Bruce O. Riedel. Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. Washington, DC: Press, 2017. xv + 251 pp. $25.99, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8157-3137-5.

Reviewed by Kelly McFarland

Published on H-Diplo (March, 2019)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

In his latest work, Kings and Presidents: Sau‐ very diferent countries. America is a superpower di Arabia and the United States since FDR, the democracy that aspires to be a tolerant home to a Brookings Institute’s (and longtime government diverse multiethnic and multireligious popula‐ analyst and policymaker) Bruce Riedel focuses on tion, all of whom are equal in the eyes of the law. the US-Saudi relationship since 1945. Riedel’s Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monar‐ book comes at a rather precarious time in the re‐ chy and also is a theocracy with a fundamentalist lationship’s history. Congressional and public out‐ religious faith, dominated by a Wahhabi clergy cry over Riyadh’s ongoing war in Yemen and the that is intolerant and suspicious of outsiders” (p. October 2018 killing of Washington Post journal‐ xiii). The contradictions in the relationship have ist Jamal Khoshoggi inside the Saudi consulate in been ever-present. Riedel points out that this book Istanbul—which Saudi crown prince Muhammed is “not a diplomatic history of the relationship or bin Salman probably sanctioned according to the a comprehensive study of all their interactions,” Central Intelligence Agency—have put the part‐ but instead uses specifc “case studies of interac‐ nership on notice. On the other hand, relations tion between American presidents and Saudi between the White House and the royal family kings to illustrate the nature of the uneasy al‐ seem to be on solid footing, highlighting how liance,” which the author succeeds in doing splen‐ much the relationship depends upon presidents didly well (p. xiv). Those students or scholars and kings at any given moment. That dichotomy is looking for a more comprehensive picture of the exactly what Riedel focuses on. This book will al‐ relationship, a more detailed diplomatic history, most certainly become a starting point for anyone or a closer snapshot of specifc episodes, though, who plans to study the unique American-Saudi re‐ will ultimately need to turn to other works.[1] lationship. Diving deeper into the contradictions inher‐ Riedel’s main theme is straightforward, but ent in the US-Saudi relationship, Riedel believes no less difcult to manage for policymakers, and that “three fundamental issues hamper the rela‐ becomes apparent as the author traces the US- tionship.” And, “on these issues kings and presi‐ Saudi relationship over seventy years. Riedel dents have basic disagreements about core goals states that “there is a basic conundrum at the core and objectives. Interest and mutual accommoda‐ of the American relationship with Saudi Arabia. It tion can overlap, but it is difcult to fnd them. has always been an uneasy alliance between two The three issues—the -Palestine confict; the H-Net Reviews role of Wahhabi Islam in Saudi policy at home nally gotten the attention of the White House” (p. and abroad; and the pursuit of political reform in 186). While not a detailed account such as that the Arab world—are likely to be disruptive factors found in Andrew Scott Cooper’s 2011 The Oil in the relationship in the years ahead and will re‐ Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia quire creative diplomacy to manage” (p. 190). The Changed the Balance of Power in the , author pinpoints numerous occasions in which Riedel captures the tensions in the relationship one, or a combination of these factors, has threat‐ during the Nixon administration, the October ened the relationship. As Riedel points out, War, and afterwards well. Camp David and its though, this also highlights the relationship’s re‐ separate peace between Egypt and Israel again siliency. No matter how bitter disagreements over threatened the relationship in 1978 (along with the Palestinian issue or Iran, for instance, became, what the Saudis saw as inept US handling of the there has always been a larger issue—the Soviet Iran situation and an unwillingness to aid an invasion of , Saddam Hussein’s inva‐ ally), which the Soviet Union eventually saved sion of Kuwait, or counterterrorism coordination when it invaded Afghanistan, giving Washington —that has kept the nations together. and Riyadh the chance to work together to hurt a The Palestinian issue is the best example of a common enemy.[2] divergence between the two nations, but one that Riedel notes that “the 1990s were an era of can also be set aside when seemingly more urgent strong relations between Riyadh and Washington, matters arise. And, it was “present at the cre‐ perhaps the strongest ever” due to victory over ation,” to borrow a book title from former secre‐ Saddam, and George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s tary of state Dean Acheson. While the meeting be‐ determined eforts at an Israel-Palestine peace tween President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and settlement (p. 130). But, by the end of the Clinton King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Saud creat‐ administration the relationship was on the rocks ed the partnership that would be based upon due to his epic peace failures in 2000. The Saudis American security and Saudi fows of oil (and then almost fundamentally changed the relation‐ grew to include fghting communism and terror‐ ship in 2001 due to George W. Bush’s lack of inter‐ ism), it also contained a disagreement that has est in promoting a peace initiative. It took Bush’s continued since—the issue of Israel and Palestine. shift in US policy to an overt backing of the two- FDR and Ibn Saud disagreed on the topic, and Tru‐ state solution to calm the situation just as planes man’s quick recognition of Israel in 1948 might few into the World Trade Center in September have doomed the relationship had the Kingdom 2001. Bush’s shift, new wars in Afghanistan and not been so dependent upon the United States. Iraq, and Saudi Arabia’s own internal reckoning The issue fared again most vividly in 1973 with extremism shifted both nations’ focus. with Washington’s backing of Tel Aviv in the Octo‐ The other major stumbling block in the rela‐ ber War. As Riedel points out, the Palestine issue tionship centers around Saudi Arabia’s decades and its salience also depends upon who holds the long push for the Kingdom’s specifc brand of Is‐ throne in Riyadh and how passionate they are on lam. Beginning with Faisal, Saudi kings have often the issue. In 1973, with King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz actively worked to spread Wahhabi Islam both at and his intense passion for the Palestine issue rul‐ home and abroad. In many instances this has ing in the Kingdom, it led to an oil embargo that been done in response to conservative unrest at did “more damage to the American economy than home or in answer to regional issues such as the the Soviet Union was able to do during the entire Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Cold War,” and also meant that the “Saudis had f‐ Afghanistan. One important aspect of Riedel’s

