Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Emmanuel Rios

A U.S. Special Operations Forces Soldier leads a group of soldiers from Iraqi Special Operations Force’s 8th Regional Commando Battalion while practicing movement techniques during Foreign Internal Defense training in Baqubah, Iraq. Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power, and the Global Networking of SOF

By Scott morrison

ost military professionals and historians are familiar with the theories and concepts of air, maritime, and land power, but there has been little in the way of theory or concept as to what MSpecial Operations power means and its strategic utility alongside those of the air, maritime, and land domains. Yet Special Operations Forces (SOF) must play a central role in several of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as projected in the Defense Strategy entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, such as countering terrorism, irregular warfare, and countering weapons of mass destruction. The importance of Special Operations to this new strategy was underscored in the accompanying remarks made by former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during the January 5, 2012, unveiling of the new defense strategy where he mentioned specifically, “as we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect, and in some cases increase, our investments in special operations forces.” Therefore, understanding the role of SOF power and how it fits within strategy is an essential prerequisite to successfully implementing the U.S. Defense Strategy.

Scott Morrison is a U.S. Government Civilian who serves as the Director of the Commander’s Action Group (CAG) at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe–SHAPE (Belgium).

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Recalibrating the Current SOF of an indirect lead is often a blunt and raw method- Interpretation of the Direct ology that typically results in an adverse outcome; and Indirect Approaches “In war as in wrestling the attempt to throw the Within the U.S. Special Operations community opponent without loosening his foothold and bal- there has been a considerable amount of theoreti- ance can only result in self-exhaustion increasing cal discussion, attempting to more clearly charac- in disproportionate ration to the effective strain terize the “indirect approach” as it relates to the put upon him. Victory by such a method can only “direct approach” in a Special Operations context. be possible through an immense margin of supe- The familiar understanding in U.S. SOF circles rior strength in some form, and, even so, tends to generally associates the direct approach with direct lose decisiveness.”3 From his historical analysis of action (DA), and the indirect approach with for- the indirect approach vice the direct approach, eign internal defense (FID) or security force assis- Hart became convinced that, “More and more tance (SFA). In some quarters current interpreta- clearly the fact emerged that a direct approach to tions of these two approaches represent what is one’s mental object, or physical objective, along nearly a cultural schism within Special Operations the ‘line of natural expectation’ for the opponent, due to the very different focus and skill sets asso- has ever tended to, and usually produced nega- ciated with them. In order to understand SOF tive results.”4 While the context of Hart’s theory power, one first needs a recalibrated view of the stemmed from observations of state on state con- direct and indirect approach frames of reference flict, the indirect approach is arguably more appli- from a broader strategic vantage point. cable in the complex operating environment of the An informative start point for exploring these 21st century where non-state threats and internal topics to better define and understand the strategic conflicts dominate the security landscape. utility and value of SOF power is to revert back to first principles and reconsider the roots and The Indirect Approach and SOF Power origins of the indirect approach. Former British In some circles a degree of cynicism is expressed soldier, historian, and military theorist Sir Basil when Special Operations are explained as small Henry Liddell Hart is historically credited with unit tactical actions performed by specially orga- defining the indirect approach in his work, the nized, trained, and equipped forces aimed at “Strategy of Indirect Approach,” where he asserted: achieving strategic and operational effects. SOF “…throughout the ages decisive results in war have alone are not a panacea or substitute, but they only been reached when the approach has been provide significant complementary capabilities indirect. In strategy the longest way round is apt to to those of the air, land, and maritime domains. be the shortest way home.”1 This indirect approach In fact, a great deal of what allows SOF to per- of Hart focused on targeting the balance or equi- form in a special manner are the enabling capa- librium of an adversary noting, “while the strength bilities, in many cases leveraged from outside of of an enemy country lies outwardly in its numbers SOF, such as “mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, and resources, these are fundamentally dependent remote logistics, engineering planners, construc- upon stability or equilibrium of control, morale, tion, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/ and supply.”2 The central premise of the indirect translators, communications, dog teams, close air approach is to orient upon, target, and upset an support specialists, security forces, and others that adversary’s equilibrium or balance to set up and permit SOF operators to focus more directly on enable follow-on decisive blows to be landed. Hart their missions.”5 What SOF do however, is bring goes on to explain with an athletic metaphor that together a potent and unique mix of capabilities a direct approach without the preparatory shaping to the defense portfolio that enables pursuit of

