Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver
Amphibious assault ship USS America test-fires rolling airframe missile launcher to intercept remote- controlled drone during exercise to test ship’s defense capability (U.S. Navy/Demetrius Kennon)
Swarm drones could easily take on the appearance of the U.S Navy’s Low-Cost Robotic Swarms in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology (LOCUST),3 an inexpen- sive, fixed-wing platform that is individ- Offensive Maneuver ually tube-launched and autonomously joins a swarm once airborne. Alterna- By Jules Hurst tively, ground-based swarm combatants might resemble miniature tanks like the Estonian ADDER weaponized ground vehicle.4 For the purposes of this article, or many years, military scientists of horse archers of the Asian steppe though, assumptions need to be made. have contemplated the advent of against less flexible foes.2 Whatever the Future swarm combatants will likely be swarming tactics as an evolution source of inspiration, few authors move F severable into two broad categories: fire within maneuver warfare, and futurists beyond the abstract employment of support swarms and maneuver swarms. have contemplated the execution of the robotic swarms. To fully explore swarm Fire support swarm combatants will tactics by cooperative teams of semi- utility in fire and maneuver, swarms carry one-time-use warheads that are autonomous drones.1 These projections should be inserted into the tactical con- changed modularly to deal with a variety expound on strengths demonstrated cepts of today—chiefly, the five forms of targets (area, point, soft-skinned, by hive-minded organisms such as bees of offensive maneuver recognized under hardened, airborne, and others). These or ants, which work cooperatively to Army doctrine. kamikaze-styled drones could be airborne defeat larger invaders through non-hier- or ground-based. They might be capable archal communications. Other swarm Swarm Combatants of independently recognizing enemy theorists reference the deadly effective- Much of the reluctance to begin targets through image classification or ness of the ephemeral, loose formations theorizing about specific swarm tactics need assistance from human controllers. stems from the absence of a clear devel- They will likely be individually inexpen- opmental path in the technology. No sive compared to many modern weapons one knows what swarm combatants will Captain Jules “Jay” Hurst, USAR, previously of war, including the precision-guided served as the Operations Officer of the USSOCOM look like or what their capabilities will munitions they may replace. Fire support Analytic Innovation and Technology Unit and be, and many prototype pathways exist. Senior Intelligence Analyst of 1st Ranger Battalion. swarms probably will be initially deployed
JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 105 Finally, robotic maneuver swarms may offer the best platform to execute reconnaissance pull tactics, a subset of Auftragstaktik or mission-type tactics.5 In recon pull, commanders order units to conduct reconnaissance along the length of the enemy front to determine where to mass forces for the battle’s decisive operation and attempt penetra- tions or envelopments. A swarm could be particularly effective at this because of its potential to collect big data in real time. Without pause, swarm combatants could relay situation reports faster than any squad leader on a radio. Every soldier may be a sensor, but each swarm com- batant will be a sensor platform with an infallible memory.6 A shot fired by or at a swarm combatant provides a data point Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle designed to provide multiple surveillance, reconnaissance data, that, when aggregated, could help the and battlefield damage assessment missions launches from amphibious dock landing ship USS swarm (or human analysts and operators) Comstock, February 25, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Joseph M. Buliavac) determine the mass, density, and disposi- tion of enemy forces along its front. With by conventional field artillery and air as- orbit the battlefield like flocks of angry proper processing, this swarm data could sets, but in the future, semi-autonomous birds. provide commanders with a visualization systems specifically designed for this Maneuver swarms will likely be of enemy activity on the battlefield in real purpose may take this mission from them. more durable than their fire support time and improve their cognitive ability Something akin to a mini–mobile mortar, counterparts and exercise greater coop- to perceive a battlefield filled with tens of self-propelled howitzer, high-flying drone eration with human combatants on the thousands of robots, human beings, and aircraft, or a “truck with rockets” could battlefield. Unlike fire support swarms, vehicles. autonomously move forward with ma- maneuver swarms will be persistent and