sign in sign up
<<
Home , Great Power, Regional power, Sphere of influence, Superpower

COMMENTARY Graham Allison The New Spheres of Influence Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers March/April 2020 By Graham Allison In the heady aftermath of the of influence hadn’t gone away; they States, that will require accepting , American policymakers had been collapsed into one, by the the reality that there are spheres of pronounced one of the fundamental overwhelming fact of U.S. . influence in the today—and that concepts of obsolete. Now, however, that hegemony is not all of them are American spheres. Secretary of Condoleezza Rice fading, and Washington has awakened THE WORLD AS IT WAS described a “in which great to what it calls “a new era of great-power Before making pronouncements power is defined not by spheres of competition,” with and about the new rules of geopolitics, influence . . . or the strong imposing increasingly using their power to assert post–Cold War U.S. secretaries of state their will on the weak.” Secretary of interests and values that often conflict should have looked back to the final State Hillary Clinton declared that with those of the . But months of World War II, when U.S. “the United States does not recognize American policymakers and analysts policymakers were similarly resistant spheres of influence.” Secretary of State are still struggling to come to grips with to accepting a world in which spheres John Kerry proclaimed that “the era of what this new era means for the U.S. of influence remained a central feature the is over,” ending almost two centuries of the United States staking claim to its own in the Western Hemisphere. Unipolarity is over, and with it Such pronouncements were right the illusion that other in that something about geopolitics had changed. But they were wrong about would simply take their what exactly it was. U.S. policymakers had ceased to recognize spheres of assigned place in a U.S.-led influence—the ability of other powers to international order. demand deference from other states in their own or exert predominant control there—not because the concept role in the world. Going forward, that of geopolitics. Competing views on the had become obsolete. Rather, the entire role will not only be different; it will issue lay at the core of a debate between world had become a American also be significantly diminished. While two top Soviet experts in the U.S. sphere. Spheres of influence had given leaders will continue announcing . way to a sphere of influence. The strong grand ambitions, diminished means On February 4, 1945, President still imposed their will on the weak; the will mean diminished results. Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet rest of the world was compelled to play Unipolarity is over, and with it the leader and British Prime largely by American rules, or else face illusion that other nations would simply Minister at Yalta. At a steep price, from crippling sanctions take their assigned place in a U.S.-led Roosevelt’s side was his translator and to outright regime change. Spheres international order. For the United principal adviser on the ,

