Spy Wars : Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games / Tennent H
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Spy Wars Spy Wars moles, mysteries, and deadly games Tennent H. Bagley Yale University Press New Haven & London A Caravan book. For more information, visit www.caravanbooks.org Published with assistance from the foundation established in memory of Philip Hamilton McMillan of the Class of 1894, Yale College. Copyright ∫ 2007 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Set in Aster Roman by Keystone Typesetting, Inc. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bagley, T. H. (Tennent H.), 1925– Spy wars : moles, mysteries, and deadly games / Tennent H. Bagley. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-300-12198-8 (hardcover: alk. paper) 1. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 2. Soviet Union. Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. 3. Intelligence service—Soviet Union—History. 4. Espionage, American— Soviet Union. 5. Bagley, T. H. (Tennent H.), 1925– 6. Intelligence officers—United States— Biography. 7. Intelligence officers—Soviet Union—Biography. I. Title. JK468.I6B345 2007 327.1247073—dc22 2006036953 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10987654321 Contents Preface vii Acknowledgments xi Part One A Defector Like No Other 1. Walk-in 3 2. Getting Under Way 10 3. A Visit to Headquarters 19 4. En Route 28 5. New Job, Under Clouds 51 6. Bombshell 63 7. Popov’s Ghost 68 8. Defection 80 9. Impasse 92 Part Two Deadly Games 10. ‘‘Guiding Principle’’ 105 11. Deceiving in Wartime 112 12. Postwar Games 118 13. Symbiosis: Moles and Games 133 Part Three Hidden Moles 14. Dead Drop 147 15. Code Clerks 156 16. Connections 163 Part Four Confrontation 17. Crunch Time 177 18. Face-off 183 Part Five Too Hot to Handle 19. Head in the Sand 197 20. Lingering Debate 209 Part Six Late Light 21. Hiding a Mole, KGB-Style 223 22. The Other Side of the Moon 231 23. Boomerang 238 Appendix A A KGB Veteran’s View of Nosenko 247 Appendix B A Myth and Its Making 256 Appendix C Self-deception—Bane of Counterintelligence 265 Appendix D Glossary 278 Notes 291 Index 307 Preface Like millions of others I was riveted to my TV screen in late 1989 watching young Germans exuberantly hacking away with hammers and picks at the Berlin ‘‘wall of death.’’ They were breaking down the most visible symbol of the Cold War—and opening up an opportunity I had never foreseen. Long years had passed since my retirement from CIA, but old ques- tions still nagged. The nation—and History—had been ill-served in certain encounters between CIA and KGB. In the meantime the truth had been buried under layers of lies so often repeated that they had become conven- tional wisdom. Now those gaps opening in the Wall foreshadowed an early end to the Cold War—and suggested a way to dig the truth back out. After the Second World War veterans had met with wartime foes to compare tactics and see their battles through the enemy’s eyes. If the Cold War was really ending, might KGB veterans loosen up the same way? Their side of old events could break out some of the buried truth. Two years later the Soviet Union collapsed and the opportunity loomed large. I grabbed it, knowing that if I didn’t go after the answers to certain old questions, no one would. The American intelligence community had so unequivocally supported falsehood—and lost so much by doing so—that if any CIA people still remembered, they would probably prefer to let this sleeping dog lie. It wasn’t mere curiosity. I was sure that that old blanket of lies was covering traitors in our midst. More than one American intelligence officer viii PREFACE before Aldrich Ames had betrayed CIA’s secret helpers inside the Soviet bloc—and got away with it. More than one American code clerk before the infamous treason of Navy communicator John Walker had compromised America’s secret ciphers—and got away with it. Today practically no one in the West is aware that they even existed. At that late date I suppose I might have relaxed and taken comfort from the thought that our side won the Cold War despite their treason. The passage of time had probably eroded whatever damage they had done. Or had it? Maybe, instead, as had happened throughout history, old spies had led the enemy to others in a continuum of treason that might still be active today. Either way, any history of the Cold War that ignored the role these traitors played would remain distorted and incomplete. So I set out on my own, with no reference to my former employers, toward former Soviet bloc intelligence and counterintelligence officers who might be willing to throw light on those old mysteries. Step