South China Sea Intelligence Briefngs Weekly Briefing: December 13th

At The Open Source Briefing, we remain committed to providing the public with ongoing developments around the globe.

United States Author: Kevin O’Connell ​ ​

Courtesy of USNI News

There were several high-profile developments in the United States this week, including the White House’s Office of Management and Budget’s release of a Fiscal Planning Framework (FPF) including the Navy’s 30-year Shipbuilding Plan[1], the announcement of the planned nomination of retired Army General and commander of U.S. CENTCOM Lloyd Austin to serve as Secretary of Defense[2], and the passing of the annual National Defense Authorization Act in the United States Senate[3]. While these developments will undoubtedly impact the United States’ strategy in the South China Sea, they remain speculative pending the next administration’s endorsement, senatorial confirmation, and Presidential approval, respectively. As such, these topics are not heavily emphasized in this report. Instead, highlights of this report include the USS Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) operating in the South China Sea

The Open Source Briefing 1 ​ from December 6th through December 12th, a B1-B Lancer flight over the South China Sea as part of a Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployment on December 10th, and regular United States Navy and Air Force flights over both the South China Se and East China Sea including one by a U-2 north of Taiwan.

Courtesy of USNI News

The first of these updates focuses on the USS Makin Island ARG’s operations in the South China Sea. With the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG) having recently returned to port in Yokosuka after an extended deployment, and the USS America (LHA-6) in port at Sasebo, the Makin Island ARG takes on a critical role for United States power projection in the Indo-Pacific. The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is currently made up of USS Makin Island (LHD-8), USS San Diego (LPD- 22), and USS Somerset (LPD-25).[4][5] There are indications that USS Makin Island passed West through the Luzon Strait on December 6th and joined up with USS Somerset after she passed through the Philippines, also on December 6th.[6][7] After five days of continuous operations, the Makin Island ARG transited the Singapore Strait on December 11th and continued northbound through the Strait of Malacca, joined by USNS Big Horn (T-AO-198).[8][9] Interestingly, the USS Port Royal (CG-73) also

The Open Source Briefing 2 ​ passed North through the Strait of Malacca just days earlier, on December 8th.[10] With the Makin Island ARG presumably still in the Indian Ocean, this leaves INDO-PACOM without a ‘large deck’ large-deck amphibious assault ship or aircraft carrier at sea in the Western Pacific.

Courtesy of Pacific Air Forces

The next update focused on the ongoing Bomber Task Force (BTF) B-1B deployment to Andersen AFB, Guam. At least one of the four B-1Bs currently deployed to the base conducted a flight over the South China Sea on December 10th as part of a more extensive exercise involving F-22A aircraft also stationed at Andersen AFB. The flight over the South China Sea was “to conduct stand-off weapons training with the goal of improving coordination with command and control elements.”[11][12] These BTF deployments play a critical role in overall United States force posture in the Indo-Pacific as they represent an unpredictable and credible strategic deterrent.

The Open Source Briefing 3 ​

Courtesy of ainonlin.com

The third significant update for the United States in the Indo-Pacific is the ongoing high-tempo aerial surveillance and patrol operations. Most of these flights appear to have been completed by P-8A Poseidons, RC-135W Rivet Joints, and their supporting KC135-R/T Stratotankers.[13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21] Interestingly, there was one U.S. Air Force flight this week that was out of pattern. On December 9th, a U-2S Dragon Lady took off from South Korea and flew South to a point just north of Taiwan.[22] While U-2 flights do occur in theatre, notably one overflew a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) exercise in August, one so close to both Taiwan and China is striking.

