The Art of SEAD: Lessons From

The Art of SEAD: Lessons from

By Maj Jeff Kassebaum, USAF

"Run for it Marty...it's the Libyans!" Twenty-six years after Doc Brown's SEAD) world flying warning in the movie. Back to the Fu- the EA-6B Prowler and ture, the US and its allies were back in EC-130H Compass Call, and work- Libya for the first time since Operation ing in five Combined Air and Space El Dorado Canyon. The aftermath of the Operations Centers (CAOC) and five EW- 2011 Libyan revolution and Operations CCs, the first time I ever read the Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector J-SEAD pub was this past July. I (OUP) gives Suppression of Enemy Air had accepted an invitation from Defenses (SEAD) and EW players an ex- the LeMay Center for Doctrine to be a cellent opportunity to debrief. part of the J-SEAD working group after For the first two months of OUP, I returning from CAOC-5 for OUP. When the ran NATO's SEAD Cell and the Electronic working group convened, it turned out I Warfare Coordination Cell (EWCC). The was not alone in never having used the J- short nature of OUP offers the luxury to SEAD doctrine publication. The primary debrief an entire campaign from start reason is the substantial gap between division across the Suez Canal. to finish, unlike ongoing operations in doctrine and combat reality. He destroyed newly operational SA-6s CENTCOM. The three SEAD/EW debrief The doctrine gap is a direct result of and enabled the Israeli Air Force (IAF) themes of OUP are: ineffective communication. As J-SEAD a permissive environment. However, ar- 1. Why hasn't Joint SEAD doctrine ef- players, we've failed to effectively armor division tactics do not belong in the fectively taught how to rollback and ticulate how to suppress an IADS. In J-SEAD just because a suppression effect suppress an Integrated Air Defense lieu of staffing adequately trained, tac- was achieved. The goal of effective doc- System (IADS)? tical SEAD-experienced personnel at the trine should be specific enough at the 2. Non-traditional IADS requires non- strategic and operational levels of war- operational level to guide effects-driven traditional analysis! fare, we turned the J-SEAD pub into an decision-making for apportionment and 3. How do we break the trend of Les- unwieldy, catchall encyclopedia of any allocation, yet generic enough to avoid sons Identified instead of Lessons possible weapon system that can enact tactical specifics that will trample the Learned? any level of suppression of an IADS. flexibility of tactical assets. Based on For example, during the Yom Kippur this premise, the J-SEAD publication THE DOCTRINE GAP War, Maj Gen Ariel Sharon destructively was streamlined back to what it was de- After 10 years of working in the Joint suppressed his enemy's air defenses in signed for: a reference pub that cross- Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J- October 1973 when he took his armor references tactical publications. In all. the new J-SEAD pub will be 33 percent • AS*'vL'GiiT AI KHAMÍ 4TÄRa9IJi"IS 'RIM;-; of its previous size. iitenanean Sea Effective doctrine discusses what should be done strategically and opera- tionally, not how to do it tactically. This is especially true for doctrine publications like J-SEAD, which are updated only every seven years - too slow to EGYPT maintain relevancy if tactical employ- ment is addressed. An effective reference pub cross-references tactical pubs and directs readers to the latest, most current information. The new J-SEAD pub will also reflect combat reality based on Lessons Learned from 10 years of CENTCOM operations and the latest conflict in Libya.

