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Al-Qa`Ida's Resurgence in Pakistan

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DECEMBER 2007 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 1 Al-Qa`ida’s Resurgence in Factors Behind al-Qa`ida’s Ability to Regroup In addition, the situation in Pakistan Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan changed. On December 13, 2001, five Pakistan and al-Qa`ida were in practice de facto Kashmiri terrorists from groups long allies. Both supported the Taliban and associated with Bin Ladin attacked the By Bruce Riedel Kashmiri terrorist groups in a complex Indian parliament in New Delhi. India nexus of terror with which the Pakistani blamed Pakistan for harboring the al-qa`ida has made a spectacular Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was terrorist leadership that ordered the resurrection in Pakistan during the intimately familiar but did not fully attack, which followed dozens of others. last five years. In 2002, the terrorist control. After General Pervez Musharraf India mobilized along the border, group had been driven from its base took power in a coup in October 1999, he causing Pakistan to mobilize in turn; in Afghanistan, their Taliban ally was promised to crack down on al-Qa`ida, this development meant that Pakistani discredited and defeated and their key but in actuality he did little. To the troops that were needed in the west operatives were being hunted down and contrary, in December 1999 Kashmiri were turned to the east. For the next arrested. Today, however, al-Qa`ida has terrorists working closely with the year, almost one million soldiers faced a secure operating base in the country, Taliban, ISI and al-Qa`ida hijacked each other in a nervous showdown. its leadership is issuing constant an Indian airliner to Kandahar to free guidance to its global supporters, prisoners in India in an operation that It is not clear if diverting forces from it is threatening NATO’s position underscored the intimate connections the hunt for Bin Ladin was one of the in Afghanistan through its Taliban between Pakistan and the terrorist intentions of the planners of the attack allies and it is now a growing force in network inside Afghanistan.2 on the Indian parliament, nor is it clear Pakistan itself. The current political who was the real mastermind behind crisis in Pakistan is endangering Al-Qa`ida and the Taliban were stunned the attack—the Kashmiris on their the secular democratic forces in the by the speed of the collapse of their own, the ISI which had created them, country, polarizing the debate about forces in late 2001 when the U.S.-led Musharraf and the generals, or al- the country’s future and strengthening coalition moved into Afghanistan. They Qa`ida. Yet, the impact was critical. At al-Qa`ida’s Islamist partners. Al- had expected the Northern Alliance its moment of greatest peril, al-Qa`ida Qa`ida’s room to operate in the country to disintegrate after assassinating its was free to recover due to U.S. and is expanding, not contracting. leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Pakistani resources diverted away from thought that Pakistan would stand by the hunt. Some important al-Qa`ida The conventional wisdom is that al- its Taliban protégé. Instead, by the end figures—Musharraf claims more than Qa`ida leaders Usama bin Ladin and of the year Pakistan had withdrawn its 6004—were apprehended in Pakistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri are operating in the logistical support and pulled out the including Khalid Shaykh Muhammad border lands along the Afghan border thousands of advisers and experts that and Abu Zubayda, yet the top leadership in the Federally Administered Tribal kept the Taliban war machine running. eluded capture. Areas (FATA); however, there are many Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and their followers more areas of the country that are now fled into Pakistan. An American- These leaders lurked behind the increasingly out of the control of the Afghan hammer was poised to crush resurgence of the Taliban, which came central government and are essentially them against a Pakistani anvil. roaring back. Operating with at least lawless. From Balochistan to Kashmir, the tacit acquiescence of the ISI, the much of western Pakistan is sympathetic In what amounted to a costly diversion, Taliban quickly recovered and rebuilt. to al-Qa`ida’s message and remains however, the United States concentrated By 2005, it was again in control of an open field where they can operate. its operations on Iraq, and key Special much of southern Afghanistan at night. Even in the urban areas, al-Qa`ida Forces units and CIA operatives were Taliban leaders have consistently said operatives have been able to attack key taken off the Afghan battlefield and were that Bin Ladin has assisted them with targets, including military posts, with prepared for engagement in the Middle their military recovery