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ORE 50-50

Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese Communist Invasion

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PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION ORE 5().SO

PROSPEcrS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950 ·ORE 50-50 Supplement

Published 7 Septc:mber 1950

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DISTRIBUTION: Omce of the President National Security Council Natiollal Security Resources Board I Department of State Office of Secretary or Defense . Department or the Army· l)epartment or the Navy· Department of the All' ·Force Joint Chiefs ot Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION

(ORE 50-50)

The Problem

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities of a program of foreign aid that would be re­ for an invasion of Indochina, the attitudes of quired to stimulate the will of the Vietnamese the Vietnamese that would affect their will to to resist an invasion. resist such an invasion, and pertinent aspects

SUMMARY

In the event of a Chinese Communist in­ China, moreover, is givlng Ho's army an in­ vasion of Indochina under present cIrcum­ creasing capability for an early large-scale of­ stances, it is almost certain that the defend­ fensive against the French and a developing' ing forces under the French would soon lose potential for conventional warfare, all of Vietnam except .Cochlnchina. So long The operations of the French Army (some as present political and. military conditions 150,500 regulars) reveal a lack of aggressive­ continue unaltered, US material aid alone can­ ness and are in part handicapped by a scar­ not decisively improve this prospect. city of adequate material. The most that Some 100,000 Chinese Communist troops' French ground forces, who receive some sup­ are presently deployed near enougll to the In­ port from weak indigenous forces totalling dochina border to make possible a Chine.<;e at­ 66,700 men, can presently accomplish is the tack without appreciable forewarning. Ap­ destruction of enemy supplies and the conse­ proximately 150,000 additional Chinese Com­ quent temporary postponement of a Viet Minh munist troops could arrive at. the border ,in offensive. The French Air Force in Indochina support of an invasion within ten days. Some is weak and its limited capabilities are severely reinforcements might be moved by sea to rebel­ strained by action against the Viet Minh. The held sections of the Indochina coast. It is also French Na\'y possesses forces adequate for sup­ within Chinese Communist capabilities to fur­ port of the army in limited amphibious opera- nish air support for an invasion. . tions but is incapable of maintaining a com­ The 92,500 Viet Minh regulars and the 130,- plete blockade against the smuggling of arms. 000 irregulars that make up the rebel forces In balancing the capabilities of these oppos­ of Ho Chi Minh possess significant capabilities ing forces, it becomes apparent that, under (or expanding thelr guerrilla operations and present circumstances, a Chinese Communist thereby increasing the present cost in troops invasion, which in all probability would be and eqUipment borne by the opposing French. supported by the Viet Minh, could easily pene­ Aid now being provided from· Communist trate French border defenses in Tonkin and

Note: This estimate concerning Chinese Communi5t capabilities is made in the light of CIA's I>revious estimates that an early Chinese Communist invasion is possible but not prob­ able. The scope ()f the paper is in accord with lhc request of the Office uf Intelligence Research, Department of State. The inteJllgence organizations of the Dcpal'lments oC State, Army, Navy. and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of 5 September 1950.

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compel withdrawal of defending forces to the well ~ met with resignation or opportunistic south. . The strategic Tonkin plain would cooperation. probably be overrun within six weeks and the The overriding preoccupation of Vietnamese retention ofa -French foothold in the Saigon intellectuals and common people alike Is the area would depend upon the provJalon of rein­ issll;e of independence. The effect of foreign forcements from abroad. If Chinese Commu­ aid on Vietnam wUl to resist Chinese Com­ nist assistance to the Viet Minh were increased, munist encroachments must therefore be while foreign aid for the French remained only viewed against this background' of intense na­ at the level presently programmed, and the tionalistic aspirations. If the French should French were unable to develop the support of make satisfactory concessions to the spirit. of the Vietnamese people, -Ho could eventually Vietnamese nationalism, a program of eco­ drive the French out of Indochina without the nomic assistance in Vietnam offering visible direct support of invading Chinese Communist improvement in the lot of the common people, forces. combined with military aid sufficient not only In analyzing the probable Vietnam reaction to maintain French forces but also to develop to a Chin~e Communist invasion, considera­ anefJective national army, could be expected tion must be given to the fact that the Viet­ to stimulate the Vietnamese wlll to resist. namese are In general apathetic toward Com­ The channeling of such aid through the Viet­ munism and antipathetic toward the French. namese themselves, subject to a certain neces­ Forced to choose between present tangible sary degree of French influence, would com­ French control and the contingency of domi­ plicate the problems of supply but would have nation by international Communism, even the advantage of encouraging Vietnamese de­ some of those Vietnamese who have some ap­ sire to defend the country. The announce~ preciation of the nature of Communism prob­ ment of such an aid program would be more ably would risk the change in the interest of effective if it preceded a Chinese Communist early achievement o( national identity. -Al­ invasion. In any event, the effectiveness of though the Vietnamese dislike tlie Chinese, re­ the announcement would be seriously lessened gardless of their ideology, a rapid Chinese if it were not preceded by a declaration of un­ Communist occupation of Vietnam wqUld not equivocal French concessions and followed by arouse active popular resistance or widespread the prompt and substantial delivery of such rallying to the Frerich or Bao Dai. It might aid. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION

Conclusions. troops could arrive at the Indochina border within ten days to bolster initial invading Under present political and mUltary condi­ forces. Even in the event of a simultaneous tions in Indochina. a Chinese Communist In., assault on Taiwan, these reinforcements would vasion in force would quickly overrun Tonkin be avaUable and would bring the potential in­ and severely threaten the maintenance of even vading force to a total of at least 250,000 a French foothold in the south. US material troops. In view of the Chinese Communists' aid alone cannot decisively change thiS situa­ improving capability for waterllft, it is pos­ tion. sible that some invasion forces might be moved In the event of an invasion, effective mm- . by sea to Viet Minh-held sections of the Indo­ tary opposition will depend at least as much china coast. There Is no evidence, however, on substantial modification of the present of Chinese Communist preparations tor such anti-French attitude of the Vietnamese people, amove. as on the French Army or foreign assistance. Although there have been no indications of French guarantees of independence, if imme­ any Significant build-up 01 Ch1neseCommu­ diately followed by the expansion and equip­ nist Air rorce strength in· Southwest China ·ping of an indigenous army, would stimulate and although this alr force has no~ yet ap­ some Vletnamese wlll to resist. Even assum­ peared in combat, the estimated 200 to 250 ing appropriate French concessions to Vietna­ operational combat types (including fighters mese nationalism, however, successful Viet­ and light bombers) In the Chinese Communist namese opposition to the Chinese Communists Air Force could furnish effective air support would depend on the amount of time.available to operations in Indochina. There are six air­ to develop a popularly supported indigenous fields in China within 170 miles of the TonkIn regime and on the speed with which effective border. In addition, construction of new air­ Vietnamese forces could be created. fields and the restoration at others in South­ Chinese Communist Military Capabilities. west China are reportedly in progress in the Tonkin-Kwangsi border area and on Hainan Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Island. Communists would probably be undertaken in cooperation with the forces of Ho ChI Minh. Viet Minh Military Capabilities .. Sizable Chinese Communist military forces The forces of Ho Chi Minh, which have been are in position to intervene in Indochina. De­ engagcd in resistance activities against the spite reports of actual and scheduled north­ French since September 1945, are capable of ward movements of certain Chinese Commu- . expanding their operations. Ho's organiza­ nist field forces, approximately 100,000 troops tion, commonly known as the "Viet Minh," remain deployed along the Indochinese border. possesses approximately 92,500 regUlar troops These units could launch an invasion of Indo­ and an estimated 130,000 irregulars. The china without appreciable forewarning. Al­ Viet M:inh forces include 2,000 Khmer Issarak!; though reliable reports do not indicate the . in Cambodia and 500 Issaraks in Laos. presence of armored units on the Indochina The Viet Minh forces are geared primarily border, a division oC armored cars, plus a bat­ for guerrilla warfare. The demonstrated ef­ talion of tanks attached to the Fourth Field fectiveness of a few task forces, each totaling Army, are stationed in South China within 700 as many as three to five thousand men and miles of the frontier. Moreover, approxi­ equipped with adequate infantry weapons and mately 150,000 additional Chinese Communis\' some artillery, points to a developing capabil-

