NIDS East Asian Strategic Review 2021
Summary Southeast Asia was impacted greatly by the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in 2020. In Indonesia and the Philippines, infections continued to spread or level off even into the start of 2021. While some countries in the region largely contained new infections, others experienced a resurgence of cases from the second half of 2020. In the region as a whole, there is no sign of the pandemic ending. Measures taken in response to COVID-19, such as border closures, city-wide lockdowns, and other restrictions, had serious repercussions on domestic economies with the poor particularly hit hard. At the same time, some governments resorted to authoritarian approaches under the pretext of the response to COVID-19, raising concerns about the impact on democratic practices that have been implemented in the countries. Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) played a role as a platform for international support to deal with COVID-19, its role as an independent actor to deal with problems was limited. Notwithstanding the pandemic, the situation in the South China Sea remained tense as China’s activities to claim its rights unfolded with a greater show of force. Southeast Asian countries responded militarily and diplomatically to the extent possible, taking into account the disparity in their forces with China’s and the impact on economic relations. Western countries, on the other hand, became increasingly wary of China’s actions, and the United States in particular embraced a more active engagement on this issue. As differences in opinion between the United States and China become prominent in the ASEAN diplomatic arena, the organization appears to be distancing itself from this great power competition. Prime Minister Despite the effects of COVID-19 spending on national Suga attending the defense budgets, countries are working to reinforce and East Asia Summit modernize their naval fleets and boost their capabilities for held online due to anti-ship attacks and maritime intelligence, surveillance, and Chapter 4 the pandemic on reconnaissance (ISR) for strengthening sea power. As regards November 14, 2020. military activities, while the first half of 2020 was marked President Trump of by the postponement of joint exercises due to COVID-19, Southeast Asia the United States large-scale exercises resumed in the second half of the year, did not attend it including by the Indonesian Navy. even once during Post-COVID-19 Regional Security Issues his four-year term. (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan MATSUURA Yoshihide (Lead author, Sections 1 and 2 (3)) official website) TOMIKAWA Hideo (Sections 2 (1) and (2) and 3)
114 115 Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 117 A Philippine military personnel conducting lockdown inspections in Manila (DPA/Kyodo News Images)
3 In Indonesia, the Joko Widodo administration issued the “Regulation of Figure 4.1 shows trends Indonesia has seen cases rise almost consistently since the beginning of the outbreak and clearly has not succeeded in containment. The Philippines recorded fewer cases after they peaked in August and September. infections nearlyHowever, have levelled off since then, and containment has not been achieved. Minister of Health Number 9 of 2020 on Restrictions Guidelines in Accelerating to COVID-19 Mitigation” Large-scale on April Social3. Based on the regulation, local governments imposed restrictions on activities called “large- scalesocialrestrictions” (Pembatasan However, SosialBerskala Besar: PSBB). strict measures like a city-wide lockdown were not taken in order to balance preventing contagion andperiod from the sustaining latter half April, of example, for initially the government only economicrequested activities.people to voluntarily refrain from returning Duringto their hometowns, and thethis is Ramadhan believed to contributed have to spreading the disease across the country. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte declared a state of public health emergency on March 8, put Metro Manila in lockdown from mid-March, and applied curfews to the entire island of Luzon. From June, after infections restrictive surged measures were relaxed, and the Philippinesback and forth between tightening has and loosening since restrictions. In gone its report, the in COVID-19 casesin COVID-19 in the ten ASEAN member states. Among them, Indonesia and accounted Philippines the aboutfor the 80% of total casesCOVID-19 and about 90% the of total deaths in the regionthe as of 2020. end of ) ) ) ) 0 3 0 ( ( ( 35 ( 41 157 378 (Month) 1,465 2 1
1 1
0 1
9 8
Vietnam Cambodia 7 6
4 5 Laos Brunei 3
2 1 0 800 600 400 200 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 (Number of people) ) ) ) ) ) ) 61 29 ( ( 471 ( 2,664 9,244 ( ( 21,944 113,010 735,124 123,740 474,064 ( 6,690 Thailand 58,599 Myanmar (Month) 2 1
1 1
2 0 Restrictions on movement and economic activities activities economic and movement on Restrictions 1 1
9
8 Singapore Malaysia
1. COVID-19 and Southeast Asia and Southeast 1. COVID-19 7
6
Dashboard. 3 4 5 Indonesia Philippines
those in parentheses indicate the number of deaths, both as of the end of December 2020. 2 1
According to the count of the World Health Organization (WHO), the 10 0 116 Compiled by the author based on country data from the WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) (COVID-19) the WHO Coronavirus the author based on country data from Compiled by Source: cases, while on the right not in parentheses indicate the total number of confirmed Note: Numbers (1) The Epidemiological Situation in Southeast Asian Countries Southeast Asian in Epidemiological The Situation (1) COVID-19 spread around the world and is also raging in Southeast Asia. The pandemic has affected the nature state of management in regional countries and even ASEAN the of role as a regional community. ASEAN member states million had total about 1.51 cases and a death toll of about 34,000 in 2020. within the countries, coupled with a slowdown in cross-border human mobility December In 2020, trade,significantregional andeconomy. the a had on fallout the Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasted Southeast realAsia’s growth rate the for year at -4.4%. 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Figure 4.1. Cases of COVID-19 in ASEAN member states (2020) in ASEAN 4.1. Cases of COVID-19 Figure (Number of people; thousand) Chapter 4 Southeast Asia
8 119 9 n April was prohibited, and public holidays during The World Bank, in an October report, forecast that the number 11 People are thus forced to work to survive, even by breaking breaking by even survive, to work to forced thus are People 10 First, the pandemic has had an adverse economic impact especially on In Cambodia, travel between Phnom Penh and Khmer otherNew Year period i provinces during the this period were to moved August. of poor people (those with incomes less than $5.50 per day) in developing East East in developing per day) with incomes than less $5.50 (those people poor of Asian and Pacific countries (including Southeast Asian countries except Brunei (2) State Management Problems Management State (2) pandemicThe COVID-19 has constrained state functions in all countries in Southeast Asia, albeit to varying degrees. This has triggered a major fallout livelihoods.on their people’s The economic and political issues are discussed below. low-income groups, including people who work in the informalexample, inability sector. to work For due to movement restrictions has a direct bearing on the survival of day laborers and street subsidies vendors. and other support are available, Even they may be inadequate when or may not be government Indonesia, inJune,numberproperlydelivered.reportsof Accordingthe to of as people unemployed reached million, 6.4 and the government’s cash payments in response to COVID-19 were reaching only about 30% dueto geographical constraints, of the institutional problems,corruption, population and other obstacles. the restrictions, which in turn hinders containment. Such circumstancesbehind the government’s drive to give greater priority are to maintaining economic activities strict over infection control restrictions. In particular, according to ADB, the Philippines’ real growth rate is projected to -8.5% to on an dropannualized significantlybasis, and there are concerns that this will have serious impact. a and public and commercial facilities were temporarily closed. At the Ramadhanend of in May, mass prayers and open houses at government offices and businesses banned, were although there had been cases new no in the previous groups. large in celebrating from restricted were too, Individuals, weeks. two 4 It is reported It 6 As a result, until July, 7 The government has contained new new contained has government The 5
Until around July, the rest of the countries in the region fell into two Vietnamstopped issuing visas to Chinese travelers and suspended flights to 118 that Vietnam took very strict measures to quarantine infected persons and theircontacts and restrict activities, backed stronga by policy implementation mechanism under the direction the of Communist Party. International Monetary Fund (IMF) mentions Indonesia and the Philippines as countries that eased restrictions beforethey had suppressed infection. notes It that the effectiveness of containment was affected by constraints healthcare, in testing, and government capacity to populated cities, implement which have both lockdowns a large informal of sector and densely a high level of poverty, and in the case Indonesia, of also the by delayed start restrictions. of categories: those that had a certain number explosive spread of of new totalinfections like cases in Indonesia but and avoided the Philippines the and hadlimiteda numberdeaths of (Malaysia, Thailand, andthose and Singapore); that hadminimal cases and deaths (tens(Vietnam,deaths) digitMyanmar, Cambodia, Brunei).Laos,andSubsequently, to hundreds of cases and zero or single-some countries saw a rise in new cases as restrictions were eased on people’s movement and economic activities. At the timeMalaysia of have writing, recorded Myanmar a surge and inaccountmigrantworkerswhere Singapore, cases is uniqueexample A September.and (and deaths in the former) since August more thanfor the 90% total of number cases. of Authorities this to catch were slow and hygiene, poor with dormitories overcrowded in occurred that clusters led to infection spreading from April. outbreaks testing by all migrant and taking workers measures their to improve living conditions, including building new dormitories that take into