A few additional operational updates include the arrival of the Legend-class cutter USCGC Waesch (WMSL-751) in Yokosuka on December 8th[23], the arrival in Singapore and drydocking of USNS Vadm K. R. Wheeler (T-AG-5001) and USNS Fast Tempo on December 9th[24][25], and the arrival of USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE-10) in Yokosuka on December 13th.[26]

The Open Source Briefing 4 ​ Japan Author: Gaetano Scalise ​ ​ On Monday, Japan’s Self Defense Ground forces announced the holding of joint drills with U.S forces on the main island of Honshu, in both the southwest and central areas. The drills were given the names Yama Sakura and Forest Light, and will be conducted in the Niigata and Gunma Prefectures.[1] Japan Times reports that Yama Sakura began on December 2nd and will continue until Dec. 15th. 4,000 JGSDF personnel will take part in conjunction with 1,000 of their American counterparts and will utilize various assets such as CH-47 helicopters and MV-22 Ospreys. Japan Times reports further that the operational focus of the exercise will be working on the ability to seize and defend key maritime terrain.”[2] These statements on the exercise’s focus highlight a crucial commitment of the two allies to defend Japan’s maritime claims in the East China Sea and elsewhere.

Japanese officials have made vocal concerns about coincidental land purchases made by South Korean and Chinese companies near key Japanese military installations. South China Post reports that these transactions have been monitored over the last decade, but have gained more attention in the past several years with China’s recent assertive attitude in the region.[3] Approximately 80 plots of land were sold to such companies, with additional sales being blocked by Japan’s government for concern that the South Koreans and Chinese were buying pieces of land in territory that were hotly disputed in the East China Sea. The aforementioned transactions of Chinese companies, in particular, are not new. In fact, U.S intelligence personnel have pointed out that the U.S government suspects that certain Chinese land purchases in Texas could enable individuals to gather intel on critical military facilities.

In an important strategic update, Japan’s National Security Council announced that it will upgrade certain vessels with the powerful Aegis radar after canceling plans to build ground-based radar stations. At the cost of $2 billion, the updated Spy-7 radar system will give the JSDF the capability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles with their new interceptor missiles.[5]

The Open Source Briefing 5 ​

Photo courtesy of the Japanese Ministry of Defense

China Author: Tad Unruh ​ ​ China has continued its pressing behavior across the SCS into December.

Image Courtesy South China Morning Post ​

The Open Source Briefing 6 ​ The Chinese military has to create ‘livable’ conditions on specific Spratly islands since their push for claims ramped back up in 2015. These reefs and atolls have been modified with airstrips, military facilities, anti-aircraft guns and weapons systems, essentially making them habitable for PLA forces.[i] China has long posited that these claims and military established sites are worthy of an Exclusive Economic Zone, encapsulating its waters. They are fashioned in Chinese PR as being forward defense mechanisms, but are they actually defensible? An article in a Beijing based monthly magazine named Naval and Merchant Ships, that is published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, has highlighted several issues with their distance from the mainland, small size, and small airstrip size.[ii] It is considerably rare for a Chinese state-owned enterprise to criticize a defense issue like this publicly. The article by the magazine also says that it could take up to 20 hours for mainland ships to reach the islands in its defense, and there wouldn’t be any ability to store and host the J-16 fighters.[iii]

Image Courtesy CSIS/AMTI Amongst the talk of defense and offense in the Spratly Islands, the Chinese PLA Navy has continued its gray zone warfare campaign of pushing its claims through in the SCS. On December 4th, CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative announced its yearly review of China’s power projection capabilities in the South China Sea.[i] Above ​ ​ is a picture of that map via a tweet, and this hyperlink provides an interactive map, with ​ ​ toggles for radar, missile, and aircraft ranges.

The PLA Navy has executed several drills this week in the SCS in response to US Navy actions in the region. The PLA Type 056A corvette warship group of the Enshi,

The Open Source Briefing 7 ​ Yongzhou, and Guangyuan, conducted practice against incoming missile detection, smoke and flare deployment and live-fire drills on a target ship, announced by China National Radio.[ii] The exercise went on for about 7 days, starting on December 1st. ​ ​

Later in the week, Friday, December 11th, the Chinese Coast Guard executed a maritime rescue drill, an overview of aerial/underwater search, maritime personnel and property rescue as well as maritime fire-fighting.[iii] ​

The United States Congressional Research Service Report, on China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities and Background issues for Congress was released on December 3rd, 2020. It highlights the continued watch of ever-expanding Chinese naval power.[iv] The following week’s briefing will cover the ​ ​ report in more depth.

Taiwan Author: Tad Unruh ​ As with many weeks in the sphere of Taiwanese defense issues, the news tends to rely upon the actions of the three main actors, Taiwan, China, and the USA. This week was no different.