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ity for more conventional warfare. Under nation of the Viet Minh forces and the de present circumstances. the Viet Minh should fense of the China border. Indications an have little dimculty 1n maintaining relative that current emphasis is on the former. Un, freedom of action throughout mast of Indo­ der these circumstances, the 'most they car. china whlle simultaneously supporting pock­ hope to achieve in the immediate future is tht ets of resistance within French-occupiedterri­ destruction of enemy supply Caches and the tory and continuing to harass French lJnes of consequent postponement of a large-scale communication. In addition, the Viet Minh Viet Minh offensive: is capable of seizing one or more French border The strength of the French Air Force in outposts and holding them for & short time at Indoch1na, which is severely strained by its least. , actions against Viet Minh forces, presently Following the de jure recogn1tlon of the totals 84 fighters and fighter-reconnaissance "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" by Com­ aircraft, 68 transports and 50 liaison planes. munist China and the USSR. a general plan for The level of servlceabUlty of fighter aircraft, closer cOllaboration between the Cbinese Com­ now about 55 percent, will probably continue munists and the Viet Minh probably was to drop as maintenance shortages become more formulated. As many as 10 to 20 thousand acute. Many of the French airinstaUations-­ Viet Minh troops are being trained in Com­ few in number and generally in poor condi­ munist China. There is evidence 'that the tlon-are vulnerable to 'Sabotage and some, Chinese Communists have supplied the Viet even to direct Viet Minh attack. Minh with Significant quantities of materiel, probably confined to small arms. ammunition, French naval forces are adeqUate for sup­ mortars, and light artillery. Access to train­ porting the army in small-scale amphibious ing facUlties in Communist China, theexpan­ operations and for conducting raids against sion of routes and facUlties for supply, and the rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. the possibility of accelerating recruitment Their inabUlty to maintain a complete block­ give the Viet Minh the potential capabilities ade of the coast is demonstrated by the extent for 1n1t1ating a large-scale offensive against of over-water arms smuggling now in progress. the French at an early date. French Naval Forces, Far East, stationed in Indochina, consist of 166 small craft and ships, Capabilities of French-Controlled Forces. and 21 aircraft manned by 8,750 personnel. French ground, naval and air forces in In­ Vessels in the most important categories cur­ dochina are under the operatlon'a} control ot rently stationed in Indochina waters include GHQ, Armed Forces in the Far East (FAEO). one old cruiser, 11 fleet mine,sweepers, two As of 1 July 1950, French regular ground forces LST's, nine submarine chasers of various types totalled approximately 150,500 men. An esti­ and a number of supporting service and re­ mated 66,700 troops in the armies of the Asso­ palr craft. Naval aircraft include nine patrol ciated States, although subject to the nominal bombers and 12 reconnaissance aircraft. political control of these states, are under FAEO operational control. In addition there Comparison of Opposing Forces. are 122,500 quasi-military and miscellaneous indigenous troops under over-all FAEO con­ A Chinese Communist lnvasion could with­ trol. Of these local forces, only the Vietna­ out difficulty penetrate the extended French mese army, at present weak and ineffective, perimeter in Tonkin and rapidly overcome the has the potential for developing into a sig­ defending forces. Although the French Ail' nificant force. French ground forces are capa­ Force would be capable of limited defensive ble of penetrating the Viet Minh-held areas of action in the event of an invasion, therc is a IndOchina but at the expense of garrison grave risk of its being overwhelmed if the strength engaged in pacification duties else­ Chinese Communists committed their air force where, The French have demonstrated a lack in support of the attack. On the ground, only of aggressiveness .. The French-controlled in the coastal border area of the strategic ground forces have a dual problem-the elimi- Tonkin plain, where the French are organized in some .depth. could effective resistance control-most Vietnamese intellectualB would against a Ch1nese assault be expected and be w1ll1ng to grant CommunIsm a trial. even in thiS. area inferior front line strength Among all classes at the Vietnamese popu­ and the lack of reserves would Inevitably com­ lation, the local Chinese, who :compose the pel a withdrawal. It is est1Diated that a Chi­ majority of the small merchan.t group, are nese Communist force of 100 to 150 thousand generally dfsUked. 'The memorY of previous could overrun the whole Tonldn plain within Vietnamese wars of Uberatlon aga1nst Chinese six weeks, but that the French COuld. hold a overlords and the ChInese ~up~tlonof Ton­ temporary beachhead in the vic.ln1ty of Hai­ kin during 1945-46 is painful To the Viet­ phong. A successful second-phase ChInese namese, the Chinese are unpopular, regardless communist drive further to the south would of their Ideology. take longer and require additional troops. In Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh is widely regarded this circumstance, French maintenance of a by· all classes ot the Vietnamese population firm foothold around Saigon would depend as the potentlaillberator of Vietnam from the upon the provision of mllltary reinforcements French yoke. Most Vietnamese Intellectuals, from abroad. even some of those who are 1n~he Bao Da1 Although French forces in Indochina are at Government, regard armed oppoSition to the present stalemated, a French offensive iri Ton­ French as justifiable and,. to tlrlS extent, ap­ kin, with considerable outside aid, probably . prove of the Viet Minh's activities. Although CQuld carry through to the border and mIght in some areas ot Tonkin where the Viet Minh even effectively isolate the Viet Minh from has used scorched-earth tactics, the peasantry overland Chinese Communist aid. However, has reportedly become bitter, such hostUlty (if such an offensive probably would not result measured in terms of popularity of the Bao in the destruction o~ the Viet Minh forces. If Dat Government) has falled to produce signifi­ Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh con­ cant results. tinues to