www.belfercenter.org 2

Charles Bohlen. Just that morning, well-being and security and those of never be fought.” Bohlen had opened an urgent private the free non-Soviet world must . . . This bit of Cold War history should missive from his close colleague George draw [the non-Soviet world] closer serve as a reminder: a that is Kennan in Moscow. Kennan correctly together politically, economically, simultaneously idealistic and realistic forecast that the Soviet Union would financially, and, in the last analysis, will always struggle to reconcile attempt to maintain control of as much militarily in order to be in a position rationales and rationalizations of of as it could. The question to deal effectively with the consolidated purpose, on the one hand, with realities was what the United States should do Soviet area. of power, on the other. The result, in the about that. Kennan asked, “Why could This conviction became a pillar foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria’s we not make a decent and definitive of the United States’ strategy for the apt summary, has been “the rhetoric compromise with it—divide Europe coming decades, and it rested on the of transformation but the reality of frankly into spheres of influence—keep acceptance of spheres of influence. accommodation.” Even at the height ourselves out of the Russian sphere and There would be areas that would be of U.S. power, accommodation meant keep the out of ours?” subjected to Soviet domination, with accepting the ugly fact of a Soviet Bohlen was appalled. “Utterly often terrible consequences, but the sphere of influence. impossible,” he erupted in response. best course for the United States was to TECTONIC SHIFTS “Foreign policy of that kind cannot be bolster those powers on the periphery After nearly half a century made in a .” Reflecting on of this Soviet sphere while reinforcing of competition, when the Cold this moment later, Bohlen explained: the strength and unity of its own sphere. War ended and the Soviet Union “The American people, who had fought For the four decades that followed, disappeared, in 1991, the United States a long, hard war, deserved at least an the United States and the Soviet was left economically, militarily, and attempt to work out a better world.” Union engaged in the great-power geopolitically dominant. In the first Between 1945 and 1947, Bohlen competition that we know as the Cold two decades of the post–Cold War era, worked alongside other leading figures War. In the Soviet sphere, the captive U.S. defense spending exceeded the in the Roosevelt and then the Truman nations of remained defense budgets of the next ten nations administration to realize their “one under the boot of an “evil .” combined (five of them U.S. world” vision, in which the allies who American presidents faced repeated allies). Operationally, that meant that, had fought together to defeat the Nazis crises in which they had to choose as Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s would remain allied in creating a new between sending troops into Soviet- 2018 National Defense Strategy put it, global order. But he ultimately resigned dominated nations to support freedom the United States “enjoyed uncontested himself to the world as it was—in short, fighters seeking to exercise rights that or dominant superiority in every Kennan had been right. “Instead of the American creed declares universal operating domain. We could generally unity among the great powers on the and standing by as those freedom deploy our forces when we wanted, major issues of world reconstruction— fighters were slaughtered or suppressed. assemble them where we wanted, and both political and economic—after the Without exception, U.S. presidents operate how we wanted.” The United war, there is complete disunity between chose to watch instead of intervene: States and its allies could welcome the Soviet Union and the satellites on consider Dwight Eisenhower when new members into NATO, applying to one side and the rest of the world on Hungarians rose up in 1956 and Lyndon them its Article 5 security guarantee, the other,” Bohlen acknowledged in the Johnson during the Prague Spring of without thinking about the risks, since summer of 1947 in a memo to Secretary 1968 (or, after the Cold War, George the faced no real threat. In that of State George Marshall. “There are, in W. Bush when Russian troops attacked world, strategy in essence consisted short, two instead of one.” Georgia in 2008 and Barack Obama of overwhelming challenges with When he finally came to share when Russian special forces seized resources. Kennan’s diagnosis, Bohlen did not Crimea). Why? Each had internalized But that was then. The tectonic shift shrink from the implications. His an unacceptable yet undeniable truth: in the balance of power that occurred memo to Marshall concluded: that, as U.S. President in the first two decades of the twenty- Faced with this disagreeable fact, once explained in a joint statement first century was as dramatic as any however much we may deplore it, the with Soviet leader , shift the United States has witnessed United States in the interest of its own “a nuclear war cannot be won and must over an equivalent period in its 244

