DOCSLIB.ORG

Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects JUNE 2018 ISSUE NO. 244 Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects KANAK GOKARN ABSTRACT Russia recently witnessed the re-election of its long-serving president. A constitutionally mandated term limit suggests this would be Vladimir Putin’s last presidential term. As Russia enters a period of power transition, it is likely that a number of political actors will become relevant during this phase. This brief looks at the groups that form the opposition—those operating within the formal institutions and the major players outside it—to the incumbent government in Russia. The paper will examine their composition, their role in the current Russian political landscape and the influence they will wield in the future. INTRODUCTION The year 2018 has been an eventful one for served as prime minister from 2008 to 2012. Russia so far. Amidst ever-expanding Following this, he was re-elected president for sanctions and worsening relations with the a six-year term in 2012. West, Russians re-elected Vladimir Putin as president. Most pre-election analyses left President Putin is a popular figure: he little doubt of the outcome. This marks the received around 76 percent of the vote share beginning of his fourth overall presidential with an official turnout of over 67 percent, and term. Previously, he served as president for his approval ratings have remained in the 80s 1 two four-year terms starting in 2000. He then since 2014. Russia’s re-assertiveness in the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-81-938027-0-0 © 2018 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects foreign-policy sphere, particularly in Syria and of state and nominates the chairperson of the Crimea, has partially contributed to this. The government, i.e. the prime minister. A election, however, was marred by voter apathy majority of the State Duma, the lower house of due to the inevitability of the result and the the federal legislature, needs to approve this absence of a viable alternative candidate. The appointment. If the president’s nominee is turnout fell slightly short of the authorities’ rejected thrice, the constitution allows them to unofficial target of 70 percent. This was higher dismiss the Duma and call for fresh elections. than the 65 percent turnout in the 2012 presidential elections. What makes this term The candidates for president must meet significant for Russia is the possibility of it certain standard requirements. Criminal being Putin’s last. The Russian constitution convictions render one ineligible to run. sets a two-consecutive term limit for the post Candidates from political parties with seats in of president. President Putin will not be the State Duma have free access to the eligible to run for the elections until 2030. He election, i.e. they do not need additional will be 77 at that point. Recent developments signatures. Those from non-Duma parties are in China have raised the question of him required to collect 100,000 signatures in staying on, but given the precedent he set by support of their candidacies, with no more stepping down in 2008, this seems unlikely. than 2,500 from one of Russia’s 85 federal subjects.2 Independent candidates require For the past 18 years, Russia has 300,000 signatures with no more than 7,500 experienced a fairly predictable domestic from one subject, and support from a group of political environment. However, it has now at least 500 citizens. Earlier, the requirements entered a period of transition. It will, were more stringent: while independent therefore, be useful to look at the other major candidates required 2,000,000 signatures, political actors in Russia’s domestic sphere, non-Duma party-affiliated candidates needed particularly those whose outlooks differ from 1,000,000. the government. The paper will focus on the parties, groups and figures that constitute the In 2012, President Putin ran as a candidate domestic political opposition in Russia, of United Russia, the current ruling party. He primarily as they have coalesced around the was also the party’s chairperson from 2008 to 2018 elections and the start of the subsequent 2012. In 2018, he ran as an independent term. It looks at their composition, the candidate, even though it would have been challenges they face and their future easier for him to run as a party candidate. This prospects. was likely done due to the growing unpopularity of the party itself and to THE ELECTION PROCESS demonstrate that he personally still enjoys the support of a broad segment of the population. Russia is a federal semi-presidential republic. There were seven other candidates. It features a bicameral legislature—the Federal Assembly—and a powerful, directly As for the legislative elections, deputies of elected presidency. The president is the head the State Duma are elected on the basis of two 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 244 l JUNE 2018 Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects lists: 225 of the 450 seats through party lists 1996. In the same year, Zyuganov came close based on proportional representation, and the to defeating the incumbent president, Boris other half through single-member Yeltsin, forcing the elections into a run-off. constituencies in a first-past-the-post system. They have also been the largest faction in the This system has undergone changes too, from State Duma in 1995 and 1999. Zyuganov has a fully proportional representational system been the opposition leader in several cabinets. that