The Democracy Support Deficit: Despite Progress, Major Countries Fall Short Daniel Calingaert, Arch Puddington, and Sarah Repucci

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The Democracy Support Deficit: Despite Progress, Major Countries Fall Short Daniel Calingaert, Arch Puddington, and Sarah Repucci Supporting Democracy Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers minimal moderate moderate moderate limited limited minimal strong minimal very strong moderate Brazil | European Union | France | Germany | India | Indonesia | Japan | Poland | South Africa | Sweden | United States support for democracy and human rights The Democracy Support Deficit: Despite Progress, Major Countries Fall Short Daniel Calingaert, Arch Puddington, and Sarah Repucci EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and human rights through their trade poli- The world’s leading democracies are making cies and in their responses to coups. significant efforts to promote democracy In relations with China, immediate eco- and human rights, but their policies are nomic and strategic interests almost always inconsistent, and they often overlook au- override support for democracy and human thoritarian threats. As authoritarian states rights. Virtually none of the democracies collaborate to push back against political under review have been willing to confront and human rights around the globe, democ- Beijing directly or consistently, despite the racies must reassess their approach and regime’s pattern of abuses. adopt a bolder and more coherent strategy. The study also found that although About this project Among the 11 regional and global pow- support for democracy through regional This project analyzes ers examined in this study, the democracies or international bodies can aid legitimacy, support by 11 democratic in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were less these organizations are rarely effective powers for democracy and human rights likely to exert pressure on rights violators in without the leadership of a major country. during the period their regions and less inclined to condemn Indeed, democratic powers sometimes use June 2012–May 2014. the abrogation of democratic standards by multilateral organizations as a screen to About the authors major powers than were the United States, avoid more direct or decisive action against Daniel Calingaert is the European Union, and individual Europe- repression. executive vice president The report’s recommendations for lead- of Freedom House. an countries. The disparity is largely attrib- utable to the emphasis placed by the former ing democracies include the following: Arch Puddington is Freedom House’s vice group on the principle of noninterference • Vigorously counteract encroach- president of research. and respect for sovereignty. ments by large authoritarian states— Sarah Repucci is project Nearly all of the countries assessed such as Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, director of Supporting provide strong support for elections abroad, and Iran—that seek regional hegemo- Democracy Abroad, at Freedom House. but they largely fail to promote democracy ny and are openly hostile to demo- cratic change among their neighbors. 1 www.freedomhouse.org Supporting Democracy The Democracy Support Deficit: Despite Progress, Major Countries Fall Short Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers • Devote greater attention to the tract to sell warships to Russia. Brazil has remained settings where democracy and its silent about widespread repression in Cuba and the step-by-step dismantling of democratic institutions advocates are most under threat, and in Venezuela. Despite its public commitment to a val- jointly adopt more robust methods ues-oriented foreign policy, Germany has until very re- when responding to coups and cently given precedence to economic interests in its massive human rights abuses. relations with Russia, even as the Kremlin suppressed media independence, marginalized civil society, and • Ensure that major democracies take threatened and invaded Ukraine. South Africa has the lead in firmly addressing dem- failed to take decisive steps against crackdowns on ocratic setbacks and gross human fundamental freedoms in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. rights violations in their And the United States, the one country with truly global influence assessed in this study, has soft-ped- own regions. aled its responses to serious human rights abuses in • Actively engage in regional and the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere. international institutions to mobilize In addition to their reluctance to act in their home strong collective responses to dem- regions, leading democracies have failed to meet the ocratic disruptions and human rights challenge posed by authoritarian powers with inter- abuses, and to oppose efforts national reach, which have increasingly threatened the status of rules-based governance as a global to water down any joint action. norm. Particularly noteworthy is the near-univer- • Establish a united front when dealing sal unwillingness to criticize the growing abuses with China and Russia in order to of human rights and civil liberties in China, even check their coercion of neighboring as censorship is intensified, the roster of political prisoners grows, and persecution of Uighurs and states and address antidemocratic Tibetans worsens. practices within their borders. At the same time, the report’s findings show that Introduction democratic powers are beginning to recognize the The world’s leading democracies are making sig- danger emanating from major authoritarian states nificant efforts to promote democracy and human and are taking steps to counter their initiatives. rights, but their policies are inconsistent, and they Democracies are making use of an array of strat- often overlook authoritarian threats in their own egies, some modest and others more ambitious, regions in particular. The democracies are nota- to promote free institutions in authoritarian and bly reluctant to respond to systematic repression quasi-authoritarian settings. At the bilateral level, or disruptions of democratic processes (such as they train governments in the techniques of honest coups). Especially disappointing is the unwillingness elections and participate in missions to monitor the of countries that possess massive economic and balloting process. Major democracies also use their political power to apply diplomatic pressure, even influence at the United Nations and other interna- privately, when neighboring governments engage tional and regional bodies to press for collective in blatant cases of vote fraud, media suppression, action, urging these entities to defend democratic or the persecution of minority groups. Moreover, freedoms and send peacekeepers to crisis zones. democracies have not effectively countered efforts Even democracies with limited resources provide by authoritarian regimes to block democratization support for independent media, civil society groups, efforts in other countries. In important respects, and persecuted minority populations around the the 11 regional and global powers examined in this world. In a few cases, free countries have placed report are failing to use their influence to defend principles above short-term interests by standing democracy beyond their borders. firm for democracy in the face of the competing Thus France, while placing increased emphasis on demands of economics and diplomatic realpolitik. human rights diplomacy under President François Most importantly, a number of the countries in this Hollande, continues to prop up autocrats in former study have advanced beyond traditional policies that colonies like Algeria, and has not yet canceled its con- eschewed democracy concerns and favored strict 2 Freedom House noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign militarily, and politically to push back against de- states. In the governments examined, heads of state, mocracy around the world. They share expertise to foreign ministers, and other high officials now feel strengthen repressive laws and practices, and they obliged to include democracy and human rights work together to undermine accepted international themes in statements on broad foreign policy objec- standards and institutions that protect political and tives. When confronted with questions at the United civil rights. Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the Nations that involve violations of fundamental World report shows that their efforts have had some rights, coups, or aggression against neighboring success, documenting eight consecutive years in states, they have voted to condemn abuses and which countries suffering democratic decline have take remedial action. While the inclusion of de- outnumbered those experiencing gains. These mocracy standards in foreign assistance programs developments merit a concerted response by demo- has varied considerably, almost all of these powers cratic countries in all regions of the world. If they are encourage the spread of free institutions through to turn the tide, leading democracies must reassess programs supporting adherence to the rule of law, their existing policies and adopt a bolder and more anticorruption measures, honest elections, and consistent strategy. The present study is intended to gender equality. stimulate such a process. Purpose of the Study Major Findings Supporting Democracy Abroad assesses the degree • Significant gap between north and south: to which 10 leading democratic countries and the Among the countries examined, the democra- European Union promote democracy and human cies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were less rights in their foreign policies. These countries are likely to exert pressure on rights violators in their regional or global powers on five continents, and regions and less inclined to condemn the abro- most are members of the Group of Twenty (G20). gation of democratic
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