Imagine the power of thousands of neuvering elements to deploy responsive capable of multiple uses. A maneuver drones gathering combat data in real time fire support swarms. swarm might resemble a microcosm of and the rapidity with which weak points Theoretically, fire support swarm the combined arms forces that have made in the enemy line could be calculated combatants will be less expensive than up militaries since the mid-20th century. and exploited with a robotic coup d’oeil. precision-guided munitions, capable of They will reflect the synergistic mix of ca- Then imagine how quickly these same targeting without human intervention pabilities found there, but they may field drones could concentrate in an attack on through object recognition and able to air and ground assets in drastically dif- these points. The potential for a trained loiter overhead until needed by maneuver ferent ratios than are common in today’s swarm to observe, orient, decide, and act forces. Their largest advantage will be nu- Brigade Combat Teams. faster than human combatants in this sce- merical. Modern air defense systems are Robotic maneuver swarms lack the nario is frightening.7 When swarms face not designed to intercept large quantities biggest inhibitor of human combatants— one another, the speed of the swarm’s of small projectiles, and current missile fear. This apathy to casualties would coup d’oeil—determined by algorithmic systems would be overwhelmed if tasked prevent them from having their maneuver efficiency and processing power—may with intercepting a fire support swarm restricted by enemy fires, and their ability decide the outcome of battles, and if consisting of dozens of munitions. to field large numbers of swarm combat- robots ever become the military’s primary Maneuver swarm drones will resemble ants offers them a resilience against losing maneuver arm, a force’s mobile comput- modern air forces and armies on a mi- combat effectiveness unknown to human ing capabilities may be a key component croscale. Miniature quadcopters armed combatants. Maneuver swarms consisting in evaluating its overall combat power. with light machine guns might act as at- largely of aerial robots would also pos- tack aviation platforms, and scaled-down sess the ability to compress into a space The Role of the Air Force infantry fighting vehicles will imitate unimaginable by ground-based maneuver and Naval Aviation modern armor and mechanized infantry. units because of their ability to stack ve- Air Force and Navy assets will play criti- Flights of fixed-wing swarms will provide hicles in the air at different altitudes. cal roles in the delivery, sustainment, persistent autonomous air support as they and cyber protection of drone swarms
106 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 on the land and in the sea and air, but article, maneuver swarms function under incapable of massing at a decisive point they will also have significant roles multi-Service control. with swiftness. Fire support swarms with in fielding and controlling maneuver Capability Assumptions. Autonomous straightforward attack missions may be swarms in land armies. Fixed-wing swarm technology only exists in nascent less reliant on intra-swarm communica- systems offer numerous advantages over stages, but to explore the use of swarms tions and should be less vulnerable to their rotary-wing counterparts in endur- in offensive forms of maneuver, we need electronic warfare. For this article, we as- ance, speed, and payload capacity due to make projections regarding their future sume that most future swarm combatants to efficiencies inherent in their aero- capabilities. will possess the means to communicate nautical design. Accordingly, fixed-wing Future swarm combatants will possess mid-battle, at least to the point where drones should make up a large portion sufficient artificial intelligence to oper- they will be able to intermittently com- of future maneuver and fire support ate semi-autonomously after receiving municate through burst communications swarms. Unless ceded to the Army, initial guidance from human operators. or while in close proximity to each other. these armed, robotic fixed-wing plat- Maneuver or fire support swarms should Both maneuver and fire support forms will be controlled by Air Force or be able to process tasks of the following swarms will be vulnerable to cyber attacks naval aviation, necessitating that both complexity without human control: by state and nonstate actors. The cyber Services further integrate their mission components of every Service will need command of these swarms directly with Attack all adult males within a 500-meter to make considerable effort to minimize land forces. radius of given center point until depleted vulnerabilities of friendly swarms and Currently, the Air Force sees maneu- of ammunition. Return to rally point X exploit those of the enemy. To decrease vering airpower as a way of adding