(SCMP)

Leading all bylines for this week was the Tuesday approval of a $280 million arms and technology communication equipment sale from the United States to Taiwan. The US State Department confirmed the sale of 154 communications nodes, 24 communication relays, eight network management systems, and related equipment plus

The Open Source Briefing 8 ​ personnel training, technical and logistic support for maintaining political stability, military balance and economic progress in the region.[1] This is the sixth arms deal Taiwan and the US have reached this year, and the 11th that has been under the administration of President Trump. In response to the recently announced sale, China has continued its run of incursions into Taiwanese airspace and reapplied their threats. President Tsai Ing-Wen said at a security forum on Wednesday, that “Authoritarian forces consistently attempt to violate the existing norms-based order, and Taiwan has been at the receiving end of such military threats on a daily basis.”[2]

In conjunction with the arms sale, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which has portions related to Taiwan. Specifically, it calls for “continued arms sales to the country, and timely review and response to Taiwan’s request for defense articles and expanding the military partnership, along with a provision that protects Taiwanese citizens from discrimination in employment settings at international financial organizations.[3]

Also included in this military sale is the purchase of 300 MIM-104 Patriot missile systems in the upcoming year.[4] It is assumed that Taiwan’s total Patriot missile arsenal could reach 650 by 2027 if they continue to purchase at the current rate.[5] Taiwanese military announced scheduled missile tests over the Christmas weekend on Taiwan’s southeast coast.[6]

Lastly, watchers of Cross-Strait politics this year have noticed the elevated incursions of Chinese planes into the Taiwanese ADIZ. The incursions didn’t stop this week. According to Chinese State media, Thursday of the previous week, a PLA Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft performed a live-fire depth charge drill anti-submarine drill.[7] On the 7th, A PLAAF Shaanxi Y-8 anti-submarine aircraft entered the ADIZ.[8] On the 8th, Taiwan scrambled fighter jets, issued radio warnings, and deployed air defense missiles to eject a PLAAF Shaanxi Y-8 ASW.[9] On the 9th, surprisingly, a US Navy Northrup Grumman MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone was spotted by multiple sources over the SCS and off the coast of Taiwan.[10] Also on the 9th, Two PLA aircraft (Y-8 EW and Y-8 RECCE) entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.[11]On the 10th, a Chinese electronic warfare plane entered Taiwan’s ADIZ.[12] On the 12th, two Chinese PLAAF aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s ADIZ, marking the 9th day in December that a Chinese plane has come into Taiwanese airspace.[13]

The Open Source Briefing 9 ​ Philippines Author: Bang Tongco ​ During the week, acting US Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller transferred defense equipment during his visit, while news of a new naval base on the coast of the Philippine Rise and elevated levels of radiation were reported in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). In South Korea, the Philippine Navy’s (PN) guided-missile frigate BRP Antonio Luna was photographed conducting its sea acceptance trials (SATs).

Miller on 8 December visited the Philippines where he transferred about $29M of defense equipment and urged the countries in the region to support the rules-based order and reiterated the US’ commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific [1]. In a statement, Miller cited the recently concluded ASEAN Summit where member-states expressed support for the 1982 UNCLOS as clear proof that non-militarization and self-restraint prevail in the SCS despite China’s use of coercion and intimidation. Miller criticized China’s actions in 2020, adding that Beijing’s military and militia activities in the SCS violate its own commitments to ASEAN [2]. During his visit, Miller spoke with Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana and Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. Miller told Lorenzana that the first of two refurbished C-130H transports ordered by the Philippine Air Force would be delivered by 17 December 2020 after transfers were affected by the COVID-19 Pandemic [3]. Lorenzana, for his part, opined that a militarily strong, peaceful, and stable Philippines is beneficial to US presence in the region. Lorenzana thanked the US government for helping the Philippines in protecting its “borders from external threats”, despite the arms transfers being composed of counter-insurgency equipment [4].