infectiousdiseases. account and from mainland China as early as the beginning February. of new cases were not identified in the countryfor three months, and no deaths were reported since the outbreak country the into entries banned Brunei deaths. and cases community-acquired began. However, Vietnam has sinceand restricted confirmed the activities of individuals. Large gatherings were prohibited, Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 121 However, the “circuit breaker” breaker” “circuit the However, 16 According to the final election results released on on released results election final the to According 15 Nevertheless, in the July 10 voting results, the ruling ruling the results, voting 10 July the in Nevertheless, 17 The need infection for control may be real, and to some extent may it require In Myanmar, State Counsellor Aung the San de facto Suu Kyi, government In Singapore, opposition parties called the for postponement the of general party significantly reducedits shareof votes althoughit stillwon, Partyopposition while Workers’ gained more seats.the authoritarian approaches. Nevertheless, the attempts made incumbent by administrations to use COVID-19 as a pretext to steer policies advantageto are underminingtheir public trustown in the government, and the resultant backlash is creating political and social turmoil. There are concerns that such measure to restrict social activities was liftedAction on June Party 1, and the decided ruling to People’s hold the campaign rallies and generalcontact between candidates electionand voters were restricted in in July. Because response theto largeelection COVID-19, campaign was expected to be unfavorable parties. opposition to federal territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya on October Meanwhile,14. Malaysian politics continued to be in turmoil due to the struggle leadership for following the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in February. Kingto appealed Al-Sultan Prime MinisterOn 23, October Muhyiddin Yassin Abdullah to declare a proclamation emergency, citing of the need to combat COVID-19 and stabilize the lives of the people. The King, however, did not recognize the necessity and rejected the request. leader, announced that the general election on November 8, 2020 would take place as scheduled, even as the number infected of people increased rapidly and some opposition parties called a postponement. for is reported It that due to a ban on gatherings more than of people 50 and restrictions on movement to curtail COVID-19, emerging opposition parties were at a particular disadvantage in theelection campaign. November 14, the ruling 14, November National League Democracy for more votes than won in the previous election and maintained its single-party majority. election amidst outbreak, the COVID-19 after speculation emerged in March that the Parliament would be dissolved early. In 13 14 The prolongation of the COVID-19 pandemic will continue continue will pandemic COVID-19 the of prolongation The 12
In Malaysia, the resurgence infections of prompted the government to Secondly, inSecondly, the political context each of country, the restrictions that have fact,since July 2020, rallies by students and others have not only criticized the government but also advocated for reform of the monarchy, which in turn has led to the emergence of pro-royalist groups and the rise of tensions between the opposing factions. Against this backdrop, when an anti-government rally was staged on October 15, the government declared a state of emergency for Bangkok, banned gatherings of five people or more,were people and 55 least at arrested rally, 17 November leadersothers.theaddition,Inand at 20 protest reportedly injured, including six who were shot by unknown assailants amid violent clashes among dissidents, police, and royal supporters. Anti-regime rallies in Thailand continued until December,began to reemerge across the country. when COVID-19 infections 120 and Singapore) will increase by somewhere betweenmillion in 2020. 9.5 million and 12.6 issue a Conditional Control Movement Order the for state Selangor of and the to push more people into poverty and widen the economic gap in the countries, and this is anticipated to a major impact have on state stability and security. been put in place in response led have to constraints to COVID-19 on political freedoms based on democratic values. A salient example is Thailand. In Thailand, a state of emergency was declared by Prime Minister Prayut Chan- o-cha on March 26 to allow for lockdown as a The COVID-19 declaration countermeasure. was extended twice, at the end of April and the end of May. At the end-of-June deadline, Prime Minister declaration Prayut for another month decided despite the absence to of new cases extend for more than the a month. Since then, the declaration has repeatedly been extended, and the state emergency of is still in place as the Although of 2020. end of the Prayut government was transferred from militaryopposed to civilian to Prayut’s rule repressive in stance July 2019, factions toward opposition parties continue anti-governmenthold rallies. Though to the government deniesit, is it believed that the state emergency of continues to be in place to counter such rallies. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia In 123 22 On 21 At the Mekong-Japan Foreign Foreign Mekong-Japan the At 24 At the ASEAN-Japan Foreign Ministers’ 25 23 On September at the ASEAN-China 9, Foreign Ministers’ 20 At At the same time, the U.S. pledge of over $87 million in relatedCOVID-19 Meeting (online), State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China would establish a relationship of “China-ASEAN vaccine friends” by giving priority to the vaccine needs ASEANof member states and announced the joint buildingreserve a of emergency pool of medical supplies. Ministers’ Meeting held online on July 9, it was agreed that Japan would provide would Japanagreed that was it 9, July onlineon Ministers’ held Meeting assistance worth 11.6 billion yen, including medical equipment, countriesMekong mentioned to above. the five Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced on December 202015, that it would only procure vaccines certifiedby WHO. Althoughit was reported that this announcement the excluded acceptance vaccines of directly from China, this view has been disputed. December 6, Indonesia received the first shipmentSinovac vaccines. of 1.2On December million31, Thailand dosesannounced of that it secured two million doses vaccines of to be received from February and to later April 2021, revealedin an official announcement that the vaccineswould be Sinovac’s. Meeting (online) on September 9, Japan announced that it is contributing $50 million to support the establishment of the ASEAN Center for Public Health assistance to ASEAN member states was welcomed States at Summit (online) the held on November 14. ASEAN-United “vaccine diplomacy.”to cooperate vaccines. the for provision COVID-19 of Since China’s November, On Aug ust 20, ChinaSinovac Biotech has reached been supplying vaccines an to ag Bio pharmaceutical Farma, reement company in Indonesia, and a has been producing vaccines state-owned for with Indonesiathe Indonesian domestic market. On August 24, at the online summit the of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), which is a framework for cooperation between China and the countries of Laos, the Myanmar, Mekong Thailand, River and basin Vietnam), Premier (Cambodia, Keqiang of announced the State that China Council would give Li Mekong countries priorityvaccines and set up special funds access the for promotion public health of under the to LMC framework. It is unclear, however, if if however, unclear, is It 18 19
TakeHA/DR under the ASEAN framework as an example. The 2004 Indian Meanwhile, China has been demonstrating its presence by offering bilateral ASEAN was useful in sharing and providing hygiene and medicalpersonnel, supplies, funds, know-how, and other items needed by countries in theregion during the spread the of disease at that time. Ocean earthquake and tsunamiprompted the gradual formation regionalof cooperation arrangements and schemes in both the military and civilian sectors. But in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, various factors are have thought made to cooperation on tangible supplies difficult, including: allstates member were affected nearly simultaneously; the nature the of crisis entailing an infectious disease forced countries to close their borders and stop the flow of people and goods; and necessary supplies were overwhelmed by the demand at home. Against this backdrop, the establishment ASEAN the of COVID-19 Response Fund and the ASEAN Regional Reserve of Public Medical Health Supplies Emergencies for was proposed at the summit in the launch April of the latter was 2020, confirmed and at the ASEANSummit (online) held on November 2020. 12, 122 The COVID-19 pandemicThe COVID-19 presented issues Southeast for Asian countries and, understandably, also pressingissues for the region as a whole. Still, ASEAN as aregional organization did not play a marked Aprilrole 14, 2020,in dealing the Specialwith the ASEANissues. SummitdeclarationOn the of summit called intra-ASEAN for cooperation on in areas COVID-19 such as was held online.health and hygiene, Themilitary medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and the economy, as well as cooperationand international with organizations, external including WHO. partners (3) Regional Diplomacy Issues Diplomacy Regional (3) a situation may jeopardize democratic practices that have been implemented in Southeast Asian countries, which could affect not only ASEAN countries themselves but also the ASEAN value of as a community. andmultilateral cooperation, known initially as“mask diplomacy” andlater as Chapter 4 Southeast Asia , 125 , escorted by West Capella West maintaining presence near the (U.S. Navy photo by MC2 Brenton It has It begun to conduct operations 28 Poyser) Gabrielle Giffords LCS USS Gabrielle drill Capella ship West 32 However, inHowever, the same month, the drill ship 31 Vietnam deployed its Border Guard shing and fi and other vessels. In August, the Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8 30 29 In mid-May2019, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel patrolled waters around Following Following President Xi announcementJinping’s 2018 to strengthen energy In the past, China As a result of diplomatic negotiations, the ships of both nally sidesleft fi the waters in October. which was contracted to Malaysia’s national oildrill WhenDecember.thein vessels activities,exploration ChinaCCG andsent company Petronas, began shipfrom moved the area off the coast of Sarawak to the Malaysian-Vietnamese joint developmentarea, China followed the ship with alternating vessels. with a greater show of force, targeted at Malaysia and Vietnam’s independent development of energy resources in waters overlapping with the claims of the line. nine-dash so-called the Luconia Shoals at the southern tip the of Spratly Islands and sailed through ed naturala gasliquefi (LNG) mining area, which was set upby Malaysia and operated by the private oil company Sarawak Shell. In July, a Chinese survey ship and a CCG vessel sailed near the development area set up by northwestVietnam, of Vanguard Bank, exploration putting activities of Rosneft, pressurea Russian national on oil company operating the in the area. development and several vessels, includingof Vietnam. the 12,000-ton CCG 3901 cutter, approached the coast security, China has become more oriented toward securing its own andinterests enhancing activities. exploration sporadically attempted to attempted sporadically put pressure on Malaysia and and exploration Vietnam’s development activities in The establishment of 26 in Southeast Asia 27 It It is meaningful that ASEAN and other regional frameworks function as 2. The South China Sea Dispute and Security Developments Developments The South China Sea Dispute and Security 2. 