www.belfercenter.org 3 years. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, Asian country, including U.S. allies. 18 of the last 18 Pentagon war games then the president of Czechoslovakia, (And as an aggressive practitioner involving China in the Strait, it has happened so fast, we have not of economic statecraft, Beijing does the U.S. lost.” yet had time to be astonished. The U.S. not hesitate to use the leverage this Russia is a different matter. share of global GDP—nearly one-half provides, squeezing countries such as Whatever President Vladimir Putin in 1950—has gone from one-quarter in the Philippines and South when might want, Russia will never again 1991 to one-seventh today. (Although they resist Chinese demands.) Globally, be his father’s Soviet Union. When the GDP is not everything, it does form China is also rapidly becoming a peer Soviet Union dissolved, the resulting the substructure of power in relations competitor of the United States in Russian state was left with less than among nations.) And as the United advanced technologies. Today, of the half the GDP and half the population States’ relative power has declined, 20 largest information technology and saw its borders rolled back to the the menu of feasible options for companies, nine are Chinese. Four days before Catherine the Great. Yet policymakers has shrunk. Consider, for years ago, when Google, the global Russia remains a nuclear example, the U.S. response to China’s leader in artificial intelligence (AI), the with an arsenal that is functionally . With currency most significant advanced technology, equivalent to that of the United States; reserves of almost $3 trillion, China assessed its competition, Chinese it has a defense industry that produces can invest $1.3 trillion in infrastructure companies ranked alongside European weapons the world is eager to buy (as linking most of Eurasia to a China- companies. Now, that state of affairs is and have demonstrated centered order. When Secretary of barely visible in the rearview mirror: in the past year); and it boasts State Mike Pompeo announced that Chinese companies lead in many areas forces that can fight and win—as they the United States would increase its of applied AI, including surveillance, have demonstrated repeatedly in own investments in the Indo-Pacific in facial and voice recognition, and Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. response, he was able to come up with financial technology. On a continent where most of the other just $113 million in new investments. China’s military spending and nations imagine that war has become China has, of course, been the chief capabilities have surged, as well. A obsolete, and maintain military forces beneficiary of this transformation. quarter century ago, its defense budget more for ceremonial than combat In the past generation, its GDP has was one-25th that of the United operations, military prowess may soared: from 20 percent of the U.S. level States; now, it is one-third and on a now be Russia’s major comparative in 1991 to 120 percent today (measured path to parity. And whereas the U.S. advantage. by purchasing power parity, the metric defense budget is spread across global BACK TO BASICS that both the CIA and the International commitments, many of them in Europe The claim that spheres of influence Monetary Fund use to compare and the Middle East, China’s budget is had been consigned to the dustbin of national ). Although China focused on East . Accordingly, in history assumed that other nations faces many internal challenges, there specific military scenarios involving would simply take their assigned places are more reasons to expect this basic a conflict over Taiwan or in the South in a U.S.-led order. In retrospect, that economic trend to continue than to bet China Sea, China may have already assumption seems worse than naive. that it will stop soon. With four times taken the lead. Short of actual war, the Yet because many U.S. analysts and as many citizens as the United States, best tests of relative military capabilities policymakers still cling to images of and if Chinese workers become as are war games. In 2019, Robert Work, China and Russia formed during this productive as Portuguese workers are a former U.S. deputy secretary of bygone era, their views about what the today (that is, around half as productive defense, and David Ochmanek, one of United States should and should not as Americans), China will see its GDP the Defense Department’s key defense do continues to reflect a world that has rise to double that of the United States. planners, offered a public summary of vanished. In Asia, the economic balance of the results from a series of classified Over the course of centuries of power has tilted especially dramatically recent war games. Their bottom line, geopolitical competition, policymakers in China’s favor. As the world’s in Ochmanek’s words: “When we fight and theorists developed a set of core largest exporter and second-largest Russia and China, ‘blue’ [the United concepts to help clarify the complexities importer, China is the top trading States] gets its ass handed to it.” As of relations among states, including partner of every other major East The New York Times summarized, “In spheres of influence, balances of power,