effects - enhancing strengths and against a dictatorship where the lines mitigating weaknesses. The benefit of between military assets and civilian SEAD force packaging during OUP was infrastructure are blurred. In addition a constant educational process due to to suppressing threat radar, command the gap between doctrine and combat and control (C2) and military commu- reality. One of the fixes is a concise nications, an effective SEAD plan must J-SEAD pub that outlines broad SEAD incorporate the inaccurately-termed concepts and objectives and then di- "civilian" capabilities (such as air traf- rects the reader to consult tactical fic control radar and modern communi- subject matter experts for specific, cation devices) into a targeting plan. The last 10 years of up-to-date information on how to sup- Without a robust plan to suppress the close air support (CAS) and electronic press an IADS. Critically important to IADS from the beginning of a conflict, attack (EA) in CENTCOM has resulted in suppressing an IADS is starting Day the longer we are engaged in war, the a generation of aviators accustomed to a One of the war to fully rollback the en- more difficult it becomes to effectively permissive air environment with a mini- emy's IADS, regardless of suppression conduct Joint SEAD. mal surface-to-air threat at medium and tactic type (sequential or concurrent) The gap between doctrine and com- high altitudes. These kinds of permis- employed and size of geographic area bat reality can be breached, but not sive environments can dangerously requiring suppression. without the understanding that ef- trend toward complacency and lack of Robust planning to fully roll back fective SEAD cannot be achieved by respect toward credible surface-to-air the enemy's IADS is another key con- a wordy, out-of-date publication that threats. This trend became a reality in cept often absent as a result of the gathers dust. Effective SEAD is achieved Libya, when the strategic and opera- doctrine gap. Doctrinally, we train to by the strategic and operational levels tional game plans opposed tactical force attack and suppress the threat systems of warfare providing executable guid- packaging from the start of the conflict employed by the enemy's air defense ance to the tactical level, while allowing and lacked a robust plan to locate and system. While this is academically ac- tactical flexibility to achieve strategic suppress the threat IADS. curate, tactical reality requires the objectives. Tactical SEAD players must Force packaging, which combines doctrinal flexibility to modify J-SEAD respect credible surface-to-air threats - specialized assets into a single strike to fully prosecute an IADS rollback. For while ensuring supported strikers also and SEAD package, enables integrated example, consider combat operations respect those threats - and execute a full-scale rollback of the threat's IADS from day one.

