BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER ANALYSIS PAPER Number 10, February 2014
CONVINCE, COERCE, OR COMPROMISE?
ENNAHDA’S APPROACH TO TUNISIA’S CONSTITUTION
MONICA L. MARKS B r o o k i n g s
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I. Executive Summary ...... 1
II. Introduction ...... 3
III. Diverging Assessments ...... 4
IV. Ennahda as an “Army?” ...... 8
V. Ennahda’s Introspection ...... 11
VI. Challenges of Transition ...... 13
Overcoming the ‘Surveillance Mentality’ ...... 13
Striking a Balance Between Principles and Politics ...... 16
VII. Ennahda’s Gradualism and Restraint ...... 20
The Sharia Question ...... 20
Women’s Status ...... 22
Blasphemy ...... 24
Parliamentary versus Presidential Model ...... 26
VIII. Ennahda in Transition: Lessons as Policymakers ...... 29 A b o ut T h e A u t h o r
onica L. Marks is a Rhodes Scholar and doctoral candidate at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. MHer work, which focuses primarily on Islamism, youth politics, and security reform in Tunisia, has appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and the Huffington Post, as well as academic publications.
As lead Tunisia researcher for the Barcelona-based Institute for Integrated Transitions in 2012- 2013, Marks drafted “Inside the Transition Bubble,” a report analyzing international technical assistance flows to four key sectors of Tunisia’s transition. A former Fulbright Scholar to Turkey, Marks returned there to work as an instructor at Istanbul’s Bogazici University in Summer 2013.
She is currently based in Tunisia, where she has also worked as a freelance journalist for the New York Times.
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After two years and four drafts, Tunisia's new 2011 Revolution. Amidst a host of challenges, constitution is complete, passed by lawmak- the party had to address its own defensiveness ers on January 26, 2014 – the first constitution and seek a new balance between strongly- created by a representative, democratically held principle and political gains as part of elected assembly in the Arab world. Within its transition from defensive opposition to Tunisia, actors among the national media, constructive engagement. secular civil society, and other opposition parties have tended to highlight flaws in the As the party has operated and governed in a constitution, alleging that Ennahda repre- democratic context for the first time, Ennahda sentatives lacked constitutional expertise has been grappling with deep tensions between and were working to inscribe an aggressive its national political leadership and a region- Islamist agenda into the document. Outside ally connected base. Debates between the two observers, on the other hand, tended to be have focused on issues of revolutionary tran- less concerned with Ennahda’s role in draft- sition more than classic so-called “Islamist” ing the constitution, focusing instead on pro- issues, with supporters pressuring Ennahda cedural and communications issues within leaders on the role of unelected “technocrats” the National Constituent Assembly (NCA). in governance, on the drafting of a political Despite this divergence, both opposition and exclusion law for members of the old regime, outsiders have largely promoted an image of and on preventing the targeting of religious- Ennahda as a unified, near-monolithic politi- minded individuals by the authorities. cal party whose members move in lock-step coordination. Such perceptions have tended Often, after working out positions on critical to obscure the many divisions and transitions issues in the Shura Council, Ennahda leaders inside Ennahda. have had to sell those positions to the move- ment’s mid-level activists and grassroots For Ennahda, this perception exists in part supporters around the country. Ennahda’s because Ennahda is relatively well-orga- leadership has therefore had to rationalize nized, at least compared with Tunisia's other and re-elaborate matters of principle and ide- political parties. Ennahda possesses a clear, ology in light of changing political demands, democratic internal structure, with regular conceding far more on matters of religious party conferences, strong organizational ties ideology than issues of concrete political between grassroots supporters and party lead- objectives. ers, and a governing Shura Council that deter- mines major party decisions via a one-person, On the place of sharia in the constitution, for one-vote scheme. example, the party ultimately opted not to include the word. While Ennahda members do Still, despite Ennahda’s cohesiveness, it look to sharia as an ideal ethical framework, hardly constitutes an “army.” Instead, since most members accept a more abstract, ethical Ennahda and its coalition partners formed a definition of Islamic law (focusing on social government in December 2011, party mem- justice, equality, and good governance). Key bers have continually revealed key differ- members of the Shura Council were per- ences of opinion. Ennahda, along with the rest suaded that this was the appropriate course of of Tunisia, had undergone a period of collec- action for the party, keeping itself a relevant tive soul-searching in the wake of the January and viable political player.
1 Likewise, regarding an initial draft of Article Policymakers should resist the urge to give 28, which defined the status of men and Ennahda more credit for organization than women in complementary terms, the party it deserves, or to examine its moves exclu- similarly adapted its position to political sively through the prism of party ideology. realities. The initial language the party used Recognizing that Tunisian politics extend in drafting the article was a problematic beyond an Islamist-secularist binary will departure from clear, equality-affirming legal enable policymakers to more accurately language. International and domestic pres- identify the range of options available to sure ultimately forced the party to revert to key actors and advocate for options that best straightforward references to “equality,” further a culture of constitutionality and plu- though not before the issue had become a ralism in Tunisia. Seeing the broader picture critical public relations and trust-building will allow policymakers to appreciate the failure for the party. real vulnerabilities and challenges – not to mention the resources and capabilities – that Agreeing on how to address the matter of Tunisia’s political actors face in attempting to blasphemy proved far more challenging. positively impact Tunisia’s future. Ennahda members of the Rights and Liberties Committee threw their weight behind lan- guage that would criminalize blasphemy in a vaguely worded article, representing a serious threat to freedom of expression in Tunisia. Still, even here Ennahda members managed to overcome their defensiveness, accepting the removal of criminalizing language and communicating its rationale down through the party’s regional ranks.
Ennahda was most resistant to compromise on whether to design Tunisia's new politi- cal system along the lines of a presidential model, a parliamentary model, or a mixture of the two.
Even here, though, Ennahda ultimately ceded a great deal of ground, and the new constitu- tion sets up a mixed presidential-parliamen- tary system, a crucial political compromise.
Despite its dearly held political goals, Ennahda’s leadership is willing to dilute and sometimes shelve those goals when civil soci- ety, international voices, and local experts push back. On sharia, women’s status, and blasphemy, the party has stepped back from more rigid positions, arguing alternatively that society was not yet ready, that its true intentions were misunderstood, and that the constitution is not the proper place for crimi- nalization articles.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 2 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution I n t r o d u c t i o n
Tunisia's constitution-drafting process is com- demonstrating that – far from being a tightly plete. After two years, four drafts, and serial structured monolith with a clear, religiously threats to dissolve the National Constituent driven agenda – the party itself is in flux. Assembly (NCA) in the summer of 2013, Ennahda is coping with a broad range of tran- lawmakers voted on January 26, 2014 to sitional challenges, from lack of expertise in approve Tunisia's new, post-revolutionary governance and constitution writing to ten- constitution – the first constitution freely sion over exactly where it stands regarding created by a representative, democratically core issues of principle and ideology. Such elected assembly anywhere in the Arabic- challenges of adaptation have made it diffi- speaking world. While Tunisian and foreign cult for Ennahda to develop coherent strate- media focused primarily on Ennahda's role in gies. For all its much-vaunted organization, the drafting process – particularly whether the the party has been part and parcel of Tunisia's transitional landscape, itself wrought by con- party, which holds a 41 percent plurality in fusion, mistakes, and vulnerabilities. the NCA, attempted to shoehorn an aggres- sive, Islamizing agenda into the document This paper begins by examining how Tunisian – analysis of the process that produced this and outside observers have characterized historic deal has yet to emerge. With constitu- Ennahda's approach to the drafting process. tion drafting having drawn to a close, the time It then takes a careful look at ways in which has come to reassess Ennahda's role. obstacles related to Tunisia's transitional con- text in general, and Ennahda's internal tran- Has the party single-handedly dominated the sition in particular, have shaped the party's drafting process, as its critics claim, or has constitutional positions. It goes on to exam- it simply acted as a well-organized force for ine how these transitional challenges molded compromise? What explains the evolution the development of Ennahda's positions on of Ennahda’s positions on the constitution’s four particularly controversial issues that more controversial articles, such as efforts emerged during the drafting process: whether to include the criminalization of blasphemy or not to include overt references to sharia and a notion of gender complementarity? This (Islamic law), how to define the status of paper argues that received characterizations women, how to deal with the matter of blas- of Ennahda as an intensely well-organized phemy, and how to balance presidential and and ideologically driven party fail to fully parliamentary powers in Tunisia's emerging explain its approach to central constitutional political system. The paper then concludes debates. Instead, internal and external tran- with a section explaining how developing a sitional challenges have shaped Ennahda's greater awareness of Ennahda's own internal constitutional positions and led directly to the transitions can aid policymakers in accurately current political bargain. assessing the movement's actions and engag- ing more effectively with Tunisia's emerging Like Tunisian society as a whole, Ennahda is political landscape. getting reacquainted with itself. Confusion over priorities and differences of opinion within the party have played out visibly during the course of constitution drafting,
3 D i v e r g i n g A s s e s s m e n t s
Opinions regarding Tunisia's new constitu- organization and frequently labeled Ennahda tion, and Ennahda's role in drafting it, diverge an “army” on account of its perceived cohe- widely. Local actors – particularly secularists sion and group-think mentality. “They're just in Tunisian media and opposition parties – like troops marching in unison,” said Selma have tended to highlight flaws in the constitu- Baccar, a member of the secular Democratic tion, alleging Ennahda representatives lacked Pole and Deputy Vice President of the NCA's the expertise necessary to produce a quality Rights and Liberties Committee. “They draft. Outsiders and comparativists, on the defend lock-step positions without any inde- other hand, tended to be more sanguine in pendent thinking.”2 their assessments. Despite this divergence, though, both opposition and outsiders have Prominent Tunisian legal analysts, includ- largely promoted an image of Ennahda as a ing Kais Saied, Chafik Sarsar, and Yadh Ben cohesive, well-organized political party that Achour criticized the fourth and final consti- is mostly free of internal divisions. tutional draft for its seemingly schizophrenic contradictions. Article 141 of the draft, for Opposing politicians were critical of rep- instance, defined Islam as the “state religion” resentatives from Ennahda, questioning yet affirmed the “civil nature of the state,” their qualifications and motives. Many also creating an ambiguous space for potential expressed fear that Ennahda would attempt conflict.3 The fourth draft also stipulated to sneakily coopt the drafting process to that only a Muslim could become president, Islamize Tunisian society, which secular crit- an exclusionary requirement that contra- ics of Ennahda often perceive as the party's vened principles of equality before the law ultimate goal. “In their minds the NCA was established elsewhere in the draft.4 For some an opportunity to finally realize the dream of Tunisian legal experts, this new constitution an Islamic state, said Mohsen Marzouk, a top- seemed to offer little more internal cohesion ranking member of Nidaa Tounes, the coun- than its 1959 predecessor – a jumbled but try's main opposition party.1 Representatives highly flexible document formulated in the from opposing blocs in the NCA stressed 5 potentially sinister aspects of the party's wake of Tunisian independence.