124 (1) Responses by Countries: Confl ict Avoidance Responses and Countermoves(1) by Countries: Confl The situation in the South China Sea remained tense in China 2020. continued activitiesassertto rightsits intheSouthChina demonstratingisSea, andBeijing againstcountriesotherforce of concerned,greater a show including parties the to South China boost Sea dispute. its deployment To capabilities, China proceeded to establish military outposts on geological features effectively it controls and on maritime features it has reclaimed sinceOn the2014. other hand, China’s show force hasof elicited stronger opposition from other countries and raisedthe alarm of Western countries, including the United States. This section describes some incidentsthat occurred between China and Southeast Asian countries concerned Chineseandmilitary U.S. of overviewanprovides addition, it Indispute. thewith operations in the South China Sea and the diplomatic responses taken ASEAN. by Emergencies and Emerging Diseasesand that it would contribute(ACPHEED) $1 million to the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund. ACPHEED was offi cially announced at ACPHEED wasthe offi ASEANSummit onNovember 12, the on (online) Summit ASEAN-Japan the at held was event inaugural the and same day. a platform support for from external partners in responding to COVID-19. As discussed in the next section, however, it would not be sound if the great powers utilize cooperation, even support,COVID-19 as a means for obtaining Southeast Asian countries’ alignmentrivalry. The regional recovery with society’s from must be made COVID-19 in a any of them in the age of U.S.-Chinaforward-looking manner through intra- and extra-regional cooperation,thestatesmember ASEANand fully that respectsof sharedvalues the way both in a ownership and autonomy ASEAN. of Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 127 36 In May, 38 A Vietnamese A 37 39 40 34 In addition, in April 2020, a collision 35 that was continuing to conduct exploration activities. While China had left the area of a standoff with Malaysia, it was confi rmed confi was it Malaysia, with standoff Whilea China area the of had left In April 2020, it was reported that a Chinese oceanographic survey ship was Vietnam, on the other hand, announced in the December establishment 2019 The United States, Australia, and other countries carried on with their between a CCG vessel and a Vietnamese shing boat fi Vietnamese was media, ramping up reported domestic public outcry against China. by the West CapellaWest completed its scheduled work and left the waters, and later, the Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship also departed. In response to the situation, the United States and Australia sent naval ships and carried out exercises near the waters in late April. In May, the United States sent two vessels, littoralincluding combat ship (LCS), to continue a surveillance. ruling coalition parties, and a new administration headed by Ministerof Home Affairs Muhyiddin was formed. Yassin ship was also tagging the Chinese survey ship, creating a tense situation with vessels from three countries facing each other in the same waters. once again approaching the Vietnamese development area. Subsequently, the survey ship, together with several vessels, sailed southward near the exclusive West drill ship the approached and Malaysia by claimed (EEZ) zone economic Capella of maritimeof militias provinces, in 14 aiming to strengthen response capabilities cooperation. military-civilian under daily surveillance, near including freedom operations navigation of (FONOPs) maritime features claimed by China.can be considered a response tailored The more to a particular U.S. situation action and a new describeddevelopment involvement in in the U.S. South above, China Sea. Malaysia, on the however, other hand, could nd not effective fi means other than continuingnegotiations, with persistentits ministers and others repeatedly calling for a “peacefulsolution” in the face of Chinese pressure. Malaysia sometimes used wordings, including “sea of peace, stability and trade” and “all relevant parties.”administration’s The new policy toward the South China Sea dispute should be given focus, including the implications such wordings. of Under such circumstances, such Under gas fi elds. But,gas asfi described above, CCG vessel and survey operations from around ship became more mid-2019 continuous and coordinated. Malaysiain December 2019, made a partial submission for rights in the South China Sea, overlapping with the claims Chinaof and Vietnam, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). CLCS makes recommendations based on information received from partiesto establish the outer limits the of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. In 2009, andMalaysiawhen Vietnam made a joint submission, China submitted a note verbale attached with a In this light, China submitted another Sibutu Strait Sibutu Reef 33 Philippines Scarborough Reed (Recto) Bank Commodore Reef Brunei Mischief Reef Mischief Second Thitu Island Thomas Reef Spratly Islands Continental shelf claimed by Malaysia Continental shelf claimed by Indonesia Continental shelf claimed by Brunei Indonesia Fiery Cross Reef Sandy Cay Malaysia Subi Reef Shoals Luconia developmentarea Island Spratly Vietnam-Malaysia joint Island Woody activity area West Capella West Paracel Islands South China Sea South China s nine-dash line ’ Claims of the Indo-Pacific,” CSIS, among other CSIS, among other Claims of the Indo-Pacific,” sources. Compiled by the author based on AMTI, “Maritime AMTI, on based author the by Compiled shown on the map. shown by Vietnam Vietnam (200 nautical miles) China China (200 nautical miles) Continental shelf claimed Vanguard Bank Natuna Islands Vietnam Haiyang Dizhi 8 Dizhi Haiyang activity area development area (06-01) Rosneft Only the main claims mentioned in this chapter are are chapter this in mentioned claims main the Only Note: Sources: Sources: 126 note verbale to the UN strongly protesting the partial submission. is believed It that Malaysia took this measure due to a change in policy under the Mahathir administration, which came to power in May disputes 2018, to related proactively to address rights over the Southin February China2020 led to the collapse theof cooperative relationship among Sea.the However, political upheaval Figure 4.2. Main claims by countries over the countries over Main claims by 4.2. Figure map of the so-called nine-dash line to the United Nations (UN) and asked the UN not to evaluate the joint application.
Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 129 China 47 50 Indonesia submitted a note 48 Moreover, Australia, Moreover, the United Kingdom, 49 The presence U.S. in the South China Sea and its involvement in the dispute made unilateral decisions related to the South China Sea, announcing the establishment administrative of districts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in April and a ban on fishing in the waters in May. France, Germany, and other countries submitted similar opinions to the UN. Not only countries in Southeast Asia concerned with the dispute but alsoWestern major powers showed clear support for the President 2016 Duterte Arbitral had not actively referred to after taking Award, office. which Malaysia’s Malaysia’s submission to CLCS. The note stated China’s counterarguments that were invalid the and appealed for claimslegitimacy based made on in thethe of Arbitral Award Tribunalin the SouthChina Sea Arbitration. are generally thought the to favor Philippine security environment. Since December 2018, Delfin Lorenzana, secretary of national defense, hastheUnited States to clarify asked the scope application of defense of obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between United he received States. assurances In March 2019, the from Secretary State of Philippines and the Pompeo that “any armed in attack the South […] China Sea will trigger mutual In reality, Mutual Treaty.” Defense under [the] Article obligations of 4 defense however, discussions for clarifying the scope of application progress. have When not U.S. secretary made of defense Mark Esper visited the Philippines Defensein NovemberSecretary 2019, Lorenzana said the Philippines planned to review the MDT Nevertheless, by the end 2019. of discussions were not held toward stance diplomatic Philippines’ the Furthermore, year. the of end the by theUnited States under the Duterte administration achieve to and has been States complicated by United the on over-reliance from away move to need the balance between the United Statesunilaterally decided to andabrogate the China. Visiting Forces Agreement In(VFA), a key February 2020, the Philippines verbale in andMay, the United States addressed a letter to the UN in June. In July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on the U.S. position regarding the South China Sea dispute, indicating that the United States would be actively in involved the issue. However, In July and and In July 45 43 46 In June 2019, a Philippine In June 2019, 42 44 Even with the ongoing “regular” naval patrols of of patrols naval “regular” ongoing the with Even 41
