soobshchalos': Zapiski armeyskogo chekista (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978); S. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979); lu. Semenov, Komissar gosbezopasnosti (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979); G. K. Tsinev, Voyennye kontrrazvedchiki (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979); lu. B . Dogopolov, Voina bez liniy fronta (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1981); Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," passim; Senate, Soviet Intelligence, Vol II. 163

politically oriented terror carried out by Soviet military

counterintelligence, and all deal primarily with 00 coun­

terespionage operations against GIS targets, the apprehen­

sion of GIS agents in the Soviet rear area, or the ex­ ploits of the 00s during the Revolution and Civil War. By

linking the Special Departments to traditional counter­

intelligence and counterespionage type functions, the

Soviets probably intend to show regular military officers that the State Security presence in the Armed Forces is needed to protect it from foreign spies, and that the operational emphasis (at least on paper) for military counterintelligence will lean toward the rooting out of bona fide agents of a foreign power. The campaign to upgrade the image of Soviet military counterintelligence probably started from the overall Soviet effort in 1962 to improve the reputation and status of the KGB in general.

In practice, of course, any operational shift by the 00s to concentrate on catching legitimate agents of a foreign power within the Soviet Armed Forces will undoubtedly be used as a guise to increase the political surveillance of the armed forces. The books and articles on military counterintelligence published by the Soviets in the last five years may also be a reflection of the fact that several prominent members of the Soviet security police 164

have had extensive military counterintelligence experi­

ence. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, now chief of the MVD and former

head of the KGB, spent thirty-eight years in Soviet mili­

tary counterintelligence.*’® The present-day Third

Chief Directorate, exactly as its predecessors, is primar­

ily an instrument of the CPSU to ensure political relia­ bility of the Soviet Armed Forces. The absence of terror may only indicate that after sixty years of soviétisa­ tion the CPSU may feel that terror applied on a mass scale

is no longer necessary. Although the Soviet military is somewhat more "loyal," or at least not as "contaminated by foreign influence" as in the past, the Party perceives that at the very least it must enforce a "corporate dis­ cipline" of sorts in order to ensure that the long-term process of "soviétisation" still proceeds smoothly. Given the political climate in which the Third Chief Directorate operates and the organizational history of Soviet military counterintelligence and its role in the Soviet police system, it is virtually impossible for Soviet military counterintelligence to solely "concentrate on genuine counterintelligence activity." The dual character of the

00s has been ingrained for sixty-six years, and as long as

*’®See Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," and Deriabin, "Fedorchuk, the KGB." 165 the CPSU views the Soviet Armed Forces as a potential hotbed of "counterrevolutionary activity" and as an

instrument for soviétisation, the Special Departments of the KGB will forever remain a vital instrument of political repression. CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Soviet military counterintelligence has clearly been

underrated by western analysts of the Soviet Union, both

as an instrument of political repression and as a formid­

able adversary in wartime. Soviet sources go to great

lengths to legitimize the role of the 00s within the

Soviet Armed Forces, even to the extent of stating that

"all operations connected with the penetration of enemy

intelligence had to be conducted on the decision of the

Military Council of the Front." An analysis of Special

Department operations over a sixty-year period unequivo­ cally shows that the 00s need no "decision from the Mili­ tary Council of the Front" to obliterate any "ideological saboteur," "wrecker," "traitor of the Motherland," or

"anti-Soviet element" within the armed forces.*’’ In other words. Western analysts have been inordinately pre­ occupied with analyzing the role of the Main Political

*” Nosryev, V poedinke s abverom, p. 113; U.S. Army, German Counterintelligence in Occupied Soviet Union, MS-P-122, p. 27. Nosryev states in Russian; "Vse operatsii svyazannye s vnedreniyem vo vrazheskuyu razvedky, provodilis' po resheniyu Voyennogo soveta Fronta."

166 167

Administration of the Armed Forces and have been too concerned with the role of the political officer as an instrument of political control. They have neglected to analyze the role, mission, and functions of a security organization that had virtually unbridled authority and power and was placed in the heart of the Soviet war machine in order to ensure that it functioned properly and would be devoid of "foreign contamination."

The wide array of tasks either given to, or thrust upon, Soviet military counterintelligence during World War

II shows that Smersh possessed all the attributes of a full-fledged, independent, self-contained security machine that could by and large operate independently of Lavrenty

Beriya's NKVD or Merkulov's NKGB. Smersh was allocated resources to carry out foreign espionage, security duties, and internal repression on a wide scale. Merkulov's NKGB possessed no security troops, and the NKVD had no foreign espionage mission after 1943, as it was primarily con­ cerned with internal security. There was, of course, considerable redundancy and overlapping of functions; nevertheless, Smersh was essentially responsible for the immediate security of the Soviet war effort and of neces­ sity required a considerable degree of operational inde­ pendence. Neither the NKVD nor Merkulov's NKGB was instrumental in the immediate postwar subjugation of 168

Eastern Europe, as this was left primarily for Abakumov

and his "military chekists" to carry out.