1 Author’s interview with Mohsen Marzouk, Tunis, 12 March 2013. 2 Author’s interview with Selma Baccar, Tunis, 13 March 2013. 3 Article 141 developed into a major point of contention in the draft constitution, as Ennahda introduced a clause stipulating that 141 is the only non-amendable article in the Tunisian constitution. That clause has since been rescinded, and Article 141 has been dropped from the draft. See also Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Revise the Draft Constitution,” 13 May 2013. 4 This wording was toned down. The final version of the constitution stipulates that “running for Presidency of the Republic shall be a right entitled to every male and female elector who bear only Tunisian nationality by birth... and who embrace Islam.” 5 Habib Bourguiba, under whose watch the 1959 constitution was crafted, was the first president of independent Tunisia (1957- 1987). Bourguiba, a Sorbonne-educated lawyer and admirer of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, attempted to bring secular-style reforms to Tunisia, but was careful not to push too hard, too fast. The 1956 Personal Status Code, for instance – a key piece of women’s rights legislation that banned polygamy and enabled women to initiate divorce – specifically stated that a wife should “obey” her husband and left more entrenched elements of sharia-based law, such as inheritance rights, untouched. The 1959 constitution like- wise blended French-based law with more traditional, sharia-based elements. This blended approach suited Bourguiba, who sought to modernize Tunisia in the style of Europe and France without provoking unrest amongst more traditional Tunisians, particularly those who lived in the interior of the country and had supported his rival – Salah Ben Youssef – in the run-up to Tunisian independ- ence. See Monica Marks, “Women’s Rights before and after the Revolution,” in The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects, ed. Nouri Gana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 2013.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 4 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Leading Tunisian media outlets sharply criti- constitutional drafts, such as the blasphemy cized Ennahda's role in the drafting process.6 article (discussed below) – Ennahda was A daily stream of talk shows and news reports taking praiseworthy steps toward inclusion vilified the group as unprepared, reactionary, and compromise.8 and regressive. Ennahda had severe difficulty battling back such negative reporting and Rather than highlighting an intransigent found itself continually portrayed as inex- Islamist agenda as the chief threat to Tunisia's perienced but intimidatingly well-organized constitution, therefore, these Western experts – an Islamist juggernaut bent on obliterating tended to identify poor expectation manage- long-held principles of Tunisian state secular- ment and public communication as the NCA's ism and introducing more Egyptian or Saudi- core failures. The Carter Center, in particular, oriented Ikhwanji (Muslim Brotherhood) repeatedly called on the NCA to launch a com- conservatism to the country.7 Secular civil prehensive outreach campaign to explain to society in Tunisia, including human rights the Tunisian public why its delays were nec- organizations, feminist associations, associa- essary, and to honestly and transparently com- tions of judges and lawyers, and other groups municate a realistic timetable for completion. – though sometimes themselves critical of According to a report released by the Carter Tunisian media coverage – also tended to see Center in June, 2013, such a campaign “might itself as embattled against a well-organized have raised public understanding of the NCA Islamist front, and pushed back against many members' work and the importance of the of Ennahda's proposals throughout the draft- process, as well as the perceived legitimacy ing process. of the constituent assembly.”9 Drawing on statistics released by al-Bawsala, a Tunisian Unlike Tunisians, who often judged the draft- organization that has monitored the NCA's ing process against their own ideals and aspi- work, outside observers also highlighted lack rations, international experts of accountability and poor and NGOs compared develop- NCA attendance as additional ments in Tunisia to scenarios Ennahda found factors that eroded the NCA's that had played out in other public image. Al-Bawsala's transitional contexts. NGOs itself continually statistics showed the atten- that actively observed Tunisia's portrayed as dance rate for votes on 124 Constituent Assembly – most different pieces of legislation notably Democracy Reporting inexperienced but in the NCA averaged just 62 International and the Carter intimidatingly percent, with parties' average Center – stressed that no coun- attendance ranging between try had successfully written a well-organized. 79 percent for Ennahda, whose democratically inclusive con- representatives attended most stitution in just one year, that delays were regularly, and 45 percent for the socialist to be expected, and that – despite its prob- party and member of Tunisia's governing lematic propositions regarding a handful of troika coalition, Ettakatol, whose representa- tives had the highest rate of absenteeism.10
6 Fatima el-Issawi, “Tunisian Media in Transition,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2012. 7 An exception to this line of coverage occurred in March 2013. Then, following then prime minister and prominent Ennahda leader Hamadi Jebali’s decision to partially cede control of government to a number of ‘technocratic’ ministers, Tunisian and foreign me- dia wondered if Ennahda wasn’t ready to imminently collapse. Coverage rapidly shifted from portraying Ennahda as uniformly monolithic to portraying it as ready to split apart. 8 See: Carter Center, “The Carter Center Congratulates Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly on Final Draft of Constitution and Urges Safeguards for Human Rights,” 12 June 2013,
5 International parliamentary observers joined sometimes emphasized Ennahda's role as Human Rights Watch in flagging problem- an accommodating force while overlooking atic, potentially rights-limiting articles of instances of hard-nosed political bargaining the various drafts, including propositions on and self-interest, such as attempts by Ennahda women's status, the authority rapporteur Habib Khidhr to of international human rights editorialize his own views into law, and freedom of religious Interviews with the third constitutional draft.13 expression. Ultimately, how- a key cadre of ever, these observers identi- top Ennahda While outsiders do not always fied less ideological, more accept the caricature of procedural issues – such as representatives in Ennahda as an army of “troops poor public outreach, unrealis- the capital have marching in unison,” their tic timetable management, and interviews with a key cadre of lack of attendance to key NCA often reinforced the top Ennahda representatives in votes – as the NCA's primary notion that Ennahda the capital, along with oppos- failures. Polling conducted by ing elites from opposition Zogby and the International is highly organized. parties and secular civil soci- Republican Institute indicates ety, have often reinforced the that many Tunisian citizens agreed, perceiving notion that Ennahda is highly organized. Their the body as over-paid and lazy – unconcerned exposure to Ennahda is typically limited to its about meeting its deadlines and unwilling or multi-story headquarters in the Montplaisir unable to make progress on core issues such district of Tunis – a far cry from the party's as the economy or public security.11 jumbled regional offices, many of which have been attacked or vandalized in sporadic pro- When commenting specifically on Ennahda's tests. Like any party, Ennahda is also eager to role throughout the drafting process, Western present itself as unified and efficient, a task analysts tended to characterize the party eased by pre-existing notions that it functions as pragmatic, well-organized, and will- as a monolith. Therefore, though Ennahda has ing to compromise – particularly on key made up many of its constitutional stances issues regarding religion's role in society as it goes, and though internal cleavages cer- and the nature of Tunisia's political system. tainly do exist within the party, such ad hoc Scholars Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke decision making and intraparty division have Hostrup Haugbolle argued, for instance, that remained relatively invisible. “pragmatism plays a greater role than fixed ideological positions” in shaping Ennahda's Outsiders also had difficulty determining approach to constitutional debates.12 While precisely where to place Ennahda on the this has most certainly been the case, it is spectrum of MENA region political move- also true that outside analysts – impressed ments. For many onlookers, there has been by savvy young pragmatists in the party, like a temptation to see North Africa in general Zied Ladhari and Osama al-Saghir – have and Ennahda in particular through an Egypt- centric – or, in Ennahda's case, a Muslim
11 International Republican Institute, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion: October 1-12, 2013,” 3 December 2013,
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 6 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Brotherhood-centric – lens.14 Throughout 2011 and 2012, foreign journalists and ana- lysts tended to lump the parties together, conflating Ennahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as part of the same “Islamist winter” some feared was sweeping the region. The experience of the Brotherhood, which became increasingly hierarchical and inward- looking during its stint in power, also influ- enced onlookers' perceptions of Ennahda, making some more likely to stress the party's organization and de-emphasize its internal cleavages. Following repeated constitutional and political compromises from Ennahda, however – most notably the party's acceptance to cede power in early 2014 to an unelected 'technocratic' government – observers began drawing more finely tuned contrasts between the two groups. Still, the dominant lens for analyzing Islamist parties remains subtly shaped by assumptions that Islamists move in lock-step, that they behave cultishly and act unilaterally, and that they pose an inherently greater threat to pluralism than secular, left- ist, or otherwise self-avowedly liberal parties. Such reflexive assumptions have tended to make outside analysts less likely to pick up on divisions and challenges of organizational transition inside Ennahda.
14 William Lawrence, former North Africa Director at International Crisis Group, has memorably termed this the “Egypt effect” – the tendency for journalists and researchers to analyze local North African dynamics through an Egypt-centric lens.