increas~ seems probable-and if The Frenc,h are the targets of historical the French receive no more foreign assistance Vietnamese antipathy, rooted in decades of than is. now programmed and are unable to colonial rule. Postwar French pollcy has done develop the support of the Vietnamese people, little to diminish this antipathy and the desire the Viet Minh could eventually defeat the for independence bas grown progressively French in Indochina without the help of an stronger. The French tQday are .regarded by overt Chinese invasion. almost all Vietnamese as the priple obstacle to the attamment of these intense nationalistic Key Vietnamese Attitudes. aspirations. Key Vietnamese attitudes which would largely determine their conduct in the event Probable Conduct in the Event of Invasion. of a Chinese Communist invasion are their In all probability, a Chinese Communist seiz­ views concerning: international Communism, ure of Tonkin would be rapidly accomplished. the local Chinese, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet As a result, the Tonkinese intelligentsia, most Minh, and thc French. of whom would be basically opposed to the The Vietnamese people, as a whole, know entry of Chinese troops, would have little op­ little about international Communism. The portunity to manifest opposition in an organ­ opposite poles of political attraction in Viet­ ized and effective manner. Those now in Ho's nam are rcprescn ted by the Viet Minh and the camp probably would continue loyal to him; French-Vietnamesereg1me. The fact that the the rest could be expected to make themselves Viet Minh is an instrument of international as inconspicuous as possible while awaiting Communism causes the average Vietnamese developments. little 01' no concern. Although most educated Elsewhere in Vietnam, the attitude of Viet­ Vietnamese arc aware that the espousal of namese intellectuals would be largely affected Communism entails the risk of Soviet control, by the determined nat\,l.re of the French de­ it is probable that-forced to choose between fense and by the prospects for US intervention, actual French control and hypothetical Soviet either locally or as part of generaIUS-Com- mun1st China hostWties. Absence of strong tual Franco-Vietnamese distrust had been defensive action by the French or lack of US achieved, the character of foreign aid requir~d interest In the conflict would probably force to stimulate the will of the Vietnamese people those Vietnamese, who-although fearful of to resist a Chinese Communist invasion could Communism-would see the futWty of solltary be estimated as follows: (1) a program of eco­ resistance, to accept Communist rule. nomic assistance which, in the manner of the In C9ntrast to the intelligentsia, the mass Griffin Mission proposals, would offer visible of the ·Vietnamese people-in the absence of improvement in the lot of the common people; eftective and popular antl-Communlst leader­ and (2) military aid beyond that necessary to ship-probably would accept the burden of maintain French forces in the area and sufil­ ChInese occupation much as they have ac­ cient to permit the development of a sizable cepted it in the past. A pact with Communist and adequately equipped national army. It. China which offered Ho ostensible control of is recognized that the development ot an effec­ a post invasion Vietnamese government, would tive Vietnam army Is a long-range task made probably be welcomed, at least at the outset, difficult by a shortage of trained personnel by the vast majority of Vietnamese. Even and by the fears of the French authorities evidences of Chinese imperialism subsequent that they may not be able to control a strong to the Invasion probably would be rationalized native army. Nevertheless, the announce­ by th~ majority so long as the Ho government ment and the rapid implementation of plans did not actively oppose such actions. to create such a force would at once stimulate the spirit of Vietnamese resistance to aggres­ Foreign Aid and the Vietnamese Will to Resist sion and lessen antipathy toward the French. Invasion. .The utilization of. French managerial knowl­ All problems connected with the strengthen­ edge is essential to efficient administration of ing of the Indigenous will to resist a Chinese foreign aid in Vietnam. However, as earlier Communist Invasion of Indochina by means of discussion has shown, Vietnamese suspicions foreign aid inevitably are related to the issue are such that unless the indigenous Vietna­ of nationalism. As a whole, both Vietnamese mese government is' clearly recognized as the intelligentsla and the mass of the people are authority through which aid is dispensed, the preoccupied with the problem of their inde­ local reaction will be unfavorable. In this pendence. connection, It is probable that if the French· The character of whatever aid is granted in were willing to make full concessions in rna t­ the immediate future will have little effect on tcrs of form, the Vietnamese would be willing the Vietnamese because of the present atmos­ to concede much in matters of substance. Un­ phere of ,mutual Franco-Vietnamese distrust. der these circumstances, French participation So long as French monopolization of the key (possibly with third-party or UN supervision) . elements of administratLve and military power as paid advisors and technicians exercising a continues, thc Vietnamese are likely to view substantial managerial function within the foreign military aid as a device actually in­ framework of the Vietnamese gov.ernmcn.t, tended to strengthen French hegemony and might well prove to be a satisfactory com­ would probably either be apathetic to a Chi­ promise formula. The device of channeling nese Communist invasion or would welcome aid through the Vietnamese, subject to such the invading forces. Economic aid-for a degree of French influence, would do much health, agriculture, transportation, and reo to develop respect for the Bao Dai regime and construction-would engender some gratitude concomitantly to encourage a Vietnamese de-· but, if the allocation of such aid were subject sire to aid in defense of their country. to French control, its effect on the Vietnamese A final factor in stimUlating the will of the will to resist a Chinese Communist invasion Vietnamese to resist invasion is that of timing. would be minimized. which although subsidiary in importance to If, instead, it were assumed that a reso· the French attitude toward granting inde­ lution oC the difficulties arising from mu- pendence, is nevertheless significant. If what- 7