However, when analyzing the operational effective­

ness of Soviet military counterintelligence during World

War II, it is necessary to define the criteria for the

measurement of that effectiveness. If one measures the

effectiveness of Soviet military counterintelligence by

the fact that the Soviets achieved their goal of winning

the war, and subsequently succeeded in subjugating Eastern

Europe, then Smersh was highly effective, and it was cer­

tainly a key player in the liquidation of foreign "anti-

Soviet" elements in the reoccupied areas. A different perspective is gained, however, when the following German mistakes and vulnerabilities are taken into consideration:

1. German occupation policy, as the war went on, was not conducive to enlisting support from the Soviet population. Mass murders and brutal reprisals drove a

large number of Soviet citizens into the hands of the partisans.

2. The German Intelligence Services were extremely small, decentralized, and often more interested in bureau­ cratic in-fighting than in combatting Russians. The critical dimensions of the manpower problem for the GIS operating on the Eastern Front can be illustrated by the fact that Leitestelle III Ost, essentially the head- 169

quarters for the mobile operational Abwehr assets on the

Eastern Front, had at its disposal toward the end of the war only 4 Frontaufklaerunqskommandos (FAKs) divided into

33 Frontaufklaerunqstruppen (FATs) totalling 120 officers

and 1,200 enlisted men. Given the level of intensity of

Soviet agent commitments, this number was clearly inade­ quate. The Germans were constantly plagued with a short­

age of not only intelligence officers, but intelligence officers who could speak Russian and had a good knowledge of the Soviet Union.*’*

3. The German Army consistently exhibited a cava­

lier attitude toward rear-area security and toward the

large number of Soviet troops and partisans in the rear area of the German Army. One of the most vivid examples of this attitude can be demonstrated by the fact that often the FATs were billeted in small Russian villages, which tended to compromise operational security.*’*

4. Although the Soviet intelligence services were badly mauled in the initial phases of the war, former

Abwehr officers have stated that they faced a well-

*’*U.S. Army, CI-CIR-16, p. 2; U.S. Army, German Counterintelligence in Occupied Soviet Union, MS-P-122, pp. 4-5, 91.

*’*7707th MISC, CI-SR-32, pp. 22, 40; U.S. Army, CI-CIR-16, pp. 3, 10. 170 prepared Soviet counterintelligence system.This was

largely due to the fact that the Soviets had almost

twenty-four years to consolidate, train, and centralize

their security apparatus. By 1941, Hitler had only been

in power for eight years. The effect of this can be

illustrated by stating that two entirely separate bureau­ cracies, as well as two military organizations, were operating on the Eastern Front. The SS's war-fighting capability consisted of the formations of the Allgemeine

SS and the Waffen SS, and the intelligence and security agencies of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA, or the

Reich Security Main Office) such as the SD, Gestapo, and any attendant police units. In addition, the SS had set up numerous administrative agencies in German-occupied

Russia. On the other hand, the Wehrmacht, in conjunction with the Abwehr, FHO, the military intelligence sections of the German Armies, and the GFP were subordinate to an entirely separate chain of command than their SS counter­ parts. The German Army and the SS often operated at cross purposes. In the Soviet context, this would be the equiv­ alent of the tsarist "intelligence and military systems"

(this equates to the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr) fighting the Germans side by side with the Soviet intelligence and

'7707th MISC, CI-SR-32, p. 16. 171 military systems (this equates to the SS), each having an entirely separate chain of command. The lack of centrali­ zation and the lack of strategic direction on the part of the Germans was the major German weakness during the war

in intelligence operations against the Soviets.

When these criteria are considered, an analysis of the operational effectiveness of Smersh depends largely on one's perceptions of GIS' vulnerabilities. The Soviet strategy was certainly not sophisticated in that the mass use of agents against the decentralized GIS does not represent innovative strategy or a high degree of clever­ ness. The mass use of agents by the Soviets does, how­ ever, represent the ability of the Soviet intelligence apparatus to maximize its advantages (numbers) over the vulnerabilities of the GIS and to maintain a persistent level of intensity under rather difficult conditions.

