JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

edited by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne

2007, Volume 13, Number 2 The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on Euro- pean integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history. The Liaison Committee: – gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; – advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions; – enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; – promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians’ critical method.

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Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commis- sion avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spé- cialistes d’histoire contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: – de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale; – de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archi- ves des institutions communautaires; – d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposi- tion (archives, sources orales...); – d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupati- ons du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre crois- sant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

2007, Volume 13, Number 2 Anne Deighton, coordinator

Foreword ...... 5 Linda RISSO Introduction...... 7 Against Rearmament or Against Integration? The PCI and PCF’s Opposition to the European Defence Community and the Western European Union, 1950–1955 ...... 11 Maud BRACKE From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956–1973...... 33 Muriel BLAIVE Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Demcracy: The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945–1968 .... 55 Dagmara JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren ...... 69 Thomas FETZER Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961–1975)...... 85 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy ...... 103 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ...... 115 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ...... 133 Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren ...... 141

Editorial notice JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

2007, Volume 13, Number 2 Anne Deighton, coordinator

Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes included. They may be in English, French or German. Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks. The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the authors. Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the Editorial Secretariat.

Citation The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).

ISSN 0947-9511 © 2007 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publishers. 5 Foreword

Anne DEIGHTON

There is as yet little archivally based research on the reaction of Communists to the attempts to develop institutions of integration and consolidation in Western Europe in the early decades after World War Two. Volume 10, Number 2 of the Journal of European Integration History did start to examine some of these issues with regard to attitudes in Poland and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic towards the European Community in the later periods of the Cold War and then post-Cold War years. However, the earlier period holds considerable promise as archival sources become more easily accessible across time, as well as within a greater number of Eastern European countries. The attitudes, policies and plans of Communist parties in Europe were necessarily predicated upon a delicate triangulation of each country’s specific national context, its relations with the Soviet Union, and the philosophical aspects of reactions to the recovery of Western capitalism and the growth of supranationalism, as well as integrated Western security and defence projects. This number of the Journal of European Integration History therefore takes forward the exploration of reactions of Communist parties to the uneven integration and security building process in the western part of the continent. Most of the articles in this number derive from papers presented at a conference Quelle Europe? Les partis communistes entre internationalisme et patriotisme, 1945-2005, organised at the Institut d’Etudes Européennes in Brussels on 5 May 2006. They have been gathered together and edited by Dr Linda Risso, a young Italian scholar based at the University of Reading in the UK. The articles that follow are in most cases based upon sets of archives that have been barely used before, or indeed which are still closed to the general researcher who cannot gain special permission to access them. The picture that emerges is still a fragmented one. We see how different the responses were, and also that there was not a monolithic and unchanging perception of what was happening in the western part of the continent. The bulk of the content of this Journal number is concerned with Communist parties. However, the articles by Thomas Fetzer and Gabriele d’Ottavio have a different focus. Fetzer deals with trade unions in the United Kingdom, and he considers their shifting responses to European integration. He deploys new archival sources effectively, to reveal the different sets of attitudes and ideas that drove the negative British union responses to changes on the continent. D’Ottavio considers the significance of the ratification of the Rome Treaties for the development of the German Social Democratic Party’s European policy. 6 Anne DEIGHTON 6[W
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Linda RISSO

The contribution of European Communist parties to the struggle for national liberation during the Second World War seemed to signal the final reconciliation of Communism with patriotism, after three decades of swaying back and forth between the primacy of the international revolutionary discourse and the need to “build socialism in one country”. The fight against fascism provided a strong and ideologically legitimised course for broadening the recruitment base of Communist militancy. The Yugoslavian and Italian Resistance movements offer two good examples of how the antifascist fight, combined with the strong charisma of their leaders, could transform small Communist groups into mass parties, attracting unprecedented support reaching far beyond the working class. On the model of the Soviet “great patriotic war”, Communist parties everywhere in Europe combined the need to defend their country with the hope of bringing about permanent and radical social change at the end of the conflict. In order to do so, they took a first step towards greater instrumental collaborations with other political parties, thus ending their political isolation. With the beginning of the Cold War, such developments were rapidly effaced. If nationalism, internationalism and the geopolitical interests of the USSR were compatible at an international level, they stood in antithesis at a national level. With the division of the world into two blocs, the Communists found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to defend patriotic interests while simultaneously opposing all policies that might jeopardise Soviet geopolitical interests. The rejection of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent opposition to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community and the Treaty of Rome seemingly left the Communist parties with no other strategy for the reconstruction of Europe but the repli national, thus becoming defenders of national sovereignty. The creation of a new supranational political order for some West European countries, the establishment of a strong transatlantic political and economic collaboration and the need to find a solution to the Trieste question are further examples that demonstrate the extent to which the Communists were torn between their traditional adherence to internationalism and the obligation to safeguard Moscow’s interests. Historians have already widely shown that the Communist parties widely rejected the early stages of the European integration process. The integration process was criticised by the Communists as an imperialist and clerical project conceived to strengthen US control over Western Europe’s economic development and political affairs in preparation for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. Yet, if historical researchers have often examined the reasons behind Communist 8 Linda RISSO opposition, they have rarely focused on a number of alternative projects proposed by the Communists and the question how internal dissent among national parties developed over time. Even less is known about internal opposition within Eastern European parties. Apart from enquiries into direct international exchanges between party militants, pacifist manifestations and the involvement of intellectuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, little research has been undertaken in this area. The solidity and consistent development of Communist criticism have often been overemphasised. Communist opposition has been seen as a monolithic rejection of any proposal put forward by Western European and American policy-makers. However, closer inspection reveals that Communist opposition changed over time and that there were national differences. Both national and international contexts had a deep impact on the parties’ respective positions concerning the integration process, and by the early 1960s their views differed greatly. Instead of merely resulting in a catalogue of misconceptions, an analysis of critical discourses around the European integration process should also provide a true account of various alternative sources of legitimacy and take into consideration the section of public opinion that rejected integration. To what extent were the Communist parties able to offer a viable alternative to European integration beyond a mere rejection? Is it possible to identify the development of a cultural environment that could give rise to a vision of a united Europe as an intermediate stage between the world revolution and the parties’ national interests? What was the actual significance of the transnational and cross-Curtain contacts? New sources available in Moscow and in many Western and Eastern European countries offer invaluable new material to examine these issues. At the same time, the passage of time itself allows us to re-examine previously studied cases, such as the French and Italian Communist parties, under a new light. The articles gathered here look at various national cases, often by taking a comparative approach and trying to identify a series of national characteristics and changes over time. They are a selection of papers presented at the conference Quelle Europe? Les partis communistes entre internationalisme et patriotisme, 1945-2005 organised at the Institut d’études européennes in Brussels on 5th May 2006. The question of how Communist parties on both sides of the Iron Curtain dealt with the problem of balancing nationalism (as a major propaganda tool to oppose the integration process) with their traditional adherence to internationalism is a thorny issue rarely addressed by historians.1 The merit of the contributions gathered together in this issue is to focus precisely on this point through the study of national examples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Linda Risso and Maud Bracke examine the situation in France and Italy from 1950 to 1975; Muriel Blaive focuses on both the Czechoslovak Communist Party around the end of WWII as

1. The most notable exception is the work by Marc Lazar and particularly his article “The French Communist Party between Nation and Internationalism”, in: T. SAARELA, K. RENTOLA (eds.), Communism: National & International, SHS, Helsinki, 1998, pp.41-59. Introduction 9 well as the Prague Spring and Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast offers a comparative analysis of Polish and Czechoslovakian policies to further integration between the 1950s and the 1970s. These articles make extensive use of archival material and unpublished sources including parties’ internal documents, private correspondence as well as various articles published in the parties’ newspapers and magazines. Risso and Bracke base their research on documents from the Archivio del PCI (APCI) of the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci in Rome and several articles taken from L’Unità. Bracke also uses material from the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) in Berlin and the Archives du Parti Communiste Français (APCF) in Paris, which are currently closed to the public. Jajesniak-Quast uses the hitherto largely unexplored Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) in Warsaw and makes ample use of files from the Ministerstwo Przemysu i Handlu II (MPiH II) (ministry of Industry and Trade), the Gabinet Ministra (minister’s Cabinet), the Centralny Zarzd Przemysu Metalowego (central administration of metalworking industry) and the Uzasadnienia ogólne do 3-letniego planu gospodarczego (general reasons to the three-year economic plan) files. Muriel Blaive’s article offers a sharp analysis of the writings by numerous Czechoslovakian party members, which have not yet been translated into English. In her article, Linda Risso takes a comparative approach to Communist opposition to German rearmament in France and Italy. She demonstrates how Communist opposition evolved from a total rejection of the project between October 1950 and March 1953 towards a more balanced strategy in the following years. The study of archival material along with a detailed analysis of the parties’ newspapers and congress decisions reveals that after the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War, outright rejection of the integration process gave way to more differentiated criticism in the following years. The aim was to delay the ratification process in the hope that the governing coalitions in France and Italy would divide over the issue and that the public would grow weary of the debate. This article also deals with the reasons behind the Communists’ alleged “silence” during the debate concerning the Western European Union and demonstrates that although in 1953 the French and Italian Communists accepted a controlled form of German rearmament, they still opposed the political unification of Western Europe. Maud Bracke also focuses on the French and Italian Communist parties but turns her attention to the period that followed the rejection of the European Army project. She takes a wider perspective which includes the two parties’ respective positions on the idea of a unified Europe in general, and the EEC in particular. According to Bracke, in addition to the Soviet-lead rejection of the EEC as a product of American dominance over Western Europe, the anti-EEC stance of the PCI and PCF was based on specific social arguments including the claim that European integration was an imperialist and capitalist project and an instrument to curtail national sovereignty. Bracke demonstrates that despite some common ground, the two parties developed different political strategies. The PCI gradually shifted towards a more positive view of the EEC and by the early 1970s, the party came to see the EEC as a potential vehicle for social and political change. 10 Linda RISSO

Conversely, the PCF persisted in its opposition and only in the early 1970s did the French Communists timidly accept European integration. Muriel Blaive’s article deals with the chasm between internationalism and patriotism within the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) through the analysis of the writings and correspondence of leading Czechoslovak politicians and intellectuals. Whereas the “international” aspirations of the KSČ have frequently been said to conform to Moscow’s official stance (which often symbolizes the gloomiest aspects of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia), the “patriotic” side, has been made to embody national democratic traditions and the positive side of Communist achievements. According to Blaive, this black-and-white picture fails to address a number of crucial issues concerning Communist domination of Czechoslovakia even though it has so far not been challenged. Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast examines the Polish and Czechoslovakian cases between the 1950s and the 1970s and demonstrates how, contrary to common assumptions, after the turning point of 1947, Eastern European states did remain interested in maintaining economic relations with the West. Although the Eastern European Communist parties officially rejected the European integration process, the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments undertook a number of steps towards greater economic collaboration with the West. It follows that their attitude towards the economic integration of Western Europe differs substantially from their formal opposition to the political unification process. Thus, Poland and Czechoslovakia along with other Eastern European countries found ways to “permeate” the Iron Curtain by approaching the neutral states – Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland – that seemed to have been willing to enter negotiations in view of trading raw materials and organizing know-how transfers as well as capital movements. Similarly, the increase in Eastern European exports to Western Europe and the promotion of national productivity in view of achieving a positive balance of payments offered additional incentives to develop more intricate economic relations with the EEC countries. International organizations, such as the Economic Commission for Europe and GATT, offered additional channels through which relations with the West could be improved. I would like to thank Prof. Pieter Lagrou, Dr Irene Di Jorio and Nicolas Naif for their help in organizing the conference. Financial support from the History Section of the Institut d’Etudes Européennes at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and from the Wiener-Anspach Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 11 Against Rearmament or Against Integration? The PCI and PCF’s Opposition to the European Defence Community and the Western European Union, 1950-55

Linda RISSO

Historians have often presented Communist opposition to the European Defence Community as a monolithic block. However, closer inspection reveals that Communist criticism passed from total opposition between October 1950 and March 1953 to a more differentiated criticism in the following years. This development was due to both the changes that occurred in the international arena after the death of Stalin, as well as to the political events that took place at the national level.1 In order to explain how the different elements influenced the Communist position regarding this dimension of the integration process, this article follows the chronological development of Communist criticism between 1950 and 1955, focusing first on the initial reaction of the French and Italian Communists to the launch of the project and then on the reasons behind the fall of the European army project. This will allow a comparison between Communist opposition to the integrated army and to the Western European Union, assessing the reasons behind the alleged “silence” of the Communists in the latter case.

The launch of the integrated army project (1950-52)

Between 1949 and 1950, the foundation of NATO and the outbreak of the Korean War put the rearmament of Western Europe on the front burner. The NATO Council meetings of September 1950 led to the American decision to rearm West Germany and, in the following months, this materialised in the form of the Spofford plan, which foresaw full German rearmament under the control of NATO.2 In order to prevent the re-establishment of the German military staff, in October 1950 the French government proposed the creation of a European integrated army. This project envisaged that the participating governments would merge their troops in a common army which would be under the control of a supranational authority and of a European Defence minister. Unable to find a compromise between the

1. This article is based on the chapter “Communist opposition to the European army” in: L. RISSO, Divided we stand: The French and Italian political parties and the rearmament of West Germany, 1949-1955, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (forthcoming, end of 2007), pp.166-181. 2. A summary of the Spofford report is available in “Integrated forces and European Army” [no date], in: Historical Archives of the European Communities (henceforward HAEC), JMDS/82. 12 Linda RISSO

Spofford plan and the French government's proposal, the NATO Council allowed the running of two parallel sets of talks at Petersberg and Paris.3 Talks at Petersberg reached an early stalemate on the degree of integration and the conference was forced to close prematurely. After several months of discussion, the Paris Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed on 27 May 1952.4 The European army entailed the creation of a supranational authority that would represent its members on the international stage and, if the approval of the EDC Council of ministers had been secured, it would have had the right to enter defensive agreements and to join international organisations on behalf of its members. Since its outset, numerous political parties, intellectuals and pressure groups criticised the notion of an integrated army because it entailed the permanent curbing of national sovereignty and made it impracticable for its members to have fully independent foreign policies. Many also argued that national governments would lose control over national troops, which would be put at the service of the Community.5 Precisely because of its supranational features, the project was enthusiastically supported by the federalists and the Christian Democrats, who, at the time, were leading most of the governments of the countries involved in the project. They believed that the creation of a supranational institution would offer a permanent solution to the economic problems of Europe, facilitate the reconstruction of the continent and normalise diplomatic relations between its members. Because the EDC project put into question the definition of the nation-state and entailed the creation of a new international system, it awoke strong feelings. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the EDC produced one of the fiercest debates in post-war Europe. In the fifties, the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) was the largest and possibly the best organised political group among the philo-Soviet parties in Western Europe. It has been estimated that its membership ranged from 1,371,000 in 1945 to 2,145,000 in 1954, with an efficient network of party cells and collateral organisations.6

3. Documents on American Foreign Policy, vol.XII, 1950, p.215. 4. The EDC Conference took place in Paris between February 1951 and May 1952. Copies of the EDC Treaty and minutes of the debates are available in several European archives as well as at the HAEC. The EDC members were France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. For the history of the EDC, see E. FURSDON, The European Defence Community: A History, Macmillan, London, 1980; A. CLESSE, Le projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au “crime” du 30 août: Histoire d'un malentendu européen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989; M. DUMOULIN (ed.), The European Defence Community: Lessons for the future?, Euroclio, Brussels, 2000; D. PREDA, Storia di una speranza: La battaglia per la CED e la Federazione Europea nelle carte della delegazione ital- iana, 1950-1952, Jaca Book, Milan, 1990. 5. However, each member state retained the right of veto in the Council of ministers and Community policies could be implemented only once the Council had unanimously approved of them. Each member could therefore block any decision that risked undermining national interests. The actual power of the Community was therefore much more limited than it was perceived at the time. 6. P. SPRIANO, Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Einaudi, Turin, 1967-1975, vol.5; G. GALLI, Storia del PCI, Kaos, Milan, 1993. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 13

The PCI was strengthened by its close collaboration with the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party, PSI). The two parties were bound together by the “Common Action Pact”, which had been drafted in 1934 to coordinate their anti-fascist fight. The Pact was renewed in October 1946 and extended to a number of political issues in both domestic and foreign affairs.7 The PSI was, however, more a follower of its political ally than an equal partner and, more often than not, it unquestioningly complied with the directives of the PCI’s leadership.8 Consequently, because it would be impossible to make a distinction between the two parties in their fight against the EDC and because internal debate was virtually absent, the position of the PCI and PSI is here analysed as that of one political actor.9 Their French counterpart, the Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party, PCF), was slightly smaller in terms of membership but was nevertheless the strongest opponent of the Troisième Force governments in the Fourth Republic. The PCF suffered from total political isolation as both the Socialists and Radicals rejected an alliance with the Communists. Despite this, the PCF regularly won a quarter of the French votes in the Fourth Republic and earned a major place in the French political milieu.10 The different degree of isolation of the two parties in the early post-war period partially arose from their historical development between the early 1920s and the end of World War II. It has been argued that one of the fundamental explanations for this discrepancy is that the more democratic structures of the Third Republic allowed the PCF to grow and set down roots in the country, whereas the PCI had no sooner emerged in 1921 than it was forced underground by Fascism.11 If the immediate result was that the PCI became a more conspiratorial group, in the long run the PCI’s absence from Italian politics for nearly twenty years saved it from being blamed for the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. By the time the PCI re-appeared with the Resistance, the Red Army was successfully allied with the US and was winning in the East. Initially, the PCI and the PCF paid little attention to the integrated army project and simply described it as an “ugly little monster”.12 The Western Communist

7. Gli otto punti del nuovo patto, in: Avanti!, 27.10.1946. In the 1948 elections, the Italian Commu- nists and the Socialists gained 31% of the votes and the PCI’s political weight grew even bigger in 1953, when it received 22.6% of votes on its own. 8. The relationship between the two parties reflected the Leninist concept of the Communist Party as the “vanguard party” according to which in order to advance the cause of Socialism the Communist parties – which were by definition the holders of “socialist truth” – had to be entrusted with the leadership of any alliance with other socialist - or social democratic - parties. 9. Only after the Hungarian crisis (October 1956) and the XX congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, was the “Common Action Pact” replaced by the looser “Mutual Consultation Pact”. 10. The PCF obtained 28.6% of the votes in 1946, 26.7% in 1951, and 25.9% in 1956. A. KRIEGEL, Les Communistes Français dans leur premier demi-siècle. 1920-1970, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1985. 11. D.L.M. BLACKMER, S. TARROW (eds.), Communism in Italy and France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pp.581-582. 12. See for example Assomiglia al ‘pool’ dell’acciaio il progetto Pleven sulla Germania, in: Avanti!, 25.10.1950. S. GALANTE, Il Partito Comunista Italiano e l’integrazione europea: Il decennio del rifiuto, 1947-1957, Liviana editrice, Padova, 1988. 14 Linda RISSO parties’ attention was monopolised by the Korean War and the foundation of NATO, and at the same time they believed the integration process to be too nebulous and ambitious to become reality. Thus, both Robert Schuman’s declaration concerning the coal and steel pool (May 1950) and René Pleven’s proposal about the creation of an integrated army (October 1950) received little attention, a delay later regretted by the party leaderships.13 In the period 1949-50, the western European Communist parties identified Europeanism with Atlanticism and saw all initiatives aimed at creating a federal Europe as steps in bringing Europe under the control of Washington and as the preparation for an imperialistic war of aggression against the USSR.14 According to the PCI’s archives, the EDC was first discussed during a plenary session of the Central Committee only in late 1953.15 The initial poor attention does not mean that the Communists ignored the issue altogether but rather that the party believed its collateral organisations – such as the ex-partisans' groups, the women's associations and the party newspapers - provided the most appropriate means of fighting the EDC. When the EDC Conference opened in Paris in February 1951, the Communists expressed their criticism through parliamentary opposition, street demonstrations, conferences and newspapers articles. The opening ceremony itself was disrupted by a protest organised by the PCF, with the support of the ex-partisans and the concentration camp survivors. They attempted to prevent the German delegation from entering the building. The object of their protest was the military advisor general Hans Spiedel, who had been Erwin Rommel’s chief of staff.16 This was only the beginning. The study of the private papers of Emilio Sereni, who was the leader of the Italian section of the Peace Partisans, demonstrates that the Communist collateral organisations did indeed carry out an anti-EDC campaign since the early 1952.17 After the summer of 1951, with the failure of the Petersberg talks and the renewed US support for the EDC, the Communists became progressively more determined to oppose the creation of an integrated army in all forms. The soviet diplomatic note sent to the French government on 11 September 1951 marks the beginning of a new phase in the opposition of the PCF and PCI to the EDC. The Western Communist parties rejected any further step towards the economic and political integration of Europe, which they deemed to be against the interests of the workers; they criticised the integration process for deepening the rift between the

13. Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio del Partito Comunista, Rome (henceforward FIG-APCI), MF131, “Campagna contro la bomba H e la CED”. Riunione del 29 aprile 1954. Verbali della Di- rezione. 14. See for example the comments of Antonio Pesenti in his column Nostro Paese, in: Critica, 2(1950) and 4(1950). 15. Catalogues of the Verbali della Segreteria and Verbali della Direzione, 1950-1955, FIG-APCI. 16. Les déportés manifestent ce soir à 18h 30 à l’Opéra, in: L’Humanité, 15.02.1951. 17. Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Emilio Sereni: Scritti e Discorsi (henceforward FIG-ES), fold- ers 12 and 13. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 15

East and the West and believed it to be in preparation for a war of aggression against the USSR.18 In the period between September 1951 and the summer of 1953, the Western Communist parties fiercely opposed the project both inside and outside their parliaments. Their opposition was organised around three central themes: widespread anti-German feeling, fear of excessive influence of the US on European affairs and the need to protect national sovereignty. These three issues had great resonance among the European public.

Anti-German and anti-American feelings

As has already been demonstrated elsewhere, the opponents of the EDC project belonged to different political backgrounds and opposed it for different reasons.19 However, they all shared a deep distrust of Germany and were determined to prevent its rearmament or at least to secure sufficient guarantees against the resurgence of German militarism. The Nazi occupation had left deep scars in the memory of the populations of the potential EDC members and debates on amnesties and trials against war criminals kept alive such memories.20 In addition to the memories of the Nazi occupation, large sectors of the public feared that because West Germany had an experienced high command, its officers would soon occupy the highest ranks in the future army and be able to threaten their neighbours again.21 The French Socialist Jules Moch remembered that: “At the time, I had the tendency to consider all Germans as Hitler’s collaborators. Every time I met one I could not avoid wondering ‘what crimes did he commit?’. It took years before I could get rid of these feelings”.22 Public and politicians alike demanded clear guarantees that ex-Nazi marshals and generals would be excluded from all involvement in the defence of Western Europe, pointing out that the international agreements of Potsdam and Yalta forbade all rearmament of Germany. In the eyes of many, premature West German rearmament would also mean Germany’s premature political rehabilitation, only five years after the end of the war. The ghost of the “new Wehrmacht” was thus indissolubly bound to the EDC from its inception and the Communists skilfully turned this into a powerful

18. S. GALANTE, op.cit., pp.84-85. 19. M. DUMOULIN, op.cit. 20. P. LAGROU, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in West- ern Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 21. See for example La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: Avanti!, 20.02.1953. M. GEHLER, Ein wiedervereinigtes und blockfreies Deutschland mit Nation- alarmee und die französischen Kommunisten im Jahre 1952, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilun- gen, 2(1988), pp.75-104. 22. J. MOCH, Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950, Laffont, Paris, 1965, p.268. 16 Linda RISSO propaganda weapon. In fact, although such concerns pervaded the Western European public and lay behind the various political parties’ criticism of the European Army, it was the Communists who more effectively focused their anti-EDC campaign on the spectre of the “new Wehrmacht”. They turned the commemoration of the most well known massacres, such as Oradour-sur-Glane and Marzabotto, into occasions to oppose the rearmament and political rehabilitation of West Germany.23 The French and Italian Communists presented their opposition to the EDC as a logical consequence of their fight against the Atlantic Pact, the rearmament policies implemented by their governments and the H bomb. The PCI and PCF criticised the submission to the US which such policies implied, and proposed instead the creation of a neutral and disarmed Europe.24 Since the autumn of 1950, the PCF and the PCI had joined their Western European counterparts in a declaration of opposition to German rearmament either under NATO or in any other form. The reasons for their opposition were twofold: first, they argued that there was no need for rearmament as the USSR and its satellites were peaceful countries; second, they claimed that US propaganda was criminalising the People’s Democracies in order to justify its own imperialist greed.25 Reflecting Moscow’s opposition to Washington’s interference in European affairs, the Communist criticism found fertile ground in the widespread anti-Americanism in parts of Europe at the time. Although after World War II Western Europeans recognised that Europe needed American economic support, there was nevertheless resentment of American hegemony, which was often seen as cultural colonisation and infringement of national sovereignty.26 The Communist parties skilfully exploited such feelings and denounced American political and economic interference. Opposition started with graffiti (“Ami go home”) expressing hostility to the American troops still stationed in Europe and soon took the form of violent demonstrations every time American officials visited Western European capitals. In France, anti-Americanism reached worrying proportions: on 28 May 1952, the Communists organised massive protests against the visit of general Matthew

23. 40.000 personnes ont participé à la manifestation à la mémoire des victimes du massacre, in: Le Monde, 05.02.1953; 111 français et une fillette de 9 ans étaient assassinés, in: L’Humanité, 27.10.1950; La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: Avanti!, 20.02.1953. 24. FIG-APCI, MF 131, “Campagna contro la bomba H e la CED. Relatore: E. Sereni”, Verbali della Direzione, Riunione del 29 aprile 1954. P. TOGLIATTI, Discorsi Parlamentari, 1946-1964, 2 vols., Ufficio Stampa della Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 1984, pp.405-441; D.L.M. BLACKMER, S. TARROW, op.cit. 25. See for example Contre la ratification des traités de guerre contre les peuples d’Allemagne et de France, in: Cahiers du Communisme, 2(1953), pp.168-169; and L’Unione Sovietica é per la pace, in: Avanti!, 27.09.1950. 26. This opinion was shared by several political parties in Western Europe, particularly in France, where the government repeatedly rejected the US attempts to guide their foreign and economic pol- icies. In Italy, the fact that the Social-Communists were excluded from the government upon De Gasperi’s return from Washington with a cheque for 50 million dollars led to the claim that the ex- clusion of the PCI-PSI was the price imposed by the US for its help. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 17

Ridgway (nicknamed Ridgway la peste). The demonstration was broken up by anti-riot police, resulting in one dead, more than two hundred injured on both sides and seven hundred arrests.27 Similar demonstrations had been organised by the Communists against general Dwight D. Eisenhower both in Paris and Rome.28 Along with their criticism of the United States, the Communists orchestrated campaigns against those policy-makers who had bound their names to the Atlantic and European policies, accusing them of “shameful servility” to the US, their “Imperialist Employer”. The Italian Communist press, for example, identified in Alcide De Gasperi the channel through which the philo-fascist Vatican policy tried to shape Italian politics. They predicted the creation of a clerical Italy on the Salazarian model, which would be the first step towards a crypto-fascist Europe, servant of the US.29 In April 1953, during a ceremony to honour the victims of World War I at the Arc de Triomphe, Gaullist protesters faced Prime minister Joseph Laniel and the minister of Defence René Pleven shouting “Vive l’Armée”. The Communist activists scattered among the crowd seized upon this first sign of protest and started a violent demonstration at the cry “CED nazie” and “À bas les revanches allemandes”, and the demonstration rapidly escalated into physical confrontation.30 The episode received a great deal of attention from all the major newspapers in France and calls for tougher legislation against the Communists resounded in and outside of parliament. The PCI expressed similar criticism of their government’s submission to the US, their demonstrations were usually crushed by the Celere, the anti-riot police of Mario Scelba, the Christian Democratic minister for Home Affairs.

The Communists’ defence of national sovereignty: A paradox?

In addition to the memories of the Nazi occupation and the widespread anti-Americanism, the Communists had another weapon in their hands: the need to defend national sovereignty.

27. Les ‘commandos’ communistes ont provoqué des bagarres, in: Le Figaro, 29.05.1952. 28. The PCI Central Committee recommended the demonstrations to be widespread and involve all the parties’ organisations. FIG-APCI, MF266, Verbali della Segreteria. Sessione del 15 gennaio 1951 “Manifestazioni per la venuta di Eisenhower”. Cf.. also Pourquoi les chefs communistes veulent une démonstration de masse contre le général Eisenhower, in: Le Figaro, 23.01.1951. 29. Il più americano della classe, in: L’Unità, 12.12.1951; De Gasperi quinta colonna degli USA per superare l’opposizione al riarmo tedesco, in: L’Unità, 20.02.1953. 30. MM. Laniel et Pleven sont malmenés par des manifestants, in: Le Monde, 06.04.1954; Comment le PCF cherche à exploiter l’opposition du Maréchal Juin, in: Le Figaro, 03.04.1954. For the po- sition of Le Monde and Le Figaro in the EDC debate, see M. KÖNIG, Die Wiederbewaffnung der Bundesrepublik im Le Monde und Le Figaro, 1950-1955, in: M. KÖNIG, M. SCHULZ (eds.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung, 1949-2000, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004, pp.401-422. 18 Linda RISSO

In order to ratify the EDC Treaty, the member governments had to approve substantial amendments to their own constitutions. The six members had to renounce some of their prerogatives, which would be transferred to the new supranational organisation. The EDC Treaty also established the precedence of Community law over national law, thus forcing the member governments to implement the supranational organisation’s directives, another important clause that needed to be added to the national constitutions. On the other hand, the EDC opponents – Communists and non-Communists alike – stressed the economic consequences of the treaty’s ratification. Not only did the treaty establish an integrated procurement policy, but it also foresaw a joint research project designed to lead to a more integrated armament industry, which meant that the supranational army would formulate plans for the harmonisation of national economies. Thus it was not just a matter of loss of control of the amount of money to be used for military purposes, but also of loss of sovereignty over the nation's budget. According to many EDC opponents, including the Communists, the economic and social situation of post-war Europe meant that the six governments were in no position to divert money to anything other than reconstruction. In an interview to Avanti!, Francesco Saverio Nitti, a liberal Prime minister of the pre-fascist era, declared that a “country with more than two million unemployed that commits itself to a policy of rearmament is a country of crazy people”.31 Thus, during the EDC ratification debate the Communists became the fiercest defenders of national sovereignty. As Pietro Nenni, the PSI leader, declared: “We want a foreign policy of firm defence of our national interests particularly over Istria and Trieste”.32 Paolo Emilio Taviani, the Christian Democratic leader of the Italian delegation to the EDC, remembers that: “There was no doubt that the Communists were going to engage the European Defence Community in an even fiercer battle than the one they had orchestrated against the Atlantic Pact a few years earlier. They had become the defenders of the Italian heritage [Italianité]”.33 In defiance of the traditional Socialist vision of the unity of the working class across national borders, the new Communist strategy was based on the awareness that the defence of the nation-state had a larger appeal to the public and could raise more support than the sheer class struggle approach would have ever done. The Communists denounced the “double threat” to the sovereignty of the nation-state: on the one hand, there was the American attempt to buy out the European

31. See E’ necessario che gli Italiani sappiano ciò che significa la ratifica della CED, in: Avanti!, 20.03.1954. See also I 250 miliardi stanziati per il riarmo siano usati per la ricostruzione del Pole- sine, in: L’Unità, 27.11.1951. 32. P. NENNI, Dal Patto Atlantico alla politica di distensione: Pace e guerra nel parlamento italiano. Scritti e discorsi di Pietro Nenni, Parenti, Bologna, 1953, p.480. 33. HAEC-INT/10, “Interview avec Paolo Emilio Taviani. Participation au séminaire du Prof. Richard T. Griffiths à l’IUE (14-15 May 1989)”. In the same interview, Taviani remembers when in 1954 he went with Giovanni Gronchi to Ravenna to confer the medal for resistance to the city and was faced by a crowd of communist protesters who shouted “Viva l’armata nazionale” and “Viva l’es- ercito italiano”. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 19 governments with loans and skilfully designed procurement policies, which increased Western Europe’s economic dependence on the US and, on the other, there were the European policy-makers who supported such policies in order to gain a personal advantage. This political strategy was approved of – and to a certain degree inspired by – the Soviet Union, who since the “great patriotic war” of 1941-45 had recognised the appeal that nationalism could exert on the public. Since the end of WWII, Moscow had identified nationalism as an “anticoagulant against the new internationalism pushed forward by the US”.34 The defence of the constitution and of national sovereignty was of course also a concern of the French and Italian right-wing parties. However, this produced different results in the two countries. While the PCF worked for an instrumental alliance with the Gaullists to fight the EDC and even made public appeals in favour of such an alliance, their Italian counterparts refused to have any contact with the Right. On 23 October 1953, Jacques Duclos launched an open invitation to the Gaullists when he declared that:

“Always aware of the need to act rapidly everywhere in the country to prevent the ratification of the treaty that establishes the European army, we declare that we, the Communists, are ready to fight with all the French, whoever they are – we repeat, whoever they are – and who like us do not want a new Wehrmacht, to take part in all political actions that can and should be organised as part of a conscious campaign everywhere in France”.35 Although the French Communists and the Gaullists never formed an official alliance, they united informally to defeat the EDC and eventually caused its collapse on 30 August 1954, when their combined vote struck a mortal blow to the project. Clearly, the relations that the PCF and PCI maintained with the Gaullists and the Italian Social Movement respectively were determined by the different natures and histories of the Italian and French right-wing parties. The Gaullist party members were among the most well known members of the European Resistance.36 The Italian Right, on the other hand, was made up of ex-Fascists who had managed to continue their political careers after the end of the war.37

34. Pravda, 29 September 1951, as quoted in A. CLESSE, op.cit., pp.316-317. In the Italian case in particular, the PCI had opted for the defence of national sovereignty as a tool to enhance the pos- sibility of establishing alliances with other political parties since April 1944, with the so-called svolta di Salerno (Salerno turning point). 35. FIG-ES, Folder 12, “Estratto da una dichiarazione di Jacques Duclos, Segretario del PCF”. See also a similar declaration of a few months earlier in J. DUCLOS, Mémoires, Fayard, Paris, 1952, pp.126-127. S. BERSTEIN, Le Parti communiste français et de Gaulle sous la IVe République: Confrontations et convergences, in: S. COURTOIS, M. LAZAR (eds.), 50 ans d’une passion française: De Gaulle et les communistes, Balland, Paris, 1991, pp.79-95. 36. Besides de Gaulle himself, generals Koenig and Juin, Gaston Palewski and Jacques Soustelle were among the most outstanding French resistants. 37. Giorgio Almirante, the MSI secretary from 1946 to 1951, had been a member of minister Mezza- soma’s cabinet and in 1944 took part in several anti-partisan operations. 20 Linda RISSO

Finally, the Communists argued that the lack of democratic control within the EDC would jeopardise the political stability of Europe and of West Germany in particular: “[The EDC] is the worst solution that could be conceived: a German national army would be at least under the control of the German public opinion. [...] The German section of the European army, instead, would be exclusively under the command of the American army, thus escaping the control of the German public opinion”.38 A more specific criticism of the Italian Communists was the link between the fight against the EDC and their opposition to the Christian Democratic government: the PCI claimed in fact that by touting the need to comply with the EDC requirements, the Christian Democrats were in fact trying to undermine parliamentary powers and pave the way for an authoritarian regime. In their eyes the EDC was merely an excuse to reshape Italian democracy according to the Salazarian model, which would turn Italy into a philo-Fascist and philo-American theocracy. The opposition to the EDC was therefore intentionally linked to their fight against the new electoral law, the so called legge truffa, and the new legislation approved by the DC government in the early fifties, which they regarded as being all part of the Christian Democrats’ plan to establish an authoritarian regime.39 The report by Emilio Sereni clearly summarises the ideas around which the Communist campaigns were organised: “It is clear that the limitation – or liquidation – of the parliamentary prerogatives in our country is one of the crucial objectives of the promoters of the EDC […]. We need to defend our country and our constitution […] Along with these democratic issues, other issues can be used more than in the past to open the way to new initia- tives at the local and national level: the theme of national independence and the threat of German rearmament: which are at the same time issues of national inde- pendence and of peace. […] We need to demonstrate that the EDC, in which German militarism would be virtually uncontrolled, means for Italy – now more than in 1940 – the risk to be pulled into a world conflict at the service of German greed for revenge and aggression. We need to show that the ratification of the EDC will be the greatest obstacle to any policy of international appeasement. […] This will open an extremely vast and heterogeneous field of political and propagandist actions”.40 A further peculiarity of the Italian case was the problem of Trieste, whose contended position created frictions between Rome and Belgrade and which was widely exploited in the EDC debate by both the Communists and the right-wing parties. The Yugoslavian occupation of Trieste, which had the support of Moscow,

38. P. NENNI, Dal Patto Atlantico …, op.cit., p.355. 39. IFG MF116, Verbali della Segreteria del 30 dicembre 1954, “Provvedimenti del CdM del 4 dicem- bre 1954”. See also E’ necessario che gli Italiani sappiano ciò che significa la ratifica della CED, in: Avanti!, 20.03.1954. L. LOTTI, Crisi del centrismo e legge elettorale maggioritaria, in: A. TURBANTI, Movimento di Unità Popolare e crisi del centrismo: Atti della giornata di studi or- ganizzata dalla Fondazione Bianciardi. Grosseto, 12 marzo 1994, Giunti, Florence, 1995. 40. IFG-ES, Folder 12, Emilio Sereni, I compiti dei partigiani della pace nella lotta contro la CED e contro il riarmo tedesco. 15 dicembre 1953. Draft article for Il Quaderno dell’Attivista. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 21 reinforced anti-Communism at home and put the PCI in an uncomfortable position as the party was accused of being a pawn of the Soviet and Yugoslavian greed.41 The expulsion of Josip Tito from the Cominform in June 1948 allowed the PCI to criticise him and support the government’s demand for full control over the town without upsetting Moscow. Trieste became therefore yet another propaganda weapon in the hands of the Communists who used it to show, once again, that the Western Allies were sacrificing Italian national interests at their advantage. Between 1953 and 1954, the fear that Trieste might become the reward for Tito’s collaboration created alarm in Italy. Thus, the right-wing parties’ support for the ratification of the EDC became increasingly linked to the solution to the problem of Trieste. According to the monarchists, Italy had to take advantage of the fact that the US wanted the EDC Treaty to be ratified and bargain with the Western Allies, “claiming its dignity and territorial integrity like a respected nation, as it deserved”.42 As the US ambassador to Rome, Clare Boothe Luce, commented, “ratification is the only carrot Italy has”, and it was one they were determined to use.43 Officially, Italian authorities denied the link between Trieste and the EDC. In his diaries, Paolo Emilio Taviani wrote that the Italian government never thought of linking the ratification of the treaty to the solution to Trieste mainly because such blackmail would upset those in London and Paris who were against a positive solution for Italy, but other surces suggest otherwise.44 Pietro Nennni remembers in his diaries, for example, that during an informal conversation over dinner Prime minister Pella told him that “About Trieste he does not see a solution. He will go to Paris and to the Hague to remind the others that they cannot ask him to support the EDC if they do not give him Trieste”.45 The behaviour of his successor, Prime minister Mario Scelba, remained similarly ambiguous, thus raising further suspicion among the other EDC members.46

41. L. GIBJANSKIJ, Mosca, il PCI e la questione di Trieste, 1943-1948, in: F. GORI, S. PONS (eds.), Dagli archivi di Mosca: L’URSS, il Cominform e il PCI (1943-1951), Carocci, Rome, 1998, pp.85-133; S. PONS, Stalin, Togliatti and the origins of the Cold War in Europe, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 3/2(2001), pp.3-27. 42. Il problema del TLT e la CED, in: Il Popolo di Roma, 12.05.1954; La definizione della frontiera orientale presupposto alla ratifica della CED, in: Idid., 08.04.1954. 43. Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforward FRUS), 1952-54, VI, pp.1671-1675. For the PNM’s decision to link Trieste to the EDC ratification, see Trieste e la CED, in: Il Popolo di Roma, 03.03.1954. 44. P.E. TAVIANI, Politica a memoria d’uomo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, p.193. 45. P. NENNI, Tempo di guerra fredda: Diari, 1943-1956, Sugar&Co, Milan, 1981, p.594. 46. A. CANAVERO, La politica estera di un Ministro degli Interni: Scelba, Piccioni e Martino e la politica estera italiana, in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1(1990), pp.63-97. 22 Linda RISSO

Mobilising all the forces against the EDC

The PCI and PCF mobilised their MPs, newspapers and collateral organisations in what became one of their fiercest opposition campaigns of the post-war period. Party newspapers were the most obvious way of presenting the Communist criticism. The PCI, in collaboration with the PSI, relied on two widely read newspapers, L’Unità and Avanti!. In the early fifties, L’Unità, the PCI’s newspaper, sold more than half a million copies a day and a million on Sundays and special occasions like the 1st of May.47 The Socialist Avanti! added a further two hundred thousand copies to the Italian left-wing press. In France, the PCF published L’Humanité, which reached 170,000 copies. Compared with the Italian Communist press, the circulation of L’Humanité might appear limited, however the PCF allowed the publication of different sections of the party's newspapers. Between 1950 and 1954, it is possible to find not only more than eight different editions of L’Humanité itself, but also fourteen other newspapers which were published under the PCF’s umbrella.48 The parties and their newspapers did not shape their campaign against the EDC around the class struggle theme, but chose instead to concentrate exclusively on the dangers of German rearmament: namely, the return of Nazism and the beginning of a new world conflict (often interchanging the prospects of German aggression with the imminent East-West conflict). The public was extremely sensitive about these two issues. Thus, the ghost of the “new Wehrmacht” became omnipresent in the Communist press. The party newspapers skilfully placed reports on the concentration camps and interviews with survivors on the same page as anti-EDC articles, in order to remind readers of the Nazi horrors and to reinforce their anti-EDC position and they published articles on the massacre of Korean civilians by US troops to encourage anti-Americanism.49 It is also interesting to note that in their parliamentary speeches as well as in their articles, the Communists often used the terms ‘rearmament’ and ‘remilitarisation’ as synonyms.50 The misleading use of the term ‘remilitarisation’ evoked the re-creation of the German army and indirectly implied that the premature creation of an army in a country that had not yet been de-nazified would lead to a new authoritarian regime and eventually to military aggression against its neighbours. If through the newspapers the Communist parties reached their own followers, they recognised the importance of engaging other groups whose political allegiances were close – but not exactly within – the Communist sphere and they

47. Data taken from Intervento di Ingrao alla riunione della Segreteria del Cominform. Novembre 1950, quoted in F. GORI, S. PONS (eds.), op.cit., pp.399-414. 48. A. KRIEGEL, op.cit., p.39. 49. Several examples are available in L’Unità, Avanti! and L’Humanité in the period 1951-53. 50. See for example: La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: Avanti!, 20.02.1953; and I partigiani contrari all’esercito europeo tendente a ridurre in schiavitù il paese, in: Ibid., 01.03.1953. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 23 therefore resorted to the collateral organisations they had created for this purpose. The Italian Communists could rely on a huge variety of groups and associations. One of the most influential was the Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani (National Association of Italian Partisans, ANPI). Since the beginning of the Cold War, the partisans had opposed rearmament and denounced the risk of an irreversible shift of the Italian Republic which would put it under the control of the US. It was only in February 1953, however, that the ANPI addressed the EDC problem: at their congress in Florence, their president, Arrigo Boldrini, warned that it was impossible for those who had fought against Nazism and Fascism to support the creation of the “new Wehrmacht” and called for the general mobilisation of all “democratic citizens”.51 Thereafter the ANPI took an active part in the anti-EDC campaign organised by the party. The Association Nationale des Anciens Combattants de la Résistance (National Association of the Ex-Combatants of the Resistance, ANARC), the ANPI’s French counterpart, included the protagonists of the French resistance who, unlike what had happened in Italy, belonged to different political groups, which meant the PCF exerted little or no influence over them. Only the smaller Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes (National Federation of the Deported and Interned Resistants and Patriots, FNDIRP) was close to the PCF, and it offered its unconditional support in the fight against German rearmament. There were other collateral organisations the Communists could rely on. In July 1951, the Dockers Union organised a congress in Genoa under the motto “The Mediterranean: a peaceful sea”, at which they declared their refusal to load or unload any military items in the name of the peaceful coexistence of all nations. The Italian dockers sent an invitation to follow their programme to all the cities facing the Mediterranean Sea, and the French dockers were the first to answer the call.52 Finally, the Union des Femmes Françaises (French Women’s Union, UdFF) and the Unione delle Donne Italiane (Italian Women’s Union, UDI) tried to reach the female population, especially housewives, who were deeply influenced by the Church and the Christian Democratic parties. The foundation of the Kominform in 1947 had produced a new transnational opposition in the form of international organisations or, as the Western security agencies called them, “front” organisations. Since the 1920s, the USSR had understood that organisations that were believed to be independent could be more useful to the cause of international Communism than those that were openly pro-Communist. Precisely because their programmes were ones with which non-Communists could sympathise – peaceful coexistence, disarmament, economic and cultural exchange – they attracted wider support. The great asset of such organisations was their spurious international appeal to both Communists and non-Communists, and their ability to demonstrate that they enjoyed support that

