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The Initiators of the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Democratization Experience

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The Initiators of the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Democratization Experience The Initiators of the Arab Spring: Tunisia's Democratization Experience Uğur Pektaş Tunisia is seen as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, which is described as pro-democracy popular protests aimed at eliminating authoritarian governments in various Arab countries. The protests in Tunisia, which started with Mohamed Bouazizi's burning on December 17, 2010, ended without causing violence with the effect of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali’s departure from the country on January 14th. With its relatively low level of violence, Tunisia achieved the most successful outcome among the countries where the Arab Spring protests took place. In the decade after the authoritarian leader Ben Ali fled the country, significant progress has been made on the way to democracy in Tunisia. However, it can be said that the country's transition to democracy is still in limbo. Although 10 years have passed, Tunisians barely gained some political rights, but a backward economy and deterioration of the political fabric prevented these protests from reaching their goals. In the last 10 years, protesters took to the streets from time to time. If we take a general look at what happened in Tunisia in the last decade, it may be easier to understand the situation in question. An emergency was declared on January 14, 2011, following ongoing street protests. It has been announced that the government has dissolved and that general elections will be held within six months. Even this development did not end the protests and Ben Ali left the country. Fouad Mebazaa, the former spokesperson of the lower wing of the Tunisian Assembly, became the temporary president. Mohamed Ghannouchi became prime minister. Mohamed Ghannouchi and Mebazaa are former members of Ben Ali's party (Democratic Constitutional Rally-RCD). The fact that the politicians who are members of Ben Ali's party continued to serve as ministers in the interim government drew the reaction of Tunisians. Apart from this, the supporters of Ben Ali were held responsible for the occasional violence. The people wanted a complete break with the old regime. Mohamed Ghannouchi stated that Ben Ali was responsible for the violent suppression of the protests; he argued that the ministers in the interim government had nothing to do with this situation. As prime minister of the interim government, Mohamed Ghannouchi stated that economic stability would be achieved, political freedoms would be established in Tunisia, political criminals would be released and censorship of the media would be abolished. Due to the growing street protests, Mebazaa, Ghannouchi and other interim government members resigned from Ben Ali's party, RCD. However, those who believed that the interim government maintained its ties with the old regime continued to protest in the streets. On February 6, 2011, the RCD was shut down, and on February 27, Mohamed Ghannouchi stepped down as prime minister. Former foreign minister Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi has become the new prime minister of the interim government. The interim government dissolved the Tunisian secret police, which was used as a tool to suppress political opposition during the Ben Ali era. It issued a statement saying that the rights and freedoms of Tunisians would be respected and that the security forces would not be used again to suppress political opposition. Tunisians went to the polls on October 23, 2011, to elect members of a 217-member Constituent Assembly. The aforementioned parliament would form an interim government and make a new constitution. Ennahda Party won the elections by a wide margin, with 70% of the population participating. Ennahda won more than 40% of the valid votes and won 89 seats in parliament. The new parliament adopted an interim constitution in December. The parliament elected Munsif Marzuki, a former opponent of the Ben Ali regime and a human rights activist, as president. Marzuki assigned Hamadi Jebali, a member of Ennahda, to form the government. Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, who has lived in exile in Britain for 20 years, returned to the country in 2011. However, the release of political prisoners and the free activity of the parties in Tunisia have created a new problem. A polarization between secular and religious factions has become a dominant problem in Tunisian political life. In 2012 and 2013, the rise of political violence and the assassination of some secular politicians jeopardized Tunisia's transition to democracy. Secular groups held Ennahda Party responsible for the current situation, claiming that the secular opposition was being suppressed by a policy of intimidation and that there was a danger of a theocratic regime. Violent acts of various Salafist groups have also increased these concerns. In 2013, the assassination of Chokri Belaid, a