Although the quality of Soviet military counterin­ telligence operations against the GIS can be debated end­ lessly, what is evident from an analysis of Smersh opera­ tions is that Smersh was more effective as an instrument of political repression than as a counterespionage ser­ vice. It was the agency largely responsible for the elimination of "anti-Soviet elements" from Eastern Europe and from the ranks of repatriated Soviet citizens and

POWs. By 1946 the Soviet armed forces could be considered 172 to have been completely "cleansed" of "old tsarist ele­ ments." The battle to ensure the loyalty of the Red Army was over, and since the end of World War II, in the absence of a major war, the 00s have been entrusted to see that the process of sovietization proceeds smoothly within the military as well as to eliminate any potential

"hotbeds" of dissent against the regime. With the excep­ tion of Afghanistan, the Third Chief Directorate of the

KGB is presently concerned, in practice, less with rooting out foreign spies than with political security operations designed to ensure that the Soviet armed forces do not engineer a palace coup or deviate from the process of sovietization.

In peacetime the existence of the informant network serves several purposes, but one of the major by-products of an efficient informant system is to keep to a minimum the ability of a hostile intelligence service to recruit agents among the rank and file of the Soviet military.

This, in combination with other security measures, made it exceedingly difficult for the GIS to infiltrate the Red

Army in the latter stages of the war. The informant system in the Soviet military best illustrates the Soviet concept of counterintelligence. A system designed for political repression, or even to ensure that the process of sovietization proceeds smoothly, protects the armed 173

forces from penetration by a hostile intelligence service

or at least makes this task difficult at best. The Soviet

Military Encyclopedia's definition of military counterin­ telligence as "consisting of ensuring the security of the

armed forces from subversive activities of capitalist states" and of "exposing and foiling attempts by enemy spies, saboteurs, terrorists, traitors of the Motherland" and other enemy elements to inflict damage on the combat might of the armed forces" is not just an abstraction, but is fervently applied to all facets of Soviet military counterintelligence operations.

When the functions of the Third Chief Directorate, the Second Chief Directorate (responsible for internal counterintelligence and political repression of the Soviet population), and the Fifth Chief Directorate (responsible for repression of dissidents) are combined, they represent the major resources at the Party's disposal to ensure the political loyalty of the Soviet population and the Soviet military. Thus, Soviet military counterintelligence is but one element, albeit a major one, in a system designed to conduct political security and counterintelligence operations on a massive scale. Soviet military counter­ intelligence, as has been shown, does not operate in a vacuum but is a vital component of a system established to ensure the complete subjugation of the Soviet population. 174

Given the history of the Special Departments and the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union, Soviet military counterintelligence is and will be

in the foreseeable future an extension of the sword and shield of the Party inside the Soviet military. APPENDIX A

BASIC EVOLUTION OF TSARIST

SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Organization Period Ruler

Oprichnina 1510-1533 Vasily Ivanovich Granduke of Muscovy

Oprichnina 1598-1605 Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible)

Rozysknoe Mesto 1612-1689 Tsars Mikhail, (Bureau of Investi­ Alexey, and gation, under Tsar Feodor Alexey, possibly the Secret Office)

Preobrazhenskiy Frikaz 1690-1718 Peter the Great (Office)

Fiksali 1718-1729 Peter the Great

Chancery for 1731-1746 Empress Anna, Secret Investigations Empress Elizabeth

Secret Chancery for 1746-1762 Catherine the Investigatory Affairs Great

Secret Chancery 1767-1694 Catherine the Great

Secret Expedition 1974-1800 Tsar Paul

Committee of Higher 1801-1825 Alexander I Police (Sept. 5, 1807) Commit te for Public Safety (Jan. 13, 1807, this became a Chancery in 1809) Ministry of Police 1811-1819 Minstry of Internal Affairs

175 176

Organization Period Ruler

Third Section (also 1826-1880 Tsar Nicholas I called Bureau or Tsar Alexander II Department) Corps of Gendarmes (Ministry of Internal Affairs)

Okhrana 1881-1917 Tsar Alexander III Corps of Gendarmes Tsar Nicholas II (Ministry of Internal Affairs) APPENDIX B

BASIC EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SECURITY ORGANS

Organization Dates

VeCheka 20 Dec 1917 - 6 Feb 1922

GPU 6 Feb 1922 - 15 Nov 1923

OGPU 15 Nov 1923 - 10 July 1934

GUGB/NKVD 10 July 1934 - 3 Feb 1941

NKBG and NKVD 3 Feb 1941 - 20 July 1941

GUGB/NKVD 20 July 1941 - 14 Apr 1943

NKGB and NKVD 14 Apr 1943 - 19 Mar 1946

MGB and MVD 19 Mar 1946 - 7 Mar 1953

(The KI was established in 1947 and absorbed the foreign intelligence missions of the MGB and the GRU. It was abolished in 1951 and the MGB and GRU were given back their foreign intelligence missions. The MVD also existed at this time but with slightly different responsibilities. See Hingley, pp. 211-213, and Barron, KGB, p. 341)

KGB and MVD* 13 Mar 1954 - Present

MVD 7 Mar 1953 - 13 Mar 1954

*The MVD was the MOOP from 1962 until 1968, when it reverted to MVD.