51. Manifestazioni in tutta Italia contro il Trattato della CED, in: Avanti!, 22.02.1953. 52. Nei porti del Mediterraneo soltanto traffici di pace, in: Avanti!, 31.07.1951. 24 Linda RISSO transcended the limits of the Party as well as national boundaries. Consequently, the USSR invested massively in these organisations: in 1951 the CIA estimated that the USSR spent $ 2,500,000,000 a year on the front organisations.53 The World Peace Congress (WPC) was one of the most effective of these groups. From the very beginning, the Peace Partisans – as the WPC members called themselves – were an instrument in the hands of the USSR and therefore were under the control of each country’s Communist party. It is not surprising, that the movement had its strongest branches in France and Italy, whereas it remained a marginal phenomenon in Britain and in the Scandinavian countries.54 According to the PCI’s archives, the Italian section of the Partisans received 1.2 million lira a year from the party and an additional 375,000 lira from the PSI and the CGIL, the Communist trade union.55 Along with the Communist parties, the Peace Partisans initially focused their actions on issues such as disarmament, peaceful coexistence, the Korean War and NATO. Accordingly, at the end of 1950, the Partisans launched a campaign against rearmament and collected ten million signatures in nine months, a sign of the extent of the public’s fear of a new conflict and a clear demonstration of the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda campaign.56 In February 1950, the Italian section of the movement presented a motion to the Italian parliament asking for an immediate stop to the rearmament process, the prohibition of the atomic bomb and the drawing up of a “peace treaty” between the Western Allies and the USSR.57 It was only at the end of 1951 that the Peace Partisans addressed the European Army question.58 Not surprisingly, the decision to address the question followed the Soviet note to the French government in September in which the USSR criticised the integrated army and the rearmament of the Federal Republic.59 The movement organised a series of international meetings to gather together the anti-EDC opponents and to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution to the German problem through diplomatic agreements between the Four Powers. The WPC built on their previous campaigns against the atomic bomb and disarmament and presented their opposition to the EDC as a logical consequence of their

53. J. KOTEK, Youth Organisations as a Battlefield in the Cold War, in: Intelligence and National Se- curity 18/2(2003), p.181. 54. D. DESANTI, Les Staliniens, 1944-1956: Une expérience politique, Fayard, Paris, 1975; R. GI- ACOMINI, I Partigiani della Pace, Vangelista, Milan, 1984. 55. FIG-APCI, MF189, Verbali della Segreteria del 19 giugno 1952; FIG-APCI, Verbali della Segret- eria del 17 settembre, MF 165, “Lettera di G. Pajetta alla Segreteria. 18 luglio 1953”. 56. According to the report by Emilio Sereni, the partisans had gathered 13,500,000 signatures. “Cam- pagna per la raccolta di firme”. FIG-APCI, MF191, Verbali della Direzione. Riunione del 26 set- tembre 1951. 57. Oggi presentata in Parlamento la mozione dei Partigiani della Pace, in: Avanti!, 28.02.1950. 58. See the speech of Pietro Nenni, the movement secretary, denouncing the EDC in L’Assemblea Na- zionale per il disarmo e la pace, in: La Pace, 4-5(December 1951), special supplement. 59. L. BRUNORI, I Partigiani della Pace e la CED: Il caso italiano (1950-1954), in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 2(1992), pp.299-332. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 25 commitment to international dialogue and détente.60 According to the Peace Partisans, therefore: “The campaign against the EDC – along with the general campaigns against German rearmament, in favour of national independence and in support for peace – needs to become a decisive campaign of all the democratic forces. It will require a concrete and direct commitment of the party similar to that against the atomic bomb”.61

New strategy: Delaying the ratification process (1953-54)

Nineteen fifty-three marked a turning point in the history of the European Army or, as Edward Fursdon has put it, the beginning of the end of the EDC.62 Key international events that took place in 1953 reshaped East-West diplomatic relations and had far-reaching effects on Italian domestic affairs. Such changes were triggered by the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 and the end of the Korean War in July. It marked the beginning of a period of relaxation in East-West relations, in which peaceful coexistence was the order of the day. In this changed atmosphere, the need for the EDC as a precautionary defence scheme against a Soviet attack lost its urgency. It was the Berlin Conference (January-February 1954) which marked a volte-face in Moscow’s approach to the German problem. Rather than rejecting the military integration of Western Europe tout court, the USSR proposed through its Foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, a Pan-European Security Pact whereby thirty-two nations from the Atlantic to the Urals would merge into a common supranational organisation, while the USSR and the US would act as external observers.63 James Richter has suggested that, although his proposal was rejected by the Western Allies, Molotov did achieve his goal: to divide the Western Allies and to widen the internal rift within several political parties, particularly the West German Social Democrats and the French Socialists.64 In fact, for the first time the words of a Soviet leader seemed to strike a chord in groups other than the Communists, including members of the French centre. Édouard Herriot and Jules Moch, for example, praised Molotov’s words and asked for new talks with Moscow before proceeding with the EDC ratification debate.65

60. FIG-APCI, MF 116, Verbali della Segreteria dell’11 November 1954, “Dichiarazione dell’Esecu- tivo del Consiglio Mondiale della Pace”. Vienna, 15 Settembre 1954. 61. FIG-APCI, MF165, Verbali della Segreteria del 29 dicembre 1953, “Campagna contro la CED. Con- clusioni della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sottoporre all’esame della Segreteria”. 62. E. FURSDON, op.cit., p.229. 63. FRUS, 1952-54, VII, pp.1122-1123. V.M. ZUBOK, K. PLESHAKOV, Inside the Kremlin Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Mass, 1993. 64. J. RICHTER, Re-examining Soviet policy towards Germany in 1953, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 45/ 4(1993), pp.671-691. 65. M. Edouard Herriot: On vous demande de commettre une terrible imprudence, in: Le Monde, 16.03.1954. 26 Linda RISSO

Molotov’s speech opened the way to a new form of criticism, which focused on the use of the adjective “European” itself. The Communist parties claimed that it was inappropriate to use the term European for the EDC since it only included six countries, while others (such as Spain, Portugal, Britain, the German Democratic Republic and the Scandinavian countries) were excluded. Rather than a “Small Europe”, the Communists endorsed the “Pan-European Pact”, which included all the countries between the Atlantic Ocean, the Urals and the Mediterranean Sea, with mutual recognition of the two blocs, and normalisation of international relations.66 Following the developments that had occurred in Moscow, Communist criticism of the European integration process underwent significant changes and outright rejection of the EDC gave way to a more articulated strategy, aimed at delaying the ratification process. The new Communist approach was based on the conviction that international détente was working against the EDC and that support for the European Army was decreasing by the day. The more time passed, the more likely it was that it would be defeated.67 For this reason, it was vital to keep the Western Allies, as well as the national parties, divided and to show that there were viable alternatives to the rearmament of West Germany. Consequently, it was necessary for the USSR to prove – or, as their opponents would say, pretend – that they were willing to co-operate on issues such as the German and Austrian peace treaties, the war in Indochina and disarmament. The proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact should therefore be contextualised as part of the new Soviet leadership’s attempt to change the world perception of its foreign policy. Disarmament and co-operation were the new weapons in the Communist propaganda armoury. Because of their political weight and their position within the National Assembly’s spectrum, the solid vote of the French Socialists and Radicals in favour of the EDC was vital for the ratification. For this reason, Guy Mollet, the Socialist leader, asked for a “disciplined vote” arguing that because of the virtually equal division of the National Assembly over the EDC, it was necessary for the Socialists to vote solidly together to ensure the treaty’s ratification.68 In spite of party

66. FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria del 4 marzo, “Riunione a Parigi contro la CED dei rappresentanti dei 6 Paesi della ‘Piccola Europa’”, Lettera di G. Pajetta alla Segreteria, 27 febbraio 1954. See also Gli amici dell’Europa (i veri e i falsi), in: Avanti!, 27.09.1952. 67. FIG-APCI, MF165, Verbali della Segreteria del 29 dicembre 1953, “Campagna contro la CED (Se- reni, Giuliano Pajetta, Robotti). Conclusioni della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sot- toporre all’esame della Segreteria”. See also the report sent by the Italian Ambassador to Moscow, according to which, the death of Stalin notwithstanding, the Soviet administration remained deter- mined to have the Treaty rejected. HAEC-IML/16, “Telespresso dal MAE alla Delegazione Ital- iana CED; Subj.: URSS e CED”, 27 April 1954. 68. A disciplined vote would impose to all party members to vote according to the directives of the party leadership, with any disobedience being punished by “disciplinary measures” ranging from suspension to expulsion from the party. Party discipline was imposed at the special congress of Pu- teaux by 2,414 votes to 972. Le congrès national extraordinaire de la SFIO se prononce en faveur de la ratification de la CED, in: Le Populaire, 31 May 1954; for the full text of the Mollet motion, La motion de la CED, in: Le Populaire, 31 May 1954; for the disciplined vote, Motion sur la dis- cipline, in: Le Populaire, 6 July 1954. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 27 discipline, however, the Socialists remained deeply divided and split into two almost perfect halves at the final vote of 30 August 1954: 53 deputies supported the ratification, whereas 50 opposed it.69 The Radical Party was deeply divided too and many of its members suggested postponing the EDC ratification debate until new relations with Moscow had been established.70 Thus, the new Soviet tactic produced the envisaged results: it widened the internal rifts within the French Socialist and Radical parties, while the Communists’ obstructionism contributed to the rejection of the EDC. Believing that the Italian ratification would weaken the French opposition within the National Assembly, the PCI delayed the parliamentary discussion on the EDC through parliamentary obstruction, claiming that the ratification debate could take place only after new relations with Moscow had been initiated.71 As a result of this action, the Italian Communists found they had an unexpected ally in the government. Since the parliamentary debate appeared highly problematic, with both the Left and the Right embracing obstructionism, the Italian government decided to postpone the ratification debate until after the elections, which were scheduled for the summer of 1953. Aware of the increasing difficulties within the National Assembly, the Italian government believed that it would be pointless to initiate a long fight in parliament if the treaty were then to be rejected by the National Assembly. Italy preferred to wait for the French results.72 It is worth remembering that before the elections of 1953 the Italian government still enjoyed a comfortable majority that would have ensured the ratification of the EDC Treaty, whereas the prospects of the election results were increasingly uncertain and it was unlikely the new government would have been in a position to ratify the Treaty.73 By postponing the ratification debate, the Christian Democrats prevented a sensitive issue from jeopardising the already difficult electoral campaign and thus they consciously sacrificed the EDC, to the great distress of the US.

69. Journal Officiel la République Française, Assemblée Nationale, 30 August 1954, pp.4473-4474. 70. On 30 August 1954, 29 Radicals voted in favour of the Herriot motion, which signalled the end of the EDC, whereas 31 of them supported EDC by voting against the motion. Journal Officiel, 30 August 1954, pp.4473-4474. Among them there were Jean-Paul David, Bernard Lafay, Léon Mar- tinaud-Dèplat, and René Mayer. The fall of the EDC did not mean a return to the unanimity that had been seen at the time of the Coal and Steel Community vote and the WEU produced a similar internal divisions. 71. FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria, “Campagna contro la CED (Sereni, Giuliano Pajetta, Robotti). Conclusioni della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sottoporre all’esame della Segreteria”. See also FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria del 2 aprile 1954, about the de- cision to postpone the ratification process and to revise the propaganda campaign. Non si deve rat- ificare la CED prima della Francia e della Germania, in: Avanti!, 13.02.1953. 72. P.E. TAVIANI, op.cit., pp.196, 200 and 209. 73. Before the 1953 elections, the governing coalition could count on 61.9% of the votes in parliament, P. GINSBORG, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin, Lon- don, 1990, p.442. Yet, the municipal elections of 1951 had shown a decrease in the consensus of the governing coalition and it seemed unlikely they could repeat the success of 1948. 28 Linda RISSO

Contrary to the opinion of the Italian government, several American officials believed that Italian ratification would pave the way for French ratification. At the end of March 1953, De Gasperi informed the US secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that there was not enough time to discuss the EDC Treaty, because the parliamentary debate regarding the new electoral law had stretched into the Spring.74 This caused great disappointment in Washington and it was only thanks to the mediation of David Bruce, the US observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC, that Foster Dulles did not release another of his threatening statements.75 The Italian decision to postpone ratification until after the French vote has generated an intense historiographical discussion: Sergio Pistone, for example, maintains that Italian ratification would have encouraged the French to do the same.76 However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is unlikely that the Italian vote would have influenced the French parliament. The French ratification was hampered by widespread opposition not only among the Gaullists and the Communists, but also among governmental parties such as the Socialists and the Radicals. Therefore, it seems improbable that Italian ratification would have exerted any influence on the French vote. At the time, Taviani too believed that the French parliament would not be influenced by the Italian vote77 and Pietro Quaroni, the Italian ambassador to France – whose opinion was highly regarded at the Foreign ministry – thought that ratifying the treaty before the French would be a strategic mistake: the Assembly would see Italian ratification as a betrayal and this would strengthen the anti-EDC front: “Many believe that if the EDC Treaty were ratified by all members, the French par- liament would not dare reject it. But the French parliament […] would dare! […] From time to time, the French parliament still suffers from a form of ‘National Con- vention’ reflex”.78

Against rearmament or against integration?

The changes that occurred at the international level after the death of Stalin, combined with the continuous delays in the ratification process, reinforced the anti-EDC opposition and led to its rejection by the French parliament in August 1954 – thanks to the combined vote of the Gaullists and the Communists. After four years of thorny diplomatic meetings and parliamentary debates, the rejection of the EDC did not come as a sudden blow. However, if European policy-makers

74. P. PASTORELLI, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987, p.198. 75. HAEC-JMAS(Bruce)/149, Bruce’s diary at the entry of 16 March 1953. 76. S. PISTONE (ed.), I movimenti per l’unità europea dal 1945 al 1954: Atti del convegno internazi- onale, Pavia 19-21 ottobre 1989, Jaca Book, Milan, 1992, pp.46-47. 77. P.E. TAVIANI, op.cit., p.200. 78. HAEC-IML/15, “Lettera di Quaroni al Ministro. Parigi, 23 ottobre 1952, Subj.: Integrazione Eu- ropea”. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 29 had expected the negative vote of the National Assembly, they remained uncertain about what would happen next. The failure of the EDC did not change the core problem it had tried to solve: providing military security for Western Europe. This was eventually achieved through the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) at the end of 1954. There is no room to recall here the debate that led to the creation of this new organisation, suffice it to say that the WEU was a military alliance of a traditional kind and it created neither unified high commands nor integrated headquarters, and it allowed its members to follow independent foreign policies under the NATO umbrella. For West Germany the WEU meant the end of the occupation statute and the opportunity to become a member of NATO, which it joined in May 1955. It is interesting to compare the Communists’ opposition to the WEU with their opposition to the EDC. In his conclusion, Raymond Aron has pointed out that neither the USSR nor the Communist parties opposed the WEU as strongly as they had opposed the EDC.79 Aron argues that the “silence” of the Communists was due to the fact that between 1950 and 1954 they were actually opposing the European integration process rather than German rearmament. According to Aron, in the fifties the USSR, while being aware that they could not prevent the rearmament of Western Germany, were nevertheless determined to prevent European integration and the creation of a strong power aligned with the US.80 Interesting questions that are still waiting to be answered. First of all, it is important to assess whether Communist opposition to the WEU was indeed different from the opposition organised against the EDC, and to explain the reasons behind such behaviour. A comparison between the parliamentary debates of August and December 1954, as well as a quick look at the Communist press during those months, shows a quite remarkable change. The number of front-page articles on European defence fell after 30 August. This might partially be due to the fact that some scandals were taking place at that time. In September and October, the Italian press was obsessed by the Montesi Affair and its political implications, as well as by the love drama of the cyclist Fausto Coppi and his White Lady.81 In France, a case of espionage involving some PCF members and Emmanuel D’Astier, the editor of Libération, polarised the public and the media, leaving little room for anything else. The very fact that the Communist press allowed such topics to take over the front page is evidence that their commitment to

79. R. ARON, D. LERNER (eds.), La querelle de la CED: Essais d’analyse sociologique, in: Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 80(1956), p.201. 80. R. ARON, op.cit., pp.201-202. 81. In April 1954, Wilma Montesi was found dead on a beach near Rome and a four-week investigation concluded that the death had been accidental. Six months later, the case was reopened due to the intervention of Amintore Fanfani, the Interior minister. It is widely believed that Fanfani exploited the Montesi scandal to get rid of Attilio Piccioni, his rival to the party’s leadership; G. GALLI, Mezzo secolo di DC, Rizzoli, Milan, 1993, pp.121-123. Still in 1954, the cyclist Fausto Coppi had a love affair with a married woman, known as the “White Lady”. At a time when divorce was still a long way off, the couple was prosecuted for indecency and the White Lady had to spend a short time in prison, where she started a hunger strike. 30 Linda RISSO the fight against the WEU was not as great as it had been to the anti-EDC campaign. In fact, in 1952 and 1953, Italy and France had witnessed several scandals, but they had been reported in small articles that would not distract the reader from the important issue of the EDC. Hence, there must have been a conscious decision on the part of the editorial committees to grant D’Astier and Montesi the honour of the front page.82 The parliamentary debates offer another excellent perspective from which to analyse the same issue. The French and Italian Communists used their seats in parliament to criticise the WEU, but if they tried to delay its ratification, they did not attack it with the same strength as they had attacked the EDC. They repeated some of the criticism they had used against the EDC: namely, the rearmament of West Germany would make the reunification of Germany impossible, it would entail the re-formation of German militarism, it would hamper relations with Moscow, and so forth. The direct dependence of the WEU on NATO was a further point of criticism because it would increase the military dependence of Western Europe on the US. During a meeting of the Central Committee, Arturo Colombi, responsible for the PCI Propaganda Commission, confirmed that regrettably “there has not been a large mobilisation throughout the country” against the WEU.83 Similarly, the Foreign affairs section of the party pointed out that “even our leadership is scarcely informed about the development of current events” and claimed that there was “a dangerous discrepancy between the extent of our duties and our actual manpower”.84 At the same time, after 1953, the Peace Partisans seemed unable to adjust to the new strategy suggested by Moscow. Initiating new relations with the Western bloc required diplomatic and conciliatory skills, which the movement clearly lacked. Consequently, the Peace Partisans proved to be incapable of adapting to the new Soviet strategy. It is not surprising, then, that in the last months of 1954 the Partisans’ voice grew weaker and that they decreased their activity even further during the WEU negotiations.85 The twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956) inflicted the final blow on the already dying movement, which disappeared a few months later.86 The reasons for the French and Italian Communists’ attitude towards the WEU must be traced back to Soviet foreign policy, rather than being restricted to the national political context. As has been shown, the new leadership in Moscow had

82. Giorgio Galli has already examined how the PCI used the Montesi affair to discredit the Christian Democrats, thus the relevance given to the case must be contextualised as part of the Italian internal political debate. G. GALLI, op.cit., pp.121-123. 83. FIG-APCI, MF 116, Verbali della Direzione, Riunione del 29 dicembre 1954, “Giudizio sulla sit- uazione internazionale e azione del partito contro la ratifica dell’UEO”. 84. FIG-APCI, MF 194, Verbali della Segreteria del 10 May 1955, “Piano di lavoro della sezione es- teri, 23 marzo 1955”. 85. L. BRUNORI, op.cit., p.331. 86. D. DESANTI, op.cit. Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 31 understood that it was vital to keep the Western Allies divided on the issue of German rearmament and that in order to do so it was imperative to show a clear commitment to peaceful international co-operation. For this reason, Moscow had announced the Pan-European Pact and the national Communist parties had not rejected the integration process per se but had proposed the creation of a larger and neutral Europe. The problem of Germany might also have influenced Moscow’s position. As Aron has pointed out, in 1954 the division of Germany seemed likely to be long term and possibly permanent. Thus, the rearmament of West Germany under the WEU would have indirectly implied official recognition of East Germany. Instead of offering something new, the WEU stabilised the European post-war settlement and recognised Soviet control over the Eastern zone.87 However, although Aron’s opinions are worthy of consideration, it should not be forgotten that the Western European Union created neither unified high commands nor integrated headquarters; it was a traditional military alliance and allowed its members to follow independent foreign policies, albeit within a common framework. In the Cold War context, a divided Europe was more likely to appeal to Moscow than a militarily united one under the NATO umbrella. As Nenni confirmed: “The Paris Agreements are far less threatening for us than the EDC, except for the everlasting problem of German rearmament”.88 Therefore, while the USSR had good reasons to criticise the foundation of a new military alliance, it was quite plausible for Moscow to regard the WEU as likely to be far less threatening than the EDC would have been.

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Maud BRACKE

The decade of the “long 1960s” was crucial in shaping and changing the attitudes of the Italian and French Left with regard to European integration. This article deals with the positions taken by the Italian and to a lesser extent the French communist party (Partito comunista italiano, PCI, and Parti communiste français, PCF) vis-à-vis the EEC and the idea of a unified Europe. A striking contrast distinguishes the two cases in this regard. The two parties had since the start of the Cold War taken on strongly negative positions vis-à-vis the EEC and its institutions, on the basis largely of the Soviet analysis of and Soviet propaganda on the nature of European integration. In this analysis, the EEC was understood as a product of the Cold War and of American dominance over Western Europe, intended to provide the economic and political framework for the re-armament of West Germany, as well as to undermine the Soviet Union and the communist governments in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the anti-EEC stance of PCI and PCF was based on a social argument – European integration was seen as an expression of the concentration of capital – and, in the case of the PCF especially, an argument relating to the loss of national sovereignty. During the 1960s the PCI gradually shifted towards a more positive stance on the EEC, an evolution hallmarked by the entry of a PCI delegation in the European parliament in 1969. By the early 1970s, the party came to see the EEC as a potential vehicle for social and political change in Europe. The PCF, by contrast, continued throughout the 1960s to oppose any form of West European integration. It was only in the early 1970s, in the context of its continued domestic alliance with the socialist party, continued problematic relations with the Soviet communist party, and under the influence of the PCI, that the French communists came to accept, although never welcome, West European integration. The PCF’s gradual acceptance of the EEC was always more tactical than it was in the case of the PCI, and signified a far less fundamental change in its international outlook and strategy. In this article I set out to demonstrate how the two parties’ positions with regard to Europe can be understood as resulting from the specific impacts of European détente on domestic politics in the two countries. Doing so, I aim to contribute to the existing literature, not only by using primary document from the PCI, PCF and SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) archives, but also by refining our understanding of the impact of 1960s European détente on West European communism.1 The ambivalent impact of European détente on West European communism has not sufficiently been understood in the mass of literature on Eurocommunism in the 1960s-1970s. Much of this literature has in an unproblematic way assumed the positive impact of détente on West European 34 Maud BRACKE communism and specifically the PCI, and has, accordingly, failed to note the contradictions in the PCI’s views on Europe and détente in this period.2 The only recent, archive-based monograph on the PCI and the question of Europe in the 1960s, L’Europa degli altri by Mauro Maggiorani, usefully emphasises the centrality of détente, as well as offering the first comprehensive account of the PCI’s shifting positions.3 However, when the PCI case is not compared to another one such as the PCF, the specificity of the Italian situation, both in terms of the domestic political situation and in terms of the country’s position in the Cold War, cannot come out clearly. It will become clear here through the comparison that the parting of the PCI’s and PCF’s European ways in the 1960s reflects more than anything else the different positions held by Italy and France in European and global Cold War politics, as well as the ambivalent impacts of détente on domestic politics in Western Europe.

Détente in Europe and Italy

There was in the early 1960s a remarkable symmetry between the rise of détente on the global and European level, and developments in Italian domestic politics which allowed the PCI to partially escape its political isolation of the 1950s. It is this set of circumstances that convinced a generation of PCI leaders that European integration had the potential of providing a context for the kind of European détente which would allow for the PCI’s move towards governmental power. In this perspective, European integration and European détente would create the circumstances in which Italy and other West European states would become more

1. I have used the following archive collections: Archivio del PCI (APCI), Istituto Gramsci, Rome; Funds: Direzione (full minutes of the meetings of the Direzione), Comitato centrale (“CC”, full minutes of the Central Committee meetings), and Fondo Berlinguer, which includes the personal papers of Enrico Berlinguer (study documents, reports of meetings, correspondance); Archives Parti communiste francais (APCF), Paris; collection accessible at the time of my consultation in 2001/02 (but meanwhile closed): Bureau politique (“BP”, agendas and conclusions of the meet- ings), Comité central (“CC”, agendas and conclusions of the meetings), Secrétariat (agendas and conclusions of the meetings), Fonds Waldeck Rochet – Provenance Secrétariat Marchais (person- al papers, transferred to Marchais’ office after 1968, including some reports of meetings and con- ferences, preparations of letters and speeches, correspondences); Ministerium für Auswärtige An- gelegenheiten (MfAA), Berlin: Politisches Archiv; Zentrales Parteiarchiv SED (ZPA-SED), Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Berlin: Buro W. Ulbricht, Buro H. Axen. 2. See for example H. TIMMERMANN, Democratic socialists, Eurocommunists and the West, in: W. GRIFFITH (ed.), The European Left: Italy, France and Spain, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1979. A still very valuable attempt at developing a more sophisticated view on détente and Euro- communism is presented in the various contributions to R. TOKES (ed.), Eurocommunism and détente, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1978, which, however, are not based on unpublished primary sources. 3. M. MAGGIORANI, L’Europa degli altri. Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea 1957-1969. Carocci, Rome, 1998. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 35 autonomous from the United States, a process through which, ultimately, the Cold War division of the continent would be “overcome” and West European countries would be free to choose socialism. The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 led to the first onset of détente between the superpowers. In Europe, these crises on the short term gave way to the establishment of what Marc Trachtenberg has referred to as the European political Cold War system.4 The system was based on respect for the status quo (including the so-called territorial status quo, the 1945 frontiers, as well as the informal superpower division of spheres of influence), West Germany’s non-access to nuclear weapons, and continued intense US presence in the country. In Western Europe, there was in the early 1960s a shift in public opinion with regard to Cold War matters: as superpower acceptance of the status quo in Europe had become evident, public opinion started to feel less directly threatened by the Soviet Union.5 This led to a crisis in anti-communist politics which had served as a source of legitimation and public support for governments since the start of the Cold War in countries like Italy. It was in this sense that that early superpower détente, while stabilising relations between the superpowers, acutely destabilised relations within the blocks as well as the social and political order within states, based since 1948 on the Cold War consensus.6 Within NATO, the major challenge came from French president Charles de Gaulle’s policy of rapprochement to the East European and Soviet regimes. Also early Ostpolitik between 1966 and 1968, although in a less acute way, destabilised the balance of power within the Western alliance. This coincided with a severe crisis of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, provoked notably by Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, and relating to a number of disagreements over military and strategy and nuclear proliferation as well as economic integration.7 The crisis of the Cold War consensus and the de-legitimation of anti-communist politics were translated in the Italian political context into a crisis in the Democrazia cristiana (DC), the dominant government party since 1948. Having lost its majority in 1953, around 1960 the DC found it increasingly difficult to build a coalition government without the socialist party PSI (Partito socialista italiano). The PSI became not only unavoidable, it also became acceptable as a government partner, especially given its break with its earlier neutralism in the Cold War and its distancing from the Soviet Union and the PCI starting in 1956. Despite strong opposition within the DC against a coalition with the socialists, Aldo Moro’s

4. M. TRACHTENBERG, A constructed peace. The making of the European settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton UP, Princeton, 1999. 5. A similar point in E. CONZE, “Cold War crises and Public Opinion”. West European public opin- ion and the Berlin Wall”, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Europe, Cold War and Coexistence 1955-1965, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp.90-91. 6. J. SURI, Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2003, pp.41-43. 7. H. CARRERE D’ENCAUSSE, Le grand frère. L’Union soviétique et l’Europe soviétique, Fayard, Paris, 1983, chapter 4. 36 Maud BRACKE strategy of “opening to the Left” became dominant in the DC in the early 1960s. In 1963, the PSI entered into the first Moro government, and centre-left coalitions were to govern Italy up to 1969.8 It was early détente that made the “opening to the Left” possible, in that it took away the main ideological argument against socialist government participation.9 Also in terms of its policy contents, the centre-left’s reformist strategy was quintessentially one of 1960s détente, and its contradictions can be seen as reflecting the ambivalent nature of 1960s détente. The contradictions of the centro-sinistra were to do on one level with its anti-communist nature, and the question whether the centre-left was aimed at isolating the PCI. Another contradiction was to do with the fact that the centro-sinistra was based on a shaky coalition between, on the one hand, those in the PSI and on the left of the DC who aimed at profound economic and social reform as well as a reconfiguration of the political landscape and, on the other hand, the majority in the DC which aimed at preventing fundamental social and economic reform and wished to maintain the DC’s political supremacy. Such avoidance of structural social and economic reform was indeed possible between 1963 and 1966, through the – extensive rather than intensive – economic growth created by Italy’s “economic miracle”.10 The coming of the centre-left, thus, presented the PCI with a contradictory challenge, not unlike the challenge posed to it by European détente. This is why the issue of the centre-left and how to respond to it provoked intense debate in the PCI, notably between the so-called right, headed by Giorgio Amendola and Giorgio Napolitano, who were in favour of a classic communist-socialist rapprochement as a way to avoid PCI isolation, and the so-called left, headed by Pietro Ingrao, who started to think in terms of a social rather than a political alliance aimed at shaking up Italy’s party system.11

8. On the coming of the centre-left government see: P.L. BALLINI, S. GUERRIERI, A. VARSORI (eds.), Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra 1953-1968, Carocci, Rome, 2006; S. COLARIZI, Storia politica della repubblica 1943-2006, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2007, chap- ter 3; R. GUALTIERI, L’Italia dal 1943 al 1992. PCI e DC nella storia della Repubblica, Carocci, Rome, 2006, pp.143-151. 9. R. GUALTIERI, op.cit., pp.145-146. In addition, the centro-sinistra had crucially become possible because in 1963 the Kennedy administration turned to support it. One reason for this was the ex- pectation that the PSI in government would oppose an Italian nuclear programme. L. NUTI, Gli Stati uniti e l’apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1999, pp.500-517. 10. R. GUALTIERI, op.cit., pp.153-154. 11. On the centro-sinistra debate in the PCI see P. GINSBORG, Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi. Societá politica 1943-1988, Einaudi, Turin, 1989, pp.397-398. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 37

The PCI’s détente, the PCI’s Europe

An important strand of opinion in the PCI leadership, mostly of the right current, started to emphasise the potential benefits of European détente to the PCI and its domestic strategy and political position. Already in 1962, the PCI had devoted much of its 10th national congress to issues of peaceful coexistence and European détente.12 The choice to place peaceful coexistence at the centre of attention was still a sign of obedience to the Soviet Union, motivated by the need to demonstrate support to Moscow in its dispute with Maoist China over peaceful coexistence. Yet, if strictly speaking the 1962 Congress texts did not depart from the Soviet line, the points that were emphasised gave proof of a growing awareness of the PCI’s own, specific interests in peaceful coexistence and détente, grounded in its domestic political experience and increasingly disconnected from Soviet foreign policy interests. The party’s view on peaceful coexistence and détente was one in which improved East-West relations would be accompanied by the loosening of cohesiveness and hierarchies within the two blocks. This was evident from the emphasised call for the “withdrawal of all foreign bases across the European continent”.13 Such a statement was in contradiction with Washington’s détente policies but it also went counter to Soviet interests in détente. Also the party’s new insistence here on “the positive view on the role played by non-aligned states such as Yugoslavia” illustrated its own particular view on what détente in Europe should be: a way to break through the division of the continent and end superpower domination over it. There was a close and crucial connection between the PCI’s emerging European strategy, and the development of its ideas on détente and peaceful coexistence.14 While the thesis of the EEC in its origins being a product of the Cold War was maintained, the belief grew that Europe had qualitatively changed, and that a “third force” Europe, increasingly autonomous from the United States, could be turned into an instrument of détente as well as domestic social and political change. Europe, in its continental scope, would be able to contribute to “the overcoming of the blocks” globally. A strategy similar to the party’s domestic “long march through the institutions” was to be developed on the EEC level: a broad mobilisation behind, in a first instance, “general-democratic and anti-monopolistic objectives”. This meant combating the influence of monopoly capitalism and democratising the EEC’s institutions.15

12. The resolutions of the 10th national congress: COMITATO CENTRALE DEL PCI, Documenti po- litici dal X al XI Congresso, Editori riuniti, Rome, 1963, pp.122-156. 13. D. SASSOON, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party. From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise, Pinter, London, 1981, pp.209-211 (emphasis added – MB). 14. For a similar view see M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., passim. 15. The theme of democratisation was linked to the question of the PCI’s inclusion in the Italian dele- gation to the Strasbourg parliament, and the PCI leaders were to some extent supported by the PSI. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., pp.232-239. 38 Maud BRACKE

Within the party leadership a number of individuals developed revised interpretations on the political significance of European integration, and more optimistic views on the potential for social change in (Western) Europe. Important here were especially Amendola and Napolitano. They were influenced by two organisations linked to the PCI: the left-wing trade union Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL), and the research centre Istituto Gramsci. At the (Soviet-dominated) World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) meetings of 1961 in Moscow and 1962 in Budapest, the CGIL defended its new, more positive positions regarding Europe, arguing that the EEC had become an “objective necessity”, which could lead to the improvement of the living conditions of the Italian workers. The Gramsci Institute convened in 1965 an international conference on “Tendencies of European capitalism”, which marked a break-through in terms of economic analysis of the EEC. CGIL leader Bruno Trentin argued that European economic integration had led to an increase of the real wages of Italian workers; an affirmation which clearly went counter to the heavily biased opinions expressed on this occasion by the Soviet delegation. In 1965 the CGIL established with the French communist trade union CGT a permanent “liaison office” in Brussels, and in 1969 it sent a representation to the EEC’s Social and Economic Committee. Influenced by the discussions in the CGIL and the Istituto Gramsci, the PCI in March 1966 established a “Study Centre for Economic Policy” (CESPE), which equally developed more positive analyses of European economic developments.16 This “Europeanism” of part of the PCI leadership was, and would always remain, linked to their focus on a parliamentary strategy, based on domestic and international alliances with social-democratic and socialist parties.17 The pro-European position would indeed on the longer term prove to be part and parcel of the social-democratisation of the party. The deep contradictions inherent in this line, notably the party's, and specifically Amendola's continued adherence to and limited criticism of the Soviet-dominated communist world, were not debated in any fundamental way until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was in the context of the crisis of the EEC in 1963-1965 that majority opinion within the PCI leadership shifted in favour of European integration. The crisis of the EEC and the Gaullist challenge were seen as proof of the collapse of the Atlanticist consensus and the erosion of American hegemony in the Western world. The PCI was particularly attracted to the Gaullist concepts of Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” and l’Europe des Patries, with the potential of countering

16. Ibid., pp.251-252. 17. See in particular Napolitano’s memoirs, which present a longer-term interpretation of the PCI's de- velopment towards a social-democratic party, and the importance in this regard of its European contacts (with, for example, the German SPD and the French socialists). G. NAPOLITANO, Dal PCI al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2005. A similar inter- pretation is presented in the memoirs by Luciano Barca: L. BARCA, Cronache dall'interno del vertice del Pci, vol.1-3, Rubbettino, Catenzaro, 2005. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 39 superpower dominance.18 The PCI in 1963 supported de Gaulle’s veto against UK entry into the EEC for reasons of fear of increasing US influence. It welcomed his verbal assault on the Bretton Woods system in 1965 as a sign of the deepening inner contradictions of capitalism. Further, it interpreted de Gaulle’s withdrawal of French troops from NATO’s integrated military command in the following year as closely connected to this vision of a new, strong Europe “between the blocks”.19 The PCI perceived the défi francais as not just a French matter, but as the most radical expression of the crisis of the Cold War consensus. It was in this sense enthusiastic also about by the new foreign policy activism displayed by the Italian government around 1965-67. The centre-left government showed interest in improving its (economic, cultural, political) relations with the communist regimes. In 1966 Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited Rome and met with Foreign minister Amintore Fanfani, and the following year Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny did the same. Podgorny’s visit marked the high point in this evolution, as the two Foreign ministers signed a document calling for the need for a European conference on security. Fanfani increasingly put emphasis on the issue of pan-European co-operation and security.20 Party leader Luigi Longo saw Italy now as “a protagonist of a new vision for Europe” and attempted to push the centre-left’s foreign policy even further Eastward.21 At the 1966 national Congress held in Rome, the party’s new European policy was laid out in the following way: (1) the establishment of a denuclearised zone in central Europe, (2) the acceptance of the 1945 frontiers, and thus the acceptance of the sovereignty of the GDR, (3) no West German re-armament, and (4) the signing of a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. PCI texts in this period stressed that integration should not be limited to the “small Europe” of the six, but rather should encompass the entire continent. The expectation was that European integration could have positive effects on the domestic political situations in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece), as well as on the East European communist regimes. The strong sense of the interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe was probably the most innovative and significant element of the PCI’s new views on Europe and gave proof of the fact that a supranational political vision came to be widespread in Italian politics. Yet it was at the same time in its approach to Eastern Europe that the contradictions of the PCI’s new vision on Europe were most pronounced. The “overcoming of the blocks” in theory implied the undermining of Soviet dominance over the Eastern part of the continent. The PCI did, around the mid-1960s, advocate the autonomy of the communist parties in the East. However,

18. This in contrast to the PSI, which critiqued the PCI’s blunt ideological agnosticism in its support for the conservative French president. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., p.211. 19. More detail on the French challenge to the EEC and NATO in 1963-1965 in N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, Routledge, London, 2006. 20. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., p.248. 21. Ibid., p.244. 40 Maud BRACKE it never went as far as to unambiguously argue for the end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and much remained unclear on this point.22 It was furthermore never specified how this Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” would relate to the Soviet Union – which gave the PCI’s European vision the same limitations as the Gaullist one. Ironically, it were those in the leadership, like Amendola, who put forward this vision of Europe which left the Soviet question unanswered for, who were at the same time most in favour of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, as was to become clear during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Moscow’s own positions on the EEC in the mid-1960s were ambivalent. Some in the Kremlin abandoned the harsh anti-EEC positions of the 1950s and took on an “instrumentalist” position with regard to Europe, arguing on the one hand that the crisis of both the EEC and NATO allowed for demilitarisation, and on the other hand that this new Europe was not inherently expansionist like the Atlantic alliance in the 1950s had been. Others, however, including probably Leonid Brezhnev, did see the EEC as a direct threat to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and argued for increased military spending in this context. A “compromise” in 1966 left the issue largely unresolved, although Brezhnev decided that the EEC needed to be met with both political overtures and militarism.23 Well-aware of the widening gap with the Soviet-dominated communist world over the question of Europe, the PCI attempted to have an impact on the discussions in the communist world. It did so at the conference of European communist parties held at Karlovy Vary (Czechoslovakia) in 1967 and during the intense debates preceding it in 1966-1967. The debates at this Conference on European strategy were, to communist standards, exceptionally open and confrontational. During the pre-Conference debates in the party, discussions were focussed, inevitably, on the question of how this new policy would relate to the party’s membership of the Soviet-dominated communist world, and how to assess the Soviet concept of détente. Criticism by the radical left within the PCI leadership on Soviet policies with regard to Europe came to the surface. In reaction to the draft resolutions to the Conference, Pietro Ingrao wrote an alternative version, in which he strongly advocated the need for European autonomy in the East-West conflict, and criticised the way peaceful coexistence was carried out by the socialist states.24 The call for a system of collective security was linked to the need for unity of an autonomous Europe in its continental scope, which should assume a new role in the global order. In line with Warsaw Pact policies, Ingrao emphasized the need for the recognition of the post–World War Two borders and of

22. Ibid., pp.303-304. 23. J.M. NEWTON, Russia, France and the Idea of Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp.69-77. 24. It is not clear what the reactions to this report in the wider PCI leadership were; according to Carlo Galluzzi, there was no time to propose this alternative version to the Conference, but the amend- ments proposed by the PCI to the resolutions (see above) were based on this text. APCI, “Berlingu- er”, 35.3, Nota per la conferenza sulla sicurezza europea. Commenti Pietro Ingrao sul progetto, 18.07.1967. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 41 the GDR, but it was stressed that this is not a status quo policy. Criticism on the Soviet conception of détente was explicit: “the struggle for peaceful coexistence has in recent years not had the necessary development and impulse, also because it has been understood by part of our forces [i.e. the Soviet-aligned communist world] as a struggle to be carried out essentially by the socialist countries through state and economic initiatives”.25

French communism and French détente

The PCF’s objections against the EEC were based on a double argument: a social argument (“Europe of capital”) and an argument relating to national sovereignty. The issue of French national sovereignty had been a central source of domestic political legitimation employed by the PCF.26 The PCF had since 1945 promoted itself as the liberator of the French people – a term here understood in its double meaning, national and social.27 It had been able to do so in the context of the early Cold War in spite of the evident fact that the party itself was highly dependant on the Soviet Union, because until de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 it was able to present itself as the sole political party in France fighting against US domination. Because the question of sovereignty was so central in the party’s identity structure, it was extremely difficult for the party to not see the EEC as a (US-sponsored) vehicle for the undermining of the French nation. By contrast, to the PCI and to the Italian Left more generally the issue of national sovereignty became less significant as of the 1960s. This was to do with the Left’s reactions to the Cold War and international developments more generally. While the matter of national sovereignty was an important one to the Italian Left in the immediate aftermath of the war because it was related to the liberation from Fascism, it bore much less significance as of the 1960s. By then, the Italian Left had come to understand that Italy was not a major actor in international affairs and that its domestic politics had since 1945 been greatly dependant on global Cold War developments. Acknowledging this was politically useful to the Italian Left, as it helped to explain its exclusion from power. In addition, the PCI in the 1960s and 1970s took a rapidly growing interest in developments outside Europe: the “Third World”, anti-imperialism, decolonisation. The party started to develop a broader line of thought on imperialism, and on the structural dependency on the United

25. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 35.3, Nota per la conferenza sulla sicurezza europea. Commenti Pietro Ingrao sul progetto, 18.07.1967 (my translation - MB). 26. For the use of the concept of sources of legitimation here I refer to De Felice’s work on the PCI after World War Two. F. DE FELICE, Doppia lealtá e doppio stato, in: Studi storici, 3(1998), pp.493-563. For my application of this notion to the PCF and its view on sovereignty, see M BRACKE, Which socialism, Whose détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007, pp.21-25. 27. A similar view in M. LAZAR, Le communisme, une passion française. Perrin, Paris, 2005(2nd ed.), pp.74-77. 42 Maud BRACKE