had been in place since 2003 to the current Grudinin received almost 12 percent of the split re-established in 2013. The threshold for vote share in the 2018 elections. entering the Duma is currently five percent of the total vote. Five parties sit in opposition. The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, the third-largest faction with 39 seats, was POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATE DUMA founded in 1991. In the erstwhile Soviet Union, it was the second officially recognised As of October 2017, Russia’s Central Election party. The party is opposed to both neoliberal Commission (CEC) had registered 67 parties.3 capitalism and communism, and its platform In the ongoing Seventh Convocation of the can be described as chauvinist and revanchist, State Duma, six parties are represented. supporting the restoration of a ‘greater Russia’. United Russia, the party in power, is the It espouses anti-Western attitudes with a belief largest faction with 343 of 450 seats. in a strong state role in domestic affairs. In the 1993 State Duma elections, the party received The second-largest faction in the Duma is a plurality of votes. Its leader, Vladimir the Communist Party of the Russian Zhirinovsky, 71, has been a fixture of the Federation (CPRF) with 42 seats. It was presidential elections, contesting every single formed in 1993. Its leader, 73-year-old election except the one in 2004. In the 2018 Gennady Zyuganov, has participated in every elections, he placed third behind Pavel presidential election since 1993 (except in Grudinin. 2004) but chose not to run in 2018. The party The fourth-largest party in the Duma with instead nominated Pavel Grudinin, a 23 seats is “A Just Russia.” As a social- businessperson who is a former member of democratic party, it supports a welfare state, United Russia and not a member of the CPRF. improved labour legislation and individual The hope was that a fresh face with moderate property rights, and a market economy with views would do better to attract a broader base progressive taxation. It was formed in 2006 of voters. The party’s platform focuses on after the merger of parties with similar improving labour conditions, progressive ideologies. While they supported Dmitry taxation, social welfare schemes and economic Medvedev for the post of president in 2008, sovereignty, and includes measures such as they fielded the party head Sergey Mironov in 4 Russia exiting the World Trade Organisation. 2012. In the latest 2018 elections, they A vocal faction with a well-established history supported the candidacy of Vladimir Putin. and party apparatus, it has been attracting new members.5 They have consistently placed The smallest parties in the Duma with one second in every presidential election since seat each are Rodina6 and Civic Platform. ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 244 l JUNE 2018 3 Political Opposition in Russia in 2018: Composition, Challenges and Prospects Rodina, a conservative nationalist party, was NON-DUMA POLITICAL PARTIES formed in 2003 and is headed by Aleksey Zhuravlyov. It supports a strong state role in Parties without seats in the Duma, too, fielded economy, improved labour r ig hts, candidates for the 2018 elections. Grigory administrative services and Russia’s improved Yavlinsky, the founder of the liberal party standing in a multipolar world. Civic Platform Yabloko, ran as its candidate. Formed in the is a young party, formed in 2012 after the 1990s, its platform advocates for greater civil party registration process was eased. It was liberties, improved rule of law, increased formed by billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov after spending in the social sector and stronger he placed third in the 2012 presidential anti-corruption policies. It is a proponent of elections. Pro-business and pro-industry, it the European model of development and seeks 8 considers improving the sectors of education, better relations with the West.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • "Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"
    AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW "Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks" By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze* Story about the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative to change the make-up of the boards of state-owned firms, especially energy companies. In late March of this year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev demanded that high-ranking officials – namely, deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers that co-ordinate state policy in the same sectors in which those companies are active – step down from their seats on the boards of state-run energy companies by July 1. He also said that October 1 would be the deadline for replacing these civil servants with independent directors. The deadline has now passed, but Medvedev‟s bid to diminish the government‟s influence in the energy sector has run into roadblocks. Most of the high-level government officials who have stepped down are being replaced not by independent managers, but by directors from other state companies in the same sector. Russia‟s state-owned oil and gas companies have not been quick to replace directors who also hold high-ranking government posts, despite or- ders from President Dmitry Medvedev. High-ranking Russian officials have made a show of following President Medvedev‟s order to leave the boards of state-run energy companies, but government influence over the sector remains strong. This indicates that the political will needed for the presidential administration to push eco- nomic reforms forward may be inadequate. 41 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011 Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Full Text In
