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Measuring Power, Power Cycles, and the Risk of Great-Power War in the 21St Century

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Measuring Power, Power Cycles, and the Risk of Great-Power War in the 21St Century MEASURING POWER, POWER CYCLES, AND THE RISK OF GREAT-POWER WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY JACOB L. HEIM | BENJAMIN M. MILLER Cover design Peter Soriano Cover image: Adobe Stock/kras99 Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2989. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0462-6 © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation Measuring Global Power great-power wars are rare, their consequences are dramatic. The combination of full mobilization and The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense intense competition between powerful states leads to Strategy signals that great-power competition has very high death tolls and widespread destruction. For supplanted terrorism as the primary focus of U.S. example, Figure 1 illustrates that battle deaths during defense planning.1 This reflects a growing concern in great-power wars dwarf those from other interstate recent years that U.S. power, particularly its military conflicts.4 power, has been declining relative to the growing The consequences of major wars between great global power of Russia and China.2 This concern powers go beyond the deaths of soldiers and civilians. renews longstanding questions about how we should Wars of this magnitude can lead to major changes in measure international power, which nations have the international system. WWI led to the breakup of the most power, which states are gaining and losing the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the power, and when such shifts in relative or perceived creation of new states in the Middle East and Eastern power might portend conflict between major pow- Europe, for example. World War II (WWII) led to the ers.3 In this report, we explore these questions, illustrating a quantitative, scenario-based approach for policymakers who are interested in measuring the interstate balance of power, assessing the impact of Abbreviations shocks on the balance of power, and identifying peri- ods during which shifts in the balance of power could potentially portend conflict between major powers. AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment There are different theories that describe conditions Bank under which the balance of power could increase the CINC Composite Index of National threat of conflict. We use one such theory—power Capability cycle theory—to illustrate how the approach pre- GDP gross domestic product sented in this analysis can be used to quantitatively GPI Global Power Index assess the balance of power and associated risks in a systematic way across a variety of potential future IF International Futures scenarios. Policymakers could use this approach to assess which nations have the most power and then IISS International Institute of Strategic Studies identify—and attempt to avoid—risky scenarios. The approach we illustrate in this report, as well NIC National Intelligence Council as the theories on which it is built, focus on great- OECD Organisation for Economic Co- power wars: conflicts that involve intense and direct operation and Development combat between major powers. The ability to identify PLA People’s Liberation Army and avoid these conflicts is particularly import- ant because the stakes of these wars are high. They PPP purchasing power parity involve significant potential changes to the global RCP Relative Concentration Pathway order, and participants mobilize their societies to bring all elements of power to bear. These wars are R&D research and development not simply fought with the weapons on hand when they start. Great-power wars, fortunately, are rare SSP shared socioeconomic pathway events. It has been more than 70 years since the last UN United Nations great-power war ended in 1945. There have been even longer periods between great-power wars; there WWI World War I were 99 years between the end of the Napoleonic WWII World War II Wars and the start of World War I (WWI). While 1 FIGURE 1 Battle Deaths from Interstate Wars, 1816–2007 WWII 12 10 About 75 percent of all interstate battle deaths between 1816 and 2007 WWI 8 occurred in WWI or WWII. 6 4 2 Vietnam Iraq-Iran Number of battle deaths (millions) Korean War War War 0 1823 1846 1849 1853 1855 1859 1862 1864 1866 1876 1879 1884 1894 1898 1904 1907 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1929 1932 1935 1938 1940 1943 1945 1948 1951 1956 1958 1965 1967 1969 1971 1974 1977 1979 1982 1987 1991 1993 1998 2001 2007 SOURCE: Data from Sarkees and Wayman, 2010. creation of the United Nations (UN) and a U.S.-led the Soviets winning the Space Race. The energy crises economic order based on trade and economic liberal- of the 1970s did not spell the end of American pros- ization. Defeat in these wars can have grave conse- perity. Predictions of Japan as Number One evapo- quences; the Ottoman Empire disintegrated because rated after the collapse of Japan’s asset bubble in the of WWI, Germany was partitioned and occupied for mid-1990s was followed by two decades of economic decades after WWII, and Japan shifted from imperial stagnation. Claims in the 1990s that the United States rule to a constitutional monarchy. had led the world into a new era of stability collapsed After a post–Cold War hiatus, there has been along with the World Trade Center in 2001. Today, growing concern in the past decade that competition the United States is experiencing record prosperity between the great powers could lead to a major war yet is once again uneasy about its place in the world. in the next decade or two.5 This concern underscores China’s sustained economic and military growth has the importance of finding ways to anticipate—and raised concerns about whether the United States can avoid—great-power conflict. This analysis explores maintain its military and economic dominance. The one approach to this problem based on the balance of simultaneous deterioration of the U.S.-Russia relation- power. ship has also raised concerns about a costly military Political scientists, economists, and interna- competition. The reemergence of power politics and tional relations theorists have yet to agree on the spheres of influence harkens back to dangerous eras of most meaningful metrics for understanding—let history when major powers engaged in brinksmanship alone forecasting—the balance of power.6 Competing and overt and proxy conflicts on multiple continents.8 views on how to define, measure, and interpret global A particular focal point of the concern over power are based on different assumptions that lead renewed great-power competition relates to Sino- to different conclusions about the implications of the American competition and whether China’s rise global balance of power. Over the past 70 years, the means that the two states are destined for war.9 United States has wrestled with competing prophecies Despite this focus on the rise of China, however, we of declinism and triumphalism.7 These assessments do not have a reliable way to measure China’s power were generally wrong. Sputnik did not, in fact, presage relative to U.S. power. As this report shows, the 2 perceived balance of power depends on assumptions contrast, the United States plods along at a steady rate about how components of power are measured and of growth, with a noticeable impact of the financial assumptions about how power is defined in the first crisis in 2009. Through this lens, China’s GDP passed place. For this reason, there is much to be gained that of the United States in 2013 and continues to from a framework that not only assesses power rocket away. using a clear set of well-defined assumptions but Figure 2 tells a story of relentless Chinese growth that allows researchers the flexibility to compare the that leaves the United States lagging behind. But implications of trading one set of assumptions for Figure 2 does not come close to telling the full eco- another set. This research develops such a frame- nomic story, in part because of how it measures GDP. work and applies it to three alternative assumptions When comparing two economies that use different about future economic, demographic, and climate currencies, one must develop a conversion factor. PPP outcomes. measures use a common basket of goods to develop a relative price index. This is useful for comparing the standard of living between two countries. But The Role of Perspective American unease over China’s growth has less to To illustrate the challenge, we present three ways of do with the rising standard of living of the Chinese comparing the size of the U.S. and Chinese econo- people and more to do with the potential of China mies, showing that each perspective tells a different channeling that economic growth into international story. Figure 2 shows what many may think of when influence, including through military force.10 they hear that China will soon eclipse the United The common basket of goods researchers States. It shows the gross domestic product (GDP) generally use to calculate PPP measures may be less of each country, measured using purchasing power relevant to questions of latent military power.11 A parity (PPP).
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