DOCSLIB.ORG

Crafting Political Society the Role of Electoral Rules and Islamist Party Factions in Tunisia’S Democratic Transition

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Crafting Political Society the Role of Electoral Rules and Islamist Party Factions in Tunisia’S Democratic Transition Crafting Political Society The Role of Electoral Rules and Islamist Party Factions in Tunisia’s Democratic Transition By Brittany Dutton Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego March 30th, 2020 Acknowledgments I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Maureen Feeley, for her invaluable expertise, support, and guidance throughout this entire academic journey. I will be forever grateful for the opportunity to indulge my obsession with Tunisia and write a thesis under her incredible supervision. I would also like to sincerely thank Dr. Daniel Butler and Dr. Kaare Strøm for their extremely help feedback and suggestions during this process, with additional thanks to Dr. Strøm for answering my virtually endless questions about electoral rules, party behavior, and coalition governments. I also extend my gratitude to Dr. Michael Provence and Dr. Dilşa Deniz for graciously lending me their time to discuss the role of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa; to Annelise Sklar for providing invaluable research assistance last summer when I was preparing for my thesis; and to Michael Seese and my fellow thesis writers who provided feedback during the early stages of writing. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, my family, and my dearest friend, Sydney, for listening to endless iterations of my thesis for the past six months. I would not have been able to complete this journey without their support. 2 Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter Outline ..................................................................................................................... 14 Chapter 2: Ennahda Origins (1964-2010) .............................................................................. 16 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 16 Framework ............................................................................................................................ 18 Analysis................................................................................................................................. 23 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 53 Chapter 3: Ennahda Institutionalization (2011-2016) ........................................................... 56 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 56 Framework ............................................................................................................................ 57 Analysis................................................................................................................................. 59 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 73 Chapter 4: Interim Governments and Electoral Rules .......................................................... 77 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 77 Tunisia Analysis .................................................................................................................... 85 Egypt Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 99 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 116 Chapter 5: Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 118 Findings and Discussion ...................................................................................................... 118 Limitations .......................................................................................................................... 122 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 124 Works Cited .......................................................................................................................... 126 3 Chapter 1: Introduction Introduction The regimes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have resisted democratization for so long that when the Arab Spring swept the region in 2010 and 2011, scholars, citizens, and political parties alike were caught completely off-guard. Authoritarians in the region, like Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, had long felt secure in their positions of power, bolstered by their key roles in the international “War on Terror” against Islamic fundamentalist groups.1 Egypt in particular enjoyed a special relationship with the United States because of its shared border with Israel.2 Despite years of growing civil unrest in both countries due to corruption and deplorable economic conditions, nothing in 2010 suggested that these countries would experience massive uprisings.3 Everything changed when 26-year old university graduate Tarek al-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi stood outside a municipal building in Tunisia and set himself on fire after the police confiscated his only means of earning an income—a produce cart.4 Bouazizi’s act of desperation on December 17, 2010, sparked Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and unleashed a wave of protests across the region within a matter of weeks. By the middle of January, Tunisians had successfully ousted their president from office.5 Spurred by Tunisia’s success, Egypt’s January 25th Revolution quickly toppled Mubarak’s regime and for a moment there was renewed hope for democratization in MENA.6 