7 E na n a h d a s a n “A r m y ?”
The widespread perception that Ennahda rep- party decisions via a one-person, one-vote resentatives move in a tightly organized pha- scheme in its highest body, the Shura Council. lanx, or – as more suspicious observers have Ennahda is also bound by what many mem- suggested, like “robots” marching behind bers describe as a shared “civilizational proj- party president Rachid Ghannouchi – exists ect”: the belief that Islam’s principles, broadly partly because Islamism is often portrayed, interpreted, are not only compatible with but both inside and outside Tunisia, as a brand of edifying for democratic governance, and that fascism. The rise of Salafi jihadism in Tunisia such an Islam-infused democracy – a style after the revolution – linked to attacks on of government that is both “authentic” and alcohol stores, Sufi shrines, and the assassina- recognizable for non-elite Tunisians – will tions of two prominent left-wing politicians – resolve the country’s lingering post-colonial further heightened fears of “Islamo-fascism” identity crisis and lead it forward on a path and rendered it difficult for Ennahda to towards strength and renewal. escape being conflated with Salafi jihadi ten- dencies.15 This increasingly unstable security Ennahda members, especially those who situation, paired with the unprecedented vic- remember the early days of the movement, tory of an Islamist party in the Tunisian polls, say that it is much more than just a party. “It’s made many secular activists feel embattled in a philosophical project, it’s a civilizational an almost existential struggle project,” an older woman and against a solidly unified, vio- Unlike competing Ennahda member in Sfax told lently disposed, Islamist front. me. “That’s why we can never parties, Ennahda just call it a political party. Moreover, this perception that possesses a clear, It will always be something Ennahda moves in lock-step bigger, a movement, too.”17 exists because Ennahda actu- operationally Indeed, confusion over exactly ally is well-organized, at least democratic internal what Ennahda is – a party or a in comparison to Tunisia’s movement – has been a major other political parties.16 Unlike structure. point of debate within the competing parties, Ennahda organization since the revolu- possesses a clear, operationally democratic tion, one which this paper will later discuss internal structure. It holds regular party in more detail. conferences (its next conference is due in July 2014), has regional and local level rep- Notwithstanding Ennahda’s party-movement resentational structures linking grassroots tensions, and the diverse spectrum of opinions supporters to party leaders, and makes major held by its leaders (ranging from Abdelfattah
15 French interior minister Manuel Valls, for instance, warned of a rising tide of “Islamo-fascism” in Tunisia following the Febru- ary 2013 assassination of leftist politician Chokri Belaid. See “Pro-government rally in Tunisia gathers thousands as crisis grows,” Reuters, 9 February 2013,
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 8 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Morou’s progressive criticisms to the con- NCA representatives and Shura Council servative, Salafi-influenced demands from members echoed Brahmi, noting that Ennahda more ideological party right-wingers like subcommittees dealt with their portfolios as Sadok Chorou and Habib Ellouze) Ennahda’s “independent groups” and that only a “small leadership remains relatively cohesive. So handful” of especially weighty or contro- far, Ennahda has avoided the fractious rival- versial issues ever went to vote in the Shura ries and egoism that have riven other par- Council.20 ties. Whereas its fellow parties have tended to rally around individual, “big personality” Matters that did go all the way to the Shura candidates, Ennahda’s leaders – and its core Council included the nature of the political supporters – are joined by something larger: a system (presidential versus parliamentary), shared history of ideological struggle against whether or not to include references to sharia and brutal oppression under Ben Ali’s regime. in the constitution, and how to deal with con- As Yadh Ben Achour, a prominent Tunisian troversial issues regarding rights and liberties, jurist, recently noted, Ennahda members are such as the matter of criminalizing blasphemy. “bound by blood and tears,” having withstood “We didn’t plan on discussing all these issues decades of harassment, imprisonment, and in the Shura Council,” said Ennahda represen- torture, and having been blacklisted from tative Selma Sarsout, who, like Monia Brahim, employment by the former regime.18 sits on the Rights and Liberties Committee. “Issues started in the subcommittees and Inside the NCA, Ennahda’s organization man- filtered up to the Shura Council only if they ifested itself in a different way: its representa- involved the ideology of the whole party or if tives on each of the NCA’s six constitutional they became very controversial.” The matter subcommittees made a point of caucusing of blasphemy, she said, was discussed in the outside meetings before presenting their posi- Rights and Liberties Committee first, and the tions. This was a critical step that opposition Shura Council only debated it after a proposal parties largely failed to take. Though all par- to “criminalize all attacks on that which is ties met as blocs in the NCA to discuss party sacred,” included in the first draft of the con- planning and positions, Ennahda representa- stitution, provoked outcry from international tives distinguished themselves in holding and local rights activists.21 Ibrahim Zoghlemi, smaller, additional caucuses amongst mem- a member of the Shura Council and former bers of the individual subcommittee groups. head of Ennahda’s regional office in Le Kef, similarly characterized such votes as reactive, “We [Ennahda members of the Rights and stressing the leeway Ennahda’s subcommit- Liberties Committee] have tried to meet in tee representatives had in formulating initial a small group, outside, to talk through our drafts. “Issues went up from subcommit- opinions and reach agreement before walk- tees to the Shura Council, not the other way ing into important committee conversations,” around,” Zoghlemi said. “The Shura Council said Monia Brahim, an Ennahda representa- is the biggest representative group we have in tive. “On a handful of especially important Ennahda. It was the place where we spelled out and controversial matters… the entire Shura Ennahda’s position on major issues or matters Council met and voted.”19 Other Ennahda that became extremely controversial.”22
18 Quoted in Anne Wolf and Raphael Lefèvre, “Revolution under threat: the challenges of the ‘Tunisian Model’,” Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 3, (May 2012): 559-563. See also Beatrice Hibou, The Force of Obedience: the Political Economy of Repres- sion in Tunisia, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). 19 Author’s interview with Monia Brahim, 2 April 2013. 20 A total of 43 Ennahda NCA representatives and Shura Council members were interviewed for this report. 21 Author’s interview with Selma Sarsout, 11 March 2013. The first draft of the Tunisian constitution was released on August 8, 2012. See also Monica Marks, “Speaking on the Unspeakable,” Sada, 4 September 2012. Language of criminalization was rescinded and did not appear in any subsequent drafts. 22 Author’s interview with Ibrahim Zoghlemi, 2 June 2013.
9 Other party blocs had trouble maintaining elections and whether the party should have cohesion in the NCA. Ennahda’s two-tiered given in to opponents who called for it to process of external subcommittee caucusing step down from the government following and Shura Council voting, in addition to its the assassination of Pan-Arabist politician normal meetings as a bloc inside the NCA, Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013. Arguments made the party seem frighteningly well-orga- grew most heated during the fall of 2013, as nized in comparison to other parties, many of many regional representatives in Ennahda’s which collapsed almost entirely due to internal Shura Council complained the party’s top disputes regarding party positions and organi- leadership – represented in the maktab tanfi- zation. Ettakatol, for example – which, along dhi (executive office) – was compromising too with the Congress for the Republic (CPR) much on political negotiations in the National party, is one of Ennahda’s two partners in the Dialogue.26 The constitutional drafting pro- so-called “troika” coalition government – saw cess revealed particularly important dynamics over half of its NCA representatives defect within Ennahda. The positions Ennahda has from the party.23 A stunning graphic compiled taken throughout the two year course of draft- by al-Bawsala charts changes in NCA repre- ing, and the ways in which it either abandoned sentatives’ party affiliation over the past two or selectively defended those positions, shine years. The only party that managed to keep all light on the party’s ideological and political its elected representatives on the same ticket evolution, and how it is transitioning after was Ennahda. Every other party experienced decades of oppression. significant defections, with members splitting off, forming new blocs, and joining others.24 For some opposition members, caricaturing Ennahda as a monolithic “army” therefore became a defensive mechanism, deflecting attention from painful realities regarding their own performance – such as the fact that Ennahda representatives turned up for key NCA votes over 20 percent more frequently than their nearest rivals.25
Ennahda was and still is cohesive in compari- son to Tunisia’s other parties, but it hardly constitutes an army. Instead, since Ennahda and its coalition partners formed a govern- ment in December 2011, party members have continually revealed key differences of opinion – often on national radio and televi- sion stations. Interestingly, the party’s most serious divisions have centered around politi- cal rather than ideological issues, such as how to deal with figures from the old regime who want to compete in the upcoming 2014
23 Ten of the 19 originally elected Ettakatol MPs defected from the party and joined alternative blocs in the NCA. 24 See “Mercato political parties of the National Constituent Assembly,” Marsad, 23 October 2011.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 10 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution E na n a h d ’ s I n t r o s p e c t i o n
Tunisia’s only two presidents since indepen- October, 2005 when, using the presence of dence, Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) and Zine international media for a UN-sponsored infor- el-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), aggressively mation summit, a coalition of leading leftists propagated a myth of “national consensus” and Islamists living inside Tunisia began a that deflected citizens’ attention away from 32-day hunger strike.29 Still, such high-profile potential points of difference.27 Newspaper activism was exceptional, and Tunisian media articles, radio programs, and presidential was unable to cover such events openly. speeches consistently reminded Tunisians Forced to look into regime-manufactured they were united, peaceful, secular, and lib- funhouse mirrors that showed only images of eral. Though Tunisian society percolated with progress, stability, and unification, Tunisian dissent and diversity under authoritarianism’s society was unable to truthfully confront tight lid, most Tunisians were unable to look itself before the revolution, let alone grapple across their streets and cities with its long-repressed issues to get an idea of exactly how of discontent and difference. much discontent there was, Tunisian society was and what real Tunisian soci- unable to truthfully Since January, 2011, though, ety looked like underneath the Tunisians have undergone a mask. confront itself before process of collective soul- the revolution, let searching, hearing – often In 2003, representatives of alone grapple with for the very first time – their some of Tunisia’s leading neighbors’ views on matters non-regime parties, including its long-repressed of religion and politics and Ennahda, CPR, Ettakatol, and issues of discontent discovering the extent of their PDP, agreed on an oppositional differences, a process that has platform in France, concluding and difference. proven both exhilarating and that their differences were less at times alarming. The Ben important than their shared opposition to Ben Ali regime’s unwillingness to tolerate open Ali’s dictatorial regime. Efforts to forge such discussion on issues of religion and identity oppositional consensus, however, involved – combined with limited time and the parties’ just a small number of party leaders and could lack of policy expertise – meant that the 2011 only happen in exile.28 Back in Tunisia, dis- election campaign focused almost exclu- cussing political views outside one’s trusted sively on ideological issues, most notably the circle of friends and family members was question of whether Ennahda would enforce risky; a climate of strict official censorship, an Islamization program inimical to secular and informal self-censorship, prevailed. lifestyles.30 A notable exception to this silence came in
