AUFKLÄRUNG, JoãoPessoa,v.5, n.2,Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18012/arf.2016.41957 Recebido: 10/06/2018 |Aceito: 27/08/2018 Licença: CreativeCommons 4.0International(CCBY 4.0)

THE LACK OF STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE

[UMA FALHA NA ESTRUTURA DO CONHECIMENTO]

Arthur Viana Lopes * Universidade Federal da Paraíba, Brasil

ABSTRACT: For a long time philosophers have RESUMO: Durante muito tempo, os filósofos se struggled to reach a definition of knowledge esforçaram para alcançar uma definição de that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive conhecimento totalmente satisfatória a partir de standard. However, what could be so fuzzy um padrão intuitivo. Contudo, o que poderia ser about the concept of knowledge that it makes tão confuso sobre o conceito de conhecimento our intuitions to not obviously support a single que faz com que nossas intuições não suportem, analysis? One particular approach from a obviamente, uma única análise? Uma naturalistic perspective treats this question abordagem particular de uma perspectiva from the point of view of the psychology of naturalista trata essa questão do ponto de vista concepts. According to it, this failure is da psicologia dos conceitos. De acordo com explained by the structure of our folk concept ela, essa falha é explicada pela estrutura de of knowledge, which organizes its constitutive nosso conceito popular de conhecimento, que information in a much looser way than we organiza suas informações constitutivas de um assume when we rely on intuitive knowledge modo muito mais vago do que supomos quando ascriptions. I will adopt the same starting point contamos com as atribuições de conhecimento here, but argue against the proposed answer intuitivo. Vou adotar o mesmo ponto de partida and defend the view that this difficulty is aqui, mas argumentar contra a resposta explained not by something related to the proposta e defender a visão de que essa specific structure of our concept of knowledge dificuldade não é explicada por algo but, on the contrary, by its lack of structure. I relacionado à estrutura específica de nosso claim that our folk concept of knowledge conceito de conhecimento, mas, pelo contrário, should be understood as a primitive mental por sua falta de estrutura. Afirmo que nosso state concept. conceito popular de conhecimento deve ser KEYWORDS: Analysis of knowledge; entendido como um conceito de estado mental Psychology of concepts; Mindreading primitivo. PALAVRAS­CHAVE: Análise do conhecimento; psicologia dos conceitos; leitura mental

or a long time now philosophers have struggled to reach a definition of Fknowledge that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive standard. Proposed definitions have successively faced intuitive counterexamples as we can find either cases that satisfy the criteria but do not please our intuitive judgment, or cases that do not satisfy it, but do not alarm our intuition either. This is especially salient in the period immediately after Edmund Gettier’s paper (1963; Zagzebski, 1994), however,

* Professor Adjunto da Universidade Federal da Paraíba. Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. m@ilto: [email protected] 22 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 fo gis h pcfcaayi.Gvntedfutve npyhlg htconcepts that psychology in view default favor the in either Given evidence analysis. as construct specific serve are the can cases against cases or imaginary those about of analysis, categorizations one intuitive assessing our and When analyses. proposed test st bev u srpinpten eadn eti ido hnsadt eiethe define to and things of kind certain general, a in regarding analysis, patterns conceptual ascription concept of our point observe starting to common is a Indeed, imaginary. or actual sisacsof instances as pseooit fe ou nour on focus often epistemologists pseooyadtedfutve fcnet npyhlg Lwec Margolis, & the (Lawrence in psychology intuitions in on concepts but rely of –, Epistemologists view abstract 1999). default more the knowledge. much and about thinking something epistemology start indeed we when is at mechanisms theory concept look a a we the as what – understood is about sense be that of not something psychological concept need the ‘the theorization say call philosophical in we of intuitions What end 1999). the linguistic of (Hintikka in knowledge’ competence content our are linguistic the They our to like things. for access such responsible psychological just access of can entity, kind we a the how that are and intuitions about world and natural something entities the psychological in reveal concepts to folk of trying place is intuition knowledge consult psychological a they a for in when choice intuitions obvious and more concepts a natural both Instead, the work. understand within would place to sense. them a is to occupy framework access can naturalist the entities exactly abstract entities how concepts such these which and that to whether intuitions, access example, through clear rational individuals for not of of multiple claim, is kind by which point may a graspable of are One some entity starting turn framework. concept, abstract in a the naturalistic of as kind a and is premise a in intuition are same fit an this as to the counts and hard assume what are on 2002), revea also views different may to Kornblith, have philosophers trying but 1998; Other are naturalistic 1993, Pust, theorization. 