The Rodrigo Duterte administration of the Philippines has separated A number Chinese of vessels gathered around Thitu Island and around In responseambitions to China’s to strengthen de facto control over At At the beginning of 2020, a CCG vessel paid an official visit to the August, Chinese naval vessels successively sailed in offshore Philippines. Their automatic identification system(AIS) was turnedoff, and no coastal state was notified, according to reports. the United States, approached vessel CCG a drill a ship operating in Vanguard Bank in July as part continued China’s of demonstration force. of economic development from security in its response to China the over South China Sea dispute, and has actively promoted bilateral cooperation. appears It that this approach basically has not changed.In 2020, the Philippines still fundamentally sought to find a peaceful solution to the dispute;time, at the though, same it made more attempts to effectively applying counterthe rule of China’s law in show the international of framework. force This by was partially triggered by the continued dispute with China in theIsland (Pag-asa Island) that isarea de facto controlled the by Philippines. of Thitu nearby Sandy Cay, coinciding with the start of the construction of a landingplace on Thitu Island A series inDecember incidents of 2018. then obstructed the sailing ships of and operations fishing of boats. fishing boat operating near Reed (Recto) Bank was opinion toughenedChina. fishinga toward result, public As boat. slammed by a Chinese 128 it it was later reported that, in February 2020, a ship believed to naval be vessel a Chineselocked a fire-control radar onto aPhilippine navy corvetteCommodore near Reef under the effective control of the Philippines; it brought to light the challenges building of trust between the two countries. in June that Beijing had sailed an oceanographic survey ship, this time in the EEZ claimed by Vietnam. these waters, the Philippines submitted a note verbale in March regarding Philippines for the first time, and a joint drill with the Philippine Coast Guard Guard Coast Philippine the with drill joint a and time, first the for Philippines was conducted, raising an expectation that tensions would ease. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 131 56 Indonesia maintains that is it a non-claimant state in the territorial dispute in In DecemberPrabowo Subianto,2019, defense minister, on his firstofficial On the other hand, the Philippines has shown an openness to cooperation theSouth China Sea. Indonesia and China have existsrepeatedly no dispute over territorialconfirmed waters between the two countries.that China,there on the other hand, contends that the area the of so-called nine-dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s claim to maritime rights and interests.attempts to Inmake the effect addition, of historic Chinafishing rights in the undemarcated sea area a fait accompli, together with the claim that they precede economicthe exclusive activities in the EEZ definedbetween Chinaby and Indonesia,UNCLOS. which refuses to accept claim. China’s There is an ongoing tussle visit to China as a Chairman minister, of met the with Central Chinese officials, MilitaryMinister Fenghe, andWei discussed strengthening including Commission bilateral ties in the Vice defense Xu Qiliang and sector. Defense However, from the latter Chinese half fishingvessels of accompanied December,by CCGvessels it repeatedly engaged was in “illegal, reportedunreported, and that unregulated (IUU) fishing” in theIndonesia EEZ to the northclaimed the of Natuna Islands. Indonesia by sent a patrol vessel of the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut Republik with China to the extent manageable in China Sea and non-traditional energy security sectors. example, duringFor development the in the South above-mentioned visit of President Duterte to China, the two countries talks on joint explorationheld resourcesof in the South China Sea. A document describing the members of the Philippines-China Steering Inter-Governmental Committee on Cooperation Joint on Oil and Gas was mutually exchanged, and the committee was established. During Defense visit to Minister the Wei’s Philippines in September,the maintenance peaceof and stability in theSouth China Sea was confirmed in a meeting with Defense Secretary Lorenzana, and guidelines were signed for China’s financial assistanceworth 130 million yuan that could be used by the Philippine military in procuring equipment for HA/ operationsDR and other supplies. WithU.S.- 52 However, in However, June, 51 55 53 In August 2020, the Kalayaan Municipality (town), which has 54
In this way, the Philippines is taking measures to counter China on the South China tensions in the waters increasing, the Philippines announced exercises military in joint August in participating from military its prohibit would it that with other countries in the high seas of the South China Sea. As such moves illustrate, the Philippines struggled to maintain a balance between the United States and China. 130 arrangement maintaining for the Philippines-U.S. alliance. China Sea dispute by utilizing the rule of law in the international framework, alongsideasserting itsown claims.In August at the invitation2019, Beijing, of President Duterte made his fifth visit to China since assumingthe Arbitral office Award and for raisedthe first time.However, as Chinese president Xisteadfast was in his refusal to recognize the award, the two sides reaffirmed their differences in opinion and shared the view through to dialogue and other means. On resolve the occasion Chinese of defense minister the issue peacefully Wei Fenghe’s visit to the Philippines in September 2020, President stressed the importance Duterte of international law in resolving disputes in the South China Sea, noting, “Any and all disputes must be resolved peacefully in full accord with the UNCLOS [United Nations Convention Sea] and on all the relevant Law international of instruments.” the In addition,Department the of Philippine Foreign Affairs in reiteratedSeptember2020 in a GeneralAssembly UN the tospeech Dutertehis in statement in July 2020 and President the Philippines’ commitment to the landing Arbitral place Award. on Thitu The aforementioned Island and was Defense completed Secretary Lorenzana, in June who visited 2020, the despite site withofficers, senior stated obstructions, military that work would continue on infrastructure developmentrepairs. runway and a temporary freeze on the abrogation process was announced amidst China’s continued show of force in the waters surrounding the Philippines. jurisdiction Thitu over Island, names gave to six sandbanks and reefs around the island that have been used as refuge for fishermen, and asserted its de facto control the over waters. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 133 Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) (CVN-71) made a port call call port a made (CVN-71) (CVN-68) were conducting self- conducting were (CVN-68) 65 64 63 Meanwhile, the Yokosuka-based USS 66 U.S. andU.S. Chinese Activities in the South China Sea: Deployment Enhancement Presence and Capability In March 2020, after Theodore USS Roosevelt No No significant changes in China’s maneuvers were observed despite the In September 2020, a CCG vessel again sailed near the EEZ boundary quarantine of their crews, leaving the United States without an aircraft carrier carrier aircraft an without States United the leaving crews, their of quarantine and the Naval Base Kitsap-based USS Nimitz USS Kitsap-based Base Naval the and neither rights the over Spratly Islands nor historical rights and that negotiation was unnecessary. (2) (2) In 2020, as the effects of COVID-19 were felt across the region, China began toconduct a show of force against Malaysia and Vietnam’sas described energy above. The development United States, which was considering a more active involvement in the South China Sea dispute, took China, despite a temporary constraints stern on its aircraft carrier response operations in the toward Pacific due to the pandemic. in Da Nang City, Vietnam, crew members were confirmed to have contracted COVID-19aboard the vessel. Itcalled at Guam and was forced to stay there for term.a long rigorous responses taken byopinion rejecting Indonesia claims. is China’s anticipated It attempts that China’s to make and the clear showits ofclaims international a fait accompli in these waters publicwill be continuous. CollinIn this Koh, regard, a research fellow at the S. RajaratnamStudies School of (RSIS), International Nanyang Technological Universityexpressed the (NTU) view that Indonesia in may have to rethink Singapore, its strategyChina with a new approach in the future. and confront claimedIndonesia. by Although vessels all of countries freedom enjoy of navigation inthe high seas and in the EEZs of other countries, this CCG vessel stayed for many hours and showed suspicious tracks, raising questions warned and vessel about the BAKAMLA tracked that reported was It operations. its that the leave it area. In 57 On 59 58 61 In response, China sent a note verbale in June expressing expressing June in verbale note a sent China response, In 62 This government policy is believed to be based on Jakarta’s realistic realistic Jakarta’s on based be to believed is policy government This 60
