Fire controlman (left) and gunner’s mate maintain Mark 38 25mm machine gun aboard USS Porter in Atlantic Ocean, March 5, 2019 (U.S. Navy/James R. Turner)
Global Risks and Opportunities The Great Power Competition Paradigm
By Mark D. Miles and Charles R. Miller
hen studying today’s emerg- at least in part by Great Britain’s global geographies, the competition nar- ing great power competition reach and near-hegemonic power. rowed to a bipolar contest, as in the W paradigm, it is edifying to Instead, Europe’s great powers sought “Great Game” between the British and recall the most recent historical ante- other domains of national power and Russian empires in Central Asia. In cedents: the zenith of Europe’s imperial geographic locations outside of the that contest, information operations, period and the Cold War. From 1815 European core in which to compete— economic diplomacy, and espionage to 1914, it was rare for competition for example, the Russian and Austro- were the primary weapons of state- between the great powers of Europe to Hungarian empires in the Balkans or craft, as was typical for a century when manifest militarily (the Crimean War the British, Belgian, French, and later military force was rarely a first resort in being the notable exception), limited German empires in Africa. In some inter-state competition and was never employed without accompanying diplo- matic and economic levers of power. Another historical era to which some Mark D. Miles is a Strategic Analyst, U.S. Central Command, J5, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. Brigadier General Charles R. Miller, USA, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of U.S. Central Command, J5, Strategy, compare the present great power compe- Plans, and Policy. tition paradigm is the Cold War between
80 Features / Global Risks and Opportunities: Great Power Competition JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 the United States and the Soviet Union. this model, we should expect that great and has attracted billions in Chinese The coldest part of the Cold War was power competition in the 21st century investment, including the Persian Gulf felt in Europe and northeast Asia where will encompass not only the Middle East and Iran. Likewise, China has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Central Asia, but also Latin America a pivotal economic partner for Latin alliance, along with U.S. security guaran- and Caribbean (LAC) regions and Africa. American countries through access to tees, shared ideological perspectives, and The 2018 National Defense Strategy natural resources, foreign markets, and relatively stable political arenas left little prioritizes competition with China and the diversification of Chinese firms, and room for direct competition. But else- Russia and seeks to expand the competi- it is fostering additional ties via a regular where—in Southeast Asia, Latin America, tive space while strengthening alliances China–Latin America forum that includes and Africa—the struggle between the and partnerships.1 Formulating an ef- 33 countries. China has invested billions West and the Soviet bloc was anything fective response to China and Russia’s in the LAC and sub-Saharan African but “cold,” as the two superpowers, their global activism will be challenging. To countries, making Africa the second larg- allies, and proxies competed across all accomplish this in terms of great power est source of crude imports for China elements of national power to gain sway competition, we must ensure a clear after the Middle East.4 with emerging or transitioning coun- understanding of both powers’ strategic Also associated with the BRI are tries amid the unwinding of colonialist concept for these regions. Next, we must China’s investments into regional com- systems. Nowhere was the superpower examine the available political, economic, mercial port infrastructure. This includes competition more dynamic or more piv- information, and security “space” in a joint venture with Egypt to develop otal to the Cold War’s final outcome than which competition could occur and allo- the China-Egypt Suez Economic and in the Middle East and Central Asia. cate resources against them according to Trade Cooperation Zone, the Shanghai national priorities. Finally, we must work International Port Group’s development Great Power Competition Today with our strategic allies to promote ef- of a commercial port in Khalifa (Abu The shift in emphasis in the National ficiency of our combined efforts and find Dhabi), potential future investment in Defense Strategy and other guiding areas of mutual interest to build bridges Omani ports, the port development proj- documents toward a transregional with our rivals, ultimately reinforcing ect turned military base in Djibouti, and and inter-state competition concep- global institutions and avoiding the esca- economic support to the Panama Canal.5 tual framework reflects the reality of lation of tensions into open hostilities. Many observers believe the Chinese China’s rapid rise to the first rank of China. Chinese President Xi Jinping People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) economic and military powers, Russia’s amplified existing trends when he came support base in Djibouti is a model for reassertion—by word and deed—that to power in 2012 and adopted poli- China to establish additional support it deserves great power status after cies