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this indirect approach with an effect or outcome is known today, primarily offensive operations in that is grossly disproportionate to the investment the form of high tempo precision raids, are in fact in resources. The SOF core activities identified by integral components of a broader application of the U.S. Special Operations Command are: Direct the strategic indirect approach. Obtaining clarity Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional on this topic is critically important, as the value Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs and utility of SOF power operating in this strategic Operations, Counterterrorism, Psychological indirect manner are particularly relevant to the Operations, Information Operations, Counter- threats and challenges faced in the 21st century proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, security environment. Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency Operations, and Activities Specified by the Facing Nefarious Networked Actors President or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).6 and Today’s Paradigm for Conflict Collectively, these core activities provide a toolbox It is no secret that the technological impact on for pursuing the strategic indirect approach. SOF telecommunications and modern transportation power is the ability to apply the precise effects of has made the world more interconnected. It has these collective capabilities at carefully calibrated revolutionized how we look at commerce and busi- points of the adversary’s balance or equilibrium ness through a global lens of interdependence. As a described by Hart, whether that opponent is a result, the global international security landscape state, non-state, or irregular actor in the form of is inherently more complicated due to the same an insurgent challenging an incumbent allied gov- interconnected nature found in today’s world of ernment. These capabilities might include the sur- interdependent financial markets and commerce. gical application of force through offensive action, The nature of today’s threats and challenges is more methodical long-term efforts that support characterized by a complex network of nefarious and influence others through training, advice, and state and non-state actors ranging from insurgents assistance, or as in most instances a combination and terrorists to traffickers, financial institutions, of both. A strategy of support and influence seeks and drug cartels who collaborate wittingly and to achieve a positional advantage, exercised pri- unwittingly through relationships of opportu- marily via local indigenous forces to undermine nity, convenience, dependence, shared ideology, the foundation and environment that enables like causes, common enemies, financial gain and the equilibrium or balance of an adversary. These brotherhood. Iran for example, by many accounts local forces empowered with indigenous knowl- has become extremely adept at leveraging a diverse edge and information, enabled with advice and global network of nefarious entities. The balance assistance, are capable of eroding an adversary’s or equilibrium, referred to by Hart, of this loosely balance over time. These longer term support and affiliated network is similarly complex, amor- influence efforts, complemented by carefully cali- phous, and dynamic. We have seen this in over brated, high tempo offensive action driven by high more than a decade of conflict against the network fidelity intelligence, combine to achieve, through of Al Qaeda. a strategic indirect approach, what John Arquilla Arquilla and Ronfeldt are not frequently and David Rondfeldt described as “swarming” to credited for their concept articulated as early as disrupt command and control, deny sanctuary, 1996, “It takes a network to fight networks.” Today interdict lines of communication, gather informa- this phrase is unfortunately bantered about and tion and provide strategic anticipation to inform attributed to others with little of the contextual follow-on actions and decisions.7 The tools of the substance and detailed understanding that made current interpretation of the direct approach as it their observation so profound and prophetic. In

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the aftermath of September 2001 in a follow-on of pieces. It is more about fighting to cre- piece entitled “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)”, ate secure territories than about fighting to the authors brought the issue into sharper focus: the death of one’s pieces. Further, there is often a blurring of offense and defense—a “It takes networks to fight networks. single move may both attack and defend Governments that want to defend against simultaneously. Finally, the use of massed netwar may have to adopt organizational concentrations is to be avoided, especially in designs and strategies like those of their the early phases of a game, as they may repre- adversaries. This does not mean mirroring sent a misuse of time and later be susceptible the adversary, but rather learning to draw to implosive attacks. This is quite different on the same design principles that he has from chess, which is generally linear, and already learned about the rise of network in which offense and defense are usually forms in the information age. These princi- easily distinguished, and massing is a vir- ples depend to some extent on technological tue. Future conflicts will likely resemble the innovation, but mainly on a willingness to game of Go more than the game of chess.”9 innovate organizationally and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new mech- The work of these two authors will prove anisms for interagency and multijurisdic- over time to be as consequential to understand- tional cooperation.”8 ing warfare in the 21st century as the thoughts of Clausewitz were to the 20th century martial art. This concept of requiring more dynamic con- The centrally important role of networks to figurations to enable combating networked nefar- counter nefarious networks of the 21st century has ious actors bears relation to another key work by not been lost upon the United States Government the same authors written for RAND in 1997 enti- after a decade plus of war against the Al Qaeda tled, “A New Epoch and Spectrum of Conflict,” network. Across innumerable U.S. national secu- that metaphorically describes the paradigm shift rity policy documents the inexorable fact of life required to fight these “netwars” of the future. In that the United States cannot go it alone and this work, the traditional western game of chess must work with other international actors in a is juxtaposed as the frame of reference represent- comprehensive whole of government manner ing the past against the Chinese game of Go to to achieve common security interests resonates describe the nature of the strategic paradigm shift with unmistakable clarity. Former Secretary of to the future. Defense Panetta emphasized the importance of this in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace “Thus Go, in contrast to chess, is more in June of 2012 where he said, “In the 21st cen- about distributing one’s pieces than about tury, we must build partnerships that enable massing them. It is more about proactive us to better meet a wider range of challenges. insertion and presence than about maneu- To that end, I see us building networks that lever- ver. It is more about deciding where to age our unique capabilities – and the unique stand than whether to advance or retreat. strengths of our allies and partners that share com- It is more about developing web-like links mon interests – to confront the critical challenges among nearby stationary pieces than about of the future.” He again reiterated this theme fur- moving specialized pieces in combined oper- ther in a briefing at the Pentagon in October while ations. It is more about creating networks speaking about the ongoing implementation of the of pieces than about protecting hierarchies new U.S. Defense Strategy against the backdrop of