177 APPENDIX C

CHIEFS OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANS

Chief Organization Dates

Felix Dzerzhinskiy VeCheka 20 Dec 1917 - 6 Feb 1922

Felix Dzerzhinskiy GPU 6 Feb 1922 - 15 Nov 1923

Felix Dzerzhinskiy OGPU 15 Nov 1923 - 20 July 1926

Vyacheslav Menzhinskiy OGPU 20 July 1926 10 May 1934

Genrikh Yagoda GUGB/NKVD 10 May 1934 - 25 Sept 1936

Nikolay Yezhov GUGB/NKVD 25 Sep 1936 - 8 Dec 1938

Lavrenty Beriya GUGB/NKVD 8 Dec 1938 - (V. N. Merkulov probably 3 Feb 1941 Chief GUGB)

V. N. Merkulov NKGB 3 Feb 1941 - 20 July 1941 Lavrenty Beriya NKVD 3 Feb 1941 - 20 July 1941

Lavrenty Beriya GUGB/NKVD 20 July 1941 (Merkulov Chief GUGB) 14 Apr 1943

V. N. Merkulov NKGB 14 Apr 1943 - 19 Mar 1946 Lavrenty Beriya NKVD 14 Apr 1943 - 19 Mar 1946

V. S. Abakumov MGB Oct 1946 - Aug 1951

178 179

Chief Organization Dates

S. N. Kruglov MVD 19 Mar 1946 7 Mar 1953

(The KI was established in 1947 and absorbed the foreign intelligence missions of the MGB and the GRU. Both MVD and the MGB existed but with slightly altered responsibilities. Abakumov was replaced as head of the MGB in 1952 by S. D. Ignatyev. Kruglov continued as chief of the MVD.)

S. N. Kruglov MVD 7 Mar 1953 - (MGB merged with MVD) 13 Mar 1954

Ivan Serov (Chief KGB) KGB and MVD 13 Mar 1954 - (Separate 25 Dec 1958 organiza­ tions continue to present day)

Alexander Shelepin KGB 25 Dec 1958 - 31 Oct 1961

Vladimir Semichastny KGB* 13 Nov 1961 - 18 May 1967

Yuri Andropov KGB 18 May 1967 - 26 May 1982

Vitaliy Fedorchuk KGB 26 May 1982 - 16 Dec 1982

Viktor Chebrikov KGB 16 Dec 82 - Present

*The MVD was the MOOP in 1962 until 1968 when it reverted to the MVD. APPENDIX D

BASIC EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET MILITARY

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1698 Peter the Great purges streltsy.

1815 Army Gendarme Regiment established.

January 1821 Plan approved by Alexander I to establish a small informant network in the Corps of Guards and the 2nd Army.

1914 General V. F . Dzhunkovsky abolishes Okhrana informant network in the Army.

1914 Department of Police created 9th Secretariat, which dealt with matters of police interest in areas occupied by the Army.

March 1917 Colonel B. V. Nikitin, Chief of Counterespionage Bureau of Petrograd Military District, takes over political security operations in Petrograd.

October - Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) December 1917 establishes Military Investigation Commission.

20 December 1917 With establishment of VeCheka, counterintelligence organs scattered throughout Party and military organizations.

9 April 1918 Dzerzhinskiy discusses possibility of placing military counterintelligence under one roof.

180 181

May 1918 Voyenkontrol (Military Control) established under Commissar for War to conduct counterespionage and counterintelligence functions in the army.

July 1918 Chekas established to fight counterrevolution on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. VeCheka establishes a Military Sub-Department to coordinate work of Front Chekas.

September 1918 Various organizations dealing with counterintelligence in the military placed under the Military Supervision Sub- Department of the Registration Office of the Rewoyensovet ■

November 1918 Military Sub-Department of VeCheka given full department status.

19 December 1918 Special Departments of the VeCheka established. Considered official birthday of Soviet Military Counterintelligence.

6 February 1922 00 (Special Departments) of VeCheka becomes 00 GPU.

15 November 1923 00 GPU becomes 00 OGPU.

10 July 1934 00 OGPU becomes OO/GUGB of the newly formed NKVD.

3 February 1941 OO/GUGB of the NKVD (commonly referred to as 00/NKVD as the NKVD is the parent organization with the GUGB as a subordinate agency) is transferred to the Armed Forces as 3rd Directorate of the NKO, 3rd Directorate of the NKVMF, and a 3rd Directorate was left behind in the GUGB of the NKVD to conduct political security operations in Internal Troops and Frontier Troops, etc.