to accelerate the growth of China’s bases and military facilities in its “string of the perceived humiliations of the comprehensive national power in support pearls” strategy intended to underpin the 1990s, and an openness to alternative of the country’s “great rejuvenation” security of Chinese economic interests economic and political models within by 2049 through the assertive use of and citizens. The location of China’s first the regions hosting the competi- all instruments of national power, in- overseas base and the other ports with tion. This openness is both a result of cluding economic and military.2 The concerted Chinese investment provides internal trends emboldening national Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which significant advantages that will affect leaders to seek opportunities to protect joins a continental economic belt and the decision calculus and potentially the their interests, and a perception that a maritime road to promote coopera- access of all actors in the region to key the United States—and the West in tion and interconnectivity from Eurasia thoroughfares and infrastructure.6 general—is retrenching, introspective, to Africa and into Latin America, is the As China rises as a global military and capricious. central foreign policy tenet in support power, its economic and domestic se- Amid these real and perceived of this goal and aims to ensure China’s curity interests have begun to require changes, the United States is actively continued economic growth and con- Beijing to adopt a limited security role shifting its resources—military and oth- nectivity to needed resources and global outside of its traditionally claimed sphere erwise—toward Europe and East Asia markets.3 Across Central Asia, China has of influence in the South China Sea. to ensure that we are poised to protect invested in energy and transit infrastruc- The base in Djibouti supports China’s ourselves and our allies from our rivals’ ture under the BRI umbrella to create long-standing counterpiracy efforts in revisionism. However, a look back to the the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Gulf of Aden.7 In Central Asia, China 19th century or the more recent Cold War which includes the creation of economic created the Quadrilateral Cooperation reveals that, as the frontiers nearest our zones and investment in Gwadar port and Coordination Mechanism in 2016 competitors harden, inter-state competi- and is the “flagship” component of BRI. as a counterterrorism effort that includes tion will displace to those geographies The Middle East is important to BRI joint patrols of the Afghanistan-China- that offer space and provide broader as well, as the region is one of China’s Tajikistan border region and a military economic opportunities. Following more important sources of crude oil facility with People’s Liberation Army
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miles and Miller 81 Sailors man rails aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt as ship pulls into Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Pearl Harbor, April 2, 2019 (U.S. Navy/ Holly L. Herline) presence in Tajikistan.8 China’s com- win-win development, China’s predatory energy, and finances to influence deci- prehensive policy toward the LAC has economic practices, tensions emanating sionmakers, political systems, and public included important elements of military from its preferential use of Chinese mate- attitudes in the Middle East, Central Asia, and security cooperation to include bilat- rials and labor, and infringements on host Latin America, and Africa. The Middle eral and multilateral military-to-military nation sovereignty often undermine these East reemerged as a priority for Russia engagements and exercises, trainings, fo- narratives and may impede implementa- in 2012 due to the region’s economic rums, and humanitarian missions.9 In the tion of key Chinese projects. potential to prop up Russia’s lagging private sector, China has leveraged private Ultimately, the lack of an overt politi- economy, domestic security concerns security companies to protect some of its cal or ideological agenda, the availability (especially terrorism) related to the re- BRI-related projects in unstable areas and of capital, and Beijing’s willingness gion’s geographical proximity, and the its commercial fleet to support the PLAN to invest in riskier projects with fewer Kremlin’s political objectives to create le- for use as an asset to support military restrictions make China particularly at- verage to affect Western behavior, change operations abroad.10 tractive to regional governments. Beijing the international order to avoid isolation, China has adopted several key mes- largely employs a noninterference policy and shape domestic public opinion.12 saging themes in an effort to enhance its diplomatically and is nonconfrontational Russia’s military intervention in Syria influence within the regions. Beijing’s in international forums on topics regard- in September 2015 and subsequent narratives are designed to portray China ing the Middle East. perceived successes in this theater have as a nonthreatening, reliable economic Russia. The election of Vladimir motivated a more proactive and assertive partner that can provide countries in Putin in 2012 and his return to the Russian approach to the Middle East, the region with the capital, technology, Russian presidency marked the begin- exemplified by the Kremlin’s attempts infrastructure, and equipment needed ning of a significant expansion in Russia’s to affect the domestic political dynam- for greater prosperity and stability. global reach. To enable this expansion, ics of the region as in Syria and Libya, Conversely, Chinese narratives cast the Moscow has relied on a wide array of defense of Iran in international forums, United States as a destabilizing and pred- diplomatic, intelligence, military, and and offers to mediate talks for various atory influence.11 Despite promises for economic tools to include cyber, trade, regional conflicts and tensions. Thus far,