42 | FeAtUReS PRISm 4, NO. 3 Special OperatiOnS FOrceS and GlObal netwOrkinG (DoD photo by StaffDepartment by U.S. of Defense (DoD photo Air Force/Released) Sgt. Joseph Swafford, U.S. Afghan National Police Crisis Response Unit members climb over a wall to enter a compound during training in Surobi, Afghanistan, Dec. 9, 2010. the training was conducted by International Security Assistance Force special operations forces. fiscal challenges, “But one important way that we preventative insertion, presence, and action in are going to do this is to strengthen our network coordination with a multinational collaborative of defense Alliances around the globe.” network of SOF networks. A robust and focused effort to build a global The Networking of SOF Power SOF network of networks supports the U.S. With the formidable array of SOF fielded by the defense strategy in three major ways. The first is United States, some might question the utility that this global networking of SOF builds relation- and need for closer networking of U.S. SOF with ships that engender trust and confidence among allied and partner SOF around the world. As for- different national SOF elements enabling more mer Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ms. effective, efficient, and coherent multinational Michelle Flournoy once insightfully remarked, employment and collaboration among SOF. The allies and partners of the United States are more central importance of relationships cannot be over- than “nice to have” or “window dressing,” but are emphasized; in fact this is the center of gravity instead essential for achieving our security inter- relative to a multinational SOF network. This is ests in today’s world. The ultimate strategic utility especially important to SOF as they are in most of SOF power is applying a classic reinterpretation nations a close-knit insular community stemming of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach from their sensitive strategic and operational work to leverage SOF as a force multiplier and econ- that is inherently classified; often of a low visibil- omy of force instrument to upset an adversary’s ity, clandestine, or covert nature; and quite often equilibrium and balance through proactive and depends on a high degree of operational security

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for success and force protection. As a result, col- capabilities for both self-defense and their con- laboration among multinational SOF depends tribution to future coalition operations. Without first and foremost upon trust and confidence the appropriate capability, capacity, and interop- that underpins relationships between command- erability, allied and partner SOF will not be pos- ers, staffs, and SOF operators. However, without tured to work effectively alongside U.S. SOF, and undergirding and codifying these relationships therefore will have diminished utility in burden in a habitual, enduring, and substantive manner, sharing. Secretary of Defense Panetta highlighted working collaboratively alongside allies’ and part- the importance of this in remarks at the Pentagon ners’ SOF will never rise above a baseline threshold stating, “Indeed, I think it is fair to say that a vital of effectiveness. What is required to build these pillar of the new defense strategy that we released relationships is more than transactional episodic this year is the important work of developing and interactions. Transactional relationships, or those deepening ties to other nations; developing their forged under the duress of hurried timelines are capabilities and building new Alliances and part- less effective, as they lack the critical foundation nerships to build stability and security. This is one that leads to trust and confidence. The quality of of the keys to the Defense force we are trying to these relationships is proportional to the value build for the 21st Century.” and output of the relationships. Substantive and The third and no less critical way in which U.S. enduring relationships that yield results require an leadership of a SOF network of networks supports investment of time, energy, and resources. These the U.S. Defense Strategy is by providing U.S. SOF relationships entail understanding the culture with peacetime and contingency access. Access not and ethos of the different SOF elements, as well as only in a classic sense in terms of infrastructure organizational and individual capabilities, limita- such as airfields, ports and training opportuni- tions, idiosyncrasies, and terminology. Concepts ties, but more importantly access to information, that engender and foster these enduring relation- knowledge, understanding, perspective and legit- ships among the global network of multinational imacy that are essential ingredients to operating SOF support the “system of defense Alliances and successfully in the complex operational environ- security partnerships” described by the Secretary ment of the 21st century. As the 2008 U.S. Defense of Defense as “one of America’s greatest national Strategy described, “Allies often possess capabili- security assets.” Secretary Panetta went on to point ties, skills, and knowledge we cannot duplicate.”14 out that “No other nation in the world really has It is for that reason that the global SOF network of this asset,” and that “These relationships are sound networks enables a shared comprehensive under- investments in an era of fiscal challenges and they standing of today’s challenges, threats, and issues really do pay dividends.”10 His assertion on the that provides a broad and in depth appreciation efficacy of these networks in response to the asso- for the nature of the problem as a point of depar- ciated investment reaffirms the findings of semi- ture for designing and implementing collaborative nal studies of network effectiveness by Professors solutions. Keith Provan, Brinton Milward,11 and Alex Turrini and others12 over the last decade that indicate net- Conclusion work leadership and associated resource munifi- We recognize that the nature of the nefarious net- cence are some of the key characteristics required worked adversary is dynamic and complex, requir- to build effective networks.13 ing an adaptive, agile, and collaborative response. The second way this SOF network of net- Arquilla and Ronfeldt postulated that applying works is supportive of the U.S. Defense Strategy the networks to fight networks paradigm would is by building allied and partner SOF national require “a willingness to innovate organizationally

