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Friend Or Ally? a Question for New Zealand

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Friend Or Ally? a Question for New Zealand .......... , ---~ MeN AIR PAPERS NUMBER T\\ ELVE FRIEND OR ALLY? A QUESTION FOR NEW ZEALAND By EWAN JAMIESON THE INSTI FUTE FOR NATIONAL SI'R-~TEGIC STUDIES ! I :. ' 71. " " :~..? ~i ~ '" ,.Y:: ;,i:,.i:".. :..,-~.~......... ,,i-:i:~: .~,.:iI- " yT.. -.~ .. ' , " : , , ~'~." ~ ,?/ .... ',~.'.'.~ ..~'. ~. ~ ,. " ~:S~(::!?- ~,i~ '. ? ~ .5" .~.: -~:!~ ~:,:i.. :.~ ".: :~" ;: ~:~"~',~ ~" '" i .'.i::.. , i ::: .',~ :: .... ,- " . ".:' i:!i"~;~ :~;:'! .,"L': ;..~'~ ',.,~'i:..~,~'"~,~: ;":,:.;;, ','" ;.: i',: ''~ .~,,- ~.:.~i ~ . '~'">.'.. :: "" ,-'. ~:.." ;';, :.~';';-;~.,.";'."" .7 ,'~'!~':"~ '?'""" "~ ': " '.-."i.:2: i!;,'i ,~.~,~I~out ;popular: ~fo.rmatwn~ .o~~'t,he~,,:. "~.. " ,m/e..a~ tg:,the~6w.erw!~chi~no.wtetl~e.~gi..~e~ ;~i:~.::! ~ :: :~...i.. 5~', '+~ :: ..., .,. "'" .... " ",'.. : ~'. ,;. ". ~.~.~'.:~.'-? "-'< :! :.'~ : :,. '~ ', ;'~ : :~;.':':/.:- "i ; - :~:~!II::::,:IL:.~JmaiegMad}~)~:ib;:, ,?T,-. 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' ~. ,' -':".- i"~'!" • %:' il,.~i .~,,~,.:~..:"~''' '"~ :' ......~ ..:':,/;/U:"~,.':.~..q÷O2)475dlgO~:: ~ ..... •...... 9 " " " ' ' : ,. :," .,:.,.. :.-..... ...;.. -: :. : , 'e'::,~Z::;~.;~,:~.'2;','~,:."/:"~i:~( ;;/".-" '?. :. ' .~' W~:'I "~. "~'- ~, i~: .,: ? ./"..;; ~,:',:. ::;.'~ "i" ....... ....;,.~ .. ;.~,.,:.:v.:~:,.~.!:;:.~',, .?.,: :' -.~,~'~.3:-:,'~,'.." '. ,,. " ..- ,".. " " ~ -? !' "2. ,-..':, ' ., • ,. • ,.' .~.." ...-., ,;: ,,..,,';- L;, ,:,',-i':..',,~'"';~,,::.. -.,c,~'. ': • :., 9-- "i . "- i ..;,: ', .;.~'. ..... , :. FRIEND OR ALLY? A QUESTION FOR NEW ZEALAND Mc NA I R PAPERS NUMBER TWELVE FRIEND OR ALLY? A QUESTION FOR NEW ZEALAND By EWAN JAMIESON THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES CONTENTS Preface vii THE PARTING 3 Alliance: Its Nature and Obligations 12 The Reasons for Parting 21 The Allies' Reaction 33 The Changing Worm 41 H. PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION 45 The American Attitude 47 The Australian Attitude 59 The New Zealand Attitude 66 A Constantly Evolving Relationship 77 Notes 85 About the Author 87 PREFACE The dispute between the United States and New Zealand over alliance obligations, which came to a head in early 1985, has not been settled by the US Secretary of State's decision to reopen limited contact with his New Zealand ministerial coun- terpart. The unprofitable standoff continues. Unless their politi- cal leaders are prepared to show greater regard for national inter- ests--and less for their own advantage--both nations are fated to suffer continuing damage of more consequence than the momentary benefits gained from the expediency that has marked too much of the past handling of the disagreement. The most serious consequences of the original breach remain with us. In particular, New Zealand continues to be hurt by being left on the outside of world affairs critical to its future. Wellington's ability to influence other governments and so move events to its advantage has been seriously weakened. Too much is at stake for New Zealanders to let the drift into international irrelevance continue. For a small Western nation which lives on trade--predominantly with distant and more powerful nations of similar political orientation--geographic isolation is burden enough. Voluntarily to compound that by accepting restraints on political association, when nothing of substance stands in the way of reconciliation, is irresponsible folly. New Zealand has gained nothing of substance from Secre- tary Baker's decision. In fact, it has suffered a reverse. Recovery of full association has been made more unlikely by the immod- erate, if predictable, reaction to Washington's show of partial forgiveness. The limited contact proposed by Secretary Baker is a far cry from the ready, unrestricted access which was one of the privileges of alliance membership; for New Zealand, it is not an adequate basis on which to conduct such an important relationship. The United States will gain nothing if it lets the present situation stand. New Zealand is not a major player in world viii PREFACE affairs, but it has been a good friend and valued ally in the past. It could contribute more to the stability and security of the South Pacific if allowed back on the field with the United States than it can while banished from play. The