The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) on 7 December reported that higher levels of Iodine-129 (129I) were detected in coral samples taken from the WPS [5]. PNRI Director Carlo Arcilla clarified that the levels of radiation were not dangerous but traceable, and were noticeably higher than other coastal areas of the Philippines. Arcilla explained that 129I is a product of nuclear fission produced by nuclear reactors, power plants, or explosions. Arcilla disclosed that initial findings of the radioisotope were discovered as early as 2016 and that the radiation levels were not caused by the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Arcilla suggested that the 129I may have come from nuclear-powered vessels [6]. Meanwhile, a PNRI infographic on the matter says that 129I may have merely accumulated in the WPS due to complex water currents in the SCS [6].

The Open Source Briefing 10 ​ The PN on 7 December signed a deal with the Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport (APECO) for a new naval air base in Casiguran, Aurora Province, which would increase Navy presence near the Philippine Rise in the Philippine Sea--within the Philippine EEZ and facing the Pacific Ocean. The PN disclosed that the agreement involved a 12,000-hectare “naval support facility and naval air detachment” in Casiguran. Flag Officer in Command Adm. Giovanni Bacordo said that the deal will allow the PN to establish a foothold and increase its long-term force projection capabilities to protect the Philippines’ national maritime interests in the northern frontier of the archipelago [7]. To recall, interest in the Philippine Rise--which includes the submerged Benham Bank--increased in 2018 after China submitted a list of five names for undersea features in Benham Bank to the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) [8]. China submitted the names to the IHO despite not securing a permit from the Philippines for any marine scientific research (MSR) expeditions to be carried out in the then-named Benham Rise region prior to the submission, prompting protests from Manila [9].

Location of Aurora Province (in red), where Casiguran is located, on the main Island of Luzon relative to the Philippine Sea. The island on the top left is Hainan, China. Image courtesy of Philippine Star.

In other military developments, the PN released images of the newest Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigate, the BRP Antonio Luna conducting its SATs, in South Korean waters. The PN updated that the Luna was on its second week of SATs and is expected to be delivered to the Philippines by the first quarter of 2021[10].

The Open Source Briefing 11 ​

BRP Antonio Luna conducts SATs in South Korean waters. Image courtesy of the Philippine Navy Facebook page.

The recent arms transfer comes after US National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien donated about $18M worth of weapons to the Philippines in late November [11]. The US’ back-to-back trips to key SCS states are likely part of Washington’s attempt to reassure partners in the region of the US’ continuing support despite a change in administration. Lorenzana’s statements reflect the warm security relations between Washington and Manila regardless of the suspension--and eventual reinstatement--of the US-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement in early 2020.

Meanwhile, the detection of 129I in the Philippine-claimed waters of the SCS could be a result of early Chinese and Russian/formerly-Soviet submarines that ply the disputed waterway. Another possibility, though remote, is that China is moving forward with its alleged plans to place floating nuclear reactors to power its bases on its occupied features in the SCS [12]. However, the PNRI is still validating its findings and could provide more information at a later date.

With regard to the possible establishment of a PN base facing the Philippine Rise, Manila has been increasing its presence in the country’s eastern seaboard following China’s naming of undersea features at the submerged Benham Bank in 2018. In 2018, the Philippines announced plans to construct lighthouses in its northern

The Open Source Briefing 12 ​ maritime border and completed a small outpost on Mavulis Island in the Bashi Channel [13] [14]. The PN’s move to increase its presence in the Bashi Channel comes after the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force has been increasing its operations in the strategic waterway just south of Taiwan’s Orchid Island and north of the Philippines’ Mavulis since 2018 [15]. Nevertheless, greater PN presence in the Philippine Rise can increase Manila’s maritime domain awareness but may stretch the Navy’s already limited air and naval assets--possibly to the detriment of its claims in the SCS.

Lastly, delivery of the second Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigate to the PN appears to have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic since the Luna was supposed to be transferred by September or October 2020[16]. Regardless, the delivery of the ship will allow the PN to have more crews gain experience in operating advanced systems for a greater variety of missions--anti-surface, air, and submarine warfare--on newer and more capable ships. However, the PN only has two Jose Rizal-class frigates on order and two AW-159 Wildcat helicopters delivered, indicating that the ships’ and assigned air wing’s crew might take at least until the end of 2021 to be fully operational [17]. Furthermore, the lack of spare AW-159s could mean that the Luna and its lead ship, the BRP Jose Rizal, will likely take to sea without its Wildcats or with the PN’s more numerous AW-109s aboard.