States of not only Third World countries but also countries like Italy. Sovereignty, in this world-view, was not an important political idea because it was not considered a realistic one. Next to the matter of sovereignty, the PCF’s greater reluctance in accepting European integration resulted from the fact that European détente impacted very differently on French domestic politics than it did in Italy. European détente in the mid-1960s, and Gaullist détente specifically, challenged the PCF on the most fundamental level, in terms of its domestic sources of legitimation, its political identity, and its actual domestic strategy. The PCF’s objections against any form of détente or peaceful coexistence can be traced back to 1956, when the PCF leadership expressed strong initial disagreement with the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the West.28 One indication of the fact that the Thorez leadership was particularly weary of peaceful coexistence was the fact that Pierre Hervé, party journalist, former resistance member and private secretary to Jacques Duclos, was expelled from the party for pointing at the un-revolutionary implications of peaceful coexistence. Hervé had developed an argument on the tension between peaceful coexistence and revolution. It was precisely because Hervé identified the essence of the problem that peaceful coexistence posed to the “orthodox” view on the global class struggle, that his views needed to be tabooed.29 While there never was a public debate on this tricky matter, the question whether peaceful coexistence could be beneficial to revolution in the West was a central one in the discussions of the Bureau politique between 1956 and 1961.30 A majority in the PCF leadership had a basic, almost intuitive sense of the un-revolutionary character of peaceful coexistence. The issue went to the heart of the strategic gap between the Soviet and French communists with regard to the Cold War after 1956: to the SU, the Cold War was to be ended because it damaged the communist regimes and hindered the expansion of socialism, especially to the Third world. To the PCF – and other communists in the West – ending the Cold War was primarily about ending American dominance in the West. The PCF officially accepted Moscow’s new line on relations with the West, but purely as a matter of discipline - never out of conviction. Its vision on global politics was always to remain an essentially bipolar one, which equated the global class struggle with Cold War antagonism. The question of détente became a particularly urgent one to the PCF when around 1965 it felt the actual negative implications of Gaullist détente on its domestic strategies as well as its international alliances. De Gaulle’s vision of European integration and of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” defined the terms of the debate on Europe in France in the 1960s. It focused the debate on two questions: American domination over Western Europe and national sovereignty. On

28. F. FEJTO, The French communist party and the Crisis of International Communism, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1967, pp.54-69. 29. F. FEJTO, op.cit., pp. 44-45. 30. F. HINCKER, Le Parti communiste au carrefour. Essai sur 15 ans de son histoire 1965-1981, Al- bin Michel, Paris, 1982, p.51. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 43 both issues, de Gaulle succeeded in outbidding the PCF. By obtaining friendly relations with the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and by forcefully re-asserting national sovereignty vis-à-vis the Western alliance, de Gaulle was able to undermine the PCF’s main sources of domestic legitimation. In addition, the increasingly friendly relations between Brezhnev and de Gaulle made it clear to the PCF leadership that a fundamental divergence of strategic interests on the European continent had occurred between the CPSU leadership and themselves. This happened on occasion of the French presidential elections of 1965, when the Soviets openly preferred de Gaulle to the Left alliance between the PCF and the newly founded Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste (FGDS). The two parties engaged in an electoral alliance that was based not yet on a common programme but on a joint candidate for the second round of the presidential elections, the socialist François Mitterrand. The latter was considered in Moscow (and by many in the PCF) as pro-Atlantic, and did indeed stand for a foreign policy of close relations with the Atlantic world and the United States. Despite the fact that the Union de la gauche lacked broad support from the apparatuses of either party, it obtained a surprising success at the 1965 presidential elections.31 In the midst of the election campaign, Moscow intervened in a manner that was explicitly aimed at undermining the Left alliance. The Pravda published a series of articles in support of de Gaulle’s European and détente policy, in meaningful omission of any reference to the Union de la gauche. Equally significantly, the PCF leadership responded in L'Humanité by referring to “the interpretation of domestic French problems by a foreign agency”.32 The harshness of reactions both in Paris and Moscow demonstrates that what was at stake was nothing less than the question of a revolutionary strategy in Europe. Moscow’s strategic interests in Europe went totally counter to those of the FGDS, and this placed the PCF in an impossible position. In other East European capitals, however, there was more interest in discussing matters of European détente with the socialist-communist alliance in France. Notably the Czechoslovak communist party (CPCS) engaged around 1966 in talks with both the French socialists and communists on a “European” solution for Germany, that is to say, a process of improving FRG-GDR relations, initiated and supervised by the European powers, with the aim of evacuating Bonn from US influence. Even the Moscow-loyal East German communist party SED demonstrated at this stage a careful interest in the French Left alliance and, specifically, its views on the German question. Following a number of meetings in 1966-67 between the SED

31. Mitterrand lost to de Gaulle in the second round, but only just, obtaining 45%. More details on the coming of the Union de la gauche in J. VIGREUX, Waldeck Rochet, une biographie politique, La Dispute, Paris, 2000, pp.234-236; J. KERGOAT, Histoire du Parti socialiste, La Découverte/ Repères, Paris, 1997, pp.144-151. 32. F. FEJTO, op.cit., p.200 (emphasis added – MB). The gravity of the PCF-CPSU fall-out, although it unravelled largely behind the scenes, is evident from the fact, very unusual in the PCF’s history, that its political bureau discussed the possibility of protesting against Moscow’s intervention in a more direct manner (although it was rejected at this point). Agenda of the BP meeting of APCF, Waldeck Rochet, box 9, file 2. 44 Maud BRACKE and the FGDS, an SED report noted positively that Mitterrand was “personally in favour” of French diplomatic recognition of the GDR (although this was not his party’s official position).33 These talks were kept secret and therefore had little direct impact. Nonetheless, the fact that they were held does show how the question of European détente provoked cracks in the both the American- and Soviet-dominated alliances and created possibilities for new alliances across the Iron Curtain. It was only this grave conflict of interests with Moscow that lead the PCF around 1965 to seek alternative alliances in Europe – although this was done carefully and within limits. It was a constant characteristic of the PCF’s international politics that it only engaged in alternative international alliances when its relations with the Soviet communist party were under severe pressure. To a significant extent, its more positive perspective on Europe and its rapprochement to the PCI were no more than tactical tools in its stand-off with Moscow over Gaullism and détente. Nonetheless, the PCF did start to revise its positions on the EEC, hereby pressurised by both the FGDS and the PCI. In the mid-1960s relations between the two largest West European communist parties improved significantly, and the PCI leadership succeeded in influencing its French counterpart on a number of issues. A series of meetings took place between the PCI and PCF leadership between 1965 and 1967, some of which took place in the context of the West European “pressure group” that was forming itself in the communist world. The PCI had since 1956 actively sought to establish such a grouping of Western communist parties, as an expression of what it referred to as Polycentrism in the communist world. The aim was double: on the one hand, creating autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow and having, as a group, some impact on discussions in the wider communist world, and on the other hand, providing a forum for the discussion of issues relevant specifically to the West European context and developing practical ways to cooperate.34 Despite the PCF’s strong initial objections to any type of Polycentrism, the PCI succeeded by 1965 in establishing an informal network of West European communist leaders. The West European communist “cluster” became around 1965 important as a forum in which new ideas on a European strategy for socialism emerged. From discussions on practical co-operation on a European level, the debate shifted to a more substantive one on European integration and the crisis in the EEC. This included discussions of socialist strategy in “late capitalism”, reflections on socialism and democracy, broader left alliances, issues of European security, the Cold War and détente, and European integration. At the 1965 Geneva meeting between the two new party leaders Luigi Longo and Waldeck Rochet, the former spoke clearly about prioritising a debate on a “system of collective European security”.35 The conference of West European communist parties held in

33. MfAA, B24, Bd 606, Die FGDS and die Deutschlandfrage. For more details on these talks, see K. BARTOSEK, Les aveux des archives. Prague-Paris-Prague, 1948-1968, Le Seuil, Paris, 1996, pp.177-180. 34. On Polycentrism see D. SASSOON, op.cit., pp.98-109. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 45

Brussels in the same year committed to favouring the dissolution of both the Warsaw pact and NATO. One year later, the meeting of Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest adopted the same statement. At the Vienna meeting of 1966 the PCI leadership convinced Rochet, at least in theory, to agreeing to adopt the strategy of “struggle from within” strategy with regard to the EEC.36 Nonetheless, the delegations discovered that many disagreements existed on important matters of domestic programme, European and global strategy, and the organisation of the world communist movement. The Italians failed to gather support for a joint statement on the EEC and European integration.37 The West European communist grouping was based on a PCI-PCF alliance that was weak because of the two parties’ very different perspectives on the domestic and European struggles for socialism and how détente related to this. These two major shortcomings that characterised the West European communist cluster, were also characteristic of Eurocommunism in the 1970. In this sense, the episode discussed here prefigures Eurocommunism but highlights its limits rather than its strengths.38 The Karlovy Vary Conference mentioned above brought to the fore the fundamental disagreements that existed between the PCI and PCF – and the disparate effects that European détente was having on the Left in Europe. On the German question, the central and most contentious issue on the agenda, cleavages were complex and, significantly, cut across the East-West division. While Brezhnev in his speech suggested the possibility of a positive response to Ostpolitik, the delegations of East Germany and Poland fiercely rejected this. Among the Western parties, the PCI strongly argued in favour of a positive response to Bonn, which would go beyond rhetoric and would consist of actual co-operation. Other parties such as the PCE and the KPÖ advocated a positive response to Bonn. The PCF, by contrast, remained wary of any positive re-evaluation of West German politics.39 The impossibility for West European communists to agree upon détente, Gaullism and Ostpolitik was at the essence of the impossibility to bring about a truly effective West European communist pressure group within the communist world.

35. APCF, “Waldeck Rochet”, box 27, folder 4, Notes CC d’avril: points de désaccord avec Longo, (probably Waldeck Rochet), early 1966. It was noted here that there were “positive and negative aspects” to the PCI’s policies. With regard to foreign policy “they [the Italian communists – MB] pose fewer questions [than we do – MB] on NATO and other difficult matters”. 36. According to what PCF BP member J. Denis told SED leader H. Axen in January 1967. SAPMDB, ZPA-SED, DY/30/IV A 2/20, 457, Vermerk über ein Gesprach des Gen. Hermann Axen mit Gen. Jacques Denis am 30.Januar 1967, p.3. 37. H. TIMMERMAN, Moskau und die Westkommunisten: von Breshnew zu Gorbatschow, in: Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 3(1989). 38. Some of the literature on Eurocommunism has over-estimated the autonomous character of the West European communist cluster in the world communist movement in this phase. (For example K. DEVLIN, The Role of the Non-ruling Communist Parties in Transforming Internationalism, in: L.L. WHETTEN (ed.), The Present State of Communist Internationalism, Lexington, 1983, pp.21-74). 39. APCF, BP, 06.04.1967. 46 Maud BRACKE

1968-73: European détente controlled

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 demonstrated that what the PCI understood by “dynamic détente” or “détente from below”, that is to say the improvement of East-West relations through the loosening of block cohesiveness and the limiting of superpower supremacy, was an illusion. The outcome of the Czechoslovak crisis made it clear that détente would be superpower-led and based on the consolidation of the spheres of influence on the European continent, rather than that it would undermine these. This was the only realistic conclusion that could be drawn from the combined facts of, first, the Soviet need to re-assert control over its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe after a period of challenges to its supremacy, and second, Washington’s and NATO’s unwillingness to consider the invasion as anything different from an internal Warsaw Pact affair.40 The year 1969 marked the start of the era of “controlled détente”, in which the superpowers and their European allies aimed at securing and consolidating the benefits of détente in terms of the further stabilisation of the European Cold War system and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, whilst avoiding this process to lead to the questioning of Cold War alliances or further destabilisation within the blocks.41 This meant putting an end to the instability that early détente had provoked in Europe: challenges to the superpowers’ supremacy by their allies, and the questioning of the legitimacy of Cold War ideology and politics in public opinion. The changed meaning of détente involved, firstly, the end of Gaullism. De Gaulle’s replacement as president of the French Republic by Georges Pompidou in 1969 signified the end of the urgent challenge to US hegemony in the Western alliance. Although the Pompidou presidency aimed at preserving aspects of the spirit of Gaullist détente and continued to strive towards a unified and politically strong Europe to counterbalance the US, the threat that Gaullist has posed to the US and its role on the old continent had vanished. Despite diplomatic friction between France and the US around 1973, France continued to move towards a more pro-Atlanticist outlook under the subsequent Valéry Giscard d’Estaing presidency. Pan-European détente now included the US – even in French eyes.42 Secondly, the consolidation of superpower détente as of 1969 implied a subtle shift in the political meaning of West German Ostpolitik. After 1968, Ostpolitik was carried out by the Willy Brandt government in consultation with the US, and the latter in turn no longer felt it interfered negatively with its own designs for dealing with the Soviet Union and the communist world.43

40. On NATO country responses: J. MCGINN, The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s response to the Prague Spring, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 1.3(1999), pp.119-127. 41. See J. SURI, op.cit., for a similar argument on post-1968 détente as a superpower strategy to limit the destabilising effects of early détente on intra-block relations and within societies. R. GUAL- TIERI, op.cit., pp.165-166, has analysed post-1968 European détente as part the US’ “containment through dialogue” strategy. 42. More details in J.M. NEWTON, op.cit., pp.84-88. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 47

This is, however, not to argue that there were no elements whatsoever of change “from below” in European détente after 1968. Many have argued that European détente continued to feature, up to at least the late 1970s and arguably later, a dimension of bottom-up change, involving non-state rather than state actors, which helped bringing about the end of the Cold War by undermining block cohesion in the East.44 In Western Europe, however, there were after 1968 no similar signs of decreased US influence. Atlantic unity was significantly greater in the years following 1969 than it had been in 1962-1968, and it was restored on the basis of US re-assertion vis-à-vis its allies.45 US interference in domestic politics in countries like Italy continued to be a reality in the 1970s, although through somewhat different means.46 Tragically, from the perspective of West European communism, the crisis of 1968 meant the end of the possibility of radical social and political change in Western Europe through détente. Similarly, the Soviet vision of détente shifted after 1968. Having forcedly re-asserted its domination over Eastern Europe through the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent phase of “normalisation” of the People’s Democracies, the Brezhnev leadership felt it could engage with the Western powers from a position of relative power. Moscow was fairly successful in the early 1970s in combining its strategic priorities: stability on the European continent and access to West European economies, socialist cohesiveness under its dominance, and controlled political and military détente with the United States.47 However, European integration continued to be potentially problematic to Moscow, in as far as it implied an expansionist agenda (vis-à-vis Eastern Europe) and threatened to upset on the status quo on the old continent.48 The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia caused the PCI, the PCF and most West European communist parties to for the first time in their history explicitly disassociate themselves from Soviet policies. The PCI and PCF did so, however, on the basis of to some extent different arguments, and also the importance of the crisis to the parties’ strategies and world-view differed. Most of the PCI leaders interpreted the Prague Spring as an example of a democratic form of socialism, similar to its vision for socialism in Italy and other Western countries. Optimistically, they recognised in the Prague Spring signs of the future of socialism on the European continent. They understood it, in terms of socialist

43. J.W. YOUNG, Cold War Europe 1945-1991, A Political History, Edward Arnold, New York, Lon- don, 1996 (2nd ed.), p.86. 44. J.M. HAHNIMAKI, Ironies and turning points: détente in perspective, in: O.A. WESTAD (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, interpretations, theory, Frank Cass, London, 2000, pp.326-433. 45. As Pons has noted, the perception of US weakness in the 1970s was, while widespread in Europe at the time, a false one. S. PONS, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo, Einaudi, Turin, 2006, p.3. 46. More details in O. NJOLSTAD, The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists out of Power without Interfering, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 4.3(2002), pp.56-94. 47. J.M. NEWTON, op.cit., pp.82-84. 48. V. ZUBOK, The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(1996), pp.85-98, here pp.92-93. 48 Maud BRACKE doctrine, as announcing an era of varied and new forms of democratic socialism. In terms of international relations, they understood it as the result of dynamic détente: the decline of anti-communist politics and American domination in the West, and greater autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow in the East. The invasion, then, shattered all these hopes. The discussions in the PCI’s Direzione in September-October 1968 demonstrate that the party leadership was well aware of the implications of the invasion to the nature of détente in Europe. Publicly, the centrality of détente in the Czechoslovak crisis was acknowledged in the Central Committee statement that was issued a week after the invasion. The party leadership here invoked as motives for its decision to disagree with the invasion the need to “overcome the blocks” and to “liberate Italy from Atlanticism”, as well as the need to create a “system of collective security in Europe”.49 At the first Direzione meeting following the invasion, Achille Occhetto made it clear that “the Soviets confuse internationalism with block politics”, while Emanuele Macaluso accused the Soviets of seeking détente on the basis of block consolidation and stated that “the current strategy is objectively working against us”.50 Yet, it was clear from the outset that the understanding regarding the ambiguous character of détente and the Soviets’ different interpretation of it, would not affect the party’s aim to work towards a bottom-up type of détente, based on a strong integrated Europe. Amendola in particular made this clear in the days following the invasion, by leading the debate towards focusing on a “dynamic” concept of détente and on the EEC as a means for achieving it. In an October 1968 article in Critica marxista, the party’s theoretical journal, he defined the struggle for peaceful coexistence in Europe as “a struggle against the politics of intervention in military, political and economic terms”.51 It was, crucially, Enrico Berlinguer who formulated a response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and related it to the party’s European and détente policies. Berlinguer, vice-secretary at the time and to become the new general secretary in 1972, constructed a new international policy for the party which, while built on deep contradictions particularly in relation to détente, did succeed in introducing a number of changes while avoiding the party’s falling apart. His aims included reinforcing the party’s understanding of and support for European integration as a strategy for the overcoming of the blocks and of the Cold War. The goal remained dynamic détente, now more explicitly than before defined in contrast to static or top-down détente. The party’s engagement in the EEC was significantly reinforced, albeit still critical on issues such as democracy in the EEC institutions. However, the problem at the heart of Berlinguer’s new line lie in the fact that dynamic détente had been compromised by the invasion, to the point that it had become an unrealistic perspective. This was wilfully ignored by the leadership, and

49. CC statement, 29.08.1968, in: COMITATO CENTRALE DEL PCI (ed.), Documenti politici dal XI al XII Congresso, Editori riuniti, Rome, 1969. 50. APCI, Direzione, 020.0926, 23.08.1968. 51. G. AMENDOLA, 25 anni dopo l’internazionale comunista, i: Critica marxista, 4-5(VI), pp 63-87, here p.84. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 49 a debate on it among the rank and file was discouraged. The precise reasons why the PCI needed to support the EEC and how European integration would create dynamic détente, were after September 1968 not communicated to the rank and file. At the Central Committee meeting of May 1969, Napolitano reiterated the well-known arguments on both the need and the possibility for the West European Left to co-operate and actively work towards a “third way” Europe, independent of the United States and having the potential of weakening Atlanticism.52 These, however, had become mere slogans, out of touch with the much cruder realities of international politics in the era of static détente. The leadership’s unwillingness to debate its European choice in a more fundamental way was sharply evidenced by the so-called Manifesto affair in the fall of 1969, when a number of leaders of the left within the party were excluded following the publication of an article in the Manifesto paper entitled “Prague is alone”. The article strongly denounced the Soviets’ static conception of détente and criticised the Berlinguer consensus for its unwillingness to draw the necessary conclusions from this regarding the real rather than desired nature of European détente.53 In 1969 the first PCI delegation, headed by Amendola, entered the European parliament. In 1971 Amendola proposed the Eastward enlargement of the EEC. Increasingly, and especially from the early 1970s onwards, “Europe” became one of the core points of reference of the PCI’s international outlook and strategy, and a standard element in its rhetoric and political discourses. The shift towards Europe was not only a matter of pragmatism and accepting existing situations, there now was also a teleological, and arguably a utopian dimension in the PCI’s European policy. By working inside the European institutional framework, the perspective was, the PCI would contribute to making Western Europe socialist. Concretely, however, the “alternative development of democracy” as a strategy for Europe remained vague. At this point only the immediate, “democratic phase” of the strategy was more or less clear: it focused on the democratisation of the European institutions, for example through the direct election of the European parliament.54 Deep tensions existed, and persisted up to the mid-1970s and beyond, between the PCI’s pro-European choice and its belonging to the Soviet-dominated communist world. After a phase of open conflict with the USSR in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion, a gradual improvement of relations between the CPSU and the PCI occurred. A new modus vivendi between the two parties came about. To the PCI, a break was impossible for reasons to do with the party’s identity, history and unity, but also because it was impossible to claim having an internationalist strategy without belonging to a global movement, however fraught with contradictions. To the Soviets, a break with the PCI was undesirable because the party was after all the most powerful CP in the West, increasingly successful domestically, and increasingly influential ideologically in the global

52. APCI, Fund Berlinguer, “Comitato centrale maggio 1969”, Unitá, 29.05.1969. 53. On the Manifesto affair, see G. AMYOT, The Italian Communist Party. The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy, Croon Helm, London, 1981, chapter 6. 54. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., pp.212-233. 50 Maud BRACKE anti-imperialist movement. Soviet funding to the PCI was resumed in 1970, and so were the regular bilateral meetings, although the illusion of unproblematic solidarity had forever been lost.55 Yet the PCI’s vision of an expanding Europe very clearly went counter to Soviet interests; strategically, because it suggested taking Eastern Europe out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and ideologically because it suggested the building of a different, better socialism for this enlarged Europe. Also Berlinguer’s abandonment of the two camp theory, which was linked to its pro-European choice, evidently went counter to Soviet interests.56 Nonetheless, the Berlinguer leadership succeeded at this stage in avoiding an open clash with Moscow. At a meeting between the CPSU and PCI leaderships in 1973, Berlinguer attempted to make the PCI’s European positions acceptable to Moscow, emphasising on the one hand that the PCI still advocated a radically different EEC, which implied the need to revise the treaties, and on the other hand the fact that the EEC no longer merely served US and Atlantic interests.57 This was not only a matter of avoiding an open clash with Moscow, it was also an attempt to influence the positions of the communist world. This naive optimism regarding the PCI’s own influence characterised also the party’s tactics during the Eurocommunist phase of the mid-1970s.58 Berlinguer in the 1970s highlighted the neutralist dimension and the vision of Europe “between the blocks” (“A Europe neither anti-American nor anti-Soviet”).59 At this stage, the PCI’s pro-European stance was still an anti-Atlantic position. In fact, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the context of left-wing criticism at the Berlinguer line in 1969, the party hardened its stance on NATO.60 The slogan “Italy out of NATO, NATO out of Italy” became in the early 1970s once more an important one in PCI propaganda, while it had been downplayed in the years preceding 1968.61 However, in the context of improved relations between the European powers and the US in the Atlantic alliance after 1968, there was a clear tension between the party’s pro-EEC and anti-NATO stances. This tension, it has been argued, came to be “resolved” between 1973 and 1976, when the party line gradually moved towards accepting US military and political influence in Western Europe and Italy. Berlinguer’s explicit acceptance of NATO’s presence in Italy in 1976 was welcomed by mainstream political opinion in Italy as the party’s belated recognition of the country’s security interests.62 This

55. See a similar argument on the PCI’s inability to break its ties with Moscow over the 1968 crisis, see S. PONS, op.cit., pp.8-11, 51-52, 256. 56. Ibid., p.21. 57. Ibid., pp.26-30. 58. See Urban’s comments on the PCI’s “evangelical face”, in J.B. URBAN, The four faces of Euro- communism, in: C.F. ELLIOT, C.A LINDEN (eds.), Marxism in the Contemporary West, West- view Press, Boulder, 1980, pp.36-59. 59. S. PONS, op.cit., p.23. 60. G. AMYOT, op.cit., p.179. 61. M. BRACKE, op.cit., pp.279-287. 62. For a discussion of the connections between Berlinguer's pro-European stance and his acceptance of NATO, see: S. PONS, op.cit., pp.257-258. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 51 move was, however, also the party’s final surrendering of any kind of revolutionary vision on a Europe capable of upsetting the Cold War order and superpower hegemony. Moreover, rather than resolved, the tensions within the party's international line were in fact aggravated, as the party still failed to unambiguously reject Soviet-style communism. In the case of the PCF, the invasion of Czechoslovakia provoked less of a shift in international positions than it did in the case of the Italian communists. The PCF found itself in an impasse, between lack of Soviet support for détente “from below” or even for its domestic strategy of Left unity, and its own inability to move away from its internationalist tradition and identity centred around loyalty to what the Soviet Union represented historically and symbolically. The PCF leadership’s post-1968 self-realignment on Soviet positions was nearly complete. While since 1956 sentiments regarding the un-revolutionary character of peaceful coexistence and détente had been widespread in the party, the official line was now one that fully supported the superpower-based vision on European détente, including the Soviets’ domination over Eastern Europe. At the Moscow conference in June 1969, the French delegation stated: “As long as there will not be a system of collective security in place, the socialist states have the duty to reinforce their defence and unity”.63 However, this was not understood in the same way the Soviet leaders understood their own security interests in the early 1970s and did not include the acceptance of friendly relations between East and West. Significantly, the PCF came close to ignoring the Moscow treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1970, thus implying its lack of enthusiasm for the new European détente.64 The party in the 1970s fell back into interpreting the EEC as an expression of American domination in Western Europe – and therefore as a rather insignificant actor in international politics. Admittedly, there were important and visible changes in its attitude vis-à-vis the EEC in this phase, including the sending of its first delegation to the Strasbourg parliament in 1973, and its first participation in the European elections of 1977. Its approach to the EEC was, however, at all times instrumental. The party started to display remarkable pragmatism with regard to the EEC and its institutions.65 The argument relating to national sovereignty gained in importance, despite the fact that Brezhnev’s doctrine on limited sovereignty of 1968, which the PCF had not explicitly denounced, made it very hard to make strong claims regarding the need for national sovereignty on the European continent. In the context of the Union de la gauche, which in the mid-1970s developed from an electoral to a political alliance based on a common programme, the party’s new leader George Marchais and his foreign policy advisor Jacques

63. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 81.2, Conferenza PC di Mosca 5-17 giugno 1969. Discussioni, note. 64. The Bureau politique in a very brief statement noted that the treaty “should be considered impor- tant”. APCF, BP, 13.08.1970. 65. See also A. KRIEGEL, French communism in the Fifth Republic, in: D. BLACKMER, S. TAR- ROW (eds.), Communism in Italy and France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, pp.69-86, here p.82. 52 Maud BRACKE

Kanapa favoured an independent French nuclear force, the force de frappe. This was a suitable way of bridging the gap with the socialists over foreign policy, but did bring the party once more in conflict with Moscow.66 This foreign policy was however severely hampered by the fact that it did not allow for a meaningful analysis of the EEC or of Europe as an actor in the Cold War. The PCF indeed spent most of the 1970s ignoring the fact that France’s sovereignty was already limited through its membership of the EEC and NATO. These different approaches to Europe became clear at a PCI-PCF meeting held in June 1970 in Rome. The PCI’s position of “change from within” was reinforced: Amendola argued that it was genuinely possible through geographic and political “enlargement” to alter the ideological and political character of the EEC. Jacques Denis of the PCF sharply countered that there was “no objective basis for a [European – MB] third force”. The PCF delegation did nonetheless declare itself in favour of an “active presence” in and continued pressure on the EEC institutions, to make them “more democratic and anti-monopolistic”.67 The differences continued to be pronounced at a conference of West European communist parties held in Brussels in 1974 on the theme of “Europe”. The PCI delegation upheld its ambitious yet vague vision of a democratic Europe “which was to realise its role of peace and progress in the world”. This contrasted sharply to Marchais’ nihilism: “Europe can be the best and the worst”. Much of the debate dealt with the practicalities of support among the West European CP’s in political and trade union action, and there was little or no substantial discussion on issues related to European integration and the Cold War.68

Concluding remarks

Communist parties such as the French continued up to the end of the Cold War to perceive the global class struggle in terms of the classic East-West confrontation. Relaxation of this confrontation towards the United States or West Germany appeared to them as a retreat from the global class struggle. A Europe “between the blocks” was in this vision unrealistic, if not undesirable. To the PCI, by contrast, the revision of its European policies signified a true, if partial and problematic, transfer of allegiances. The main contradictions inherent to it were to do with the party’s continued links with the Soviet Union, and the latter’s relation to Europe. The European debates in the two parties during the long 1960s bear longer-term significance. Firstly, the 1960s episode announces the main limitations and contradictions of 1970s Eurocommunism: the very different views held by the PCI and PCF on “Europe” and its relation to the Cold War, and the PCF’s purely

66. G. STREIFF, Jean Kanapa, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, pp.547-557. 67. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 89, Incontro con delegazione PCF Roma, 25-26.06.70. 68. M. STEINKUHLER, Eurokommunismus in Widerspruch. Analyse und Dokumente, Verlag Wis- senschaft und Politik, Köln, 1977, pp.37-48. Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 53 instrumental approach to a European strategy. Furthermore, a direct historical line can be drawn from the PCI’s choice to accept and then embrace the EEC in the 1960s-70s, to the policy of quasi-unconditional support for the EU of much of the Italian Left today. This is rooted historically the fact that the impasse of Italian domestic politics in the 1960s was indeed unlocked by the dynamic of early European détente. The Italian Left as a whole has since the 1960s maintained the assumption that European integration would always affect Italian politics positively. Similarly, the PCF’s legacy is unmistakable in the European policy of most of the French radical Left today, critical of the EU for reasons to do with both class politics and national sovereignty. While the issue of national sovereignty is today, it can be argued, largely overcome by the facts, the social nature of the EU continues to be a highly pertinent issue. 54 Maud BRACKE 7gdab{[eUZW
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IY^h_\j[dh[_^[$ 55 Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Democracy: The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968

Muriel BLAIVE

Seldom has the presumed tension between internationalism and patriotism been given so much academic coverage as in the Czechoslovak case. From its very birth in 1921 until the crushing of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact tanks in 1968, from the expulsion of the Social Democratic opponents in the 1920s to the «Czechoslovak path to socialism» between 1945 and 1948, from the «bolshevization» in 1929 to the alleged «cruellest terror of all popular democracies put together» in the beginning of the 1950s, from the absence of 1956 to the brilliance of the Prague Spring, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) has been considered special, indeed very special. The Czechoslovak case is described as being unique in communist Eastern Europe. What is the crux of this specificity? The KSČ is said to have suffered from a particular kind of disease called the «democratic spirit», which impregnated Czech society so thoroughly from 1918 onwards that it supposedly didn’t spare the Czechoslovak section of the Internationale. A communist party impregnated by a democratic spirit? This paper will first of all carefully review this argument in its different chronological versions, ranging from the interwar to 1968; it will then argue that the «democratic argument» has much rather served to avoid questioning the local responsibilities in the terror regime of the 1950s; and finally, to emphasize this point, it will concentrate on the KSČ’s policy in several concrete cases during the 1950s and argue that facts simply don’t match with this «democratic theory». As will come out in the course of this article, the internationalism/patriotism dichotomy reflects the fate of the European integration process only in a very twisted way. The European integration in the West can be seen as a successful internationalist project, slowly attempting to overcome patriotic – actually, more often than not, chauvinistic – traits. In the East, the idea of internal cohesion promoted by the communist elites was negatively perceived by the population as it mostly served to disguise exploitation by the Soviet Union; the concept of European integration as it was thought of in the West was largely repressed. The Cold War reinforced the East-West divide and it is only when it came to an end that a redefinition of the European project including both the «East» and the «West» – the famous «return to Europe» – could begin.1 This article points to the fact that the Eastern «cohesion» which preceded it was rather questionable, not because Czechoslovakia was democratic and the other

1. See H. ARMBRUSTER, C. ROLLO, U.H. MEINHOF, Imagining Europe Everyday Narratives in European Border Communities, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 5(2003). 56 Muriel BLAIVE countries were not – what «Czech» historiography was so intent on proving – but on the contrary because Czechoslovakia embraced communism with a degree of sincerity unequalled elsewhere, with the possible exception of the former GDR. It also shows between the lines that almost anything is possible if the populations can be mobilized for a project whose values they share – both in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1945 and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2004.

Introduction to the «democratic spirit» of the Czech nation

In the Czechoslovak historiography, or rather in the Czech one,2 the tension between internationalism and patriotism has been largely equated with the antinomy dictatorship/democracy. The dichotomy East/West was never very far from most of the authors’ mind either. Contrary to the claimed «uniqueness» of the Czech case, this issue is in fact common in the wider context as practically each Central European country is convinced to have been the last bastion of civilization before the «barbarian» East. After 1948, «East» became synonymous for the end of Europe, lack of civilization, dictatorship, Moscow’s orders and therefore of internationalism; «West» represented culture, development, democracy, in other words patriotism.3 This vision fitted in a framework where Czechoslovakia had largely celebrated itself for being the only democracy in Central Europe – later referred to as the «East bloc.» Indeed, in contrast to interwar Poland and Hungary, or to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, not to mention Germany and Austria, a true democracy was established between 1918 and 1938 under the patronage of president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and of his successor Edvard Beneš. Free elections were guaranteed, as were freedoms of speech, of the press, of meeting, of movement, etc. A significant measure of minority rights was granted.4 The problem is that this Czechoslovak democratic spirit has been generally over-interpreted, both in the interwar period and after the Second World War,5 especially in contrast to Poland and Hungary. It is true that the latter did not enjoy the same degree of freedom in the interwar period, for instance, but the intellectual life was nevertheless flourishing in those two countries, a fact easily forgotten on the Czech side. Instead, a vast historiographical current – which might seem

2. Unfortunately Slovakia didn’t have much of a word to say concerning the running of the country, neither in the 1920s and 1930s – which led to the well-known Slovak fascist state during the Sec- ond World War –, nor in the 1950s and 1960s. Czechoslovakia was turned into a federation only on 1st January 1969. The vast majority of academic works dealing with «Czechoslovakia» actually deal almost exclusively with the Czech lands. 3. For an elaborate and elegant version of this trend, see for instance M. KUNDERA, Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale, in: Le Débat, November 1983, pp.3-21. 4. It was a kind of paternalistic democracy which would also describe the French third- or even fourth Republic, where criticism of De Gaulle was tolerated but where the state would keep a significant amount of control on national broadcasting medias. The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 57 incredibly outdated today but which is practically the only one existing to date as it has hardly been renewed since the 1980s –, has devoted itself to the study of the famed Bohemian democratic heritage and of its legacy onto the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and onto its militants. We will review the different chronological stages of this argument, ranging from the First Republic to the 1945-1948 period, to the 1950s in general, 1956 in particular, and of course to the Prague Spring.

The «democratic spirit» of the KSČ from the interwar period to 1968

To avoid confusion, we will first of all review the dominant «democratic narrative» of the Czech nation and of Czech communism in twelve different variations, and then we will go back to the arguments one at a time.6 At the origin of Czech democracy, thus, was the First Republic. For numerous political scientists and historians, mainly American, Canadian and Czech,7 the KSČ’s history placed it in cantilever between the democratic atmosphere in which it had been born and its allegiance to Moscow. It was said to have found itself in an ambiguous position after 1948 since it was both a dictatorial party in power and the heir of the First Republic democratic institutions, in which it had taken part.8 In other words, it would have been submitted to an internal conflict between its own democratic tendencies, nourished by Masaryk’s regime, and its authoritarian tendencies, which eventually led it to seize power through force in 1948. In the relevant literature, the KSČ has been understood to work on a different basis than the other Komintern members already before World War II. In the 1930s, the Czech militants were allegedly reluctant not only to sacrifice their life for revolution’s sake but also their spare evenings.9 Apart from a few muscled speeches

5. And even, one might add, after 1989: the general notion that the Czechs are the «best pupils of the class» led to an optimistic (if not outright arrogant) self-analysis of the Czech elites concerning their country’s ability to step into the EU – specifically to be the first Central European country to do so. See J. KARLAS, P. KRATOCHVÍL, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and European In- tegration: During and After the Cold War, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(2004), p.37. 6. To underline this narrative’s predominance in the Czechoslovak literature, we will refer to as many authors as possible in this short article. These references already abundantly show the very diverse ideological and chronological provenience of these concordant arguments; however, for a more de- tailed review and a hopefully convincing demonstration of this narrative’s almost unanimous char- acter, please refer to M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquée, Tchécoslovaquie 1956, Com- plexe, Bruxelles, 2005. 7. For a study of Czech intellectuals’ influence on American politics and, by extension, on North-American academia on Czechoslovakia, see J. FAURE, L’ami américain. La Tché- coslovaquie, enjeu de la diplomatie américaine 1943-1968, Tallandier, Paris, 2004. 8. B.W. JANCAR, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power, Praeger, New-York, 1971, p. 50. 9. E. TABORSKY, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960, Princeton University Press, Prince- ton, 1961, p.7. 58 Muriel BLAIVE on Klement Gottwald’s part, we are told that the KSČ did not threaten the democratic institutions and was well integrated. In sum, it had lost its revolutionary character, at least among the rank-and-file.10 Is that to say that Czechoslovak communism, which had deep roots into the working class, suffered more than others from the conflict between its national traditions and the policy imposed by the Soviets? This would be all the easier to believe that the Komintern leaders themselves pointed their finger at the KSČ members with this 1928 open letter: «It is precisely because the KSČ suffers from a significant social-democratic heritage and has not forged itself in revolutionary fights that it must find its own Bolshevik line», it said.11 In 1945, on the other hand, the KSČ was in a good position to convince the population that a «specific Czechoslovak path to socialism» could succeed. Its popularity portended that the new type of Communist regime it was promising was achievable. Yet, as soon as it found itself in charge of the state in 1948, what Barbara Wolfe Jancar has named a «logic of absolute monopoly», centred in the USSR, allegedly forced it to adopt the «same position» as Gottwald in the 1930s, i.e. to Stalinize the party (and now the country).12 Supposedly, it was not easy. Gottwald is said to have resisted a long time before surrendering and accepting a total sovietization of the political institutions, a resistance which was understood to be the consequence of the «links, partly conscious and partly subconscious, with Western traditions which have left an indelible mark on Czechoslovak communism».13 In other words, the communists had to put aside the «Czechoslovak experience» of democratic socialism and to rely on Moscow to be able to remain in power. This situation is said to have resulted in the disaster of repression: «Rigidity and an orthodoxy more conservative than that of the Soviet party was Gottwald's response to the KSČ's new power position».14 In fact, the Czechoslovak Communist party members allegedly suffered from a «split personality», torn as they were between their loyalty for Moscow and for their own country.15 In the concrete case of 1956, for example, the Czechoslovak delay in destalinizing is explained in literature by the «idiosyncratic framework of Czechoslovak political

10. Idem., p. 7. 11. J. RUPNIK, Histoire du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, Presses de la FNSP, Paris, 1981, p.73. 12. B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.55. The fact that Western historians based themselves on (or, in Tabor- sky and Duchacek’s case, even preceded) reform communist historians or witnesses, such as Karel Kaplan, Evžen Löbl or Artur London without ever questioning their ideological background shows (1) how political the history of popular democracies during the Cold War was, (2) what legitimacy Prague Spring intellectuals had attained in the West, (3) how pregnant the thesis of the «Czech democratic spirit» was, since it bound together practically all historiographical currents, however diverse they may have been. For a study of the importance of this «democratic argument». See M. BLAIVE, La démocratie pour les Tchèques: une légitimité politique et une composante identi- taire, in: Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 1(2003), pp.59-82. 13. E. TABORSKY, op.cit., p.603. 14. B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.55. 15. Ibid., p.52. The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 59 culture», which accounts for the leaders’ «apprehensions about the possible consequences of a major policy revision.» In other words, «Among the parties in control, only the KSČ was aware of the power of public opinion».16 The democratic traditions, we read, also refrained people from expressing their discontentment. The «sophisticated sobriety of the opponents, reared in the tradition of democracy and its non-violent methods of action» allegedly accounts for the lack of resistance of the Czechoslovak population.17 Face to face with an anti-democratic regime, democratically raised citizens, deprived of their only weapon, the right to vote, felt powerless. As for the party members, they are said to have felt equally democratic. The news of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech caused «a new and surprisingly vigorous inner-party democracy».18 The party was supposedly upside-down. The Central Committee was said to be flooded with demands for an extraordinary party congress.19 Even though such a party congress actually never took place, some of the authors’ enthusiasm was revived by the 1968 events. The rehabilitation law passed in that year, for instance, was welcomed: «The passage of the law on rehabilitation was a humane step, rare in history, and unique in the communist world, to restore justice to the victims of illegalities of an entire historical period and to supplement the limited and inadequate measures of correction taken in the sixties. It was the first occasion in a communist country in which an action of such vast scope, embracing even discrimination and persecution by administrative agencies, was to be undertaken in accordance with strictly legal procedures».20 Finally, nowhere more than in the gloomy area of the numbers of victims to the Communist terror regime the «democratic argument» is more emphasized. A vast majority of authors consider that Czechoslovakia suffered an unprecedented level of terror, in fact «higher than in all the other popular democracies put together».21 Why? Precisely, so the argument goes, because Czechoslovakia had strong democratic traditions, in and outside of its communist party: to destroy them, one needed a much higher level of terror than elsewhere. Hence the «especially ruthless character of Stalinism in the 1950s [which] was, in a sense, proportional to the

16. Z. SUDA, Zealots and Rebels. A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, The Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1980, p.258. 17. Ivo DUCHACEK, «A ‘Loyal’ Satellite: The Case of Czechoslovakia», in Henry L. Roberts (ed), The Satellites in Eastern Europe, Philadelphia, AAPPS, 1958, p.115. 18. E. TABORSKY, op.cit., p.77. 19. J. PELIKÁN, S’ils me tuent …, Grasset, Paris, 1975, p.112. 20. G. SKILLING, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p.409. 21. K. KAPLAN, Zamyšlení nad politickými procesy, in: Nová mysl, 7(1968), p.915. This argument was taken over by nearly ever author every writing on Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. See for in- stance J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.15 and p.229; A. KRATOCHVIL, Žaluji I. Stalinská justice v Čes- koslovensku (I Accuse), Dolmen, Prague, 1990, p.5; O. ULČ, Politics in Czechoslovakia, San Fransisco; G. FEIWEL, New Economic Patterns in Czechoslovakia, Praeger, New-York, 1968, p.139; J. PELIKÁN, op.cit., p.82; B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.100, Z. HEJZLAR, Praha ve stínu Sta- lina a Brežněva (Prague in Stalin’s and Brejnev’s Shadow), Práce, Prague, 1991, p.34; etc. 60 Muriel BLAIVE democratic traditions it had to destroy».22 In other words, both the Western historians, the Czech democrats in exile and the former reform communists agreed after 1968 that the Czechoslovak terror had been much higher than in other countries because the democratic traditions had to be destroyed (for the democrats, inside society, for the reform communists, inside the communist party). Let us now go back and re-examine each argument in turn.