20 July 1941 3rd Directorate (00s) of the NKO and the NKVMF transferred to GUGB/NKVD and again referred to as 00/NKVD. 182

14 April 1943 00/NKVD is transferred to the NKO as Third Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense-Death to Spies. (GUKR-NKO-Smersh). A Third Main Directorate for Counterintelligence was set up in the Navy (GUKR-NKVMF-Smersh). An 00 contingent is left behind in the NKVD to conduct political security operations in the Internal Troops, etc.

19 March 1946 Smersh dissolved and its entire organization absorbed by the newly created MGB. When the NKVMF was subsumed under the Ministry of Defense, the 00 of the MGB assumed responsibility for security of the Navy. 00 MGB became GUKR of the MGB

7 March 1953 GUKR/MGB becomes the 00/MVD (see Appendix C).

13 March 1954 00/MVD becomes 00/KGB, where it remains to the present day as the Third Chief Directorate. APPENDIX E

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND FOREIGN TERMS

Term Expansion/Translation

Abteilung Section/Department

Abwehr German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence organization.

CIO U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps.

FA Frontaufklaerung (divided into Truppen and Kommando) Mobile Abwehr intelligence counterintelligence and counterespionage units. Literally translated Front Reconnaissance.

FHO Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East). German Intelligence of OKH (German Army High Command on the Eastern Front).

Gestapo Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police) of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) of the SS.

GFP Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) of the German Army.

GIS German Intelligence Services. Acronym used by CIC reports to refer to all German intelligence services operating on the Eastern Front.

GKO Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony (State Defense Committee).

GPU Gosudarstvennoye Polisticheskoe Upravleniye (State Political Administration).

183 184

Term Expansion/Translation

GRU Glavnoye Razvedylvatel'noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate). Soviet military intelligence, it is a Main Directorate of the General Staff.

GSUSA General Staff, United States Army.

GUKR Glavanoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki (Main Administration for Counter­ intelligence) . Name given to Soviet military counterintelligence during World War II.

GUGB Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Main Administration for State Security).

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security).

KI Komitet Informatsii (Committee for Information).

KRU Kontrrazvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (Counterintelligence Administration). The KRU of the NKGB was entrusted with conducting counterintelligence and political security operations within the USSR; however, not within the Red Army. This administration is now the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB.

MISC Military Intelligence Service Center (U.S. Army).

MOOP Ministerstvo Okhrany Obschestvennogo Poryadka (Ministry for the Maintenance of Public Order).

MVD Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

NKGB Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (People's Commissariat for State Security).

NKO Narodny Komissariat Oborony (People's Commissariat for Defense). 185

Term Expans ion/Trans1at ion

NKVD Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs).

NKVMF Narodny Komissariat Voyenno-morskogo Flota (People's Commissariat for the Navy).

OGPU Ob"edinyennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoe Upravleniye (Combined State Political Administration).

00 Osobye Otdely (Special Departments). Soviet military counterintelligence since December 19, 1918.

OSS Office of Strategic Services (U.S.). Forerunner of the CIA in World War II.

Rewoensovet Revolyutsionny Voyenny Sovet (Revolutionary War Council).

RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office). The intelligence and security organization of SS. The Gestapo and the SD were subordinate to the RSHA.

Smersh Smert' Shpionam. Name given to Soviet military counterintelligence during World War II from 14 April 1943 on.

SD Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service). Part of the RSHA of the S S .

Sovnarkom Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Council of People's Commissars).

VeCheka Vserossiiskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya (po bor'be s Kontrrevolyutsiyey, Spekulyatsiyey, Sabotazhem i Pre- stupleniyami po Dolzhnosti). All- Russian Extraordinary Commission [for Combatting Counter-Revolution, Specu­ lation, Sabotage, and Crimes in Office]. 186

Term Expansion/Translation

Voyenkontrol Voyenny Kontrol (Military Control). Established in May 1918 as a military counterespionage organization within the Red Army.

VRK Voeyenno-Revolyutsionny Komitet (Military Revolutionary Committee). SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Agabekov, George. OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror. New York: Brenatano's, 1931; reprint ed., Wesport, C T : Hyperian Press, 1975.

Akhmedov, Ismail. In and Out of Stalin's GRU. Frederick, MD.: University Publications of America, 1984.

Bailey, Geoffrey. The Conspirators. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1960.

Barron, John. The KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974.

KGB Today: The Hidden Hand. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983

Belousov, M. A. Ob etom ne soobshchalos': Zapiski armeyskoqo chekista. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, K. The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.

______. e d . Political Controls in the Soviet Army: A Study Based on Reports by Former Soviet Officers. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954.

Carell, Paul. Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Translated by Ewald Osers. Toronto and Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964.

Cockburn, Andrew. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. New York: Random House, 1983.

Colton, Timothy J. Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

187 188

The Soviet Police System. New York: Praeger, 1968,

Cooper, Matthew. The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1978.

