Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 11/08/2009; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT) Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415550253/dtp/9780415550253.3d Superpower Rivalry and Conflict The long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-first century Edited by Chandra Chari Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 11/08/2009; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT) Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415550253/dtp/9780415550253.3d First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2010 Chandra Chari for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution Typeset in by Taylor & Francis Books Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Superpower rivalry and conflict : the long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-first century / edited by Chandra Chari. p. cm. – (Routledge advances in international relations and global politics ; 81) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World politics–21st century. 2. Cold War. I. Chandra Chari. D863.3.S87 2010 909.83'1–dc22 2009020745 ISBN 978-0-415-55025-3 hbk ISBN 978-0-203-86533-0 ebook Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 11/08/2009; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT) Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415550253/dtp/9780415550253.3d 6 Pakistan and the Cold War Stephen P. Cohen Introduction Pakistan is undergoing a prolonged internal crisis, one that has been com- pounded by strained relations with its neighbours, and even with its allies. It is tempting to attribute its present difficulties to its involvement in the Cold War, and particularly to its relations with the United States.1 This is most frequently done by Pakistani analysts, but scholars and practitioners from other countries often share this approach. However, absolute judgments about the connection between the Cold War and contemporary perplexities are often misguided. History is obviously one guide to the present, but it is more often a trap, as bits and pieces of the past are coupled in order to create a reality that never existed. This chapter seeks to assess the causes and consequences of Pakistan’s engagement in the Cold War from several perspectives. What were the pushes and pulls that brought Pakistan to the point where its leaders liked to boast (especially to Americans) that it was the ‘most allied’ of American allies? What were the American and British motives in bringing Pakistan into their orbit? What were the political, economic, and ideological consequences of Pakistan’s participation in the Western alliance system, notably on the very identity of the Pakistani state? Finally, what are the lessons? Since Pakistan’s incentives for joining the alliance system were largely India-oriented, what has been the impact on India and the region? Thinking about alliances and security In 1945 ‘Pakistan’ was an idea, not a state, and very little thought was given to strategic implications in the event of its creation. If there was any concern about South Asia’s security, it revolved around India’s status, not Pakistan’s. The British themselves were ambivalent: many liked and respected ‘Muslim India’, and some favoured the idea of an independent Pakistani state. But others saw that if there were to be a split, then the larger India would be the dominant regional power. Strategically, the British thought that India and Pakistan would have to enter into some form of military confederation, Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 11/08/2009; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT) Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415550253/dtp/9780415550253.3d Pakistan and the Cold War 75 requiring a British presence in the region for many years to come. The assumption was that both India and Pakistan would remain dependent on the former colonial power. As for the Americans, they were more familiar with India than with the still-theoretical notion of an independent Muslim state in South Asia. This familiarity arose through the writings and reputation of leading Hindu poli- tical figures, notably Mohandas K. Gandhi (the ‘Mahatma’) and Jawaharlal Nehru. Their only peer and rival in the Muslim community, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was unknown to most Americans. By 1947, the regional security debate revolved around two questions. First, how would an independent Pakistan stand between India and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and between India and the Soviet Union, on the other? Could Pakistan maintain a viable army? Would it serve as a bul- wark for India against Soviet pressure or radical Islamic movements? Jinnah, the leading figure in the Pakistan movement, and the late poet-philosopher Mohammed Iqbal, argued that a new Pakistan would enhance the defence of the subcontinent precisely because of its Islamic nature. Neither man correctly foretold Pakistan’s strategic fate. According to Iqbal, whose ideas under- pinned the Pakistan movement, the Muslims of Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province would ‘be the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or bayonets’.2 Iqbal wrongly believed that the Islamic nature of a new Pakistan would give it inherent strength. Jinnah, too, was excessively optimistic in thinking that the mino- rities in Pakistan would be hostages to good behaviour, and that natural cul- tural and economic linkages would strengthen relations between its various groups. The original idea of Pakistan was as a homeland for Indian Muslims, a place where they would not be dominated by the Hindu majority in a one- man-one-vote democracy. Few advocates of Pakistan dreamt that Pakistan and India would become bitter enemies, or that the armed forces of Pakistan would dominate Pakistani politics. Other Indian Muslims were more sceptical. The Congress politician Shau- katullah Ansari argued that Pakistan would have insufficient resources to defend itself without outside help, for it would face three conflicts involving two fronts. In the west there was a potential threat from both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, in the east from Japan and China, and in both the east and west from India. Further, a united India would be a great power, whereas a divided one would be as weak as Egypt, Burma or ‘Siam’, and the British would use an independent Pakistan to control India (this idea later resurfaced in India, with the United States replacing Britain as the potentially controlling power). Ansari failed to persuade Congress to concede a sub- stantial degree of autonomy to the Muslims of a united India, perhaps as a confederation.3 The most prescient politician of them all, when it came to assessing what Pakistan would become, was the Scheduled Caste leader B. R. Ambedkar, Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 11/08/2009; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT) Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415550253/dtp/9780415550253.3d 76 Stephen P. Cohen who argued that India stood to benefit from a separate Pakistan, which would leave most of the subcontinent’s wealth in predominately Hindu India and make Pakistan, with its poor resource base, a weak state. Ambedkar also noted that India’s army would no longer be dominated by Muslims, and its primarily Hindu civilian government would not be vulnerable to the army. ‘A safe army,’ Ambedkar commented, ‘is better than a safe border.’4 The second strategic calculation involved Pakistan and Britain’s far-flung territories in the east, notably Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. Some British strategists distrusted Congress and Nehru, and saw Pakistan as a more reliable ally, one that could facilitate British contacts with these colonies, and Australia and New Zealand. Eventually Americans, too, came to see the strategic value of West Pakistan’s location, particularly as a possible bomber base on the Soviet Union’s southern flank. This perception eventually led to close ties between the West and Pakistan’s fledgling army, but for the first ten years the army was too small and too junior to play any role other than a military one. It did, however, become a conduit for western influence. Into the alliance The process by which Pakistan became a Cold War ally can be quickly sum- marized. At independence in 1947, Pakistan became a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.5 It retained Britons in high administrative and military positions, and the United Kingdom was the initial source of military supplies and officer training. In 1954, Pakistan and Iraq signed mutual cooperation agreements with Turkey (a NATO member). Britain and Iran also entered into security arrangements, and the ‘Middle East Defence Orga- nization’, more popularly known as the ‘Baghdad Pact’, was formed in 1955, loosely modelled upon NATO. The United States never became a full member. The name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958. CENTO had little formal structure, but the United States and Britain had access to facilities in Pakistan, notably an air base outside of Peshawar from which U-2 intelligence flights over the Soviet Union were launched. There was also an important signals intelligence centre located there.