82 Features / Global Risks and Opportunities: Great Power Competition JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 the Kremlin has reestablished itself as on the counterterrorism activities of the to a Russian ally, or to groups in search a regional power broker and cultivated United States and its allies, while focusing of alternative explanations. In the Middle relations with regional rivals with minimal its resources to achieve short-term goals East, the largely state-controlled media backlash. As Moscow takes on a greater to include securing a Moscow-friendly restrict the effectiveness of Russian in- role in the region’s internal dynamics, it is regime in Syria and reinforcing its hard formation operations, and the Kremlin’s unclear if Russia will be able to maintain power in Central Asia. narratives are best received in popula- this diversity or support all of its efforts Politically, since 2015, Russian actions tions with preexisting positive sentiment unilaterally. in the Middle East have demonstrated to toward Russia, including Syria, Egypt, Economically, the Middle East and regional regimes that Russia is a reliable, and Iraq. In Latin America, RT and Central Asia regions are critical for decisive partner devoid of the West’s ide- Sputnik Mundo programming is readily Moscow’s interests due to the importance ological restrictions and a diplomatic and available and often cited as main sources of hydrocarbons to the Russian economy military force to be reckoned with. This is by official media. Moscow’s propaganda and opportunities to circumvent or ease especially true for Iran. Russia positioned outlets work to stoke anti-U.S. sentiment the impact of Western sanctions.13 Russia itself as a key mediator in the Iranian and support populist figures in Latin is building relations with its potential nuclear issue and as a viable alternative to American elections.17 rivals in the energy sphere, particularly the West’s perceived capriciousness with Iran and Saudi Arabia, and is compet- the Kremlin’s backing of Iran through What’s Next for Great Power ing for influence over resources that are the reimposition of U.S. sanctions. The Competition in the Regions? also critically important to China in the Kremlin responded quickly to partner re- The expanding need driven by the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and quests for military equipment in the face global reach of China’s diplomatic, Latin America.14 These economically of internal unrest and used its position in information, military, and economic important regions in the Middle East and international forums to defend its part- initiatives, as well as Russia’s objective North Africa are also essential to Russia’s ners. While Moscow has not sought to to weaken or subvert Western security security calculus. The extended lease of directly compete with the United States structures in the Middle East, Central Tartus Naval Base in Syria and investment economically or politically in the region, Asia, Latin America, and Africa will in the Suez Canal area provide Russia the Kremlin is poised to capitalize on challenge U.S. prosperity, security, and with access to critical lanes of maritime geopolitical space created by either U.S. critical relationships in the respective communication leading to the Atlantic policies or changes within the domestic regions. Deterring or defeating great and Indian oceans and a platform to spheres of partner countries. In this way, power aggression is a fundamentally project naval power and monitor the flow Putin casts doubt on the existing inter- different challenge than the regional of Middle Eastern oil and gas to Europe national order and casts himself as the conflicts that have plagued these areas and the Far East. From this position, defender of sovereignty and “traditional” and formed the basis of U.S. planning Russia can restrict Western flexibility in values. constructs over the past quarter-century. the region. Although Russia has largely not In an era of constrained resources Russia’s intervention in Syria and sought to directly challenge the United and in the context of an evolving global posturing with respect to Afghanistan States, Moscow uses the information dynamism, the United States is facing a highlight another security concern mo- space to reinforce regional narratives, cast multitude of questions, not least of which tivating its reemergence as a player: the Russia as a responsible actor, question the are: How do China and Russia’s actions threat to Russia and its claimed sphere of reliability of the West, and promote falsi- affect U.S. interests and foreign policy influence by the presence and participa- ties that undermine the United States, goals? What are the costs and benefits to tion