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ROBBERY, basic for a are, of in murder subcategories and not KNOWLEDGE, of are INFERENTIAL think instances and can their KNOWLEDGE we PERCEPTUAL Although like categories. knowledge, themselves are members whose aeoy NWEG snta not is KNOWLEDGE category, .D 3. assumpt basic I this structure. of exemplars because precisely an fail or they structure and prototypical fail, a hypotheses either these concept, believe folk our of structure Arthur Viana Lopes E NWEG AEASTRUCTURE A HAVE KNOWLEDGE OES ecnsatb onigotteabstractness the out pointing by start can We with dealing experiments by motivated mostly is theory prototypical The for solution fine a like seems KNOWLEDGE about hypothesis prototypical A ocps u NWEG san is KNOWLEDGE but concepts, superordinate ? abstract aeoylk RM,ie,acategory a i.e., CRIME, like category subordinate degree ocp,ie,acnetabout concept a i.e., concept, fKOLDE sa As KNOWLEDGE. of aeoisaeindeed are categories enmany ween 4 Because . ecsin rences ntuitive ion. not ted ed of y e t hr sn ifrne o ntne ewe nwn httedgetrdtehueby house the entered dog the that knowing Intuitively between being representativeness. instance, as their for them categorizations to difference, of intuitive regard no some our with is of diversity, qualitatively there think such vary to context. not despite natural do and only but knowledge be others, situation would than it specific informat examples exemplars statistical a better of by set to defined limited representation particular a summary or a is justi by case organized explicitly were testimony, every an diversity abstract inference, and these make perception, etc., or to by beliefs, can cartography equivalent acquired we information not about animals, empirical, is same KNOWLEDGE obviously the that is feel respect. claim this here the in not concepts test United for do the good ideal case (in as many armchair chemistry adultery the and or while physics Although Brazil), mistake, of SCIENCE, linguistics. think (in by we driving house of Meanwhile when your examples. examples good seatbelt to robbery so arrived your and not that using murder case, as “weaker” of States) mail not a think a while but to is s out CRIME, lie, common telling the a throwing of is which of is it examples case in Similarly, she a good situation 1981). or also Kay, as a is he & that falsehood what (Coleman a and way that telling deceive, a are knows i to they LIE speaker intention know of The not the case does false. have best is the they leads that that told represe say structure false, being or to quality examples is sense exemplar intuitive best what intuitive or makes as which it instances the prototypical Hence, of category. 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Villiers, etlsaecnetaogieBLE,DSR,ITNIN t.(rmc & (Premack etc. INTENTION, DESIRE, BELIEF, Baron­Cohen 2011; alongside jus Apperly, as 1978; Woodruff, concept listed constantly state is KNOWLEDGE mental literature psychological the motivates in that views, Nothing state. factive folk a a in properties that. consist of other prevents fact understanding assumption plus contain in the that belief not can from by does state possible that composed mental itself be not perfectly KNOWLEDGE is may truth, knowledge It is intuitively concept, like represented. is It properties, properly other information example, here. this plus for belief inconsistency truth, of composed no state as is knowledge such is can that we knowledge. properties idea there although of the non­mental nature However, if the other concept on supported? mental and view a orthodox idea belief be the This it by is from could concept. problem ideas how state with The instance, mental collide literature. 