Curtiss, John Shelton. The Russian Army under Nicholas I: 1825-1855. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965.

Daliin, Alexander. German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A study in Occupation Policies. 2nd rev. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981.

Deane, Michael J. Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces. New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, 1979.

Deriabin, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. 2nd e d . Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984 .

Deriabin, Peter, and Gibney, Frank. The Secret World. Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 21. New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1982.

Dvornik, Francis. Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, The Arab Muslim Empires, The Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy. New Brunswick, N J : Rutgers University Press, 1974.

Dyadkin, Iosif, G . Unnatural Deaths in the USSR 1928- 1954. Translated by Tania Deruguine. New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.): Transaction Books, 1983.

Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War wit^i Germany, Vol. 2 . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.

Gehlen, Reinhard. The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen. Translated by David Irving. New York: World Publishing, 1972.

Gerson, Lennard, D. The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976. 189

Gordon, Gary Howard. "Soviet Partisan Warfare 1941-1944: The German Perspective." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Iowa, 1972.

Heilbrunn, Otto. The Soviet Secret Services. Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981.

Hoehne, Heinz. Codeword Direktor: The Story of the Red Orchestra. Translated by Richard Barry. Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 18. New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1982.

Hoehne, Heinz, and Zolling, Hermann. The General Was A Spy: The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. New York: Coard, McCann and Geohegan, 1971.

Irving, David. Hitler's W a r . New York: The Viking Press, 1977.

Lederey, E. Germany's Defeat in the East: The Soviet Armies at War 1941-1945. London: The War Office, 1955.

Leggett, George. The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter- Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917-February 1922). Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Levytsky, Boris. The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970. Translated by H. A. Piehler. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1972.

Lucas, James. War On the Eastern Front 1941-1945: The German Soldiers in Russia. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1979.

Matthews, Mervyn, ed. Soviet Government: A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. Inc., 1974.

McKale, Donald. Hitler: The Survival Myth. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1981.

Monas, Sidney. The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961. 190

Myagkov, Aleksei. Inside the KGB. Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 8. New York: Random House Inc., Ballantine Books, 1981.

Nosryev, D. P., ed. V poyedinke s abverom: Dokumental'ny ocherk o chekistakh Leningradskogo fronta 1941-1945. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968.

Orlov, Alexander. The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes. New York: Random House, 1958.

Ostryakov. Military Chekists. Translated by Defense Intelligence Agency, No. LN 290-80, September 29, 1980. Moscow: Voyenizdat.

Penkovskiy, Oleg. The Penkovskiy Papers. Translated by Peter Deriabin. Ballantine Espionage Intelligence Library, No. 15. New York: Random House, Inc., Ballantine Books, 1982.

Rosenfeldt, Niels, Erik. Knowledge and Power. The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government. Copenhagen: Rosenkildeand Bagger, 1978.

Romanov, A. I. Nights Are Longest There: A Memoir of the Soviet Security Services. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1972.

Scott, Harriet Fast, and Scott, William F . The Armed Forces of the USSR. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981.

Seth, Ronald. The Executioners: The Story of Smersh. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.

Soviet Military Intelligence: Two Sketches. Mimeographed Series No. 104. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1952.

Soviet Security Agencies in Postwar Poland. Mimeographed Series No. 17. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1952.

Squire, P. S. The Third Department: The Political Police in Russia of Nicholas I . Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Suvorov, Viktor. Inside the Soviet Army. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982. 191

Inside Soviet Military Intelligence. New York; Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984

The Liberators: My Life in the Soviet Army, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981.

Taylor, Kenneth Charles. "The Reorganization of the Soviet Command System for Total War 1939-1941." Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973.

Tolstoy, Nikolai. The Secret Betrayal 1944-1947. New York: Glencoe IL: The Free Press, 1977.

Vassilyev, A. T., and Fueloep-Miller, Rene. The Ochrana: The Russian Secret Police. Philadelphia: Lippincott C o ., 1930.

Waxmonsky, Gary Richard. "Police and Politics in Soviet Society, 1921-1929." Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982.

Werth, Alexander. Russia at War 1941-1945. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1964.

Wittlin, Thaddeus. Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya. New York: Macmillan, 1972 .

Wolin, Simon and Slusser, Robert M . , eds. The Soviet Secret Police. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1964.

Zuckerman, Frederick, S. "The Russian Political Police at Home and Abroad (1880-1917). Its Structure, Functions and Methods and Its Struggle with the Organized Opposition." Ph.D. dissertation. New York University, 1973.

Articles

Artiemiev, Vyacheslav P. "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," Military Review 53 (September 1963): 21-31.