27 Larbi Sadiki, “The Search for Citizenship in Ben Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity,” Political Studies 50 (2002). See also Cavatorta and Hostrup Haugbolle, “The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali.” 28 Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations,” Journal of Democracy, 23, no. 2 (April 2012): 89-103. 29 See Farah Samti, “Eight Years Ago Today, When Islamists and Secularists Got Along.” Tunisia Live, 18 October 2013,
11 Ennahda’s leadership is also struggling to “We went from the prison to the palace,” said get reacquainted with itself – with its own Lotfi Abeyda, director of Ennahda’s head- partisan base and with the broader Tunisian quarters in Sfax, echoing the sense of still- public. As an organized movement, Ennahda stunned disbelief common to Ennahda leaders had no visible presence in Tunisia between throughout the country. “Internal reconstruc- 1991 and 2011. A better than expected perfor- tion of the party is difficult, especially at this mance by Ennahda-affiliated candidates in the time.”33 “Getting your house in order is dif- 1989 elections prompted Ben Ali to abruptly ficult when a fire is burning inside,” noted reverse course, changing what many had Mohamed Tounekti, a member of Ennahda’s seen as a promising opening into a dictato- regional executive office in Tataouine: “For rial crackdown. Ben Ali launched a campaign years, I could only identify another Ennahda of imprisonment and forced exile against the member through silent signals – a smile, a nod party, using the names of Ennahda candi- as we passed, something small just to let each dates to round up the group’s members. From other know we still exist… Now, we’re talk- 1991 to 2011, Ennahda’s leadership was split ing again. But there’s no time. There are many between Ennahda fil-kharij (Ennahda figures responsibilities. The country needs many in exile) – such as Rachid Ghannouchi and things, people here need many things, and we Lotfi Azzouz in London, along with numerous must work to meet their needs quickly.”34 families based primarily in France and Italy – and Ennahda fil-dakhil (Ennahda figures in Tunisia), the majority of whom – like Hamadi Jebali, Sahbi Atig, and Ali Laarayedh – were imprisoned throughout most of that period.31
In 2006 and 2007, a number of party leaders, including the aforementioned three (Jebali, Atig, and Laarayedh), were released. Though these figures met regularly in secret, they were hounded by Ben Ali’s police and unable to operate in the open. Similarly, although exiled party members spoke openly abroad, they were unable to engage in more sustained conversations regarding party ideology or direction with Ennahda members back in Tunisia. Instead, these conversations had to play out in the revolution’s wake – a burden- some, chaotic time when a number of high- pressure issues preoccupied the party. The challenges of, as one party member put it, “re-familiarizing the party with itself,” came amidst a host of other challenges, including finding and fielding candidates, building party offices, and – after October 2011 – actu- ally running the country.32
31 Estimates of the exact number of Ennahda members imprisoned vary widely, since the regime held many people under undocu- mented detention. Ennahda members, however, generally say that approximately 30,000 members were held in such detention or imprisoned during the Ben Ali years. 32 Author’s interview with Zied Boumekhla, Tunis, 17 June 2013. 33 Author’s interview with Lotfi Abeyda, Sfax, 12 June 2013 34 Author’s interview with Mohamed Tounekti, Tatouine, 13 June 2013.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 12 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution C h a l lenges o f T r a n sition
The fast-moving nature of Tunisia’s transi- and transparent political communication. tion meant that Ennahda found itself at the Tunisia’s governmental ministries, political center of constitutional debates before it had parties, and older civil society groups have taken the time to pause and reconsolidate as all been challenged to reinvent the communi- a movement. Far from pursuing a well-struc- cations wheel, learning – often from scratch tured blueprint throughout the entire drafting – how to transmit their messages to the public process, Ennahda frequently revealed its own at large and, even more challengingly, how challenges of transition – the to incorporate public criticism ways in which Tunisia’s transi- and feedback into their own tion from authoritarian rule is Ennahda has often efforts and strategies.35 shaping the internal dynamics come off as defensive of the party, challenging it to A vibrant new atmosphere respond effectively in a pres- and ill-at-ease in of vocal media coverage has surized political context. Two Tunisian media. sprung up in Tunisia. Though specific challenges have stood Ennahda members, like out: overcoming the party’s Tunisians in general, tend to “surveillance mentality” and its tendency speak positively about this, its party leaders towards defensive behavior, and establishing and spokespersons have sometimes reacted to a balance between principle and pragmatism. the media defensively, accusing it of slander and tabloid-style attack journalism. Their complaints were often well-founded. As OVERCOMING THE Fatima el-Issawi noted in a comprehensive “SURVEILLANCE MENTALITY” 2012 report on the state of Tunisian media, journalists have “remained unable to trans- For senior Ennahda leaders, communicating late their acquired freedom into professional openly and confidently with the public – par- media practices.”36 Press ethics and media ticularly with critics in the media, opposi- regulations remain undeveloped, and the line tion parties, and the country’s major trade between rumor and journalism is frequently union, the Tunisian General Labour Union blurred. Still, Ennahda has often come off as (UGTT) – has proven challenging. It should defensive and ill-at-ease in Tunisian media, be noted that fostering clear communication especially in comparison to its critics, many and transparency have represented key obsta- of whom hold influential positions in the cles for Tunisia’s political and civil society country’s top media outlets. actors across the board, not just for Ennahda. Tunisia’s authoritarian history left the coun- Messaging and media relations represent uni- try with an almost complete absence of versal challenges for Tunisian political par- critical media, governmental accountability, ties. For Ennahda leaders, though, sustained
35 The Institute for Integrated Transitions, “Inside the Transition Bubble: International Expert Assistance in Tunisia,” April 2013,
13 pushback from local media – combined with Laarayedh’s 26 year-old son and a member of difficulty in breaking free from what one Ennahda’s Shura Council, recounted driving member termed the group’s “surveillance men- his father and other top Ennahda leaders to tality” – represented an additional obstacle to and from their secret meetings between 2006 constructive engagement.37 Ennahda has a ten- and 2011: “We used to put tall, broad-shoul- dency to see itself as unfairly and perpetually dered Hamadi Jebali in the trunk of the car to victimized, in part because memories of the get him outside his house in Sousse, which persecution it experienced under Bourguiba was under heavy surveillance – can you imag- and, to a much greater extent, under Ben Ali, ine? … It’s difficult now, I think for them [the are still very fresh. After having spent long older generation of party leaders] to break out years on the margins, in prison, and in exile, of that mindset of secrecy, that feeling that the party – like many of Tunisia’s more mili- they’re being constantly watched.”38 tant civil society organizations and activists – has had trouble Zied Boumakhla, a 28 year-old transitioning from defensive After having Shura Council member and opposition to constructive spent long years director of Ennahda Youth at engagement. Ennahda has on the margins, University, one of the party’s sometimes seemed wobbly core youth organizations, and reactive, prone to concep- in prison, and in shared similar observations. tualizing itself in the mode of exile, Ennahda “It’s very difficult for them victimhood and hesitant to con- to get over their suspicions, fidently embrace the mantle of has had trouble the feeling of being chased,” governance. The lessons of transitioning from he said. “Long periods of history – backlashes against imprisonment and persecution victorious Islamist parties in defensive opposition shaped a specific psychology Algeria and Tunisia during the to constructive – it’s hard for these leaders to early 1990s, and again now in express themselves comfort- Egypt following last summer’s engagement. ably and transparently.”39 coup – have made a certain segment of Ennahda’s leadership extremely Holdovers from earlier clandestine behavior – cautious. This caution, which has manifested including hesitancy to disclose vulnerabilities itself positively in moves toward power shar- to all but an inside circle of trusted confidants ing and reconciliation, has also appeared as a and the tendency to see threats of old regime kind of wariness and self-doubt. The party’s reprisal lurking around every corner – have resulting “surveillance mentality” entails a compounded challenges of clear communica- fear of offensive engagement and open criti- tion for Ennahda leaders. The constitution, for cism, along with the gnawing worry – usually example, promises to set up a political system unvoiced – that the party’s gains might still be in which the president will have a much stron- reversed by the resurgence of anti-democratic, ger role than Ennahda had originally wanted. old-regime forces. Ennahda first abandoned its hopes that Tunisia would have a fully parliamentary system, Younger activists and leaders in Ennahda tend promoting the idea of model which combined to recognize these dynamics more readily and a parliament with a weak president. Then it discuss them more candidly than their elders. stepped back once more, ultimately settling Hichem Laarayedh, Prime Minister Ali on a model in which the president would be
37 Author’s interview with Lotfi Abeyda, Sfax, 12 June 2013. 38 Author’s interview with Hichem Laarayed, Tunis, 6 June 2013. 39 Author’s interview with Zied Boumekhla, Tunis, 17 June 2013.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 14 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution significantly stronger than it had anticipated. Ali’s governments (1987 through 2011), as Intense resistance from local media, paired well as senior figures in Ben Ali’s party, the with Ennahda’s own hesitance to confidently Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), from step out in front of its compromises and label holding elected or appointed government them as such, meant that the Tunisian public posts, founding political parties, and running remained largely ignorant of the negotiations in the 2014 elections.40 and what Ennahda had conceded. Ennahda representatives’ moves to crimi- While some party members suggested that nalize attacks on vaguely defined “sacred Ennahda’s history of exclusion and persecu- things” in Article 28 of the first constitutional tion could be responsible for poor public draft represented a prime example of the outreach, it should also be noted that pro- party’s vulnerability to defensive thinking. actively drawing attention to its conces- This tendency should be evaluated in light sions could have also weakened the party of the transitional context, in which many internally. Trumpeting compromises would Ennahda supporters feel pressure to retrench have likely made the party appear feeble and their gains and secure a new order that breaks easily cowed to many of its supporters. By definitively with past forms of persecution, early 2013, Ennahda’s leadership was already which disproportionately attacked Islamists having a difficult time convincing staunch and those expressing more public forms of supporters that it was standing up for the religious conservatism. party’s brand, after having made a series of compromises on religious and political issues Many Ennahda supporters, for instance, in the constitution. While labeling compro- saw January 2011 not just as a democratic mises as such could have won Ennahda more revolution but as a revolution for religious support from its Tunisian opponents, as well freedom. Ben Ali’s regime tightly controlled as earlier plaudits from abroad, it may have religious expression, placing police officers come at the cost of losing core party support. in mosques, scripting imams’ Friday ser- mons, and ensuring that individuals wearing Defensive behavior represented another visible signs of religious conservatism – such related challenge for Ennahda throughout the as beards, hijabs, and so on – were barred 41 drafting process. Memories of past persecu- from participating fully in public life. Many tion, and fear that those abuses might happen feared that without firm laws ensuring the again, factored powerfully into Ennahda’s tolerance of more conservative forms of reli- positions on key pieces of legislation, most gious expression the old persecution might notably a proposed article – Article 28 of resume. “I’m afraid this is all a dream,” said the second constitutional draft – that would one Ennahda activist in Kairouan in summer, have criminalized blasphemy, and a separate, 2011. Then, holding up a wallet-sized photo non-constitutional law called the Law for of her daughter, who wears a hijab, she said the Immunization of the Revolution (com- “I don’t want her to go through what I went monly referred to as the “exclusion law”) that through. Democracy means freedom to prac- 42 would have disqualified all members of Ben tice Islam, too.”