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Mr. min time. five on of left 203) left time 1982: just flight Tversky, departure a and his scheduled in delayed that the caught was told after were is flight 30min limousine, Crane airport Mr. same the flights. at the at their flights, in arrived different town and on from airport jam, traveled the traffic They leave time. to scheduled same were the Tees Mr. and Crane Mr. mentalizing S) hc tn o w ie faln eaeaothow about debate long a of sides two for stand which (ST), fi.Bcuetepicpe prt nrpeettosof representations on operate principles the Because it. of aho hs iw eest ubro particular of number a to refers views these of Each . .. e frpeettosadpicpe.Those principles. and representations of set a i.e., , theory­theory theory (TT) itute his t do t ttle of trbto ly nesnilrl nmnraig ogl,oenest detect, to needs one s Roughly, He others. to mindreading. first­person them theory, attribute in to his order this role in to states under According mental essential own of simulation. one’s an introspectively, in consist involved plays concept be state attribution are can mental which concepts concepts a mental have does do take we what use that that in we concepts say this of So can view do framework? we states. default To thoughts, states. mental the situations. of just mental about counterfactual constituents assuming the in about and, as them about representation them information about talk of and attributions, think storing sort predict make even We some can states. without we wha mental We and about others mindreading. about think them, for can to structures obviously rules we sates represented However, psychological about mental internally or of attribute are necessity states the mental dismisses simulation h rcs res tmyn ogrrsml h agtspoess alr od s do to Failure processes. target’s his the running resemble longer when no in states may interfere an own not it to the must agent’s else leads states is or mental the own co­optation process agent’s of this the The 2006). inhibition of (Goldman, or entire system. consequence cognitive an “quarantine” a i.e., of however, “off­line”, computation of just the Importantly, system necessity of simulation information. the instead make of thereby, mechanism, existing to we body Computationally, Obviously, of inputs have co­optation the action­controllers. we mechanism. the process mindreading, requires our normally decision­making to we from propos own related as include not states disconnected our can pretend tasks these into which in process find states, them not initial do run we his however, we enact that and states attitudes, pretend create we aeu osyta h vs aoiyo efatiuin fcretmna states, i mental he current However, of state. self­attributions mental “partly” of a majority uses classify 263). “vast Goldman to (2006: only” the them. used being introspection that use also are of suspect, representations say that of virtue to kinds representations in other careful of the is possibility of the he exclude properties part state not those does mental instantiates he because also what states classifies mental agent of Instantiation introspection. fM.Te n r rn,w a utrnte nooroncgiiesse for, system cognitive own our into them run like. just sta are can initial states relevant resulting we their the Crane, what of Mr. checking states lastly, and pretend Tees creating Mr. After 2006). of (Goldman, target the of neproa itnei ygenerating by is distance interpersonal rdc h eutn tt fsmoe iuainrqie a oueteother’s the use to to fundament way trying a a airport attribute properly to requires the simulationists order Accordingly, to simulation In input. delay. way of to someone, as of our situations states of piece on specific initial state their limo are relevant this of a resulting we any in that in see the we not is predict are Simulationists are obstacle nor We M obvious flight, simulate is. situations. a One to catch their them? able colleague in compare we really are and limo how not states Tees’s So his Mr. simulation. of and than case Crane’s representative upset a as more mindreading is Tees mgntv processes imaginative li oda’ rpslo idedn rvdsacerve bu how about view clear a provides mindreading on proposal Goldman’s Alvin states, others’ predict to model a as apparatus cognitive own or use we Since nohrwrs h ­oecnit fpoete hc r cesbeto accessible are which properties of consists I­code the words, other In iial,t rdc oen’ eiino psei tt bu eti m certain a about state epistemic or decision someone’s predict to Similarly, gcnrcbias egocentric ycnrltei sta etlcnet prl)employ (partly) concepts mental that is thesis central My lsiymna­tt oesi em ftoectgre.(06 260). (2006: categories. those of terms in tokens mental­state classify the or introspection­associated nrsetv code introspective ncsslk hs n a ecudoecm h initial the overcome could we way One this. like cases in yteagent. the by Icd) sdt ersn ye fmna aeoisadto and categories mental of types represent to used (I­code), etlrpeettos hr saporeaycode, proprietary a is There representations. mental , rtn states pretend htaerlvnl iia othose to similar relevantly are that h ako structure lack of The knowledge of introspection­derived n an and , ays: lrole al itional atter, tes r. o s I t , 31 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 32 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 tt id ie htitopciecasfcto sa“ecpinlk process” “perception­like a is sa classification the to introspective a pertaining as essentially that agent is only the Given consist DESIRE by classi DESIRE recognized introspective kind. of being in instantiations tokens