Unfortunately, protests throughout the region were frequently crushed by brutal security forces, and by 2012, most of the uprisings had been put down by their respective authoritarian 1 Wolf 2017, 92 2 Mietzner 2014, 441-447 3 Rosefsky Wickham 2013; Wolf 2017 4 Wolf 2017, 129; “Tunisian President Says Job Riots 'Not Acceptable'” 2010 5 Wolf 2017 6 Rosefsky Wickham 2013 4 regimes. Tunisia and Egypt stood apart from countries like Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as the only ones to initiate democratic transitions.7 Then in July 2013, Egypt’s democratically elected president and parliament were forcibly removed from office during a military coup.8 The Arab Spring was over, and Tunisia stood alone as the only democracy in MENA. For the past nine years, countless scholars have asked why Tunisia survived the transition and whether the results could be replicated in another state. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz (2013) argue that the divergent outcomes of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt can partially be accounted for in the behavior of their respective Islamist parties as well as the presence of political society in one country but not the other. According to their earlier work on democratization, Linz and Stepan (1988) argue that a transition requires the “core institutions of a democratic political society—political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, intraparty alliances, and legislatures—through which civil society can constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic government” if there is any hope of the transition reaching the consolidation phase.9 Minimally functioning political parties are absolutely necessary if a transition is to be carried through to the consolidation period as parties serve the vital function of linking voters to their newly formed government.10 In the MENA region, secular parties are typically weak and dysfunctional while their Islamist counterparts are often exceptionally well-organized and have a high mobilization capacity.11 Islamist parties, by virtue of their stability and popularity, are therefore the most important political actors during democratic transitions in this region, and their behavior can have significant consequences. 7 Stepan and Linz 2013 8 Stepan and Linz 2013 9 Linz and Stepan 1988, 4 10 Pridham 1990 11 Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011, 340 5 On October 23, 2011 Tunisia held its first democratic elections since gaining independence in 1956. The country’s largest Islamist party Ennahda, returned from a twenty- year exile to win a plurality of the parliamentary seats. Their leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, immediately followed through on his pre-election pledge to not allow one party to rule Tunisia alone.12 Ennahda immediately established a “troika” caretaker government consisting of two other major secular parties, Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol, and began the process of drafting the country’s new constitution.13 Stepan and Linz (2013) argue that this ability to forge important political alliances was one of the keys to Tunisia’s successful transition. In addition, Ennahda embraced the concept of a civil state, in which religion has a consultative, but not controlling, role in politics, and committed itself to Tunisia’s progressive Personal Status Code and the equitable treatment
Load more

Recommended publications
  • IFES White Paper Series on Electoral Fraud
    IFES Briefing Paper | January 2011 Elections in Tunisia: Key challenges for credible and competitive elections Tunisia: Briefing Paper No. 1 International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1850 K Street, NW | Fifth Floor | Washington, DC 20006 | www.IFES.org January 25, 2011 Background Elections in Tunisia: Key challenges for credible and competitive elections Despite the challenges it faces in finding a cohesive consensus, the newly appointed Tunisian government has acknowledged it must address important transitional issues for democratic reform. Politically and constitutionally, one of its primary tasks will be to prepare for elections to determine the choice of a new president. There have also been calls that parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2014, should be sooner.1 While there has been a wealth of analysis in recent weeks on the political and democratic implications of the January events in Tunisia, there has been little focus on the key issues that may emerge in relation to the conduct of these next elections. This IFES briefing paper provides a preliminary overview of those issues. Introduction Previous elections, including the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, were held in a repressive environment and under a legal framework that was “tailor-made”2 by the then-ruling party to ensure its political dominance had a veneer of electoral legitimacy, ensuring participation of a number of tolerated ‘opposition’ parties and candidates. Despite the changes brought about by recent events, persons opposed to the previous regime may question the credibility of any election held under the current flawed framework or run by persons associated to the previous regime. Unless Tunisian authorities make an effort to show political will for improved opportunities for credible elections, the elections are likely to fail to meet public expectations and stakeholder demands of democratic change in Tunisia.