A dispassionate look at Czechoslovak communist history

These arguments are all marked by an understandable, but often unreasonable, sympathy for Czechoslovakia’s fate. Time and the ideological appeasement of the post-Cold War period now permit a more dispassionate approach. In fact, simple logic suffices to put most of the arguments back into perspective. Why, for instance, would the KSČ «suffer» once it had attained power? It was striving to do so and it did; this friendly presentation of the KSČ is simply naïve. Let us for instance call back to memory the testimony of a direct witness, Ota Hromádko, who describes, as an early Communist militant, his activities under the First Republic; reading through his account, one will be convinced not only that he dedicated more than a spare evening to the Revolution,23 but also that he and his comrades had no qualms about fulfilling their goal: reaching power. More importantly, a revolutionary wave of violence inspired by the Marxist left swept Czechoslovakia in 1919-1921, notably with a general strike in December, 1920 and an insurrectional situation in Kladno and Most.24 The middle-class thought a coup was under way and the strike was bloodily crushed. At least 13 people were killed.25 In Slovakia, a Republic of Councils was established (July 1919) and constituted the first attempt to export the Bolshevik revolution out of Russia.26 The troubles started again after the 1929 crisis and were again stirred by the Communist party.27 And the presentation of the KSČ as a «good child of the Republic» is gravely undermined by these few sentences pronounced by Gottwald after he was elected to Parliament in 1929:

22. See G. SKILLING, op.cit., p.825. See as well F. EIDLIN, The Two Faces of Czechoslovak Com- munism, in: East-Central Europe, (1-2)1983, p.189; F. AUGUST, D. REES, Red Star Over Prague, Sherwood Press, London, 1984, p.XVII; Z. HEJZLAR, op.cit., p.34; J. PELIKÁN, op.cit., pp.82-83. 23. O. HROMÁDKO, Jak se kalila voda (How the Water Got Troubled), Index, Cologne, 1982, pp.9-95. 24. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.49. 25. V.S. MAMATEY, Le développement de la démocratie tchécoslovaque, in: V. MAMATEY, R. LUŽA (eds), La république tchécoslovaque 1918-1948, Librairie du regard, Paris, 1987, pp.96-97. 26. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., pp.44-45. 27. V.S. MAMATEY, op.cit., p.131. The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 61

«We are the party of the Czechoslovak proletariat and our general staff is in Moscow. We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to twist your necks. And as you know, the Russian Bolsheviks are masters at that».28 As for the lack of Czechoslovak destalinization, the alleged blindness of the Polish and Hungarian Communists to the power of public opinion between 1953 and 1956 also has to be contended. The existing interviews, for instance that of Edward Ochab’s,29 show, on the contrary, that the leaders were very much aware of the risks incumbent to destalinization. They did it not because they were fools, but because there was a strong public demand for it which they did not feel politically able to stand up to. The KSČ was all the less the only party aware of the power of public opinion as the Hungarian and Polish party's ground was not as secure. The Communist parties’ policy is always more fluctuating when the public’s pressure is mounting, as is shown by the detailed chronology of the period 1953-1956.30 All concessions on the leadership’s part in Poland and Hungary (apart perhaps from the very first one, the nomination of Imre Nagy, in which the Soviets apparently played a major role) were the result of popular pressure. The fact that the KSČ didn’t make any concessions, or very little, is a proof not of its dogmatism but of the fact that there was no significant demand for such concessions. It should lead to wonder how come there was so little discontentment, not to reflect on the alleged «Stalinian wisdom» of the Czechoslovak leadership. The Czechoslovak democratic tradition must not be disregarded but neither can it help to explain why people did nothing in 1956. Incidentally, those who did oppose the regime and ended up in jail or were killed are better reminders of the democratic traditions than those who remained almost or totally passive. That the population was aspiring to freedom and democracy is certainly true but it is not necessarily incompatible with a partial satisfaction on the socio-economic, and even patriotic, level. If the Czechoslovak population was not pro-communist, it didn’t show any strong sign of anti-communism either, neither at that time nor later.31 This is true as well of the Communist party members: as we have seen above, the party was said to be upside-down and flooded with demands for an extraordinary party congress in 1956. In reality, only 0,5% of the party local organisations called for such a congress to take place.32

28. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.78. 29. See the chapter «Edward Ochab» in: T. TORAŃSKA, Oni. Stalin’s Polish Puppets, Collins, Lon- don, 1987, p.48. 30. See this chronology in M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquée …, op.cit., pp.224-253. 31. This could have been deduced already before 1989 but is becoming increasingly clear since the ar- chives are being opened. See for instance this analysis of the State Security reports on the people’s mood during the 1956 Hungarian revolution in M. BLAIVE, La police politique communiste en action: les Tchécoslovaques et la révolution hongroise de 1956, in: Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 2(April-June 2002), pp.176-202. There was little of a «revolutionary mood» among the Czechoslovaks. 62 Muriel BLAIVE

As far as the special role of Czechoslovakia in the terror policy is concerned, finally, it can be contested on two fronts. First of all, it is simply wrong. Since the opening of the archives in 1989, we know, even if only roughly, that Czechoslovak terror was not greater than in any other popular democracy and certainly not greater than in all the other countries put together33 (at least in statistical terms, one might argue that such a gruesome simplification doesn’t leave any space to the victims’ feelings, which are yet legitimate and commanding respect – in Czechoslovakia, too, but not only in Czechoslovakia). But even if we leave statistics aside, it would have been only logical to invoke the real level of support for the communist party inside a given country to explain a particular level of terror. If we take for instance Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the difference lies not in the presence or absence of democratic traditions but in the fact that the KSČ pulled 38% of the votes in Czechoslovakia in 1946, becoming the leading political party of the country,34 whereas the Hungarian Communist party had pulled a few months earlier only 17% of the votes, which put it far behind the Smallholders’ party which had gained a stunning 60%. The Hungarian people, by clearly rejecting the communist option, obviously risked a lot more to be persecuted by a Communist party in power. The Polish and the Hungarian examples – not even to mention Romania or Bulgaria – suffice to show that it is not the presence of democratic traditions which accounts for the depth of the repression. And if the Czechoslovak 1968 rehabilitation law was «unique», it is so only in its 14-year delay: the Hungarians and the Poles had proceeded to extensive rehabilitations already between 1954 and 1956. László Rajk and Wladysław Gomułka were both fully rehabilitated in 1956, whereas Rudolf Slánský never was reinstated in the KSČ, not even in 1968. But let us now concentrate in greater detail around some of the above mentioned arguments, i.e. around the central question of internationalism vs. patriotism.

32. See A. NOVOTNÝ, Současná situace a úkoly strany (The current situation and the party’s tasks), Nová mysl, Celostátní konference KSČ, June 1956, p.25. 33. See M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquéé …, op.cit., pp.93-101. 34. And secured the absolute majority (55,75%) in the Czech lands together with its Social-Demo- cratically. Counting the Socialist-National party, the socialist coalition reached an astonishing 79,41% of the Czech vote. The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 63

The KSČ policy

1920s and 1930s What is important to keep in mind is that in the 1920s and 1930s, division was in the very nature of the Communist parties, insofar as it reflected the power struggle which took place in Moscow. In this respect, the KSČ is not specific in the least. Let us remember the history of the Hungarian Communist party at the turn of the 1930s with the confrontation between Gyorgy Lukács’ «Blum Theses», Béla Szántó’s «Robert Theses» and Gyula Alpári’s theses taken over by József Révai. Just like in the KSČ’s case, the Komintern sent an open letter to the Hungarian PC members.35 The history of the French Communist party at that time was very similar: some denounced the leadership’s sectarism, were excluded, created a dissident party, while the said leadership was torn between the men in place, the trade-unionists and the Communist youth leadership. In an open letter sent on 7 December 1930 by the Komintern to all PCs, the French Communist party was denounced as one of the most faulty sections. In other words, the PCF was said to be «the worst pupil of the communist class».36 The title of «worst pupil of the communist class» would actually fit many of the Central European Communist parties by the end of the 1920s, insofar as the Komintern’s grip on the parties’ organisation and tactics was never easy to accept. But those who found it the hardest were undoubtedly those whose life was endangered by Moscow’s dogmatism, because they already had to live in clandestinity under a right-wing dictatorship: from the beginning the Polish, Hungarian and Yugoslav parties, later on the German and Austrian ones. The first three were particularly attacked by the Komintern.37 The first two were even dissolved: the Hungarian apparently in 1936,38 the Polish in 1938.39 The third one was able to make it only thanks to Josip Tito’s personality but at the price of a zealed purge of its own ranks (the «split personality» issue undoubtedly applying

35. See A. KRIEGEL, S. COURTOIS, Eugen Fried, Le Seuil, Paris, 1997, p.97. See also M. MOL- NÁR, De Béla Kun à János Kádár, Presses de la FNSP, Paris, 1987, pp.67-79. 36. Idem., pp.119-120. 37. See B. LAZITCH, Les partis communistes d’Europe 1919-1955, Les îles d’or, Paris, 1956, p.87. 38. See M. MOLNÁR, op.cit., p.82 and p.87. 39. See M.K. DZIEWANOWSKI, The Communist Party of Poland, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976, p.150. 64 Muriel BLAIVE here in full force).40 In all three cases, their Central Committee members exiled in Moscow were exterminated.41 Yet one can not speak of an authentic «democratic heritage» when referring to Poland, Hungary or Yugoslavia. The divisions inside their Communist parties nevertheless existed and were even more exacerbated than in the Czech case. All of them had at least two antagonistic wings, which reflected the opposition between internationalism and patriotism.

1945-1948

Doubts on Gottwald’s will to plan and implement the monopoly of power in his country also have to be lifted. Gottwald had been politically educated in Moscow. He had ruthlessly stalinized the Czechoslovak Communist party in 1929 and earlier (see the Bubník case in 1925).42 He had been one of the main organizers of the Komintern’s VIIth Congress in 1935, spending one and a half years in Moscow for this purpose. He had been elected on the Komintern’s political bureau along with personalities such as Georgi Dimitrov, Otto Pieck and Palmiro Togliatti. He had attended the trial of the «Trotskyist criminals» in 1937.43 He had also spent the war in Moscow. There can be little doubt that he purposely drafted the after-war political institutions in the ambivalent spirit which would allow him to take power sooner or later – as was dictated by Stalin.44 What is certainly true, on the other hand, is that numerous European communist militants, at the bottom and even at the top, had faith, after the war, in the communist discourse; however, as Miklós Molnár remarks, this doesn’t mean that one can speak of an authentic «democratic current» inside the Communist parties.45 The 1948 tactical change was dictated by Stalin, just like the conciliatory policy of 1945-1948 had been, and Gottwald followed suit, just like Mátyás Rákosi and Bolesław Bierut.

40. See A.B. ULAM, Titoism and the Cominform, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, p.20. For an eye-witness account, see M. DJILAS, Tito, mon ami, mon ennemi, Fayard, Paris, 1980, p.44. 41. See for instance B. LAZITCH, Stalin’s Massacre of the Foreign Communist Leaders, in: M. DRACHKOVITCH, B. LAZITCH, The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Praeger, New-York, 1966, pp.139-174 and B. SOUVARINE, Comments on the Massacre, in: ibid., pp.175-183. 42. See J. RUPNIK, op.cit. 43. See F. NEČÁSEK, O Klementu Gottwaldovi. Náčrt životopisu (On Klement Gottwald. Sketch of a biography), SNPL, Prague, 1954, pp.37-41. 44. In the 1945 institutions, the decision making was taken away from experts and administrations and given to sole politicians. The unity of the state was replaced by the unity of the political will. From 1945 onwards, a criticism of the means through which the goal would be achieved was still possi- ble; but a criticism of the goal itself was already rendered impossible. See V. CHALUPA, Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State, H.E. Steinfert Kneese N.V., Leiden, 1959, pp.80-81. 45. M. MOLNÁR, op.cit., p.195. The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 65

The 1950s It is too easy an explanation, on historian Karel Kaplan’s model followed by most other historians, to blame solely the Soviets for everything which ever went wrong with Czechoslovak communism: Gottwald was allegedly a «good guy», the inventor of the genuine «Czechoslovak path to socialism»,46 who was distracted from his «noble» task only by Stalin’s blood thirst, a fact which caused him a great deal of pain and explains why he surrendered to alcoholism before and during the political trials. As for the trials, the reasoning was simplified in the following way: «The domestic causes of the trials, according to Kaplan, lay in the political process itself […] This political order, contrary to Czechoslovak tradition, was a product of Bolshevik experience and was imported into Czechoslovakia as an essential feature of the policy of modelling all aspects of life on the Soviet pattern».47 But this narrative does not account for the strong domestic support for such a terror policy, including on Gottwald’s part. If only the Soviets are guilty, it does not really help to understand why Antonín Novotný, KSČ’s first secretary after 1953, did so little to implement a real destalinization in 1956, both as a successor to the Stalinian leader Gottwald and as Moscow’s follower after the XXth Congress. Accordingly, the year 1956 in Czechoslovakia – which didn’t bring any substantial implementation of the destalinization process, contrary to what happened in Poland and Hungary –, and more generally the whole period 1953-1965, is conveniently left out in most books dealing with post WWII Czechoslovak history. The terror level and the democratic traditions vaguely serve to mask the incongruency of a supposedly democratic-minded population and of a Communist party who both completely failed to take part in the liberalization campaign in 1956. Alexander Dubček then pops out of history seemingly out of nowhere in the second half of the 1960s and is said to have revived the national, patriotic, side of Czechoslovak communism, before being forced again by the «evil» Soviets (the «internationalists») to give up. Yet again, Dubček’s gradual surrender, the fact that he himself undid most of what he had done while he was still in power and that he remained in spite of everything a dedicated communist48 is rather left out, just like the astonishing isolation of the valorous dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather than wondering why the latter were at best a couple of thousand in Czechoslovakia as opposed to some 30,000 in Poland and Hungary, academic literature abroad has concentrated

46. «After 1945, the Czechoslovak Communists sought new ways of passing from the national and de- mocractic revolution of the immediate post-war period to the socialist revolution. They envisaged the transition as peaceful and democratic, and in this they were absolutely serious. For a time it seemed that they even had Stalin’s support; one recalls, for instance, an interview with British La- bour MPs in which he mentioned the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to social- ism». See J. PELIKÁN (ed.), The Czechoslovak Political Trials, Macdonald, London, 1971, pp.15-16. 47. G. SKILLING, op.cit., pp.389-390. 48. For instance, he dutifully came back to Czechoslovakia after he was revoked from his ambassa- dor’s post in Turkey in 1970 even though he was certain to be demoted, if not sent outright to jail. 66 Muriel BLAIVE on an in-depth analysis of their samizdat and tamizdat texts – indeed very inspiring on the intellectual level but enjoying a remarkably limited support among the population.

Pressure from «under» and concessions from «above»

It should be reminded that it was not Gottwald who invented the theory of the «national path to socialism», but Stalin. It was indeed during the visit of Labour MPs to Moscow in the summer of 1946 that the Soviet leader formulated it for the first time and it was only then that the Czechoslovak communists began to refer to it (see Gottwald’s first speech on this theme dated 4 October 1946: «On our Czechoslovak road to socialism»).49 Jiří Pelikán gives the impression that Czechoslovak communism was a pioneer in this matter, but this is only due to the fact that he remains silent about the rest of the world communist movement: yet Gomułka,50 Rákosi51 and Maurice Thorez,52 or even Togliatti and Dimitrov, made similar references to a national specific path to socialism. Success of the said path in Czechoslovakia as opposed to Poland and Hungary is not the consequence of the Czech communists’ democratic mind but of the inclination of the Czechoslovak population towards an egalitarian, strongly socialist, regime. The national consensus can hardly be better illustrated than by the fact that the communists

49. K. GOTTWALD, O naši československé cestě k socialismu, in: Spisy (Collected Works), XI- II(1946-47), SNPL, Prague, 1957, pp.230-231. 50. W. GOMUŁKA, Przemówienie sekretarza generalnego KC PPR Tow. Wl. Gomułki, in: W. GO- MUŁKA, J. CYRANKIEWICZ, Jednošcia silni – zwycieżymy. Przemówienia wyglosone na zeb- raniu aktywu warszawskiego PPR I PPS w dniu 30 listopadu 1946 (By Uniting Our Forces – We Will Win), Warsaw, 1946, p.25. In the chapter «We follow a Polish road, the road to popular de- mocracy», Gomulka explains: «We have chosen our own path, a socialist path of development, which we have named the path of the Popular Democracy. Along this road and in our conditions, the dictatorship of the proletariat or even less of a party is neither an aim itself, nor a means to achieve it». 51. See M. RÁKOSI, A magyar demokráciáért (For the Hungarian Democracy), Szinka, Budapest, 1948, p.376. In the chapter «Forward to a popular democracy!», Rákosi explains: «The Communist parties have learned in the course of the last quarter of the century that there is no unique path lead- ing to socialism but that there are as many paths as there are countries which build them through their own experiences». 52. See M. THOREZ, Déclaration au journal anglais ‘The Times’, in: Œuvres de Maurice Thorez, Livre cinquième, t.23 (Novembre 1946-Juin 1947), Ed. sociales, Paris, 1965, pp.14-15. In the chapter «One can envisage on the path to socialism other roads than the one followed by the Rus- sian communists», Thorez claims: «The progress of democracy throughout the world, inspite of a few exceptions which confirm the rule, allow us to envisage on the path to socialism other roads than the one followed by the Russian communists. In any case, the road is necessarily different for every country. We have always thought and said that the French people, rich of a glorious tradition, would find its own path towards more democracy, progress and social justice». The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 67 mainly propagated a «democratic socialism» between 1945 and 1948, while the democrats were advocating a «socialist democracy».53 Its failure in Poland and Hungary is not the consequence of a lack of democratic spirit on the communists’ side but of the fierce opposition of the (essentially agricultural) population to anything resembling socialism. Communism gained a strong base in Czechoslovakia because the party succeeded in presenting itself as the embodiment of patriotism. It failed in Poland and Hungary at that time because it was perceived on the contrary as the symbol of something imposed from the outside, while other political forces better represented the patriotic feelings. And it finally regained partial success in those countries, for example with Gomułka in 1956, when the communists were somehow able to re-establish a connection between patriotism and communism.

The domestic soldiers of repression

It is not Stalin who signed Rudolf Slánský’s and Milada Horáková’s death sentences but Gottwald. As of today, the KSČ and its successor the KSČM have refused to condemn or even to express regrets over Horáková’s fate (respected political leader of the First Republic and dedicated Democrat, also persecuted by the Nazis, she was hanged along with three other defendants after a Stalinist trial in 1950 for alleged anti-state activities). On 27 June 2005, on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of her execution, KSČM’s vice-president, Václav Exner, expressed the view on Czech Radio that Horáková had been indeed guilty of anti-state activities after 1948, activities which even today would be considered as collusion with a foreign state.54 Yet it is not Stalin anymore who puts these words into Comrade Exner’s mouth. It was certainly not Khrushchev who stopped Novotný from destalinizing, as it was him who had launched the destalinization and encouraged the other communist parties to follow suit. Even though Leonid Brejnev’s guilt in crushing the Prague Spring is overwhelming, it is again Dubček who chose to do what he did: he did refuse to consider the Prague Spring a «counter-revolution», but out of a genuine and unshakable communist faith, not out of a democratic spirit; and it didn’t stop him in his report to the November, 1968 plenum of the KSČ from defending the

53. Cf. these words by Hubert Ripka, the democratic minister for Trade in the post-war government: «We want to create a new social order, which means radical changes in the economic structure ac- cording to socialist principles. We are entertaining the constructive energy and the creative spirit of our people because we thus offer them the real hope that our political democracy, which has overall proven its worth during the First Republic, will be supported and strengthened by the eco- nomic and social democracy. […] I am convinced that we will manage in a few years to build an efficient socialist democracy in Central Europe». Quoted in G. BEUER, New Czechoslovakia and her Historical Background, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1947, p.41. Beuer made this interview of Ripka in 1945 or 1946. 54. See A. DRDA, P. DUDEK, Kdo ve stínu čeká na moc. Čeští komunisté po listopadu 1989 (Look Who’s Hiding in the Dark. The Czech Communists after November, 1989), Paseka, Prague, 2006, p.11. 68 Muriel BLAIVE necessity of «normalization» and criticizing the «negative features» of the post-January 1968 policy and the «anti-socialist forces» currently active.55 And finally the Czechoslovak communists were among the most reluctant to follow Mikhail Gorbachov; if it had been up to them, 1989 would never have occurred.

Conclusion

The antinomy between internationalism and patriotism has been instrumentalized in the Czechoslovak case to present a vision of good, patriotic local communists against bad, international (Soviet) communists and to exonerate the Czechoslovak communists of the worst of their mistakes. A re-evaluation of Gottwald’s historical role could be a first step. Unfortunately, Czech historians do not seem in a hurry to embark on this hazardous journey and the existing biographical notes remain at the level of a «personal drama» on Gottwald’s part.56 They do not seem in a hurry either to re-evaluate in writing the fundamental myth of the Czechoslovak communist regime, e.g. that the level of terror was higher than in all the other democracies put together; therefore it keeps permeating most Western works on this period.57 And finally, they do not seem in a hurry to reinstate society, rather than political institutions and specifically the KSČ, at the heart of their analysis. The existing Czech historiography still favours the big events (1948, 1968, 1989) or riskless topics like repression and opposition rather than questioning the involvement of Czech society in the communist regime.58 Yet it is not a coincidence if the Czech communists have still been polling 20% of the popular vote 15 years after the Velvet Revolution; it testifies to the long-term support basis for the communist regime built over the years. To gain a plausible explanation of this phenomenon, one will undoubtedly have to plunge into the historical depth of Czechoslovak communism. Until this comes into being, the dealing with the memory of communism under post-communism will remain rather abstract.

55. G. SKILLING, op.cit., p.815. 56. See for instance Českoslovenští a čeští prezidenti (Czech and Czechoslovak Presidents), CEP, Prague, 2003; J. PERNES, Takoví nám vládli (Those Who Ruled Us), Brána, Prague, 2003; V. KA- DLEC, Podivné konce naších prezidentů (The Strange End of Our Presidents), Kruh, Prague, 1991; K. KAPLAN, Gottwaldovi muži (Gottwald’s Men), Paseka, Prague, 2004, etc. 57. See for instance a mild version in H. AGNEW, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2004. See also A. MARÈS, Histoire des Tchèques et des Slovaques, Perrin, Paris, 2005. 58. As often in similar cases, young, foreign historians are lending a hand in opening the debate on controversial topics: see for instance, on two very different chapters of Czech postwar history, B. FROMMER, National Cleansing. Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslo- vakia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 and P. BREN, Opposing the Opposition: Re- thinking Fear and Apathy in Late Communist Czechoslovakia, presentation at the international workshop Authority and Expectations: A Social History of the Socialist Dictatorships in Central Europe, Charles University, Prague, June 21-22, 2007. 69 Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren

Dagmara JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST

1. Einführende Fragestellung

Der vorliegende Beitrag über die Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschafts- integration in Ostmitteleuropa am Beispiel Polens und der Tschechoslowakei fragt, wie die westeuropäischen Integrationsprozesse in Ostmitteleuropa wahrgenommen wurden und welche Effekte sich durch diesen Prozess für die Handelsbeziehungen Polens und der Tschechoslowakei zu den westeuropäischen Ländern vom Beginn der fünfziger bis zum Zeitpunkt der ersten Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft im Jahre 1973 ergaben.1 Dabei beschränkt sich diese Untersuchung allerdings nicht auf die Länder der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG), sondern versteht die Integrations- prozesse Westeuropas in einem breiten historischen Kontext. Unter „Integration“ wird die schrittweise Abschaffung ökonomischer Schranken zwischen unabhängi- gen Staaten und die zunehmende Verflechtung von deren Volkswirtschaften, sowie das Zusammenwachsen der Güter- und Faktormärkte verstanden.2 Dieser Prozess vollzog sich nicht nur in der Zollunion im Rahmen der EWG, sondern auch in der Freihandelszone im Rahmen der European Free Trade Association (EFTA) sowie im Fall der Nordeuropäischen Länder im Rahmen des NORDEK. Diese alternati- ven Integrationsmodelle entstanden zum Teil als Reaktion auf die Entstehung der EWG und wirkten in gegenseitiger Konkurrenz. Gerade diese Vielfalt – so eine These – versuchten die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder für die Durchsetzung eigener Interessen zu nutzen. Schon jetzt kann man sagen, dass der Eiserne Vorhang nicht immer so undurch- lässig war wie ursprünglich angenommen. Besonders ab den 1970er Jahren flossen verstärkt westliches Kapital und Technologien in Form von Krediten und Patentli- zenzen nach Ostmitteleuropa. Zum Beispiel erwarb Polen drei Viertel aller westli- chen Lizenzen seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges in der Zeit von 1971-1979. Ab Mitte der achtziger Jahre kamen zu den Portfolioinvestitionen auch einzelne Joint-Ventures, also ausländische Direktinvestitionen aus den EWG-Ländern in der Region.3 Vor diesem Hintergrund gilt es die These kritisch zu hinterfragen, wonach

1. Für zahlreiche Hinweise zu diesem Text danke ich Herrn Prof. André Steiner, Frau Prof. Helga Schultz und Herrn Dr. Uwe Müller. 2. Vgl. dazu: H.-J. WAGENER, T. EGER, H. FRITZ, Europäische Integration. Recht und Ökono- mie, Geschichte und Politik, Verlag Franz Vahlen, München, 2006, S.35 ff. 70 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den RGW [Rat für gegenseitige Wirt- schaftshilfe]- und westeuropäischen Ländern seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vollstän- dig abgebrochen waren. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass es ein Spannungsfeld zwischen der politisch motivierten Ablehnung der westeuropäischen Integration in den sozialistischen Staaten und dem wirtschaftlich bedingten Bestreben einiger Staaten gab, mit den EWG- und EFTA-Mitgliedsländern Handelskontakte zu unter- halten. Trotz der Nationalisierung des Bankwesens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurden sowohl in Polen als auch in der Tschechoslowakei zwei Banken nicht voll- ständig verstaatlicht, die den Außenhandel mit westlichen Ländern abwickeln soll- ten. Bis 1989 bleibt die Bank Handlowy [Handelsbank] in Polen - neben dem polnischen Staat als größtem Gesellschafter - auch teilweise in ausländischer, vor- wiegend westeuropäischer Hand. Die ausländischen Beteiligungen erleichterten den Finanzverkehr insbesondere mit Unternehmen aus Westeuropa und den USA. Die westlichen Unternehmen, die weiterhin mit Polen Kontakte pflegten, vertrauten diesen Banken mehr als den rein staatlichen Finanzinstitutionen. Eine ähnliche Situation war in der Tschechoslowakei festzustellen. Dort übernahm die Gewerbe- bank [Živnostenská banka] in der gesamten sozialistischen Periode eine Vermitt- lerrolle im Zahlungsverkehr mit dem westlichen Ausland.4 An dieser Bank gab es auch eine Minderheitsbeteiligung von ausländischem Kapital.

2. Forschungsstand und Methoden

Die wirtschaftspolitischen Reaktionen in den ostmitteleuropäischen Ländern auf die wirtschaftliche Integration des westlichen Teils des Kontinents und die daraus folgenden realwirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen in Ostmitteleuropa sind bis heute nicht ausreichend erforscht. Die zeitgenössische Literatur zum Thema der wirt- schaftlichen Integration Westeuropas fällt in Polen und der Tschechoslowakei (ČSSR) eher spärlich aus. Der wichtigste Grund dafür ist, dass dieser Prozess in beiden Ländern in der sozialistischen Periode offiziell abgelehnt und verurteilt wurde. Jan Kułakowski – der erste Unterhändler Polens in den Assoziierungsver- handlungen mit der Europäischen Union – erinnert sich, dass in den 1950er Jahren ein Engagement für die pro-europäische Bewegung nicht möglich war und schon das Interesse an den entstehenden europäischen Strukturen Kritik hervorrief.5 Bis in die 1970er Jahre hinein und damit bis zu der neuen auf Entspannung und Ver- ständigung ausgerichteten Ostpolitik der meisten EWG-Länder, sahen die Ent-

3. Siehe dazu: Á. TÖRÖK, Á. GYÖRFFY, Ungarn in der Vorreiterrolle, in: J. GÜNTHER, D. JA- JEŚNIAK-QUAST (Hrsg.), Willkommene Investoren oder nationaler Ausverkauf? Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20. Jahrhundert, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 2006, S.253-274. 4. JIRÁSEK, Zdeněk/MAŁKIEWICZ, Andrzej (2005): Polska i Czechosłowacja w dobie stalinizmu (1948-1956) [Polen und die Tschechoslowakei in der Zeit des Stalinismus (1948-1956)], Warsza- wa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, S. 182 und 184 . Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 71 scheidungsträger der Volksrepublik (VR) Polen und der ČSSR den Integrationspro- zess des Westens als eine Konzentration des Kapitalismus an, die maßgeblich durch die USA inspiriert sei. Spätestens seit Anfang der 1950er Jahre, also mit dem Beginn des westlichen Wirtschaftsembargos gegenüber Ostmitteleuropa, wurde daher dieser Prozess offiziell abgelehnt. In beiden Ländern wurden derartige Kon- takte zum westlichen Teil des Kontinents in den 1950er Jahren auch als Landesver- rat angesehen. In der Tschechoslowakei wurden besonders viele Wirtschaftsexper- ten während der politischen Schauprozesse der 1950er Jahre zum Tode verurteilt.6 Eine erste Monographie über die Tendenzen und Perspektiven des Handels zwi- schen Polen und den Ländern der EWG erschien in Polen erst im Jahre 1974.7 Mit dem Außenhandel und den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Blöcken befasste sich die Forschung systematisch erst Ende der achtziger Jahre.8 Anders sieht es in den zahlreichen wirtschaftlichen Fachperiodika aus, die für die zu untersuchende Zeitperiode allein in Polen mit ca. 218 Titeln beziffert werden können. In Polen diskutierte man die Auswirkungen der westlichen Integration auf den polnischen Außenhandel und die Binnenwirtschaft für den hier betrachteten Zeitabschnitt in unregelmäßigen Abständen in „Ekonomista“ [„Ökonom“] (Wars- zawa 1947-2000), „Handel Zagraniczny“ [Außenhandel] (Warszawa: 1955-1984) und Życie gospodarcze“ [Wirtschaftsleben] (Katowice: 1945-1949, Warszawa 1949-1988). Für die Tschechoslowakei sind in diesem Kontext die zahlreichen Ver- öffentlichungen in den zeitgenössischen Periodika wie „Plánované hospodárství“ [„Planwirtschaft“] oder „Hospodářské noviny“ [„Wirtschaftsnachrichten“] sowie „Zahraniční obchod“[Außenhandel] vor allem in der Zeit des Prager Frühlings von großem Interesse.9 Bis heute sind allerdings Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, mit Ausnahme von wenigen ersten Ansätzen, rar geblieben.10

5. KUŁAKOWSKI, Jan: Polityka Polski wobec Unii Europejskiej [Politik Polen bzgl. der Europäi- schen Union], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe rocznik 1997 [Jahrgang 1997], unter: http:// www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/rocznik/1997/ jan_kulakowski_polityka_polski_wobec_unii_europejskiej.html 6. Vgl. K. KAPLAN, Komunistický rezim a politické procesy v Československu [Das kommunisti- sche Regime und die politischen Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei], Barrister & Principal, Brno 2001; Id., Nekrvavá revoluce [Die unblutige Revolution], Mladá fronta, Praha, 1993; Id., Die po- litischen Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei 1948-1954, Oldenbourg, München, 1986. 7. Vgl.: A WIECZORKIEWICZ, Tendencje i perspektywy handlu między Polską a krajami EWG [Tendenzen und Perspektiven des Handels zwischen Polen und den Ländern der EWG], Państwo- we Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warschau, 1974. 8. Vgl.: M. HAENDCKE-HOPPE (Hrsg.), Außenwirtschaftssysteme und Außenwirtschaftsreformen sozialistischer Länder. Ein intrasystemarer Vergleich, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1988. 9. J. PLEVA, Konference o plánování zahraničního obchodu [Die Konferenz über die Planung des Außenhandels], in: Plánované hospodářství, 2(1968); Z. ŠEDIVÝ, Ke koncepci rozvoje vnăjších ekonomických vztahů [Zur Konzeption der Entwicklung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen], in: Plánované hospodářství, 7(1968); K. PODLAHA, Struktura vnăjších hospodářských vztahů a ekonomická rovnováha [Die Struktur der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen und das wirtschaftliche Gleichgewicht], in: Plánované hospodáøství, 4(1969); J. KUBÁLEK, Konkretizace hospodářské politiky v oblasti vnìjších ekonomických vztahů [Die Konkretisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik im Bereich der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen], in: Hospodářské noviny, 09.08.1968. 72 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast

Die Erforschung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den westeuropäischen- und einzelnen RGW-Ländern im Kalten Krieg bleibt also nach wie vor eine anspruchsvolle Aufgabe. Derartige Untersuchungen wurden parallel von Forscher- gruppen initiiert, die von Alice Teichová, Dieter Stiefel und Gertrude Enderle-Bur- cel in Wien, Luciano Segreto in Florenz sowie André Steiner in Potsdam geleitet werden. Darüber hinaus gibt es einzelne neuere Veröffentlichungen zu diesem Thema.11 Für die Tschechoslowakei sind vor allem Beiträge von Jaroslav Kučera,12 Christoph Buchheim,13 Bohumír Brom14 und Lenka Málková15 zu nennen. Die Auswertung der Primärquellen in den Nationalarchiven ist auf Grund des geschilderten Forschungsstandes unumgänglich. Außerdem werden die Statistiken des Außenhandels herangezogen. Meine Recherchen basieren vor allem auf den Quellen aus den Zentralen Archiven in Warschau und Prag: Prager Staatsarchiv (Státní ústřední Archiv, SÚA), Warschauer Archiv der Neuen Akten (Archiwum Akt Nowych) sowie Archiv des Außenministeriums (Archiwum MSZ). Für das Thema sind in Prag insbesondere die Akten des Außenhandelsministeriums (Mini- sterstvo zahraničního obchodu) sowie die Akten der Wirtschaftskommission (Eko- nomická komise) und die Bestände der Staatlichen Planbehörde (Statní úřad plánování, SÚP) von großer Bedeutung. Für die polnische Seite erfasste ich vor allem die Bestände der Plankommission (Państwowa Komisja Planowania Gospodarczego PKPG bzw. Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów), des Ministeriums für Industrie und Handel (Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu, MpiH),

10. Die ersten Ansätze dieses Themas findet man auch in dieser Zeitschrift. Siehe für Polen: A. KROK-PASZKOWSKA, J. ZIELONKA, Poland´s Road to the European Union, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(2004), S.7-24, hier: 11-13 und für die Tschechoslowakei: J. KARALAS, P. KRATOCHVÍL, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republik and European Integration: During and After the Cold War, in: idem., S.25-42, hier: 26-32; sowie: J. SCHEVARDO, Der We- sten im Osten. Reaktion auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa, [un- veröffentlichtes Manuskript], Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, 2005. 11. J. ELORANTA, J. OJALA (eds), East-West Trade and the Cold War, Jyväskylä Studies in Huma- nities, Jyväskylä, 2005. 12. J. KUČERA, Reformdynamik und wirtschaftspolitischer Alltag. Der Außenhandel in Theorie und Praxis der tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre, in: Ch. BOYER (Hrsg.), Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen. Tschechoslowakei und DDR im Vergleich, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2006, S.311-355. 13. Ch. BUCHHEIM, Die Integration der Tschechoslowakei in den RGW. In: Bohemia, in: Zeitschrift für die Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder, 1(2001), S.1–10. 14. B. BROM, Dokumenty z českých archívů k historii mezinárodných hospodářských vztahů v období studené války: studie o pramenech [Dokumente aus den Tschechischen Archiven für die Geschichte der internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges: Eine Studie über die Archivquellen], Karolinum, Prag, 2002; ders.: Československo a západoevropská integra- ce (základní rysy vzájemných hospodárských, zejména obchodních vztahů od konce 2. svătové vál- ky do počatku 90. let) [Die Tschechoslowakei und die westeuropäische Integration (Grundrisse der gegenseitigen Handelsbeziehungen seit dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges bis Anfang der 1990er Jah- re], [unveröffentlichtes Manuskript], Staatliches Zentralarchiv, Prag, 2000. 15. L. MÁLKOVÁ, Vývoj spolupráce mezi Evropskými společenstvími a Československem do roku 1992 [Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Tschechoslo- wakei bis 1992], unveröffentlichte Magisterarbeit, Wirtschaftshochschule Prag, 1999. Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 73 des Außenhandelsministeriums (Ministerstwo Handlu Zagranicznego) und des Zentralkomitees der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei (Komitet Centralny PZPR).

3. Phasen der Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Integration in Ostmitteleuropa

Die Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in Polen und der Tschechoslowakei war – ähnlich wie die tatsächlichen Handelsbezie- hungen – nicht statisch, sondern unterlag verschiedenen historischen Einflüssen. Ich beschränke mich zunächst auf eine Periodisierung des Hauptdiskurses, ohne dabei auf die spezifischen Unterschiede zwischen Polen und der Tschechoslowakei einzugehen. In der Wahrnehmung der Integrationsprozesse wird vor allem der Unterschied zwischen den einzelnen Jahrzehnten deutlich. Die Reaktion auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa ist trotz der offiziellen Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen Parteien sehr vielschich- tig. Das Beispiel der Tschechoslowakei und Polens in der Zeit von den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren zeigt, dass diese Reaktionen von der völligen Abschot- tung, von Autarkiebestrebungen, über die eigene Integration im Rahmen des RGW bis hin zu gezielten Bemühungen um den Dialog mit den Integrationsbündnissen der westeuropäischen Länder reichen. Es wäre eine Binsenwahrheit zu sagen, dass die sozialistischen Länder der Ent- wicklung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den Ländern Westeuropas, darun- ter mit den Staaten der EWG, eine immer größere Bedeutung beimaßen. Aus der zeitgenössischen polnischen Sicht sprachen für diese Beziehungen eine große Kon- vergenz der Struktur der Importnachfrage der sozialistischen Länder (vor allem Investitionsgüter) mit der Struktur des Exportangebots der EWG-Länder, die große Aufnahmefähigkeit des EWG-Marktes, die historisch bedingte Tradition des gemeinsamen Handels, die geographische Nähe, woraus relativ niedrige Transport- kosten resultierten, und schließlich das wachsende Interesse der EWG-Länder an der Erweiterung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den sozialistischen Staa- ten.16 Die historische Tradition des gemeinsamen Handels wird durch den Anteil der westlichen Staaten und den USA im Außenhandel mit Polen und der Tschechoslo- wakei vor dem Krieg deutlich. Dieser Anteil verringerte sich von durchschnittlich 85% bzw. 90% vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und entsprechend 60% bzw. 68% noch im Jahre 1948 auf durchschnittlich 33% bzw. 30% im Jahre 1952 (siehe Abbildung 1).

16. Vgl. dazu: Z. KAMECKI, Integracja gospodarcza w Europie Zachodniej a handel Wschód-Zachód [Die Wirtschaftsintegration in Westeuropa und der Ost-West Handel], Sprawy Międzynarodowe, Warszawa, 10-11(1970), S.30-43, hier: 30. 74 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast

(1) Anteil der westeuropäischen Staaten und der USA im Außenhandel Polens und der Tschechoslowakei vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (in Prozent)

Quelle: S. BIALER, O międzynarodowych stosunkach ekonomicznych nowego typu [Über die internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen des neuen Typs], in: Ekonomi- sta, III(1953), S.56.