state example, only states for mental consist DESIRE, certain concepts for in true mental is certain this that Assuming possible is it Arthur Viana Lopes 20) .. sietclt nweg states. knowledge to identical as i.e., (2000), ocp hc osssol nteaiiyo eonzn atclrcaso interna of class particular a a is recognizing t KNOWLEDGE of I­code, ability ability call shall an the the we in which of in the states, only existence to only consists pertaining the which consists as Assuming concept states it state. mental is, of mental about instances that of talks certain concept, this and classify and of recognitional thinks recognize meaning one a when The is i states. Thus, concepts. desire about KNOWLEDGE refers. as or talk recognizes it thoughts one still states which new can the to to compose one refers entities ability, to one the DESIRE, recognitional it just or a use is that by content or concept under even only it, descriptive Furthermore, fall constituted about no concept. that is think recognitional possess things concept a the to possess a to of needs if order instances one in recognize which structures Importantly, to informational to 1998). ability according (Fodor, the requirement have concept recognitional to a needs include one conditions possession whose ttsaesml n ido ttsta a eatiue ocraninformation certain to attributed or be individually may k­ inputs, that that claim status their may system of one of cognitive Thus, kind the status. status internal one to this cognitive available the simply recognize Our to are standards. if way determinate states a only some reasoning have to of must status according outcomes system enough the if a good and only are knowledge, forward such collectively, as carried taken are have are actions are them some processes processes information knowledge, from motivate perceptual of of that of processed status pieces reasons outcomes internal many the and Countless the that have knowledge. produced obvious to of quite is seem pieces is it as it treated and that processors internally world, “information information the are the with Humans interaction self­regulate states. certain that of machines statuses internal the recognize processes. simulative and introspection by supported ipyd o edsc usatv otn otikaotkolde u folk Our knowledge. about discriminate think to ability to the content in substantive only we consists such but knowledge assumption, need of a this concept not followed or hypotheses content do previous internal The simply substantive information. of stored of sort body some involves fundamentally ‘understanding’ tutr,hwvr ontma ocnet htw ednwi oass this knowledge assess of to understanding K is 6. ordinary now our states? need mental that of we So, kind No idea certain What knowledge. concept. a the recognizing concept. primitive in as hypothesis: is only no a non­structured consist plausible treats mean is a How t knowledge system not have have proposal. of we do cognitive that understanding far, however, our so ordinary state, structure, saw our mental what we underlies proper is hypotheses what this all It as with system status. contrasting cognitive internal our proper by classified states OLDEA RMTV ETLSAECONCEPT STATE MENTAL PRIMITIVE AS NOWLEDGE ic hr­esnatiuinfnaetlydpnso is­esnattribution, first­person on depends fundamentally attribution third­person Since pligti dat NWEG,asrrsn yohssarises: hypothesis surprising a KNOWLEDGE, to idea this Applying ecniiilyfvrti hssb oigta esol aeawyto way a have should we that noting by thesis this favor initially can We hsi aia hneo esetv o noewoasmdta h term the that assumed who anyone for perspective of change radical a is This eontoa concept recognitional k­states 7 onttk ­ttsi h aevi fWilliamson of vein same the in k­states take not do I . u ow aepstv vdneta hsi the is this that evidence positive have we do But . k eontoa ocp saconcept a is concept recognitional A . sae r ipytecaso mental of class the simply are ­states k­states n htis that one , aekind same primitive fication. me his ”, t, o l , nld pcfccaso roso issrgrigteatiuino knowledge, of attribution the regarding biases or errors of called effects is these own both class what importantly, constituting our More a of specific 1956). children of Inhelder, a which have aspects & in include we (Piaget literature, with egocentric developmental tendencies others as the described in attributing particular often theme and common of is states This number mental viewpoint. a own our concerns overestimating literature This states. u hi w etlsae n“urnie,t nii hmfo neigi the in entering issue. right an from the such having resemble be them of not longer matter should no inhibit a egocentrism and is then to attribution process hand, state other the “quarantine”, mental in If interfere states. in target’s will the states they otherwise ne mental process, S one simulative situation. own state naïve mental more their someone’s a predict put in successfully To others