373 V . FROM EEC ASSOCIATION APPLICATION TO “GOING IT ALONE TO BRUSSELS” 1961–69 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE ADVANCING AND GROWING EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – A PRODUCT OF THE MERGER OF INSTITUTIONS A thaw occurred relatively quickly after the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. This also occurred within the context of the Hungary crisis that had been smold- ering since that time (1953–1955/56) and the new course of confrontation that had been set between West and East with the growing second crisis in Berlin 1958–1961. This caused Austria’s ambitions for ECSC/EEC membership – which had been increased in the face of growing domestic political resistance, above all on the part of the SPÖ and the trade unions – to be moved considerably to the background and may be understood, starting from a process of reflection and self-discovery, as an actual phase of profiling the Austrian neutrality. Added to this were French ambitions for hegemony within the ECSC and the EEC under the State President Charles de Gaulle (in office 1958–69)1 with growing reservations regarding integration policy with respect to Austria,2 as well as Italian objections above all else as a result of the South Tyrol conflict3 and, last but not least, Euro- pean Communities reservations about the postulate of Austrian neutrality. These aspects had as much of a formative influence upon Austrian integration policy as internal resistance did. The EEC arrived at economic progress and political setbacks. On January 1, 1959, tariffs were reduced for the first time by 10% in order to then continue being reduced little by little until completely eliminated. In parallel to this, a common external tariff was set up. In the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) tariff negotiations within the framework of the “Kennedy Round”, the EEC lowered its external tariffs (with the exception of agricultural products) by 35 to 40%, depending upon the product. They came to an end on June 30, 1967. 1 Maurive VAÏSSE, La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969, Paris 1998. 2 Birgit HALLER – Anton PELINKA, Charles de Gaulle und die österreichische Europa politik, in: De Gaulles europäische Größe: Analysen aus Österreich, Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 1990–91, Wien – Salzburg 1991, 77–84. 3 Hubert SPECKNER, Von der „Feuernacht“ zur „Porzescharte“. Das „Südtirolproblem“ der 1960er Jahre in den österreichischen sicherheitsdienstlichen Akten, Wien 2016. 374 V. From EEC Association Application to “Going It Alone to Brussels” The EEC of the 1960s moved in the shadow of de Gaulle, who sought with it to perpetuate French hegemony on the continent and the exclusion of Great Britain from the EC. It was a decade of progress for the integration of trade and tariff policy and stagnation for supranationality policy.4 The “Fouchet plans” of 1961–625 were harbingers of a further intracommunity and institutional crisis that were to escalate with de Gaulle’s veto of the United Kingdom in 1963 and the “empty chair” policy in 1965–66.6 This crisis was de- fused through the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the community and the maintaining of the dominance of France on the continent as the first among the six EEC states at least for the time being. The crisis of the policy of the “empty chair” practiced by Charles de Gaulle – who blocked decisions in the Council of Minis- ters for half a year because of the controversial matter of agricultural financing – ended with the “Luxembourg Compromise” of 1966 with the establishment of the possibility of a veto with matters of important national interest and the prevention of the introduction of majority decisions.7 1967 March 25: Stamp commemorating the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome (EEC and EURATOM) 4 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, 3rd edition Reinbek/Hamburg 2018, 251–284. 5 Wichard WOYKE, Die Ablehnung der Fouchet-Pläne oder die Krise der europäischen Ver- fasstheit, in: Romain KIRT (Hrsg.), Die Europäische Union und ihre Krisen (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung/Center for European Integration Studies 30), Baden-Baden 2001, 97–109; Hartmut MAYER, Germany’s Role in the Fouchet Negotiations, in: JEIH Vol. 2 (1996), 2, 39–59; Gabriele CLEMENS, A delicate matter. Großbritannien und die Fouchet-Verhandlungen 1960–1962, in: JEIH Vol. 11 (2005), 1, 103–124. 6 John PINDER, Europe against De Gaulle, London – Dunmow 1963; 7 Philip Robert BAJON, Die Krise des leeren Stuhls 1965–66. Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen, in: Michael GEHLER (Hrsg. unter Mitarbeit von Andreas PUDLAT), Vom gemeinsamen Markt zur europäischen Unionsbildung. 50 Jahre Römische Verträge 1957–2007. From Com- mon Market to European Union Building/50 years of the Rome Treaties 1957–2007 (Institut für Geschichte der Universität Hildesheim, Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 5), Wien – Köln – Weimar 2009, 371–391. 