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Comprehensive Examinations: a List of Historical Events, Figures, Concepts, and Terms

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Comprehensive Examinations: a List of Historical Events, Figures, Concepts, and Terms Comprehensive Examinations: A List of Historical Events, Figures, Concepts, and Terms Ems Telegram Gulag Archipelago Franco-Prussian War Kellogg Briand Pact Dual Alliance Non-aggression pacts Zollverein Third International Bismarck Dismissed Comintern Entente Cordiale, Russia, France Spanish Civil War Spanish-American War Popular Front Panama Canal Construction Francisco Franco Russo-Japanese War Benito Mussolini Balkan Wars Treaty of Rapallo Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Fascism Schlieffen Plan Weimar Republic Triple Entente Munich Putsch (Beer Hall Putsch) Triple Alliance Mein Kampf First Battle of the Marne Locarno Conference and Treaties Verdun Wall Street Crash (Black Monday) Lusitania Smoot Hawley Tariff Wilson declares war Hitler becomes chancellor Armistice Day National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Treaty of Versailles Party) Senate rejects Versailles Treaty Night of the Long Knives Fourteen Points Maginot Line League of Nations Remilitarization of the Rhineland Alsace Lorraine Washington Naval Treaty David Lloyd George London Naval Treaty Georges Clemenceau Open Door Policy Ferdinand Foch Manchukuo Erich von Ludendorff Japanese occupation of Manchuria Kaiser Wilhelm (William II) Kuomintang Balfour Declaration Sun Yat-Sen Provisional Government (Russia) Chiang K’ai-Shek Petrograd Soviet Neutrality Act Bolshevik Revolution Holocaust Vladimir Lenin Adolf Hitler Leon Trotsky Joseph Goebbels Joseph Stalin Munich Conference and Agreement Feliks Dzherzhinky Neville Chamberlain Cheka Appeasement Third International Anschluss Bandung Conference Stalin-Hitler Pact (aka Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Nazi-Soviet Pact) Laurenti Beria Sudetenland Russian Civil War Blitzkrieg Polish-Soviet War Annexation of Baltic states Collectivization Soviet invasion of Poland Purges Katyn Forest Massacre Show Trials Soviet-Finnish War Dunkirk German Democratic Republic Fall of France COMECON Vichy Government Warsaw Pact Quisling KGB Marshall Petain NATO Charles de Gaulle Point Four Atlantic Charter China goes Communist Four Freedoms Mao Tse Tung (Mao Zedong) Lend Lease People’s Republic of China Winston Churchill named Prime Minister Republic of China Battle of Britain Korean War Pearl Harbor attack Kim Il Sung Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere Death of Stalin Germany attacks USSR (Operation Barbarossa) Dien Bien Phu Battle of Stalingrad Geneva Conference 1954 and the division of Warsaw Uprising Vietnam Manhattan Project SEATO D-Day ANZUS Battle of Midway Ho Chi Minh (his 21 st alias) Iwo Jima Ngo Dinh Diem Hiroshima OAS Charter (Organization of American States) Nagasaki Alliance for Progress Teheran Conference Austrian State Treaty Yalta Conference Quemoy and Matsu Potsdam Conference Hungarian Revolution Alger Hiss Suez Crisis Harry Hopkins Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at 20 th Party VE Day, VJ Day Congress Gen. Douglas MacArthur Andrei Gromyko Dumbarton Oaks Conference, San Francisco John Foster Dulles Conference, Founding of United Nations CENTO (Baghdad Pact) Nuremberg Trials Eisenhower Doctrine Bretton Woods Cuban Revolution International Monetary Fund Common Market/European Economic Community/ International Bank for Reconstruction and European Union Development (World Bank) Sputnik Iron Curtain Speech U-2 Incident Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) Missile gap/bomber gap NKVD Cuban Missile Crisis The Long Telegram Second Berlin Crisis Policy of Containment Nkrumah Truman Doctrine Julius Nyerere Marshall Plan Gamal Abdul Nasser NSC-68 Tonkin Gulf Resolution Two Camps doctrine (Zhdanov doctrine) Great Leap Forward Communist Takeovers in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Cultural Revolution North Korea, etc. “Let one hundred flowers bloom” campaign Founding of Israel Lao Gai Berlin Blockade Red Guards Federal Republic of Germany June 1967 War 2 UN Resolution 242 Independence of India Founding of Pakistan Massive Retaliation Flexible Response Prague Spring Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Tet Offensive Khmer Rouge Fall of Indochina Communist takeovers in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua, Grenada Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Brezhnev Doctrine SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty) Nixon Doctrine Shanghai Communique Yom Kippur War (October 1973 War) CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (Helsinki Accords) Détente Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Reza Shah Pahlavi Iranian hostage crisis Taiwan Relations Act Reagan Doctrine START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty) SDI Mikhail Gorbachev Boris Yeltsin Solidarity movement Democracy Wall Nelson Mandela Fidel Castro Pope John Paul II Lech Walesa Tiananmen Square Fall of Berlin Wall Collapse of Soviet empire NATO expansion U.S. declares pre-emptive war strategy 3 .
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