effects. of egocentric states predicts epistemic the and state epistemic rcdrlnrsta eemn u ainlraoig(olc,19) hti,we the is, through That normativity 1995). understand (Pollock, to reasoning sense rational this of our more content re determine makes the crucial that it compose a norms not have believe procedural do still I those judgments k­states. but normativity with Nevertheless, knowledge, concept. achieve do state to should mental people order what in about betwe think judgments relation conscious or make the that surely obviously is can that We what KNOWLEDGE. or are is: attitude, question that intuitions relevant assumed one have KNOWLEDGE? epistemic So, and not etc. normativity should appropriate, some one is that Accordingly, attitude evaluate proposition. they normative, a regarding xeietlltrtr regarding literature experimental case? r“ or nweg,oemycam a od ihraoigaotthe about reasoning with do to about has Reasoning literature. claim, the in may concept the normative one a and it as knowledge, egocentrism for described case epistemic often stronger is k­states, more knowledge much of knowledge a working of make the can normativity we approaching but epistemic speculatively here, proposed of by evidence the cases theoretical of is by reported favor explained it a widely is TT, 2003), of the by Bloom, terms & of the (Birch explained adults in instance mistakes. and these explanation easily children explain every an in could is develops egocentrism, that theory of one implausible pieces bias if what simply even hand, i This generally, other k­states agent’s the More situation. the On errors? that process. is This previous simulative cases the true. these for in in be our available problem to knowledge The the told assessing hypothesis. suppress more simulationist were to much have when they were we outcomes difficulty group us of the the informed of likelihood to representative the likelihood the is in outcome result higher assess participants actual attribute to the that to of asked found presente informed inclined Fischhoff and was were story. participants outcomes an the Participants of possible In group of them. some four one opposite. of outcome, of with individual likelihood the story descriptions each the indicates short written judge a evidence on to believe with when people based us asked even events making (1975) occur, case, historical Fischhoff the would Baruch was study, they actually influent than knew predictable we more that been having as events nwi­l­ln effect knew­it­all­along aoseapeo psei gcnrs swa scle the called is what is egocentrism epistemic of example famous A own our overestimate both to have we tendency the is egocentrism Epistemic h nwrhr sta oepii omtv ugeti osiuieof constitutive is judgment normative explicit no that is here answer The h togreiec ecnfn o h iuainhptei si the in is hypothesis simulation the for find can we evidence stronger The h ieaueo psei gcnrs rvdstebs miia vdnein evidence empirical best the provides egocentrism epistemic on literature The lhuhti a enoeloe ofr h ocp of concept the far, so overlooked been has this Although . psei egocentrism epistemic .Ti isi hrceie stetnec osepast see to tendency the as characterized is bias This ”. gcnrceffects egocentric hc r o etitdt children. to restricted not are which , norraoigaotmental about reasoning our in h ako structure lack of The knowledge of correct idih bias hindsight hoy nthe on theory, naturally T nterfere attitude d to eds lation en re d 33 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 34 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 uget a osiuepr ftesmltv rcs,epcal ftematte assess the to if words, other especially In process, reasoning. simulative regarding conscious the one state, more those when of matter, that triggers part subject therefore, situation constitute plausible, particular is a can matte It regarding to matter. judgments state what subject the proceed, mental about certain to another’s etc., how simulates a conclude, about to judgments judging normative what as When personal think, us system simulation. give cognitive norms through our procedural states by epistemic treated others’ are that steps states determine normative the also the i.e., they by k­states, determine judgments; knowledge. k­states of norms normative causal as production conscious procedural considered processes, including the be well, reasoning, not intuitive as like in or Just processes other involved be in system. may and steps reasoning outcomes certain insights our resulting prohibit whose reasoning, or etc., authorize logical reasoning, that reasoning, principles or factual rules tacit have Arthur Viana Lopes osbe hrfr,ta naetfist eetthat detect to of fails simulation agent inaccurate an an that in therefore, resulting possible, simulating conclude, when to states authorized mental own her or p his inhibit to fails judgments. normative include may mechanisms these and nii hi