Beloborodov, A. "Voyennye kontrrazvedchiki." Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 February 1979, p. 2. Translated in United States Joint Publications Research Service No. 73162, April 5, 1979, USSR Military Affairs No. 1426, pp. 133-135. 192

Bradley, J. F. N. "The Russian Secret Service in the First World War." Soviet Studies: A Quarterly Journal on the USSR and Eastern Europe 20 (October 1968): 242-248.

Bradsher, Henry S. "Afghanistan." The Washington Quarterly 7, (Summer 1984): 42.

Deriabin, Peter. "Fedorchuk, the KGB, and the Soviet Succession." ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs (Fall 1982): 611-635.

Dziak, John. "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the 1980’s: The Paramilitary Dimension." In Intelligence Reguirements in the I980's: Counterintelligence, pp. 95-113. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1980.

Knight, Amy. "The KGB's Special Departments," ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs (Summer 1984): 257-280.

Marchenko, Anatoliy. "Geroy nevidimykh srazheniy." Sovietskiy Voyn No. 16, 1979, pp. 30-31.

"The Plight of the Soviet Prisoner: Afghan Rebels Find Red Army Captives a Burden." Financial Times Limited, 23 May 1984, p. 20.

Reitz, James T. "The Soviet Security Troops: The Kremlin's Other Armies." In Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No. 6, 1982, pp. 279-327, edited by David R. Jones.

Rybinetsev, F ., and Koralyev, V. "Ob armeyskikh chekistakh." Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 7 April 1979. Translated United States Joint Publications Research Service No. 73603, June 4, 1979 USSR Military Affairs no 1444, pp. 87-89.

Slusser, Robert M. "The Budget of the OGPU and the Special Troops, from 1923-4 to 1928-9." Soviet Studies: A Quarterly Journal on the USSR and Eastern Europe 10 (April 1959): 375-383.

"Sovetskiye organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti v gody velikoy otechestvennoy Voyny." Voprosy Istorii No. 5; 1965, pp. 20-39. 193

Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, vol 2. S.v. "Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki", p. 564. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976.

vol 2. S.v. "Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony". Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976. pp. 621-622.

. vol 4. "Kontrrazvedka". S.v. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977, pp. 326-327.

vol 6. "Osobye Otdely". S.v. p. 142, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977, pp. 326-327.

"Soviets in Danger of Overextending Themselves." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 December 1983, p. 14.

Suvorov, Viktor. "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces." International Defense Review 16 (September 1983): 1209-1216.

United States Joint Publications Research Service. Collection of Articles on Soviet Intelligence and Security Operations No. 55623, April 4, 1972.

Tsinev, Georgi. "Na strazhe interesov vooruzhennykh sil SSSR." Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 24 (December 1978): 26-31. Translated by United States Joint Publications Research Service No. 73037, 20 March 1979, USSR Military Affairs no 1421, pp. 1-8.

Tsvetkov, A. "O boyevykh armeyskikh chekistov." Voyenny istoricheskiy zhurnal, December 1982, pp. 83-84.

Documents

Germany. Auswaertiges Amt. Photocopies of Correspondence and Reports in Russian with Some Translations in German Pertaining to the Autobiography of Captured NKVD Lieutenant Tschigunow and his Exploitation by German Authorities, April 1941-April 1943. Contained in United States National Archives. Miscellaneous German Records Collection. Record Group 242/1048. Microfilm Publication No. T78. Roll No. 287. Frame 879. Item No. EAP-3-a-ll/2.

Germany. Oberkommando des Heeres. Fremde Heere O s t . Abteilung I. Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront 194

(1943)■ Contained in United States National Archives. Collection of Captured German Records. Record Group 242. Microfilm Publication T78. Roll No. 562. Item No. H3.323.

Germany. Oberkommando des Heeres. Fremde Heere Ost. Abteilung Ilb. Truppenverbaende und truppenaehnliche Organisâtionen des roten Volkskommissariats der Inneren ("NKWD"). January 16, 1943. Contained in United States National Archives. Collection of Captured German Records. Record Group 242. Microfilm Publication T78. Roll No. 563. Item No. H3/398.

Germany. Oberkommando des Heeres. Generalstab. Hauptabteilung Fremde Heere Ost lib. Die Uebervachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat. Merkblatt Geheim 11/5. December 1, 1945. Annex 15. Contained in United States National Archives. Collection of Captured German Records. Record Group 242. OKH H3/753.

United States Congress, Senate. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Interal Security Laws. Committee on the Judiciary. Soviet Intelligence and Security Services 1964-1970: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications with Some Additional Titles from Other Sources. Volume I, 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Soviet Intelligence and Security Services 1971-1972: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications with Some Additional Titles from Other Sources. Volume I, 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 .

United States. Department of the Army. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service of the USSR. October 9, 1942. Record Group 319. Entry 85. File ID No. 918441. Declassified February 6, 1978.

