IPRIS Maghreb Bulletin 8

8 IPRIS Maghreb Review FEBRUARY 2011 2010: the last year of an authoritarian development model and the limits of Tunisia’s electoral authoritarian regime DIRK AXTMANN Maghreb-Expertise, Heidelberg, Germany On 17 December 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor Competitiveness Index remunerated the government’s from the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid dowsed past development efforts by identifying Tunisia as the himself with gasoline and set fire to himself in front of most competitive economy on the African continent? the local governorate. The weeks that followed this act Average growth rates of 5% over the last 10 years had of self-immolation saw an ever-growing wave of clashes confirmed the regime’s choices of resolutely embarking between Tunisians and the security forces spread all on an export-driven development strategy. Recent over the country. Faced with unprecedented popular negotiations with the European Union had led to an anger, the regime firstly resorted to its usual panoply of agreement to set up a commission to work on a roadmap anti-riot measures. The regime’s bell tolled when on 13 for Tunisia to finally achieve an advanced integration January 2011 General Rachid Ammar, the Chief of Staff of status. Clearly, the country capitalized on decade-long the Tunisian Army, refused to order his troops to fire on investment efforts in Tunisia’s human capital. Also, demonstrators, hence denying President Zine El Abidine Tunisia had received a considerable influx of foreign Ben Ali any further support. direct investment in recent years, which in contrast to other countries in the region, was increasingly directed The limits of an authoritarian development path toward manufacturing industries higher up the value Hardly any observer would have predicted that Mohamed chain (e.g. aeronautical components). Next to Tunisia’s Bouazizi’s solitary and desperate protest against the weak interlinkages with global financial markets, it was arbitrary confiscation of his fruit cart would eventually undoubtedly thanks to these sound economic foundations lead to the ousting of incumbent President Zine El that Tunisia had managed to weather the global economic Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. After the economic crisis. In addition, rising government expenditures for downturn of 2009, the economy stabilized in 2010 with infrastructure projects, while preserving macroeconomic growth perspectives being again promising in the light stability, and a good harvest helped keeping the country’s of the solid business environment. Hadn’t the World economy on track in 2009. Despite a 22.1%-drop in Economic Forum in its 2010-2011 edition of the Global export revenues in 2009, the Tunisian economy grew IPRIS Maghreb Review | 2 by respectable 3.1% in 2009 and an estimated 3.2% in regime. On a more abstract level, the end of the year 2010. In terms of human development, according to 2010 seems to have seen the explosion of an increasingly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), less conciliable contrast between the ambitions of a Tunisia’s Human Development Index had risen quicker young, relatively well-off educated modern society with than the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) average important middle classes and Tunisia’s sclerotic political over the last 20 years. With a global rank of 81 out of structures. While Tunisia could long pass for a relatively 169 countries in 2010 Tunisia came in, not surprisingly, successful example of an authoritarian developing behind oil-rich countries such as United Arab Emirates regime, this development model had finally reached its (rank 32) or neighboring Libya (rank 53). But the country intrinsic limits. In other words, in order to face the social, had outpaced countries like neighboring oil-rich Algeria economic and political challenges of upcoming years, the (rank 84) and even more Tunisian society was in clearly Egypt (rank 101) or dire need of more, not Morocco (rank 114). less freedom than the Of course many observ- Tunisia had received a institutions of the Ben Ali ers in 2010 knew that the considerable influx of foreign regime could offer. image of the immaculate social and economic suc- direct investment in recent The apparent political cess story lauded by the stability of an electoral government-controlled years, which in contrast to authoritarian regime media and Tunisia’s Eu- other countries in the region, Politically nothing pre- ropean partners was only destinated the year 2010 one side of the Tunisian was increasingly directed to be the last out of the 23 reality. Years of econom- years since (then-) Prime ic growth had not been toward manufacturing Minister Zine El Abidine enough to bring unem- industries higher up in the Ben Ali had ousted his ployment