    [Show full text]
  • Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution
    BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER ANALYSIS PAPER Number 10, February 2014 CONVINCE, COERCE, OR COMPROMISE? ENNAHDA’S APPROACH TO TUNISIA’S CONSTITUTION MONICA L. MARKS B ROOKINGS The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high- quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its scholars. Copyright © 2014 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha TABLE OF C ONN T E T S I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................1 II. Introduction ......................................................................................................................3 III. Diverging Assessments .................................................................................................4 IV. Ennahda as an “Army?” ..............................................................................................8 V. Ennahda’s Introspection .................................................................................................11 VI. Challenges of Transition ................................................................................................13
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia 2019 Human Rights Report
    TUNISIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Tunisia is a constitutional republic with a multiparty, unicameral parliamentary system and a president with powers specified in the constitution. During the year the country held parliamentary and presidential elections in the first transition of power since its first democratic elections in 2014. On October 6, the country held open and competitive parliamentary elections that resulted in the Nahda Party winning a plurality of the votes, granting the party the opportunity to form a new government. President Kais Saied, an independent candidate without a political party, came to office on October 23 after winning the country’s second democratic presidential elections. On July 25, President Caid Essebsi died of natural causes and power transferred to Speaker of Parliament Mohamed Ennaceur as acting president for the three months prior to the election of President Saied on October 13. The Ministry of Interior holds legal authority and responsibility for law enforcement. The ministry oversees the National Police, which has primary responsibility for law enforcement in the major cities, and the National Guard (gendarmerie), which oversees border security and patrols smaller towns and rural areas. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Significant human rights issues included reports of unlawful or arbitrary killings, primarily by terrorist groups; allegations of torture by government agents, which reportedly decreased during the year; arbitrary arrests and detentions of suspects under antiterrorism or emergency laws; undue restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, including criminalization of libel; corruption, although the government took steps to combat it; societal violence and threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; and criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct that resulted in arrests and abuse by security forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics in Tunisia Some Recent Events
    INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS DZIV-17 c/o Hotel St. Georges 16 Rue de Cologne Tunis 3uly 1987 POLITICS IN TUNISIA SOME RECENT EVENTS. Mr. Peter Martin Institute of Current World Affairs Wheelock House 4 West Wheel oci: Street Hanover, NH 03755 Dear Peter, For a few hours last saturday morning (27 ]une) a small antechamber in Tunis's main court building was filled to capacity with a veritable who's who of the country's opposition. At any other time and different venue those present would have risked arrest for unlawful assembly. But here ironically beneath a large discolored print of President Bourguiba in lawyer's garb they milled around without restrictions. Also in the room were a representative of Amnesty International, four or five journalists from the BBC, Reuters and other international news agencies, an observer from the International Commission of lurists and a junior official from the American embassy. They had all gathered to attend the trial of Chamais Chamari, a member of Tunisia's Mouvement Dmocratique Socialiste. But Mr. Chamari's tribulations this time had little to do with his membership in the MDS, an essentially loyalist opposition party headed by Mr. Ahmed Hestiri. Mr. Chamari is also the Secretary General of the Tunisian League of Human Rights, an organization founded in 1977 to watch over human ri'ghts conditions within the country. Ever since then the League has been a gadfly to the Bourguiba regime. These last couple of years, however,/ it has become a real thorn in the flesh of Tunisia's ruler.
    [Show full text]
  • [Tunisia, 2013-2015] Tunisia
    Case Study Series Women in Peace & Transition Processes: [Tunisia, 2013-2015] December 2019 Name of process Tunisia Constituent Assembly (2013-2015) and National Dialogue Type of process Constitution-making The role of women in resolving Tunisia’s post-“Arab Spring” political crisis, which and political reform peaked in 2013, was limited, but not insignificant. Institutionalized influence Modality of women's was very limited: there was no formal inclusion of women’s groups in the main inclusion: negotiations of the 2013/2014 National Dialogue and the influence of organized • Consultations advocacy was also limited in the pre-negotiation and implementation phases. • Inclusive commission For example, the women’s caucus formed in the Tunisian National Constituent • Mass mobilization Assembly (Tunisia’s Parliament from the end of 2011 to 2014, hereafter NCA) Women’s influence could not prevail over party politics and was not institutionalized. However, in the process: individual women played decisive roles in all three phases: one of the four main Moderate influence due to: civil society mediators, who not only facilitated the main negotiations, but also • + The progressive legislation in initiated the dialogue process and held consultations to determine the agenda Tunisia on women's rights and in the pre-negotiation phase, was a woman, (Ouided Bouchamaoui President political participation of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Crafts (UTICA), from 2011 • + The influential role and status to 2018). A small number of women represented political parties in the of individual women negotiations of the National Dialogue. And women were active in consultations • - The lack of organized and group-specific women's and commissions concerning the National Dialogue, before, in parallel or after involvement the main negotiation period, for example in the consensus committee of the • - The involvement of relatively National Constituent Assembly.