unresolved security disagree- ment stands witness to Washington's inability to manage an alliance with a nation which the world recognizes has more in common with the United States than all but a very few other nations. There is more to be gained for the United States, too, in full cooperation than in the present limited relationship. The way in which the dispute has been handled so far does credit to few of the main players. The New Zealand Govern- ment, under Prime Minister Lange, gulled the public into allow- ing it to take the nation out of close association with the United States behind a smoke-screen of imaginary nuclear peril. Secre- tary Baker evidently was prepared to sacrifice the prospect of return to a full alliance relationship with New Zealand merely to deflect congressional criticism of his part in the Scow- croft/Eagleburger visits to "the butchers of Peking." Now, in a blatant show of electoral opportunism, the principal opposition party in New Zealand, National, has embraced the Labour Party's doctrinaire anti-nuclearism and joined the retreat from alliance. In today's rapidly changing world, it might be argued, few of the original reasons for forming ANZUS are likely to prove relevant to the partners' future needs. Japan is unlikely to revert to military aggression to advance its national ambitions. It is doing well enough through economic expansionism. As China grapples with daunting domestic difficulties and the Soviet Union turns away from reliance on military power to forward its political and economic interests, the balance of the main benefits of alliance is changing. But the world is not so altered that the status of ally is now without value. In many respects, in fact, in this time of great change and uncertainty the need for the solid base of alliance, upon which to construct a strong web of inter- national relationships, is greater than ever. New Zealanders can- not afford to put to one side as no longer important the issues raised by their nation's departure from active membership of ANZUS. What was to others no more than a minor disturbance in global affairs was a major watershed in New Zealand's PREFACE ix foreign relations. The greatest sacrifice made at the time of the split with the United States was not of the security guarantee-- important as that might still prove in the unpredictable future. It was of the close association previously enjoyed with all the great Western nations. The loss of New Zealand's military contribu- tion is of little lasting importance to any of its erstwhile partners, but its withdrawal to the sidelines threatened the solidarity on which Western collective security was based since World War II. Its consequent rejection as a reliable partner is likely to do seri- ous harm to a small trading nation's ability to protect its eco- nomic interests in a world in which making a living is likely to become ever more difficult. What New Zealand has sacrificed by abandoning the ANZUS connection cannot be judged adequately in simple United States/New Zealand terms. It must also be viewed in the context of the vital link to Australia and, more broadly, in likely future changes in New Zealand's wider international relation- ships. Since mid-1989 the rate of change in world political affairs has been almost beyond comprehension. The shifting political orientation of a number of strategically important coun- tries may be the first dramatic sign of a fundamental reshaping of the balance of military, political, and economic power throughout the world. It will certainly not be the last. The adjustments now in progress will have further effects. Some will be unexpected: not all will be welcome. World trad- ing relationships, in particular, could be on the brink of funda- mental change. The gloomy Orwellian vision of a few exclusive super trade blocs is becoming an all too possible reality. Should that vision prove prophetic, this is no time for any trading nation to be on the outside, unable to influence affairs vital to its future economic survival. The welcome fading of the Cold War clearly suggests that a review of alliance priorities is in order. But, just as clearly, such a review must be made on the basis of long-term national interests, not on short-term political advantage. The question whether New Zealand should be content to accept its present place as a distant friend of the main actors, limited to watching
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