below the offi- predecessor and founder cial rate of 14%. Socially value chain. of the Republic, Habib motivated riots in the Bourguiba, in a bloodless region of Gafsa in spring It was undoubtedly thanks “medical coup” of 7 No- 2008, at the latest, must to these sound economic vember 1987. Rather, the have alerted the regime cadence of political life in that some regions in the foundations that Tunisia had Tunisia in 2010, dominat- Tunisian hinterland might ed by President Ben Ali, well one day constitute managed to weather the his state-party Rassem- a powder-keg for the re- global economic crisis. blement Constitutionnel gime. The unemployment Démocratique (RCD) and (or under-employment) a fairly efficient security among young, well-educated Tunisians hovered around apparatus, sent a signal of apparent political stability. 30% in regions like El Kef, Gafsa, Kasserine or Sidi Bou- The years 2009 and 2010 revolved around the renewal of zid. The economy there was clearly disconnected from formal institutional structures of the regime and, hence, the industrial centers around Sousse and Monastir, the the presidential and parliamentary elections, held in par- glamorous holiday resorts in Hammamet or the am- allel on 25 October 2009, and the municipal elections of bitious real estate projects in greater Tunis. And the 9 May 2010. drought of autumn 2010, in conjunction with increasing Tunisia has since independence held presidential and par- prices of everyday commodities, had surely not made life liamentary elections at fairly regular intervals. In this re- easier for the average Tunisian. spect, the Ben Ali regime was an archetypical example of This increasing gap between two Tunisias, evolving at an electoral authoritarian regime, in which elections were different paces, widening discrepancies in purchasing neither competitive nor fair. Notwithstanding, elections power and mounting social hardship, explain only in part had specific important functions, especially garnering the why the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi had such population around a presidential program and ritually re- wide repercussions on the Tunisian society. Protestors’ newing the “unity” between the regime and the popula- anger needs of course to be seen against the background tion. To a limited extent, elections also provided forums of the more and more unabashed corruption of a narrow for discussion within the tolerable “limits” and allowed for state elite and the family clan around President Ben Ali, a controlled rotation (or rejuvenation) of regime elites. as well as the day-to-day patronizing of an omnipresent The presidential elections on 25 October 2009 led to the police state and the bleak human rights record of the re-election of incumbent President Ben Ali for a third IPRIS Maghreb Review | 3 time in a row with officially 89.62% of valid votes. As in was that the regime did not perceive opposition parties the 1999 and 2004 elections, in an effort to lend credibility as a legitimate emanation of a pluralistic society. Rather, to the pseudo-pluralistic elections, a number of parties were supposed to comply with the government’s handpicked opposition candidates were allowed to stand strategy of a “controlled pluralism” in order to prove the as candidates against Ben Ali. Among these candidates, regime’s alleged “openness”. Apart from this, parties Mohamed Bouchiha – Parti d’Unité Populaire (PUP) – were supposed, and often forced, to abide to the authori- and Ahmed Inoubli – Union des Démocrates Unionistes tarian “national consensus”, which included the acknowl- (UDU) –, both representatives of legal opposition parties edgment of the RCD’s vanguard role in political life. Op- considered close to the regime, were officially credited position parties attempting to free themselves from this with 5% and 3.8% respectively of valid votes. Taking a imposed consensus or criticizing political stagnation were more resolute oppositional stance, Ahmed Ibrahim, subjected to different kinds of pressure including legal secretary-general of the harassment and govern- (ex-communist) Ettajdid ment-induced splintering. – “Renewal” – movement, This was most prominent- obtained a mere 1.57% The increasing gap between ly the case of two small of votes. In January 2011 two Tunisias, evolving at legal parties, the Parti Ahmed Ibrahim would des Démocrates Progres- take a ministerial post different paces, widening sistes (PDP) and the Fo- in the two transitional rum Démocratique pour governments under discrepancies in purchasing le Travail et les Libertés Prime Minister Mohamed power and mounting social (FDTL), both of which were Ghannouchi that lasted more outspoken in their from 17 January until 1 hardship, explain only in part criticism of the regime March 2011. than the

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