flanks at that time OR travel to this geographic the likelihood of a single software or outside of horizontal battle, but the field- coordinate, count all individuals possibly hardware vulnerability, the Armed Forces ing of large swarms of fixed-wing drones identified as adult males for the next four will need to avoid overstandardization will expand the Air Force definition to hours, relay that data in real time, then of software within swarms, which will include features of Army and Marine return to coordinate X OR conduct a complicate system interoperability. The Corps concepts of maneuver.8 Unlike reconnaissance in force along a pre-deter- cyber battles that enable the kinetic use of historical aircraft, fixed-wing maneuver mined route, deviations are authorized if swarm combatants will consist of system swarms will have the persistence to take the route becomes impassable. Self-defense administrators and information assurance and hold terrain, allowing air forces to authorized if engaged. officers updating software patches before execute maneuvers in combat analo- enemy forces can identify exploitation gous to their land force brethren. Large Because of their ability to com- pathways in older versions, while friendly swarms of unmanned aircraft will be able municate with other members of the forces attempt to do the same to adver- to orbit for hours, if not days, at a time, swarm while performing other tasks (for saries. Encryption and the rapid updating raining munitions down on their foes like example, fighting or moving) without of cryptography will be another struggle. Mongol horse archers circling in front of distraction, maneuver and fire support Communications officers across the joint (or above) enemy battle lines.9 Aircraft swarms should be able to change forma- force may need to update cryptographic losses from ground fire may be high but tions or dispositions faster than human keys multiple times a day to preserve in- acceptable because swarm combatants combatants and exploit this advantage formation assurance. will maintain low per-unit production on the battlefield. Their ability to ignore Swarm combatants will be deploy- costs and not endanger pilots—one of the psychological effects of incoming fire able into combat from diverse platforms, the most expensive combat occupations makes this advantage even greater. including but not limited to airdrops, to train. Swarm endurance will grow with artillery projectiles, cruise missiles, Like modern Air Force combat time, but for now let us assume that conventional aircraft, and other ground- controllers, the Air Force and Navy swarm combatants possess satisfactory based motherships. personnel who control these fixed-wing power to sustain operations independent Deploying armed swarms on the bat- maneuver swarms will need to integrate of human support for 12 to 24 hours tlefield could easily pose risks to human into maneuver formations, and Air Force depending on the intensity of tasks. combatants on both sides. Fratricide is a and naval doctrine will change to accom- Charging stations, situation dependent, real risk, especially considering the early modate their new role in land warfare. may be deployable to extend their endur- state of robotic object recognition. To Additionally, the required interoper- ance mid-combat. combat this, both maneuver and fire ability of automated systems between the Among the hurdles to the success support swarms will likely have a number automated and unmanned components of swarm technology are secure com- of fire support control measures built into of different Services will necessitate stan- munications. Without intra-swarm their programming prior to employment. dardization and joint testing beyond that communications, maneuver swarms These control measures may be geo- of most 20th-century weapons systems. would become the equivalent of a graphic (only target enemy personnel in In the scenarios in the later part of this human-wave attack—deadly in scale but this geographic bounding box), temporal
JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 107 Figure 1. Swarm Infiltration via Cruise Missile the Viet Cong famously led thousands A mixture of Fire Support Swarms and Aerial/Ground Maneuver Swarms are deployed through of North Vietnamese army units into the air-launched cruise missiles to seize bridges and block enemy forces from threatening a future South in small groups before launching amphibious assault on this coastline. the Tet Offensive.13 In another example, American and British forces boldly air- dropped behind German defensive works in Normandy to seize key bridges and intersections prior to the main assault on the morning of June 6, 1944.14 While airborne forces still offer attrac- tive infiltration options, maneuver swarms will likely be deployable more quickly due to the speed of potential transporta- tion options available. Today, Tomahawk land attack missiles can precisely