www.belfercenter.org 4 and . These concepts must giant Huawei. As the leader of a country Syrians, and the millions of displaced be adapted to take account of specific currently considering the choice people have had a major impact on conditions in the twenty-first century. recently put it, Washington is trying neighboring countries and Europe. But Yet they remain the sturdiest building to persuade other countries not to buy did Obama, or, later, President Donald blocks available for understanding and Chinese hardware because it will make Trump, conclude that this outcome constructing international order. it easier for China to spy and instead to was so costly that it would be better Where the equilibrium of forces buy American hardware, which would to send large numbers of U.S. troops between one state and another shifts make it easier for the United States to to fight and perhaps die in Syria? Can to the point where the first becomes spy. Americans sleep soundly in a world predominant, the resulting new balance A REALISTIC RECKONING in which Putin and Assad now smile of power casts a shadow that becomes, From the perspective of American when they ask visitors who is gone in effect, a “sphere of influence.” That interests and values, the consequences and who is still standing? U.S. inaction specific term entered the vocabulary of increases in China’s and Russia’s speaks for itself. of in the early nineteenth power relative to that of the United Sadly, Americans will come century, but the concept is as old States are not good. As great powers, to accept such outcomes as good as itself. (As China and Russia can use their power enough—at least for the foreseeable Thucydides noted, after the defeat of to suppress protesters’ freedom in Hong future. Like Assad’s atrocities, Russia’s the Persians in the fifth century BC, Kong or block Ukrainian membership absorption of Crimea and China’s Sparta demanded that Athens not in NATO. The South China Sea is likely militarization of the South China Sea rebuild the walls around its city-state to to become more like the Caribbean than are now facts on the ground that no leave itself vulnerable.) Traditionally, the Mediterranean—that is, China’s one will contest militarily. great powers have demanded a degree neighbors in will be as Acknowledging that other powers of deference from lesser powers on beholden to China as Latin Americans have spheres of influence does not, of their borders and in adjacent seas, and have been to their hemispheric course, mean that the United States they have expected other great powers hegemon. Ukraine will have to get can do nothing. It is a reflection of to respect that fact. Recent actions by over the loss of Crimea as countries in the recent overmilitarization of U.S. China and Russia in their respective Russia’s “near abroad” learn to be both foreign policy that restraint in the neighborhoods are just the most recent more fearful of and more deferential to use of military force is often equated examples of that tradition. the Kremlin. with acquiescence. Washington has Spheres of influence also extend For many other nations and other ways in which it can shape other beyond . When the United individuals around the world countries’ calculations of costs and States led the world in the creation of who have found shelter under the benefits: through the condemnation the Internet, and the hardware and American security umbrella and found of unacceptable actions; the denial of software that empowered it, the United inspiration in a vision of an American- legal status; the imposition of economic States enjoyed what Michael Hayden, led international order that safeguards sanctions on countries, companies, a former director of the National core liberties, the consequences will and individuals; and support for local Security Agency, later called a “golden be tragic. Recent events in Syria offer resisters. But such tools can rarely age of electronic surveillance.” Since a preview of what’s to come. As the decisively alter a decision another most countries were unaware of the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010 and power has made when interests it sees surveillance capabilities revealed by 2011, Obama famously declared that as vital are at stake. And it is worth the former NSA contractor Edward Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad “must remembering how often a refusal to Snowden, the United States had go.” But Putin had other ideas, and recognize and accept realities on the an unparalleled ability to exploit he was willing to act on them. He ground in the shadow of other powers technology to listen to, track, and even demonstrated that a nation Obama has led to major U.S. policy failures. influence them. But post-Snowden, had dismissed as a “” From General Douglas MacArthur’s many states are resisting the current could use its military forces to defy rush to the Chinese border during the U.S. campaign to prevent them from the United States and help the Syrian (which triggered Chinese buying their 5G wireless infrastructure leader consolidate his control. intervention and a bloody, inconclusive from the Chinese telecommunications This has been a horror for war) to George W. Bush’s insistence that