by step, year after year through the 1990s, I worked my way slowly from an in- troduction here to a visit there, sent letters, traveled to one place and another—including Russia—and sat with Eastern veterans at European roundtables discussing our Cold War. Luck rode with me. I managed to get in through the door that opened when the Soviet Union collapsed and, before it began to close again early in the new century, to talk with almost twenty Soviet bloc intelligence veterans, a few during their visits to the West but most of them in the former Soviet bloc. I visited some of their apartments, was invited to offi- cial premises (even to see the luxurious bathroom in the Moscow residence of the infamous wartime and postwar Smersh leader Victor Abakumov), and had a look at Dzerzhinsky’s statue after it had been lifted away from in front of the Lubyanka, the KGB headquarters. These Chekist veterans, knowing that I had supervised CIA’s work against them, reacted in different ways. One senior KGB general bared his teeth. When my European journalist companion mentioned some recent East-West roundtable discussions of Cold War espionage, this old Chekist snapped his disapproval of any such openness. He turned to me. ‘‘Remem- ber,’’ he said darkly, ‘‘we are still working against you.’’ He was telling it straight. Though the KGB’s name has changed (not for the first time) its main elements remain intact in the same buildings, with the same mindset and many of the same objectives. As another high official affirmed—years after the collapse of the Soviet Union—‘‘the KGB is PREFACE ix not dead.’’ It still hides its assets and significant parts of its history. Until its files are opened no one can tell the full story of our old skirmishes in the dark—and it will not open these files. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused hardly a hiccup in the KGB’s handling of penetration agents inside American intelligence, like Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames. To- day it stiffly denies that it had any other such spies or that it broke Amer- ica’s codes before or after the Walkers’ treason. It hides the advantages it gained and the tricks it played, for it still needs those advantages and uses those tricks. But some Chekist veterans had turned the page and spoke with can- dor. They seemed pleased and intrigued by the opportunity to talk with a known former adversary familiar with the people and incidents and pro- cedures of their past. They responded spontaneously even to detailed ques- tions (posed in a neutral context), confident that as a professional I would not ask them to betray their undiscovered spies in the West. Their answers cast priceless light on hidden activities of our past. Some, in fact, were trying as I was to bring old mysteries out of the dark. True, most of the memoirs and histories that the KGB and its vet- erans published after the Cold War differed little from what they had been pumping out for decades, rehashing and exalting their known successes, telling little new and exposing no recent secrets. But some Moscow mem- oirs, either published without official imprimatur or cleared inattentively, gave fresh insights into their past operations. Over the course of ten years I thus succeeded in digging out at least the broad outlines of the buried truth. Satisfied with that and aware that I would never get all the answers I sought, I might just have laid it all away on a shelf. But in September 2001 came the shock of 9/11—and some basic questions it raised. The first question was relatively easy: How did we fail to detect it in advance? One obvious answer lies in the near-impossibility of infiltrating spies into tiny groups of closely related and fanatic alien terrorists—a task more difficult even than ours, in my time, of penetrating the near-seamless security barriers of the Soviet regime. A second question, however, looms larger: Why did the American intel- ligence community fail to properly assess the information it did have? This stirred old memories. In the answer to that question lay some of the same defects that had buried truth in my time. I saw the same group-thinking, the same bureaucratic resistance to unpleasant warnings, the same inabil- ity to think outside the box of comfortable assumptions, the same refusal x PREFACE to recognize visible portents, and the same failure to ‘‘connect the dots.’’ Perhaps, after all, my findings about that earlier time might be useful—not to correct these tendencies, for they are incorrigible—at least to haul them out again into the open where, if intelligence is to properly serve the na- tion, they must be recognized and fought like a chronic disease.