The Divine Within: Selected Writings on Enlightenment Free Download
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Gold Medal IPO 2012 Tadas Krisciunas, Lithuania
Tadas Krisciunas (Litauen) - Goldmedaille bei der IPO 2012 in Oslo Topic Nr. 4: “And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance – and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgment about the appearance.” Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I. 10 (2nd century AD). Among the schools of Hellenistic philosophy, one of much interest for anyone with an interest in epistemology flourished. Skeptics, as they were called, combining the negative1 arguments of the rival- ing schools of Stoics and Epicureans, tried to disprove2 the possibility of knowledge. One of the key works in the tradition of Hellenistic skepticism is Sextus Empiricus’ “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” As the title shows, in the work, Sextus Empiricus tries to outline the skeptical tradition started by Pyrrho. In this essay, I am going to discuss a certain distinction made by Sextus Empiricus. The distinc- tion is between what the philosopher calls appearances and underlying objects (D)3. I will try to compre- hend the motivation for such a distinction and the logical consequences of it. However, I will try to give some arguments against this distinction, showing how the problems the distinction addresses can be dealt with in other ways. -
Victorian Popular Science and Deep Time in “The Golden Key”
“Down the Winding Stair”: Victorian Popular Science and Deep Time in “The Golden Key” Geoffrey Reiter t is sometimes tempting to call George MacDonald’s fantasies “timeless”I and leave it at that. Such is certainly the case with MacDonald’s mystical fairy tale “The Golden Key.” Much of the criticism pertaining to this work has focused on its more “timeless” elements, such as its intrinsic literary quality or its philosophical and theological underpinnings. And these elements are not only important, they truly are the most fundamental elements needed for a full understanding of “The Golden Key.” But it is also important to remember that MacDonald did not write in a vacuum, that he was in fact interested in and engaged with many of the pressing issues of his day. At heart always a preacher, MacDonald could not help but interact with these issues, not only in his more openly didactic realistic novels, but even in his “timeless” fantasies. In the Victorian period, an era of discovery and exploration, the natural sciences were beginning to come into their own as distinct and valuable sources of knowledge. John Pridmore, examining MacDonald’s view of nature, suggests that MacDonald saw it as serving a function parallel to the fairy tale or fantastic story; it may be interpreted from the perspective of Christian theism, though such an interpretation is not necessary (7). Björn Sundmark similarly argues that in his works “MacDonald does not contradict science, nor does he press a theistic interpretation onto his readers” (13). David L. Neuhouser has concluded more assertively that while MacDonald was certainly no advocate of scientific pursuits for their own sake, he believed science could be of interest when examined under the aegis of a loving God (10). -
Constraints on an External Reality Under the Simulation Hypothesis
Constraints on an external reality under the simulation hypothesis Max Hodak (Originally: 9 May 2020, Last Revised: 14 November 2020) Abstract Whether or not we are living in a simulation has become the subject of much lighthearted conjecture. Despite it being often considered an unfalsifiable question, here I present an argument that places strong contraints on the nature of any universe that contains ours as a \simulation," and I argue that these constraints are so strict that the most likely conclusion is that we are not living in a simulation. The crux of the idea is that almost any external world-simulation interface allows for Lorentz violations, and that these cannot be remedied in a simulation that implements quantum mechanics as we observe it. These arguments do not preclude all possibility that we are living in a simulation, but they impose significant constraints on what such a thing could mean or how the physics of the \external" universe must work. 1 Assumptions all practical purposes.1{3 The analysis that follows requires making three key Assumption A. A simulation should be somehow assumptions. accessible to its creators. Assumption C. The state of a valid universe Similarly, this is difficult to formalize fully gen- must be internally consistent at all times. erally, but for a quantum mechanical universe like ours with Hermitian observables, we can say some- Consistency is an essential property of any thing like the space of positive operator-valued mea- mathematically-describable physics; when we dis- sures available to the creators of the simulation is cover contradiction implied by our mathematics, we not empty; that is, they have some way to measure know that something must be wrong. -