ever aid that may be offered is announced thermore, unless the announcement of aid is subsequent to, rather than prior to, an inva­ timed in the light of practicable deliv~ dates, sion by the Chlnese Co~unists. the effect ev.en a prom1Be of usistance made against the on the Vietnamese will to resist will be minor background of French guarantees of inde­ regardless of other factors which may charac­ pendence wUl be followed by dJsillusionment terize the timing of the announcement. Fur- and disappointment. PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950 (ORE 50-50 Supplement)

. 1. Introdudion and Conclusions. 2. Types of Chinese Communist Adion • Communist China at present possesses the The two major courses ot action open to the capability for· a successful invasion of Indo­ Chinese Communists in support of the Viet . china. If Communist China, as a participant Minh are: (a) overt intervention in the form in the world Communist movement, were of an invasion; or (b) assistance short of open called upon to invade Indochina, it could prob­ Invasion. ably be persuaded to initiate such an opera­ a. Overt Interoention. tion. Chinese Communist mUitary commit­ (1) Indicators: ments elsewhere would not necessarily mili­ Recent Chinese Communist activity in the tate against an invasion of Indochina because two border provinces of Kwangsi and Yun­ the. Chinese Communists possess the forces nan~the construction and improvement of necessary for military actlon-separately or roads, railroads, and air facilities-might be simultaneously--against Indochina, Korea, construed as positive indicators of an impend­ Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao. ing invasion. It is equally Valid, however, to Despite this general capabUity and despite interpret these activities as indicators of an the existence of Chinese Communist military increase in the flow of Chinese Communist concentrations along the, Indochina border, aid to the Viet Minh and its subsidiary move­ adequate for the task, ·it is estimated that an ment in Laos and Cambodia. open Chinese Communist invasion-whUe pos­ The presence of some 100,000 Chinese Com­ sible and capable of being launched with little munist troops in the Indochina border re­ or no preliminary warning-is improbable in gion-whence they could launch an invasion 1950 because considerations «(rom the stand­ without appreciable warning-might also be point of Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese Commu­ construed as a positive indicator. The pres­ nists, and international Communism) favoring ence of t.hese troops, however, can be explained such action appear to be outweighed by con­ in part by the need for "paCification" forces siderations opposing it. It is highly probable, in Southwest China, where thousands of anti­ however, that the Chinese Communists will Communist guerrillas have been operating. continue Lo expand m1Utary assistance to the It is also noteworthy that the present strength Viet Minh (orces (by measures short of open or Chinese Communist troops in the Indochina invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide those border area is only one-third of that reported forces with thc capability of achieving signifi­ in May of this year. cant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and, (2) Factars Favoring Intervention: assuming that the French receive no more aid The following factors favor a Chinese Com· than is presently programmed, of eventually munist invasion of Indochina in 1950: expelling the French without the aid of a Chi­ (a) A Chinese Communist invasion of Indo­ nese Communist invasion. china would be the most rapid means of build-