    European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences EpSBS www.europeanproceedings.com e-ISSN: 2357-1330 DOI: 10.15405/epsbs.2020.12.02.36 TILTM 2020 Topical Issues of Linguistics and Teaching Methods in Business and Professional Communication INFLUENCE OF INTERNET SPACE ON INTERCULTURAL AND BUSINESS COMMUNICATION Boris G. Vulfovich (a), Veronika V. Katermina (a)*, Anastasia A. Shestakova (a) *Corresponding author (a) Kuban State University, ul. Stavropolskaya 149, 350040, Krasnodar, Russia, E-mail: [email protected] Abstract The 2016–2018 election cycle in France, the USA and Russia showed the need to develop new options for analyzing the election campaign and the degree of potential voter turnout on the Internet, taking into account the impact on social networks. The article discusses the results of an empirical study, “Communication Campaign Model: A Comparative Analysis of Russia's Experience in the USA,” and analyzes the election campaign of the “unexpected” presidential candidate in Russia, Ksenia Sobchak. By the word “unexpected” we mean that the person never appeared on the political stage before, and no one saw this person before the presidential election. The empirical base for the study was taken from the presidential candidate’s account on social networks. The study analyzed the informative patterns of the personal page of Ksenia Sobchak, where the analysis was performed on four social networks (VKontakte, Instagram, Facebook and Odnoklassniki). An excerpt from the discourse contains all the materials published by the candidate since the announcement of her candidacy for the presidency of Russia (from May 18, 2017 to March 19, 2018). As part of the study, a new model of selective advertising communications was developed and conceptualized.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of International
    Russia’s 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of International Integration 1800 K Street NW | Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org authors Andrew C. Kuchins Amy Beavin Anna Bryndza project codirectors Andrew C. Kuchins Thomas Gomart july 2008 europe, russia, and the united states ISBN 978-0-89206-547-9 finding a new balance Ë|xHSKITCy065479zv*:+:!:+:! CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Russia’s 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of International Integration authors Andrew C. Kuchins Amy Beavin Anna Bryndza project codirectors Andrew C. Kuchins Thomas Gomart july 2008 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC. More than 220 full- time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.
    [Show full text]
  • The Media As a Mirror of Putin's Evolving Strategy in Ukraine
    Tomila Lankina and Kohei Watanabe ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Lankina, Tomila V. and Watanabe, Kohei (2017) ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies. pp. 1526- 1556. ISSN 0966-8136 DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2017.1397603 © 2017 University of Glasgow This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68226/ Available in LSE Research Online: January 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 1 Tomila Lankina* and Kohei Watanabe** ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring Betrayal’? The Media as a Mirror of Putin’s Evolving Strategy in Ukraine Abstract We develop a novel Russian-language electronic content analysis dictionary and method to analyse Russian state media’s framing of the Euromaidan protests.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's 2012 Presidential Election
    Russia’s 2012 Presidential Election: Yet Another Term for Putin? By Paweł Piotr Styrna l February 27, 2012 The next presidential election in post-Soviet Russia is scheduled for March 4, 2012. The roster of candidates Russian voters can choose from is rather limited, both in terms of the number of candidates and their backgrounds. The upcoming contest pits five candidates against each other: the Sovietonostalgic chekist, Vladimir Putin; the unreconstructed and unrepentant communist, Gennady Zyuganov; the socialist - and long-time Chairman of the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house) - Sergey Mironov, the nominee of the “Just Russia” Party; the infamous, rabid chauvinist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky; and the “independent” oligarch, Mikhail Prokhorov. Not surprisingly, all these men embody different, yet often overlapping, facets of post-communism. One will notice the conspicuous and telling absence of a conservative, Christian, anti-communist alternative of the Alexander Solzhenitsyn variety. This seems to correspond with what some have argued to constitute one of the essential features of post-communism (particularly in the former USSR), i.e. an ostensible political pluralism serving as a façade, disguising an establishment jealously guarding the post-communist status quo, and attempting to marginalize threats to it. Thus, the faux pluralism appears designed to cater to multiple ideological persuasions in society without jeopardizing the main continuities between communism-proper and post-communism, not to mention the privileges, perks, and golden parachutes retained or acquired by the post-communist oligarchy. This is not to claim that the post-bolshevik establishment is a monolith or that no spheres of freedom exist, but that these are significantly limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia
    Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia the fight against corruption, embezzlement and fraud, claiming that the whole system built by Putin was akin to a mafia. In 2009, he discovered that one of Putin’s allies, Mayor of Moscow City Yury Luzhkov, BORIS and his wife, Yelena Baturina, were engaged in fraudulent business practices. According to the results of his investigation, Baturina had become a billionaire with the help of her husband’s connections. Her real-estate devel- opment company, Inteco, had invested in the construction of dozens of housing complexes in Moscow. Other investors were keen to part- ner with Baturina because she was able to use NEMTSOV her networks to secure permission from the Moscow government to build apartment build- ings, which were the most problematic and It was nearing midnight on 27 February 2015, and the expensive construction projects for developers. stars atop the Kremlin towers shone with their charac- Nemtsov’s report revealed the success of teristic bright-red light. Boris Nemtsov and his partner, Baturina’s business empire to be related to the Anna Duritskaya, were walking along Bolshoy Moskovo- tax benefits she received directly from Moscow retsky Bridge. It was a cold night, and the view from the City government and from lucrative govern- bridge would have been breathtaking. ment tenders won by Inteco. A snowplough passed slowly by the couple, obscuring the scene and probably muffling the sound of the gunshots fired from a side stairway to the bridge. The 55-year-old Nemtsov, a well-known Russian politician, anti-corrup- tion activist and a fierce critic of Vladimir Putin, fell to the ground with four bullets in his back.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup the Suppressed Transcripts
    Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 3 Hearings "About the Illegal Financia) Activity of the CPSU" Editor 's Introduction At the birth of the independent Russian Federation, the country's most pro-Western reformers looked to the West to help fund economic reforms and social safety nets for those most vulnerable to the change. However, unlike the nomenklatura and party bureaucrats who remained positioned to administer huge aid infusions, these reformers were skeptical about multibillion-dollar Western loans and credits. Instead, they wanted the West to help them with a different source of money: the gold, platinum, diamonds, and billions of dollars in hard currency the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and KGB intelligence service laundered abroad in the last years of perestroika. Paradoxically, Western governments generously supplied the loans and credits, but did next to nothing to support the small band of reformers who sought the return of fortunes-estimated in the tens of billions of dollars- stolen by the Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, as some in the West have chronicled, the nomenklatura and other functionaries who remained in positions of power used the massive infusion of Western aid to enrich themselves-and impoverish the nation-further. In late 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development concluded that Russian officials had stolen $45 billion in Western aid and deposited the money abroad. Radical reformers in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the parliament that served until its building was destroyed on President Boris Yeltsin's orders in October 1993, were aware of this mass theft from the beginning and conducted their own investigation as part of the only public probe into the causes and circumstances of the 1991 coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
    [Show full text]
  • Nord Stream 2
    Updated August 24, 2021 Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline nearing completion, is which accounted for about 48% of EU natural gas imports expected to increase the volume of Russia’s natural gas in 2020. Russian gas exports to the EU were up 18% year- export capacity directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, on-year in the first quarter of 2021. Factors behind reliance Poland, and other transit states (Figure 1). Successive U.S. on Russian supply include diminishing European gas Administrations and Congresses have opposed Nord Stream supplies, commitments to reduce coal use, Russian 2, reflecting concerns about European dependence on investments in European infrastructure, Russian export Russian energy and the threat of increased Russian prices, and the perception of many Europeans that Russia aggression in Ukraine. The German government is a key remains a reliable supplier. proponent of the pipeline, which it says will be a reliable Figure 1. Nord Stream Gas Pipeline System source of natural gas as Germany is ending nuclear energy production and reducing coal use. Despite the Biden Administration’s stated opposition to Nord Stream 2, the Administration appears to have shifted its focus away from working to prevent the pipeline’s completion to mitigating the potential negative impacts of an operational pipeline. Some critics of this approach, including some Members of Congress and the Ukrainian and Polish governments, sharply criticized a U.S.-German joint statement on energy security, issued on July 21, 2021, which they perceived as indirectly affirming the pipeline’s completion.