    [Show full text]
  • Print This Article
    ISSN: 2051-0861 Publication details, including guidelines for submissions: https://journals.le.ac.uk/ojs1/index.php/nmes From Dictatorship to “Democracy”: Neoliberal Continuity and Its Crisis in Tunisia Author(s): Mehmet Erman Erol To cite this article: Erol, Mehmet Erman (2020) ―From Dictatorship to ―Democracy‖: Neoliberal Continuity and Its Crisis in Tunisia‖, New Middle Eastern Studies 10 (2), pp. 147- 163. Online Publication Date: 30 December 2020 Disclaimer and Copyright The NMES editors make every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information contained in the journal. However, the Editors and the University of Leicester make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness or suitability for any purpose of the content and disclaim all such representations and warranties whether express or implied to the maximum extent permitted by law. Any views expressed in this publication are the views of the authors and not the views of the Editors or the University of Leicester. Copyright New Middle Eastern Studies, 2020. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted or disseminated, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission from New Middle Eastern Studies, to whom all requests to reproduce copyright material should be directed, in writing. Terms and Conditions This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date.
    [Show full text]
  • Enhancing the Rule of Law and Guaranteeing Human Rights in the Constitution
    Enhancing the Rule of Law and guaranteeing human rights in the Constitution A report on the constitutional reform process in Tunisia Composed of 60 eminent judges and lawyers from all regions of the world, the International Commission of Jurists promotes and protects human rights through the Rule of Law, by using its unique legal expertise to develop and strengthen national and international justice systems. Established in 1952 and active on the five continents, the ICJ aims to ensure the progressive development and effective implementation of international human rights and international humanitarian law; secure the realization of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights; safeguard the separation of powers; and guarantee the independence of the judiciary and legal profession. Cover photo © Copyright Remi OCHLIK/IP3 © Copyright International Commission of Jurists The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) permits free reproduction of extracts from any of its publications provided that due acknowledgment is given and a copy of the publication carrying the extract is sent to its headquarters at the following address: International Commission Of Jurists P.O. Box 91 Rue des Bains 33 Geneva Switzerland Enhancing the Rule of Law and guaranteeing human rights in the Constitution TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 2 CHRONOLOGY................................................................................................ 8 GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisian Human Rights League Report on the Freedom Of
    Tunisian Human Rights League The Press: A Disaster Victim Report on the Freedom of Information in Tunisia May 2003 PREAMBLE On the occasion of the international day of the press freedom, the Tunisian League for the Human Rights Defence puts at the hand of the public opinion this report about information and press freedom in Tunisia after it issued in 1999 under the title of “Press freedom in Tunisia” a complete study relevant to the press reality in Tunisia. The League insisted in its report, articles and activities on its interest in the press reality In Tunisia because this area knew a serious decline during the last years, which let the Tunisian citizens abandon it and appeal to the foreign press, since the Union is aware that the press is the reflective mirror of any progress that the country is likely to record and since It also realized that the freedom of expression is the way to issue general freedoms. This report focused on clinging to the recorded events and happenings that the last century had known and which show by themselves the decline that this field has known through hamper and pressure on journalists as well as the excessive similitude made between all mass media, which led to a national agreement about requiring the improvement of this field. This report is not limited to the various harms which affected the journalists and newspapers resulting from the authority control, but this report concerns every citizen who tries to put his rights of expression into practice mainly through the internet, but who also faced arrest and trial.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia: Freedom of Expression Under Siege
    Tunisia: Freedom of Expression under Siege Report of the IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group on the conditions for participation in the World Summit on the Information Society, to be held in Tunis, November 2005 February 2005 Tunisia: Freedom of Expression under Siege CONTENTS: Executive Summary p. 3 A. Background and Context p. 6 B. Facts on the Ground 1. Prisoners of opinion p. 17 2. Internet blocking p. 21 3. Censorship of books p. 25 4. Independent organisations p. 30 5. Activists and dissidents p. 37 6. Broadcast pluralism p. 41 7. Press content p. 43 8. Torture p. 46 C. Conclusions and Recommendations p. 49 Annex 1 – Open Letter to Kofi Annan p. 52 Annex 2 – List of blocked websites p. 54 Annex 3 – List of banned books p. 56 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) is a global network of 64 national, regional and international freedom of expression organisations. This report is based on a fact-finding mission to Tunisia undertaken from 14 to 19 January 2005 by members of the IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) together with additional background research and Internet testing. The mission was composed of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, International PEN Writers in Prison Committee, International Publishers Association, Norwegian PEN, World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) and World Press Freedom Committee. Other members of IFEX-TMG are: ARTICLE 19, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies (CEHURDES), Index on Censorship, Journalistes en Danger (JED), Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), and World Association of Newspapers (WAN).