40 Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Sweeping Political Exclusion Law,” 15 June 2013.
15 Victims of imprisonment and torture in STRIKING A BALANCE Ennahda have generally demonstrated unwill- BETWEEN PRINCIPLES AND ingness to take revenge on their abusers, and POLITICS claim that their desire to practice religion “in the way we think is right” does not conflict Ennahda’s ideology and political philosophy with others’ freedom of expression. In prac- evolved considerably throughout its decades- tice, though, members’ passion to ensure that long history, particularly in the 1980s, when the past does not repeat itself – their shared the party’s predecessor, the Islamic Tendency sense of “never again” – has sometimes Movement, broke with its more conservative resulted in hyper-defensiveness and a ten- Salafi wing, and again during the 1990s as dency to neglect others’ right to more secular Ghannouchi and other leaders rearticulated forms of expression. While Ennahda members their views in exile.43 Though Ennahda has are often ready to endorse liberties in the gen- existed as a party and as a movement for eral, collective sense, problems have arose decades, it is operating in a fully open, demo- when actual, individual Tunisians dared to cratic context for the first time. This is also test the limits of those freedoms. Precious few the first time Ennahda has governed. The Ennahda supporters had anything to say, for realities of governing in a truly multi-party example, in defense of two atheists from the system, particularly as a member of a three- coastal town of Mahdia in March, 2012, when party coalition with more secular partners, has they were arrested for publishing documents presented new challenges and opportunities that derided Islam on the internet. Similarly, for Ennahda. The party’s top leadership, com- Ennahda members were quick to label secu- posed primarily of pragmatists and blended lar expressions in cinema and artwork inde- fensible “provocations” following the airing evenly between those who were in exile and of Marjane Satrapi’s film Persepolis in the those who remained in Tunisia – recognizes summer of 2011 and the Abdelliya art exhibit that the party must retool and repackage to 44 during the summer of 2012 which included meet these transitional challenges. a painting that depicted a religious phrase – subhan Allah (‘Glory be to God’) – written On the level of abstract, constitutional debate, in ants. this has often required moving away from fixed revolutionary or ideological stances Understanding the history of Ennahda – a his- towards more conciliatory, pragmatic posi- tory which involved considerable repression tions. On the level of practical, regional reali- – is therefore a necessary first step in coming ties, organizing as a nationally established to terms with the kinds of transitions the party political party for the first time has required is grappling with internally, and how those Ennahda to make critical decisions about transitions – on individual, local group, and where it should invest time and money. Often, national party levels – are reshaping the move- the party has found itself departing from an ment. Overcoming the ‘surveillance mental- older “movement model” more focused on ity’ and a tendency toward defensive behavior charity work to a newer “party model” focused are two important, historically grounded chal- on building a strategic network of nationwide lenges for Ennahda to overcome – challenges offices and developing a ground game to that have clearly shaped the development of tackle social problems through governmental the party’s positions on key issues throughout policy. Understandably, these changes have the drafting process. caused some stress within Ennahda.
43 Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Moderation through exclusion? The journey of Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party,” Democratization 20, no. 5 (July 2013): 857-875. 44 One assumption often made by outside observers is that there is a clear division between Ennahda members who lived abroad in exile and were “moderated” by the experience and those who faced abuse inside Tunisia and grew more radical as a result. Interest- ingly, though, the political pragmatists at the top of Ennahda’s leadership include both individuals returning from exile and individu- als who stayed, and many of the party’s most prominent “soft-liners,” like Ali Laarayedh, for instance, experienced years of torture.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 16 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Since the revolution, Ennahda has been grap- – deliberating about long range goals and pling with deep tensions between its more the necessity of strategic pragmatism. From strategically minded, national political lead- high-ranking positions of guardianship within ership, and a regionally connected base that the party, they watched as Islamists’ gains in clings most firmly to matters of local prior- Algeria and their own gains in Tunisia were ity and has a more inflexible attachment to rolled back in the 1990s, and watched again matters of principle. Interestingly, “principle” in Summer 2013 as Brotherhood member from an Ennahda supporter’s perspective does Muhammad Morsi was deposed by a military not exclusively mean religiously grounded coup in Egypt. Their general instinct has been ideology. Many of the toughest debates inside to take notes from these experiences, and the party and sharpest criticisms of its leader- they have been careful not to push too hard, ship have come from Ennahda members upset too fast, retracting more intense revolution- not about sharia or classic so-called “Islamist” ary demands and ideological positions when issues, but about the party’s seeming over- politically necessary and focusing on long eagerness to compromise with figures from term viability as a party. the old regime. For dedicated supporters at the local level, On the national level, intra-party criticism mid-level regional activists, and regional rep- has been especially pronounced on what resentatives in the NCA and the Shura Council, some members perceive as the leadership’s however, such maneuvers have proven con- dangerous decision to hand over governance fusing and at times disappointing. Rank and to unelected “technocrats,” its inability to file Ennahda members have naturally focused swiftly pursue a comprehensive transitional less on strategizing for the party’s national justice process, its hesitation to advocate for future and more on grappling with local poli- passage of the Law for the Immunization of tics, while coming to terms with their own the Revolution, and so on. Even issues that personal histories of oppression and express- seem on their surface to be entirely about ing hopes for Tunisia’s future. They want a Islamist ideology – such as quick, definitive break with the debates over sharia and the old regime, recognition of criminalization of blasphemy Rank and file and sometimes reparations for – are often understood by indi- Ennahda members past wrongs, and a governing vidual Ennahda members as have naturally system that reflects their own, important political ‘fencing’ more Islamist-inclined voices measures that would preserve focused less on – voices that had been pushed the gains of the revolution and, strategizing for the out of Tunisia’s political arena as mentioned earlier, keep the party’s national for decades. These local level country from sliding back into Ennahda supporters have an authoritarianism that targets future and more on expressed growing confusion religiously minded individuals. grappling with local about what exactly makes Ennahda an Islamic party. With the exception of more politics. Some have implied that the inflexible, principle-driven leadership’s compromises may representatives from the party like Chorou have come at the cost of losing its strength and Ellouze, Ennahda’s leaders, both those as an ideologically dynamic movement. coming in from exile and those emerging from “They’ve given a lot away since they’ve decades of in-country persecution, seem to been in power... they’ve failed to stand up for have cautiously entered party politics with a important values so many times,” said one sense of self-controlled gamesmanship. Many longtime Ennahda supporter in the Kabariyya of Ennahda’s leading figures spent decades neighborhood of Tunis. “I just don’t see what biding their time – in prison or in exile makes them Islamic anymore.”45
45 Author’s interview with female long-term Ennahda supporter, Tunis, 22 December 2013.
17 This tension is playing out, in part, through and for many local residents these charities disputes over whether to define the group as provide practical social services that make it a hizb (party) or haraka (movement). Leading easier to get by. Likewise, the smallest unit figures in Ennahda identify this as an impor- of organization in Ennahda is still the usra tant issue which the party must address.46 (family unit), a group of about five to six “What many of our members members who live near one really want is to invest in another and discuss their lives da‘wa [preaching], educa- Ennahda hopes to and current affairs through a tion, and cultural work, while retain the adaptive lens that is at once religious others want to be in politics,” and political.50 In official said Mehrezia Laabidi, Deputy flexibility of a statements, such as its party Speaker of the NCA and political party platform, Ennahda attempts Tunisia’s top-ranking female while maintaining to merge broad commitments politician. “It can be tricky, to both religious and political but I think we are capable of the dynamic base ideology, stating its support making a clear distinction of a grassroots for Arab and Muslim unity and between the two spheres.”47 incorporating “Islamic refer- “There are many people, like movement. ences” for Tunisian identity me, who simply feel more alongside its support for open- comfortable and effective doing cultural, not ness and democracy. By stating its principles political work,” noted Monia Brahim, another in broad, vague terms, Ennahda hopes to leading member of Ennahda. “Political work retain the adaptive flexibility of a political is not always easy.”48 Jamila Jouini, a Shura party while maintaining the dynamic base of a Council member who sits on Ennahda’s exec- grassroots movement – a balance it hopes will utive office in Tataouine, expressed similar keep principled supporters on board while views, stating that many people in her south- enabling the party to succeed politically on ern city of Tataouine are opting for da‘wa and the national stage. charity work “because they gradually started realizing the huge pressure of politics… This tension between hizb and haraka points and do not want the movement to simply be to the discomfort many in Ennahda feel about politicians.”49 trading in tightly held, principled goals for pragmatic political objectives. Older mem- For now, Ennahda has tried to split the dif- bers who recall the movement from the ference, referring to itself as hizb harakat 1980s sometimes admit to feeling unmoored Ennahda (Party of the Ennahda Movement). in the current, highly political context, wor- Though it functions as a de facto political ried that politicking and party-building will party, with a nationwide infrastructure of local reduce Ennahda to a “politicians’ club” that and regional offices, it touches many mem- “forgets its roots,” as one resident of El Kram bers’ lives as a social movement. Hundreds of said.51 Many in Ennahda have been disap- charities are loosely affiliated with Ennahda, pointed by the party’s tendency to shelve
46 Ennahda began debating the question of potentially splitting its political and charitable activities at its 2013 party conference, but decided the matter was too divisive of a subject. It shelved the matter until the 2014 party conference, likely waiting until the 2014 elections are finished to address it in full. 47 Author’s interview with Mehrezia Laabidi, Tunis, 22 April 2013. 48 Author’s interview with Monia Brahim, Tunis, 17 September 2012. 49 Author’s interview with Jamila Jouini, Tatouine, 13 June 2013. 50 At various points in Ennahda’s history, it has also referred to usra meetings as halqa sessions (Quranic discussion circles), and khalaya (cells). 51 Author’s interview with Ennahda member in Tunis, 10 November 2013.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 18 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution their revolutionary demands in favor of cau- tious gradualism. Former political prisoners, for instance – most of whom are Islamists and their families – have protested repeatedly for a swifter transitional justice process.52 Other Ennahda members, along with former sup- porters who have been moving to the right of Ennahda, have been disturbed by the party’s failure to include clear Islamic objectives in the constitution. “I voted for Ennahda think- ing they would take this country towards peace and make it a place where religion is respected,” said a young man in Bizerte who claimed to have campaigned for Ennahda at his university in the run-up to the October 2011 elections. “They haven’t fulfilled their promise to protect Islam. I don’t think I will vote for them again.”53
After working out their positions on critical issues in the Shura Council, Ennahda leaders have had to sell those positions to the move- ment’s mid-level activists and grassroots supporters around the country. Ennahda’s leadership has therefore had to rationalize and re-elaborate matters of principle and ide- ology in light of changing political demands. Interestingly, the party has been more suc- cessful at “selling” re-elaborations of reli- gious principle than political principle. This points to a dynamic in the party that has been systematically ignored by outside observers: namely, the party’s tendency at all levels to concede more on issues of religious ideol- ogy than matters involving concrete political objectives, particularly when those political objectives touch on elements of transitional justice and old regime versus new regime dynamics.