A Critical Engagement of Bostrom's Computer Simulation Hypothesis
A Critical Engagement of Bostrom’s Computer Simulation Hypothesis Norman K. Swazo, Ph.D., M.H.S.A. Professor of Philosophy and Director of Undergraduate Studies North South University Plot 15, Block B, Bashundhara R/A Dhaka 1229, Bangladesh Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a computer simulation. Although his argument is structured to include a “hypothesis,” it is unclear that his proposition can be accounted as a properly scientific hypothesis. Here Bostrom’s argument is engaged critically by accounting for philosophical and scientific positions that have implications for Bostrom’s principal thesis. These include discussions from Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Dreyfus that relate to modelling of structures of thinking and computation. In consequence of this accounting, given that there seems to be no reasonably admissible evidence to count for the task of falsification, one concludes that the computer simulation argument’s hypothesis is only speculative and not scientific. Keywords: Bostrom; simulation hypothesis; Heidegger; Dreyfus; Feynman; falsifiability 1. Introduction In a paper published in 2003, Nick Bostrom argued that at least one of several propositions is likely to be true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage, i.e., (fp≈0); (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof), i.e., (fI≈0); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation, i.e., (fsim≈1). (Bostrom 2003) Proposition (3) is characterized as the simulation hypothesis, thus only a part of Bostrom’s simulation argument. -
PAPER VI UNIT I Non-Fictional Prose—General
PAPER VI UNIT I Non-fictional Prose—General Introduction, Joseph Addison’s The Spectator Papers: The Uses of the Spectator, The Spectator’s Account of Himself, Of the Spectator 1.1. Introduction: Eighteenth Century English Prose The eighteenth century was a great period for English prose, though not for English poetry. Matthew Arnold called it an "age of prose and reason," implying thereby that no good poetry was written in this century, and that, prose dominated the literary realm. Much of the poetry of the age is prosaic, if not altogether prose-rhymed prose. Verse was used by many poets of the age for purposes which could be realized, or realized better, through prose. Our view is that the eighteenth century was not altogether barren of real poetry. Even then, it is better known for the galaxy of brilliant prose writers that it threw up. In this century there was a remarkable proliferation of practical interests which could best be expressed in a new kind of prose-pliant and of a work a day kind capable of rising to every occasion. This prose was simple and modern, having nothing of the baroque or Ciceronian colour of the prose of the seventeenth-century writers like Milton and Sir Thomas Browne. Practicality and reason ruled supreme in prose and determined its style. It is really strange that in this period the language of prose was becoming simpler and more easily comprehensible, but, on the other hand, the language of poetry was being conventionalized into that artificial "poetic diction" which at the end of the century was so severely condemned by Wordsworth as "gaudy and inane phraseology." 1.2. -
Schwitzgebel May 12, 2014 1% Skepticism, P. 1 1% Skepticism Eric
1% Skepticism Eric Schwitzgebel Department of Philosophy University of California at Riverside Riverside, CA 92521-0201 eschwitz at domain: ucr.edu May 12, 2014 Schwitzgebel May 12, 2014 1% Skepticism, p. 1 1% Skepticism Abstract: A 1% skeptic is someone who has about a 99% credence in non-skeptical realism and about a 1% credence in the disjunction of all radically skeptical scenarios combined. The first half of this essay defends the epistemic rationality of 1% skepticism, appealing to dream skepticism, simulation skepticism, cosmological skepticism, and wildcard skepticism. The second half of the essay explores the practical behavioral consequences of 1% skepticism, arguing that 1% skepticism need not be behaviorally inert. Schwitzgebel May 12, 2014 1% Skepticism, p. 2 1% Skepticism Certainly there is no practical problem regarding skepticism about the external world. For example, no one is paralyzed from action by reading about skeptical considerations or evaluating skeptical arguments. Even if one cannot figure out where a particular skeptical argument goes wrong, life goes on just the same. Similarly, there is no “existential” problem here. Reading skeptical arguments does not throw one into a state of existential dread. One is not typically disturbed or disconcerted for any length of time. One does not feel any less at home in the world, or go about worrying that one’s life might be no more than a dream (Greco 2008, p. 109). [W]hen they suspended judgement, tranquility followed as it were fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body…. [T]he aim of Sceptics is tranquility in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us (Sextus Empiricus, c. -