3.1. Die späten 1940er und 1950er Jahre Direkt nach dem Krieg waren die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftswissenschafter noch unsicher, ob es sich bei der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration um einen dauerhaften Trend handelt. Die Zusammenschlüsse zur Zoll- und Wirtschaftsunion wurden als eine Mode bezeichnet. Schon bald standen die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsexperten diesen Prozessen allerdings sehr skeptisch gegenüber. Das Hauptargument gegen die Zoll- und Wirtschaftsunion war, dass die damit verbun- denen Integrationsprozesse nur den Wirtschaften weniger westeuropäischer Kern- ländern Vorteile bringen.17 Eine Zollunion lehnte man im Osten des Kontinents kategorisch ab, denn eine Zollunion (wie die EWG) reduziert bzw. hebt im Unter- schied zur Freihandelszone (wie die EFTA) nicht nur die Zollgrenzen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft auf, sondern erhebt auch einen gemeinsamen Außenzoll. Ein gemeinsamer Außenzoll würde demnach die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder, die tra- ditionell mit Westeuropa Handel betrieben, sehr stark benachteiligen. Nach der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge im März 1957 wurde die Zollunion von sechs westeuropäischen Ländern schrittweise zur Realität und damit erfuhren auch die ostmitteleuropäischen Vorbehalte eine Bestätigung. Im Angesicht des Kalten Krieges wurden die gesamteuropäischen Wirtschafts- und Handelsbe- ziehungen, sowohl im Osten als auch im Westen Europas, immer mehr durch den Austausch in jeweils regionalen wirtschaftlichen Gruppierungen (RGW vs. EWG/ EFTA) ersetzt. Diese Integrationsorganismen in Ost und West entwickelten sich vor

17. Włosko-francuska unia celna [Die italienisch-französische Zollunion], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 3(1948), S.118-119, hier: 119. Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 75 allem in den 1950er Jahren in einer völligen gegenseitigen Isolation. Unter diesen Bedingungen führten die europäischen Integrationsprozesse - trotz der Wachstums- stimuli für die integrierten Länder - in der Perspektive der gesamteuropäischen Arbeitsteilung zu eindeutig negativen Ergebnissen. Ursprünglich sahen die ostmitteleuropäischen Ökonomen den Handel zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa als eine Notwendigkeit für beide Seiten an. Bereits kurz nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg schrieben polnische Wirtschaftswissenschaftler darüber, dass die Okkupationszonen in Westdeutschland, vor allem die Bi-Zone, nicht das ursprüngliche ökonomische Potenzial erreichen könne, wenn sie weiterhin von der sowjetischen Besatzungszone (SBZ) und den Ländern Osteuropas abgekoppelt blieben.18 Der „amerikanische Imperialismus“ war in den Augen der osteuropäischen Experten dafür verantwortlich, dass die westeuropäischen Länder die Möglichkeit des Bezugs von Lebensmitteln aus den alten Herkunftsländern Ostmitteleuropas einbüßten.19 Hier wurden vor allem der „Battle Act“ und andere Begrenzungen im Rahmen des Marshall-Plans genannt. So gelten die Restriktionen der Mutual Secu- rity Agency (MSA) oder die Arbeit der Consultive Group Cooperation Committee (CGCOCOM) als Beispiele in dieser Hinsicht.20 Die Rolle der USA bei der Zerstö- rung der traditionellen Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und ihr Einfluss im Inte- grationsprozess Westeuropas wurde aber nicht nur von den ostmitteleuropäischen Wissenschaftlern und Politikern betont, sondern auch im Westen thematisiert. So wählte der Schwede Gunnar Adler-Karlsson in seiner bekannten „Abrechnung“ mit den Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen bewusst eine ähnliche Argumentation, als er feststellte, dass der amerikanische Kongress den Handel zwischen Ost- und West- europa unterbinden wollte, um damit die innere Wirtschaftskraft der Sowjetunion ernsthaft zu schädigen.21 Die Schuld für das Abbrechen der Handelskontakte zwischen Ost- und Westeu- ropa gaben die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftspolitiker eindeutig der Politik der USA und dem fortschreitenden Integrationsprozess Westeuropas, mit dessen ein- zelnen Schritten wie der Gründung der Organisation für europäische Wirtschafts- zusammenarbeit (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation – OEEC, 1948), der Europäischen Zahlungsunion (1950), der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (1951) bis hin zu den Römischen Verträgen im Jahre 1957.22 Der Integrationsprozess wurde wiederum als entscheidend für die Reaktivierung

18. F. WILIŃSKI, Bizonia [Die Bizone], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 5(1948), S.194-197, hier: 197. 19. Siehe dazu: A. PAWLIKIEWICZ, Destrukcyjne skutki planu Marshalla [Die destruktiven Folgen des Marshallplans], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 5(1950), S.235-238, hier vor allem: 238. 20. Im Jahre 1951 beschloss der Kongress der USA das Battle Act, das mit dem Rückzug der wirt- schaftlichen Hilfe der USA für die westeuropäischen Länder drohte, die weiterhin Handelsbezie- hungen, vor allem den Handel mit den Embargowaren, mit sozialistischen Ländern unterhalten. Die MSA wurde im Jahre 1952 ins Leben gerufen und kontrollierte die Marshallplanländer. Eben- falls im Jahre 1952 wurde das C.G. CO. COM mit Sitz in Paris zum Zweck der Kontrolle des Han- dels mit Osteuropa gegründet. 21. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, Der Fehlschlag. 20 Jahre Wirtschaftskrieg zwischen Ost und West, Eu- ropa Verlag, Wien, 1971, S.123. 76 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast des „deutschen Imperialismus“ und die Exportexpansion der Bundesrepublik von den ostmitteleuropäischen Politikern und Wirtschaftsexperten angesehen und gefürchtet.23 Vor allem wurde der so genannte Schuman-Plan scharf verurteilt, denn in ihm sahen die ostmitteleuropäischen Experten eine wesentliche Unterstüt- zung für westdeutsche Eisen- und Stahlunternehmen. Daher wurde der Schu- man-Plan als ein Werkzeug der Aggressionspolitik der großen Stahlmonopole der USA und der westdeutschen „Magnaten aus dem Ruhrgebiet“24 angesehen und als eine „Party der amerikanischen Monopolisten unter dem Namen Schumanplan“25 bezeichnet. Die Aufhebung der alliierten Kontrolle über die Produktion von Kohle und Stahl, die Reaktivierung der Vorkriegskartelle und die Steigerung der Rüstungsproduktion in Westdeutschland sah man in Ostmitteleuropa als eine direkte Folge des „atlantischen Integrationsprozesses“26 Westeuropas. Die steigende Exportkraft Westdeutschlands befand sich vor allem mit der auf Export orientierten tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaftspolitik auf Kollisionskurs. Schon unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hoffte unter anderem Präsident Edvard Beneš, dass nach der Kriegsniederlage Deutschlands die Tschechoslowakei als eines der am meisten industrialisierten Länder Ostmitteleuropas die einstige Rolle Deutschlands als Lieferant von industriellen Produkten für den europäischen Markt, vor allem von Erzeugnissen der Schwerindustrie, übernehmen könnte.27

22. K. PIOTROWSKA-HOCHFELDOWA, Europejska Wspólnota Gospodarcza [Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft], in: Ekonomista, 1(1958), S.165-188. 23. Vgl.: M. TOMALA, Odradzanie się ekspansji ekonomicznej monopoli zachodnio-niemieckich [Das Erneuern der wirtschaftlichen Expansion der westdeutschen Monopole], in: Ekonomista, 1(1955), S.134-142 und ders: Besprechung des Buches von K. H. Domdey: Die deutschen Mono- pole auf den äußeren Märkten [Verlag Die Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1959], in: Ekonomista, 4-5(1959), S.1095-1099, hier: 1098. Noch stärker wurde das Problem des „amerikanischen Programms der Wirtschaftsintegration Westeuropas“ und der Verknüpfung der Zoll- und Wirtschaftspolitik West- deutschlands mit der USA-Politik in der DDR-Literatur diskutiert, was die polnische Fachliteratur rezipierte: J. RUTKOWSKI, Besprechung des Sammelbandes: Zur Finanzpolitik der Deutschen Bundesrepublik. I. Anton Borgmeier: Preispolitik, II. Rolf Lohse: Die Zollpolitik [Berlin: Verlag die Wirtschaft, 1958], in: Ekonomista, 1(1959), S. 1105-1110, hier: 1109 f. 24. A. FILIPIAK, Z obrad VI Sesji Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej ONZ [Aus den Verhandlungen der VI. Tagung der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission der VN], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 15(1951), S.868-870, hier: 868. 25. L. SIENNICKI, Plan Schumana – narzędziem polityki agresji [Der Schumanplan – Werkzeug der Politik der Aggression], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 8(1951), S.470-473, hier: 473; S. BIELAK, Przed realizacją planu Schumana [Vor der Realisierung des Schuman-Plans], in: Idem., 23(1951), S.1294-1296, hier: 1294, sowie: Przemysł stalowy Francji i Europejskie Zjednoczenie Węgla i Sta- li [Die Stahlindustrie Frankreichs und die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl], in: Idem., 1(1954), S.38-39; sowie: Czy Anglia przystąpi do Europejskiego Zjednoczenia Węgla i Stali [Wird England der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl beitreten?], in: Idem., 8(1954), S.318-320, hier: 318. 26. Co dało Francji „Europejskie Zjednoczenie Węgla i Stalii” [Was hat Frankreich der „Europäi- schen Vereinigung für Kohle und Stahl” gebracht], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 18(1954), S.715-717, hier: 717; Handlarze broni zapowiadają nowy boom [Die Waffenhändler kündigen einen neuen Boom an], in: Idem., 21(1954), S.839; W imię zapewnienia pokoju w Europie trzeba uniemoźliwić wskrzeszenie militaryzmu niemieckiego [Im Namen der Sicherung des Friedens in Europa muss man die Wiederbelebung des deutschen Militarismus verhindern], in: Idem., 24(1954), S.921-922. Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 77

Dieses Ziel verfolgten allmählich auch die anderen ostmitteleuropäischen Länder. So wurde die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit der ostmitteleuropäischen Länder als Kompensation zum Wiedererstarken des wirtschaftlichen Potenzials Deutsch- lands interpretiert. Der spätere Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe sollte das Erbe des deutschen wirtschaftlichen Einflusses im Osten des Kontinents antreten.28

3.2. Die 1960er Jahre

Seit Beginn der 1960er Jahre schauten die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder verstärkt über den eigenen Tellerrand und suchten nach Wegen der Nutzung der Integration zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil. Angestoßen von polnischen Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern (Włodzimierz Brus, Oskar Lange), bald gefolgt von tschechoslowakischen Ökono- men (Otta Šik) setzte eine Diskussion über die positiven Effekte wirtschaftlicher Integration ein.29 So beriefen in Polen im Jahr 1968 der Außenminister und der Minister für Außenhandel gleichzeitig eine Kommission für die Untersuchung der Möglichkeiten der Nutzung der Integrationsprozesse im Westen Europas für die polnische Volkswirtschaft ein.30 Offiziell wurden vor allem seitens der Partei die wirtschaftlichen Integrations- prozesse Westeuropas in ihren Zielen und Aufgaben weiterhin als gegen das sozia- listische System gerichteter Prozess wahrgenommen.31 In den wissenschaftlichen Publikationen, die seit dem Ende der 1960er Jahre verstärkt zu dem Thema der wirtschaftlichen Integration Westeuropas in Polen publiziert wurden, sah man

27. A. ZAUBERMAN, Industrial progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany 1937-1962, Oxford University Press, London, u.a., 1964, S.272. 28. W. KONDERSKI, Zagadnienie współpracy gospodarczej państw południowo-wschodniej Europy [Das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit der Länder im süd-östlichen Europa], in: Ży- cie Gospodarcze, 6(1948), S.246-249, hier: 246 f. 29. Vgl. J. SCHEVARDO, op.cit., S.7; D. JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST, Die ersten Versuche der Dezentrali- sierung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in Polen. Höhepunkte der Debatten über die Wirtschafts- reformen (1956-1968), in: H.-G. HAUPT, J. REQUATE, M. KÖHLER-BAUR (Hrsg.), Aufbruch in die Zukunft. Die 1960er zwischen Planungseuphorie und kulturellem Wandel. DDR, CSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich, Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist, 2004, S.89-106. 30. Verordnung Nr.3 des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten vom 20.03.1962 für die Berufung einer internen Arbeitsgruppe im Außenministerium für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen In- tegration und: Verordnung Nr.62 des Ministers für Außenhandel vom 13.09.1962 für die Berufung einer Arbeitsgruppe für die Bearbeitung der Folgen für den polnischen Außenhandel aufgrund des Fortschrittes der Integrationsprozesse in Westeuropa, in: A. KOCHAŃSKI, Polska 1944-1991, In- formator historyczny, Tom 2, Ważniejsze akty prawne decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1957-1970) [Polen 1944-1991, Ein historischer Leitfaden, Band 2, Die wichtigsten Rechtsakten, Entscheidun- gen und Staatlichen Beschlüsse], Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2000, S.301 und 322. 31. Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warschawie [Archiv der Neuen Akten in Warschau; weiter: AAN], Ko- mitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczenej Partii Robotniczej [Zentralkomitee der Polnischen Verei- nigten Arbeiterpartei; weiter KC PZPR], 1354/V/101, Protokół z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 14.03.1972 [Protokoll aus der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 14.03.1972], S.133. 78 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast neben den ökonomischen Motiven den Integrationsprozess auch als einen politisch, ideologisch und sogar militärisch bedingten Vorgang an.32 In den Expertengremien der beiden Länder herrschte allerdings in den 1960er Jahren bereits die Meinung vor, dass die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft den „point of no return“ erreicht hat und „zum Erfolg verurteilt“ sei.33 Angesichts des Faktes, dass die EWG in den 1960er Jahren der größte Handelsblock der Welt war und mit 185 Millionen Konsumenten den ersten Platz auf der Liste der Weltexpor- teure von Industriewaren einnahm, gleichzeitig auch zu den größten Importeuren von landwirtschaftlichen Produkten gehörte, war eine weitere Abnabelung der bei- den Länder gegenüber dieser Gemeinschaft nicht mehr möglich.

3.3. Die 1970er Jahre In den 1970er Jahren zeigte die Entspannungspolitik im Rahmen der Vorbereitung für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) auch die Änderung in den wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen zwischen den beiden Ländern und vorwiegend den EWG-Ländern.34 Im Rahmen der Vorbereitung dieser Konferenz und während des Treffens der Außenminister der Staaten des Warschauer Paktes in Budapest im Juni 1970 war dies ein Thema. Polen und andere sozialistische Länder formulierten in einem Memorandum den Vorschlag im Rahmen der KSZE auch die Probleme der Erweiterung der gesamteuropäischen Wirtschafts- und Handelsbezie- hungen zu berücksichtigen.35 Dabei hatten gemeinsame Infrastrukturprojekte Prio- rität, wie die Schaffung eines europäischen Energiesystems, der Ausbau des Stra- ßennetzes und die Verbesserung des Eisenbahntransportes in Europa. Auf der anderen Seite wurde der ostmitteleuropäische Markt immer interessan- ter für die Länder aus den westeuropäischen Integrationsbündnissen. Vor allem nach dem Ölschock der 1970er Jahre zeigte sich die Enge des EWG-Markts und eine gewisse Sättigung. In Osteuropa (inklusive der UdSSR) bestanden dagegen große Reserven sowohl an Rohstoffen als auch an den qualifizierten Arbeitskräften. Darüber hinaus stellte Ostmitteleuropa einen großen und in keiner Weise gesättig- ten Konsumentenmarkt mit fast 350 Millionen Einwohnern und einem relativ gro- ßen Wachstum dar.36 Den polnischen Wirtschaftsexperten war dieser Umstand

32. Vgl. u.a.: T. GRABOWSKI, Z. NOWAK (Hrsg.), Integracja ekonomiczna Europy Zachodniej i jej aspekty polityczno-militarne [Die wirtschaftliche Integration Westeuropas und ihre politisch-mili- tärischen Aspekte], Instytut Zachodni, Poznań, 1969; Z.M. KLEPACKI, Zachodnioeuropejskie organizacje międzynarodowe [Die internationalen Organisationen Westeuropas], Ksiąźka i Wied- za, Warszawa, 1969. 33. M. ŁYTKO, EWG – czy tylko unia celna? [EWG – nur eine Zollunion?], in: Sprawy Międzyna- rodowe, 12(1968), S.48-68, hier: 56 und 64. 34. Vgl. dazu: Z. LUDWICZAK, Aktualne problemy związane z Europejską Konferencją Bezpiec- zeństwa i Współpracy [Die aktuellen Probleme, die die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammen- arbeit in Europa betreffen], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 9(1970), S.23-34. 35. W. GRABSKA, Ogólnoeuropejska współpraca gospodarcza [Die gesamteuropäische wirtschaft- liche Zusammenarbeit], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 9(1970), S.35-49, hier: 48. Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 79 bewusst. Während der vielen Treffen im Zentralkomitee der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei am Anfang der 1970er Jahre diskutierte man daher immer öfter die Stellung Polens bezüglich der Beziehungen zwischen den RGW-Ländern und der EWG. Man stellte fest, dass die Konsolidierungsprozesse innerhalb der EWG immer weiter voranschreiten werden. Aus der Sicht der sozialistischen Länder sollte die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Gemeinschaft gegenüber den RGW-Län- dern eine große Rolle spielen. Dabei zählte man in Polen vor allem auf die Verstär- kung der industriellen Kooperation und auf westliche Kredite.37

4. Auswirkungen der Integrationsprozesse auf den Außenhandel und Reaktionen darauf

Eine weitere These dieses Beitrags lautet, dass gerade im Bereich des Außenhan- dels mit Westeuropa der Einfluss des RGW nicht sehr stark war und die Länder weitgehend eigene Interessen verfolgten. Dies lag zum einen an der institutionellen Schwäche des Rates, zum anderen daran, dass der Außenhandel im System der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft an sich einen eher niedrigen Status eingeräumt bekam.38 Diese institutionelle Schwäche des RGW führte dazu, dass sowohl Polen als auch die Tschechoslowakei immer wieder versuchten, mit westeuropäischen Ländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten und die starren Grenzen des RGW zu überwinden. Diese Wege zu den Ländern der westeuropäischen Integrationsge- meinschaften waren sehr verschieden. Allgemein erfolgte eine Reaktion beider Länder auf die westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegrationsprozesse in folgenden Bereichen: – Diskussion und Einflussnahme im Rahmen der internationalen Wirtschaftsorga- nisation, z.B.: der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission (ECE) oder des Allge- meinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommens (GATT); – Neuausrichtung der Handelbeziehungen in andere westeuropäische Märkte, vor allem im Rahmen der EFTA und NORDEK; – „Handel“ mit den EWG-Ländern über die neutralen Staaten;

36. In den Jahren 1950-1967 war das Wachstum sowohl des Volkseinkommens als auch der Industrie- produktion der RGW-Länder höher als der EWG-Länder. Grund dafür war das niedrige Ausgangs- niveau. Bei einem Ausgang der Industrieproduktion von 1950 (= 100) betrug die Steigerung der Produktion im Jahre 1967 für die RGW-Länder 176 und für die EWG entsprechend 136. Siehe da- zu: W. GRABSKA, Ogólnoeuropejska współpraca …, op.cit., S 40. 37. AAN, KC PZPR, 1354/V/101, Protokół z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 14.03.1972 [Pro- tokoll aus der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 14.03.1972], S. 12 und 133. 38. Vgl. W. SEIFFERT, Das staatliche Außenhandelmonopol – Entstehungsgeschichte und Ausge- staltung bis zur Reformperiode der 1960er Jahre, in: M. HAENDCKE-HOPPE (Hrsg.), Außen- wirtschaftssysteme und Außenwirtschaftsreformen sozialistischer Länder. Ein intrasystemarer Vergleich, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1988, S.11-17. 80 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast

– Nutzung der Kontakte zu den kommunistischen Parteien in Westeuropa und deren Wirtschaftsbereiche; – Eigene Integration im Rahmen des RGW. In diesem Beitrag wird zunächst die Neuausrichtung der Handelbeziehungen in andere westeuropäische Märkte, vor allem im Rahmen der EFTA und NORDEK und der „Handel“ mit den EWG-Ländern über die neutralen Staaten vorgestellt.

4.1. Umlenkung der Warenströme

Eine Möglichkeit, den Handel mit Westeuropa aufrecht zu erhalten bildeten u.a. die Umlenkungsstrategien der Warenströme. So kann auch die Steigerung der Handels- ströme in die EFTA-Länder aus Polen als eine direkte Auswirkung des gemeinsa- men Marktes des „kleinen Europas“ gesehen werden. Im Gegensatz zur Tschecho- slowakei spielte in Polen der Außenhandel mit den späteren EFTA-Ländern schon vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg eine große Rolle und war mit 668 Millionen Złoty Han- delsvolumen im Jahre 1936 sogar höher als mit den späteren EWG-Ländern, wo diese Summe entsprechend 624 Millionen Złoty betrug. Nach dem Zweiten Welt- krieg stieg das Handelsvolumen mit den EFTA-Ländern weiter, während der Außenhandel mit den späteren EWG-Ländern bis zum Zeitpunkt der Römischen Verträge im Jahre 1957 stagnierte bzw. sank. Danach nahmen das Handelsvolumen mit beiden Integrationsblöcken zu, aber erst im Jahre 1968 übertraf der Außenhan- del Polens mit den EWG-Ländern den Handel mit der EFTA. Aus der Statistik wird ersichtlich, dass die Zollunion der EWG vor allem für die Tschechoslowakei eine große Rolle spielte, denn für sie waren die späteren EWG-Länder traditionell die wichtigsten Handelspartner. Im Fall der Tschechoslo- wakei, das neben der DDR am meisten industrialisierte und exportorientierte Land des RGW, brach der Handel mit diesen Ländern nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg am stärksten ein und konnte sich von diesem radikalen Bruch erst Mitte der 1960er Jahre langsam erholen. Auch die sich verstärkenden Handelsvolumina mit den neutralen Ländern kön- nen als eine Folge des Integrationsprozesses in Westeuropa angesehen werden. Nach der Gründung der OEEC wurden die anderen Länder Westeuropas immer interessanter für den polnischen und tschechoslowakischen Außenhandel. Skandi- navien spielte dabei schon aus politischen Gründen wegen der Neutralität von Finnland und Schweden eine entscheidende Rolle. Für den finnischen Außenhandel sind Polen und die Tschechoslowakei nicht zu unterschätzende Handelspartner, denn beide Länder standen im Jahre 1955 auf dem 8. und 9. Platz des finnischen Exports und entsprechend auf dem 6. und 9. Platz bezüglich des finnischen Imports (siehe Tabelle). Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 81

Tabelle 1: Die Haupthandelspartner Finnlands im Jahre 1955 (in Milliarden Finn Mark)

Export Ranking Import Ranking bzgl. bzgl. Exports Imports

Großbritannien 43,5 1. 35,9 1. UdSSR 31,7 2. 26,0 2. BRD 16,5 3. 15,9 3. USA 10,4 4. 9,3 5. Frankreich 8,4 5. 10,5 4. Niederlande 8,0 6. 6,4 7. Belgien/Luxemburg 6,3 7. 5,3 8. Polen 3,6 8. 8,6 6. Tschechoslowakei 1,9 9. 4,8 9.

Quelle: Handel zagraniczny Finlandii [Der Außenhandel Finnlands], Życie Gospodarcze, 8(1956), S.321. Polen und die Tschechoslowakei beobachteten bereits seit 1952 die Integrati- onsbestrebungen der skandinavischen Länder im Rahmen des Nordischen Rates sehr genau. Ostmitteleuropa reagierte mit Enttäuschung auf den Beschluss der Kopenhagener Konferenz im April 1968, im Rahmen der EFTA eine nordische Gemeinschaft mit dem Ziel einer Zollunion zu gründen. Ein Jahr später – im Juli 1969 – wurde das Projekt der Nordischen Zollunion – NORDEK von den Regie- rungen von Dänemark, Norwegen, Schweden und Finnland umgesetzt.39 Damit entstand eine neue europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die zwar mit ca. 22 Mil- lionen Konsumenten und 40 Milliarden US-Dollar der gesamten Summe der BIPs viel kleiner als die EWG war (hier waren die Daten zu dem Zeitpunkt entsprechend 180 Millionen Konsumenten und 300 Milliarden US-Dollar), aber für Polen und die Tschechoslowakei bedeutete dies neue Handelsbarrieren in Europa. Immerhin betrugen die Handelsvolumina der NORDEK-Länder ca. ein Drittel des Umsatzes mit allen EFTA Ländern und entsprachen einem Fünftel des Außenhandels mit der EWG.40 Die sozialistischen Länder befürchteten darüber hinaus mit Recht, dass das langfristige Ziel der nordischen Länder darin bestehen könnte, ihre Position in

39. A. GROCHULSKI, NORDEK – nowy etap integracji krajów skandynawskich [NORDEK – die neue Etappe der Integration der skandinavischen Länder], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 3(1970), S.106-116, hier: 107 und 109. 40. Ibid., S.111. 82 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast den Verhandlungen mit der EWG zu stärken, um schließlich eine Integration in die EWG zu erreichen. Ein Hinweis für dieses mögliche Ziel waren unter anderen die Pläne für eine Festlegung der Zollsätze aller vier skandinavischen Länder auf die Höhe der EWG-Zölle. Die Mitgliedschaft von Schweden und Finnland in der NORDEK-Gemeinschaft rief in beiden sozialistischen Länder weiterhin Sorgen hervor, dass die Neutralität der beiden Länder aufgegeben würde und sie unter die Vorherrschaft der NATO geraten könnten. Wirtschaftlich fürchteten Polen und die Tschechoslowakei die Entstehung eines weiteren abgeschotteten Wirtschaftsblocks im Norden Europas. Damit würde die bis jetzt relativ liberale Handelspolitik der nordischen Länder gegenüber den ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten aufgegeben. Für Polen hätte das den Verlust eines relativ großen wirtschaftlichen Partners bedeutet, denn der Anteil der skandinavischen Länder am polnischen Außenhandel betrug ca. 15%. Daher schaute man mit großer Hoffnung in Richtung Finnland, wo es große Bedenken gegenüber dem NORDEK-Verbund gab.41 Gegen die Aufgabe der Neutralität, vor allem Finnlands, protestierte auch die Sowjetunion stark. In den beiden Ländern versuchte man aber weiterhin eigene Interessen unab- hängig von der Sowjetunion zu verfolgen. Bereits Mitte der 1960er Jahre herrschte unter den Wirtschaftspolitikern Polens die Meinung vor, dass die Weiterentwick- lung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den kapitalistischen Ländern eine wich- tige Aufgabe sei. Sogar Piotr Jaroszewicz, der ständige Vertreter Polens im RGW, stellte fest, dass trotz der guten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsperspektiven Polens innerhalb des RGW, ein Teil der wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben besser erfüllt werden könnten, wenn man die Kooperation mit anderen westeuropäischen Ländern aus- bauen würde.42 Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass sich die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen und westeuropäischen Ländern seit dem Anfang der 1960er Jahre langsam normalisierten. Die Bedeutung der neutralen Staaten ist schon in der 1950er Jahren rückläufig und die der EWG-Länder steigt. Vor allem war der Zoll- abbau der EWG im Prozess der Normalisierung wichtig. Während der Handel Polens mit anderen Integrationsgruppen stagnierte oder sogar sank, stieg der Anteil der EWG-Länder am Außenhandel, im Export mit Polen bereits Mitte der 1950er Jahre von ca. 6% im Jahre 1955 auf über 12% im Jahre 1970. Der Anteil der EWG-Länder am polnischen Import stagnierte dagegen fast über den gesamten Untersuchungszeitraum bei einem Umfang von ca. 10% (siehe Abbildung 2). Im Fall der Tschechoslowakei setzte das Wachstum sogar früher ein. Im Gegen- satz zu Polen nahm der Anteil der EWG-Länder sowohl im Fall des Exports als auch des Imports bereits seit 1953 kontinuierlich zu, von ca. 5% im Jahre 1953 auf über 10% im Jahre 1970. (siehe Abbildung 3).

41. Ibid., S.114. 42. P. JAROSZEWICZ, Polska, RWPG i gospodarka światowa [Polen, RGW und Weltwirtschaft], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 7-8(1967), S.16-29, hier: 19 f. Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 83

(2) Anteil des polnischen Im- und Exports aus und in die westeuropäischen Länder nach Integrationsgruppen (in Prozent)

Quelle: Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1937, S.153; Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu 1970, S.24 f.; Rocznik Statystyczny 1970, S.359 f.; Rocznik Statystyczny 1980, S.313 f. (3) Anteil des tschechoslowakischen Im- und Exports aus und in die westeuropäischen Länder nach Integrationsgruppen (in Prozent)

Quelle: Statistická Ročenka Republiky Československé 1938, S. 138-139; Stati- stická Ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky 1960, S.361-362 und 1965, S.385 und 1968, S.421 so wie 1971, S.423 und 425-427.

5. Zusammenfassung

Die Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa war trotz der offiziellen Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen 84 Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast

Parteien nicht einseitig. Er unterlag im übrigen auch Wandlungen. Die Reaktionen auf die Integrationsprozesse im Westen des Kontinents reichten von der völligen Abschottung, über Autarkietendenzen, verstärkte Integration im Rahmen des RGW bis hin zum Dialog mit den Integrationsbündnissen der westeuropäischen Länder. Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass seit dem Anfang der 1960er Jahre langsam eine Ausweitung der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen und west- europäischen Ländern zu registrieren ist. Der Zollabbau der EWG spielte in diesem Prozess eine große Rolle. In den 1970er Jahren zeigte dagegen die Entspannungs- politik im Rahmen der Vorbereitung für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusam- menarbeit in Europa (KSZE) auch eine Änderung des wirtschaftlichen Verhältnis- ses der Tschechoslowakei und Polen insbesondere zur EWG. Grundsätzlich ist festzustellen, dass die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsex- perten den Handel zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa als eine Notwendigkeit für beide Seiten ansahen. Dabei wurde die Rolle der USA in der zeitgenössischen Diskus- sion in ihrem Einfluss im Integrationsprozess im Westen des Kontinents und in der Zerstörung der traditionellen Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen betont. So sprach man im Osten über einen „atlantischen Integrationsprozess“ Westeuropas. Hier stimmen die Meinungen der ostmitteleuropäischen Wissenschaftler und Politiker mit derjenigen einiger westeuropäischer Kollegen überein. Darüber hinaus wurde der Integrationsprozess des Westens von den ostmitteleu- ropäischen Politikern und Wirtschaftsexperten gefürchtet, weil er eine Reaktivie- rung des „deutschen Imperialismus“ und die Expansion westdeutschen Ausfuhren mit sich bringen könnte. Diese Sorge gründete natürlich in den historischen Erfah- rungen Ostmitteleuropas mit dem deutschen Expansionismus. Trotz der ideologischen Vorbehalte gegenüber den Wirtschaftskontakten mit west- europäischen Ländern suchte die Wirtschaftspolitik Polens und der Tschechoslowakei nach Wegen, um den Kontakt zu den traditionellen Handelspartnern, den EFTA- und EWG-Ländern, aufrecht zu erhalten und damit auch einen Einfluss auf die westliche Integration auszuüben. Hier spielten die Diskussion und Einflussnahme im Rahmen der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation, wie der Europäischen Wirtschaftskom- mission (ECE) oder des Allgemeinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommens (GATT) eine große Rolle, denn das war die letzte Plattform, wo Mitglieder der beiden unterschiedli- chen Integrationslager sich noch treffen konnten. Hier wurden insbesondere die nega- tiven Folgen der Zollunion, die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik oder die Einfuhrkontingente für Ostmitteleuropa mit den westeuropäischen Ländern diskutiert. Zeitlich variieren die Bemühungen sehr, aber bereits in den 1960er Jahren herrschte die Meinung in den Expertengremien beider Länder, dass die Europäi- sche Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft den „point of no return“ erreicht hat und „zum Erfolg verurteilt“ sei. Angesicht der steigenden Bedeutung der EWG auf dem Welt- markt, war eine weitere Abkopplung der beiden Länder gegenüber dieser Gemein- schaft nicht mehr möglich. Zusätzlich führte die systembedingte Schwäche des RGW auch dazu, dass sowohl Polen als auch die Tschechoslowakei immer wieder versuchten, mit den westeuropäischen Ländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten und nach Auswegen aus den starren RGW-Grenzen zu suchen. 85 Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975)

Thomas FETZER

For a long time European integration historiography has been dominated by state-centred approaches either in the classic realist variant, or in the form of liberal intergovernmentalism.1 On the other hand, with the major exception of the federalist European movements,2 less attention has been paid to non-state actors. In the early post-war period neo-functionalist scholars had still contended that “interest groups” were crucial in bringing about “spill-over” effects that supposedly moved integra- tion forward,3 yet given that this general assumption proved to be of little value for historians their interest in European non-governmental organisations remained limited. Only recently, spurred by the more general turn towards transnational history and the revival of concepts such as “civil society” historians of European integration have shown a greater propensity to engage with the extensive political science literature dealing with non-state groups and networks at European level.4 So far, and rather obviously, the choice fell mostly on groups that actively attempted to influence European policy – from business and agricultural lobbies,5 pro-European party federations like the Christian Democrats,6 to “epistemic com- munities” of experts7 and those networks shaping what Keith Middlemas has called the “informal politics” of European integration.8 Largely absent are studies on cur- rents within civil society that, for whatever motives, opposed the European project consistently or for a temporary period. However, not least the recent failure of the constitution9 has demonstrated that such currents can at times have an extraordi-

1. W. LOTH, Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der europäischen Integration, in: W. LOTH, W. WESSELS (eds.), Theorien europäischer Integration, Leske+Budrich, Opladen, 2001, pp.87-106. 2. See for example A. LANDUYT, D. PREDA (eds.), I Movimenti per l’Unità Europea 1970-1986, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 3. See E. HAAS, The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957, Stevens, London, 1958. 4. See for example W. KAISER, P. STARIE (eds.), Transnational European Union. Towards a com- mon political space, Routledge, London/New York, 2005; for an overview of the political science literature see J. GREENWOOD, Interest Representation in the European Union, 2nd edition, Pal- grave, Basingstoke, 2007. 5. See for example E. BUSSIERE, M. DUMOULIN, Milieux économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au XXe siècle, Artois, Arras 1998. 6. See W. KAISER, Transnational Christian Democracy and the Making of Contemporary Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 7. See B. LEUCHT, Netzwerke als Träger grenzüberschreitenden Kulturtransfers. Transatlantische Politiknetzwerke bei der Schuman-Plan-Konferenz 1950/51, in: comparativ, 4(2006), pp.200-218. 8. K. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-1995, Fon- tana, London, 1995. 9. The “Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe” (TCE) was adopted by EU member states in 2004 but its ratification failed due to rejection in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005. 86 Thomas FETZER nary impact - simply by blocking important integration initiatives. Against the backdrop of growing signs of disenchantment with European integration political scientists have recently developed a keen interest in “Eurosceptic” movements – yet their studies, apart from few exceptions, usually lack a historical dimension.10 In the specific case of the United Kingdom Euroscepticism has to some extent always been taken into consideration by historians as part of the more general para- digm depicting Britain as the “awkward partner” in the EC because of the country’s ambiguous long-term relationship to the continent.11 However, as Anthony Forster has pointed out, few studies focused directly on Eurosceptic groups themselves, and on the historical dynamics of their changing policy agendas.12 This article is a contribution to overcome this research deficit. It is concerned with a case study of British trade union attitudes towards the European Community (EC)13 between 1961, the year of the first UK application to join the EC, and the referendum that confirmed British membership in 1975. During this time period British trade unions changed from being a cautiously pro-European to a staunchly anti-European movement. This transformation has so far received little scholarly attention – in contrast to the numerous accounts by political scientists of the cele- brated “European turn” of British trade unionism since the late 1980s.14 The main available work is Paul Teague’s unpublished Ph. D. thesis on the European policy of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which, however, is an overview of the entire post-war period up to the early 1980s.15 On the other hand, Clemens Wurms’ more

10. See for example P. TAGGART, A. SZCZERBIAK (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 (forthcoming). 11. See for example P. LUDLOW, Us or Them? The Meanings of ‘Europe’ in British Political Dis- course, in: M. af MALMBORG, B. STRATH (eds.), The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Conten- tion within and among Nations, Berg, Oxford/New York, 2002, pp.101-124. 12. A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. Opposition to Europe in the Brit- ish Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945, Routledge, London/New York, 2002, p.5. Forster himself confines his analysis to political parties. 13. The term “European Community” (EC) is used throughout the article. Direct quotations of trade union documents at times refer to “Common Market” and “European Economic Community” (EEC) as frequently used contemporary terms. 14. See for example: D. MACSHANE, Trade unions and Europe, in: Political Quarterly, 62(1991), pp.351-364; B. ROSAMOND, National labour organisations and European integration: British unions and ‘1992’, in: Political Studies, 41(1993), pp.420-434. For British union attitudes to Eu- ropean integration in the early post-war period see M.E. GUASCONI, Il Labour Party, il Trade Union Congress e il processo di integrazione europea dal 1945 al 1957, in: A. CIAMPANI (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione di interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947-1957), Franco Angeli, Milano, 1995, pp.112-126. 15. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe: The response of British trade unions to membership of the Eu- ropean Communities, Unpublished Ph. D., London School of Economics, 1984; see also his short summary The British TUC and the European Community, in: Millenium, 18(1989), pp.29-46. The TUC is the national federation of all major trade unions in the United Kingdom created in 1868. While being little involved in collective bargaining processes the main function of the TUC has been to represent the movement in the political arena. Therefore, the annual TUC Congress, the highest decision-making body, has been the most important arena of debate about European inte- gration. Between Congresses European issues have been dealt with by the TUC General Council (GC) and the GC’s Economic Committee. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 87 focused article is confined to the years between 1969 and 1971.16 Both authors do not systematically address the question of British unions’ Eurosceptic turn. The article starts out with a description of the change of TUC policy towards a positive endorsement of European integration in the early 1960s. The main part then reconstructs and explains the turn towards Euroscepticism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Particular attention will be paid to the changing perceptions of multinational firms with examples often drawn from the automobile sector. In the conclusions the article sketches out some broader implications of the case study for European integration history research.17

British trade unions as cautious advocates of EC membership (1960-63)

In his work about the TUC Teague depicted a situation of almost permanent infighting over the question of British EC membership between pro-marketeers, anti-marketeers, and a more pragmatic “centrist” fraction. The latter was by far the largest group, and its approach corresponded to the “Labourist” tradition of British trade unionism:18 attention was concentrated on the economic and social benefits and/or costs of EC membership while little interest was shown for the “high poli- tics” of European unity. Consequently, the shifts of TUC positions over time must primarily be accounted for by changing attitudes within this “centrist” group.19 The first of these shifts occurred in the early 1960s. Until the late 1950s the TUC majority regarded the EC with scepticism – as did most employers and the British government. TUC positions closely resembled those leading to the withdra- wal of the British government representatives from the Spaak Committee in November 1955: UK trade still strongly gravitated towards the Commonwealth countries, and there were good reasons to believe that future British prosperity would have little to do with a European customs union.20 Change came in 1960 and 1961 again basically in line with the parallel transfor- mation of government positions leading to the first application for EC membership endorsed by the Conservative Macmillan cabinet in July 1961.21 The first public

16. C. WURM, Verbände und europäische Integration. Großbritanniens Beitritt zur EG aus der Sicht von Industrie (CBI) und Gewerkschaften (TUC) 1969-1971, in: F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-84, Wissen- schaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2004, pp.329-377. 17. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the HEIRS colloquium “European voices: Actors and Witnesses of European Integration” in Geneva in March 2007. I would like to thank the participants of the colloquium, in particular Anne Deighton, Linda Risso, and Antonio Varsori, for their helpful suggestions. 18. See J. SAVILLE, The Ideology of Labourism, in: R. BENEWICK et. al. (eds.), Knowledge and Be- lief in Politics, Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, pp.213-226. 19. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe …, op.cit. 20. See A. MILWARD, The Rise and Fall of a national strategy. The UK and the European Commu- nity, Vol.1, 1945-1963, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.178 ff. 21. Ibid., pp.310-351. 88 Thomas FETZER trade union endorsement of British entry into the EC was expressed in a report of the Confederation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions (CSEU) on the future of the automobile industry in August 1960. It urged the government to seek imme- diate talks about EC membership before “irreparable damage” was done to British car exports.22 It is worth looking in more detail at the case of the motor industry to analyse the background to this new pro-EC position: Since 1945 Britain had become a car-exporting nation, and the industry could not maintain its production and employment levels without success in overseas markets. However, by the late 1950s, export prospects became clouded. Orders from Commonwealth countries decreased heavily due to local development policies backed up by tariffs and local-content provisions. These losses were temporarily offset by increased exports to North America, however with the launch of “compact cars” in the United States this option quickly evaporated.23 In this situation British motor industry unions, as much as the automobile employers, joined the chorus of those who saw the fast-growing markets in Western Europe as primary targets for British exports. The CSEU document noted that “with the competition from the US in building compact cars and the growth of native car industries in other parts of the world, there is no doubt that the British car indus- try will have to look for its export increasingly to Western Europe”.24 In this context, the unions also started to worry about the effects of Britain’s exclusion from the EC since UK producers now suffered a competitive disadvan- tage compared to Fiat, Renault or Volkswagen, each of whom benefited from a new larger “home market”. Membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was not seen as compensating this disadvantage. The CSEU document concluded that the government should “face up to the fact that to protect our interests there is no sensible alternative but for this country to offer to join the Common Market straight away”.25 Deliberations between the TUC, the CSEU, and individual motor industry unions in 1961 resulted in a joint policy paper, which reinforced this pro-EC approach. It was acknowledged that turning to the EC meant facing tough competition, and if the British motor industry proved not efficient enough, this could mean “the loss of home markets without a corresponding build-up in European markets”. But this negative scenario was dismissed because “there is little reason to doubt that the British car industry could compete favourably” provided the UK would join the EC soon.26

22. R.J. LIEBER, British Politics and European Unity. Parties, Elites and Pressare Groups, Univer- sity of California Press, Berkeley, 1970, p.106. 23. See T.R. WHISLER, The British Motor Industry. 1945-1994. A Case Study in industrial decline, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 312 ff. 24. MRC (Modern Records Centre Warwick), MSS. 44/TEN.4/8, CSEU, Draft Report on the motor industry, undated [August 1960]. 25. Ibid. 26. MRC, MSS. 292B/617/1., CSEU, The Motor Manufacturing Industry. Observations of the Sub-Committee on the questions circulated by the TUC, undated [July 1961]. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 89

There was another, more specific aspect of the EC issue. Unlike other major European car-producing countries such as Italy or France, though similarly to Ger- many, the British motor industry was characterised by a strong presence of multina- tional US-owned firms – Ford and General Motors had established subsidiaries in the UK already in the 1920s, and they were to be followed by Chrysler with the take-over of Rootes in the mid 1960s.27 This meant that the export capacity of the British car industry depended to a large extent on investment decisions by multina- tional firms. Here, the question of EC membership took a particular twist since Ford and General Motors both had subsidiaries in Germany potentially able to cater for European exports, too. The issue was less salient with regard to GM since the company’s British and German subsidiaries kept two competing model ranges until the early 1970s. In the case of Ford, however, sourcing decisions in Europe started to be influenced by considerations about the political future of the EC since the late 1950s – basically leading to a slow upgrading of the German subsidiary.28 The impact of this emerging competition for investment on British union thin- king became discernible in November 1960 when Ford requested government per- mission to buy out the minority shareholders of the UK subsidiary as it had done in Germany shortly before. Union leaders concurred with government views that refu- sal would result in investment diversion to Cologne in Germany, and hence the loss of valuable export potential.29 On the other hand, they hoped that Ford UK would benefit from the major sales efforts the company was expected to undertake in European markets in the 1960s, thus stabilising and further improving employment prospects in Britain. Clearly, these hopes and fears were all directly connected to the question of British EC membership. Ford might for a while have accepted mar- ginal profits in European markets but in the longer term sourcing advantages over the German subsidiary could only be expected if rapid entry into the EC was secu- red.30 The example of the automobile industry thus confirms what has been repeatedly emphasised as the basic feature of British union attitudes in the early 1960s, namely its “economistic” bias, which stood in sharp contrast to the Labour Party’s hardening political opposition to the EC.31 Admittedly the TUC leadership raised a number of other points in the consultations with government ministers in 1961 and 1962, on the one hand with regard to safeguards for Britain’s national economic sovereignty and its links with the Commonwealth that ensured low food prices, on the other related to the need for a better representation of trade union interests

27. See R. CHURCH, The rise and decline of the British motor industry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. 28. See S. TOLLIDAY, The origins of Ford of Europe: From multidomestic to transnational corpo- ration, 1903-1976, in: S. TOLLIDAY, H. BONIN, Y. LUNG (eds.), Ford, 1903-2003: The Euro- pean History, vol.1, pp.153-242, here: pp.182 ff. 29. MRC, MSS.44/TEN. 4/8, Unsigned note „United States private investment in Britain”, undated [November 1960]. 30. MRC, MSS. 126/TG/Sack 24/1, Notes of proceedings of Ford Joint Negotiating Committee, 29.05.1961. 31. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe …, op.cit., pp.83-84; R.J. LIEBER, British Politics …, pp.109 ff. 90 Thomas FETZER within EC institutions. Yet, these either subsided because of government reassuran- ces or were simply dropped because of the overriding argument about the link bet- ween European trade and national welfare. At the 1961 TUC Congress, for example, the General Council’s report on the EC stressed once more the importance of entry for British trade; significantly, the example of motor cars was again put forward as the paradigm case justifying rapid accession.32 TUC leaders were nearly unanimous in their support of entry. It is true that the official policy stance adopted by Congress and General Council was to reserve final judgement until the concrete terms of entry became known. However, as Robert Lieber has argued, this public policy line is probably foremost attributable to a concern not to embarrass the Labour Party.33

The Eurosceptic Turn (1969-1975)

The timing of British unions’ anti-European turn is somewhat controversial. Teague’s chronology closely follows official TUC Congress decisions, which declared opposition to entry for the first time in 1971, and, in a more principled form, in 1972.34 Against this rather rigid focus on formal decisions Wurm has rightly emphasised that a clear shift towards scepticism within the movement already occurred in the late 1960s.35 Admittedly, the “official” TUC position in 1970 was little different from that in 1962, namely the reservation of final judge- ment until after the precise terms of entry were available. There can be little doubt, too, that after June 1970 the trade unions’ more general policy to oppose the new Tory government under its Euro-enthusiastic Prime minister Edward Heath encou- raged a stance of rejection.36 Yet, already the General Council reports on the issue in 1969 and 1970 were much less optimistic than they had been in the early 1960s, and Congress debates acquired a much stronger critical tone. To fully understand the historical dynamics of the shift in British union thinking we are well advised to look for longer-term changes, all the more so if we consider that the anti-European turn was not to be a short-lived interlude but was to continue until the 1975 referen- dum, and, after a brief period of adaptation “enforced” by the clear polling defeat of the anti-EC camp, was to resurface in the late 1970s. How and for what reasons then did the majority within the British union move- ment shift to anti-European positions in the late 1960s and early 1970s? We can lar- gely discard Tom Nairn’s argument that the anti-EC camp within the British labour movement was imbued with an isolationist political and social culture (the “little

32. TUC, Report of Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1961, pp.325 ff. 33. R.J. LIEBER, British Politics …, op.cit., p.111. 34. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, op.cit., p.32. 35. C. WURM, Verbände …, pp.358-359. 36. J.W. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1993, p.114. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 91

Englander” attitude), portraying the EC as an institution of bureaucrats and big capital alien to British political traditions.37 Nairn was primarily concerned with the European policy of the Labour Party. His assessment appears to have a certain validity for the attitudes of a number of left-leaning organisations within the TUC but these attitudes did not change much between 1962 and 1970, and they also remained those of a rather small minority.38 The decisive shift occurred in the large “centrist” group within the TUC, and it is here that we must look for explanations. Since the “centrists” were mainly intere- sted in the concrete economic and social effects of EC membership, and in the pre- cise terms of entry, there are two basic options of interpretation: Either the terms of accession as negotiated between the Six and the British government had worsened or were considered to have worsened, or the broader assessment of economic and social benefits and risks had become more negative. This article opts for the second approach. This choice is not meant to downplay the salience of the often hotly debated terms of entry themselves. Their importance is easily understood if the changes of the EC’s budget and agricultural policies between the early and late 1960s are considered. From a British point of view these changes basically amoun- ted to the simple truth that accession became more expensive - a fact that undoub- tedly affected trade union attitudes.39 Yet, as the remainder of the article attempts to demonstrate, British union views of accession shifted partly independent of the precise terms of entry. Two aspects were of crucial importance, first a changed assessment of economic benefits and risks of EC membership, and second, the increasing importance of European ele- ments for domestic debates about a reform of the British political economy, in par- ticular with regard to industrial relations.40 The analysis will now turn to these two aspects in more detail.

Roots of the Eurosceptic turn I: A changed assessment of economic benefits and risks

British trade union support for EC accession in the early 1960s had mainly been based on the optimistic assessment of national welfare gains through increased European trade and foreign investment in the UK. Yet, by the late 1960s much of this optimism had been lost. Already at the time of the second application by the Labour government in 1967 union assessments had struck a more sceptical note.