of Russian-speaking and former such as emphasizing U.S. responsibility the United States, and what role does it Soviet state citizens in violent extremist for regional instability and supporting want to play? What roles in great power organizations in these regions. Prior to terrorist organizations. Russia’s informa- competition for Russia and China are Syria and the rise of the so-called Islamic tion operations in the Middle East and acceptable to the United States? Finally, state, jihadists from former Soviet states Latin America utilize the state media RT, how can the United States compete were more scattered, had more narrow Sputnik Arabic, and Sputnik Mundo ser- against Russia and China in these key objectives, and did not have the size and vices, which maintain an online presence, regions, and what are we willing to sac- diversity currently represented. Syria pro- utilize social media as a force multiplier rifice, especially when the demands of vided the ground for networking among and engagement mechanism, and en- buttressing our positions in Europe and these entities and enhanced ties with courage local authors with the requisite East Asia compel a reallocation of forces international terrorist organizations.15 language and cultural familiarity to ap- away from some great competition areas? Moscow’s concern for this threat is long peal to a wide audience.16 The Kremlin’s While not exhaustive, some combina- term, although it is an area where Russia narratives are generally most effective in tion of the following lines of effort may seems to be reluctant to directly intervene uncontrolled media environments and help posture the United States to counter at this time. Instead, Russia is capitalizing among populations favorable to Russia, adverse Chinese and Russian activity and
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miles and Miller 83 Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter assigned to 2-6 Cavalry Regiment, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, sits on flightline under night sky on FARP 17, Pohakuloa Training Area, Island of Hawaii, Hawaii, April 13, 2019 (U.S. Army/Keith Kraker) present opportunities to U.S. security by the West is a potential opportunity for and publics. To that end, there are multi- interests and alliances relative to great a competitor. Simultaneously, U.S. and ple instances of the Chinese debt trap and power competition. host nation resources are not infinite, and data theft, and the loss of sovereignty and Reassure Partners of our competitor engagement in some sectors freedom they bring. Likewise, we should Commitment. Through our continued may be beneficial to U.S. goals. increase awareness of how Russia uses dis- military presence, even amid a reallocation Encourage Regional Integration information to sow political discord and of resources that reduces our footprint, and Military Interoperability. We instability and should inoculate the public we demonstrate to our allies and partners should continue our diplomatic efforts and governments against this threat. our commitment to regional security to buttress existing regional coordina- We should also ensure that Chinese and and stability. Task-specific combined tion mechanisms, such as the Gulf Russian human rights violations as well joint task forces, continual senior defense Cooperation Council, and to advance as repressive domestic policies toward official–defense attaché engagement, deeper formal military and economic Muslim populations (such as Chechens international military education and train- regional coordination, as with the Middle and Uighurs) are well understood by ing exchanges, and coordinated high-level East Strategic Alliance, especially in light regional governments and publics. visits all contribute to military presence. of China’s whole-of-government ap- Expose Areas Where Chinese and Continued long-standing military exer- proach. Regional integration will help our Russian Interests Diverge. Chinese cises signal our commitment and increase partners resist hostile powers’ efforts to and Russian goals for the region are our readiness and capacity to cooperate subvert their sovereignty. largely aligned only in the short term with partners. In demonstrating our Reinforce Regional Understanding and, in some areas (such as arms sales), commitment, we must also be honest of the Dangers of Chinese or Russian they are already competing. We should and forthright about our limitations and Practices. We must engage both dip- remain alert to examples of divergence priorities within these relationships and lomatic and informational means to between Beijing and Moscow and seek understand that security, economic, dip- spotlight the dangers of Chinese and opportunities to capitalize on these using lomatic, and information space unclaimed Russian practices to partner governments diplomatic or informational levers. In
84 Features / Global Risks and Opportunities: Great Power Competition JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 areas where U.S. interests converge with Arctic (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018); Eleanor Albert, those of China or Russia, but not both, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Rela- we should strive to cooperate within tions Backgrounder, July 12, 2017, available existing U.S. law and international insti- at
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