The Modal Future
The Modal Future A theory of future-directed thought and talk Cambridge University Press Fabrizio Cariani Contents Preface page vii Conventions and abbreviations xi Introduction xii PART ONE BACKGROUND 1 1 The symmetric paradigm 3 1.1 The symmetric paradigm 3 1.2 Symmetric semantics 4 1.3 The symmetric paradigm contextualized 10 1.4 Temporal ontology and symmetric semantics 14 Appendix to chapter 1: the logic Kt 17 2 Symmetric semantics in an asymmetric world 19 2.1 Branching metaphysics 20 2.2 Branching models 21 2.3 Symmetric semantics on branching models 27 2.4 Ways of being an Ockhamist 32 2.5 Interpreting branching models 32 PART TWO THE ROAD TO SELECTION SEMANTICS 39 3 The modal challenge 41 3.1 What is a modal? 42 3.2 The argument from common morphology 44 3.3 The argument from present-directed uses 45 3.4 The argument from modal subordination 48 3.5 The argument from acquaintance inferences 52 iii iv Contents 3.6 Morals and distinctions 54 4 Modality without quantification 56 4.1 Quantificational theories 57 4.2 Universal analyses and retrospective evaluations 59 4.3 Prior’s bet objection 60 4.4 The zero credence problem 61 4.5 Scope with negation 64 4.6 Homogeneity 66 4.7 Neg-raising to the rescue? 69 5 Basic selection semantics 73 5.1 Selection semantics: a first look 74 5.2 Basic versions of selection semantics 78 5.3 Notions of validity: a primer 81 5.4 Logical features of selection semantics 82 5.5 Solving the zero credence problem 83 5.6 Modal subordination 85 5.7 Present-directed uses of will 86 5.8 Revisiting the acquaintance -
Evolution Education Around the Globe Evolution Education Around the Globe
Hasan Deniz · Lisa A. Borgerding Editors Evolution Education Around the Globe Evolution Education Around the Globe [email protected] Hasan Deniz • Lisa A. Borgerding Editors Evolution Education Around the Globe 123 [email protected] Editors Hasan Deniz Lisa A. Borgerding College of Education College of Education, Health, University of Nevada Las Vegas and Human Services Las Vegas, NV Kent State University USA Kent, OH USA ISBN 978-3-319-90938-7 ISBN 978-3-319-90939-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90939-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018940410 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. -
Omphalos, Miracles, and Occam's Razor
OMPHALOS, MIRACLES, AND OCCAM’S RAZOR Bruce S. Bennett Abstract ___________________________________________________________________________ Philip Gosse’s Omphalos (1857), which attempted to reconcile Genesis with science by proposing that the pre-Adamite stage of the world existed only as a Platonic idea, has usually been criticized as violating Occam’s razor and being unfalsifiable. It is argued here that this is faulty, because Gosse makes different assumptions about the data to be explained. The theory was rejected by Christians not because of logical problems but because of its theological meaninglessness. In this it differs from miracles, which also involve the introduction of extra data. Key words: Omphalos, miracles, Occam’s razor, parsimony, Philip Gosse, Incredulous Stare, creationism, science, religion. ___________________________________________________________________________ In 1857, the respected naturalist Philip Gosse, a Fellow of the Royal Society, published Omphalos,123 which attempted to reconcile scientific evidence of geological time with a literal reading of Genesis. The book was published before Darwin’s Origin of Species and, although well-informed scholars such as Gosse were aware of new ideas, the conflict was being expressed more in terms of geology. The account in Genesis seemed to be inconsistent with the evidence, which implied huge periods of time. Many were seeking some reconciliation of the two,124 though it would not be long before the quest was abandoned by scientists. It is important to note that Gosse was not a theologian but a scientist, not only “the finest descriptive naturalist” of his time125 but “the David Attenborough of his day”,126 noted for his popular works and public lectures. He was a pioneer of the aquarium and indeed seems to have invented 123 Philip Henry Gosse, Omphalos: An Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot: With Fifty-six Illustrations on Wood (London: John Van Voorst, Paternoster Row, 1857). -
How Do Christians View the Creation of the World? (Leader''s Guide and Participant's Guide)