leftist leader, in an unsolved murder made the political atmosphere tense. Street protests increased, and some secular and liberal ministers in the cabinet resigned. The proposal of Prime Minister Jebali, who demanded the establishment of a government of technocrats, was rejected by Ennahda. Thereupon, Jebali resigned. In July of the same year, a second secular opposition politician, Mohamed Brahimi, was assassinated. These developments have put the drafting of the new constitution in the Constituent Assembly at great risk. But Ennahda chose to make concessions to ease tensions and handed power to an interim government in October. In January 2014, the new constitution was accepted in the Constituent Assembly, taking 200 of the 217 votes. The new Constitution has been praised by Tunisian politicians and international observers; it has been shown as an example of successful reconciliation between Islamist and secular parties. At the end of 2014, according to the new constitution, legislative assembly and presidential elections were held. Nida Tunisia (Nida Tounes) Party was the first party in the legislative assembly, whose new name is the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. Secular Nida Tunisian Party, led by Sebsi, won 86 of the 217 seats. Ennahda, who received 89 seats in the 2011 General Election, lost power. In the second round of the presidential elections, Sebsi was elected president by taking 55% of the votes against the interim President Marzuki. Since no party in the parliament could get the majority to form a government, Nida Tunis and Ennahda parties came together and formed a government of national unity. ISIS attacks were carried out on major touristic areas of Tunisia in 2015. Since tourism revenues have a significant share in Tunisia's economy, the country's economy has been highly affected by this situation. Street demonstrations started again with an increase in the unemployment rate as well as no recovery in the economy. There was a change of government in 2016. Prime Minister Habib Essid has been replaced by Yusuf Shahid. Thus, 7 different governments have served in Tunisia in the last five years. At the end of 2017, several austerity measures have been taken to address the growing international pressure to close the budget deficit and attract foreign capital. Taxes have been raised and the prices of basic consumer goods have been increased. In January 2018, the public took to the streets again. Presidential and general elections were held in 2019. Looking at the election results, it can be said that the public is in great dissatisfaction with the existing political elites and the political order. Kais Saied won the presidential elections in the second round with 70% of the votes. Kais Saied is an associate professor of constitutional law, who came to the fore with the criticisms and comments he made during the constitution draft studies in 2014. Kais Saied won the election despite running a very low budget and modest election campaign. While Abdulfettah Moro, the candidate of the Ennahda Party, could not qualify for the second round, Nabil Karoui, who was described as a media mogul, was the other candidate who could qualify for the second round. General elections were held one week before the presidential elections. Ennahda became the party with the most votes, winning 52 seats. However, when it is remembered that it won 69 seats in 2014, it is seen that Ennahda continues to lose blood. Nida Tunisia, which had 86 seats in the 2014 general elections, was able to win only 3 seats in this election. Nabil Karoui's new party, Qalp Tounes (The Heart of Tunisia), was the second-largest party in the general elections. In the 2019 general elections with a low turnout, no party received more than 18% of the vote. There were 20 parties in the Tunisian Assembly of the Representatives of the People, where the number of seats required to form a government was 109. This situation made it very difficult to form a government. When the Ennahda Party could not form a government, President Kais Saied gave the task to former finance minister Elyes Fakhfah. The government that Fakhfah formed in February 2020 also did not last long. Instead of Fakhfah, who left office on corruption allegations against him, his interior minister Hichem Mechichi formed a government of technocrats. Mechichi's new government was able to get a vote of confidence from parliament in January 2021. Tunisia is the most promising country in the context of transition to democracy among the countries where the Arab Spring took place. Compared to the Ben Ali regime, the people had important gains in terms of political rights. However, it can be said that Tunisia has a bumpy road ahead. Despite the past 10 years, Tunisian people still suffer from problems such as economic failure, high unemployment and high cost of living. The lack of political leadership to deal with these problems has made the situation more difficult. The current constitution has given the legislature more power over the president. In Tunisia, the political structure requires reconciliation between political actors.
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