and, indeed, the 1 increasingly deadly results. East. The new Afghan government was Taliban rapidly adopted al-Qa`ida-style left with only the leanest of forces to tactics. Martyrdom operations were not Most concerning is that the resurgence pursue its enemies and stabilize the typical in Afghanistan; in 2002, there of the al-Qa`ida-Taliban alliance in country. Pakistan’s ambassador to the were only two in the whole country. Pakistan has created a safe operating United States, Mahmud Durrani, has Today, however, a suicide attack occurs base for the global jihadist movement noted that “we had almost licked al- approximately every three days.5 NATO to train and recruit operatives from Qa`ida after 9/11 because of the U.S. casualties are up sharply, and more Western Europe (especially from the invasion of Afghanistan…But what Americans have died in Afghanistan United Kingdom) to strike in London happened? The focus shifted to Iraq big this year than any previous one. and other major European cities. There time. This was a rebirth of al-Qa`ida.”3 is little doubt that they are also hoping to strike American targets. 2 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent (New York: Ballantine, 2005). India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2007), p. 238. 4 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New 1 As long ago as July 1, 2005, Ahmed Rashid pointed out 3 Durrani interview in “Pakistan: Fall Guy or Failure,” York: Free Press, 2006). that Bin Ladin could be anywhere from the Karakoram The Washington Diplomat 14:11 (2007); See also the ac- 5 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Losing Af- Mountains near China to the Balochi desert among Kash- count by Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of ghanistan, One Civilian at a Time,” Washington Post, No- miris, Pashtuns and Balochs angry with Musharraf. How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan vember 18, 2007. DECEMBER 2007 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 1 In addition to helping the Taliban Al-Qa`ida’s goal in Pakistan is to polarize however, is al-Qa`ida’s pursuit of a recover, al-Qa`ida in Pakistan also the country into warring factions, break nuclear weapon. Pakistan is the world’s began reaching out to Pakistani the back of civil and secular society and only Muslim state with nuclear weapons. diaspora communities around the world ultimately see its allies in the Pakistani According to the International Institute to provide an effective means to recruit, Islamist movement seize power. It for Strategic Studies, Pakistan has an indoctrinate and train operatives to wants a broken state, a broken army estimated 50-90 nuclear weapons.10 strike in Europe and ultimately in the and broken political parties. From the The former director of the Central United States. The 800,000-strong ashes it dreams of an Islamic emirate Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, in Pakistani communities in the United emerging, which could unite with the his memoirs laid out in great detail al- Kingdom (1.3% of the UK’s population, Taliban in Afghanistan, free Kashmir Qa`ida’s efforts during the last decade 500,000 of whom are Kashmiris) are and be the center of a revived caliphate. to get its hands on a Pakistani nuclear the favorite targets, but communities in device.11 If Pakistan becomes more Germany, Denmark, Austria, Italy and This dream, however, is still far from destabilized, it is likely that al-Qa`ida elsewhere have also been infiltrated. al-Qa`ida’s reach. Pakistan’s political will make every effort to get one. Every major terrorist operation in the meltdown has not progressed far enough United Kingdom since 9/11, including for the extreme Islamic groups—such Bruce Riedel is Senior Fellow for Political the July 7, 2005 underground attacks as the Taliban, al-Qa`ida, Lashkar-e- Transitions in the Middle East and South and the foiled 2006 plot to blow up Tayyiba and others—to take power. Yet, Asia in the Saban Center for Middle East 10 jumbo jets en route to the United the trends are in their direction and Policy at the Brookings Institution. He States, have had a Pakistani connection time seems to be on their side as long retired in 2006 after 30 years service at back to al-Qa`ida. The head of Britain’s as the democratic center in Pakistan is the Central Intelligence Agency including domestic security service, the MI5, suppressed by a military dictatorship. postings overseas. He was a senior advisor recently noted that “the command, The best antidote to al-Qa`ida in on South Asia and the Middle East to the control and inspiration for attack Pakistan would be a legitimately elected last three Presidents of the United States in planning in the UK (for the last five government that could pursue the war the staff of the National Security Council years) have derived from the al-Qa`ida against al-Qa`ida with the backing of at the White House.
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