www.belfercenter.org 5

NATO offer membership to Georgia Washington will need partners—but NATO launch an immediate military and Ukraine (which led to Georgian partners that bring more in assets than response, in accordance with its Article overconfidence, ending in the country’s they introduce in risks. Unfortunately, 5 guarantee? Should it? If the answer partial dismemberment by Russia), a few of the United States’ current allies to any of those questions is not a stubborn disregard of brute facts has meet this standard. The U.S. alliance straightforward yes—and it is not— been counterproductive. system should be subjected to a zero- then the time has come for an alliance- THE MUSEUM OF RETIRED based analysis: every current ally and focused version of the stress tests for INTERESTS partner, from Pakistan, the Philippines, banks used after the 2008 financial When it comes to doing what it and to , , crisis. can, Washington should focus above and Turkey, should be considered in Such an approach is all the more all on its alliances and partnerships. terms of what it is doing to enhance important given the realities of nuclear If China is destined to be “the biggest U.S. security and well-being, and with weapons in this new world. Both player in the history of the world,” as what risks and costs. Alliances are not China and Russia have reliable second- the longtime Singaporean leader Lee forever. Historically, when conditions strike nuclear capabilities—that is, the Kuan Yew once claimed, the United have changed, particularly when a focal ability to withstand an initial nuclear States must work to assemble allied enemy has disappeared or balances of attack and conduct a retaliatory strike powers who together will constitute a power have shifted dramatically, so, that could destroy the United States. correlation of forces to which China too, have other relationships among Accordingly, not only is nuclear war not will have to adjust. nations. Most Americans today have a viable option; even a conventional war This logic is most evident in forgotten an era in which NATO had that could escalate to nuclear war risks the economic arena. Before the a counterpart in Asia, SEATO (the catastrophe. Competition must thus be Trump administration ended U.S. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), tempered by caution, constraints, and participation in the Trans-Pacific and even an analogue in the Middle careful calculations in risk taking. For Partnership, that agreement East, CENTO (the Central Treaty a nation that has accumulated a long promised to bring together countries Organization); both of those are now list of entanglements with nations that accounting for 40 percent of global artifacts in the museum of retired may have, or may imagine they have, GDP under a common set of rules on national interests. As Kennan noted, a blank check from Washington, this everything from tariffs to state-owned “There is more respect to be won . . . by creates a big problem. The line between enterprises to labor and environmental a resolute and courageous liquidation reassuring an ally and emboldening its standards—providing a counterweight of unsound positions than by the most leadership to act recklessly is a fine one. to Chinese economic might that could stubborn pursuit of extravagant or If the balance of military power have made Beijing a rule-taker rather unpromising objectives.” in a conventional war over Taiwan than a rule-maker. Thanks to the efforts To understand the risks entailed or the Baltics has shifted decisively of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo in the inheritance of current U.S. in China’s and Russia’s favor, Abe, the TPP is now a reality—but alliances, consider two scenarios U.S. current U.S. commitments are not without the United States. If American defense planners worry about today. sustainable. The gap between those policymakers could find a way to allow If, watching China’s suppression commitments and the United States’ strategic interests to trump , the of protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan actual military capabilities is a classic United States could rejoin the TPP. If should make a dramatic move toward case of overstretch. What a zero-based that new TPP were combined with the independence that leads China to react assessment would mean for the current parallel trade agreement between the violently, would the United States go alliance system, and for U.S. relations United States and the to war with China to preserve Taiwan’s with each of more than 50 treaty allies that was being negotiated at the end of status? Should it? On the European and partners, should emerge as a result the Obama administration, nearly 70 front, if in response to an uprising of an analysis of the evidence. But it percent of the world’s GDP could be on of ethnic Russian workers in Riga’s would likely lead the United States one side of the balance, versus China’s shipyards, the Latvian government to shed some allies, double down on approximately 20 percent on the other. cracked down on ethnic Russians others whose assets are as important for In the military arena, the same and sparked Russia’s annexation of a U.S. security as U.S. assets are for them, logic applies, but with more complexity. swath of Latvia—Crimea 2.0—would and radically revise the terms of each

www.belfercenter.org 6 commitment to make obligations and The basic view of the United restraints as prominent as reassurances States’ role in the world held by most and guarantees. of today’s foreign-policy makers was This process would also enhance imprinted in the quarter century the credibility of the commitments that that followed the U.S. victory in the the United States chose to renew. While Cold War. That world is now gone. the veterans of the Cold War rightly The consequences are as profound claim that NATO has been the greatest as those that Americans confronted alliance in the history of the world, in the late 1940s. Accordingly, it is neither Trump nor Obama before him worth remembering how long it took was convinced. Tellingly, American individuals now revered as “wise men” military commanders doubted that to understand the world they faced. the North Atlantic Council would Nearly five years passed between authorize a military response to the Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” an early Russian annexation of Crimea or that warning of Cold War competition, and the U.S. government would be able to the policy paper NSC-68, which finally make a decision about how to respond laid out a comprehensive strategy. The before the event was over. Rethinking confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign the United States’ commitments to policy community today should thus its allies would enhance American not be a cause for alarm. If it took the security and make these same pacts great strategists of the Cold War nearly stronger. five years to forge a basic approach, it PRESENT AT THE (RE-) would be beyond hubris to expect this CREATION generation to do better. Strategy is the purposeful alignment of means and ends. Among the many ways in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch— when the means an actor can organize and sustain are insufficient to achieve the stated ends—and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but unachievable end. The United States’ twenty-first-century wars in the Middle East offer vivid examples of both. Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security.w

www.belfercenter.org