In the international arena, Indonesia showed clear support for the rule of Interms the of political response,Mahfud Mohd MD, coordinatingminister the other hand, Coordinating Minister Mahfud, Defense and Ministerothers sought to defuse Prabowo, the debate, noting that the issues were diplomatic issues. readiness to negotiate with Indonesia.Marsudi refused, However, stating that Foreign Indonesia did not Ministerrecognize China’s claims Retno for January 2020, the Indonesian Navy increased the number of ships deployed to to deployed ships of number the increased Navy Indonesian the 2020, January the Natuna Islands and conducted monitoring operations with maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The Air Force also conductedfighters in the areas, not albeit describing them as part surveillanceits of responses routine operation. stern All take to willingness operations Jakarta’s demonstrated activities withthese F-16 only with the maritime security agency but also with the military. 132 Indonesia: BAKAMLA) and lodged a protest throughprotestChineseembassy. the a Indonesia:BAKAMLA)lodged and perception of the situation, not wantingwhich there is a difference military of to escalate strength. the conflict with China, with law law in the international framework from the standpoint a of “non-claimant” in the South China Sea dispute, and squarely thereby, opposed attempts China’s to make its claims in the waters a fait accompli. In May 2020, the Indonesian government submitted a note verbale to the objections CLCS to in the response to Malaysian China’s submission stated to that, as CLCS.a party to In UNCLOS, it did the not support any note, claims that violate Indonesiainternational law, including UNCLOS, and expressed its support for the 2016 Award. Arbitral for political,for legal and security affairs, refused to negotiate on Indonesia’s sovereignty. President Joko visited the Greater accompanied Natuna by Island officials in including January, Luhut Binsar minister Pandjaitan, for coordinating maritime affairs and commander the of Indonesian National investment,Armed Forces. held He a dialogue with and ACM Hadi fishermen Tjahjanto, andothers regarding the developmentplan for theNatuna Islands, demonstratingintent to Indonesia’s protect its interests to the islands. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia , 135 At the At end 71 75 Ronald Reagan 73 When USS 74 , which had returnedjoinedhad which duty, , to and Nimitz USS 72 76 Ronald Reagan As shown above, both the United States and China strengthened their Drills and deployment of forces by both the great powers, the United States States United the powers, great the both by forces of deployment and Drills Thus, until around the mid-2020, United States continued to demonstrate its which had returned to the South China Sea upon the completion of its mission in another area, conducted aviation training, China is said red to have again fi ballistic missiles into the South China Sea at the August. end of of June, USS to conduct dual-carrier exercises in the South China Sea for the fi rst time six in dual-carrierto conduct in the exercises China South the fi for Sea years. B-52H bombers were added to the exercises, and aviation and other drills were carried out. Andersen AFB inIn May. June, it was reported that the United States may have conducted andMPA other aircraft patrols near the Bashi Channel. presence in the South China Sea. Some believe that China competition” is encompassing waging military “total capabilities against the United States in these waters. and China, in the South China Sea continued in the months that followed. In early July, China conductedand soon after, the United States again conducted dual-carriernaval exercises in the exercises inSouth China Sea, Meanwhile,the which was ChinaBTF. joined B-1B by deployed vicinity fighter bombers WoodyIsland.of to ghtersthe and JH-7 fi Paracel J-11B Islands, projectioncapabilities,presenceChinaforceSouth withtheglobal in Sea while China demonstrated its deployment capabilities using the geographical features effectivelyit controls and the geographical features reclaimed it in the South China Sea. Since then, China has begun to demonstrate its ability to strike from longer distances in the course conducting of off-shore drills. the From end of July to early August, China conducted exercises in several21 and sea areas, DF-26 ring ballistic fi DF- missiles intobomber, which theis said to be capable carryingof South long-range the anti-shipYJ-12 China Sea. Furthermore, drills. re live-fi reportedly conducted also missile, the H-6J In 69 70 The United States, on showing China’sability to make deployments in the South China Sea using the features effectively it controls and geographical features reclaimed in these waters. the other hand, deployed four B1-B bombers from (Dyess Wing Bomb 7th the Air Force Base, Texas) to Amid these changes in the 68 (DDG-52), followed by the cruiser USS USS cruiser the by followed (DDG-52), Nevertheless, in April Air 2020, the U.S. 67 In response, in the same month, Navy the conducted U.S. in the FONOPs contrast, in May, it was reported that China appears to have sent KJ-500 early early KJ-500 sent have to appears China that reported was it May, in contrast, warning and control aircraft and MPA KQ-200 (or Y-8 transport aircraft) reportedalsowas SpratlyIslands.the inIt to Reef thatCrossFieryH-6K bombers conducted takeoff and landing exercises on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, deployments of the U.S. Forces in the c, Western ChinaPacifi stepped upits operationsin the South China Sea, timing them as if to test the readiness the of Forces. U.S. Paracel Islands using Barry USS Bunker (CG-52) Hill in the Spratly Islands. In addition, throughforce employment “dynamic (DFE)” that deploys forces from the U.S. mainland when necessary, B-1Bs of the 28th Bomb Wing (Ellsworth Air Force Base, Dakota) conductedSouth a Bomber Force Task (BTF) mission over the South China Sea and demonstrated that both the Navy and Air had Force not lost their deployment capability in the Western(see c Chapter Pacifi 6, Section (2)). 2 Force Force implemented its pulling back schedule as planned for bombers, which had been deployed to Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) in Guam as part of the Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) missions. 134 B-52Hs participating in an aviation drill with carrier-based aircraft during the dual-carrier exercises (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Cmdr. Joseph Stephens) deployed in the c. Western Pacifi Chapter 4 Southeast Asia , 137 Compared to the 77 East Asian Strategic Review 2020 The ASEAN Summit, originally scheduled for April in Hanoi, was postponed In the same paragraph, a sentence was added reaffirming that UNCLOS was
(3) Diplomatic(3) Efforts of ASEAN The aforementioned issues surrounding the South China Seaand the increased workings the over shadow a cast China have and States United the of presence of ASEAN as a regional organization. Given that the 2020 ASEAN chair was preliminarystanceagainststrongChina,were there a taken has Vietnam, which observations that ASEAN may take a stronger stance on the South China Sea dispute thanin the past. due to COVID-19 and was held online on June 26. The Chairman’s Statement released on the following day, June referred27, to the South China Sea dispute as follows: “We discussed the situation in the South China activitiesdevelopments,Sea,reclamations,recent land the duringonexpressed concernswere which erodedtrustseriousconfidence, incidents,and have and which increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.” wording at the 2018 and 2019 summits, which “took note of some concernssummits,somethe on “tookof whichnote 2019 and 2018 the wordingat land reclamations and activities in the area,” the 2020 wording appears to have elevated the level of concern by mentioning more specific issues, such as those mentioned while above, notidentifying the parties name. by the basis determining for maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests maritimeover zones, and that all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out in the the paragraph UNCLOS on legal the Code framework. of Conduct (COC) in In the South addition,China Sea removed “warmlythewelcomed continued improvement in cooperation between ASEAN and China,” which was in the previous relations related to statement this issue. Regarding the conclusion the of COC, the wording in terms of Sino-ASEAN “within a mutually-agreed timeline” (see internationalwith“consistentreplacedwith and deleted was 1) SectionChapter 4, includinglaw, the UNCLOS.” 1982 These changes, coupled with the increasing attempt to take a suggestsupport ASEAN’s noted earlier, the Arbitral for Award more principled stance toward China on the South China Sea dispute.
Compiled by the author based on media reports. media on based author the by Compiled Sources:
Early warning and control aircraft and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Fiery Cross Reef Cross Fiery to aircraft reconnaissance maritime and aircraft control and warning Early
● LHD]
[incl. 075 075 [incl.
Fighters and fighter bombers to Woody Island Woody to bombers fighter and Fighters
●
drill drill
) ) ( Shandong
Bombers to Woody Island Woody to Bombers Island Woody to Bombers
● ●
carrier
● Aircraft Aircraft Dual-carrier exercises Dual-carrier Sea China South sails ) ( carrier Aircraft China Liaoning
● ●
Destroyer locks radar on U.S. patrol aircraft (Philippine Sea) (Philippine aircraft patrol U.S. on radar locks Destroyer [Incl. Paracel area] Wide-area maritime drill / ballistic missile drill missile ballistic / drill maritime Wide-area area] Paracel [Incl.
● ●
Ballistic missile / new bomber drill [Paracel area] [Paracel drill bomber new / missile Ballistic drill warfare Anti-submarine
● ●
Naval live-fire drill live-fire Naval [Incl. Paracel area] Wide-area maritime maritime Wide-area area] Paracel [Incl. Naval exercise [Paracel area] [Paracel exercise Naval
● ● ● drill
Total: 3 times 3 Total: DDG-114 CG-52 LCS-8
● ● ● ● FONOPs (Paracel) FONOPs
Total: 6 times 6 Total: DDG-56 DDG-89 DDG-89 DDG-52 DDG-85 DDG-56 FONOPs (Spratly) FONOPs
● ● ● ● ● ● ●
BTF mission BTF
● ● ● ● B-1B B-1B B-1B B-1B
RIMPAC
●
B-52s are withdrawn from Guam from withdrawn are B-52s Aircraft carrier (CVN-76) drill (CVN-76) carrier Aircraft Aircraft carrier (CVN-76) drill (CVN-76) carrier Aircraft
● ● ●
United States United
navigation drill navigation
Dual-carrier exercises (CVN-76/78) (2nd round) (2nd (CVN-76/78) exercises Dual-carrier
●
conduct conduct
navies navies Dual-carrier exercises (CVN-76/78) / aviation drill (B-52) drill aviation / (CVN-76/78) exercises Dual-carrier
● ● COVID-19 outbreak on aircraft carrier (CVN-71) carrier aircraft on outbreak COVID-19
and Indian Indian and
CCG vessel sails near Vanguard Bank (July); Vietnamese frigate is sent (August) sent is frigate Vietnamese (July); Bank Vanguard near sails vessel CCG U.S. vessel monitors Chinese survey ship survey Chinese monitors vessel U.S.
● ● Vietnamese Vietnamese ●
Re-dispatch
● ● ● ● Chinese survey ship operates in offshore Vietnam offshore in operates ship survey Chinese Chinese survey ship operates in offshore Vietnam offshore in operates ship survey Chinese CG vessel cruises in offshore Vietnam offshore in cruises vessel CG C
Vietnam
vessel fishing Vietnamese seize vessels CCG
●
China-Vietnam new fisheries agreement fisheries new China-Vietnam CCG vessel collides into Vietnamese fishing vessel fishing Vietnamese into collides vessel CCG Maritime militias are established are militias Maritime
● ● ●
Luconia Shoals Luconia CCG vessel sails near Luconia Shoals (June) Shoals Luconia near sails vessel CCG U.S. vessels are sent to China-Malaysia standoff area standoff China-Malaysia to sent are vessels U.S.
● ● ●
CCG vessel sails near near sails vessel CCG
RMN conducts anti-ship missile drill (July) drill missile anti-ship conducts RMN Malaysia standoff area standoff China-Malaysia in drills conduct vessels Australian and U.S.