deploy 166 submunitions from a range of over 1,000 kilometers, traveling at a speed of 550 miles per hour.15 Envision a flotilla of U.S. destroyers launching salvos of these same missiles carrying dozens of maneu- ver or fire support swarm combatants to seize key terrain prior to an amphibi- (do not engage targets after 1200 zulu), swarm vehicles will be built specifically for ous, airborne, or air assault. These same or beacon-based (do not attack individu- identified missions, and others will pos- capabilities could be used to quickly als or vehicles broadcasting or carrying sess weapon and sensor modularity that surprise an enemy force mid-battle by X; a similar concept is displayed in the allow them to adapt to multifunctional suddenly creating a hostile force in the movie Screamers, where soldiers wear a roles across different combat theaters. enemy rear. And unlike airborne infiltra- beacon to avoid being targeted by blade- Most important, as semi-autonomous tion or forcible entry operations, a swarm wielding robots who roam the planet10). technology proliferates, commanders will transported via sub- or supersonic missile A redundant approach is likely and need swarm vehicles capable of engag- would lack the observable indicators of recommended. ing traditional maneuver units and other a large airborne operation—creation of Though deadly, swarm combatants swarms. an air corridor, massing of transporta- will be just another tool in the joint force tion aircraft—and would reduce the risk commander’s toolbox. Conventional Forms of Offensive Maneuver to brigades, regiments, or divisions of forces will still largely consist of human According to U.S. Army Field Manual human combatants. combatants and manned vehicles for 3-90, Tactics, there are five kinds of That being said, swarm infiltrations at least the next two decades, but the maneuver used in offensive operations: would likely need human support to role of robotic combatants will grow in infiltration, penetration, frontal attacks, achieve any kind of endurance on the parallel with their capabilities. One day, envelopments, and turning move- ground. Small numbers of human para- semi-autonomous systems may compose ments.11 Each offers an opportunity troopers might accompany swarms into the majority of combatants on the battle- to gain utility from robotic swarms in combat as controllers, maintainers, and field. Still, swarms will not be omnipotent. its own way. In the next section, we installers of charging stations. To hold Weapons carried by infantrymen, manned explain each of these forms of maneu- terrain for any length of time, maneuver fighter aircraft, and ships will adapt to the ver, provide historic examples of the and fire support swarms would need a arrival of swarm combatants just like they movement, and describe a hypothetical means of refueling behind enemy lines, did to tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and use for a robotic swarm inside that type potentially through air-dropped solar submarines. of maneuver. power stations, petroleum generators, or Commanders will need variety in their Infiltration. A favorite of light forces precharged batteries. Swarms would also swarm vehicles to effectively accomplish and insurgents, in an infiltration, ele- be unable to handle more complex tasks, their missions. Swarm combatants may ments of the offensive force slip behind such as the neutralization of explosively vary in cost from a few hundred dollars or through enemy lines to seize advanta- rigged bridges or the clearing of obstacles; (for disposable fire support munitions) geous terrain in the enemy’s rear or to sow after seizing objectives in Normandy, U.S. to hundreds of thousands (for persistent confusion before the main assault.12 They and British paratroopers often had to strip combatants), all depending on their can also be used to interfere with the ene- charges from infrastructure designed to purpose and desired durability. Some my’s ability to conduct resupply. In 1968, deny invading Allied forces its use.
108 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Penetration. Penetration attacks are Figure 2. Swarm Penetration offensive maneuvers that utilize attacks along a narrow front to pierce enemy lines and defensive systems. Once pen- etration is achieved, forces can either Enemy Line Enemy Line Enemy Line Enemy Line drive forward to an objective behind Enemy Line enemy lines or attack the undefended flanks created by the division of enemy Enemy Line defenses. Penetration movements are often used when flanks are unassailable or well defended or when commanders lack A dispersed Maneuver Swarm conducts Once the gap is identified, the Maneuver After destroying the enemy force in 16 reconnaissance in force across the enemy Swarm masses against it and begins front of them, drones fan out to screen the time to attempt other maneuvers. front and identifies a gap in the enemy penetration. A fire