52 In September, 2012, the so-called Ekbess (tighten up) protests at the Kasbah in Tunis attracted thousands of disgruntled political prisoners, their families, and supporters of their cause, aimed at encouraging Ennahda leaders to “ekbess” on elements of the old regime. For more on the 2013 protest of political prisoners, see Ian Patel “At the Margin of Justice: Protest and Resistance in Post- Uprising Tunisia,” unpublished paper, November 2013. 53 Author’s interview with former Ennahda supporter, Bizerte, 10 December 2012.
19 E na n a h d ’ s G rda u a l i s m a n d R e s t r a i nt
Gradualism and restraint have been hallmarks secularists who had no interest in their coun- of Ennahda’s leadership during the constitution try “becoming the next Iran” – a possibility writing process and, more broadly, through- many argued was likely if Ennahda had its out the past three years of political transition. way.54 Many accused Ennahda of adopting An up-close look at how Ennahda has handled a “double discourse” or trying to impose controversial issues in the drafting process – sharia “through the back window,” especially particularly ideologically-oriented issues on since some top figures in the party had gone which the party was expected to have reacted on record after the October 2011 elections most rigidly – demonstrates not just the power promising that the party would not attempt to of the leadership’s inclination toward gradu- include sharia or enforce a particular way of alism and restraint, but the extent to which life in the constitution.55 challenges of transition have clearly shaped Ennahda’s positions. This section examines Ennahda members, however, viewed the how Ennahda’s positions evolved on three debate around sharia differently. “From the particularly contentious issues that emerged beginning, we had no interest in implement- during the drafting process: whether or not ing sharia. Those who did were always the to include an explicit reference to sharia in exception,” said Ibrahim Zoghlemi, a Shura Article 1 of the constitution, how to define Council member from Le Kef. “But we had the status of women, and how to deal with never come together to debate this as a move- the matter of blasphemy. Initially, Ennahda’s ment before.”56 Many highlighted the fact that approach to all three of these issues was char- Rachid Ghannouchi had for decades argued acterized by confusion, short-term thinking, in favor of a fluid interpretation of sharia, and sharp differences of opinion. Ultimately, one that did not necessitate the imposition of however, the leadership’s tendency toward rigid legal codes and focused instead on more long-term planning and pragmatic restraint expansive notions of Islamic ethics, including carried the day, and Ennahda moved toward social justice, equality between persons, and more centrist positions. the like. Ghannouchi himself, in an interview in Summer 2011, stressed that:
THE SHARIA QUESTION “Islam is a philosophy, not rules. It deals with niyat [intentions] and maqasid [higher objec- In spring 2012, Ennahda members devoted tives]—it is abstract and flexible. Sharia is serious attention to the question of whether not just about hudud [punishments]… people to include a direct reference to sharia in the must understand that first…. They are scared constitution. The very fact that Ennahda’s of the word sharia because they do not under- leadership was discussing this matter hor- stand it.”57 rified many Tunisians, particularly staunch
54 Author’s interviews with secular civil society activists, summer 2011. 55 “Tunisia’s Constitution will make no place for faith; Ennahda leader rejects laws to enforce religion.” Al-Arabiya, 4 November 2011,
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 20 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Many high ranking members of Ennahda the organization had not automatically lined held similar views, maintaining that sharia, up behind him. Ghannouchi himself demon- while an inherently desirable concept, cannot strated a hesitancy to impose one view on the be easily contained in a concrete legal code. party, leading some critics to accuse him of “What is sharia? It is really a way of life,” said wavering dangerously on the issue and poten- Fathi Makni, an official at Ennahda’s national tially leaving the door open for more extreme headquarters, echoing Ghannouchi’s reason- interpretations of Islamic law. ing. “You cannot reduce it to a handbook.”58 “I don’t see why they needed to have a Despite the dominance of this expansive view debate on this,” said Nidaa Tounes’s Mohsen amongst Ennahda’s leaders, not everyone in Marzouk. “They started from zero, when the the Shura Council was initially convinced. 1959 constitution was perfectly fine... it was an “There were some people inside Ennahda intentional strategy to gain time.”62 Marzouk who genuinely believed sharia should be was referring to Article 1 of the 1959 consti- defended,” said Hichem Laarayedh. “People tution, which carefully acknowledged Islam like Sadok Chorou and Habib Ellouze. They while keeping it at arm’s length.63 Though were the big voices behind it. They were in numerous elements of the 1959 constitution the minority, but when they started speaking, have been lifted into the current constitu- they managed to persuade more people and tional draft, leading members stressed that then it became a real debate.”59 Members of discussing things from scratch was necessary, Ennahda’s Shura Council said that the debate as the party, along with the country, had not over sharia was protracted. “Views in the been able to discuss core issues of religion beginning were very diverse,” said Ibrahim and identity before the revolution. “[In the Zoghlemi. “It was only after days of discus- past] we couldn’t have a real conversation, sion and a vote inside the Shura Council that let alone determine the boundaries of these we came to an agreement.”60 “It was a very issues,” said Farida Laabidi, an Ennahda real debate, but it was a conversation that the member who heads the Rights and Liberties party needed to have,” said Osama Al Saghir, Committee in the NCA.64 an NCA member who represents an Ennahda constituency in Italy. “You have to remember, Ultimately, leaving the word “sharia” out we just held our first party congress in Tunisia of the constitution turned out to be a some- eight months ago [in July of 2012]. Too many thing of a non-issue for many in Ennahda. 61 people forget that.” A core group of elites who had long advo- cated a looser view of sharia – a view that The question of sharia was one of a series of emphasized abstract principles over specific foundational issues on which Ennahda had not rules – helped build broader-based consen- fully worked out a nationally representative, sus for not including the word. These leaders official party position before the revolution. defended their views with re-elaborated ratio- While Ghannouchi had long articulated an nales that filtered down to local and regional abstract, expansive conception of sharia – and levels. “This is a more conservative region, though his view, as party president, carried but our position works here,” said Mohamed and still carries enormous weight, the rest of
58 Author’s interview with Fathi Makni, Tunis, 9 June 2013. 59 Author’s interview with Hichem Laarayedh, Tunis, 6 June 2013. 60 Author’s interview with Ibrahim Zoghlemi, Tunis, 2 June 2013. 61 Author’s interview with Osama al-Saghir, Tunis, 5 March 2013. 62 Author’s interview with Mohsen Marzouk, Tunis, 12 March 2013. 63 Article 1 of the 1959 constitution reads as follows: “Tunisia is a free, independent, and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its lan- guage is Arabic, and its form of government is a republic.” Whether “its” refers to “Tunisia” or the “state” is deliberately left unclear. 64 Author’s interview with Farida Laabidi, Tunis, 7 March 2013.