● ●
(December) ship survey Malaysian tracks vessel CCG Chinese survey ship moves from offshore Vietnam to offshore Malaysia offshore to Vietnam offshore from moves ship survey Chinese Malaysia seizes Chinese fishing vessels fishing Chinese seizes Malaysia
● ● ●
1st and 2nd Fleet drills Fleet 2nd and 1st Armada Jaya naval exercise naval Jaya Armada
● ●
1st Fleet marine Fleet 1st drill Indonesia
● ●
BAKAMLA-related law is amended is law BAKAMLA-related
CCG vessel approaches Natuna coast coast Natuna approaches vessel CCG CCG and Chinese fishing vessels operate near Natuna Islands; Indonesia sends corvette, etc. (December) etc. corvette, sends Indonesia Islands; Natuna near operate vessels fishing Chinese and CCG
● ● ● coast
near Natuna Natuna near
Chinese vessel locks radar on Philippine vessel Philippine on radar locks vessel Chinese ● ship sails sails ship
survey survey
Chinese survey ship operates in Reed Bank Reed in operates ship survey Chinese Philippines
CCG vessel sails near Second Thomas Reef Thomas Second near sails vessel CCG
● ● ●
CCG vessel makes port call port makes vessel CCG Chinese Chinese
Chinese vessels pass through Philippines’ Sibutu Strait (October) Strait Sibutu Philippines’ through pass vessels Chinese
● ● Philippine military’s participation in South China Sea joint exercises is banned is exercises joint Sea China South in participation military’s Philippine
August July June May April March February October December November September
January 2019 2020
136 Table 4.1. Major events and activities of countries in the South China Sea China South the in countries of activities and events Major 4.1. Table Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 139 Likewise, Prime Minister 87 The Chairman’s Statement the of ASEAN- 85 The COC was expected to be concluded by the end of 2021, 2021, of end the by concluded be to expected was COC The 86 It is believed that ASEAN is closely watching how the balance of of balance the how watching closely is ASEAN that believed is It 88 This could be seen soft as criticism ASEAN’s continued China’s of 84 With regard to the COC negotiations, the chair, Prime Minister Nguyen As described Southeast above, Asian countries begun have to take measures power in the region will change under the administration new U.S. in 2021. provocative activities despite crisis. the COVID-19 Xuan Phuc of Vietnam, stated summit at that the negotiations been have suspended andthe a consultations press conference following postponed due the to COVID-19. June Phuc Phuc announced following the November summit that ASEAN and Vietnam in particular expect positive relations and healthy competition among the great powers. China ForeignMinisters’ Meetingon September 9 referred toholding the ad-hoc video conference of the Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China and Sea (DOC) confirmed the step-by-step resumptioncontinuingthe second reading the of of Single Draft COC in Negotiating spite Text the negotiations, including theof pandemic. 20. but with no opportunity for in-person negotiations since February 2020, UNCLOS it repeatedto referenceplanned.The is progress aswill it whetherunclear in chairman’s statements summits of could be seen as an attempt to place more emphasis on effective content rather than speed. against China’s show of forcein the Southinternationalframework, Chinain addition to the countries’ own efforts. SeaMeanwhile, using the rule of law inthe the regional organization of ASEAN is engaged China in tomaintain centrality ASEAN’s COC Deputy and unity. Vietnam’s Prime negotiations with Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, the chair of the meeting,September stated at a press conference after the meeting that ASEAN countries do not want to be embroiled in the would competition affect among peace major and powers stability that in the region.
81 79 82 The same phrase was also also was phrase same The 83 In both the Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN 78 Also, at the Foreign Ministers’ U.S.-ASEAN Meeting on September 80
The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summit on November 12 (online), (online), TheChairman’sASEANStatementthe Summit 12 of November on At theAt EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on September secretary U.S. 9, From SeptemberFrom 9 to meetings 12, originally scheduled August, for including Meanwhile, at the EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that the acts of U.S. interference in territorial disputesand through enhancedmaritime military deploymentare becoming the biggest factor fueling militarization in the South ChinaStates, an external country, to Sea respect the wishes regional of countries. and urged the United Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on September 9 and the ARF Chairman’s Statement on September 12, the wording on the South China Sea dispute was almost samethe as the previous year’s but also containedsummit in June. “serious In the context incidents” of the COC, the from statements kept the the wording on welcoming Sino-ASEAN cooperation, adopting both “within a mutually-agreed timeline” and “consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.” 138 released on November 18, largely retained released18, Novemberon the wordingthe summit of in June and theforeign ministers’meeting in September. However, to thecontinuously used phrase, “recognized the benefits of having the South China peace,Sea asstability, a seaand of prosperity,” it added the wording, “especially during this time in the common fight against COVID-19.” of stateof Pompeo expressed concerns aggressive China’s over actions in the South China Sea and stated expansive that maritime China’s claims are unlawful. the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), (ARF), Forum Regional ASEAN the Meeting, Ministers’ Foreign ASEAN the and the East Asia Summit (EAS) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, were online.allAccording to media reports, held many countries commented on the South China Sea dispute, including countries noted to have a tilt toward China such as Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. used in theChairman’s Statements theof ASEAN-China Summit on November 12 and the EAS on November 14 (both held online), released on November 10, 10, Secretary Pompeo reportedly called that for support the construction military severing of outposts in the South China ties Sea. with companies Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 141 91 , and ASM Sea Skua It was also reported that that reported also was It 93 Kasturi 92 94 The mission systems required the for upgrade are to be provided the by 95 As for anti-ship capability, in Julyunder 2019, the inspection of Mohamad As for maritime ISR capability, in February 2020, a plan was announced In September 2020, it was reportedwas evaluationSeptemberit Inthethatprocessbegun had2020, for of which BNS is theleadcontractor.is BNS Initially,whichbuildthetofirstwas theplan of two of four LMSs in China and the remainder in Malaysia with technology transfer from China.This plan was revised to build all four ships in China. production began in April of Naval 2019 Strike Missiles (NSM) for Malaysia, building theof However, announcedacquisitionthewaswhich plan 2018. infor LCSs that are planned to be outfitted with the missile is delayed as mentioned andabove, the deployment to troops NSM of is expected to be later than the original schedule. United States under the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). In September, the two aircraft were entrusted to PTDI that is in charge of the conversion work. is usedCN-235 the by Indonesian military Furthermore, as an MPA. PTDI has a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) contract with the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and has experience implementing a service-life extension program in RMAF’s for April CN-235s 2018. missiles were fired from theSuper Lynx helicopter. Bin Sabu, minister of defence, the first ExerciseTaming Sari in almostyears wasfour conducted at the same time as Exercise Keris Mas. An SSM Exocet MM40 Block II was fired from the frigate KD to upgrade two of the seven CN-235-200M transport aircraft produced by the Indonesian national aerospace company PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) MPA. to the second phase ofthe LMS acquisitionprogram. According toreports, of a total four teams applied—two Malaysian companies, Preston Shipyard, has been building which and repairing small boats and other vessels,and Destini Shipbuilding & Engineering, which has formed Damen Schelde Naval a Shipbuilding (DSNS) theof Netherlands, joint as well as one venture team with company each from the United States and Germany. Each company submitted a proposal based on a patrol boat. 89 , Chapter, was Section 4, 3) Due to concerns program over management 90 was delivered to RMN at CSOC-Wuchang Shipbuilding Shipbuilding CSOC-Wuchang at RMN to delivered was Keris Malaysia and Vietnam: Establishment of Domestic Production Bases
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is currently working to increase and Meanwhile, in August 2020, Malaysia’s National Audit Department noted 3. Sea Power Strengthening by Southeast Asian Countries Asian by Southeast Strengthening 3. Sea Power capabilities, in July the 2019, government reviewed plans for the LMS program 140 modernize its surface shipsunder the 15 toAs part 5 this Fleet of program, the Chinese-built Transformation Keris-class littoral mission ship Programme. (LMS) KD Industry in the suburbs Shanghai of This at the ship December end of is 2019. the firstof four LMSs to be acquired under the program, and the decisionaward to the ship building contract to China, the other party to the South China Sea dispute involving Malaysia has been controversial. As theprevious section has shown, both the United States and Chinato enhance their presence continued in the South China Sea in On 2020. the other hand, in the face of difficulties such as budget cuts and activity restrictions the militariesCOVID-19, due Southeast of Asian to countries attempted to overcome thecapability gap with China. This section provides an overview the of efforts that such countries concerned with the South China Sea disputes are making to strengthen their naval power and maritime circumstances. ISR capabilities under these (1) (1) contracted to Boustead billion Naval Shipyard ringgit, about (BNS) for 9.1 and a total of six LCSs were to be delivered from April to 2019 June 2023. As of September 2020, however, none had been completed. BNS stated that it had already spent about 6 billion ringgit and intendedwith the remaining to complete budget but at leastan additional two LCSs3 billion ringgit to complete the program.was necessary delays in the program for acquiring LCSs that are beingThe program East Asian (see Strategic built Review 2019 domestically. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 143 Contractor Lungteh Shipbuilding (Mk3) Austal’s Cebu shipyard Hyundai Heavy Industries Israel Shipyards Hyundai Heavy Industries PT PAL Main equipment Anti-shipand anti-air Automatic machine guns Anti-submarine warfare and short-range missiles and short-range Short-range missiles Short-range missiles (some) equipment and missiles ) ) 101 ) ? ? ?