w etlsae hnrnighscgiiemcaim asste to them causes mechanisms cognitive his running when that states judge mental own their inhibit ae nwihteaeti napiiee vdnilpsto ihrsetto respect with position evidential privileged a in is agent the which in cases osiu ncaatr yial novn h osdrto fatraie.This alternatives. of consideration the sequential involving effortful, different more typically the ef are follows have and character, division the which heuristic We to strategies, are in respect “high” which processes. with conscious strategies, and vary “low” mindreading character, can separates in our they division effortless common and affect One 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deliver conditions certain the a and according more a make processes, can a subject heuristic underling social a a through e.g., through mindreading, problem, processes same assessment the including proce probability of for distinct outcomes 2009), two different Importantly, types produce Evans, etc. can assessment, distinct & probability categorization, (Frankish judging, two processes least psychological at are hsafcsoesnraiejdmnsaothwt rce raotwa n is one what about or proceed to how about judgments normative one’s affects this , codnl,w a pclt htw s omtv uget ocategorize to judgments normative use we that speculate can we Accordingly, hsoestepsiiiyo atclrcsso gcnrs.Frisac,i one if instance, For egocentrism. of cases particular of possibility the opens This ae eeoshragmn ypitn oteeitneo ifrn strategies different of existence the to pointing by argument her develops Nagel Jennifer literature. philosophical the in present already is indeed, idea, This ae oe httecniin nwihw ug setclpesr cases” pressure “skeptical judge we which in conditions the that notes Nagel S sntatoie ob naksae hswudhpe,freape in example, for happen, would This k­state. a in be to authorized not is p, h gn ed ornhsoncgiiemcaim regarding mechanisms cognitive own his run to needs agent the ulpoestheory process dual ro effect error eea scooia hoyta asthere says that theory psychological general a , Ngl 00 02.Atog h remains she Although 2012). 2010, (Nagel, S si ­tt eas aln to failing because k­state a in is S smna tt regarding state mental ’s S smna tt.I is It state. mental ’s S sepistemic ’s normative about terns p or r sses and fort in p r, , httesadr a pseooit s o nutv aeoiain struhthe through is categorizations the intuitive Furthermore, for strategy. ask reasoning epistemologists their of a way or description adopt standard “disapprove” state adopt we intuitively the mental we somehow a – say, resulting that and to of moment agent, their is the that possibility of That of in adopt. but the either those would broken from say shoes, subject rules actually – the their procedural being what distinct to in than relies attention strategy ourselves usually reasoning to put he simulati different brought which to of error on “trying” instance of clock by an possibilities subject as certain a having explained evaluate naturally We is mindreading. error­effect to different “inst The benchmark have intuitive KNOWLEDGE. a of we source that as a to investigation, is fact reasoning our necessary situation for the same that be important one Therefore, very would use with is others. deal what we of to think strategies and situation reasoning to epistemic situations us represent the situat alternative induce subject’s really evaluate the those error evaluate not of in to st “benchmark” do elaborated possibilities know a more words, as we a strategy other with that higher us, In this we like proposes use so thinking we as then situation, that cases but alternative She pressure this skeptical reasoning. of in subjects consequences sequential epistemic a the assume about think to induced okcnetta rgessc aeoiain osssi rmtv ocp fa of concept primitive The a structure. in no consists is categorizations There generates knowledge. such structure as triggers counts whose representation, that what no representation concept determines is There that specific folk analysis. vague, of a purposes if the from even for epi enough intuitive come consistent Our not and mistaken. several not intuitions incorret, is presented being assumption do approach I structural structural any structure. ascriptions particular actually definitional this that a of argued notion to then the comparison folk support in that the the boundary reasons gives KNOWLEDGE, which looser of such instances, much that knowledge structure a assumes of the answer differences This statistical in attributions. from reflects is knowledge answer structure problem intuitive primary our the the underlying against that argued concept I others troubling. and intuitively not Kornblith is that knowledge of rmornraiepito iw vnwre eas ti laspsil to possible to F possible always always e is the is it then strategy, it situation reasoning definitions. naïve rigorous proposed because more more to counterexamples about