NON-TRAOITIONAL IADS: AN ANALYSIS At some point, the term "non-traditional" highlights a fundamental mis- understanding of the status quo. Libya's IADS was non-traditional in the sense that they strayed away from Cold War- era rigidity in command, control and communication (C3) and had the capability to incorporate modern technology into their air defense system. Tactically relevant SEAD cannot ignore the tech- nological incorporation of commercially available, seemingly "non-military," ad- ditions to the threat's IADS. In 1973, the tactical problem Israel had to tackle was the highly effective SA-6. The IAF did not sufficiently analyze the new threat and update their Six Day War tactics in Egypt and Syria (Operations Tagar and Dougman 5, respectively) to counter the SA-6. The SA-6 accounted for a signifi- cant portion of the 102 IAF aircraft lost in 11,000 sorties over 21 days. NATO's tactical problem in Libya wasn't a new type of SAM, it was the capability to use "civilian" infrastructure in an IADS. Libyan IADS' advantage was NATO did not attaci( the air traffic control radar at Tripoli Airport until mid-July - four months the capability to Find, Fix, Track, Tar- into the NATO air campaign. (Photo: Mahmud Turkia/Getty Images) get, Engage and Assess in a largely per- tu missive electromagnetic environment. with ICAO (International Civil Avia- ers with the implications of allowing Largely permissive due to: tion Organization) protocols. These re- an IADS access to civilian networks for • Geographic size (1,100 miles of alities highlight ever more clearly that military command and control. When coastline, 350 miles from Tripoli to suppressing an IADS must not rely on we allow the threat IADS use of "civil- Ajdabiya) doctrine focused only on military infra- ian" networks: • Limited number of SEAD assets for a structure and that suppression is more 1. The air picture built at a civilian 24hrs/day No Fly Zone than employing anti-radiation missiles. airport could be disseminated to tacti- • Amount of radar and communications In short, SEAD * HARM. cal SAM sites via commercially available jamming resources required A suppressed IADS is an effectively communications, 1 • Rules of Engagement initially preclud- analyzed and smartly targeted IADS. 2. Tactical SAMs would not need to ing targeting civilian components of We make our SEAD jobs more difficult turn on their radar to gain situational the air defense system without full analysis of: how the threat awareness, which The first three items above were operates, where their command and 3. Significantly complicates the abil- facts of the war; we deal with it and control nodes are, what communication ity of intelligence, surveillance and re- make it work tactically. The last was a means they use to coordinate, and how connaissance (ISR) assets to find, fix strategic/operational impediment to ef- they share their common operating pic- and track non-cooperative targets, and fectively rolling back the IADS. As we ture (COP) to sustain the kill chain. If 4. Results in a threat IADS with a prosecuted OUP for the first three and we fail to discern how the C3 nodes are common operational picture (COP) that a half months, Tripoli International linked, we will fail to fully suppress the can choose whether or not to engage Airport operated unfettered (for UN hu- links early in their kill chain, and the strike aircraft, leaving strike aircraft manitarian aid flights) and could build threat will eventually seize this avenue to "plink" tanks to attrite forces/pro- the air picture of NATO strike packages. for his advantage. Academically, none tect civilians until they are able to find NATO unintentionally aided the Libyan would disagree. In practice, SEAD and more lucrative C3 nodes - prolonging Regime by squawking in accordance EA advocates must arm decision-mak- the war. LESSONS lOENTIFlEO Fool us twice. Operation Unified Pro- tector is not NATO's first air campaign against a second-rate, despotic govern- ment that relies on military hardware supplied by the former Soviet Union (FSU). It likely won't be the last, either. Therefore, we must codify and disseminate our Lessons Learned from the seven months of OUP so we will avoid the mistakes of previous operations. The difference between the air campaigns in OUP and Operation Allied Force (OAF) over Serbia in 1999 had nothing to do with how NATO operated. A signifi- cant difference was that the Serbians shot back. Just because the Libyans did not shoot a NATO aircraft does not mean they were unable to do so. As shown Lessons Learned from previous opera- THE SEAO WAY FORWARO above, the Libyan Regime had the abil- tions and incorporating those lessons Seven months of enforcing a United ity to build their picture and make de- into tactical level training. For example, Nations No Fly Zone to protect civil- cisions based on that picture and then one of the reasons Operation Desert ians during the Libyan civil war of- disseminate decisions to the field. We Storm was a success was because the fers SEAD and EW players an ideal will continue to re-identify lessons if strategic leadership had fought as tac- opportunity to stop our trend of Les- we shrug off OUP because there was no tical leadership in Vietnam and applied son Identification and ensure Les- shoot-down to debrief, as in OAF. their Lessons Learned to the liberation sons Learned. We deceive ourselves This is not the forum for operational of Kuwait. Today's tactical aviators will if we assume tomorrow's threat IADS and tactical debrief specifics for OUP; be tomorrow's operational planners and will look anything like past IADS. The but it is the forum to discuss how we strategic thinkers. Lessons Learned that skill required of SEAD and EW play- break our trend item of Lesson Identifi- are frequently revisited at the tactical ers to analyze the IADS, however, will cation, instead of Lesson Learned. Four level will prevent re-identification of apply to any possible type of IADS. actions will prevent us from re-identify- past Lessons Learned. When SEAD/EW players effectively use ing lessons: We must incorporate realistic IADS doctrine as a general guideline only, E 1. Rapid, widespread dissemination of representation into training scenarios employ critical thinking to accurately a debrief items to key players, for daily squadron-level training. We analyze the IADS, and truly learn les- 2. Build collective memory among have seen enough of the anticipated sons from past campaigns, then we .s warfighting generations, Fulda Gap IADS, which effectively pre- will become skilled tacticians in the 3. Incorporate realistic, modern IADS pares us for yesterday's threat. An IADS Art of SEAD. ^ a into training scenarios for daily that incorporates military and commer- unit-level training, and cial/civilian infrastructure provides a Maj Jeff "Seed" Kassebaum, USAF, I 4. Frequently re-evaluate the status realistic training environment. Train- is the weapons officer for the US Air quo. ing against a modern IADS will prepare Force's 390th Electronic Combat Squad- Key players rotate in and out of a con- aviators and intelligence officers to ron and is an exchange officer with the flict after a few months; therefore de- analyze and suppress tomorrow's most US Navy flying EA-6B Prowlers. He is brief items must be disseminated to key likely threat IADS. assigned to the Electronic Attack Weap- players so that we preserve our Lessons Lethal tacticians frequently re- ons School at NAS Whidbey Island, WA. Learned. Dissemination must be rapid evaluate how we fight and suppress the Previously, he served as an Electronic and widespread to ensure key players threat. The status quo ante in a cam- Warfare Officer flying on EC-130H Com- share those lessons. Even though OUP paign must frequently be dissected and pass Call aircraft for seven years at Da- only lasted seven months, interim de- evaluated by critical thinkers - inflex- vis-Monthan AFB, AZ and has fought in briefs should be considered to capture ible adherence to doctrinal rigidity hin- Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Free- lessons as a campaign progresses. If we ders critical thinking. If we, as tactical dom, Enduring Freedom, New Dawn, don't conduct interim debriefs along the and operational-level aviators, do not Willing Spirit and Unified Protector. way, initial lessons during the hottest frequently evaluate the threat's (and Most recently he was the Chief of the points in a war will be forgotten. our own) decision-making, we guaran- SEAD Cell and EWCC for OUP. He can be We build collective memory among tee an air campaign that lasts longer contacted at jeffery.kassebaum@navy. warfighting "generations" by revisiting than it should. mil or (360) 257-10578. Copyright of Journal of Electronic Defense is the property of Association of Old Crows and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.