Horizon 3) → →
→ │ 6 2) 16 12 │ │ │ │ schedule 30) It also It plans to acquire support about 100 vessels and 2 0 0 0 4) │ → → → → 102 │ 40 vessels 40 vessels 4 vessels 4 vessels 42 vessels 42 vessels 6 vessels 6 vessels (2 (6 (2 (8 (12 (4 12 vessels vessels 12 12 vessels vessels 12 Revised number and (Horizon 2 For FY2021, in contrast, the government requested 209.1 209.1 requested government the contrast, in FY2021, For
100
The Philippine Navy’s original plan for surface ship procurement and procurement ship plan for surface original Navy’s Philippine The schedule revised delivery Compiled by the author. Vessel type Vessel Currently, the Philippine Navy is building surface vessels with a budget of Multipurpose assault craft (MPAC) assault craft vessel Missile frigate Missile Missile corvette OPV Large transport interdiction craft- missile (FAIC-M) Fast attack more than 30 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, which is expected to cost more than more cost rotary-wing expected to aircraft,and fixed is which 30 thanmore billion100 pesos in total in the term. long billion pesos in the budget message to the Congress, citing the need for counterterrorism measures and military modernization. The proposed budget billionincluded pesos billion 96.8 29.8 the for pesos Navy, the for Army, 31.1 billion pesos billion the for Air pesos 45.4 the Force, for Armed the Forces of Philippines – General Headquarters (AFP-GHQ), and the 1.3 government billion arsenal buildup. pesos In addition, for the budget for the Revised AFP Modernizationbudget,general separatethefrom Programis (RAFPMP), which was to be allocated 33 billion pesos in 8 FY2021, billion pesos more than the previous years’ billion 25 pesos. Source: Table 4.2. 4.2. Table the billion defense pesos budget 6.7 by in April and requested an additional funds additional responding allocate in to pesos June for billion 3 of reduction to COVID-19. about 75 billionabout pesos. 75 In May 98 96 The Military Industry and It was also reported in June June in reported also was It 99 97 MSSARS 9316 multipurpose submarine search-and-rescue search-and-rescue submarine multipurpose 9316 MSSARS
With regard to Vietnam, no information is available as of September 2020 In terms of other U.S. support under the MSI, in February 2020, RMN As anti-ship for a Vietnamese capability,corvette in November 2019, (re- 142 The Philippine defense budget for FY2020 was initially billion 191.7 pesos. However, the Department of Budget and Management decided to decrease (2) Philippines:(2) Review of Military Modernization Program Telecoms Telecoms Group (Viettel), the largest mobile telecom operated operator the by Ministry Defence,of is participating in in the the development of Vietnam and is reportedlyVCM-01 promoting the domestic production components of including electronics. on the acquisition of a new large surface combatant. types, Kieu As the Yet regards other ship ship, built at the Vietnamese state-owned Z189 shipyard in Hai commissioned Phong, and in in the December same month,2019, was the Song Thu Shipyard in Da Nang City reportedly signed a contract the for constructing of a fourth Roro landing5612 ship tank (LST). announced that it had receivedScanEagles to thebe supplied firstalong with associatedsix systems. of The12 remainingunmanned six ScanEagles are to bedelivered in 2022. The supportaerial package includes training, vehicle (UAV) maintenance, and sustainment. The aircraft are to be operated by RMN’s 601 Squadron, which was establishedUAV in November 2018. 2020, it was reported that the Z189 shipyard began production of the VCM-01, VCM-01, the of production began shipyard Z189 the that reported was it 2020, a domestically produced the copy of SS-N-25. that the third Roro 5612 was launched. Both ships are designed by DSNS of the Netherlands, and are being produced under license a shipyard by under the General Department of Defense Industry (Cong Nghiep Quoc Phong: CNQP) of the Ministry of Defence, suggesting that the military is working to develop the national industrial base ship of building. commissioned South Korean Pohang-class corvette) is believed to have been equipped with Russian SS-N-25 (Uran-E) anti-ship missile launchers. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia In 145 116 113 In July, the 2nd 2nd the July, In 115 114 111 multi-role light frigate. The vessel is 117 Usman Harun Usman In March, it was announced that French defense equipment equipment defense French that announced was it March, In 112 At the At same time, Indonesia urgently seeks the acquisition the of 110 , which is nearing decommissioning. In terms of anti-ship capability, DSNS and PT PAL announced the successful plans Indonesia that July in reported was it capability, ISR maritime for As As for training and other activities, in March, Indonesia and Russia agreed expected to be equipped with Exocet SSM MM40 3 missiles. Block Interim Readiness Frigate (IRF) for the third to and temporarilyfinal phaseof long-term Indonesia’s modernization program fill the capability (2020–2024). As part gap,of this a effort,priority it was reported in July that Ministrythe Defense showed interest inacquiring Lubeck the GermanNavy’s Bremen-class frigate manufacturer Thales and Indonesian state-owned company PT Len plantomodernize Industrithe KRI Fleet Command conducted landing drills on the eastern coast of the Java Sea and on the island of Bali, and then the 1st Fleet Command conducteddrills maneuverin the Java Sea, including the southern part of the Natuna Islands. from the Ministry of National Development additionalR.E.two acquisition Planningof the for Pembangunan BAPPENAS) Nasional: (Badan Perencanaan Martadinata-class frigates (SIGMANetherlands. 10514), developed jointly with DSNS of the completion of a sea trial and equipmentcombat systems of testingtwo R.E. Martadinata-class and frigates certifications from the for end of 2019 the to March 2020. to build a hangar for the newly established 700 Naval Air Squadron (700 NAS) to operate ScanEagle and other aircraft to be provided the by United States. This facility will be built at Juanda naval Naval air Aviation station, Center Surabaya, is located, where the and will be and used their associatedmaintenance equipment. primarily UAVs of for the storage and to conduct their first maritime drill, and in December, the navalvessels of the two countries conducted navigation drills in the Java Sea. September, these following preparatory drills, the Indonesian Navy conducted Armada Jaya, its most advancedsubmarines, exercise, and about 8,500 personnel. participated by 181 vessels, including Antonio Antonio RIMPAC 105 The FY2021 draft budget budget draft FY2021 The Meanwhile, it is anticipated 107 103 106 to the exercises. 108 In September, the Defense Ministry sought a budget 104 109 , would be commissioned, and the sister ship, BRP Jose RizalJose , would set sail from South Korea in 2021.
The Indonesian Navy is rushing to build up its surface vessels to attain Astraining for and other activities, the Philippine-U.S. annual exercises In July 2020, it was announced that the first Philippine missile frigate, conducted at-sea-only trainings for safety and participating considerations. countries Whilewere reduced, the its Philippines still scale sent its newly commissioned BRP Rizal Jose 144 released the by Finance Ministry approved a budget increase despite fears of trillion anproposing economic 136.990 defenseslowdown, rupiah, a budget of about trillion 19 rupiah more than the previous fiscal year, an increaseof about on an12%, execution basis. Indonesia’s defense budget for FY2020 was originallyrupiah. allocated However, trillion 131.182 like other countries, rupiah it in May and further trillion was reduced rupiah to 117.900 in July in order to reduced to 122.447 trillion appropriate more funds spending. COVID-19 for (3) Indonesia:(3) Buildup of Surface Ships minimum essential forces (MEF). At the end of April, a preamble contract signed reportedly was to Denmark from frigates Huitfeldt-class Iver two acquire between the Indonesian Defense Ministry, Indonesian state-owned shipbuilder(Persero), and PTPT PAL Sinar Persada Kokoh aregistered (SKP), supplier to the Indonesian armed forces and the Indonesian agent Denmark’s for Odense Maritime Technology. Balikatanin May was cancelled in light of the COVID-19 outbreak. BRP Luna that the corvette acquisition program, which was to acquire two corvettes by 2023 during the second phase of RAFPMP (Horizon 2), would be postponed to Horizon 3 (2023–2028) due to COVID-19’s impact on the economic financialsituation. and Other acquisition programs are also expected to be delayed moreby thanand year, a asa result, the replacement planolder ships for isalso expected to face delays. Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 147 , September September , South China Morning South China Asahi ShimbunAsahi , December 22, 2020. , September 2019. 18, , April 2020. 3, , July 2019; 17, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), , December 2020; Reuters, 31, January 4, 2021. , April 2020. 14, , April 2020; Reuters, 16, 2020. April 17, , December 15, 2020; Sebastian Strangio, “Is Cambodia Really Turning Its , July 26, 2019. Reuters, August 24, 2019. Reuters, October 24, 2019. (February 21, CSIS China Sea,” South the in Fight Three-Way a Picks AMTI, “Malaysia 2020). America, of Voice December 2019. 23, Post Morning South China VietNamNet Global, January 2020. 23, Post Morning South China Benar News Benar News Post [Japan] Ministry Foreign of Affairs, “Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (September 9, 2020). for Center Resources,” Gas Vietnamese Malaysian, China Risks over “Update: Flare-Up Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (December 13, 2019); ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of Ministry the of 37th Foreign ASEAN Affairs, Summit”; “23rd Japan-ASEAN [Japan] 2020). Summit Meeting” (November 12, Reuters, January 2019. 23, Post Morning South China ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the 8th ASEAN-United States Summit” (November 2020). 14, [Japan] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “13th Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting” 2020). (July 9, ASEAN Secretariat, “Declaration of (April 2020). Disease 14, the (COVID-19)” 2019 Special ASEAN Summit on ASEAN Coronavirus Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement 2020); ASEAN Secretariat, “Terms of Reference: of theASEAN Regional 37th Reserve ASEAN of Medical Summit” (NovemberSupplies for Public Health Emergencies,” approved November 2020. 10, 12, CGTN, August 24, 2020. [China] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi Attends a Video ConferenceASEAN of ForeignChina- Ministers’ Meeting” (September 9, 2020); Nikkei Asia 17, 2020. 17, Bangkok Post Back on Chinese Vaccines?” Diplomat