37. T. NAIRN, The Left against Europe, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973. 38. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, op.cit., p.37. 39. See C. WURM, Verbände …, pp.338 f. 40. The term ‘industrial relations’ is used here in its conventional meaning as the system of relation- ships between workers, trade unions, employers and the state concerned with rules pertaining to labour aspects of production – see J. ZEITLIN, From labour history to the history of industrial re- lations, in: Economic History Review, 40(1987), pp.159-184, here: p.159. 92 Thomas FETZER

The General Council had in principle supported the renewed attempt for entry but its report to that year’s Congress emphasised that opinions about the wisdom of EC entry were divided within the movement and the country not least because effects on the British balance of trade and capital appeared to be uncertain. The report admitted that most employers and the government were confident about long-term gains yet stressed that even government estimates assumed a strong growth of imports and capital outflows in the first years following accession. The paragraph on foreign investment illustrates this more sceptical view: “The government is thought to believe that after Britain had joined the EEC it would become a more attractive field for American investment, and that increase in this would more than compensate for capital outflow from Britain to the wider EEC. It is not known whether this view is based on any quantitative analysis. There are various general reasons for taking the view that, if an US investor had to choose between the Continent and Britain his choice would be for Britain. But it must be acknowledged that this is only conjectural while the short-term deteriorating effects are certain”.41 If the majority of TUC leaders supported the 1967 application for membership the main argument underpinning their case had shifted away from the optimistic hopes for welfare gains of the early 1960s towards a position that saw entry as “ine- vitable” because of the lack of viable alternatives; rather than potential benefits it were the costs of non-entry alone that were at stake now. As general secretary George Woodcock put it: “In the long run it is really the only thing we can do; we have to do it”.42 Pessimism was strongly reinforced during the renewed debate about the EC bet- ween 1969 and 1971. Unlike in 1967 the TUC carefully avoided to declare princi- pled support for the opening of negotiations despite the fact that the Labour government of Harold Wilson conducted the initial steps. At the 1969 Congress a General Council representative took great pains to secure the withdrawal of an anti-EC motion from the floor but pointed out himself that “we all know that entry into the Common Market would present considerable difficulties for Britain”.43 In the consultations with Wilson and other ministers in early 1970 several union lea- ders questioned the optimistic government distinction between probable short-term difficulties and beneficial longer-term “dynamic effects” of entry enabling British firms to operate in a larger “home market”. They argued that short-term problems might well lead to serious balance of payment problems, triggering the need for deflationary policies, which could slow down growth and thus deteriorate the posi- tion of British companies vis-à-vis their continental competitors. In this case entry was likely to boost the exports of firms from EC countries to the UK rather than the other way around.44 It is true that the General Council report for the 1970 Congress was fairly neu- tral in assessing potential benefits and risks, and it gave much attention to the pre-

41. TUC, Report of the 99th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1967, p.417. 42. Ibid., p.578. 43. TUC, Report of the 101st Annual Trades Union Congress, 1-5 September 1969, p.598. 44. MRC, MSS.292B/560.1/23, TUC Economic Committee, 13.05.1970. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 93 cise terms of entry, e.g. with regard to the Community budget and the costs associated with the Common Agricultural Policy. In Congress debates, too, the expected increase in the cost of living due to higher food prices and the introduc- tion of a value-added tax were often quoted as the decisive drawbacks of EC mem- bership. However, those opposing accession also consistently pointed to the likely balance of payment problems not only because of the EC budget burden but also because of an anticipated “flight of capital” from Britain to the Continent. Signifi- cantly, the General Council report did not anymore mention growing US invest- ments as a “conjectural” factor that might offset such a trend. It also diluted the strong emphasis on the costs of non-entry still discernible in the 1967 debate; Fea- ther, the new general secretary, alluded to general tariff reductions in the frame- work of GATT, which might make the case for EC entry less pressing. And despite this clear shift of leadership positions a motion challenging the General Council with a call for fundamental opposition to EC membership was only narrowly defea- ted.45 The argument of a slow sliding of British union policy towards anti-European positions in the late 1960s can be given added weight if we consider the develop- ment of attitudes towards foreign-owned firms during this period. As the example of Ford demonstrated such firms had been regarded as vehicles of export and investment growth by union leaders in the early 1960s. From 1967, however, deba- tes took a critical turn. There was a strong influence of increasing public uneasi- ness about the rapid rise of US investment in Europe, reflected in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreibers’ international bestseller Le défi américain.46 A key event in Bri- tain was the take-over of Rootes by Chrysler in early 1967. The fact that three of the four major motor industry firms were now owned by Detroit giants created anxious debates about the potential for American control over the entire sector in the future. Partly connected to these developments, the terms “international” or “multinational” were increasingly used to describe the tendency among for- eign-owned firms to integrate subsidiaries across borders. Again, US-owned com- panies often played the role of pioneers, already in 1967, for instance, Ford standardised its European car ranges and created the holding company “Ford of Europe” to coordinate activities on a continental scale.47 These developments occurred at a time when many sectors of British industry experienced serious diffi- culties. The general economic climate in the UK had been less favourable than on the Continent for a number of years, resulting in relatively lower GDP and income growth rates. British firms had fallen behind in terms of output, investment and profit levels. Their positions vis-à-vis European competitors were much less strong than in the early 1960s.48

45. TUC, Report of the 102nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, pp.468 f., 675-688, 741-753. 46. J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le défi américain, Denoel, Paris 1967. 47. See S. TOLLIDAY, The origins of Ford …, op.cit. 48. For the car industry: T.R. WHISLER, The British Motor Industry, op.cit. 94 Thomas FETZER

Against this backdrop, union scepticism about the benefits of international eco- nomic integration grew. In 1967, for example, the annual CSEU conference expres- sed apprehension about the potential loss of independent British research and development capacities, and requested a government inquiry into the degree of American penetration in strategic sectors of the economy.49 In the same year the TUC Congress called for the application of stricter government controls over the outflow and inflow of capital.50 More crucially still was a further shift in 1969 with the emergence of a new and critical trade union discourse on “multinational” com- panies, displaying strong anxiety that the cross-border integration of national subsi- diaries would induce companies to switch assets from Britain to the Continent, and thus accelerate industrial decline.51 The example of Ford is instructive again. In the early 1960s British union lea- ders had hoped that European exports could be increased through the international Ford network, and that this would fortify the position of Ford UK among the com- pany’s operations in Europe. But since the mid 1960s the opposite development had been set in motion. In 1965, a major expansion of capacity had taken place at Ford of Germany, and as a consequence the British subsidiary was soon downgra- ded to the role of a “junior partner”. From 1970 Ford UK was increasingly barred from exporting to EC countries, which became the almost exclusive domain of Ford of Germany. The export share of Ford UK sales fell from around 45 percent in 1968/9 to about 30 percent in 1972/3.52 From the point of view of British trade unions examples such as this seemed to require a re-assessment of positions. On the one hand, the TUC launched a cam- paign for stronger government control over the operations of multinational firms, e.g. through so-called “planning agreements”.53 The campaign was not without its ambiguities – given the traditional “apolitical” nature of British trade unionism – and it was not meant to ban foreign investors from the country; indeed, the more critical stance was combined with a continued appreciation of the advantages of foreign direct investment.54 On the other hand, a direct link was drawn between the strategies of multinatio- nal firms and the question of British EC membership. Within the TUC concern grew that the declining competitiveness of British industry would be further eroded by its link with the international economy – a complete reversal of the positions taken in the early 1960s. National officers, who back then had been among the most ardent promoters of integrating British industries with Europe, now became oppon-

49. MRC, MSS. 259/5/3, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the CSEU, 10.08.1967. 50. TUC, Report of the 99th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1967, p.508. 51. J. GENNARD, Multinational Corporations and British Labour. A Review of Attitudes and Re- sponses, London, 1971. 52. See S. TOLLIDAY, Ford of Britain: Statistical Appendix to chapters 13 & 14, in: S. TOLLIDAY, H. BONIN, Y. LUNG (eds.), Ford, 1903-2003, vol.2, op.cit., pp.118-149, here: pp.139, 144. 53. MRC, MSS. 292 D, Box 936, TUC, Report of a conference on international companies, London 21.10.1970. 54. MRC, MSS. 292 D, 560.1/Box 1087, TUC Economic Committee, 13.06.1973. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 95 ents of EC membership, arguing that British firms – in the face of export restric- tions imposed by multinational management – were better off selling outside Europe.55 Such concerns were voiced with increasing alarm during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At Ford, to quote this example once more, they were regularly rai- sed during the annual wage negotiations. As a union document elaborated in 1970: “There are obvious grave doubts as to the economic consequences of EEC entry anyway, but a major ‘non-joiner’ in the export effort of our most important export industry stacks the cards against the employment prospects of British car workers with a vengeance”.56 It was such trade union anxiety about the competitive weakness of British indu- stry, and the perceived reinforcement of that weakness by international capital movements, which strongly contributed to the anti-EC turn of British trade unions culminating in the 1971 Congress decision to oppose accession altogether. Indeed, these arguments gained further prominence in the subsequent years until 1974 during which the TUC radicalised its opposition to EC entry.57 Pessimist scenarios were vindicated by the deterioration of the British balance of payment not least as a result of a net outflow of investment capital; in the case of European investments by American multinationals, for example, the early 1970s witnessed a relative decline of the UK share from around 50 to 25 percent.58 TUC Congress debates on the EC between 1972 and 1974 saw delegates time and again pointing to the link between EC entry and capital outflow that increasingly endangered employment prospects of workers in the UK.59 There were, however, two aspects that limited the salience of these union argu- ments. First, many unionists were well aware that the British economy continued to depend both on foreign direct investment and trade with EC countries – even if at less advantageous terms. Opposition to EC entry was never combined with convin- cing proposals for an alternative economic framework; the minority within the TUC criticising the opposition stance had little difficulty to expose the flawed nature of suggestions to reanimate Commonwealth trade or increase economic rela- tions with Communist Eastern Europe.60 At the same time, the TUC majority had no intention to embrace the increasingly radical questioning of international econo- mic integration by the Left in the Labour Party. TGWU leader Jack Jones dismissed

55. For the motor industry see MRC, MSS. 126/TG/3, Sack 33/2, National Advisory Council for the Motor Manufacturing Industry – Minutes of the 76th meeting, 01.02.1967. 56. TURU (Archive Trade Union Research Unit, Ruskin College Oxford), File “Ford claim 1970”, Supplementary Notes on Motor Industry, with special reference to Ford Claim, undated [October 1970]. 57. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, p.32. 58. J. M. STOPFORD, L. TURNER, Britain and the Multinationals, Wiley, Chichester/New York, 1985, p.140. 59. See for example TUC, Report of the 104th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1972, pp.448, 521; Report of the 106th Annual Trades Union Congress, 2-6 September 1974, pp.181, 430, 479, 486-487, 491. 60. See for example TUC, Report of the 102nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, p.685. 96 Thomas FETZER

Tony Benn’s proposals for comprehensive government planning and a vast nationa- lisation program as “airy-fairy stuff”.61 There was a widespread view in the move- ment that such radical schemes were doomed to fail, or, if they were indeed implemented, they would come at the expense trade union freedom to collective bargaining. As in the case of most other post-war Eurosceptic groups in the UK62 trade union opposition to the EC lacked a strong alternative vision. Second, the argument that EC entry and concomitant international capital out- flow perpetuated the competitive weakness of British industry was only compelling from a trade union point of view. In fact, prior to accession a large fraction of Bri- tish employers, and to some extent even the CBI shared union concerns about the difficulty of many British firms to withstand the pressure of European competition. Yet, British employers were still firmly in favour of accession, and their case was not only based on the already mentioned costs of non-entry, the opinion that Britain could “not afford to be left out”. Employers also continued to suggest that short-term costs would be outweighed by long-term benefits provided British indu- stry was granted the right conditions to restore its competitiveness. Indeed, EC entry itself was increasingly seen as an inducement in this direction since stronger European competition would be a helpful “cold shower” to accelerate the moderni- sation of the country’s political economy.63 In other words, there was a direct connection between the question of Britain’s EC membership, and the controversial domestic debates how to reverse relative economic decline. This brings us to the second major underlying cause of British unions’ Eurosceptic turn: Their growing resistance to EC entry not only reflected the competitive weakness of British industry but also their perception of a link bet- ween the EC issue and anti-union agendas to overcome economic difficulties.

Roots of the Eurosceptic turn II: The end of the “post-war compromise”

This second aspect of the analysis needs to be seen in the more general historical con- text of mid- to late 1960s British politics, in particular against the backdrop of the end of what is usually called the “post-war compromise”, that is, the tripartite consensus between governments, employers and trade unions based on the double commitment to the promotion of economic growth and full employment, supplemented by an expanded welfare state and a “voluntarist” industrial relations framework.64

61. T. BENN, Against the Tide. Diaries 1973-76, Hutchinson, London, 1989, p.46. 62. A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism …, op.cit., p.143. 63. C. WURM, Verbände …, op.cit., pp.338-349. 64. See A. CAMPBELL, N. FISHMAN, J. MCILROY, The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1945-1964, in: J. MCILROY, N. FISHMAN, A. CAMPBELL (eds.), British trade unions and industrial politics, vol.1, The post-war compromise, 1945-1964, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, pp.69-113. “Voluntarism” meant that compared to most other European countries collective labour law played a marginal role for British industrial relations – see P. DAVIES, M. FREEDLAND, La- bour Legislation and Public Policy. A Contemporary History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 97

Different interpretations have been suggested as to the precise moment of rup- ture of this tripartite consensus but from a trade union point the mid 1960s were certainly a turning point. Slow economic growth and rising inflation restrained the Labour government’s commitment to ensure full employment and even led it to introduce an incomes policy. There was also a tendency to blame organised labour for British industrial problems, expressed in media agitation about the need for government policies to curb strikes. These developments strongly clashed with those on the union side. The expectations of workers had risen with employment security and regular pay increases after the war, an effect reinforced by the arrival of a new generation of young employees on the labour market. The consolidation of shop stewards as bargaining agents in many companies gave protest an outlet as the political balance within British unions shifted to more radical positions. The two largest blue-collar unions TGWU and AEU increasingly supported local mili- tancy, partly for ideological reasons, partly as an instrument to gain ground in inter-union competition.65 Aspects of international economic integration came to be associated with this break of consensus since 1968/69. It is instructive in this regard to look again at the emerging trade union debate about multinational firms during those years, which was not only concerned with new business strategies facilitating cross-border shifts of investment but also with the concomitant rise of new bargaining practices that linked threats to switch capital assets to productivity “benchmarking” between national subsidiaries. From the point of view of British unions this entailed the dan- ger of a new permanent restraint on their demands for improved wages and wor- king conditions, and their ability to deploy the strike weapon to pursue these objectives.66 The case of Ford provides a good illustration again. Here, this new dynamics became visible for the first time during a strike in February 1969 when senior management representatives declared publicly that the worsening strike record was among the major reasons why the company was liable to fall behind the German subsidiary in terms of future investment. Indeed, the issue was promoted to the cen- tre-stage of national public debates as Ford’s threats were discussed at length in the House of Commons.67 Prime minister Wilson himself attacked the strikers publicly, warning that their action would induce Ford to shift development plans abroad.68 Subsequent years witnessed similar debates on several occasions, most notoriously during the nine-week long strike in 1971 when Henry Ford II flew in personally to tell Prime minister Heath that he could not recommend any further capital expendi- ture in Britain. Such statements triggered an unprecedented debate in parliament

65. Cf. R. UNDY et. al., Change in Trade Unions. The development of UK unions since the 1960s, Hutchinson, London, 1981, pp.97 f., 275 ff. 66. MRC, MSS. 292 D, Box 936, TUC, Report of a conference on international companies, London, 21.10.1970. 67. HANSARD Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol.779, cols.978 ff., 1373 ff. 68. Financial Times, 15.03.1969. 98 Thomas FETZER and the national media about whether trade union militancy imperilled the future of British operations within Ford’s international network.69 Debates on the EC took a similar turn. British unions could not fail to notice that many employers, the Conservative Party and even fractions of the Labour Party viewed EC membership increasingly as a useful instrument to trigger “long-nee- ded” changes to modernise Britain’s political economy – with industrial relations and trade unionism featuring as one of the most prominent fields.70 At TUC Con- gresses in the late 1960s and early 1970s the issue was brought up time and again. One delegate opposing EC entry in principle argued in 1970: “The fact is that we will not only be thrown in at the deep end, but we will have a ball and chain around our legs at the same time. As we fight back we shall be faced with employers, who are, increasingly, the big multi-national companies, who will be able to say that now we are in the Common Market they are much freer to take their investment to areas outside this country”.71 One year later Jack Jones, the TGWU leader, described his anticipation of employer responses to EC entry as follows: “What they will be saying is with all the extra competition, with imports flooding into the country, they will be getting tougher against any wage increases because they will fear that they will lose sales”.72 Arguments about a link between the EC issue and the domestic strength of Bri- tish trade unionism were further fuelled by the debates about a reform of industrial relations. Since the mid 1960s, against the backdrop of an increasing number of strikes, a fraction within the employer federation CBI had increasingly argued for a break with Britain’s “voluntarist” tradition. In the motor industry, for example, employers lobbied in favour of legislation to restrict unofficial strikes and make the unions discipline their members and shop stewards.73 Under pressure from employers, the opposition and growing media hysteria about the alleged British “strike disease” the Labour government appointed a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Donovan to look into the reform of industrial relations. And while the report of the Commission, published in 1968, came out clearly in favour of keeping the voluntarist system, the debate about how to legally curb trade union power did not abate. After the failure of the first, rather modest attempt by the Labour government in 1969 (the White Paper “In Place of Strife”) the real confrontation between government and unions came with the Industrial Relations Act of the Conservative Heath government in 1971: trade union immunities were restricted to legally regi- stered organisations with registration in turn depending on rules for the conduct of

69. HANSARD Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol.795, cols.1288 f.; vol.797, cols.905 f.; vol.815, cols.238 f. 70. C. WURM, Sozialisten und europäische Integration: Die britische Labour Party 1945-1984, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 38(1987), pp.280-295, here: p.288. 71. TUC, Report of the 102nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, p.682. 72. TUC, Report of the 103rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 6-10 September 1971, p.472. 73. PRO (Public Record Office),LAB 10/2468, Note of a meeting, 06.05.1965. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 99 industrial disputes, an Industrial Relations Court was created with wide-ranging powers of intervention in strikes.74 This debate was connected to the question of EC entry on the one hand because reform proposals had an international dimension. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was clearly inspired by foreign models; Heath himself is said to have wanted to transform British unions along the lines of their German and North American counterparts.75 On the other hand, the unions perceived the legislation to be linked to the parallel aspirations of the government to take Britain into the EC. At the 1971 TUC Congress Jones voiced the suspicion that “the principal purpose of the Industrial Relations Act was to prepare the way for us to go into Europe”.76 A dele- gate of the Amalgamated Engineering Federation argued that

“the overall policy of this government, its action in introducing the Industrial Rela- tions Act, has in its make-up a conditioning of the British trade union movement to policies and laws in Europe which already condition the majority of trade union movements within the European Community”.77 The latter remark points to an additional dimension of British unions’ anti-European turn. Resistance to EC entry was reinforced by cross-border compa- rison with trade union models in other European countries. Continental labour organisations were described as being restrained by restrictive legal frameworks; Jones bluntly stated that “in the Common Market the trade unions are weak”.78 Arguments against legal regulation not only applied to legal restrictions of strikes and the enforceability of bargaining agreements but also to statutory instruments of employee representation that in different forms were in operation in almost all EC countries. The German works council and co-determination systems were seen as particularly problematic. A TUC report on German industrial relations from 1969 perceived the impact of co-determination primarily as creating shopfloor apathy. Works councils and union membership in supervisory boards, unduly blurring the lines between capital and labour representatives, were seen as unacceptable. All these features militated“ against the growth and organisation of strong trade unio- nism”.79 Clearly, then, one of the driving forces behind the resistance against EC mem- bership appears to have been the desire to isolate UK unions from pressure to “Europeanise” domestic collective bargaining and industrial relations. If the bene- ficial growth effects of EC entry had to be bought at the price of wage moderation

74. R. TAYLOR, The Heath government and industrial relations: myth and reality, in: S. BALL, A. SELDON (eds.), The Heath Government 1970-1974. A Reappraisal, Longman, London/New York, 1996, pp.161-190. 75. A. TAYLOR, The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions, in: A. CAMPBELL, N. FISHMAN, J. MCILROY, British Trade Unions …, op.cit., vol.2, pp.151-186, here: pp. 153-4. 76. TUC, Report of the 103rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 6-10 September 1971, p.473. 77. Ibid., p.482. 78. Ibid., p.485. 79. MRC, MSS 292 B./560.1/20, TUC, Economic Committee, 12.03.1969. 100 Thomas FETZER and stronger legal regulation of trade union affairs this was a price British unions were not prepared to pay.

Conclusions

In retrospect, the Eurosceptic turn of British trade unions between the late 1960s and mid 1970s, culminating in their campaign for British withdrawal in the 1975 referendum, may seem to fit into “New Labour’s” general memory tale of union militancy in the 1970s as “ghosts” from a different epoch, which have left little meaning for subsequent generations.80 Indeed, ever since the late 1960s the British trade union lobby against the EC has not only been fraught with contradictions but has probably been one of the least successful campaigns in the post-war history of the movement. In the light of this, what is the broader significance of the case study for European integration historiography? First of all, it is useful to recall that the outcome of the British referendum in 1975 could by no means be taken for granted at the time. A study dedicated to the run-up to the poll has suggested that an early vote at the time of the elections in March 1974 might well have yielded the opposite result.81 If we take this counter- factual seriously the case study can be read as a typical example of the indirect influence of Eurosceptic groups in post-war British politics: Devoid of any substan- tial “input” Euroscepticism acted as a negative constraint on government policy, forced pro-Europeans to move cautiously, and caused enormous problems for party leaderships (here for Labour) to keep a united front.82 Moreover, the case of trade unions helps to account for the changing character of British Euroscepticism in the late 1960s and early 1970s; as Forster has argued it was precisely during this period that previously dominant arguments related to ideology, geopolitics and national sovereignty were superseded by stronger concerns for the economic and social implications of European integration.83 In a longer-term perspective such concerns were by no means completely new. Frank Trentmann has demonstrated that anxiety over the implications of internatio- nal economic integration for domestic welfare was widespread in the British labour movement already in the period prior to the First World War.84 The core belief was similar to that underlying opposition to EC entry in the early 1970s, namely that the creation of wealth through international trade and investment should not be looked

80. J. MCILROY, The enduring alliance? Trade unions and the making of New Labour, 1994-97, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36(1998), pp.537-564, here: p.542. 81. D. BUTLER, U. KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, Macmillan, London, 1976, p.34. 82. See A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism …, op.cit., pp.138-140. 83. Ibid., p.39. 84. F. TRENTMANN, Wealth versus Welfare: the British Left between Free Trade and National Po- litical Economy before the First World War, in: Historical Research, 70(1997), pp.70-98. Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 101 at in isolation from its impact upon national labour markets and social policy insti- tutions. Indeed, this is an issue whose significance goes beyond the specific case of UK accession: Social policy and industrial relations, while legally still today almost exclusive domains of nation-states, have always been affected by EC measures to boost market integration, in the enabling way described by Alan S. Milward,85 yet increasingly also in a constraining sense by placing adaptation pressures on natio- nal socioeconomic institutions.86 In the light of recent controversies about EU directives related to the free movement of services and workers we may interpret the case of British trade unions in the early 1970s as setting a “template” for Euroscepticism in the name of the protection of national social standards and insti- tutions. It would be worthwhile to apply this analytical perspective to other coun- tries, too, incidentally also in the case of non-state actors, which were not fundamentally opposed to European integration, yet at times attempted to block particular EC initiatives perceived to endanger national social policy achievements. The British example highlights the limits of such a policy, too. British trade union attitudes were purely defensive shying away from the radical alternatives of the Labour Left while failing to put forward a coherent alternative international economic framework. There was also little awareness that non-participation in the EC by one of the largest European trade union movements by definition weakened the potential to build up pressure for a more labour-friendly Community – as Teague has emphasised the TUC’s “naïve Keynesianism”87 excluded a vision of the EC as a social policy arena. In methodological terms, the article lends support to new approaches to Euro- pean integration historiography focusing on non-governmental networks and the informal politics of integration.88 It also demonstrates the potential of these approa- ches to link integration historiography more strongly with other areas of the disci- pline. Rather than being focused on the political and institutional logics of bargains between national governments and the European Commission the analysis of civil society groups reaches out into the various sub-fields of economic, social and cul- tural history. At a time of a general historiographical turn towards European and transnational approaches89 this may not only provide new perspectives on the history of integration itself, but may also help to strengthen the place of EC histo- riography within the discipline.

85. See A.S. MILWARD (assisted by G. BRENNAN and F. ROMERO), The European Rescue of the Nation State, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992. 86. See G. AMBROSIUS, Institutioneller Wettbewerb im europäischen Integrationsprozeß seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27(2001), pp.545-575. 87. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, op.cit., p.44. 88. See W. KAISER, Transnational European Union …, op.cit. 89. See for example J. OSTERHAMMEL, Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27(2001), pp.464-479. 102 Thomas FETZER

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Gabriele D’OTTAVIO

July 5th, 1957: the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) voted in favour of the ratification of the treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The decision has a relevant historical significant, not the least for the fact that it was the first time that a European initiative, supported by Konrad Adenauer’s government, received the approval of the main opposition party. As we know, until that time, the SPD had rejected all the main integrationist steps: the Federal Republic’s participation in the International Ruhr Authority, its entry in the Council of Europe, the ECSC treaties and the unsuccessful EDC, and finally the treaties of Paris in 1955.1 However, the voting position, although rather relevant, is not an element which in itself may help us establish whether and to what extent the treaties of Rome marked a rethinking within the German social-democracy, and specifically its relations with Europe. In order to assess its widest meaning, in terms of continuity and discontinuity, the vote of July 1957 should be re-examined within a wider framework, taking into consideration the European policy pursued by the SPD in the previous period, the specificity of the context, where the choice of supporting the Common Market and Euratom was elaborated, as well as the specific reasons pushing the SPD to embrace the contents of the treaties signed in Rome on March 25th, 1957. A thorough analysis of development stages within the European policy of the German social-democracy from 1949 to 1957 exceeds of course the scope of the present paper. Therefore, we will focus here on the phase of the so-called «European revival»; a period between June 1955 and July 1957, which in the history of SPD’s European policy has not yet been fully studied and explored, especially with respect to the importance attributed to phases following the signing of the Rome treaties. In particular, starting from the prevailing position in historiography, establishing 1955 as the «turning» point in SPD’s European policy, an analysis will be carried out in order to assess whether the social-democrats’ position on the Common Market and Euratom, was converging, or diverging, with the governing party’s, and whether, and to what extent, the decision to cast a vote in favour of the

1. The article is the expanded and amended version of a paper presented in the workshop organised by Società italiana di Storia contemporanea (SISSCO) at Marsala in September 2007. 104 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO ratification of the Rome treaties should be considered a sort of natural outcome of a process which had evolved since 1955.2

1. 1955 as «turning point»: a point of convergence among scholars

As regards the 1949-1955 period, historiography has reconstructed in precise details the European policy pursued by the SPD, also with similar conclusions. In order to grasp their essence, it is necessary to start from the end of the period of interest, namely from the divide represented by the signing of the treaties of Paris in October 1954, by which the Federal Republic acquired its sovereignty back, and, with the institution of the WEU, became a member of NATO. In a wider-scoped historical perspective, the treaties of Paris marked the final demise of the illusion that the problem of the country’s separation could be solved before the Federal Republic entered a system of military alliances. The full awareness of this development was however not immediate: the SPD continued in fact to put forth – in the following months – the request for negotiations with the Soviet Union on the unification, before the treaty ratification made the re-armament decision irrevocable. With the treaties coming into force, the social-democrats continued nonetheless to present proposals, such as the «German Manifesto» of 1955 or the «Plan for Germany» (Deutschlandplan) of 1959, which advocated the need for detaching the Federal and Democratic Republics from the two existing systems of military alliances, and to attain unification within a system of collective security under the aegis of the United Nations.3

2. For SPD’s European policy in the first half of the 1950’s, see a recent essay by D. RAMUSCHKAT, Die SPD und der europäische Integrationsprozeß: Kontinuität und Wandel in der Sozialdemokra- tischen Europapolitik 1949-1955, Videel, Niebüll, 2003. For a long-term reconstruction, see two pi- oneer works by R. HRBEK, Die SPD-Deutschland und Europa. Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und Westintegration 1945-1957, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1972 and by W.E PATERSON, The SPD and European Integration, Westmead-Farnbor- ough-Hants, Saxon House, 1974. For the phase following the treaties of Rome: J. Bellers, Reform- politik und EWG-Strategie der SPD. Die innen- und außenpolitischen Faktoren der europapoli- tischen Integrationspolitik einer Oppositionspartei (1957-63), München, Tuduv, 1979 and R. Markowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles De Gaulle 1959 bis 1969, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, München, 1996. For an analysis of the relationship between the SPD and Europe in a comparative perspective, see: K. FEATHERSTONE, Socialist Parties and Eu- ropean Integration. A comparative history, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, pp.141- 169; A. AGOSTI, Le radici e gli sviluppi dell’europeismo. Sinistra italiana e tedesca a con- fronto, in: G.E. RUSCONI, H. WOLLER (ed.), Italia e Germania 1945-2000. La costruzione dell’Europa, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pp.295-321; D. ROGOSCH, Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945-1957, Hamburg, 1996. 3. See also the contribution by A.L. LEUGERS-SCHERZBERG, Von den Stalin-Noten bis zum Deutschlandplan: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Neutralismus in den 1950 er Jahren, in: D. GEPPERT, U. WENGST (ed.), Neutralität-Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt 1945-1990, Oldenbourg, München, 2005, pp.45-58. The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 105

The effects of the treaties of Paris and subsequent developments taking place in the international scenario resulted much more disrupting for the social-democrats’ European policy. In particular, with the Federal Republic becoming a member of NATO, the issue of defence was separated from European integration, so that, from that time onward, the backing by the SPD of a project for a united Europe based on economic integration, became certainly easier or, better still, less compromising for its national-neutralist wings. The close resolution of the Saar question, after the defeat of the referendum of October 1955 in favour of the Europeanization of the territory, removed a second important aspect which until then had made it difficult for the SPD to support the integration process.4 Several internal factors also contributed to the shift in the SPD’s European policy, such as the pressure of trades unions, which, already in 1950 had decided to back the Schuman Plan, and in particular the growing influence within the party of Willi Birkelbach, Fritz Erler, Karl Mommer and Herbert Wehner.5 Thanks to the experience developed within the ECSC Common assembly and the Consultative assembly of the Council of Europe, these politicians had acquired relevant negotiating skills and – what is more important – a wider awareness of how much the association between economic welfare and European integration was widespread in the public opinion of the six founding countries. In the Federal Republic the younger generations seemed increasingly attracted by the European idea, also in view of the opportunity it provided to distance themselves from the Germans of the Nazi period. In this perspective, the SPD joining the integration project around the mid 1950’s may be read also as a process of internal maturation, in close connection with the phenomenon of de-ideologization and modernization of the party, leading to the turning point of Bad Godesberg in 1959. However, even scholars who have pointed at the gradualness of the change taking place, linked to the disappearance from the political scene of Kurt Schumacher, agree in recognizing the importance of the year 1955.6 This year, in fact, the revirement in the SPD’s European policy seemed to come to its full definition, by taking for the first time the form of specific decisions. Firstly, in June-July 1955 the SPD expressed its position in favour of the Messina resolution, by which the 6 ECSC member states assigned a preparatory commission the task to study the possibility of implementing the two presented projects: «the creation of a joint organization for the peaceful development of atomic energy and […] the creation of a common market to be implemented on stages, via the pro-

4. On the solution for the Saar problem, see: B. THOß, Die Lösung der Saarfrage 1954/1955, in: Viertel- jahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 47(1999), pp.57-86. 5. The latter, in particolar, according to Paterson’s reconstruction, played a «crucial role» in fostering a change of direction in the European policy, also in views of his ties with Jean Monnet. W.E PA- TERSON, op.cit., p.118. 6. Ibid., p.115. See also K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., p.150, A. AGOSTI, Le radici e gli sviluppi dell’europeismo. Sinistra italiana e tedesca a confronto, in: G.E. RUSCONI, H. WOLLER (ed.), op.cit., p.308. 106 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO

gressive reduction of quantitative limitations and the unification of customs regimes».7 Secondly, in the following October, several important party members, like president Erich Ollenahuer and Herbert Wehner, joined the Action Committee established by Jean Monnet in order to put pressure on the governments of the Six so that the Messina conference would become an «effective step towards the United States of Europe».8 A few historians, like Hanns Jürgen Küsters, recognized in Monnet’s initiative the pivotal factor for the SPD’s shift towards the idea of Europe: «Now it was Monnet’s initiative for the Action Committee which caused the change of the Social Democrats’ attitude towards European Integration».9

2. SPD, Bundesregierung and «Europe’s revival», 1955-1957: different perspectives, shared goals

The great relevance assigned to events in 1955 ended by influencing on the one hand also the analysis of the SPD’s European policy in the following months. In particular the assertiveness of some scholars, starting from William Paterson, in pointing at the turning point of 1955 as the time from which the process of European integration stopped to represent an arena for political division between the main party in government, CDU-CSU, and the social-democratic opposition, should be remarked: «In the following years, the SPD’s policy on European affairs became virtually indistinguishable from that of the CDU/CSU».10 Now-available documents on German European policy in the phase of the «European revival» show, however, a much more complex context than it may be expected. Since the first favourable statement backing the projects presented during the conference of Messina, several authoritative party representatives, such as Wehner and Mommer, clearly stated that for SPD the creation of a pool for the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy should have the priority over the project of the Common Market.11 In this perspective, also the subsequent decision of Ollenhauer

7. The text of the Messina resolution is mentioned in: P. GERBET, La naissance du marché commun, Ed. Complexe, Bruxelles, 1987, pp.165-168. 8. Political and Economic Planning, Statements of the Action Committee for a United States of Eu- rope, Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, p.11. 9. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, The Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC-Treaty, in: E. SERRA (ed.), Il rilancio dell’Europa e I trattati di Roma. Actes du colloque de Rome 25-28 Mars, Bruylant, Giuffré, L.G.D.J, Nomos, Bruxelles, Milano, Paris, Baden-Baden, 1987, p.505. 10. W.E PATERSON, op.cit., pp.X f. 11. Cf. H. WEHNER (24 June 1955), in: Proceedings of the ECSC Common Assembly, pp.609-611; H. WEHNER (8 July 1955), Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, pp.5415-5418; K. MOM- MER (7 July 1955), in: Proceedings of the Council of Europe Consultative assembly, pp.112-116. Mommer again reconfirmed the priority action on favour of Euratom in an article published by Vorwärts, 10.02.1956. The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 107 and Wehner to join the Action Committee seems a logical and consistent consequence, not least because the Committee’s founder, Jean Monnet, fully shared the priority option.12 In order to understand the thorough commitment by which the SPD prepared to support the Euratom plan right from the start of the negotiations, we should consider the relevance of prospects associated by the social-democrats to the implementation of the project: responding to modernization challenges in the atomic era; neutralizing the danger that one day Europe and Germany might come to hold weapons of mass destruction; and finally making the socialist option prevail in this important and strategic production sector.13 To this end, the speech by Ollenhauer of 18 October 1956 seems particularly relevant, by which the party president explained in the plenary session the main reasons why he had decided, together with Wehner, to join the Monnet Committee: «You know that at the time we decided to join the so-called Monnet Committee, as it established a series of principles concerning the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful uses, and the need to assure an effective control. We thought that this was the right thing to do […], as there was the opportunity to secure public property and public control of raw materials and finished products in a sector where no consoli- dated ownership interests yet existed».14 At first, also the Christian-Democratic chancellor Adenauer seemed to share the priority option in favour of Euratom, when the delegation sent to the conference of Messina were given the task to support only what France was willing to accept. This means – as clearly emerged from a note by the Foreign ministry: «Consider the issue of atomic energy as the most important item on the agenda».15 However, the reasons behind Adenauer’s decision to adopt this cautious stand resides outside the scope of the integrationist preferences of the government and the majority party: at the time the chancellor believed in fact that the right time had not yet come to promote a new and wider initiative in Europe, particularly in view of the weak position held at the time by the forces favouring integration in the French IV Republic.16 On the other hand, later negotiation rounds clearly showed how for the German government and the so-called sector experts (Experten) the Common Market was the priority project, while Euratom was the most problematic. In particular, especially after Adenauer himself had Franz Josef

12. The priority option clearly emerges also in the two final resolutions of the 2 meetings of the Com- mittee, taking place in January and September 1956, respectively. Cf. Political and Economic Plan- ning, Statements of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, op.cit., p.11 and pp.16-18. 13. The aspirations are explained also in an article by the social-democratic MP, Kreyssig, published in Vorwärts. G. KREYSSIG, Sozialistische Forderungen zu Euratom, in: Vorwärts, 18.05.1956. 14. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18 October 1956, made during the joint meeting of the party’s ex- ecutive Committee, the party branch and the control Commission. AdsD, PV Protokolle 1956. 15. PA AA Berlin, 900, Bl. A9010, Ermächtigung Adenauers für Messina, 26.05.1955. Document quoted by M.L.L. SEGERS, Zwischen Pax Americana und Pakt Atomica. Das deutsch-amerika- nische Verhältnis während der EURATOM-Verhandlungen 1955-1957, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3(2006), pp.432-458 (438). 16. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, Adenauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Wirt- schaftsgemeinschaft, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 31(1983), pp.646-673, here, p.650. 108 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO

Strauss indicated for the post of minister for Atomic energy issues in October 1955, the German government moved to strongly critical positions on the Euratom dossier, despite more conciliatory positions by the ministry of Foreign affairs and pressures from the United States.17 For our analysis, it is noteworthy to stress how the main controversial point, on which minister Strauss and other influential cabinet members remained adamant throughout negotiations, referred to France’s demand that the future Atomic Energy Community should be assigned an exclusive right of ownership and procurement of fissionable materials; an aspect of the project which – as we have seen - was instead quite appreciated by the SPD. And more precisely, contrary to the social-democrats, during the negotiations, the German government did not hint at a possible sacrifice of private interests of the German nuclear industry, and the more so if this was deemed necessary in view of the surreptitious financing of France’s military nuclear programme.18 Here we have come to the second question which saw the party in government and the social-democratic opposition supporting totally opposite positions during negotiations. While the SPD continued to consider essential the principle according to which the exploitation of nuclear energy should be limited to civilian use,19 the German government, at least from the intergovernmental conference of Paris of February 1956, no longer harboured any illusion of banishing the military use of uranium within Euratom.20 Also, in close correlation with later developments on the international arena, such as the announcement of the Radford plan in July 1956 and the position taken by the United States during the Suez canal crisis, chancellor Adenauer started to increasingly consider – despite the never-assuaged perplexities of minister Strauss – the Euratom project more of an opportunity enabling the Federal Republic to «produce their own nuclear weapons as soon as possible».21 This seems also to explain Adenauer’s decision to participate directly in the negotiations in order to find a compromise solution concerning the definition of exclusive rights of properties and procurement of fissionable material, as well as his willingness to let himself be involved by the French government in a programme envisaging the first French nuclear test within the next 5 years. This position was later to lead to the signing of the tripartite agreement between Germany, France and Italy for atomic bomb development. When the military cooperation agreement was made public on 21st January 1958, in Germany a wide extra-parliamentary campaign was started «against atomic death» (Kampf dem Atomtod), which the SPD decided to take part in, a further confirmation of the

17. M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.439 f. 18. Ibid. 19. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18 October 1956, op.cit.; H. WEHNER, Europa mit Vorbehalt, in: SPD-Pressedienst, 10.01.1957. 20. Minutes of the cabinet session of 15.02.1956, published in U. HÜLLBÜSCH (ed.), Die Kabi- nettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol.9, München 1998, pp.194-202, here, p.202. 21. Minutes of the cabinet meeting of 05.10.1956, in: ibid., pp.618-631, here, p.626. The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 109 chasm existing between the position of the party in government and the main opposition party. In reality, also the social-democrats drew from the Suez crisis the understanding of the urgency to establish as soon as possible the Community for Atomic Energy, but moving from positions and strategic perspectives quite different from the chancellor’s. While Adenauer measured the negative outcome of the diplomatic mission of France and Great Britain in the light of the price that Europe was ultimately to pay, were it not to strengthen itself at political-military level,22 for Ollenhauer the Suez crisis pointed instead to the urgency of solving the problem of oil dependence and, at the same time, the need to promote détente on the international arena.23 This diversity of view helps us also to explain the reason why the SPD, despite many objections, especially touching on the clauses enabling individual member states to use atomic energy for military purposes,24 decided to accept the final proposition. As regards the dossier on the Common Market, the discourse is undoubtedly more complex, also because within the individual parties very different, if not contrasting, positions could be found side by side. This is certainly true for the government forces, which, starting from spring 1955 developed within their midst a wide-ranging debate on integration forms and methods, with the backers of a free trade area enlarged to OEEC countries on the one hand, and people like Walter Hallstein and Hans von der Groeben, who believed that the Common Market had to be anchored to an institutional structure following the ECSC’s, on the other hand.25 For the SPD, instead, institutional issues, which had nonetheless some weight in the debate over Euratom, had only a secondary importance in the debate over the ECM. Within a widespread consensus on the perspectives of growth and social welfare that the project of an economic integration, no longer sector-based but rather horizontal, seemed to embody, the SPD’s internal debate developed mainly around the long-drawn national issue: whether and to what extent the merging of

22. At this regard, what Adenauer said during the meeting of 6th November with the French Prime min- ister Guy Mollet is particularly relevant: «En ce moment, les pays européens doivent s’unir. Il ne s’agit pas de supranationalité. Mais nous devons nous unir contre l’Amérique et, après les élec- tions, demander aux Américains ce qu’ils veulent. C’est l’Amérique qui est responsable de la crise de Suez. Les Etats-Unis sont si mal informés sur la situation en Europe et sur la politique eu- ropéenne, c’est à en pleurer», in: Documents Diplomatiques Françaises [DDF], 1956, vol.II, doc.138, pp.231-238, quoted by L. NUTI, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945-1991, il Mulino, Bologna, 2007, p.124. See also Adenauer’s speech in Amsterdam on 23rd November 1956 for the Europäische Kulturstiftung: “Die Selbstbehauptung Europas. Gr- undsätzliche Ausführungen zur europäischen Einigungspolitik, vor allem zur Zusammengehörig- keit von Ost- und Westeuropa, in: K. ADENAUER, Reden 1917-1967, Böhlau, Köln, 1998, pp.373-380. 23. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18th October 1956, op.cit. 24. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, second legislature, session of 9th May 1957, p.12022. 25. On the topic, see H.J. KÜSTERS, Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Euro- papolitik, in: L. HERBST, W. BÜHRER, H. SOWADE (ed.), Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt, Oldenbourg, München, 1990, pp.335-370. 110 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO

Western European economies would contribute to further deepen the division of the country. As clearly emerging from the minutes of the meeting of the SPD’s executive Committee, at the time not all the party members were convinced that a Europe free from political-military aspects did not represent a hurdle in view of a reunification of Germany. Thus, for example, the vice-president of the party and parliamentary group, Wilhelm Mellies, recalled during the meeting of 7th March 1957 that: «the economy of the Federal Republic will increasingly intermingle with the West- ern camp. Vice versa, the DDR is increasingly integrated with Eastern economy. This will make unification much more difficult. Further difficulty will be engendered by customs tariffs».26 The shared interest in kindling the hope for unification led the German government to ask for, and receive – in the closing phase of negotiations – an important formal commitment of the Six to not recognize as definite the division of Germany. Firstly, it was established that the single external tariff was not to be applied to trade relations between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic. Secondly, in an additional protocol of 28th February 1957, which had been promoted on the initiative of Carl Friedrich Ophüls, the five partners accepted to add a clause for the review of treaties in case of a future German unification.27 These measures were not deemed enough by the liberals and the party of the «expelled and exiled», who ended by voting against the ratification of the treaties. However, also CDU-CSU and SPD continued to back their clearly diverging strategic perspectives: while Adenauer’s party perceived the process of European integration as a containment tool, precisely, as a resource to counter the activism of Nikita Khrushchev's leadership, also following the constantly increasing calls for détente,28 Ollenhauer’s SPD, instead, never stopped stressing the détente potential of economic integration. Particularly relevant is Ollenhauer’s statement reported by the newspaper Die Welt: «on the long run the true political progress of the Common Market will depend on the Federal Republic’s readiness to develop relations with countries from the Eastern bloc».29 The diverging perspective between the two sides is also mirrored in the perplexities stated by both parties, during the parliamentary debate of 21st March 1957, concerning the failed participation of Great Britain, the definition of an external tariffs which were deemed too high, and assistance measures for overseas

26. W. MELLIES, session of the SPD’s executive Committee of 7th March 1957, AdsD, PV Pro- tokolle. 27. The protocol was referred to by Hallstein at the Bundestag four days before the signing of the trea- ties. W. HALLSTEIN, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor Unterzeichnung, Bonn, 21.03.1957, in: G. RINSCHE (dir.), Frei und Geeint. Europa in der Politik der Unionsparteien. Darstellungen und Dokumente, Köln, Weimar, Wien, 1997, pp.133-143 (139). 28. Also, W. LOTH, Adenauer’s Western Choice, 1955-1958, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Europe Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, pp.7-22. 29. E. OLLENHAUER, in: Die Welt, 05.05.1957. The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 111 territories.30 In particular, while the Erhard-like liberalists continued to consider Great Britain as the natural meeting point between the Atlantic and the continental-European perspective within the framework of a single free trade zone enlarged to OEEC and GATT countries, the majority of social-democrats lamented the absence of the United Kingdom, as well as Scandinavian countries’, for their presumed higher affinity and reliability at ideological level. At the time of voting, Great Britain’s absence represented in particular for some SPD members a sufficient reason to oppose the ratification of the Rome treaties. Let us recall here the names of Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kalbitzer and Fritz Baade; and not by chance the three political personalities were coming from areas geographically and culturally closer to Nordic countries.31 As regards instead objections concerning the single external tariff, several majority members supported the interests of big industrial concerns, which feared that the customs union could turn into a sort of protection to the detriment of trade relations with third countries, whereas the social-democrats, supported by trade unions, voiced the fear that protectionist measures could entail negative effects on social and employment policies, as well as on the trade relations with Eastern Europe. Finally, with respect to the association policy of overseas countries envisaged by the treaties, the German social-democracy stated a strong concern for a possible neo-colonialist drift, which instead we do not find in the declarations of the majority party. The initial proposal of presenting a common resolution at the time of ratification, came probably to nothing also due to the different ways by which CDU and SPD perceived or, at least, declared to perceive, the diverse aspects of the treaty.