a worse, a intuitive trigger in told create Even that is naïve are facts agent view. create states we the more and mental of where where their a cases point cases judge create in egocentrically in artificially normative we many is example agent, our As the for agent by analyses. from evaluators, epistemic unknown proposed as error and the of to are, possibilities different where we counterexamples of situations than intuitive perspective existence condition describe egocentric of The an cases source of states. imaginary tendency constant internal strong a affec the own that are and our factors strategies of of reasoning kinds independent statuses the simulative to system, epistemic cognitive subjects of own are inner our categorizations component through those way, is imaginary states simulative epistemic the others’ categorize through intuitively is ascriptions these to mindreading. come we NLTHOUGHTS INAL hspyhlgclaayi si efc uewt u iuains con of account simulationist our with tune perfect in is analysis psychological This eivsiae h auaitcprpcieo h ti adt idadefinition a find to hard is it why on perspective naturalistic the investigated We enwhv nase o u eta rbe.Bcuetesadr a we way standard the Because problem. central our for answer an have now We imaginary iutosi nte esnfrbleigta h tnadway standard the that believing for reason another is situations h ako structure lack of The knowledge of valuator concept ability” rategy, stemic the t ion. na in fact ve 35 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 36 AUFKLÄRUNG, João Pessoa, v.5, n.2, Mai.­Ago., 2018, p.21­38 RNIH . 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Zagzebski, osrit o oehn oniga nitiin iei aigteapaac of enti appearance those grasp the to way conce having rational that a it implies are therefore, intuitions like view, and His entities intuition, abstract ways. of certain an species in a as robust being counting and necessity something for constraints nls­paesadKra­paesrgrigtetakn feieta source, evidential PERCEPTUAL of categories. cultures tracking level perception the young these of basic regarding own 2007). performance in (Papafragou, the otherwise Korean­speakers or in are suggesting differences that and significant testimony KNOWLEDGE find English­speakers suggest to inference, failed INFERENTIAL experiments could e.g., However, and proposition, This KNOWLEDGE asserted 2004). the (Aikhenvald, of source ilntdsusi.Frrcn eeatwr,seNgl a un&Mr(03,Turri (2013), Mar & Juan San Nagel, we and see epistemic here work, Forthcoming). important scope relevant (2015; our Yuan of recent & from Kim For robustness escapes and it. issue (2013) from the of this discuss charge showing But concept not initial cultures. has works will the and there the of however, people Since methodology), across and consonance analysis. empirical have intuitions robust growing of we case advance a then a the instance, the find (and been for colleagues cannot culture, is his we to and why this culture Stich from on If changes explanation and but an 2001). robust, Stich philos not Stephen (empirical) Weinberg, is experimental by and knowledge of claimed wave thesis Nichols, recent a the (Weinberg, presuppose, stimulated we which as and colleagues shared interpersonally not are ocp fkoldei culysmlradaqie is hntecneto eif For belief. of concept the than (2013). first Nagel acquired Jennifer and see review, simpler a actually is 1973). knowledge (Rosch, of tasks concept related other of number a predict should judgments those however, triggers upre ocuta ­tts eaenttyn osgetta.Ide,i splausible is it Indeed, that. suggest strongly knowledge to very considered trying be internally must not simply information are are information of We stored piece k­states. many a that as if count as sound to may supported enough” “good and status” hrfr,d o ipt h vdnei eeomna scooysgetn that suggesting epistemic psychology regarding generalizations developmental use in that developments 2005). evidence (Saxe, of states stages the through dispute go children not do therefore, forrpeetdifraini utcniee nweg ydfut hsfc,b its by not fact, is this status default, a by such knowledge that considered mean just not does is turn, information represented our of stecs,freape o otaqie nomto.Ms ucmso perceptual are testimony, of by k­states outcomes receive Also, we knowledge. Most that as information. information perceived the acquired internally of are most most etc., conclusions, for our example, of most for processes, case, the is dhoc ad uget ftpclt.T on seiec fpooyia structure, prototypical of evidence as count To typicality. of judgments nweg n t Limits its and Knowledge hlspia Investigations Philosophical folk e ok xodUiest Press. University Oxford York: New . defeasible concepts. lcwl Publishing. Blackwell . hsi lttd,atal.8I, 8 actually. platitude, a is This . defeasible lhuhmuch Although . ydefault by e“special ke ties. t the ate t are pts That . ophy tions onal ons