21 Tounekti, a regional leader of Ennahda in region countries, and more heavily shaped Tataouine. “Sharia… is shumuli [comprehen- by the presence of vocal secular civil soci- sive]. There’s no contradiction between sharia ety groups. Though Ennahda identifies as and what we have in the constitution now.”65 an Islamist party, it has worked – sometimes by strategic choice, sometimes as a result of Keeping society unified at a fragile time immense pressure from political opposition was one of the most common explanations and secular civil society – to keep itself a rel- Ennahda members gave for not pursuing evant and viable political player. The evolu- explicit inclusion of the word ‘sharia’ in tion of Ennahda’s positions regarding sharia Article 1. “We didn’t want to go further with throughout the drafting process displayed this word because we had no desire to divide a process of lesson-learning and cohesion- the country,” said Farida Laabidi.66 Lotfi building as the party began to re-articulate its Abeyda, who leads Ennahda’s office in Sfax, positions after years of oppression in a fast- expressed similar reasoning. “The absence of moving transitional landscape. sharia as a law within the constitution is an element of establishing balance in the coun- try… We did not want to divide society at a WOMEN’S STATUS fragile time.”67 The issue of women’s rights – specifically Ennahda members do look to sharia as an the wording of Article 28 of the first constitu- ideal ethical framework, and many feel that tional draft – provoked a firestorm of criticism society needs to be educated from local and international to better understand the “true Ennahda has staked media. Even before the draft meaning” of sharia, which was released in Arabic on most members define in more out a long-term, August 8, 2012, rumors and abstract, ethical terms (such gradualist approach, mistranslations had circulated as social justice, equality, and in the Tunisian press, leading good governance) instead of adapting itself to many observers to believe that highly legalistic, rule-based the current socio- Ennahda had defined women 69 terms. political context. as “men’s complements.” Ennahda’s pragmatic decision Though reports that the article not to put the word sharia in the constitution – reduced women to men’s “associates” and a unique position, given other Arab Islamists’ “complements” were at best misleading, there parties insistence on the term – does not mean was no question that the language of Article the party does not aim to Islamize society. 28 represented a problematic departure from Rather, Ennahda has staked out a long-term, clear, equality-affirming legal language, gradualist approach, adapting itself to the cur- and that it stood at odds with a more stan- rent socio-political context.68 That context is dard template of international human rights less socially conservative than most MENA norms. “The state guarantees the protection of
65 Author’s interview with Muhammad Tounekti, Tatouine, 13 June 2013. 66 Author’s interview with Farida Laabidi, Tunis, 7 March 2013. 67 Author’s interview with Lotfi Abeyda, Sfax, 12 June 2013. 68 Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion?” 69 International media uncritically reproduced these rumors without referencing the Arabic draft. See Tarek Amara, “Thousands Rally in Tunisia for Women’s Rights,” Reuters, 13 August 2012,
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 22 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution women and supports their achievements, con- the alarm, the issue of women’s status proved sidering them as men’s true partners in build- surprisingly uncontroversial within Ennahda ing the nation,” the article said. “Their [men’s itself. “What we tried to say between Article and women’s] roles complement one another 22 [a separate article which had affirmed the within the family.”70 Ennahda representatives equality of all citizens] and Article 28 was that on the Rights and Liberties Committee had men and women are equal and complemen- acted quickly, instinctually inserting more tary… there is no contradiction there, so it… relational, conservatively oriented word- won’t be a problem to change the language,” ing into an article on women’s rights. The said committee member Monia Brahim in article’s language sincerely reflected many September 2012, shortly before the draft members’ honest perspective on men’s and was revised.73 Ennahda members excused women’s roles – namely that men and women the article as a naïve misstep, the combined are indeed equal under God, but that they product of a rushed drafting process and their have different biological roles and familial own failure to anticipate just how controver- obligations, and therefore “complement” or sial the draft would be. Representatives on the “fulfill” one another within the family.71 Rights and Liberties Committee regretted not releasing a translation of the draft in French This muddling of Ennahda’s stance on a or English to curb mistranslations that arose critical issue came at a time when the party in Western media sources.74 needed to be doing everything in its power to build confidence on its handling of women’s Regardless of committee members’ explana- rights. During the 2011 election campaign, tions, Article 28 represented a critical failure women’s rights became a lightning-rod issue for Ennahda in terms of trust building and that some secular opposition parties used in public relations. Though the party quickly an attempt to isolate Ennahda as backward stepped away from language of complemen- and patriarchal.72 Ennahda’s unclear handling tarity, reverting to the simple term ‘equal- of Article 28 less than one year after the elec- ity’ instead, the damage of the first draft had tions spooked many secularists, particularly already been done. Mistranslations circled women, and fueled fears that Ennahda might around the world and back and large protests ultimately attempt to roll back Tunisia’s com- were held to oppose the article in downtown paratively progressive 1956 Personal Status Tunis. Many of Ennahda’s fiercest opponents Code, a key piece of women’s rights legisla- – already fearful that the party would scale tion in the Arab world. back critical pieces of women’s rights leg- islation – felt they had seen the party’s true Ennahda swiftly retracted the language of colors, and vowed to fight even harder against complementarity it had inserted into Article Ennahda. 28. Members of the Rights and Liberties Committee who had helped draft the leg- Through subsequent drafts, the constitution islation replaced its ambiguous language was revised to include stronger protections for with clearer wording guaranteeing musawa women’s rights. On January 9, 2014 Tunisia’s (equality) between men and women. For all NCA made international news by passing
70 The Arabic word used, yetekaamul, was understood in Tunisia to mean “complement one another.” It could also be translated as “fulfill” or “complete one another.” 71 Some members were also concerned that a clear reference to gender equality could eventually be used to overturn Tunisia’s exist- ing, sharia-based inheritance laws. Author’s interviews with members of Ennahda, including female attorneys in Ennahda, Tunis, Nabeul, Sousse, and Sfax, Summer 2011 and Summer 2012. 72 Ironically, Ennahda ended up fielding the highest number of female candidates nationally. Out of the 49 women elected to Tuni- sia’s 217-member NCA in October, 2011, a full 42 represented Ennahda. 73 Author’s interview with Monia Brahim, Tunis, 4 September 2012. 74 For further analysis of Article 28, see Monica Marks, “Women’s Rights Before and After the Revolution.”
23 a groundbreaking article calling for gender However, following significant lobbying on parity in elected bodies. Noah Feldman, a pro- the part of local civil society groups, inter- fessor at Harvard Law School who observed national NGOs, and foreign governments, the article’s passing, said “there wasn’t a dry Ennahda rescinded this language. When eye in the house.” Despite the trailblazing asked at various points about their views on nature of the parity provision, and the vocal this article, Ennahda members in the Rights support that some Ennahda members, includ- and Liberties Committee expressed evolving ing many Ennahda women, expressed for it, positions. Originally, committee members Tunisians secularists and many outside ana- strongly defended the article, arguing that lysts remember the party more for its behavior it represented a necessary bulwark against during the complementarity debates of Article “provocations” that insulted “Tunisia’s 28. Though Ennahda quickly backtracked on Muslim identity.” “This strikes at the essence Article 28, its failure to build confidence with of what it means to be Muslim; it touches an secularists on the matter of women’s rights extremely sensitive spot inside our hearts,” said committee member Selma Sarsout. during the first constitutional draft repre- “Coming to terms with this issue was very dif- sented an important lost opportunity to allay ficult for me,” she said, discussing the deci- opponents’ fears.75 sion to remove the language. “But ultimately it is not the job of a constitution to criminalize things. We learned that after talking for a long BLASPHEMY time with constitutional scholars.”76 Nearly all members of the committee said they had While Ennahda had little trouble giving wrestled with the issue on a very personal ground on Article 28, agreeing on how to level. address the matter of blasphemy proved far more challenging. Ennahda members of the Beyond those external constraints, though, Rights and Liberties Committee threw their Ennahda members were reacting defensively weight behind language that would criminal- to what they saw as “provocations” happening ize blasphemy in Article 3 of the first con- around them. Representatives on the Rights stitutional draft, which stated that “the state and Liberties Committee who had drafted the guarantees freedom of religious belief and legislation pointed repeatedly to the impact practice and criminalizes all attacks on that of recent events. They highlighted Nessma which is sacred,” specifically defining the TV’s 2011 decision to air Marjane Satrapi’s three Abrahamic faiths (Islam, Judaism, and film Persepolis with subtitles in Tunisian Christianity) as faiths that would be protected Arabic, along with the summer 2012 art gal- from blasphemous attacks. Such broadly lery at Abdelliya, as two particularly shock- defined efforts to restrict criticism of religion ing events that they believed disrespected represented a serious threat to freedom of religion. Sarsout said such events “threw the expression. In its original, murkily worded Quran in the toilet...We saw that they [mili- formation, Article 3 would have significantly tant secularists] would go to any length to restricted the range of free expression in insult religion. How could we have freedom Tunisia, and may have even served as a con- of religion in such an intolerant environment? venient vehicle for political repression. … These were provocative acts intended to stir up violence.”77
75 See Noah Feldman, “Tunisia: Feminist Paradise?” Bloomberg, 9 January 2014,
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 24 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution The airing of Persepolis and the Abdelliya opportunities to discuss the issue in more art exhibit, where the painting of the phrase relaxing contexts outside the NCA (without ‘subhan Allah’ in ants had been displayed, filming equipment and microphones) as fac- angered a number of religious militants who tors that led them to change their opinion. A mobilized Salafi-oriented youths living in the number of Rights and Liberties Committee capital. The Abdelliya exhibit members from both Ennahda resulted in days of rioting and and opposition parties reported city-wide curfews.78 Instead Ennahda members that such private meetings, of clearly upholding the art- were reacting away from the lights and cam- ists’ right to self-expression eras, enabled drafters to “step and placing the onus of blame defensively after back from political theater” on rioters, however, Ennahda decades of having and begin identifying their members tended to blame similarities.81 secular artists for foolishly been targeted and stirring up trouble with what abused by the old Ennahda members in par- they perceived as disrespectful regime. ticular reported experiencing “provocations” against reli- a gradual change of heart after gious values – values they said long conversations with local Tunisians share naturally and deeply.79 and international experts. The members of the Rights and Liberties Committee, like mem- Aside from taking offense at such “provoca- bers of the NCA’s five other constitutional tions,” though, Ennahda members were react- drafting committees, were often people with- ing defensively after decades of having been out constitution-drafting expertise who found targeted and abused by the old regime, largely themselves racing to meet tight, sometimes because of their religiously oriented activities absurdly unachievable deadlines.82 Although or sartorial styles. “We saw an opportunity many reported studying stacks of other to correct that legacy,” said one member of countries’ constitutions at night and meeting the Rights and Liberties Committee. “So we regularly with local and international experts, tried to correct it as much as we could, so that gaps in their understanding remained. “On a those things would never happen again... But personal level, I still feel that provocations I think we even over-corrected... It is possible against religion should be punished,” said 80 that we were too hard.” Ennahda representative Mounia Brahim, pressing her hand to her heart earnestly. “But Ennahda members ultimately managed to I heard from many experts in those meetings overcome their defensive stance and – after who talked about the dangers of putting lan- much debate with figures within and outside guage that criminalizes in a constitution. It the party – removed the language of crimi- was very difficult, but I had to step back and nalization. Ennahda members of the Rights think about it.”83 Though some still deeply and Liberties cited spending more time think- sympathized with the initial wording, all ulti- ing, participating in extended meetings with mately agreed that constitutions are “not the local and international experts, and having place for penalizing legislation.”
