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WestminsterResearch http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch Living in the shadow: Britain and the USSR’s nuclear weapon delivery systems 1949-62 O'daly, K. This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. © Mr Kevin O'daly, 2016. The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail [email protected] LIVING IN THE SHADOW: BRITAIN AND THE USSR’S NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS 1949-62 KEVIN FRANCIS O’DALY A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the University of Westminster for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2016 Abstract This thesis examines British intelligence collection efforts against the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers and long-range nuclear ballistic missiles during the period 1949 until 1962. It also analyses the serious intelligence collection problems that were encountered concerning this topic and how successful Britain’s intelligence efforts were in the light of what is now known. This period of Cold War history covers from the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb test through to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The thesis commences with an analysis of the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers which posed the initial nuclear strike threat to the United Kingdom. It explores how German personnel returning from captivity in the Soviet Union were used by the West to provide information on Soviet military research and how British analysts struggled to gather intelligence on nuclear bombers in a secret police state. The issue of the Soviet ballistic missile threat to the UK is then considered, again by initially examining intelligence provided by German returnees, through to more sophisticated intelligence collection methods such as advanced radar. The papers of the British Joint Intelligence Committee and other government departments were used to examine collection problems and assessments. The role of secret intelligence assessments in the Macmillan government’s decision to cancel the British Blue Streak nuclear missile is also explored. Aerial reconnaissance was a particularly useful intelligence asset. Britain’s clandestine over- flights of the USSR and role in the U-2 programme have only been briefly discussed before. These missions and the UK’s role in covert balloon operations are explored for the first time in a detailed case study. The use of satellite reconnaissance in Britain’s intelligence collection efforts is also assessed. The Colonel Oleg Penkovsky spy case is then analysed as a case study of human intelligence collection and its problems when dealing with Soviet bombers and missiles from 1961-62. This chapter uses declassified American documents to examine the nuclear material he provided, his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and his overall value to the British and American intelligence agencies. The conclusion is that intelligence collection and analysis evolved significantly from 1949 to 1962 from the use of basic human intelligence to the development of satellite reconnaissance. My thesis, written chronologically, demonstrates that analysts did well to overcome enormous problems when dealing with an extremely difficult intelligence target. At the end of the period they provided far better intelligence collection and analysis on Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems to British policy makers during a critical period in the Cold War. CONTENTS Introduction p.1 Chapter 1 p.19 Ruin From The Air: British Intelligence Gathering and the Soviet Nuclear Bomber Threat 1949-62 Chapter 2 p.60 A Bolt From The Blue: British Intelligence Gathering and the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat 1949-62 Chapter 3 p.110 Looking Behind The Curtain: Aerial Reconnaissance and Soviet Nuclear Delivery Systems Chapter 4 p.162 An Agent In Place: The Problems of Human Intelligence Collection and its value in the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky Conclusion p.210 Glossary p.220 Bibliography p.223 Acknowledgements The idea for this thesis originated from reading the book Spying On The Nuclear Bear by Dr Mike Goodman at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. I am grateful for the author’s initial guidance which allowed me to draft the outline for my thesis. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Huw Dylan, also at the War Studies Department at King’s College, for sending me the relevant chapters of his own work on the Joint Intelligence Bureau which proved to be most useful. I owe a debt to Dr Catherine Haddon who kindly sent me a copy of her work on British nuclear intelligence and policy which helped to guide me in the early stages of my research. Dr David Gioe, formerly at Cambridge University and now at the US Military Academy at West Point was extremely helpful in answering some of my queries on Chapter Four and for sending me a copy of his own Cambridge PhD thesis which dealt in part with the Colonel Oleg Penkovsky case. My greatest thanks are reserved for Dr Peter Catterall, my supervisor since 2011 at Queen Mary University of London and the University of Westminster. His comments, patience, advice and encouragement allowed this thesis to evolve and come to fruition after a long haul. I am also grateful to my family for their support over several years. I would also like to thank the staff of The National Archives at Kew, Surrey for meeting my incessant file requests and the librarians at King’s College London for my book applications. All errors and omissions in this paper are of course my own. Kevin Francis O’Daly Westminster, UK 22 April 2016 Declaration I declare that all the material in this thesis is my own work. UNCLASSIFIED Introduction The detonation of the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb, (nicknamed “Joe-1” by western intelligence agencies), in August 1949 came as a colossal shock to the West. America’s monopoly on nuclear weapons technology had been broken and Soviet science and espionage were shown to be terrifyingly advanced and effective. The “Joe-1” test had occurred several years before western intelligence thought the USSR would possess the atomic bomb. This revealed a misjudgement by western intelligence of the state of the USSR’s progress in nuclear physics, as well as of the loyalty of some members of the allied atomic bomb programme. Owing to the USSR’s hostile ideology and proximity to the UK, this dramatic event posed severe security implications for the nation. The secret test of this weapon had only been discovered accidentally due to an American WB-29 aircraft undertaking atmospheric sampling operations between Japan and Alaska on 3 September 1949.1 Analysis of the radioactive elements its equipment picked up revealed that it was artificial nuclear material and had not come from a natural source.2 Further flights, including one from the UK, confirmed that it had not come from an American nuclear test and that it was likely that the USSR had exploded an atomic bomb.3 British intelligence informed the Prime Minister of this fact and the UK’S Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Liaison Officer with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Washington, Mr ‘Kim’ Philby (later found to be a Soviet Intelligence Service (KGB) agent) likely informed Moscow that the allies were aware that the USSR had the atomic bomb.4 Measurements of weather patterns and radioactive material also revealed the likely date and location of the explosion. The announcement of this momentous event was not made in the West until 23 September 1949 to deny Moscow knowledge of the West’s nuclear intelligence capabilities and no date or location of either the explosion or type of nuclear device were mentioned in press announcements.5 Moscow remained silent on the issue. 1 Goodman, Michael Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo‐American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford, 2007) p.46. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.,p.47. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.,p.49. UNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED It was now, however, clear that the Russians possessed a weapon of terrifying potential. In 1949 memories of the Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign on British cities, as well as Germany’s innovative use of V-1 and V-2 rockets, were still fresh. This wartime experience showed how vulnerable the UK was to aerial attack. The potential marrying of nuclear weapons to delivery systems now posed, for the first time, an existential threat to the UK in any future conflict. The Royal Navy (RN), traditionally the primary protector of this island nation, would be incapable of defending the realm against this type of attack and the Royal Air Force (RAF) would be unable to neutralise the USSR’s considerable air assets.6 It is ironic that the UK approved the world’s first nuclear weapon programme during the Second World War, before joining America’s vast effort in this field. It then subsequently found itself, before it possessed its own atomic bomb, facing potential atomic destruction from Moscow as its former wartime ally became a Cold War adversary.7 The first Soviet nuclear test made clear the importance of airborne intelligence collection and scientific analysis in producing assessments of foreign nuclear weapon programmes. It also demonstrated the importance of allied intelligence co-operation on a global scale and revealed the paucity of western intelligence on the USSR’s nuclear weapons programme. This dramatic event further highlighted the potential dangers posed by intelligence failures against a secretive and militarised state.