Vietnam Author: Giulia Croce Butler ​ ​ On Wednesday, the UN headquarters in New York hosted the plenary and final session of the 30th meeting of state parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). [1] With almost 120 participants, the session concluded a series that started on July 6 and took many forms in order to comply with safety regulations. During the closing remarks, Vietnam highlighted the necessity to improve international maritime cooperation by adopting a multi-sectoral approach to conflict resolution. Specifically, Ambassador Quy reinstated the unity and completeness of the 1982 UNCLOS with respect to regulating and promoting the sustainability of all sea-related activities, as well as serving as a solid foundation to the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Open Source Briefing 13 ​

VNA/VNS Photo

The Ambassador also mentioned the recent infringements to Vietnam’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over its archipelagos in an effort to invite its regional partners to maintain a non-escalatory behavior even after being directly provoked. Lastly, Quy argued that all parties must implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and complete an effective code of conduct that works in conjunction with the UNCLOS.

Another important event took place on December 10, when ASEAN defense ministers held a virtual meeting with the Association’s eight partners, including China and the United States. [2] The meeting led to the group’s first joint declaration since 2013, where the ministers emphasized the importance of maintaining safe, peaceful, and stable freedom of navigation in the region by avoiding escalatory actions and agreeing to nonviolent resolutions of conflicts in accordance with international law. While no specific claims were targeted to China, host Vietnam further specified that the conversation should apply especially to maritime sovereign disputes in the South China Sea. To further the same point, the Japanese Defense Ministry added that any unilateral use of force would be strongly opposed by ASEAN members. Ministers also

The Open Source Briefing 14 ​ urged that an early conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct is imperative to achieve the above goals. Interestingly, the meeting took place only days after the U.S. Secretary of Defense accused China of exploiting the pandemic to further its claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese ambassador to the Philippines responded that the U.S. has been increasingly provoking the country over the years, especially in its effort to carry out “freedom of navigation” operations that attempt to counter China’s claims.

Unsurprisingly, Chinese and Vietnamese tensions go well beyond maritime claims in the SCS, as there seems to be a manufacturing shift from China to Vietnam, putting pressure on the latter’s supply chains. [3]

Photo by the Load Star

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that Vietnam will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Samsung and Apple are only a few of the companies that appear to be moving assembly lines from China to Vietnam. Rapid infrastructure development and increased production capacity will set Vietnam on an even greater growth trajectory, while other developing countries are struggling to recover from the economic consequences of the pandemic.

In addition to becoming a manufacturing hub, Vietnam is also exploring oil and gas in the South China Sea. Even here, tensions date back to 2014, when an oil rig tied

The Open Source Briefing 15 ​ to a Chinese driller was deemed the cause of a boat-crashing accident in Vietnamese waters. The aftermath brought anti-Chinese sentiments that resulted in rioting in Vietnam. Despite that, China has repeatedly attempted to approach Vietamese exploration areas in recent years, not without receiving severe criticism by the Vietnamese government. [4]

Photo by Associated Press

Aircraft and Naval Tracking Authors: Gaetano Scalise, Tad Unruh, Kevin O’Connell ​ ​

December 6th Taiwan News reports that a PLAF Y-8 aircraft violated airspace southwest of the island.[1]

December 7th The Official Japan Joint Staff Twitter account reports that from December 4th to the 6th, fighters of the SADF were scrambled to handle a violation of airspace above the East China Sea.[2]

The Open Source Briefing 16 ​

The official Japan Joint Staff Twitter account reports that JADF fighters scrambled to intercept “suspicious aircraft over The Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea.[3]

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense Official Twitter account reports that a PLA Y-8 ASW aircraft violated Taiwanese airspace southwest of the island.[4]

Taiwan News reports that a PLAG Y-8 aircraft was spotted violating airspace southwest of the island.[5]

December 8th ​ Twitter user @AircraftSpots reports that a Tenax Aerospace commercial jet was spotted over the East China Sea conducting a “maritime patrol mission”.[5]