31) 32) 33) 34) 35) 36) 37) 38) 30) 27) 28) 29) 25) 26) 18) 19) 20) 21) 23) 24) 22)
, October 26, 2020. , July 2020. 3, , July 11, 2020. , July 11, Regional Economic Outlook Asia and Pacific: Asian Development Outlook (ADO) Supplement: 2020 , 7. , August 20, 2020. , April 2020; Khmer Times 7, , June 17, 2020; Nikkei, June Asian 17, Review , September 2020; Shimbun Asahi 11, , September 23 and September 24, 2020. East Asia and the Pacific Economic Update: From Containment to Recovery , December 2020. 23, , March 2020. 15, , July 2020. 5, ADO Supplement 2020 Paths Diverge in Recovery from the Pandemic (December 4. 2020), WHO, “COVID-19 Situation in WHO: Western PacificSituation in the WHO Region”; South-East Asia Region.” WHO, “COVID-19 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World World Health Organization (WHO), “COVID-19 Situation inRegion,” WHO: WHO Western website; Pacific WHO, “COVID-19 Situation Region,” in WHO website. the WHO South-East Asia Asian Development Bank (ADB), Navigating the Pandemic; A Multispeed Recovery in Asia (October 8. 2020), [Singapore] Ministry of Manpower, “MinisterialMinister for Manpower, 4 May 2020” (May 4, 2020). Statement by Mrs Josephine Reuters, January 30 and Teo, February 2, 2020. Asahi Shimbun Phnom Penh Post [Brunei] Ministry of Health, “Media Statement of the Current Situation of the Covid-19 Infection in Brunei Darussalam” 2020). (May 21, (October 11. 2020), Nikkei Asian Review Nikkei Shimbun Nikkei Shimbun Nikkei Asia World Bank, World The Star The Star
As shown above, each country is engaged in active efforts to boost its
A D B ,
146 surface ships, provide anti-ship capability, and build maritime ISR capability, aimingto overcome the capability gap necessary to address the South China countries situation, are financial and economic Amidst severe the dispute. Sea striving to achieve these goals not only procuring by the latest equipment, but also through various means such as refurbishing existing equipment, receiving overseas capacity enhancement assistance, and purchasing used equipment. 3) 4) NOTES 1) 2) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 13) 10) 15) 14) 12) 11) 17) 16) Chapter 4 Southeast Asia 149 , , July , September 12, 2020. , June 26, 2020. , July 17, 2020; PACAF, “B-1s Conduct USNI News , May 28, 2020; Post Morning South China , September 12, 2020; Post Morning South China , September 12, 2020. , June 30, 2020. , September 12, 2020. , May 4, 2020; AMTI, “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea , July 30, 2020. , November 2020. 16, , July 6, 2020. , August 2020; Department [U.S.] 17, Defense, of “DOD Statement on Recent , January 6, 2020. ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference Conference Ministerial Post ASEAN the of Statement “Chairman’s Secretariat, ASEAN Session(PMC) with 10+1 China” (September 2020). 9, Nikkei Shimbun Hanoi Times Janes ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Communiqué Meeting” (September of 9, 2020); ASEAN Secretariat, the “Chairman’s 53rd Statement of the ASEAN27th ASEAN Regional Forum” Foreign (September 12, 2020). Ministers’ [China] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi: Biggest Factor The Fueling United Militarization States and the is MostDangerous Becoming Factor Jeopardizing the in the Peace South China Sea” (September 2020). 9, ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement the of ASEAN 37th Summit.” ASEAN Secretariat, Asia East 15th the of Statement “Chairman’s “Chairman’s Secretariat, ASEAN 2020); Statement 12, (November of the 23rd ASEAN-ChinaSummit” (November 2020). 14, Summit” Nikkei Shimbun U.S. Mission to ASEAN, “Secretary Pompeo’sVirtual Participation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting” (September 2020). 9, in the 10th East Asia SummitNikkei Shimbun Navy Times [U.S.] Department of Defense, “People’s Republic of China MilitarySouth China Exercises Sea” in (July the 2, 2020); Bomber Task Force Mission in South China Sea” (July 22, 2020); Stars and 2020); Stripes 22, (July China Sea” in South Mission Force Task Bomber 23, 2020. 23, Times Global USNI News Chinese Ballistic Missile Launches” 2020). (August27, Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, “Total South Competition: China Sea,” Center for a New American Chinaʼs Security Challenge (January 2020). in the ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the 2020). 36th ASEAN Summit” (June 26, Nikkei Shimbun Global Times Global Island,” CSIS (May 2018). 18, Stars and Stripes South China Sea Mission, Demonstrates Global Presence” (April 30, 2020).
87) 88) 89) 80) 82) 83) 84) 85) 86) 81) 73) 74) 75) 76) 77) 79) 78) 71) 72) 70) , September 12, 76, National Institute National 76, , January 2020. 10, Edge Markets Edge , March 18, 2020; Harada Yu, NIDS CommentaryNIDS , December 2019. 31, , June 26, 2020; , May 1, 2020. , May 1, , April 20 and May 8, 2020; ABC News, April 22, 2020. , March 4, 2019. South China Morning Post Morning SouthChina , September 2020. 14, , June 2020. 9, , June 2019. 13, New Straits Times , April 28, 2020; [U.S.] Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), “B-1s Conduct , August 17, 2020. , August 17, , April 20, 2020. , May 28, 2020. , June 2020. 18, , January 2020; 3, Reuters, January 2020; Janes 7, , June 2020. 16, , June 3, 2020; [U.S.] Department of State, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims , March 24, 2020. , May 6, 2020. , August 2020; 3, PNA, August 2020. 13, , April 20, 2020; Benar News , March 10, 2020; January 6, 2020; Reuters, January 8, 2020. (English), January 6, 2020. , Military.com South China Morning Post Morning South China USNI News USNI News Stars and Stripes Benar News Reuters, September 2020. 15, Tempo Benar News Benar News Tempo CNN Indonesia, January 2020. 7, PNA, September 2020. 11, Radio Free Asia, December Tempo 30, 2019; South China Morning Post Morning South China Benar News in the South China Sea” 2020). (July 13, PNA, September 2020. 18, PNA, January 30, 2020; CNN Philippines, February 2020. 11, PNA, June 2020. 3, Inquirer Star Philippine for Defense Studies (June 2018). 18, Inquirer “Minamishinakai no ima: Chuhietsu no doko shoten wo ni” [South China Sea now: With focus on China, the Philippines, and Vietnam], Inquirer PNA, April 2020. 23, Philippine News Agency January (PNA), 2020. 14, CNN Philippines, 2019. July 29, Reuters, April 2020;23, U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) News Philippine Inquirer.net (Inquirer) Inquirer.net Philippine Post Morning South China 2020. Benar News
66) 67) 68) 69) 65) 63) 64) 58) 59) 60) 61) 62) 57) 56) 50) 51) 52) 53) 54) 55) 49) 48) 47) 46) 45) 39) 40) 44) 43) 42) 41) 148 90) Janes, August 27, 2020. 91) Malaysia-kini, July 23, 2019. 92) Janes, September 16, 2020. 93) Benar News, July 24, 2019. 94) Naval News, April 2, 2019. 95) Janes, February 3, 2020. 96) Janes, March 27, 2020. 97) Vietnam Shipbuilding News, December 19, 2019; Navy Recognition, December 29, 2019; Janes, June 25, 2020. 98) Asia Pacific Defense Journal (APDJ), November 8, 2019. 99) APDJ, May 27, 2020. 100) Inquirer, June 8, 2020. 101) Inquirer, August 29, 2020. 102) PNA, May 12, 2020; One News, May 25, 2020. 103) PNA, July 11, 2020. 104) PNA, July 11, 2020. 105) Stars and Stripes, March 27, 2020. 106) PNA, July 7, 2020. 107) Kompas, April 13, 2020; Jakarta Post, July 6, 2020. 108) Janes, August 18, 2020. 109) Janes, June 12, 2020. 110) Janes, September 4, 2020. 111) Janes, July 30, 2020. 112) Damen, “Damen Completes Combat Systems Installation and Trials on Second Indonesian Guided Missile Frigate” (March 18, 2020); TNI-AL, “Tiga KRI dan Tiga Rusia Terlibat Latihan PASSEX RUSINDO-20” (December 20, 2020). 113) Thales, “Len Industri and Thales to Modernise Indonesia’s Naval Capabilities” (March 10, 2020). 114) Janes, July 7, 2020. 115) TASS, March 13, 2020. 116) TNI-AL. Koarmada II, “Koarmada II Uji Profesionalisme dan Kesiapan SSAT Melalui Glagaspur Tingkat L-3 Terpadu” (July 4, 2020); Kompas, July 22, 2020. 117) Kompas TV, August 27, 2020.
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