Digital Collections @ Dordt Study Guides for Faith & Science Integration Summer 2017 How Do Christians View the Creation of the World? (Leader''s Guide and Participant's Guide) Channon Visscher Dordt College, [email protected] Ashley Huizinga Dordt College Lydia Marcus Dordt College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faith_science Part of the Adult and Continuing Education Commons, Life Sciences Commons, and the Practical Theology Commons Recommended Citation Visscher, C., Huizinga, A., & Marcus, L. (2017). How Do Christians View the Creation of the World? (Leader''s Guide and Participant's Guide). Retrieved from https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/ faith_science/34 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Study Guides for Faith & Science Integration by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Leader’s Guide to How Do Christians View the Creation of the World? A Study of Christian Perspectives on Creation Dr. Channon Visscher, Ashley Huizinga, Lydia Marcus Dordt College, Sioux Center, Iowa Summer 2017 1 How to Use This Material? This study of the perspectives that Christians hold on the creation of the world is composed of eight modules. The 1st through 3rd modules address the basic three Christian perspectives on creation, using articles and other websites as source material. The 4th-7th modules address these perspectives in more detail, delving into distinguishing concordist and non-concordist interpretations of Scripture using Haarsma and Haarsma’s book Origins: Christian Perspectives on Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design. -
Knowing and Unknowing Reality – a Beginner's and Expert's Developmental Guide to Post-Metaphysical Thinking
Knowing and Unknowing Reality – A Beginner's and Expert's Developmental Guide to Post-Metaphysical Thinking Tom Murray1 Table of Contents Preface 129 Introduction and Some Foundations 131 The Metaphysics to Come 131 A Developmental Perspective 136 The Meaning-making Drive and Unknowing 140 Magical, Mystical, and Metaphysical Thinking 144 Meaning-making in Magical, Mythical, and Rational Thinking 144 Mysticism and Logic 153 Metaphysical Thinking and Action Logics 155 Interlude: Three Historical Arcs 157 (1) The Rise and Decline of Rationality 158 (2) A Brief History of Belief Fallibility 160 (3) An Evolution in Understanding Ideas vs. the Real 162 A Philosopher's Knot – Knowing and Being Entangled 165 Is there a God? – Philosophers as Under-laborers 165 Two Truths: One Problem 167 Truth, Belief, Vulnerability, and Seriousness 171 Contours of the Real 178 What is Really Real? 178 Constructing the Real 182 Reification and Misplaced Concreteness 191 Embodied Cognition and Epistemic Drives 195 From 4th into 5th Person Perspective 195 Embodied Realism and Metaphorical Pluralism 201 Epistemic Drives 211 Phenomenology and Infinity 220 Conclusions and Summary 230 References 238 Appendix – Developmental Basics 244 1 Tom Murray is Chief Visionary and Instigator at Open Way Solutions LLC, which merges technology with integral developmental theory, and is also a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Massachusetts School of Computer Science. He is an Associate Editor at Integral Review, is on the editorial review board of the International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education, and has published articles on developmental theory and integral theory as they relate to wisdom skills, education, contemplative dialog, leadership, ethics, knowledge building communities, epistemology, and post-metaphysics. -
The Inception of Simulation
The inception of simulation: a hypothesis for the role of dreams in young children Serge Thill ([email protected]) Henrik Svensson ([email protected]) Cognition & Interaction Lab, University of Skovde¨ PO BOX 408, 541 28 Skovde,¨ Sweden Abstract e.g. Shanahan 2006; Ziemke et al. 2005) of the functionality In the present paper, we present an argument and an initial of simulations and their neural substrate. model connecting research into the functional role of dreams However, current accounts of simulation do no address the with simulation theories. Traditionally, although theories that question of the phylogenetic origin and how simulations de- describe the refinement of simulations exist, the origin of these simulations is not considered in detail. Similarly, research into velop in the child. Hesslow (2002) emphasized that simula- the functional role of dreams tends to focus on adults, with less tion theory explains cognitive functions in terms of phyloge- regard to the dreams of young children. netically older brain functions, i.e., functions that evolved to Here, we suggest that a functional role of dreams in infants allow mammals to eat, move and reproduce. Thus, it might through to early childhood may be the inception of these simu- be possible to claim that part of the explanation can be off- lations. We show that the proposed model can present a unified explanation for functions of both the phenomenological expe- loaded to the explanation of the evolution and development of rience of dreaming as well as other aspects of brain activity perception and action processes themselves. However, while during sleeping, e.g.