Twitter user @is_keelu reports that a USAF Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker was spotted over the Celebes Sea.[7]

December 9th The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense Official Twitter account reports that a PLAF Y-8W and Y-8 RECCE violated Taiwanese airspace southeast of the island.[8]

Twitter user @KimagureGolf9 reports that a B-1b entered the South China Sea for a maritime mission.[9]

Twitter user @is_keelu reports that a USAF KC-135R Stratotanker was spotted northwest of the Philippines, heading straight into The South China Sea.[10]

Twitter user @is_Keelu reports that a U-2 spy plane was spotted north of Taiwan. operating North of Taiwan.

December 10th The official Japan Joint Staff Twitter account reports that JASDF fighters scrambled to intercept suspicious aircraft over the East China Sea.[12]

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense Official Twitter account reports that a PLAF Y-8W violated Taiwanese airspace southwest of the island.[13]

The Open Source Briefing 17 ​

The South China Sea News Twitter account reports that a Bomber Task Force Mission was conducted over the South China Sea with 1 B-1B Bomber and two F-22 Raptors.[14]

Twitter user @is_Keelu reports that a KC-135T Stratotanker was spotted over the South China Sea, south of Taiwan.[15]

December 11th None of significance

December 12th The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense Official Twitter account reports that a PLAF Y-8W violated Taiwanese airspace southwest of the island.[16]

Twitter user @is_keelu reports that a P-8A Poseidon was spotted over the South China Sea, south of Taiwan with another U.S unidentified military aircraft.[17] and

Twitter user @is_keelu reports that a P-8A Poseidon and KC-135R Stratotanker were spotted south of Taiwan.[18]

The Open Source Briefing 18 ​

United States [1] https://twitter.com/USNavy/status/1330904554611859457 [2] https://twitter.com/WarshipCam/status/1332844539413983234 [3] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1331429835714031620 [4] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332117675565342720 [5] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332108509043896320 [6] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332087699407335425 [7] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332109699890688008 [8] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332510617031364608 [9] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332541167246905345 [10] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332483548071211008 [11] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1332941701233717249 [12] Chung, Lawrence, and Minnie Chan. “US Admiral's Undercover Visit to Taiwan Certain to Annoy China,” November 23, 2020. https://www.scmp.com [13] Mangosing, Frances. “AFP Says Smart Bombs, Missiles from US to Help PH Wipe out Terror.” INQUIRER.net, November 24, 2020. https://globalnation.inquirer.net [14] Gomez, Jim. “US Provides Missiles, Renews Pledge to Defend Philippines.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, November 23, 2020. https://apnews.com. [15] Doornbos, Caitlin. “State Department Funds for Pacific Islands Aim to Counter China's 'Problematic Behavior'.” Stars and Stripes, November 24, 2020. https://www.stripes.com

Japan [1] Kaneko, Reito. “Japan and U.S. Conduct Joint Military Drills amid China’s Assertiveness.” The Japan Times, 7 Dec. 2020, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/12/07/national/japan-us-joint-military-drills/. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020. [2] IBID [3] Ryall, Julian. “Japan Suspicious as Chinese, South Korean Companies Buy Land near Military Sites.” The South China Morning Post, 9 Dec. 2020, SCMP.com [4] “Chinese Buy Strategic Land in Texas, U.S. Intel May Not Be Pleased.” LifeZette, 24 June 2020, www.lifezette.com [5] ---. “Japan to Put New Aegis Radars on Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi.” News.Yahoo.com, 6 Dec. 2020, news.yahoo.com

The Open Source Briefing 19 ​ China [i] https://twitter.com/AsiaMTI/status/1337185326532501506/photo/1 ​ [ii] Xuanzun, L. (2020, December 8). PLA holds drills in South China Sea amid US ​ warship transits. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1209378.shtml [iii] Xia, H. (2020, December 12). Maritime rescue drill held in South China Sea. ​ Retrieved December 14, 2020, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/12/c_139582809.htm [iv] Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization. (2020, December 08). ​ Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://news.usni.org/2020/12/08/report-to-congress-on-chinese-naval-modernization-6 [i] Huang, K. (2020, December 05). Beijing's South China Sea military bases 'vulnerable to attack'. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3112419/beijings-south-china-sea-mili tary-bases-are-vulnerable-attack [ii] ibid [iii] Griffiths, J. (2020, December 07). Beijing may have built bases in the South China Sea, but that doesn't mean it can defend them, report claims. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/07/china/south-china-sea-bases-military-intl-hnk/index.ht ml