2 H-Net Reviews study is his early explanation of the Saudi king‐ Riedel’s view, “the Saudis played Trump like a fd‐ dom’s origins and its infuential ties with Wah‐ dle” (pp. 178-79). habism, which set the tone for much of the rest of There is no doubt that the US-Saudi partner‐ the book. Riedel correctly points out that “the ship formed in 1945 around American security challenges posed by Saudi Arabia’s unique vision and the continued free fow of Saudi oil was im‐ of Islam for the American partnership with the portant over the course of the past seventy years, Kingdom are complex and have changed over remains so today, and will continue to be for the time” (p. 195). While counterterrorism issues foreseeable future. But, history and current is‐ have, in more recent times, in many ways been sues, which Riedel deftly highlights, also describe the bright spot of cooperation between Riyadh a relationship fraught with deep inconsistencies and Washington, this cooperation also exists in a and difcult periods, which will also continue for world in which the Saudis themselves have the foreseeable future. Riedel notes that these dif‐ played a major role in the “development of the ex‐ fculties in the relationship, and the fact that treme views of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al American presidents and Saudi kings have been Baghdadi” (p. 195). able to work through them, “underscore[] its fun‐ The fnal major issue that Riedel highlights damental importance and resiliency” (p. 188). Ul‐ has newer origins, but has been no less threaten‐ timately, though, even through successes such as ing for the partnership’s longevity. Political re‐ the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the form in the Arab world was an issue begun under defeat of Saddam in Kuwait, Riedel believes Saudi George W. Bush, and then picked up during the itself perpetuates a conundrum: “Superfcially, Arab Spring by Barack Obama. To the Saudis, this then, it appears Saudi Arabia is a force for order is an existential threat to their hold on power. in the region, one that is trying to prevent chaos Bush’s calls for a campaign to bring democracy and disorder. But in the long run, by trying to and freedom to the Middle East in his 2004 State maintain an unsustainable order enforced by a of the Union address “was never turned into a se‐ police state, the Kingdom may, in fact, be a force rious policy initiative toward the region as a for chaos” (pp. 197-98). Riedel was speaking about whole,” but it exacerbated an already tense rela‐ Saudi policy toward the Arab Spring in this con‐ tionship between Riyadh and Washington (pp. text, but one could also in many ways extend it 147-148). Riedel intimately highlights how the back in time to encompass the entirety of the U.S.- Obama administration’s push for reform in the re‐ Saudi relationship. gion with the advent of the Arab Spring, especial‐ Having been a student of Saudi Arabia and a ly in Egypt and Bahrain, caused serious friction player in many of these events over the past few with the Saudis. decades, Riedel is uniquely qualifed to write this President Donald J. Trump’s zealous courting history. His insider accounts of more recent issues of Saudi Arabia has stemmed many of these un‐ are invaluable in a landscape where historians derlying tensions for the moment, though, accord‐ will have to wait years or even decades for the de‐ ing to Riedel. Trump’s May 2017 visit to the King‐ classifcation of records. The author was also giv‐ dom contained “no mention of human rights, en access to George H. W. Bush’s personal diary, democracy, or political reform,” with the presi‐ adding new material to important issues during dent leaving any troubling issues undiscussed as the forty-frst president’s tenure. It is arguably the two sides focused on “forging a new strategic here, in the chapters on the more recent history partnership for the twenty-frst century.” In of the relationship, that Riedel ofers the most to scholars. While the themes and arguments run‐