78 For a further discussion of these riots, and of Salafism in general, see International Crisis Group, “Violence and the Salafi Chal- lenge,” February 2013,
25 Discussions in the Shura Council regarding vague language regarding the state’s role in this issue – which proved to be one of the most religion. Along with the absence of sharia challenging to reconcile from an intra-party in Article 1 and Article 45’s call for gender perspective – forged more agreement among parity, this represents another first for consti- the party’s leadership, enabling Ennahda to tutions in the Arab world, and a compromise work out explanatory rationales for moving on the part of Ennahda. Though Ennahda away from criminalizing language. The com- introduced problematic legislation early on, mittee members’ and Shura Council’s justifi- starting from a poorly organized position that cation for not criminalizing blasphemy filtered reflected short-term, defensive thinking, it down through the party’s regional ranks. managed to walk back its ideology and reac- Local representatives of Ennahda in Sfax, tive statements, ultimately opting for a more Sousse, Le Kef, and Tataouine interviewed calibrated, pragmatic approach. on this issue all echoed the rationale shared by the committee members and the national leadership – namely that constitutions should PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS reflect positive, rights-affirming ideals rather PRESIDENTIAL MODEL than restrictive, prohibitory language. Ennahda was most resistant to compromise Interestingly, various regional party repre- whether to design Tunisia’s new politi- sentatives employed the same anecdote from cal system along the lines of a presidential Islamic tradition to explain why criminaliza- model, a parliamentary model, or a mixture tion of blasphemy was, at the end of the day, of the two. After debating the matter in early undesirable. “The caliph Omar was presented 2012, Ennahda’s Shura Council decided to with a man who had stolen goods,” said the back a parliamentary model. Shura Council director of Ennahda’s office in Sfax when he members stressed that discussions had cen- was narrating the story. “Omar was expected tered on the importance of curbing Tunisia’s to cut off his hand as a punishment. But instead tendency toward presidential authoritarian- of cutting off his hand, Omar asked himself ism, and the need for all voices in Tunisia’s ‘What did I do wrong as a leader so that this new political landscape to be heard. Many man has to steal for the things he needs?’” also cited the lessons they had learned during Abeyda, along with the other representatives their time in exile, or from Ennahda members who told this story, used it as a justification who were returning from exile. “They talked of taking an approach to sharia based more about what they’d seen in countries like on maqasid (higher objectives) and masalah the United Kingdom, where the parliament (human interests) than hudud (rigid rules). makes sure no single man takes over,” said Terrible as blasphemy might be, the consti- Jamila Jouini, a member of Ennahda’s Shura tution was not the place for outright prohibi- Council based in Tataouine. “We have a his- tions. They concluded that a gradual approach tory of strong men... a parliament can help of “convincing, not coercing” the public to stop that.”84 Many other Ennahda members respect Islamic values was ultimately better echoed Brahim’s views, making what they for Tunisia. considered to be a strong moral argument in favor of a parliamentary model, portraying As a result, Article 6 of Tunisia’s recently such a model as a safeguard against abusive passed constitution, which deals most directly dictatorship. “We need to break from the old with matters of religious belief, upholds huri- model one hundred percent,” said one Chebab yya al-dhamir (freedom of conscience) with Ennahda (Ennahda Youth) activist based in respect to beliefs, even if it also maintains Sfax. “Why would I want some other big
84 Author’s interview with Jamila Jouini, Tatouine, 13 June 2013.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 26 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution president, like Essebsi [referring to the leader From Tataouine to Tunis, Ennahda represen- of the main opposition party Nidaa Tounes] or tatives in the NCA and figures in the party’s someone else taking over?”85 Shura Council said that debate over the political system was the thorniest, most dif- Ennahda’s opponents tended to view such ficult constitutional issue that Ennahda dealt explanations as transparently self-serving. with during the drafting process. Though Many chalked its position up to power hunger, Ennahda’s enthusiastic support for a parlia- claiming that Ennahda’s strong electoral posi- mentary model stemmed at least in part from tion means it naturally backs a parliamentary its electoral confidence – boosted by its 41 model, in which its large numbers could percent plurality in the October 2011 elec- translate more directly into political power. tions no doubt – many Ennahda members Other parties favored a presidential model, or seemed to truly believe that a parliamentary a mixed parliamentary-presidential model in system modeled on the United Kingdom, for which the president would – as in France – be instance, would ensure a real transition away from authoritarian abuse. Given the party’s directly elected by the public and retain sig- history of persecution under dictatorship, nificant powers, including powers over for- Ennahda members felt they had a personal eign relations, defense, and national security. stake in advocating a democratic politi- cal system – one in which the voices of the For Ennahda representatives sitting on the people, a sizable portion of whom are sympa- NCA committee charged with determining thetic to Ennahda – could not be overridden Tunisia’s political system, however, it was by any single person. the secularists who were to blame for playing opportunistic politics with Tunisia’s future. Ultimately, Ennahda ceded a great deal of “Leaders of Tunisia’s small parties don’t ground on the question of Tunisia’s political want a parliamentary system, because they system, moving from a parliamentary posi- know that building sustainable parties is hard tion, to a mixed system with a weak execu- work,” said Ennahda MP Osama Al-Saghir. tive, and finally falling back to a stronger “It’s much easier to play the politics of ego, presidential model more similar to what and push one candidate with a big name to exists in France. Tunisia’s new constitution the front.”86 “I don’t want to name names,” sets up a mixed presidential – parliamentary said another Ennahda MP on the same com- system, a crucial political compromise has- mittee, “but it’s clear that these parties think, tened by Tunisia’s political assassinations, for whatever reason, that their candidates – which placed Ennahda in a weaker bargaining Moncef Marzouki, Abdelraouf Ayadi, Beji position. Caid Essebsi, Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, you Despite the highly contentious nature of name it – they think they can become the next the constitutional articles dealing with the president. Ennahda is the only one with a real division of presidential and parliamentary party institution.”87 Ennahda representatives powers, few accounts of Tunisia’s drafting eagerly referenced scholars and international process – either journalistic or academic – constitution-building experts, most of whom have demonstrated awareness of this debate. agreed that a strong presidential model might Likewise, it strikes many as counter-intuitive lead Tunisia down the same old authoritarian that compromising on this question was far road. more difficult for Ennahda than giving ground
85 Author’s interview with Chebeb Ennahda (Ennahda Youth) activist, Sfax, 14 December 2012. 86 Author’s interview with Osama al-Saghir, Tunis, 5 March 2013. 87 Author’s interview with Ennahda MP on the Committee on the Relationship between Legislative and Executive Powers, Tunis, 21 November 2013.
27 on ideologically-oriented issues. The ques- tion of Tunisia’s political system presented a knot of challenging issues for Ennahda, how- ever, with deep implications for the party’s political future in terms of hard power in future governments. Determining the nature of Tunisia’s political system also directly affected members’ feelings of personal secu- rity, given fears that – unless careful politi- cal fencing measures were put in place – a strong-man oriented old regime model could come back and re-institute sweeping repres- sion in Tunisia.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 28 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution E na n a h d i n T r a n sition : L e s s o n s f o r P om l i c y a k e r s
For policymakers, particularly those repre- Having such party-wide conversations in senting the European Union and the United Tunisia, in the open, was impossible for more States, which have considerable presence and than two decades. Disagreements inside the influence in Tunisia, Ennahda’s internal tran- party have often played out in full view of the sition offers important lessons. Controversial Tunisian public, and can include the almost events that have transpired in Tunisia since diametrically opposed sentiments of individ- the revolution – from the attack on the U.S. uals like Sadoq Chorou, a well-known con- Embassy and nearby American Cooperative servative, and Abdelfattah Morou, who stands School to the assassinations of Chokri on the liberal fringes of Ennahda’s leadership. Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, and from the Ennahda has also been influenced by short- debate over sharia to the debate over gender term offenses – what it terms “provocations” complementarity – have revolved heavily – experienced during the transitional period, around Ennahda’s “true” intentions. Tunisian as in the case of the blasphemy law. and international media have tended to por- tray Ennahda as a monolithic force, while Recognizing the challenges Ennahda faces in Ennahda itself has been at pains to come off transition does not mean absolving the party as organized, efficient, effective, and accom- of responsibility for its mistakes over the past modating. Few accounts acknowledge, let two years. However, recognizing Ennahda alone explore, Ennahda’s internal cleavages as a movement that is both undergoing inter- and the ways in which its own transitions as nal transition and affected by the context of a party attempting to regroup in a challenging Tunisia’s overall transition will help policy- post-revolutionary context have affected its makers understand the challenges and oppor- behavior. tunities that have shaped its decisions. Instead of constituting a well-organized party that Though Ennahda remains better organized acts on all issues from the top down, Ennahda than other Tunisian parties, it does not con- is a messier organization in flux. Some of stitute the robotic “army” many Tunisians its most controversial positions in the draft- fear. Instead, its positions on key issues, from ing of the constitution – like criminalization Salafi jihadism to the constitutional articles of blasphemy and gender complementarity discussed in this paper (sharia, women’s – were initially put forward as the result of status, and blasphemy) reflect a party that is non-centralized decision-making. When the struggling to articulate and, in some cases, Shura Council debated critical issues ideo- to re-articulate or re-formulate, clear posi- logical issues like sharia and blasphemy – not tions on key issues. Sometimes, as was the to mention more political, but no less impor- case regarding women’s status, Ennahda has tant, issues like the nature of Tunisia’s politi- appeared to make things up as it goes along, cal system – more conciliatory, strategic, and allowing its individual members significant long-term opinions won out. Understanding leeway to state and reverse positions. At other Ennahda’s internal debates means recogniz- times, as in the sharia debate, Ennahda has ing that movement is happening within the undertaken more coordinated, party-wide party, with a broad impact on the group’s efforts to develop and articulate a consensus future positions. on key issues.
29 This paper has demonstrated that the direc- through an Islamist-secularist binary, more tion of Ennahda’s movement has been toward complex inter- and intra-party dynamics are gradualism, pragmatism, and compromise. frequently at play. Recognizing these dynam- Though its national leadership is still largely ics, including the external and internal chal- coherent, and the party remains far more of lenges that civil society and political party a sustainably robust institu- actors face in the context tion than any of its current of Tunisia’s transition, will competitors, Ennahda is beset Understanding enable policymakers to more by a range of internal ten- Ennahda’s internal accurately identify the range sions, including conflict over of options available to key national, long-term, strate- debates means actors and advocate for options gic political goals, and more recognizing that that best further a culture of locally and personally rooted, constitutionality and pluralism principle-infused goals. The movement is in Tunisia. Seeing the messi- party’s leadership wants to happening within ness, the cleavages, and the keep the movement/party the party, with a margins – even inside Ennahda unified with broad nods to party – will allow policymak- political pluralism and Islamic broad impact on ers to avoid pigeonholing identity. Ennahda members, the group’s future actors in misleading binaries mid-level activists, and party that fail to confront the real leaders remain motivated by a positions. vulnerabilities and challenges vaguely Islamizing state proj- – not to mention the resources ect that is more focused on gaining power on and capabilities – that Tunisia’s political the political and social levels than on enacting actors face in attempting to positively impact religious legislation – a project that would, as Tunisia’s future. Ghannouchi has often said, “convince, not coerce” the Tunisian people into adopting more pious modes of living.
However, Ennahda’s leadership is willing to dilute and sometimes shelve those goals when civil society, international voices, and local experts push back. On sharia, women’s status, and blasphemy, the party has stepped back from more rigid positions, arguing alter- natively that society was not yet ready, that its true intentions were misunderstood, and that the constitution is not the proper place for criminalization articles. Though the urge to infuse society with the values of “Tunisian Islam” remains, the direction has been one of acknowledgment and fall-back, rather than a dogged pursuance of top-down Islamizing reforms.
Policymakers should resist the urge to give Ennahda more credit for organization than it deserves, or to examine its moves exclusively through the prism of ideological motivation. Though local and foreign media continue to report Tunisian political developments
30 Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? 30 Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Brookings Doha Center Publications
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