Taiwan [1] Chung, L. (2020, December 08). Washington approves US$280 million arms sale to Taiwan. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3113018/washington-approves-us2 80-million-arms-sale-taiwan [2] Blanchard, B. (2020, December 08). Washington approves US$280 million arms sale to Taiwan. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3113018/washington-approves-us2 80-million-arms-sale-taiwan

[3] Chen, K. (2020, December 10). US House passes defense bill supportive of Taiwan. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4073210

The Open Source Briefing 20 ​ [4] Kalita, J. (2020, December 08). Taiwan To Strengthen Its Air Defense Against 'Chinese Attacks' With 300 US Patriot Missiles. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://eurasiantimes.com/taiwan-to-strengthen-its-air-defense-against-chinese-attacks- with-300-us-patriot-missiles/

[5] Everington, K. (2020, December 07). Taiwan reportedly buying 300 more Patriot missiles from US. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4071599

[6] Strong, M. (2020, December 10). Taiwan schedules missile tests before year's end. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4073717

[7] Xuanzun, L. (2020, December 6). PLA anti-submarine warfare aircraft conducts depth charge attack drills, seen as a deterrent to Taiwan secessionists. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1209149.shtml

[8] Chang, E. (2020, December 11). Chinese anti-submarine aircraft enters Taiwan's ADIZ. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4071425 [9] Chang, E. (2020, December 11). Chinese anti-submarine aircraft intrudes on Taiwan's ADIZ. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4072213

[10] Everington, K. (2020, December 10). US Navy Triton spotted prowling over Taiwan's ADIZ. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4073571

[11] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1336620081237819392 [12] Yun-yu, C., & Lin, K. (2020, December 11). Chinese electronic warfare aircraft enters Taiwan's ADIZ. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202012100019 [13] Strong, M. (2020, December 14). Chinese military aircraft flies within 103 km of Taiwan. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/407624

Philippines

The Open Source Briefing 21 ​ [1]Mangosing, Frances. “PH gets P1.3B more in donated military equipment from US government”. Inquirer.net. 8 December 2020. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/192598/ph-gets-p1-38b-more-in-donated-military-equip ment-from-us-government Accessed 10 Dec 2020 [2]Miller, Christopher. “Rules (not might) make right in SCS Acting US Secretary of Defense”. Philippine Star. 7 December 2020. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/12/07/2062038/rules-not-might-make-right-scs -acting-us-secretary-defense Accessed 10 Dec 2020 [3]Nepomuceno, Priam. “PH gets P1.38-B military equipment from US”. Philippine News Agency. 8 December 2020. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1124149 Accessed 10 Dec 2020 [4]Mangosing, Frances. “Pandemic delays delivery to PH Air Force of refurbished C-130s”. Inquirer.net. 28 July 2020. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1313286/pandemic-delays-delivery-to-ph-air-force-of-refurbi shed-c-130s Accessed 10 Dec 2020 [5]Ronda, Rainier. “Elevated radiation levels found in West Philippine Sea - DOST”. Philippine Star. 8 December 2020. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/12/08/2062237/elevated-radiation-levels-found -west-philippine-sea-dost Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [6]Resurreccion, Lyn. “Radioactive material in WPS corals, water baffles experts”. Business Mirror. 8 December 2020. https://businessmirror.com.ph/2020/12/08/radioactive-material-in-wps-corals-water-baffl es-experts/ Accessed 10 Dec 2020 [7]Mangosing, Frances. “PH Navy, Apeco sign deal for naval base to guard Benham Rise”. Inquirer.net. 8 December 2020. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/192572/ph-navy-apeco-sign-deal-for-naval-base-to-guar d-benham-rise Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [8]Camille Diola and Patricia Lourdes Viray. “Philippines follows China moves to name Benham Rise Features. Philippine Star. 28 January 2019. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/192572/ph-navy-apeco-sign-deal-for-naval-base-to-guar d-benham-rise Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [9]Staff Writer. “Philippines objects to China naming some undersea features”. The Straits Times. 15 February 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippines-objects-to-china-naming-some-un dersea-features Accessed 12 Dec 2020