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Thinking Secularism in Post-Independence Tunisia
    The Journal of North African Studies ISSN: 1362-9387 (Print) 1743-9345 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20 Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia Rory McCarthy To cite this article: Rory McCarthy (2014) Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia, The Journal of North African Studies, 19:5, 733-750, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 Published online: 12 May 2014. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 465 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fnas20 Download by: [Rory McCarthy] Date: 15 December 2015, At: 02:37 The Journal of North African Studies, 2014 Vol. 19, No. 5, 733–750, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 Re-thinking secularism in post- independence Tunisia Rory McCarthy* St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK The victory of a Tunisian Islamist party in the elections of October 2011 seems a paradox for a country long considered the most secular in the Arab world and raises questions about the nature and limited reach of secularist policies imposed by the state since independence. Drawing on a definition of secularism as a process of defining, managing, and intervening in religious life by the state, this paper identifies how under Habib Bourguiba and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali the state sought to subordinate religion and to claim the sole right to interpret Islam for the public in an effort to win the monopoly over religious symbolism and, with it, political control.
    [Show full text]
  • 5. EGYPT: the SEARCH for STABILITY Jon B
    5. EGYPT: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY Jon B. Alterman and William McCants hen Cairo’s Islamic Art Museum was devastated by a car Wbomb in January 2014, the attack represented a new face of an old problem in Egypt. The country’s rulers—whether Eu- ropean colonial powers, Ottoman khedival administrations, or Egyptians themselves—have struggled against what they per- ceived to be religiously inspired radicalism for more than two centuries. The museum is located across the street from a security complex that was the real target of the attack. Amidst the rubble, shattered medieval mosque lamps and splintered millennium- old prayer niches were potent symbols of how little is protected in the confusing and often violent struggle. The government swift- ly blamed its nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood, for the attack, while a Sinai-based militant salafi group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, claimed responsibility. Each side took the attack and the reaction to it as proof of the underlying radicalism of its opponents. Each resolved to fight even harder for its survival. The endurance of radicalism in Egypt is a puzzle, since the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 was broadly interpreted as a possible end to the region’s violent struggles. The Egyptian government had fought a jihadi up- rising for much of the 1990s, and Egyptians always constituted much of the muscle behind al Qaeda. Jihadists had justified their violence by calling it the only pathway to change, as Arab gov- ernments would brook no compromise with their opponents. The diverse coalition that helped displace Mubarak—secular 122 Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings 123 liberals, Muslim Brothers, the youth, and parts of the business community—held out the prospect of a new model of gover- nance.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report
    ELECTION REPORT ✩ 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report ELECTION REPORT ✩ 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org Contents Map of Tunisia................................. 4 The Independent High Authority Executive Summary ............................ 5 for Audiovisual Communications .............. 40 Background ................................. 6 Conclusion ................................ 41 Legal Framework ............................ 7 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns ........... 42 Election Management ........................ 7 Campaigning in the First Round Voter Registration ........................... 8 of the Presidential Election .................. 42 Voter Education ............................. 8 Conclusion ................................ 44 Citizen Observation .......................... 8 Campaigning in the Parliamentary Election .... 44 Candidate Registration ....................... 8 Campaigning in the Second Round of the Campaign .................................. 9 Presidential Election ........................ 46 Voting and Counting ........................ 11 Campaign Finance ............................ 47 Tabulation ................................. 12 Social Media Monitoring ...................... 49 Electoral Dispute Resolution ................. 12 Legal Framework ........................... 49 Results .................................... 13 Methodology .............................
    [Show full text]