Comparing the U.S. and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan

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Comparing the U.S. and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan MAY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 5 Comparing the U.S. and country had been used as a base for violently opposed to the new occupation the 9/11 attacks on the United States. and its atheist ideology. Soviet Experiences in The U.S. goal, endorsed by the United Afghanistan Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty In contrast, polls show most Afghans Organization (NATO), was self-defense have supported the coalition forces By Bruce Riedel against a government that had allowed that overthrew the Taliban, although its territory to be used for an act of that support is now dwindling as the a country rarely fights the same war war against another state. From the coalition has failed to provide law and twice in one generation, especially from beginning, the United States has had no order and reconstruction.4 The Taliban opposite sides. Yet that in many ways ambition to dominate or subjugate the are not widely popular either; support describes the U.S. role in Afghanistan Afghan people, or to stay in Afghanistan for the Taliban is mostly restricted today. In the 1980s, the Central once the threat posed by al-Qa`ida to the Pashtun belt in southern and Intelligence Agency, working from a and the Afghan Taliban is defeated. eastern Afghanistan. It has virtually no safe haven in Pakistan, engineered the President Barack Obama reiterated this appeal to the 60% of Afghans who are largest covert operation in its history to fact in his speech outlining the new U.S. not Pashtun. Therefore, the Soviets’ help defeat the Soviet 40th Red Army in policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on most difficult battlespace—the famous Afghanistan.1 Today, the United States March 27, 2009.2 Panjshir Valley, home of the legendary is fighting a Taliban-led insurgency in Ahmad Shah Massoud (the Lion of the Afghanistan that operates from a safe The Soviet invasion in 1979 was a Panjshir)—is today quiet and devoid haven in Pakistan. Many suggest that different matter. It is now understood of Taliban because it is an exclusively the outcome will be the same for the that Moscow blundered into Afghanistan Tajik area. United States as it was for the Soviet with little appreciation of the difficulties Union—ultimate defeat at the hands of it would face.3 Its goal was to shore up In short, while the Soviets faced a the insurgency. Pakistan’s role as a safe a communist regime that was on the national uprising, the U.S.-led coalition haven is remarkably consistent in both edge of collapse in the face of a national faces a minority insurgency that is conflicts, but focusing exclusively on uprising. The Soviet leadership wanted segregated from much of the country. that similarity misses the fundamental an Afghanistan that would be similar Moscow’s task was much more difficult differences between the two wars. This to other Soviet satellite states and than the one facing NATO today. article will address those differences, under virtual Soviet imperial rule with and will also assess how Pakistan’s only the façade of independence. The Tactics and Support role is impacting the United States’ Soviets may also have had ambitions The Soviets responded to Afghan possibilities for success today. to use Afghanistan as a base to project opposition with a ferocity and brutality authority further south. that made the situation even worse. At Goals and Objectives least 1.5 million Afghans were killed, The first and perhaps most critical The Soviet invasion and the attempt another five million or so fled the difference between the two wars is to impose communism on a rural and country to Iran and Pakistan (one out over goals and objectives. The United largely illiterate Islamic country with of three Afghans), and millions more States intervened in Afghanistan a history of xenophobia produced the were displaced inside the country. A in 2001 on the side of the Northern predictable result: a mass national country that began the war as one of the Alliance to topple the Taliban Islamic uprising. With the exception of small poorest in the world was systematically Emirate of Afghanistan only after the pockets of the urban middle class and impoverished and even emptied of its a few minority regions—most notably people. The Soviet Air Force carpet 1 The story of the first Afghan war has been told from the Uzbek province of Jowzjan where bombed cities such as Kandahar, where many angles. George Crile’s Charlie Wilson’s War: The a tough local warlord, Abdul Rashid the population fell from 250,000 to 5 Extraordinary Story of how the Wildest Man in Congress Dostum, raised a pro-Soviet militia— 25,000. Millions of land mines were and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of our Times virtually the entire country was planted all over the country, with no underplays Ronald Reagan’s and Bill Casey’s role but records kept of where they had been laid. is full of insights into the U.S. side of the war. Robert 2 In his March 27, 2009 speech, President Obama said: Nothing even approaching this level Gates’ memoirs From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s “We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or of horror is happening in Afghanistan Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War has to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront today. a more balanced view. Also important is Milt Bearden’s a common enemy that threatens the United States, our two books on the war, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and In part because of that brutality, the of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB and The Black Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of vio- Soviet invasion was condemned by Tulip: A Novel of the War in Afghanistan. Bearden was the lent extremists. So I want the American people to under- virtually the entire world except for CIA chief of station in Islamabad at the end of the jihad. stand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, its client states. The campaign to assist The Soviet side of the war has long been neglected but fi- dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghani- nally received attention from Gregory Feifer in The Great stan, and to prevent their return to either country in the 4 Anthony Cordesman, “Afghan Public Opinion and the Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. Most important is future.” See “President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan Afghan War: Shifts by Region and Province,” Center for the Pakistani version, written by the ISI commander of and Pakistan,” U.S. News & World Report, March 27, Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2009. the battle, Mohammad Yousaf, with Mark Adkin in The 2009. 5 On the cost of the war, see Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story in which the CIA is 3 Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Af- God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan a duplicitous and timid partner for the ISI. ghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 184-188, 223. MAY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 5 the Afghan insurgency, the mujahidin, used military power, especially its air Even more ironically, Pakistan serves enjoyed the backing of countries around force, to intimidate Pakistan. as the major logistical supply line for the world including China, the United NATO forces in Afghanistan. More Kingdom, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Zia insisted that outside support for the than 80% of the supplies U.S. and Iran and others. mujahidin had to flow through Pakistani other coalition forces depend on arrive hands, principally via the Inter- via Pakistan from the port of Karachi. NATO forces in Afghanistan today have Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate Geography effectively precludes another the support of the United Nations and of the Pakistani Army. The ISI sought alternative unless the alliance is willing operate under a UN Security Council exclusive access to the mujahidin. to rely on Russia or Iran to control its mandate. The International Security Outside players had little choice but supply lines. Moreover, the ISI is also Assistance Force (ISAF), created to accept Zia’s rules. Consequently, a key partner in the struggle against al- by the United Nations in 2001, has Pakistan served as the safe haven for Qa`ida. The ISI has helped capture or troops from 41 countries currently in the mujahidin, its logistical supply line kill several senior al-Qa`ida operatives, Afghanistan, including U.S. forces, and its advocate on the world stage. despite declining ISI assistance since NATO contributions, and troops from the early years after 9/11. Without non-NATO states such as Australia, Ironically, today Pakistan again acts as Pakistan’s cooperation, many operations Sweden and the United Arab Emirates. the safe haven for Afghan insurgents against al-Qa`ida would be much more Efforts are underway to get more states, and their logistical supply line. The difficult today. especially in the Muslim world, to send ISI is again the instrument by which troops. Pakistan maintains its links to the Therefore, Pakistan has unusually Afghan Taliban and other extremist strong leverage on both sides of the Much of the hardest fighting in the organizations.7 This should come as war in Afghanistan. President Obama’s current war has been conducted by little surprise since in the 1990s the new policy explicitly recognizes the non-American troops. The British in ISI was a critical factor in the creation critical role played by Pakistan and Helmand Province, the Canadians in and development of the Taliban; it elevates the importance of working Kandahar and the Dutch and Australians only reluctantly agreed to distance with Pakistan to shut down the safe in Uruzgan have been fighting for the itself from the Taliban after 9/11 under havens in Balochistan and elsewhere last several years in the heartland of enormous U.S.
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