The Open Source Briefing 22 ​ [10]Philippine Navy. BRP Antonio Luna FF151 in South Korean waters. Facebook. 10 December 2020, 1639H. https://www.facebook.com/kaTonying151/ Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [11]US Embassy in the Philippines. “U.S. National Security Advisor Reaffirms Alliance, Announces Military Assistance and Typhoon Relief during Philippines Visit”. US Government. 23 November 2020. https://ph.usembassy.gov/us-national-security-advisor-reaffirms-alliance-announces-mili tary-assistance-and-typhoon-relief-during-philippines-visit/ Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [12]Nguyen, Viet. “China’s Risky Plan for Floating Nuclear Power Plants in the South China Sea”. The Diplomat. 10 May 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/chinas-risky-plan-for-floating-nuclear-power-plants-in-t he-south-china-sea/ Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [13]Gotinga, JC. “PH to build 13 lighthouses on northernmost islands”. Rappler. 25 September 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippines-build-lighthouses-northernmost-islands Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [14]Staff Writer. “Philippines military completes outpost near Taiwan”. Taiwan News. 2 June 2019. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3715911 Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [15]Chung, Lawrence. “Operation Bashi Channel: the next flashpoint in the China-US military rivalry”. SCMP. 5 July 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3091879/operation-bashi-channel- next-flashpoint-china-us-military Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [16]Bajo, Anna. “PHL Navy’s second missile frigate launched in South Korea”. GMA News. 8 November 2019. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/714741/phl-navy-s-second-missile-frig ate-launched-in-south-korea/story/ Accessed 12 Dec 2020 [17]Nepomuceno, Priam. “More training for AW-159 chopper crew after pandemic: Navy”. Philippine News Agency. 8 September 2020. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1114704 Accessed 12 Dec 2020

Vietnam [1] “30th Meeting of State Parties to 1982 UNCLOS Wraps Up.” Vietnam News, Dec 10, 2020. https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/825077/30th-meeting-of-state-parties-to-1982-uncl os-wraps-up.html [2] “ASEAN Defense Chiefs and Partners Agree to Promote Peace in Asia.” The Japan Times, Dec 10, 2020.

The Open Source Briefing 23 ​ https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/12/10/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacifi c/asean-defense-chiefs-partners-agree-promote-peace-asia/ [3] Whelan, Sam. “China-Vietnam sourcing shift enters phase two, bringing more box congestion.” The Load Star, Dec 9, 2020. https://theloadstar.com/china-vietnam-sourcing-shift-enters-phase-two-bringing-mountin g-box-congestion/ [4] Kassabian, Armen. “Sanctioned Chinese Company Likely to Keep Influence in South China Sea.” VOA News, Dec 11, 2020. https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/sanctioned-chinese-company-likely-to-keep-influ ence-in-south-china-sea-/5694819.html

Aircraft and Naval Tracking [1] https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4071425 [2] https://twitter.com/JapanJointStaff/status/1335767199097581568?s=20 [3] https://twitter.com/JapanJointStaff/status/1336481979642961920?s=20 [4] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1335887945086078977 [5] https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4072213 [6] https://twitter.com/AircraftSpots/status/1336209632558137344?s=20 [7] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1336506545539080192?s=20 [8] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1336620081237819392?s=20 [9] https://twitter.com/KimagureGolf9/status/1336888392080969728 [10] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1336793142155161607?s=20 [11] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1336860078603972608 [12] https://twitter.com/JapanJointStaff/status/1337226013839826944?s=20 [13] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1336997322069221376?s=20 [14] https://twitter.com/SCS_news/status/1337778299997724672?s=20 [15] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1337184293664206848?s=20 [16] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1337710300687036416?s=20 [17] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1337957008910249985?s=20 [18] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1337958694445699073

The Open Source Briefing 24 ​