Note: This estimate was prepared under urgent procedures upon the request of the Intelligence Organization or the Department or State. dated 1 September 1950. Because of the llmlted time avaUable it was not feasible to integrate It with ORE 50-50 which was :l.lrca.dy In process of coordination. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report; for the dissent of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of the Army, .see Enclosure A.

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lng up .the military strength of the antl­ (d) A Communist invasion .would have sig­ French forces. nificant neg~tive effects on th~ presently neu­ (b) Moreover, It Is doubtful that the French tral states of Asia, particularly India. will be able to provide large-sCale re1n!orce­ (e) CommunJst Chin(L's prospects for mem­ ments to their forces in Indochina In sufficient bership in the UN and UN-sponsoredorganl­ time to oppose such an Invasion. zations would be eUm1nated and the oppor­ (c) Further, decisive Communist action in tWlity for the establishment o~ diplomatic re­ Indochina in 1950 would expel the French and lations with non-orbit powers' would be cur­ bring that area under. Communist control be­ taUed. fore any appreciable buUd-up in the milltary (f) The USSR may hesl~ate to urge or ap­ strength of the weStern bloc coUld be achieved. prove a Chinese COIDmWlist invasion of Indo­ (d) In addition, the fall of Vietnam to .the china, because to do so would risk the possible Communists would hasten the accommodation substitution of Peiping's lnfluence, backed by of Burma and ThaUand to Communlst power. Communist forces In "occupation" of Vietnam, for its own present remote control over the Ho (e) On the other hand, should Chlnese a .Chi Minh regime. Conununist invasion of Indochina in 1950 not be immedIately decisive, and should US or (g) In addition to the specific factors men­ other western forces subsequently Intervene, tioned above, an open CorruriWllst invasion the Invasion would serve to contain substan~ of Indochina would greatly increase the risk tial military strength of the western bloc in of global war. . inconclusive peripheral warfare In the Far b. Assistance Short 01 Open Invasion. East. A second general course of action open to (3) Factors Opposing Intervention: the Chinese Communists in support of Ho Chi The following fnctors appear to reduce the Minh is the expansion of mUltary assistance prospects for an invasion under present cir­ short of open intervention. The Chinese Com­ cumstances : munists during the past six to eight months (a) Without major external assistance to have provided substantial assistance to the the French and their supporters, Communist Viet Minh in the form of materiel, technical­ ~·llbera.tion" of Indochina would be accom­ advisory aid, training, and personnel. They plished ultimately without resort to overt Chi­ have the capability of greatly Increasing t.his nese Communist intervention.! In order to assist.ance. achieve his objective of expelling the French, (1) Materiel is now reported to be Howing Ho Chi Minh-who at present is estimated to into Indochina In increasing amounts, not have 92,500 regular troops, 130,000 irregulars, only across the border but also from Chinese and extensive manpower reserves--needs and coastal ports via Hainan. Communications in probably prefers materiel and technical­ Southwest China and In Tonkin are being advisory assistance rather than direct Chinese improved and the Chinese Communists have Communist intervention. sccured control of many former Nationalist­ (b) The presence of Chinese Communist held islands off the south China. coast. Bolh troops in Indochina-in addition to weakening these developments greatly facilitate the move­ the nationalistic appeal to the Viet Minh move­ ments of materiel into Indochina. The Viet ment-would arouse local anti-Ghinese senti­ Minh has been short of heavy equipment, ment and be a serious source of command particularly artillery. and although the conflict between Pelping and the Viet Minh present volume is unknown considerable leadership. quantities of such materiel pr~bablY wiU be forthcoming from the Chinese Communists in (c) World Communism thus far has sought tile future. to present Communist· aggression under the guise of indigenous "civil wars." (2) Technical-advisory aid could and prob­ ably will be greatly expanded by increasing 'See conr.