    [Show full text]
  • Socialism and Current Crisis of Capitalism
    providing benefits for the workers EDITORIAL who are paying into this plan." According to that law Mr. This is the last question to be Obama, it states, very, very asked of Mr. Obama: '7s the directly that: "The primary forced bankruptcy of General responsibility of the pension fund Motors and the elimination of "fiduciaries" is to run this plan tens of thousands of jobs, just solely in the interests of an arranged collection grab for participants and beneficiaries and the favored U.S. financiers that for the exclusive purpose of are calling the shots? PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE BAIL OUT OF US AUTOMKERS This financial robbery of US and Canadian taxpayers hard- earned money is nothing more than the Greatest Auto Theft in history! Besides this unheard of Billions Robbery, it is also dumping 40,000 of the last 60,000 auto trade union jobs into the mass grave dug by Obama's appointee, James Dimon. Mr. Dimon is the CEO of J.P. Morgan and Citibank. While GM trade union workers are losing their jobs and retirement benefits, their life savings, but the GM shareholders are getting rich and most expect to get back a stunning $6 BILLION! Even under the present US Laws this is illegal! Helping Mr. Dimon is also the official Obama's appointee — This cartoon is from the Toronto Daily Star newspaper' showing Steven Rattner, Obama's "Auto the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) leadership that did not stand Czar" - the man who ordered up strongly enough during this financial robbery. Looking on is General Motors to go bankrupt.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Rap in the Era of Vladimir Putin
    CHAPTER 3 RUS SIAN RAP IN THE ERA OF VLADIMIR PUTIN Philip Ewell T has always held a special place in the hearts of Rus sians. From the poetry recitations by Evgeny Evtushenko in the s that lled stadiums to the inspired lyr ics of Rus sian bards like Vladimir Vysotsky, Rus sians have sought not only beauty but also repose in artistic literary forms. is is not sur- prising given Rus sia’s troubled po liti cal history over the centuries, which reached its height in the twentieth century with the repressive Soviet era. Countless vol- umes have been written over the years on censorship in the USSR and on the ensuing balancing act that Soviet artists endured at the hands of the authorities. at Soviet and post- Soviet Rus sian rappers felt that same repression is not in doubt. What sets rap, as a genre, apart from other literary forms in Rus sia is its place in time: It really took hold only in the early s, immediately aer the fall of the Soviet Union, so one cannot speak of rap, as a genre, in uencing po liti cal events in the USSR. ough one could argue that the rst rap in Rus sia was “Rap” from by the group Chas Pik, an unabashed rip- o of e Sugarhill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight” from — widely recognized as the rst commercial rap hit ever—it was not until the s that Rus sian rappers and rap groups such as Bog- dan Titomir, Liki MC, Bad Balance, and Mal’chishnik became widely known in the former Soviet Union and, with them, the rap genre itself.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Media and Civil Society in the Russian Protests, December 2011
    Department of Informatics and Media Social Science – major in Media and Communication Studies Fall 2013 Master Two Years Thesis Social Media and Civil Society in the Russian Protests, December 2011 The role of social media in engagement of people in the protests and their self- identification with civil society Daria Dmitrieva Fall 2013 Supervisor: Dr. Gregory Simons Researcher at Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies 1 2 ABSTRACT The study examines the phenomenon of the December protests in Russia when thousands of citizens were involved in the protest movement after the frauds during the Parliamentary elections. There was a popular opinion in the Internet media that at that moment Russia experienced establishment of civil society, since so many people were ready to express their discontent publically for the first time in 20 years. The focus of this study is made on the analysis of the roles that social media played in the protest movement. As it could be observed at the first glance, recruiting and mobilising individuals to participation in the rallies were mainly conducted via social media. The research analyses the concept of civil society and its relevance to the protest rhetoric and investigates, whether there was a phenomenon of civil society indeed and how it was connected to individuals‘ motivation for joining the protest. The concept of civil society is discussed through the social capital, social and political trust, e- democracy and mediatisation frameworks. The study provides a comprehensive description of the events, based on mainstream and new media sources, in order to depict the nature and the development of the movement.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]