Support Swarm begins the mechanized infantry element defenses by continuously gathering data conducting bombardment in extremely close exploiting their breakthrough. Penetration attacks may also be launched and analyzing strength across different proximity to friendly forces. Human elements enemy sectors. fix the enemy in place and prepare to exploit to take advantage of a prominent weak- the breach. ness in enemy defenses. Armies have used penetration tactics since the dawn of Source: U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics (Washington, DC Head uarters Department of warfare. Germanic warriors employed the the Army, July 2001). boar’s head formation to pierce enemy shield walls during the Dark Ages, and medieval knights brought the maneu- the enemy line was identified, maneuver faster than human combatants in similar ver into the Middle Ages.17 In a more swarms would silently consolidate and situations, allowing it to surreptitiously modern example, British Field Marshal mass against it. As they began their as- overwhelm opponents by massing at an Bernard Montgomery successfully used sault, a fire support swarm could further unexpected point. Frontal assaults, de- an armored penetrating attack to win degrade defenses in the area, taking the pending on the complexity of terrain and an Allied victory at the Second Battle of place of an artillery bombardment, and the swarm deployment technology used, Alamein in World War II.18 permit a rolling barrage of precision can make poor use of these attributes. But, Successful penetration attacks often indirect fire support with previously as described, the ability of swarm combat- use extensive indirect fire to weaken inconceivable speed and proximity to ants to gather and simultaneously transmit enemy defenses or to pin enemy elements advancing forces—robots do not fear information to the joint force commander in place to prevent them from assisting the fratricide. Once an initial penetration will make them highly useful as scouts and section of the enemy line targeted for pen- is achieved, human mechanized forces as fixing forces. Because commanders will etration. Prior to the Old Guard’s failed could exploit the breakthrough and drive not be as concerned with swarm casualties, penetrating attack at Waterloo, Napoleon the attack onward toward objectives in they will eagerly commit them to these massed his artillery to weaken the British the enemy’s rear or exploit the newly cre- tasks. And because swarms lack fear and defenses, but the use of a reverse-slope de- ated disruption in enemy defenses. cannot be psychologically pinned down, fense and the arrival of the Prussian army Frontal Attack. Likely used since they will execute them with unrivaled prevented the maneuver’s success.19 combat took on a modicum of organiza- quickness and commitment. In a penetration attack using swarms, tion, frontal attacks are among the oldest Consider this scenario: Two light maneuver and fire support swarms could forms of maneuver. Commanders use infantry forces of equal size stumble upon work in unison to identify and exploit frontal attacks when they possess over- one another in a meeting engagement. a weakened section of enemy defenses. whelming combat power relative to the One side deploys several dozen maneuver Using the robotic coup d’oeil described, enemy to fix hostile forces in place, to swarm combatants from a mothership maneuver swarms could deploy along the destroy a breaking enemy, or to conduct vehicle and pushes them forward in a length of the enemy front as skirmishers a reconnaissance in force.20 At the Battle frontal assault to contain the enemy force and gather data on the composition and of Bunker Hill, for instance, British forces and permit human elements to maneuver. disposition of enemy forces they encoun- sustained over 1,000 casualties conduct- These swarm combatants may all be de- ter. Far behind the frontline, a cluster ing a series of frontal attacks against stroyed, but if they give the light infantry computer, a series of them, or the com- fortified colonial militiamen defending force the opportunity to maneuver on puting power of the swarm itself could the hill outside of Boston.21 Many a a similar-sized force with less risk, they aggregate the swarm’s observations and commander has planned extravagant ma- have served their role. Maneuver and fire identify enemy weakness by examining neuvers prior to battle, only for a souring support swarms will provide command- how many swarm skirmishers were lost in situation to force him into a frontal battle ers with the option to trade robot lives each sector, how fast swarm combatants of attrition with his foes. for space and time and will encourage were expending ammunition, and other The strength of a robotic swarm lies aggressive tactics that might give com- observables. Once the weakest sector of in its ability to communicate and move manders ordering human soldiers pause.
JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 109 Figure 3. Frontal Attac to Fix in Place could again make use of their ability to gather large amounts of data to conduct reconnaissance and send back data that aid human analysts in determining where the enemy flank begins and what, if any, forces are protecting it. Even more fright- ening, maneuver swarms could be easily deployed by projectile to effect a vertical envelopment of a retreating enemy force and disrupt it sufficiently to allow the pursuing army to destroy it. Turning Movement. In a turning A meeting engagement occurs between two A swarm mothership occupies the center of the friendly element similarly sized infantry elements. and releases a portion of its swarm. The Maneuver Swarm movement, the offensive force avoids moves forward while the rearmost infantry element begins a Both sides close to fix each other in place. flanking maneuver against the enemy position. the enemy’s principal defenses and seizes objectives behind the enemy lines with Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. the goal of forcing the enemy to respond by displacing from its current position Figure 4. Maneuver Swarm Conducts Envelopment in whole or in part. Turning movements are often used to force enemy units off advantageous terrain through the seizure of populated areas or supply lines critical to the enemy army.25 James Longstreet famously advocated for Robert E. Lee to execute a turning movement prior to be- coming decisively engaged at Gettysburg in July 1863.26 Longstreet hoped to place the Confederate army between George Meade and Washington, DC, forcing the Union Army into a costly attack. Infantry, with artillery support, closes in on an enemy formation. As the elements close on one another, the artillery deploys a Maneuver Swarm of air and ground combatants on the right Another well-known example is Douglas flank of an enemy infantry unit. MacArthur’s amphibious landing at Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. Inchon, which severed North Korean lines of communication and sent the Communist forces back north.27 Envelopment. Envelopments send At their core, successful envelopments Swarm combatants would likely best the attacking force around prominent require three things: a mobility advantage serve a ground commander as a screening enemy defenses to seize objectives in over an adversary, an informational ad- force, not as the element conducting the the enemy rear or to attack an assailable vantage (the location of an assailable flank turning movement itself. The swarm’s flank. They come in several forms: single must be identified), and strong com- inability to conduct self-sustainment envelopments, double envelopments, munications between the enveloping and would make it a poor choice. Without encirclements, and vertical envelop- fixing force. Robotic swarms may provide human support, maneuver swarms would ments. All forms avoid the enemy’s front, joint force commanders an edge in all not be able to sustain a hostile presence where he possesses the greatest ability three. As described in the infiltration sec- in the enemy’s rear long enough to truly to place fires.22 The classic example of tion, maneuver and fire support swarms threaten enemy lines of communication. a successful double envelopment and will be deployable at near-supersonic Instead, maneuver and fire support ultimately, an encirclement, is Hannibal’s speeds from hundreds of miles away. If swarms could be placed between the victory over Roman legions at the Battle tactical intelligence, surveillance, and enemy body and the friendly element of Cannae in 216 BCE.23 The ultimate reconnaissance assets could effectively conducting the turning movement. American example is General Robert E. identify the end of an enemy’s flank, a The mechanized and aerial mobility of Lee’s sweeping envelopment of General commander could request the expedited individual swarm combatants would not Joseph Hooker’s flank at the Battle of deployment of swarm combatants on only allow them to cover wide swathes Chancellorsville, a daring tactical maneu- that flank within minutes from cruise of terrain but also quickly consolidate to ver that secured the legend of Stonewall missiles or airdrops, granting tremendous counter any enemy attempt to concentrate Jackson and Lee in the American military tactical surprise. In addition to their de- against the turning force as it exposes its consciousness.24 ployment advantage, swarm combatants vulnerable flank to the main enemy force.
110 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Technology Drives Tactics Figure 5. Maneuver Swarm Screens During Turning Movement Ultimately, the technological limitations and advantages of maneuver swarms and Turning Force Turning Force fire support swarms will determine their OBJ OBJ uses in offensive maneuver and, more broadly, the tactics of employing them as a whole. Like all groundbreaking Enemy Line Enemy Line technologies—the tank, aircraft carrier, and submarine, among others—the Swarm Screen masses to thwart effectiveness of swarm combatants will enemy attack Swarm Screen Main Body Main Body increase in accordance with matura- tion in the technology and warfighter A body of mechanized infantry executes a In the event the enemy notices the turning turning movement using a dispersed forces attempt to slip past its lines, the comfort with its use. U.S. officers and Maneuver Swarm as a screening force to Maneuver Swarm senses the enemy obscure the movement and provide security consolidation and masses to perform a noncommissioned officers can accelerate to their vulnerable flanks as they move delaying action to shield the column. that comfort by beginning to postulate toward the rear-ward objective. about the use of swarms well before Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. they hit the battlefield. In the vein of aviation visionaries Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, members of the Depart- successfully-tested-the-first-weaponized-fully- battle-tactics-boar-formation/>. 18 ment of Defense must look forward 10, modular-unmanned-ground-vehicle.html>. Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three 5 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Battles of El Alamein (New York: Overlook, 20, or even 30 years to when artificial Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle 2006). intelligence allows the deployment of (New York: Presidio Press, 1991), 114. 19 David Howarth, Waterloo: A Near Run swarm combatants on a regular basis. 6 Stew Magnuson, “Army Wants to Make Thing (New York: Phoenix, 2003). It will take years of field maneuvers Every Soldier a Sensor,” National Defense 20 FM 3-90, 3-30. 21 to perfect the employment of swarms Magazine, May 2007, available at JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 111