3. The vote of 5th July 1957: an expected, but not forgone vote

A more attentive analysis of the debate which developed inside the SPD executive Committee in the last months before ratification leads us to move away from essentially deterministic interpretations, which consider the voting stand in July 1957 an already inescapable conclusion, after the decision of October 1955. Please refer also to Paterson’s position: «[…] with the entry of the SPD into the Monnet Action in October 1955, any pros- pect of real opposition to European Institutions was over».32 What seems instead significant is the fact that Wehner himself, one of the protagonists of the 1955 turning point, even in May 1957 was still proposing abstention at the time of ratification in view of the already outlined controversial

30. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags. Stenographische Berichte, second legislature, session of 21st March 1957, pp.11332-11340. 31. Cf. W. LOTH, Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen in der Gründungsphase der EWG, in: E. SERRA (ed.), op.cit., pp.585-602, here, p.598. 32. Cf. W.E PATERSON, op.cit., p.125. Similarly, the scholar Kevin Featherstone «[…] the SPD had entered Monnet’s Action Committee in October 1955, and this in itself represented the end of the earlier opposition strategy. Cf. K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., p.150. 112 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO issues.33 This voting option would not however jeopardize the treaty ratification; however, considering that the SPD was not discounting the possibility of abstaining, the persistence of a strong uncertainty within the party was thus shown. An uncertainty which found its explicit expression also in the speech of the social-democratic member of parliament, Ludwig Metzger, at the time of the vote: «the SPD’s indecision springs from the fact that positive and negative aspects of the treaty are mixed together, to the point that it is difficult for me to cast a clear-cut yes».34 Officially the decision to vote in favour of the ratification of the Rome treaties was formalized within the executive committee only 10 days before the vote, on 24th June 1957, with a vote declaration not bound by the president’s directive. The outcome of the internal voting confirmed, however, the presence of a rather substantial minority: of the 16 members, 10 voted in favour, while 6 abstained. Then a voting internal to the parliamentary group took place with the majority supporting the vote in favour of ratification, but with 13 abstentions. Finally, on 5th July 1957, a minority of 17 MP’s, including the already-mentioned Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kalbitzer and Fritz Baade, ended in any case by voting against the treaty ratification.35 Nothing to do, however, with the compact front shown in the previous period by the social-democrats in their almost unanimous opposition against the ECSC treaty and later the failed EDC.36 The now-accessible documents also clearly show how the voting behaviour of the social-democratic executive members was strongly influenced by several factors which in 1955 were not present. In particular, the political election set for the following month of September certainly played an important role. To this end, Fritz Erler’s statement of 30th May 1957 appears quite significant: «We must keep on stating our criticism, also in the case of us voting in favour. How- ever, we cannot afford that in the election the SPD is accused of voting “no” once again, or of not knowing what to do. Abstention is almost a “yes”. This is why we must say a clear “yes”.37 Ollenhauer himself, a week later, lamented that the treaty ratification would precede the political election of September 1957,38 while Adenauer has expressively requested European partners a date before the German election day.39

33. The proposal was put forward by Herbert Wehner during the session of the party’s executive com- mittee on 30.05.1957. AdsD, PV Protokolle 1957. 34. L. METZGER, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, Second legislature, vol.38, session of 5th July 1957, p.13345. 35. Cf. W. LOTH, Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen …, in: E. SERRA (ed.), op.cit., p.598. 36. According to figures reported by Haas, of 131 social-democratic MP’s elected in the Bundestag, 123 voted against the ratification of the ECSC, and 128 against the EDC. In either voting, no SPD MP’s voted in favour. Cf. E.B. HAAS, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, p.156. 37. Thus Fritz Erler, during the meeting of the party’s executive Committee of 30 May 1957. AdsD Protokolle 1957. 38. E. OLLENHAUER, in: SPD-Pressedienst, 07.06.1957. 39. M-T. BITSCH, Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours, Ed. Complexe, Brux- elles, 1996, p.122. The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 113

The two perspectives mirrored the same strategic consideration, namely that of two parties vying for power in the election, the governing one would certainly benefit more in terms of consensus from the new integrationist phase. This also explains the reason why the social-democratic leaders, despite the growing awareness of the popularity of the integration process in public opinion and the impossibility to “vote no again”, decided to downplay themes of European policy during the election campaign. Besides the contextual motivation, we should also recognize that for the majority of social-democrats approving the text of the EEC treaty as a framework agreement was easier, or better still, less compromising, considering that a lot was depending on the political battle around the implementation of the Common Market. Thus, for example, for Zinn the EEC treaty was like a «offspring needing care and assistance in order to be successful in life»,40 while for Mommer it represented only «the beginning, a base for later developments».41

Conclusions

With the shift observed in the SPD’s European policy around the mid 1950’s on the background of the vote in favour of the ratification of the 1957 Rome treaties cannot surely be considered an accident in history. The social-democrats themselves were the first to claim – in their vote declaration on 5th July – a certain degree of continuity and consistency with the policy expressed in the previous period: «European cooperation and the bypassing of political and economic nationalism are fundamental principles for the SPD. However, previously the SPD has always con- sidered the possible consequences for our divided country of the proposed integra- tionist measures for the integration of the Federal Republic with our Western neigh- bours. A military and politico-constitutional integration makes reunification more difficult. The SPD considers economic, social and cultural sectors as the most prom- ising ground for the success of European policies».42 These motivations mirror, however, only a partial truth. Perplexities, and in particularly criticism raised by several authoritative SPD members, during the closing debate, where neither few nor little relevant. The voting behaviour of social-democrats also showed the convergence of motivations lying outside the specificity of the contents of the Rome treaties. Undoubtedly, the constitutive nature of the EEC treaty, namely its being a «framework treaty», where implementation timeframe and regulatory contents were not detailed, facilitated the

40. G. ZINN, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundesrates, Sitzungsberichte, second legislature, ses- sion of 3rd May 1957, p.618 41. K.MOMMER, Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, second legislature, session of 5th July 1957, p.13321. 42. Voting declaration of 5 th July 1957, published in: SPD Jahrbuch 1956/1957, pp.15 f. 114 Gabriele D’OTTAVIO

final decision for social-democrats (and probably not only for them). This last remark may help us to explain how it was possible that CDU/CSU and SPD, although moving from diverging assumptions and totally opposed strategic prospects, came to share the same objectives. Finally, for the SPD the treaties of Rome represented an acceptable compromise not only because, as Mommer said in 1963, they did not contain «any trace of a crushing victory of the majority»,43 but also because they offered the party a big opportunity to counter the charge of being anti-European, without forcing it to openly challenge the guidelines of its foreign policy and its Deutschlandpolitik. Thus, detecting an anticipation of the shift in foreign policies, which was to be outlined by the well-known speech of Herbert Wehner in June 1960 on the primacy of the Western choice, would be an evident overstretched interpretation. At the same time, however, undoubtedly, with the choice to vote in favour of the ratification of the treaties of Rome, the SPD took a first important step to become, in the eyes of the German constituency, a possible and legitimate alternative candidate for government. As is well known, the SPD was to start reaping benefits, in terms of consensus-building, from its progressive transformation into an ideologically-moderate party only after the «Bad Godesberg» turning point of 1959. Another totally different matter would be whether the social-democratic leaders, by bending – in some cases quite openly – the interpretation of the meaning of the Rome treaties, had not contributed to disseminate that specific ideological approach to European themes, consisting in considering in a positive way the development of Community institutes independently from their specific contents.

43. K. MOMMER, Europa als Ziel und Wirklichkeit, in: Neue Gesellschaft, 3(May/June 1963), p.192. 115 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Curt GASTEYGER – Europa zwischen Spaltung und Einigung. Darstellung und Dokumentation 1945-2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006 575 S. – ISBN 3-8329-2011-0 (pb) – 30,45 €.

Quelleneditionen zur Geschichte Europas und der europäischen Integration können für die Forschung, vor allem aber für die universitäre Lehre zur Zeitgeschichte der EU nützlich sein. Zunehmend werden nicht nur schriftliche, sondern auch visuelle Quellen im Internet zugänglich gemacht. Das gilt etwa für den Luxemburger „European Navigator“ (http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm) oder die Zeitzeugen-Inter- views des EHI-Archivs in Florenz (http://www.iue.it/ECArchives/EN/OralHis- tory.shtml). Allerdings konzentrieren sich diese Server ähnlich wie die meisten gedruckten Quelleneditionen wie Harryvan und van der Harst (1997) auf die Vor- geschichte der heutigen EU. Dagegen hat der Schweizer Curt Gasteyger für seine zuerst 1990 vorgelegte und inzwischen 2006 vollständig überarbeitet erschienene kombinierte Darstellung und Quellenedition einen anderen Fokus gewählt. Dieser Band behandelt die Spaltung Europas genau so wie dessen Einigung und somit ost- europäische und gesamteuropäische Entwicklungen ebenso wie die westeuropäi- sche Integration zwischen 1945 und 1990. Das Buch ist in sieben Hauptkapitel mit Unterkapiteln eingeteilt, denen wie- derum einige Dokumente zugeordnet sind. Dabei handelt es sich ausschließlich um öffentlich zugängliche, wenngleich teilweise in die deutsche Sprache übersetzte Dokumente wie Auszüge aus Verträgen, Regierungserklärungen, Reden und Zei- tungsberichten. Die gesamteuropäische Anlage wird in den kurzen einführenden Darstellungen zu Zeitabschnitten und Themen genau so wie in der Auswahl der Dokumente deutlich. Neben Ausführungen Léon Blums zu einer föderalistischen Lösung der deutschen Frage von 1939 (D1) stehen Planungen des nationalen polni- schen Widerstands für Nachkriegseuropa (D4). Ausschnitte aus dem EWR-Vertrag von 1992 (D78) werden ebenso berücksichtigt wie eine Rede Michael Gor- batschows vor dem Europarat 1989 (D83). Insgesamt hat sich der Schwerpunkt des Bandes verschoben, so dass inzwischen 200 Seiten mit etwa nahezu der Hälfte der 142 Dokumente der Zeit seit 1990 gewidmet sind. Ergänzt wird der Band durch eine knappe Auswahlbibliographie, ein Abkürzungsverzeichnis und ein Personen- register. Diese kombinierte Darstellung und Dokumentation ist vor allem für den Unter- richt deutschsprachiger Studenten oder anderer, des Deutschen mächtiger Studen- ten geeignet. Allerdings enthalten die einführenden Darstellungen zu den Doku- menten keine Verweise auf den Forschungsstand und Forschungskontroversen, was sich aus der Produktion des Buches für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung erklärt, die mit ihrem Programm auch ältere Schüler und Laien ansprechen will und muss. Außerdem wäre es wünschenswert, wenn ein solcher Band neben schon gedruckten und teilweise bereits über das Internet zugänglichen Quellen zumindest für die Zeit bis in die 1970er Jahre auch unveröffentlichte Quellen aus staatlichen 116 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen und anderen Archiven enthielte. Schließlich überkompensiert Gasteyger die Ver- nachlässigung Osteuropas und gesamteuropäischer Entwicklungen in westeuropä- isch geprägten Darstellungen und Quellenbänden, wie schon ein Blick in das Per- sonenregister zeigt. Dort taucht Nikita Chruschtschow 13, Gorbatschow 15 und Josef Stalin gar 33 Mal auf, hingegen Jean Monnet, Jacques Delors und François Mitterrand nur einmal und Robert Schuman zweimal, Eisenhower einmal und Dul- les gar nicht. Die Auswahlbibliographie ist sehr kurz und äußerst selektiv und spär- lich kommentiert und enthält überdies nur wenig nicht deutschsprachige Literatur, wobei sich direkt kleinere Fehler eingeschlichen haben (Richard nicht Peter Gille- spie, S. 567). Insofern ist diese kombinierte Darstellung und Dokumentation vor allem für die Verwendung der deutschsprachigen Quellen für die universitäre Lehre zur Geschichte Europas und der EU seit 1945 zu empfehlen. Wolfram Kaiser Universität Portsmouth

Hubert KIESEWETTER – Das einzigartige Europa. Wie ein Kontinent reich wurde, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2006, 232 S. – ISBN 3-515-08927-6 – 24,00 €.

Folgt der Erstausgabe einer wissenschaftlichen Publikation zehn Jahre später eine zweite Auflage, wie im vorliegenden Fall der wirtschafthistorischen Untersuchung der Industrialisierung in Europa, dann kann dies eigentlich nur zwei Ursachen haben. Entweder hat sich das Werk als Standardwerk einer Disziplin etabliert oder der Verfasser hat es grundlegend überarbeitet. Hubert Kiesewetter darf ersteres für ‚Das einzigartige Europa’ wohl nicht beanspruchen. Insofern scheint sich die zweite Auflage nur über eine grundlegende Überarbeitung zu erklären. Schon im Vorwort scheint sich diese These auch zu bestätigen, kündigt der Verfasser doch an, dass «dieses Buch seit der ersten Auflage immer wieder ergänzt, aktualisiert und überarbeitet» worden ist. Damit macht er den (wirtschaftshistorisch) interessierten Leser neugierig. Wie hat die teils deutliche Kritik1 an der Erstausgabe reflektiert und in die zweite Auflage einfließen lassen? Inwiefern hat die (durchaus über- schaubare) neuere Forschungsdiskussion seine Ausführungen beeinflusst? Die Antwort auf beide Fragen fällt kurz aus: Gar nicht. Die kritischen Anmer- kungen der Rezensenten hinsichtlich methodischer Schwachstellen oder die Anmahnung einer präziseren Beachtung der Forschungsdiskussion scheinen den Verfasser wenig berührt zu haben. Neuere Forschungen, etwa die breit rezitierten Ansätze der Neuen Institutionenökonomik2, werden von Kiesewetter gerade einmal

1. WELSKOPP Th., Rezension: Hubert Kiesewetter, Das einzigartige Europa. Zufällige und notwen- dige Faktoren der Industrialisierung, Göttingen 1996, in: Internationale wissenschaftliche Korre- spondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 33(1997), S.148-150. 2. WISCHERMANN Cl., NIEBERDING A., Die institutionelle Revolution, Stuttgart, 2004; ELLER- BROCK K.P., WISCHERMANN Cl. (Hrsg.), Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte vor der Herausforderung durch die New Institutional Economics, Dortmund, 2004. Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 117 im Nebensatz erwähnt. Dies ist bedauerlich, bringt doch gerade die Neue Institutio- nenökonomik eine interessante Perspektive in die Debatte um die Industrialisie- rung ein. Man muss diese (neue) Theorierichtung auch nicht gleich mögen; igno- rieren sollte man sie aber nicht. In diesem Kontext wundert es insbesondere, dass Kiesewetter die Monographie des Wiener Wirtschaftshistorikers Felix Butschek ‚Europa und die industrielle Revolution’3 komplett ignoriert. Immerhin setzt sich Butschek mit nahezu derselben Fragestellung auseinander. Er bezieht sich sogar explizit auf Kiesewetter. Überhaupt erschöpfen sich die Ergänzungen und Aktuali- sierungen leider allzu oft in kurzen und eher oberflächlichen Anknüpfungen an tagespolitisch aktuelle Debatten, wie etwa die 2005 von Franz Müntefering ange- stoßene ‚Kapitalismusdebatte’. Angesichts dieser Ausgangslage möge man es dem Rezensenten der Zweitauflage verzeihen, wenn er im Vergleich zu den Rezensenten der Erstauflage keine fundamental neuen Aspekte diskutieren kann. In seinem Werk ‚Das einzigartige Europa’ setzt sich Hubert Kiesewetter mit der Frage auseinander: «Warum ist es in einigen Staaten – die wir mit dem Sammelbe- griff Europa bezeichnen – seit dem 16. Jahrhundert gelungen, einen Wohlstand zu erzeugen, der lange Zeit in der Welt als einzigartig bezeichnet werden kann»? Ein- leitend entwirft er ein Polyfaktorenmodell, von dem er überzeugt ist, dass es eine präzise Erklärung der «Ursachen und Wirkungen dieser epochalen Veränderung» liefern kann. Die dabei getroffene Unterteilung nach Faktoren, die in Europa zufäl- lig vorhanden waren (Geographie, Bodenschätze, Klima, Fruchtbarkeit des Bodens) und Faktoren, die in Europa perfektioniert wurden (Kapital, Technik, Unternehmerschaft, Bildung), wirkt wenig innovativ und lückenhaft. Wo bleiben etwa rechtliche, gesellschaftliche oder politische Strukturen? Zählen diese nicht zum Bündel der für die Industrialisierung in Europa notwendigen Faktoren? Auf eine abschließende Präzisierung seines ‚Modells’ wartet der Leser auch vergeblich. Welchen Einfluss einzelne Faktoren auf die Industrialisierung in Europa nahmen bleibt offen. Anstatt Interdependenzen aufzuzeigen, bleiben die einzelnen Faktoren isoliert nebeneinander stehen. Insofern entspricht Kiesewetters Polyfaktorenmodell nicht in Ansätzen modelltheoretischen Anforderungen. Die einzelnen Faktoren arbeitet Kiesewetter im Hauptteil des Werkes empirisch kenntnisreich ab, wenngleich vereinzelte Lücken auffallen. So wäre die Northsche These, dass «systematische Anreize zur Förderung des technischen Wandels erst entstanden, als durch die Ausdifferenzierung der Eigentumsrechte die privaten Ertragsraten von Innovationen an die gesellschaftlichen Ertragsraten angepasst wurden»4 durchaus eine Bereicherung der Ausführungen zum Faktor Technik gewesen. Interessant liest sich wiederum das Abschlusskapitel, in dem Kiesewetter nach der Übertragbarkeit der europäischen Industrialisierung fragt. Liegen der Industrialisierung in Europa allgemeingültige Faktoren zu Grunde, die heutigen Entwicklungsländern als wirtschaftspolitische Leitlinien dienen können? Obwohl man nicht jedes Argument Kiesewetters teilen muss und einige Erkenntnisse doch

4. BUTSCHEK F., Europa und die industrielle Revolution, Wien, 2002. 5. NORTH D.C., Theorie des institutionellen Wandels, Tübingen, 1988. 118 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen eher banal sind («Eine unerlässliche Maßnahme zur Ankurbelung wirtschafts- und wachstumsdynamischer Entwicklungen in ökonomisch unterentwickelten Staaten ist der Ausbau einer Infrastruktur», S.194), liest sich der Schlussteil durchaus unterhaltsam und anregend. So bleibt am Ende der Lektüre die Erkenntnis hängen, dass die Industrialisie- rung in Europa ein einzigartiger, komplexer (polyfaktoraler), evolutionärer und regionaler Prozess war, der sich nicht einfach in Entwicklungsländer exportieren lässt. Ob diese eine Erkenntnis allerdings eine Zweitauflage rechtfertigt, muss ernsthaft bezweifelt werden. Christian Henrich-Franke Universität Siegen

Pierre MANENT – La raison des nations. Réflexions sur la démocratie en Europe, coll. L’Esprit de la Cité, Gallimard, Paris, 2006, 100 p. – ISBN 2-07-077734-0 – 11,00 €.

L’ouvrage de Pierre Manent s’apparente à un essai, court mais percutant. Il s’agit en effet pour l’auteur de faire part, en quelques pages, de ses appréhensions concernant la façon dont l’Union européenne se vit aujourd’hui, et donc d’introduire dans cet appel, en même temps qu’un éloge de la raison, une certaine dose d’inquiétude. L’urgence tourne autour du besoin de l’Europe de se définir, par rapport à elle-même, mais aussi, et peut-être surtout, par rapport aux autres. On reconnaîtra là le thème de l’identité, évoqué ailleurs, mais qui ici se débarrasse des subtilités rhétoriques pour poser crûment la question de la survie de l’Europe. «L’Europe» désigne ici un territoire de culture, qui dépasse le simple espace politique que l’on désigne sous le nom d’«Union européenne». Il faut noter que l’interrogation de Manent est fidèle à sa filiation au libéralisme aronien: elle est éminemment politique, et ne se contente pas de théoriser l’économie pour mieux comprendre les comportements et les destinées humains. Manent prouve ainsi que l’on peut prendre l’Europe comme sujet en écartant les thèses trop faciles du filon néo-libéral ou de la pseudo-mondialisation, consistant à faire l’apologie ou la condamnation du «monstre» dérégulateur européen. Son but est de réfléchir aux traditionnels axes de recherche qui guident sa pensée, démocratie, nation et religion, en donnant dans cet ouvrage une dimension polémique, parfois courageuse, suivant le modèle de la «conversation civique». Cette démarche peut se justifier dans la mesure où l’auto-identification passe, non seulement par un effort conceptuel qui doit prendre en compte tous les aspects de la vie communautaire et concerner une collectivité qui hésite encore à se nommer, mais également par un effort de délimitation, dont on sait qu’il a toujours posé problème à l’Europe. Certes, les Européens ont commencé à se définir par la mise en avant du régime politique qui contient le mieux les fameuses valeurs «européennes», soit la démocratie. Par conséquent, ils ne souffrent pas de la comparaison avec les Américains, parangons de ce système dans le monde entier, Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 119 phares de la liberté et de sa défense. Or, justement, c’est là que le bât blesse, et Manent y insiste largement: les Américains, eux, n’hésitent pas à défendre un régime dont ils mesurent la fragilité, tout en lui reconnaissant un aspect messianique, spirituel, dimension qui n’entre pas en compte dans la définition européenne, toute faite de rationalité et de prudence excessive à l’égard de tous les mots, reste de notre tumultueux passé. La différence se fait ainsi entre une croyance qui est fortement encouragée d’un côté, avec d’autant plus de vigueur depuis le 11 septembre, et trop mollement défendue de l’autre. Les Européens acceptent ainsi, comme principes d’expansion de l’idéal démocratique, qu’ils pensent eux aussi universel, la vertu de l’exemple et la force de la persuasion; les Américains s’avèrent moins patients, plus déterminés, et conscients qu’il existe une force «négative» opposée au rêve de la grande réconciliation (ce mal qui est nécessaire au Bien qu’ils anticipent, et qui peut prendre la forme d’«Etats voyous»). Or, cette différence séparant les deux rives de l’Atlantique n’est pas seulement historique, elle provient aussi d’une façon diverse d’appréhender la démocratie, au sein même de nos Etats: ces Etats, nous les avons désacralisés, la construction même de l’Europe devant opérer cette démystification, qui est attendue sans ambiguïté aucune par toutes les parties prenantes dans le jeu européen. D’après l’auteur, «la version européenne de l'empire démocratique se signale par la radicalité avec laquelle elle détache la démocratie de tout peuple réel et construit un kratos (un pouvoir) sans demos (sans peuple)». Le sacré est ainsi renié comme synonyme de déviance dangereuse pour la communauté politique, alors qu’il est totalement admis dans le jeu démocratique américain, où l’adhésion à des valeurs communes n’est pas seulement déclarée, mais vécue, ce que l’auteur appelle lui-même une «communion». Manent nous décrit les sociétés européennes comme étant atomisées à mesure que le mouvement d’unification se réalise: il n’y a plus d’idée de représentation dans un système politique qui renie ou se méfie par nature de la notion de «gouvernement», lui préférant le terme plus neutre en même temps que plus rassurant de «gouvernance». Le pouvoir est ainsi morcelé, hyper-spécialisé, soumis au «principe de précaution», en même temps que l’universalité de notre cause (notre baptême et notre être «démocratiques») remet en question le principe même de la démocratie «historique»; la représentativité perdrait ainsi son sens initial, dans la mesure où les Européens définiraient une communauté où les maux sont temporaires et les besoins similaires. C’est mettre de côté la démocratie telle qu’elle s’est imposée dans l’histoire, au nom d’une rationalisation de la politique où l’Etat ne serait plus que l’étage supérieur de toute une série de commissions et d’agences spécialisées ayant analysé et défini le contour exact de l’action à entreprendre. L’Europe communautaire n’aime pas les symboles, leur préférant les instruments, ces emboîtements d’espaces «signifiants» qui font se marier l’UE avec l’ensemble des régions qui la constituent, contribuant à la remise en question de la nation comme pouvoir encore légitime. C’est pourtant Aron qui a appris à Manent que l’on devait pouvoir concilier son propre enracinement culturel dans la nation avec l’aspiration à une Europe la plus fidèle possible «à la communication des 120 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen nations européennes et de leurs mémoires», sans passer par la dénationalisation des nations. Or, la perte du cadre de référence national ne s’est parallèlement accompagnée d’aucune autre forme de mise en scène du pouvoir, qui aurait pu être acceptée comme résultant d’un exercice renouvelé de la citoyenneté dite «européenne». Celle-ci est plus mise en scène qu’elle n’est projetée, défendue ou vécue, donnant plus de droits que de devoirs, contribuant à dessiner la figure d’un consommateur plutôt que d’un citoyen. Ce divorce avec la réalité, au nom d’un universalisme abstrait et étouffant, se prolonge au point de vue de la politique étrangère. Dans ce domaine, les Européens s’avèrent incapables d’une quelconque entreprise, pétrifiés qu’ils sont par leur méfiance de la violence comme instrument politique, et de leur méconnaissance volontairement entretenue des mobiles les plus profonds à l’œuvre dans l’action des nations, la Nation étant condamnée comme le précipité chimique du Mal, obstacle à l’unification du monde. L’auteur insiste ici sur la difficulté que les Européens ont à comprendre Israël et sa politique, cette nation qui est indirectement un «produit de l’Europe», mais qui a gardé sa spécificité consistant à faire s’épouser le religieux et le politique, lui préférant une vague «nation arabe», qui n’a jamais existé, mais dont les contours se rapprochent de l’universel, du modèle des grands ensembles tel qu’il peut être le mieux appréhendé par l’Européen. Ce problème du manque de repères historiques et politiques se pose à propos de notre définition même, rendu plus pressant avec la question de l’élargissement, que l’on contrôlait auparavant, que l’on ne contrôle plus aujourd’hui, toujours sous la vertueuse mais impérieuse nécessité de ne laisser personne dehors, et sous l’emprise de la «passion de la ressemblance» que charrie l’aspiration à un monde sans frontières. Cette façon de raisonner, dont on a du mal à percevoir la fin (une «finalité sans fins», dixit l’auteur), fait que nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui confrontés au délicat problème de l’intégration de la Turquie. Que faire de cet espace? L’inclure au nom d’un passé (partiellement et négativement) commun, ou l’inclure au nom du respect de l’Autre? Certes, cette dernière tendance est une qualité, et l’une des caractéristiques de l’esprit européen, celle de «l’ouverture». Mais cette dernière, poussée à son extrême, ne revient-elle pas à nier ou à ignorer ses propres qualités, au nom de valeurs universelles dont le contenu reste largement à définir, voire à démontrer? En quoi la notion de «club chrétien» peut-elle choquer, et qui doit-elle choquer, dans la mesure où, dans toute civilisation, les interactions entre mythe, croyance et politique sont interpénétrables, complémentaires et au final, étroitement liées? Jamais la laïcité, qui est une grande victoire de notre démocratie (et, notons-le, la seule qui ait une application concrète dans une partie seulement du globe) n’a déclaré nécessaire de rejeter tout héritage religieux, comme il est impossible de demander à quiconque de renier ses origines. Le fonds religieux, dans ce sens, n’est pas à vocation essentialiste, mais participe de la vie d’une communauté, accompagne sa respiration profonde, qu’aucun décret, aucune loi, aucune volonté humaine ne peut, et ne doit, interdire. On voit là l’expérience de la cité antique , le Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 121 nœud gordien de l’approche théologico-politique qui est celle de Manent à propos de la réflexion sur le politique, jamais véritablement affranchi de sa fonction sacrée, mais dont le but est d’ancrer la nation «au cœur» de la modernité libérale. Dans ce sens, l’«agence humaine centrale» que représente l’UE aux yeux de Manent est bien la preuve que l’ère post-nationale, chantée par Habermas, n’est pas advenue. La nation reste un cadre d’expression valable, et même nécessaire à l’épanouissement d’individus, qui ne doivent plus être sommés d’en finir avec leur passé. Nouvelle attaque contre un esprit de repentance qui tourne à vide, et un «renoncement» qui prend prétexte d’un sens de l’histoire pour s’immiscer dans les esprits. Manent, en ce sens, ne se situe pas dans la vague auto-complaisante des «déclinistes» … L’espoir, nécessaire à toute vie politique, a encore la vie longue. Bertrand Vayssière Maître de conférences à l’Université de Toulous II-Le Mirail

Robert FRANK, Rosalind GREENSTEIN (dir.) – Gouvernance et identité en Europe, coll. Axes Savoir, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, 278 p. – ISBN 2 8027 1981 5 - 30,00 €.

Cet ouvrage a pour origine un colloque organisé en novembre 2001 à Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, rassemblant des représentants de différentes disciplines. Le but est de s’intéresser au terme de «gouvernance», vocable d’une nouvelle langue bruxelloise dont il s’agit de comprendre quelle mutation de l’action publique il signifie. Dans le même temps, l’objectif est de s’interroger sur la résonance sociale de ce même terme, et de confronter ce dernier au mot «identités» (pris ici dans son sens pluriel): en d’autres termes, l’acte de gouverner tel que désigné par le mot «gouvernance» ne suffit pas, il s’agit aussi de s’intéresser aux gouvernés, à ce «vécu concret», qui doit rappeler l’importance de réfléchir aux termes d’une véritable démocratie à l’échelle européenne. La première partie s’intéresse à ce rapport gouvernés/gouvernants, en essayant de comprendre les blocages et les dynamiques de leur interaction. L’étude commence par un article de la linguiste Rosalind Greenstein, qui tente de juger de l’appréhension du mot «gouvernance» par les opinions, afin de voir si ce dernier ne ressortit pas exclusivement du jargon d’experts. S’appuyant sur des dictionnaires, le Livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne (27 juillet 2001), ainsi qu’un micro-trottoir, Greenstein tente d’analyser la réception du terme, et ainsi sa compréhension (ou non) par un vaste public. La langue joue un rôle important: en français, le terme est ainsi singulièrement absent, ou alors défini succinctement, ou encore assimilé au substantif «gouvernement»; en anglais, le constat est similaire, mais englobe une définition autour de la manière ou de la méthode de gouverner (ex. de corporate governance). Dans l’ensemble cependant, l’enquête menée par l’auteur est sans appel dans ses résultats: le mot reste peu parlant, relativement hermétique aux yeux de la plupart des sondés qu’elle a rencontrés. C’est regrettable, dans le sens où le Livre blanc semble signifier que le citoyen européen, 122 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen dans la formule de la gouvernance, devrait avoir son mot à dire dans la politique qui le concerne (ouverture, participation, responsabilité, efficacité, cohérence), ce qui change de l’acception «gouverné». Au final cependant, ce mot est victime d’une polysémie qui affecte sa compréhension immédiate. Robert Frank, lui, se penche sur la question du point de vue historique. Il rappelle au préalable le travail effectué par le réseau sur l’identité créé par René Girault, faisant une synthèse des principales étapes qui caractérisent les rapports entre l’Européen et l’Europe: l’identique ou identicité européenne (traits communs d’ordre général); l’identité européenne, qui est surtout culturelle, mais qui est restée cantonnée aux élites, pendant que l’identité politique était associée à l’idée nationale; l’idée européenne, pas suffisante pour pousser au sentiment d’identité; la conscience, qui date des premiers cataclysmes (14-18 et 39-45), et qui rime avec le besoin de continuer le mouvement vers la construction européenne (associé aux différentes relances qui marquent le processus européen); le sentiment, qui est l’attachement sentimental à la collectivité, supposant autant de droits que de devoirs (et de sacrifices); enfin l’identité politique européenne. Les années 1970 ont représenté à ce niveau un consensus mou, une «conscience sans sentiment» orchestrée par des stimuli négatifs. Certes, on a bien parlé d’identité européenne à Copenhague en 1973, ou d’identité européenne de défense à Saint Malo en 1998, mais le ressort en est le même: «à partir d’une identité de vues, on espère créer une identité politique vécue». Cependant, si la démarche fonctionnaliste ne fonctionne pas, le pessimisme n’est pas non plus de mise: les Européens se disent de plus en plus capables d’assumer une double identité (environ 50% dans les différents sondages). C’est pourquoi Frank évoque une Europe non pas post-nationale, mais post-nationaliste. Il avoue cependant la difficulté pour l’historien de définir la gouvernance, qui renvoie à une série de règles permettant à un groupe humain de vivre en bonne entente: cette façon de gérer comprend-elle ou non l’idée classique de gouvernement? Pour lui, un premier sens historique se dégage de ce sentiment confus: le mot sert surtout à masquer le manque de gouvernement européen, et cherche à donner un sens au bric-à-brac politique européen, dont on ne sait avec certitude où sont le sommet et la base. Le déficit démocratique réside surtout dans l’écart entre citoyenneté et identité européennes, entre processus d’identification et processus de politisation: l’opinion se sentant impuissante dans le mécanisme de décision, la démagogie et l’abstentionnisme risquent d’avoir une longue carrière devant eux. Axer le mot «gouvernance» au seul critère d’efficacité n’est peut-être pas la bonne réponse, car «l’identité culturelle ne produit pas nécessairement de l’identité politique» (p.50). Le géographe Georges Prévélakis continue l’étude de la confrontation gouvernance/identités en s’appuyant sur la théorie de Jean Gottmann sur le cloisonnement: selon lui, la «circulation» traduit un mouvement d’ouverture, volontaire ou non, qui dépasse les frontières traditionnelles et risque de remettre en question les différentes identités (voir la mondialisation, dernier avatar de ce mouvement); cependant, cette «circulation» finit toujours par être cloisonnée, grâce aux «iconographies» («l’ensemble des symboles auxquels tient une population»), Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 123 qui permettent d’adapter ou d’apprivoiser le mouvement. Ce type de pensée ressortit de «l’idéologie géographique», qui entraîne une classification du monde par la prise en compte d’espaces clos, définis en fonction de principes de gestion d’un territoire présenté comme continu et «logique» caractérisé par des frontières, et où l’individu est précisément situé dans l’espace. Avant la fin de la guerre froide, l’Europe s’inscrivait dans une stratégie plus réticulaire que territoriale, avec un espace délimité, constitué d’un réseau d’Etats souverains. La fin du mur de Berlin a posé la question de la finitude de l’espace, et introduit les questions de l’approfondissement et de l’élargissement, remettant en jeu «l’impératif territorial» (p.56) à travers lequel se pose la question de la gouvernance européenne, qui s’attaque bien plus vivement aux souverainetés nationales. Cependant, l’iconographie européenne est modeste, en gros limitée à l’euro, qui reste simplement une «promesse de prospérité» (p.57). De même, cette remise en cause pose la question de choix différents dus à une culture de l’espace elle-même différente: d’après l’auteur, ce qui risque de l’emporter, et qui donnerait tout son sens au mot «gouvernance», c’est l’acceptation d’une vision réticulaire de l’espace européen, associée à l’existence de réseaux différents de territoires, faisant ainsi accepter l’idée d’hétérogénéité qui rompt avec la notion «westphalienne» du territoire. Michel Gérard, professeur de sciences politiques, s’intéresse au rôle des politiques externes dans la définition de l’identité européenne. L’identité collective est fortement liée à l’idée de mémoire et d’héritage à transmettre. Certains vecteurs peuvent jouer ce rôle pour l’Europe: réconciliation franco-allemande, sorties de dictatures, etc. Certains facteurs peuvent influer: la communication politique des gouvernants, les médias, quelques symboles forts comme l’euro. Il faut de même tenir compte de la «pluri-appartenance» de chaque individu, en fonction de marqueurs qui ne sont pas tous politiques (ville, musique). Ce qui paraît frappant, c’est que les Européens sont définis comme tels par la vision que l’on a d’eux depuis l’extérieur: un havre de paix pour les uns, une «forteresse» pour les autres. De même, ces «Européens à part entière» peuvent exister concrètement dans certaines enceintes, comme l’ONU, l’Unesco, l’OMC, mais également la PESC/ PESD. Un auteur comme Charles Kupchan (The End of the American Era) a pu estimer que l’impact de cette Europe diplomatique sur la scène internationale donne l’idée d’un grand avenir, où l’influence américaine déclinera (voir ce qu’en dit Jeremy Rifkin). Il est cependant évident que les différents acteurs de l’Europe (commissaires, Javier Solana) ne prennent du poids que vus de l’extérieur, où l’identité nationale joue un faible rôle dans l’identification de chaque Européen. Ainsi, un ferment d’identification est en route, mais dont nous ne sommes hélas pas les acteurs. Christian de Boissieu fait ensuite une comparaison entre gouvernance mondiale et européenne. Pour lui, ce concept de «gouvernance mondiale» n’est pas forcément associé au 11 septembre, mais a pu se faire connaître à chaque crise affectant l’ensemble de la planète (politique mais surtout économique). La quête d’une nouvelle architecture financière internationale démontre cependant le besoin 124 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen accru de faire face à une globalisation mal maîtrisée, et nous renseigne sur le retard des structures institutionnelles, quelles qu’elles soient, sur les systèmes économiques et sociaux ainsi que leurs interdépendances. L’auteur évoque ces «biens collectifs internationaux» (paix, développement durable) dont l’impact et la résonance condamnent à terme, d’après lui, des forums particularistes comme le G7/G8. Selon de Boissieu, une nouvelle architecture pour les organismes internationaux est possible et souhaitable, passant par une re-réglementation d’ordre bancaire et financière (blanchiment, paradis fiscaux, terrorisme). A l’échelle européenne, il estime que la gouvernance doit passer par une transparence de la politique monétaire (il s’insurge ainsi contre l’indépendance trop forte de la BCE), et la coordination des politiques monétaires, afin d’obtenir une cohérence plus claire de la zone euro vis-à-vis du reste du monde. Georges Saunier étudie la PAC, assimilée par lui à un «instrument de régulation – de gouvernance […] pour l’Europe communautaire» (p.83). Dans la première moitié des années 1980, le budget de la PAC augmente plus vite que celui de la CEE, à un moment où les différents pays se posent la question de la finalité du budget (voir par exemple la notion de «juste retour»). La crise agro-budgétaire qui en résulte fait voler en éclats le compromis de Luxembourg; elle permet, ce faisant, une prise de conscience que la machine s’emballe, même chez les Français, qui acceptent que les prix des céréales se rapprochent graduellement des prix mondiaux et le principe des quotas laitiers. Cette prise de conscience a été salvatrice, et a permis de relancer certains dossiers (voir comités Dooge et Adonnino de 1984). L’article est intéressant, mais à vrai dire, on ne comprend pas très bien ses liens avec le thème de la gouvernance (voir l’aveu de la note 9 p.92). Les géographes Pierre Beckouche et Yann Richard s’interrogent ensuite sur l’enjeu frontalier soulevé par Interreg. Ils en rappellent l’historique: le premier enjeu est économique, visant un aménagement territorial intégré; mais dans le fond, l’enjeu s’avère politique: il s’agit de faire reculer la logique territoriale de l’Etat-nation, et d’entraîner une diversification des acteurs et des objectifs (surtout avec Interreg II et III), qui comprennent aussi les PECO, la notion de voisinage et le thème de la connexion des réseaux: on ne raisonne plus en terme de contiguïté. On constate cependant que les régions frontalières souffrent de cette approche, puisque les grandes villes et les capitales profitent beaucoup plus de la logique de réseau. Les auteurs prennent l’exemple d’un espace frontalier avec le cas germano-polonais: à l’échelle locale, cet espace est vécu avec beaucoup de réticences (souvenir des atrocités, thème du retour des Allemands, mémoires de la polonisation), et il paraît difficile d’en faire de nouveau un lieu de passage et de coopération. Autre cas décrit: la Grande Région Saar-Lor-Lux, qui a certes une logique historique et économique, mais qui se révèle au final une absurdité au point de vue institutionnel. Les problèmes rencontrés par Interreg sont ainsi récurrents: acteurs aux pouvoirs différents le long de la frontière; prolifération des projets (absence de gestion commune des crédits); problèmes de discontinuité territoriale; parfois des espaces en concurrence; déficit de légitimité et de visibilité des territoires transfrontaliers. On doit ajouter le problème des flux, avec des Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 125 investissements qui délaissent ouvertement la partie orientale. Certes, l’aide européenne se concentre de plus en plus sur cette partie-là, et c’est en grande partie par le biais de la coopération transfrontalière qu’un rattrapage et une harmonisation resteront possibles, mais le volontarisme sera pendant encore longtemps capital en la matière. L’étude de la BCE par Hubert Kempf, professeur de sciences économiques, démontre que, sur le plan des faits, l’UEM est un succès. Cependant, au point de vue de l’adhésion, l’affaire est bien plus compliquée. Certains facteurs peuvent expliquer ce décalage: la dévalorisation initiale de l’euro face au dollar; la comparaison avec la Fed, qui se fait au détriment de la BCE, à la recherche de crédibilité à travers des présupposés dogmatiques; une politique de communication désastreuse; des désaccords criants entre politique monétaire et budgétaire, avec des critiques de plus en plus ouvertes (Lafontaine, Schröder, Verhofstadt), dont le point d’orgue est la crise de novembre 2003. Il faut reconnaître que la BCE est plus indépendante que la Fed, elle-même sous la coupe directe du Congrès, alors que les gouverneurs sont nommés par le président. L’auteur pense que les résultats positifs de cette Fed sont largement dus à l’expérience, dont ne peut se targuer la BCE. Dans ce cas de figure, le point d’équilibre entre indépendance et responsabilité paraît idéal, et la BCE devrait, selon Kempf, s’en inspirer (l’obligation de rendre des comptes, the accountability, ne s’oppose pas forcément à indépendance). Il ne s’agit donc pas d’ignorer le projet politique global que contient une monnaie, ce que la BCE pourrait être tentée de faire: l’art.109b(3) de Maastricht impose le moindre des contrôles, ce qui fait que la prise démocratique est vraiment minimale, et l’opacité de règle. T. Padoa-Schioppa, membre du directoire de la BCE, a pu parler d’une «monnaie sans Etat», ce qui traduit un découplement entre le signe et sa crédibilité. Or, il faut éviter à tout prix la «solitude» de la BCE et appuyer sur l’exigence de cohérence. C’est dire que la position de la BCE est fragile: seule son intégration politique (ou dans la politique) permettra de parler de succès. La deuxième partie pose plus directement la question institutionnelle, commençant par une réflexion de Hartmut Kaelble sur l’espace public européen. Plusieurs chercheurs, notamment allemands, commencent à valider ce concept: cet espace est multilingue (de plus en plus d’Européens parlent une langue étrangère), composite (les réseaux s’y développent, favorisant l’interconnexion d’espaces autres que nationaux), repose sur des transferts non institutionnalisés, mais s’intéresse peu à la politique à l’échelle européenne, très élitiste (espaces d’experts). Pour l’auteur cependant, on assiste à l’émergence d’indices qui démontrent l’affirmation de cet espace public dépassant la nation: le débat renouvelé autour de la civilisation européenne, l’européanisation des réseaux d’experts (publications, réunions, etc.), l’augmentation des symboles européens (passeport, euro, etc.), l’apparition d’une société civile européenne (associations, syndicats, ONG), ainsi que l’importance accrue de la thématique européenne dans les médias et les campagnes électorales. Le thème de la transparence politique est abordé par Amanda Frost (Washington) par comparaison entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis. Son constat de 126 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen départ est que les crises de confiance donnent matière à la publicisation des processus décisionnels. Elle part du cas de l’UE, qui a émis un nouveau règlement en matière d’accès à l’information le 3 décembre 2001, ce qui existe depuis une trentaine d’années outre-Atlantique. Or, dans ce cas, la volonté n’est pas, comme aux Etats-Unis, d’améliorer le système, mais de tenter de créer une légitimité démocratique. Il faut dire que l’UE propose peu de place aux acteurs non gouvernementaux dans la prise de décision. Aux Etats-Unis, on cherche à améliorer l’exécution de la loi, et non pas à répondre à une crise de légitimité: le processus se fait en amont, avec l’existence de voies d’accès des acteurs intéressés par telle ou telle procédure, qui ont une chance de peser sur l’élaboration de la loi. La transparence finit par incarner la légitimation de la décision, car le public est réellement associé (participation aux réunions du Congrès, droit de pétitionner le gouvernement): dans ce sens, la transparence insuffle véritablement de la démocratie. Pour l’Europe, la «culture du secret» est prédominante (l’Europe reste «un projet de diplomates», p.186): quelques documents de relations publiques, mais sans plus. Le PE reste un organe secondaire, et la comitologie la règle. La transparence, refusée dans un premier temps dans le Traité de Maastricht, a donc été imposée par les circonstances, mais il ne s’agit pas pour autant d’améliorer la production législative européenne, pour des raisons d’efficacité (peur d’une «re-nationalisation» des politiques, du ralentissement des décisions). Or, «là où les Américains considèrent la transparence comme une simple pratique, parmi d’autres, de bonne gouvernance, l’UE en fait une condition constitutionnelle sine qua non de la démocratie» (p.193). Le problème de la participation, si crucial en Europe, n’est en effet pas réglé par la question de la transparence du droit à l’information. L’auteur propose ainsi trois voies pour la démocratisation de l’Europe: un modèle «majoritaire supranational», qui implique la préférence pour les majorités; un modèle «intergouvernemental», qui laisse toute sa place aux comités d’experts et à l’intégration des parlements nationaux; un modèle «républicain civique», qui s’appuie sur la société civile, actrice dans le processus décisionnel. Dans tous les cas de figure, d’autres décisions que celle sur la transparence devront être prises pour permettre une véritable appropriation de la gouvernance par le public. Elisabeth du Réau propose une réflexion plus historienne sur les différents projets d’union politique: la première étude porte sur la vague d’espoirs qui a présidé à la création du Conseil de l’Europe (voir l’hommage de Mitterrand à cette génération prête à «inventer l’Europe réconciliée»); la seconde sur l’échec de la CED et sur la condamnation de l’approche fédéraliste («les fédéralistes sont les adversaires de l’Etat-nation et veulent lui substituer l’Europe-Communauté», Debré); la dernière sur la multiplication des projets qui marque les années 1980, notamment le projet Spinelli du 14 février 1984, qui a marqué plus qu’on ne le pense les discussions au sein de l’Etat et présidé à la réorientation de la construction européenne à cette époque. On ne peut que faire le constat de l’échec de ces différents plans, qui démontre qu’il est plus facile d’évoquer l’Europe que de la vivre. Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 127