\usion of ORE 50-50. the number of persons detailed to Indochina md by enlarging the already substantial forces required from areas south of the :;raining program for Indochinese within Yangtze River without Immediate jeopatdy to ~h1na. other possible operations. (3) As to persOnnel, "volunteer" soldiers are Ava.ilable information does notpermlt firm believed to have already inconspicuously quantitative estimates of either materiel pres­ Joined the Viet MInh forces in small nUmbers. enUy in the hands of the Viet M4lh forces or Although individual "volunteers" probably will of present or future rates of flow from China. be further encouraged, such reinforcement is Supply from China Is presently.confined to not likely to attain extensive proportions since transport over secondary overland routes and the language problem, among others, will con­ by coastal smuggling, with French-forces hold­ stitute a limiting factor. Problema entailed ing positions on the main overland supply in utilizing "volunteers" can and probably wlll routes. In addition, Viet Minh forces up to be partly overcome by integrating small units now have shown no indication of a _capability of Chinese Communists into the Viet Minh for orthodox warfare on a scale approaching forces, operating under Viet Minh command. that essential if French forces are ,to be elimi­ Those elements most acceptable to the Viet nated from Tonkin. Although these consider­ Minh probably would be of a specialized na­ ations do not rule out the posslbil1ty that ture, such as artillery, tank, mortar, engineer, the Viet Minh may already be equipped and signal, and medical units, capable of providing trained in the use of heavy arms on a SUbstan­ support and services now limited or unavail­ tial scale, with its presently estimated capablll­ able to the Viet Minh. It is improbable that ties the Viet Minh probably could not mount a units larger than battalions would be inte­ sustained offensive capable of driving the grated, for fear of exposing direct Chinese French from Indochina in 1950. Communist involvement and because of the Nevertheless, it is estimated that during the increased applicability of those considerations _autumn of 1950 the Viet Minh will be capable­ which reduce the prospects of open Chinese of launching the initial phase of such an of­ Communist invasion (see 2 a. (3) above). fensive which could result in the seizure or destruction of several key French border posts. 3. Prospects for Success of Chinese Neutralizing these French strongholds, in ad­ Communist Courses of Action. dition to further reducing French strength If the Chinese Communists openly invade through attritlonal warfare, would permit the Indochina under present Circumstances, it is flow of heavy eqUipment from China to the almost certain that defending forces under the Viet Minh in greatly increased quantity. Ac­ French would soon lose all of Vietnam except quisition of this equipment, assuming that Cochinchina. A Chinese Communist force of the French receive no- more aid thnn is pt'es­ 100,000 to 150,000 could probably overrun the ently programmed, would enable theViet Minh Tonkin 'plain during the first six weeks of to develop a preponderance of force over the operation, l"educing the French pOSition in the French in a matter of months. Meanwhile, north to a temporary beachhead in the vicinity the earliest reliable test of the actual military of Haiphong. Although a second-phase Chi· strength of the Viet Minh forces will be their nese Communist drive further to the south showing in the campaigns of limited objectives would take longer and require additional which it is anticIpated they will undertake in troops, Peiping is capable of providing thc the coming weeks. ENCLOSURE A DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE OR~A"'IZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, page 9, section 2.a. (1), second paragraph, first G-2, dissents for the following reason: sentence, as now containing 100,000 Chinese page 9, section 2.a. (1), second paragraph, Communist troops. The 180,000 figure for last sentence.. G-2 has never carried a troop the larger area was carried by G-2 in. May strength figure· higher than 180,000 for the 1950, but troop strength in the border region area of South and Southwest China (Yunnan as defined above was approximately the same and west Kwangsi) . This area includes more in May 1950 as it is now, that is, 100,000. territory than the border region· defined in

NOTE

CIA fully accepts the accuracy of these 0-2 border from Mengtzu to the Gulf of Tonkin troop strength figures. The discrepancy in (see enclosed map). The G-2 "border area," CIA and 0-2 views adses from a d11lerence in however, appears on the one hand to exclude the definition of "border area. II The "border the Kwangtung coastal strip adjacent to Indo­ area" referred to in this paper on page 9, sec­ china and on the other to include the Kunming tion 2.a. (1), second paragraph, last sentence, area over 150 miles from the border. The comprises a. strip of land approximately 90 conclusions of the paper are not affected by miles in uniform depth along .the Indochina this difference in definition.

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