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and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new appropriately to complement air, maritime, and mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdic- land power in the 21st century. tional cooperation.” The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader “global war on terror” stimulated more collaborative “out of the box” interagency Notes networked collaboration to include that of a 1 multinational nature in some cases, but there is a Liddell Hart, Strategy of the Indirect Approach, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1941), 4. need to evolve and push the innovation further to 2 Hart, Op. Cit., 5. enable the application of appropriate lethal and 3 Hart, Op. Cit., 5. nonlethal authorities, capacities, and capabilities 4 Hart, Op. Cit., 4. against adversary networks in the most effective, 5 Eric T. Olson, “U.S. Special Operations: Context and efficient and coherent manner. This innovative Capabilities in Irregular Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly 56, st principle is well understood by the Commander 1 Quarter (2010), 68. 6 “About United States Special Operations Command of U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral Webpage,” US SOCOM, accessed on March 8, 2013, at http:// William H. McRaven, who is pursuing multiple www.socom.mil/Pages/AboutUSSOCOM.aspx. efforts along these lines to stimulate and imple- 7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of ment precepts originally put forward by Arquilla Netwar, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 57. 8 and Ronfeldt on how to counter the phenome- John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of non of “netwar.” The first of these initiatives is Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David to engender and invigorate a multinational col- Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 15. laborative SOF network of networks around the 9 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “A New Epoch and world, and the other is to focus on and enhance a Spectrum of Conflict,” inIn Athena’s Camp, Preparing for the networked U.S. SOF relationship across the U.S. Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David interagency community. Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 163. 10 Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman The modern version of the indirect approach of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, is where networks of like-minded actors on today’s Department of Defense News Briefing from the Pentagon, game board of international security achieve stra- October 25, 2012, accessed March 8, 2013, at http://www. tegic presence through proactive and preventative defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5143. 11 insertion and activity to undermine the balance Keith G. Provan and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public- and equilibrium of the adversarial networked Sector Organized Networks,” Public Administration Review 56, actors. While networking as described by the no. 4 (July/August 2001), 68. Secretary of Defense is not uniquely applicable to 12 Alex Turrini et al, “Networking Literature SOF, in some cases U.S. SOF alongside allied and about Determinants of Network Effectiveness,” Public partner SOF, are already serving as the vanguard Administration 88, no. 2 (2010), 540-545. 13 for precisely the type of organizational, doctri- Joerg Raab, “Heading towards a Network Theory of Effectiveness: Combining Structure and Governance” nal, and mechanistic innovation and cooperation (presentation at the University of Southern California Sol described by Arquilla and Rondfeldt over a decade Price School of Public Policy Bedrosian Center, Los Angeles, and a half ago. SOF is ideally suited to lead these California, March 28, 2011), accessed March 8, 2013, at innovative efforts and serve as an enabler and cat- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksriE7B3eIM. 14 alyst to engender greater multinational and inter- U.S. Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy 2008,” (U.S. DoD: Washington, D.C., 2008), 20. agency collaboration through a comprehensive approach. This global networking of SOF through a SOF network of networks will exponentially increase the utility of SOF power and position it

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