Liêm Hoang-Ngoc évoque ensuite la notion de «gouvernement économique» européen, dans un article qui cherche à «traiter, au plan théorique, des fondements des différents critères de convergence économique et des objectifs de politique économique qui sont susceptibles d’être élaborés dès lors que plusieurs économies nationales décident de s’engager dans un projet de coordination supranationale» (p.219). L’auteur décrit le processus par étapes qui semblait s’être imposé à partir de l’AUE: marché unique, monnaie unique, puis règles institutionnelles de nature fédérale. Mais c’est sans compter avec les difficultés de concilier souci d’efficacité économique et gestion politique: le débat sur les critères de convergence empoisonne ainsi la relation entre les deux approches, alors que le critère retenu (3%) n’a rien de scientifique, mais se révèle être la moyenne des déficits des pays membres au cours des années 1980. Hoang-Ngoc se montre favorable à la renégociation du pacte de stabilité, surtout parce que le budget communautaire reste faible (1,27% du PIB communautaire); or, la politique budgétaire doit l’emporter sur l’interprétation orthodoxe des critères de convergence. La décision du 25 novembre 2003 semble marquer la fin d’un tabou, alors que certains proposent de nouveaux critères pour évaluer le déficit public (les Italiens proposent ainsi d’écarter l’investissement du calcul des dépenses publiques), dont le rôle stratégique de relance ne peut pas être assumé par le capital privé. Jean-Claude Colliard esquisse ensuite une réflexion autour du concept de «patrimoine constitutionnel européen». Celui-ci consacre certains principes, comme la primauté de l’individu ou la force du principe d’égalité. Est-ce que le fait de transposer ces éléments peut favoriser le processus constituant? Il est évident que tous les pays se retrouvent dans le régime parlementaire, mais il y a aussi des pratiques qui divergent: au sein des Etats, l’élection parlementaire devient élection au suffrage universel du Premier ministre; or, au niveau de l’UE, il y a déconnexion entre élection et composition de la Commission. Tout cela peut aussi expliquer la désaffection des électeurs, d’autant plus que ce Parlement ne vote ni l’impôt ni la loi. Il faudrait peut-être commencer par transposer certaines pratiques à l’échelle nationale: pour l’élection du PE, une procédure électorale uniforme avec élection à la représentation proportionnelle dans des circonscriptions régionales et la reconnaissance d’un système de partis communs. La dernière intervention est celle de Didier Maus et porte sur la «problématique de la constitution pour l’Europe», article écrit à l’automne 2001, et volontairement non actualisé. L’auteur s’intéresse aux questions de vocabulaire (peut-on parler de constitution?), au contenu, à la procédure (il recommande par exemple l’uniformisation de la procédure d’adoption avec des référendums dans tous les pays au même moment). Pour lui, «à partir du moment où le mot ‘constitution’ […] figurera dans l’intitulé du prochain traité, l’histoire de l’Europe ne sera plus la même» (p.274). La dernière phrase est intéressante: «c’est […] la confrontation entre la date de (l’)élaboration (de l’article) et le futur droit positif qui est susceptible d’intéresser le lecteur», (p.275), bien que le débat, à la suite de mai 2005, reste ouvert. 128 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Ainsi, différents points ont été abordés pour mettre en scène cette notion de gouvernance, sans aboutir à une vision d’ensemble relativement précise. Il faut dire que le mot reste à définir, tant son intervention dans la vie publique est récente: la période qui l’a vu naître reste marquée par les séquelles de la fin de la Guerre froide, où le pouvoir semble s’être dilué de manière inquiétante sans que l’on ait trouvé de solutions nouvelles aux différents déficits démocratiques dénoncés par l’opinion, spécialement à l’échelle européenne. Pour beaucoup de pays, dont la France, le mot de gouvernance n’a pas de racines dans notre vie politique, et signifie d’emblée une véritable remise en question de notre vision du contrat social. Le mot de gouvernance traduit de toute manière une certaine dévaluation du rôle de l’Etat, mis en cause dans son efficacité et dans son essence politique même, que les circonstances actuelles semblent condamner au profit de l’épanouissement personnel, soutenu par certaines reviviscences identitaires, en même temps que par un climat libéral qui semble pour certains être le résultat final de l’Histoire. Situation confuse qui appelle une réponse où l’Europe, parce qu’elle est le fruit de traditions politiques diverses, en même temps qu’une expérience inédite propre à toutes les souplesses, peut jouer un rôle moteur: celui d’éviter une situation anarchisante où des regroupements se constitueraient dans les marges des Etats ou carrément en dehors d’eux. Il faudra pour cela faire un pas, grand pour certains, qui consiste à reconnaître la représentation des intérêts privés, le lobbying, cette interaction qui met en question notre conception de la représentation publique, et pose les bases d’une démocratie renouvelée où l’acte de gouverner est l’affaire de tous, et où la discussion incessante d’arbitrages précaires s’avère un gage de démocratie. En ce sens, le livre atteint son objectif en liant le mot gouvernance à celui d’identité, car cette notion nouvelle est plus que la chronique annoncée d’une mutation du pouvoir, elle traduit également la volonté de faire de l’Europe un projet collectif, objectif qui ne pourra pas être atteint sans une réadaptation de nos traditions politiques, qui devra d’abord commencer dans chacun des Etats avant de se propager à l’ensemble communautaire: en ce sens, l’UE peut devenir une force d’impulsion, tout en redevenant une idée d’avenir. Bertrand Vayssière Université de Toulouse II-Le Mirail

Birgit RAMSCHEID – Herbert Blankenhorn (1904-1991). Adenauers außenpolitischer Berater, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 2006, 460 S. – ISBN 978-3-7700-1901-4 – 38,00 €.

In her University of Bonn PhD thesis Birgit Ramscheid gives a comprehensive and “thick description” of the political career of Herbert Blankenhorn, who was one of the very few top advisors to chancellor Konrad Adenauer and therefore a key figure in the process of co-ordinating and directing the foreign policy activities of West Germany from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s, when he left Bonn to serve as ambassador to NATO. Although his impact may have been more important in the Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 129

field of staff policy, he also contributed to the conception and implementation of foreign policy, especially as far as the “German question” was concerned. Blankenhorn grew up surrounded by an upper class-Protestant milieu. He joined the Foreign Office in 1929, serving among other places at Geneva, Washington, and, of course, Berlin. Although no dedicated Nazi – he became a member of the Party not until December 1938 – American officials remembered him as “the most pro-German” of all the secretaries of the German embassy in Washington during the second half of the 1930s (p.46). Since on the other hand Blankenhorn got in contact to the “20th July”-conspiracy, Ramscheid describes his attitude as fluctuating between “inner resistance and external conformity” (p.47). Between spring and autumn 1945 he was arrested by the American military authorities. During the interrogations he tried to make his American counterparts sensitive of the “Communist threat”, bringing the Germans into play as allies against the Russians. After his denazification procedure he was elected, in May 1948, secretary general of the CDU in the British Zone of Occupation, a post that brought him in contact with Adenauer, who needed – and trusted in – Blankenhorn’s foreign policy expertise. So his protégé was able to gain top positions in the chancellery and in the “new” Foreign Office, established in March 1951. Although Adenauer had warned him not to rebuild some sort of “Wilhelmstraße” – the synonym for the former German Foreign Office – this was exactly the accusation Blankenhorn had to face during the early 1950s. Nevertheless, Adenauer always shielded him. Whereas Ramscheid introduces Blankenhorn as a man with new ideas and proposals to solve the “German question”, this did not apply to the field of European integration policy. He admired Jean Monnet and was well aware of the tremendous importance of the Schuman Plan – “a landmark of European history” (p.151) –, but lacked own ideas worth mentioning. During his service as ambassador in Paris between 1958 and 1963 he at least opposed general Charles de Gaulle’s temporarily successful attempts to keep the British out of the European Economic Community and also rejected the so-called Elysée Treaty. This attitude may explain why Blankenhorn’s relationship with Adenauer cooled down even before the latter left office. And his influence had been declining already since the mid 1950s. Birgit Ramscheid’s book draws on extensive archival research including, of course, the Blankenhorn papers at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, but also a nearly endless number of German and foreign archives. She offers an impressive inquiry into successful networking and into the way of thinking and acting of a powerful “second row” official. Although she sometimes tends to make Blankenhorn appear in a rather favourable light, all in all she keeps the necessary distance to her protagonist. Prof. Dr. Werner Bührer Technische Universität München 130 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Julie M. NEWTON – Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe, Palgrave Macmil- lan, Basingstoke, 2003, 357 S. – ISBN 0-333-72100-4 – 20,00 £.

Als wesentlichster Hebel der Westeuropapolitik Moskaus diente in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren das gaullistische Frankreich, dessen auf nationale Eigenständigkeit bedachten Kurs der Kreml für eine Schwächung des westlichen Bündnisses zu instrumentalisieren strebte. Julie M. Newton hat zur sowjetischen Frankreichpolitik 1958 bis 2001 eine insbesondere über Akteure und Hintergründe der Moskauer Europadiskussion detailliert informierte und prägnant formulierte Studie vorlegt, welche die bisherige Forschung zum Thema1 um einige Aspekte bereichert. Paris wird dabei von Newton auch als zumindest bis 1970 gerne benütztes Sprachrohr der sowjetischen Westpolitik präsentiert: „Während – wie Harold Macmillan kon- statierte – ‚de Gaulle Europa sagte und Frankreich meinte‘, sagte Moskau Frank- reich und meinte Europa“ (S. 62). Sowjetische Archivquellen, wie sie etwa in der Studie Gomarts über die Chruščëvjahre ausgewertet wurden, aber für den Zeitraum von Newtons Werk nicht in gleicher Dichte zugänglich sind, wurden von ihr nicht herangezogen. Darin liegt auch ein Hauptmanko des Buches, dessen Aussagen in Zukunft durch Dokumente gegengeprüft werden müssen. Dennoch gelingt es New- ton, durch Analyse zahlreicher russischer Zeitschriftenpublikationen sowie durch Gespräche mit ehemaligen Politikern, Diplomaten und Experten, darunter Chruščëvs Schwiegersohn und „Sondergesandter“ Aleksej Adžubej, der Außenpo- litikexperte Georgij Arbatov und der spätere Gorbačëvberater Andrej Gračëv, einen Eindruck der internen Diskussionen auf Experten- und Beraterebene zu vermitteln. Dabei identifiziert sie drei Gruppen, welche ihrer Interpretation der Lage in Westeuropa und ihren Vorschlägen Gehör bei der obersten Führung zu verschaffen strebten: die vor allem im Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehun- gen sowie der Prager Redaktion der Zeitschrift „Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus“ konzentrierten „Europäisten“ (die für eine Aufwertung Europas in der sowjetischen Politik plädierten, um damit die atlantischen Bindungen zu unter- minieren), die „Amerikanisten“ (welchen Deutschland weiterhin zu unberechenbar schien, um auf die amerikanische Präsenz in Westeuropa verzichten zu wollen) und die „Ultraorthodoxen“ (welche das Dilemma durch Hochrüstung zu kontrollieren vorschlugen). In allen drei Gruppen beeinflussten ideologische Dogmen wie jene der wachsenden inneren Konflikte im Kapitalismus, der inhärenten Aggressivität der „imperialistischen“ Mächte und der steigenden Resonanz von Entspannung und Sozialismus die Standpunkte. Da die zentrifugalen Strömungen und zwischenstaat- liche Zwistigkeiten im „Westblock“ als „objektive“ Tendenzen interpretiert wur- den, meinten insbesondere die Ultras, dass die Sowjetunion nicht auf ihre Rüstungsprogramme verzichten müsse, um eine Détente zu erzielen.

1. M.-P. REY, La tentation du rapprochement: France et l’URSS à l’heure de la Détente 1964-1974, Sorbonne, Paris, 1991; T. WOLTON, La France sous l’influence: Paris-Moscou 30 ans des rela- tions secrètes, Grasset, Paris, 1997; T. GOMART, Double détente: Les relations franco-sovié- tiques de 1958 à 1964, Sorbonne, Paris, 2003. Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 131

Das gaullistische Frankreich wurde dabei zum „nützlichsten Instrument“ von Moskaus Westeuropapolitik. Der Erfolg dieser Instrumentalisierung bestärkte den Kreml in seiner Vision eines zumindest mittelfristig geteilten Europas, dessen Osten unter sowjetischer Kontrolle bleiben, dessen Westen aber aus der NATO gelöst, in der Integration gehindert und sowjetischem Einfluss geöffnet werden sollte. Unter dem Eindruck des Gaullismus wurde ab den frühen 1960er Jahren auch die EWG zunehmend als Chance zur Schwächung der transatlantischen Alli- anz begriffen und damit der „instrumentale Europäismus“ geboren, der 1962 Ein- fluss auf Nikitia Chruščëv zu gewinnen vermochte. Dessen Nachfolger konzen- trierte seine Entspannungsinitiativen unter Beibehaltung der konventionellen sowjetischen Übermacht aber neuerlich auf Frankreich, das 1964 die EWG in eine Krise stürzte, 1965 das amerikanische Projekt einer Multilateralen Atomstreit- macht (MLF) unter westeuropäischer Beteiligung torpedierte und sich 1966 aus den Kommandostrukturen der NATO zurückzog. Die höchst erfreute Sowjetfüh- rung überschüttete de Gaulle anlässlich seines Moskaubesuches mit Ehrungen, wie sie noch keinen ausländischen Politiker je in der UdSSR zuteil geworden waren, und gestattete ihm sogar, einem katholischen Gottesdienst in Leningrad beizuwoh- nen. Der General, so ein Sowjetfunktionär rückblickend in Anspielung auf Henri IV, sei „wohl eine Messe wert“ gewesen (S. 76). Obwohl Leonid Brežnev gegen- über dem als „Feind“ erkannten de Gaulle, der aus seinem Ziel eines selbstbe- stimmten und befreiten Europas „vom Atlantik bis zum Ural“ nie ein Hehl machte, misstrauisch blieb, wurde Frankreich zum wesentlichsten westlichen Verbündeten des Kremls in der Frage einer Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Dass sich Paris nicht nur durch seine außenpolitischen Kapricen als für die Sowjetunion überaus nützlich erwies, sondern diesem auch mehrfach diplomatisch zu Hilfe kam, beweisen die Aussage des Außenministers Michel Debré, der die militärische Zerschlagung des Prager Frühlings als „accident de parcours“ herun- terspielte, und die Missachtung des unter dem Eindruck des sowjetischen Einmar- sches in Afghanistan eingeleiteten westlichen Sowjetunionboykotts. Obwohl Fran- çois Mitterrand eine „atlantischere“ Politik verfolgte, blieb die sowjetische Haltung gegenüber Paris zweckoptimistisch-freundlich und auch für die EG hatte Moskau Anfang der 1980er Jahre wieder lobende Worte übrig. Ein grundlegend neuer Ansatz kam jedoch erst unter Michail Gorbaëv zum Durchbruch. Die bisher „instrumentalen Europäisten“, die nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Hoffnung, damit innere Reformen auszulösen, ihre Instrumentalisierungsbe- strebungen zugunsten einer wirklichen Verbesserung der Beziehungen aufgegeben hatten, gewannen die Oberhand. Die neue Führung griff überwiegend auf liberale Mitarbeiter des Parteiapparates zurück. Die EG wurde in den Jahren 1985 bis 1992 als Partner akzeptiert, und Deutschland löste Frankreich als Hauptadressat ab. Nachdem Westeuropa unter Boris El’cin in der sowjetischen Prioritätenskala zurückgestuft wurde, widmete Vladimir Putin Europa wieder mehr Aufmerksam- keit und behielt dies auch nach seiner Hinwendung zu den USA nach dem 11. Sep- tember 2001 bei. Im Zuge des – von Newton nicht mehr behandelten – zweiten 132 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen amerikanischen Irakkrieges, der nicht nur die atlantische, sondern auch die inner- europäische Partnerschaft einer schweren Belastungsprobe aussetzte, erlangte die Achse „Paris-Berlin-Moskau“ durch ihre gemeinsame Ablehnung der Intervention kurzfristig an Bedeutung. Trotz der inflationären Verwendung des Prädikats einer „strategischen Partnerschaft“ zwischen Russland und der EU erinnern die Bezie- hungen aber heute eher an eine Zweckallianz machtpolitisch selbstbewusster Kon- kurrenten. Newtons Darstellung überzeugt trotz kleiner Ungenauigkeiten – so ist von einer sowjetischen Anerkennung der EWG 1971 (S.24), von Mitterrand als EG-Kommis- sions- (nicht Rats-) -präsident (S.26) und von Zaire als ehemals französischer Kolonie die Rede (S.95); missverständlich ist auch, vom NATO-Bombardement „des Kosovo“ 1999 (S.4) zu sprechen. Die Feinstruktur mit Mikrokapiteln und Sei- tenüberschriften trägt mehr zur Verwirrung als zur Klärung bei. An den Verlag ist eine technische Kritik zu richten: Kapitelweise nummerierte Anmerkungen am Ende eines Buches sind generell nicht leserfreundlich; ohne einen Hinweis in der Kopfzeile, auf welche Textseite(n) sich die Endnoten beziehen, gerät das Nach- schlagen zum langwierigen Herumblättern. Wolfgang Mueller Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 133 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Linda Risso Against Rearmament or Against Integration? The PCI and PCF’s Opposition to the European Defence Community and the Western European Union, 1950-55

This article examines comparatively the French and Italian communist opposition to German rearmament. It demonstrates how communist criticism passed from total opposition between October 1950 and March 1953 to a more articulated strategy in the following years. The study of archival material along with a detailed analysis of the parties’ newspapers and congresses’ decisions reveal that after the death of Stalin and the end of the war in Korea, outright rejection of all integration gave way to a more differentiated criticism. This new approach aimed to delay the ratification process in the hope that the governing coalitions in France and Italy would divide on the issue and that the public would grow tired with the debate. This article also deals with the reasons behind the alleged “silence” of the communists during the Western European Union debate and demonstrates that if after 1953 the French and Italian communists accepted a controlled form of German rearmament, they were still persuaded of the need to oppose the political integration of Western Europe.

Contre le réarmement ou contre l'intégration? L'opposition du PCI et du PCF au projet de la Communauté européenne de défense et de l'Union occidentale (1950-1955).

Moyennant une étude comparative, cet article analyse l’opposition des communistes italiens et français au réarmement allemand. Il montre comment la critique communiste est passée d’une totale opposition entre octobre 1950 et mars 1953 à une stratégie plus articulée dans les années suivantes. Le recours à des sources d’archives ainsi qu'une analyse détaillée des journaux de partis et des actes de congrès révèlent en effet qu’après la mort de Staline et la fin de la guerre en Corée, le refus catégorique de toutes formes d’intégration a cédé la place à une démarche critique plus nuancée. Cette nouvelle approche visait à retarder le processus de ratification dans l’espoir que la coalition gouvernementale en France et en Italie fussent divisées sur cette question et que le public se serait lassé de la discussion. L'article examine ensuite les raisons à l'origine du soi-disant «silence» des communistes italiens et français pendant le débat sur l’Union occidentale en démontrant que l'acceptation, après 1953, du réarmement allemand sous une forme contrôlée n'empêchait néanmoins pas le PCI et le PCF de continuer à s’opposer à l’intégration politique en Europe de l'Ouest.

Gegen die Wiederaufrüstung oder gegen die Integration? Das Nein der Kommunistischen Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft und zur Westeuropäischen Union. 1950-1955

Der Aufsatz analysiert in einer vergleichenden Studie die Opposition der Kommunistischen Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs gegen die Wiederaufrüstung Deutschlands. Er zeigt wie sich ihre zunächst totale Kritik zwischen Oktober 1950 und März 1953 allmählich während den nachfolgenden Jahren abschwächt. Die auf Archivquellen gestützte, und durch Partei- zeitungen und Kongressakten ergänzte Analyse verdeutlicht in der Tat wie nach dem Tod von Stalin und dem Ende des Koreakriegs die ursprünglich kategorische Ablehnung aller 134 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Formen der Integration nun einer kritischeren und nuancierteren Darstellung wich. Diese neue Haltung zielte darauf ab den Ratifizierungsprozess hinauszuzögern in der Hoffnung, dass sich die Koalitionsregierungen in Italien und in Frankreich über die Abstimmung aus- einanderdividieren ließen und die Öffentlichkeit sich gelangweilt aus der Debatte verab- schieden würde. Der Beitrag untersucht sodann die Gründe des sogenannten „Schweigens“ der italienischen und französischen Kommunisten während der Diskussion über die Westeu- ropäische Union. Er belegt, dass die Zustimmung, nach 1953, für eine kontrollierte deutsche Wiederbewaffnung die beiden kommunistischen Parteien nicht davon abhielt, die politische Integration Europas nach wie vor abzulehnen.

Maud Bracke From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956-1973

In line with Soviet analyses, the French and Italian communist parties had since the start of the Cold War taken on strongly negative positions on the EEC. The anti-EEC stance of PCI and PCF was based on a social argument (European integration as the concentration of capital) and, in the case of the PCF especially, an argument relating to the loss of national sovereignty. While during the 1960s the PCI gradually shifted towards a more positive stance, the PCF continued to oppose any form of West European integration up to the early 1970s. It was only in the context of its domestic alliance with the socialist party, problematic relations with the Soviet communist party, and under the influence of the PCI, that it came to accept, although never welcome, West European integration. It is argued that the two parties’ changing positions with regard to Europe should be understood as resulting from the specific impacts of European détente on domestic politics in the two countries. The PCI supported the EEC because European integration was seen as leading to détente on the European continent, which, in turn, was understood as beneficial to the party’s domestic strategy. The PCF was faced with the far less positive implications of Gaullist détente on its domestic and international strategies. It had little interest in European détente and therefore no interest in European integration.

De l'Atlantique à l'Oural? Les communistes italiens et français et la question de l'Europe. 1956-1973

Conformément à la ligne soviétique, les partis communistes italien et français ont adopté depuis les débuts de la Guerre froide une position résolument négative à l'égard de le CEE. Cette approche était fondée sur un argument social (l'intégration européenne était fustigée comme étant l'expression d'une concentration du capital) et, spécialement dans le cas du PCF, sur l'argument de la perte de souveraineté nationale. Tandis que le PCI évoluait progressivement pendant les années 1960 vers une attitude plus positive, le PCF s'obstinait à rejeter toute forme d'intégration de l'Europe occidentale et ce, jusqu'au début des années 1970. C'est alors seulement que, sans pour autant devenir vraiment favorable à l'intégration européenne, il se ravisait sous l'influence à la fois de l'alliance nationale avec les socialistes, des relations de plus en plus problématiques avec le PC soviétique et de l'ascendant exercé par le PCI. L'évolution notée au sujet des positions changeantes des deux partis doit être attribuée à l'impact spécifique provoqué par la détente en Europe sur les politiques intérieures dans les deux pays. Le PCI soutenait la CEE parce que l'intégration européenne était considérée comme étant génératrice de détente sur le continent et que celle-ci, à son tour, s'avérait Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 135 bénéfique pour la réalisation des stratégies nationales du parti. Le PCF par contre se trouvait aux prises avec les implications nettement moins positives de la détente gaulliste. Il affichait peu d'intérêt pour la détente en Europe et partant, pas d'intérêt pour l'intégration européenne.

Vom Atlantik bis zum Ural? Die italienischen und französischen Kommunisten und die Europafrage (1956-1973)

Getreu der Linie Moskaus, nahmen die kommunistischen Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs seit dem Beginn des Kalten Krieges eine resolut negative Haltung gegenüber der EWG ein. Ihre Stellungnahme beruhte auf einem sozialen Argument (die westeuropäische Integration sei Ausdruck der Konzentration des Kapitals) und dem Argument des nationalen Souveräni- tätsverlusts. Letztere Ansicht war besonders in Frankreichs KP verbreitet, denn, während sich die Genossen in Italien im Laufe der 1960er Jahre allmählich zu einer positiveren Ein- schätzung durchrangen, beharrten die französischen Kommunisten bis in die frühen 1970er Jahre auf ihrer strikten Ablehnung jeder Form der Integration Westeuropas. Ohne jemals echte Anhänger der Europaidee zu werden, begannen sie dann doch ihre sture Einsätzung aufzuweichen unter dem Endruck der innenpolitischen Allianz mit den Sozialisten, der pro- blematischer werdenden Beziehungen zur KPdSU und dem Einfluss aus Italien. Die sich verändernde Einschätzung steht unter dem Zeichen der spezifischen Auswirkungen welche die Entspannung in Europa auf die Innenpolitik der beiden Länder ausübte. Die KP Italiens unterstützte nun die EWG weil sie in ihr einen Entspannungsfaktor erblickte, der sich darüber hinaus hervorragend eignete, um die nationalen Strategien der Partei zu begün- stigen. Die Schwesterpartei in Frankreich hingegen war mehr mit den weniger positiven Auswirkungen der gaullistischen Entspannung auf ihre innenpolitischen und internationalen Strategien befasst. Sie hatte nur wenig Interesse an der Entspannung in Europa und daher, auch kein Interesse an der europäischen Integration.

Muriel Baive Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Democracy: The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968

This article deals with the dichotomy between internationalism and patriotism and the way it has been interpreted and instrumentalized in the Czechoslovak context, and in the wider context of the developing integration process in Western Europe, a process which challenged traditional patriotism with a new form of internationalism. To meet this, in Czechoslovakia the « international » aspect was mainly pictured as representing « Moscow ». The « patriotic » side, on the other hand, was said to embed Czechoslovak national democratic traditions alongside the positive side of communism’s achievements. While this stark vision failed to address the main issues of communist domination in Czechoslovakia, this had not really been challenged yet.

Internationalisme, patriotisme, dictature et démocratie: Le parti communiste tchécoslovaque et l'exercice du pouvoir (1945-1968)

Cet article traite de la dichotomie entre internationalisme/patriotisme et de la manière dont elle a été interprétée, ou plutôt: instrumentalisée, à la fois dans le contexte tchécoslovaque et dans le contexte élargi du processus d'intégration de l'Europe occidentale qui confrontait le patriotisme classique a une nouvelle forme d'internationalisme. Aussi, en Tchécoslovaquie, l'aspect «international» a-t-il été dépeint le plus clair du temps comme représentant 136 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

«Moscou», c'est-à-dire le côté le plus sombre de la domination communiste. L'aspect «patriotique» a en revanche été considéré comme ciment des traditions nationales et démocratiques et partant, comme élément positif de l'ère communiste. Cette vision manichéenne cache cependant la vraie nature de la domination communiste tchécoslovaque qui attend toujours d'être sérieusement abordée.

Internationalismus, Patriotismus, Diktatur und Demokratie: Die kommunistische Partei und die Machtausübung in der Tschechoslowakei, 1945-1968

Der Aufsatz behandelt die Dichotomie zwischen Internationalismus/Patriotismus und die Art und Weise wie sie interpretiert, bzw. instrumentalisiert wurde und zwar sowohl im tschechoslowakischen Rahmen als auch im erweiterten westeuropäischen Umfeld in dem sich der klassische Patriotismus mit einer neuen Form des Internationalismus verband. Der «internationale» Aspekt wurde stets hingestellt als stellvertretend für «Moskau», d.h. als die schwärzeste Seite der kommunistischen Herrschaft in der Tschechoslowakei. Der «patrioti- sche» Aspekt wurde dahingegen als Kern der nationalen und demokratischen Tradition, also als positives Element der kommunistischen Machtausübung betrachtet. Diese Schwarz-Weiß-Malerei übertüncht allerdings das wahre Gesicht des kommunistischen Regimes, dessen Darstellung übrigens bis heute noch immer nicht so recht in Angriff genommen wurde.

Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast Reactions of Eastern Europe to the Economic Integration Process of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Fifties to the Seventies

Although the communist party officially disapproved the European economic integration process, this position was neither uniformly shared nor invariable in time in both Central and Eastern Europe. The present contribution shows the contradiction that existed between the politically motivated rejection and economic constraints which the Eastern popular democracies had to cope with and which led some socialist states to enter into trade rela- tions with EEC and EFTA countries. Actually, statistics show that trade relations between socialist and West European countries were slowly increasing from the beginning of the six- ties and this especially after the EEC had made cuts in customs tariffs. During the seventies however particularly the policy of détente following the Conference on Security and Coop- eration in Europe (CSCE ) was responsible for the progression of economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland on one hand and the EEC on the other.

Les réactions de l'Europe orientale à l'intégration économique de l'Europe occiden- tale: La Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne des années 1950 aux années 1970

Malgré sa condamnation officielle par les partis communistes, le processus de l'intégration économique européenne n'a point été perçu en Europe centrale et orientale d'une manière unilatérale et invariable dans le temps. La présente contribution établit que le refus politiquement motivé est une chose; les contraintes économiques auxquelles doivent faire face les démocraties populaires de l'Est en sont une autre. Aussi certains États socialistes nouent-ils des contacts commerciaux avec les pays de la CEE et de l'EFTA. Les données statistiques font en effet preuve d'une lente progression des échanges dès le début des années soixante et ce, notamment par suite des réductions tarifaires opérées par la CEE. Dans le Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 137 courant des années 1970, ce fut par contre essentiellement la détente consécutive à la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (CSCE) qui fit figure de moteur d'une progression des relations économiques entre la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne d'une part, et d'autre part l'Europe communautaire.

Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren

Die Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa war trotz der offiziellen Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen Parteien nicht einseitig. Er unterlag im übrigen auch Wandlungen. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass es ein Spannungsfeld zwischen der politisch motivierten Ablehnung der westeuropäischen Integration in den sozialistischen Staaten und dem wirtschaftlich bedingten Bestreben eini- ger Staaten gab, mit den EWG- und EFTA-Mitgliedsländern Handelskontakte zu unterhal- ten. Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass seit dem Anfang der 1960er Jahre langsam eine Ausweitung der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen und westeuropäischen Ländern zu registrieren ist. Der Zollabbau der EWG spielte in diesem Prozess eine große Rolle. In den 1970er Jahren bewirkte dagegen die Entspannungspolitik im Rahmen der Vor- bereitung für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) auch die Änderung des wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisses der Tschechoslowakei und Polens insbeson- dere zur EWG.

Thomas Fetzer Turning Eurosceptic: British Trade Unions and European Integration (1961-1975)

The article analyses British trade unions’ turn to Euroscepticism since the late 1960s - in contrast to the cautiously pro-European attitudes in the early 1960s. It is argued that this transformation was not merely a reaction to the changed terms of UK entry (budget, CAP) but also reflected changed trade union assessments with regard to the economic benefits and risks of European economic integration, and the growing importance of European elements for socioeconomic reform debates in the UK. In contrast to the early 1960s British trade unions perceived EC membership as reinforcing rather than mitigating the country’s economic difficulties. Employer and government attempts to use European integration as a vehicle of “modernisation” reinforced scepticism as they were seen to display an anti-union bias. The article demonstrates why it is useful to study Eurosceptic groups not only in the British case but also as part of a more general perspective of European integration history.

Le passage vers l’Euroscepticisme: Les syndicats britanniques et l'integration européenne (1961-1975)

L'article analyse le passage des syndicats britanniques vers l’Euroscepticisme à la fin des années soixante. Le changement d'attitude, qui contraste singulièrement avec l’approche pragmatique du début de la décade, se comprend non seulement comme une réaction aux conditions retenues pour l’entrée du Royaume Uni au Marché commun, mais encore comme le reflet d'une mutation de la perception syndicale à propos de l’impact de l’intégration européenne sur l’économie britannique et sur le débat relatif aux réformes socio-économiques nationales. Puisque les dits projets de réforme émanaient des milieux patronaux et du gouvernement conservateur, et qu'ils faisait souvent référence aux nouveaux défis européens, l'adhésion à l'Europe fut perçue comme une œuvre dirigée contre les 138 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen syndicats. L’opposition du mouvement ouvrier au processus d'intégration en fut la conséquence. L’article établit du coup l’utilité des études traitant des organisations eurosceptiques, à la fois pour le cas du Royaume Uni, mais aussi, d'une manière plus générale, pour toute l’histoire de la construction européenne.

Eine euroskeptische Wende: Britische Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration (1961-1975)

Der Artikel analysiert die euroskeptische Wende britischer Gewerkschaftspolitik seit den späten 1960er Jahren. Die Abkehr von den pragmatischen und vorsichtig pro-europäischen Positionen der frühen 60er Jahre wird nicht lediglich als Reflex auf die sich wandelnden Bedingungen des britischen EG-Beitritts gedeutet. Vielmehr spiegelt diese Transformation einen längerfristigen Wandel wider, der sowohl mit den von der Gewerkschaftsseite vermu- teten Effekten des EG-Beitritts für die britische Wirtschaft als auch mit dem Einfluss der EG-Frage auf nationale Reformdebatten in Zusammenhang stand. Versuche des Arbeitge- berlagers und der Tory-Regierung den britischen EG-Beitritt als Instrument für eine als gewerkschaftsfeindlich empfundene Reformpolitik zu benutzen, führten zusehends zu ver- schärften Vorbehalten gegenüber der europäischen Integration. Der Artikel zeigt auch, inwiefern die Analyse europaskeptischer Gruppen über den britischen Fall hinaus von allge- meinem Nutzen für die europäische Integrationsforschung sein kann.

Gabriele D’Ottavio The treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy

After the seminal works by Rudolf Hrbek and William Paterson, published in the early 1970s, SPD’s European policy has been the subject of several historical investigations. Nonetheless, the relationship between the SPD and the integration process during the “relance européenne” (1955-1957) has been relatively neglected. In particular, starting from the prevailing position in historiography, establishing 1955 as the «turning» point in SPD’s European policy, an analysis will be carried out in order to assess whether the social-democrats’ position on the Common Market and Euratom, was converging, or diverging, with the governing party’s, and whether, and to what extent, the decision to cast a vote in favour of the ratification of the Rome Treaties should be considered a sort of natural outcome of a process which had evolved since 1955.

Les traités de Rome et la politique européenne du SPD: Continuité ou rupture?

Suite aux deux travaux pionniers de Rudolf Hrbek et de William Paterson, publiés au début des années 1970, la politique européenne du SPD a fait l’objet d’investigations historiographiques. Un sujet qui reste néanmoins un peu dans l’ombre, à savoir, le rapport entre le SPD et le processus d’intégration pendant la période de la «relance européenne» (1955-1957). En partant de la thèse dominante, qui considère 1955 comme la date du «virage» dans la politique européenne du SPD, et sur la base des documents actuellement disponibles, cet article se propose d’analyser la nature des positions des socialistes allemands en matière de Marché Commun et d’Euratom. L’article évalue également les motivations qui ont influencé le plus la décision du SPD en faveur du vote pour la ratification des traités de Rome. Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 139

Kontinuität oder Bruch? Die SPD und die Romverträge

Nach den Anfang der 70er Jahre erschienenen Pionierarbeiten der beiden Politikwissen- schaftler Rudolf Hrbek und William Paterson, hat das Thema “SPD und Europäische Inte- gration“ inzwischen auch das Interesse der Historiker geweckt. Über die Bedeutung der «relance européenne» für die Europapolitk der deutschen Sozialdemokratie ist jedoch erst recht wenig geschrieben worden. Ausgehend von der Zäsur von 1955, und anhand der heute zugänglichen Quellen, untersucht der Verfasser dieses Beitrags die Stellung der SPD gegen- über dem Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom, im Zusammenhang mit der Regierungspolitik. Dabei setzt er sich mit der Frage auseinander, welche Faktoren im einzelnen die Entschei- dung der SPD vom 5. Juli 1957 bewirkt haben, der Ratifizierung der Romverträge zuzustim- men. 140 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen EUZd[XfW`dW[ZW
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IY^h_\j[dh[_^[$ 141 Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren

BLAIVE Muriel, Dr, Researcher at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, Vienna Address: Hegelgasse 6/5, 1010 Wien, Austria Email: [email protected]

BRACKE Maud, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History, Department of History, University of Glasgow Adress: 1, University Gardens, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, United Kingdom Email: [email protected]

D’OTTAVIO Gabriele, PhD–Candidate in Contemporary Political History, University of Bologna Address: Via Giacomo della Torre 1, University of Bologna, Forlì- Campus, 47100, Italy Email: [email protected]

FETZER Thomas, Dr, Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow, London School of Economics Address: Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom Email: [email protected]

JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST Dagmara, Dr, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam, Adresse: Am Neuen Markt 1, 14467 Potsdam, Germany Email: [email protected]

RISSO Linda, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Reading Adresse: Department of History, University of Reading, Whiteknights, RG6 6AA, Reading, UK Email: [email protected] 3^^We
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BARIÉTY Jacques – Aristide Briand, la Société des Nations et l’Europe 1919-1932, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007, 542 p. – ISBN 978-2-86820-307-6 - 30,00 €. BITSCH Marie-Thérèse, LOTH Wilfried, BARTHEL Charles – Cultures poli- tiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 477 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2373-8 – 65,00 €. CLEMENS Wurm – Die Türkei und Europa, LIT-Verlag, Berlin, 2007, 288 S. – ISBN 3-8258-0782-5 – 24,90 €. DIETL Ralph – Emanzipation und Kontrolle. Europa in der westlichen Sicher- heitspolitik 1948-1963, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007, 430 S. - ISBN 978-3-515-09034-6 - 76,00 €. DUCHENNE Geneviève, DUJARDIN Vincent, DUMOULIN Michel – Paul-Henri Spaak et la France. Actes du colloque organisé les 15 et 16 mai 2006 à Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 300 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2413-1 - 45,00 €. DUMOULIN Michel - La Commission européenne 1958-1972. Histoire et Mémoires d’une Institution, Office des Publications officielles des Commu- nautés Européennes, Luxembourg, 2007, 642 p. – ISBN 978-92-79-05495-2 – 30,00 €. FISCH Stefan, GAUZY Florence, METZGER Chantal – Lernen und Lehren in Frankreich und Deutschland, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007, 240 S. – ISBN 978-3-515-08945-6 – 43,00 €. HUDEMANN Rainer, HEINEN Armin – Das Saarland zwischen Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa 1945-1957, Kommission für Saarländische Landesgeschichte und Volksforschung e.V., Saarbrücken, 2007, 678 S. - ISBN 978-3-939150-02-2 – 29,00 €. HUGHES Gerald – Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The search for a Euro- pean Detente 1949-1967, Routledge, London, 2007, 253p. – ISBN 978-0-415-41207-0 – 122,39 €. JOLLY Mette – The European Union and the People, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 261 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-921307-8 – 90,00 £. JOPP Mathias, SCHLOTTER Peter – Kollektive Außenpolitik – Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007, 397 S. – ISBN 978-3-8329-2910-7 – 49,00 €. 144

KERNIC Franz – Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main, 2007, 307 S. – ISBN 978-3-631-54952-0 – 48,10 €. LUDLOW Piers N. – European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-West- politik, 1965-1973, Routledge, London, 2007, 224 p. – ISBN 978-0415421096 – 125,00 £. MINISTERE FRANCAIS DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES – Diversité et cul- ture, Culturesfrance, Paris, 2007, 95 p. – ISBN 978-2-35476-012-0 – 15,00 €. MIOCHE Philippe – Penser et construire l’Europe XIXe–XXe siècles, Hachette, Paris, 2007, 152 p. – ISBN 978-2-01-145967-1 – 11,90 €. PHILIPPE Hartmut – “The Germans hold the Key”. Anglo-German relations and the Second British Approach to Europe, Wißner-Verlag, Augsburg, 2007 – ISBN 978-3-89639-587-0 – 28,00 €. RAMSCHEID Birgit, BLANKENHORN Herbert – Adenauers außenpoli- tischer Berater, Droste, Düsseldorf, 2006, 460 S. – ISBN 978-377001901-4 – 39,90 €. TRUNK Achim – Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Iden- tität in den 1950er Jahren, Oldenbourg, München, 2007, 387 S. – ISBN 978-3486-58187-4 – 49,80 €. VARSORI Antonio – Inside the European Community, Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006, 483 p. - ISBN 978-3-8329-1191-1 - 98,00 €.