3 H-Net Reviews ning throughout the book are strong and bring a ing on these tensions, and how they were man‐ coherence to the work, many of the early chapters aged, allows readers to see just what mattered to cover well-trodden terrain. That being said, a bit both sides, and how and why they were able to more in-depth look at the Dwight Eisenhower ad‐ keep the partnership intact, even in its darkest ministration’s handling of Saud and its attempts moments. This is sure to be, along with Rachel to build up the Saudis as a counterweight to Bronson’s work, a fundamental book for those Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, as Salim Yaqub and seeking to understand the full, seven-decade rela‐ Nathan J. Citino, in particular, highlight, would tionship between the United States and Saudi Ara‐ have been useful, especially in light of the au‐ bia. thor’s point regarding the Saudi monarchy’s inti‐ Notes mate ties with Islam.[3] [1]. For example, on US-Saudi relations specif‐ The chapters on the presidency ically, see Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: and beyond stand out for the use of new materials America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia and the “insider” anecdotes and information that (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Thomas Riedel brings to bear. Using the newly published W. Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Foreign Relations of the United States volume cov‐ Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: ering Carter's regional policy in the Middle East Westview Press, 2004); and Robert Vitalis, Ameri‐ and the Arabian Peninsula, Riedel is able to ofer ca’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Fron‐ up new insights into American policymaking in tier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, Saudi Arabia and the region. Likewise, later chap‐ 2007). On the origins of the relationship, see ters, in which the author was a participant in Christopher D. O’Sullivan, FDR and the End of Em‐ many instances, provide solid evidence, especially pire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle in light of materials that are still classifed on the East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). On American side. While documentary evidence on US-Middle East relations in general, including the Saudi side is nonexistent, Riedel uses a combi‐ Saudi Arabia, among others, see Andrew J. Bace‐ nation of public records, published secondary vich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East sources, memoirs, and his own experience to (New York: Random House, 2016) (this work has paint as full a picture of the Saudi view of events more of a military focus); Peter Hahn, Crisis and as possible, and does a commendable job in the Crossfre: The United States and the Middle East process.[4] since 1945 (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2005); Ultimately, Riedel ofers readers a well-writ‐ Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United ten, concise, and analytically rigorous picture of States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel the US-Saudi relationship since its inception. Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, While it does not break much new ground regard‐ 2002); and Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic ing the origins of the relationship or why it has re‐ Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Si‐ mained important over the years, the author has mon & Schuster, 1991). brought us newly released documents and an in‐ [2]. The 1970s were an intense and important sider’s view that help to paint a fuller picture of period in US-Saudi relations and in US-Arab rela‐ the partnership since the Carter years. Riedel’s tions in general. For a more specifc look at this methodology is what stands out, with its focus on period, see Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: the “presidents and kings who have been the Americans, , and U.S.-Middle East Relations managers of the relationship—and how they man‐ in the 1970s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, aged the tensions in the alliance” (p. xiv). Focus‐ 2016).

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[3]. For more details on the Eisenhower ad‐ ministration and Saudi Arabia, see Nathan J. Citi‐ no, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Rela‐ tions (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002); and Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nation‐ alism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroli‐ na Press, 2004). [4]. For more specifc studies on Saudi Arabia itself, see, among others, Stefen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Karen Elliott House, On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future (New York: Vintage Books, 2012); and Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Mod‐ ernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Ara‐ bia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).

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Citation: Kelly McFarland. Review of Riedel, Bruce O. Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. March, 2019.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=53326

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