2. Kreisky‘s Special Way of Dealing with Europe 375 On July 1, 1967, the “merger treaty” entered into force which provided for the setting up of a common Council and a common Commission. From then on, the partial communities of the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM formed the EC on the basis of the existing treaties. On July 1, 1968, eighteen months earlier than provided in the Treaties of Rome, the EEC customs union entered into force. The internal tariffs were thus abolished and a Common External Tariff for trade with third states was introduced. But the regulation of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remained a problem.8 2 . KREISKY’S SPECIAL WAY OF DEALING WITH EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND NEUTRALITY POLICY IN ORDER TO BUILD UP AUSTRIAN IDENTITY Bruno Kreisky came from a liberal, upper-class Jewish family of Southern Moravian origin. Born in Vienna on January 22, 1911 as the son of Max Kreisky, entrepreneur and president of a company in the wool industry, he was already engaged as a young college preparatory student in the social democratic youth movement as early as 1926. Kreisky also belonged to the youth section of the Paneurope movement of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and was familiar with his writings.9 Kreisky began his studies in jurisprudence in Vienna. He joined the Social Democratic Worker’s Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei, or SDAP). After it was banned in February 1934, Kreisky committed himself in the under- ground against the dictatorship of Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg and joined the banned “Revolutionary Socialists”. Apprehended in 1935, a prison sen- tence of several months followed. During the trial, he defended himself skillfully, which attracted international attention. In 1937–38, he completed his studies. In the wake of the Anschluss, he was taken into custody awaiting trial until the au- tumn of 1938. Under the condition that he leaves the country, he managed to get to Sweden with the help of friends, where he worked as a journalist and a scholar of business law in the cooperative movement. During his Swedish exile, Kreisky was engaged in the Youth International and served as chairman of the Austrian Socialist Group. In Stockholm, he befriended leading Scandinavian politicians (among them Dag Hammerskjöld, Tage Erlander, August Fagerholm, and Hans Hedtoft) as well as those who had fled Germany such as Willy Brandt.10 8 Gerold AMBROSIUS, Die Zollunion von 1968 und das Binnenmarktprojekt von 1993, in: GEHLER (Hrsg.), Vom gemeinsamen Markt zur europäischen Unionsbildung, 419–433; for this chapter see the documents 41–68 and the appendix “Documents”. 9 Bruno KREISKY, Im Strom der Politik. Der Memoiren zweiter Teil, Wien 1988, 160. 10 Bruno KREISKY, Zwischen den Zeiten. Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten, Wien – Berlin 1986, 314–403; and fundamentally: Elisabeth RÖHRLICH, Kreiskys Außenpolitik. Zwischen 376 V. From EEC Association Application to “Going It Alone to Brussels” For Austria’s development after 1945, the dissociation from Germany and indeed from all Germans was essential. Austria’s continued existence, its pro- claimed “victim status” (according to the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943), and its independence all played a crucial role in Kreisky’s thinking about Austrian foreign policy. On the advice of friends as well as Austrian president Karl Renner, Kreisky entered the diplomatic service in 1946 and was assigned to the Austrian legation in Stockholm. In the early 1950s, he succeeded in returning to Austria. From 1953 to 1959, he was Undersecretary for Foreign Policy. Kreisky grew with these tasks and was repeatedly at the diplomatic mission or presenta- tions in the FRG. He had constant contact with the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), in which he initially did not have any particularly powerful posi- tion. Starting in 1959, when Kreisky became foreign minister, a separate foreign ministry was set up under him, while his fellow party member, the tactician Bru- no Pittermann, was chairman of the SPÖ, vice chancellor, and responsible for nationalized industry.11 Starting from 1955, the Austrian government was compelled for reasons of neutrality policy to back integration policy solutions in order to find a clever bal- ance of interests between options of a small or large Europe. The three existing initiatives (FTA, EFTA, and a possible EEC association together with the neu- trals) were possible because they were compatible with the neutrality status as a sort of “middle path”. After entry in EFTA, Foreign Minister Kreisky presented Austria’s policy with respect to integration matters as a strategy of “well-balanced caution paired with a policy of firm determination”.12 This formula reflected the openness and indecisiveness in the foreign ministry with regard to the question as to what position to take on the further course of Western European integration. In Kreisky’s view, the “building of bridges” to the EEC should take place in a multilateral manner through a framework treaty, but EFTA should not be prematurely disposed of through a fluctuating Austrian policy.