United States, Department of the Army. General Staff, United States Army (GSUSA). Intelligence Division. Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence. January 9, 1948. Declassified NND 770011. 195

United States. Department of the Army. Headquarters European Command. Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence. Exploitation German Archives. 258th Interrogation Team. Organization and Mission of the Soviet Secret Service. August 15, 1946. Record Group 319. File ID No. 960347. Declassified August 12, 1960.

United States. Department of the Army. Headquarters European Command. Office of the Military Government of Germany. Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence. Report on Soviety Military Espionage Activities. February 12, 1946. Record Group 260. 7 21-3 15. Box 18. Folder 383.4-1.

United States, Department of the Army. Headquarters 66th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment. "00" NKVD 4 5th Guards Infantry Division 1942-1943 (Organization and Personalities). November 17, 1949. File ID No. 619916. Declassified NNDG 735038, NARS Date: June 9, 1983 .

United States, Department of the Army. Headquarters, U.S. Forces European Theater. Military Intelligence Service Center. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. Special Report to Deputy AC of S G-2 USFET: The Secret Services of the USSR. November 3, 1945. File ID No. 961385. Declassified March 14, 1978 .

United States, Department of the Army. Headquarters U.S. Forces European Theater. Military Intelligence Service Center. German Methods of Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Service. September 9, 1945. Counterintelligence Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 16 (CI-CIR/16). Declassified NND 760041, November 1, 1978.

United States. Department of the Army. Headquarters United States Forces European Theater. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Counterintelligence Division. The Foreign Department and the Counter­ intelligence Department of the NKGB. July 15, 1946. Counterintelligence Special Interrogation Report No. 4 (CI-SIR/4). Declassified NND 765025, March 13, 1978. Contained in Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Moscow Embassy, 1946. File No. 820.02 Box 117. Central File No. 861.20200/7-2346. 196

United States, Department of the Army. Information Section, Counterintelligence Branch, Office of the Director of Intelligence. Headquarters U.S. Group C.C. Russian Counterintelligence Organizations. August 14, 1945. File ID No. 191047. Record Group 319. Entry 85. Declassified NND 745076. February 6, 1978.

United States Department of the Army. Military History Institute. Historical Division. Headquarters U.S. Army Europe. Foreign Military Studies Branch. German Counterintelligence in Occupied Soviet Union 1941-1945. By Wladimir Posdjakoff. Edited by George C. Vanderstadt. Translated by Wladimir Posndjakoff. No. MS-P-122, 1952.

______. Espionage Activities of the USSR. by Wladimir Posdnjakoff. Edited by J. R. Robinson. No. MS-P-137.

______. PW Project Number 5. MS-P-018e. 1950.

Rear Area Security in Russia: The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines. No. MS T-19, July 1950. Declassified January 6, 1954. (Also known as German Report Series.)

______. The Secret Field Police. By Wilhelm Krichbaum. Edited by George C. Vanderstadt. Translated by M. Franke. No. MS-C-029, May 18, 1947.

______. Soviet Counterintelligence. Wladimir Posdnjakoff. German Text. MS-P-131. 1952.

United States, Department of the Army. 7707th Military Intelligence Service Center. The Counterintelligence Organization "SMERSH" of the Red Army. March 24, 1947. Counterintelligence Special Report No. 42 (CI-SR/42). Declassified NNDG 843513. June 5, 1984.

______. Operations and Experiences of Frontaufklaerung (FA) III Ost During the Eastern Campaigns. January 27, 1947. Counterintelligence Special Report No. 32 (CI-SR/32) Declassified 765038, June 16, 1984.

United States, Department of the Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Intelligence Division. Creation of Stalin as Marshal of the Soviet Union. March 12, 1943. Serial No. 996. Declassified NND 750140 . (OSS 31006). 197

United States, Department of the Navy. Office of Naval Intelligence. Espionage-Sabotaqe-Conspiracy: German and Russian Operations 1941-1945: Excerpts from the Files of the German Naval Staff and Other Captured German Documents. April 1947. Washington, D.C.

United States, Office of Strategic Services. Operational Methods of Security Units of the Red Army. September 12, 1945. Report No. A-61642. Declassified NND 750140. XL 19175.

Soviet Activities in Estonia. January 31, 1945. Report No. A-54556. Declassified NND 750140. L555669.

United States, War Department. General Staff. Military Intelligence Division. Stalin's Brain Trust. November 5, 1943. Military Attache Report No. 385. Declassified NND 750140 (OSS 49064).

United States War Department. Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces. November 1945. Technical Manual TM 30-430.

Russia: Counterintelligence in the Army. 24 October 1945. Military Attache Report, No. R-540-45. Declassified NNDG 745076. February 6, 1978. M.I.S. No. 216593.