Social Swarming: Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future Conflict
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(AFDD) 3-13, Information Operations
Cover Sheet for Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-13, Information Operations OPR: LeMay Center/DD 28 July 2011 AFDD numbering has changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture (the AFDD titles remain unchanged until the doctrine is revised). Any AFDD citations within the documents will list the old AFDD numbers until the doctrine is revised. The changed numbers follow: OLD NEW TITLE AFDD 2-1 changed to AFDD 3-1 Air Warfare AFDD 2-1.1 changed to AFDD 3-01 Counterair Operations AFDD 2-1.2 changed to AFDD 3-70 Strategic Attack AFDD 2-1.3 changed to AFDD 3-03 Counterland Operations AFDD 2-1.4 changed to AFDD 3-04 Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.6 changed to AFDD 3-50 Personnel Recovery Operations AFDD 2-1.7 changed to AFDD 3-52 Airspace Control AFDD 2-1.8 changed to AFDD 3-40 Counter-CBRN AFDD 2-1.9 changed to AFDD 3-60 Targeting AFDD 2-10 changed to AFDD 3-27 Homeland Operations AFDD 2-12 changed to AFDD 3-72 Nuclear Operations AFDD 2-2 changed to AFDD 3-14 Space Operations AFDD 2-2.1 changed to AFDD 3-14.1 Counterspace Operations AFDD 2-3 changed to AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare AFDD 2-3.1 changed to AFDD 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense AFDD 2-4 changed to AFDD 4-0 Combat Support AFDD 2-4.1 changed to AFDD 3-10 Force Protection AFDD 2-4.2 changed to AFDD 4-02 Health Services AFDD 2-4.4 changed to AFDD 4-11 Bases, Infrastructure, and Facilities [Rescinded] AFDD 2-4.5 changed to AFDD 1-04 Legal Support AFDD 2-5 changed to AFDD 3-13 Information Operations AFDD 2-5.1 changed to AFDD 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare AFDD 2-5.3 changed to AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations AFDD 2-6 changed to AFDD 3-17 Air Mobility Operations AFDD 2-7 changed to AFDD 3-05 Special Operations AFDD 2-8 changed to AFDD 6-0 Command and Control AFDD 2-9 changed to AFDD 2-0 ISR Operations AFDD 2-9.1 changed to AFDD 3-59 Weather Operations INFORMATION OPERATIONS Air Force Doctrine Document 3-13 11 January 2005 Incorporating Change 1, 28 July 2011 This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. -
Team 4: Influencing Insurgent SVBIED
Team 4: Influencing Insurgent SVBIED Operations Using Traffic Control Points Enhanced with Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Employment Strategies TEAM 4 MEMBERS The goal of the IDFW 15 effort was to determine the value of adding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the Edward Teague aforementioned environment. Specifically, we looked to US Military Academy at West Point, US derive insights about semi-autonomous UAS with swarm Niki Goerger behaviors. Engineer Research and Development Center, US US Military Academy at West Point, US This extension can assist counterinsurgent forces in several ways. It will drive needs for UAS allocation and Brad Young Naval Post Graduate School, US development by identifying critical elements of semi- autonomous swarming behavior. In addition, it may Ng Chu Ngah highlight mission behavior that shows the most promise by Quek Kwang Ti Defence Science and Technology Agency, expanding the tasks and environment beyond this current Republic of Singapore set. Due to the complex nature of the problem, the current state of understanding in the field, and the exploratory nature INTRODUCTION of the research, insights vice specific answers are central in this research. Insurgents have effectively employed asymmetric tactics, such as the use of suicide bombers, as viable threats in urban PROBLEM STATEMENT environments. These threats are often devastating in their physical and emotional effects. They are hard to detect and This study addresses whether we can isolate factors needed have proven difficult to thwart or defeat. The U.S. Army has to identify effective semiautonomous UAS behaviors that recognized that improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a add value to the aforementioned SVBIED TCP study. -
Digital Activism in Asia: Good, Bad, and Banal Politics Online
Asiascape: Digital Asia 7 (2020) 5-19 brill.com/dias Digital Activism in Asia: Good, Bad, and Banal Politics Online Bart Barendregt Leiden Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Sociology, Leiden, the Netherlands [email protected] Florian Schneider Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, Leiden, the Netherlands [email protected] Abstract This article introduces the special issue on ‘Digital Activism’ by exploring some of the trends in social media activism and scholarship thereof. The authors ask to what extent this literature helps us understand Asian forms of online activism, which forms of activism have relatively done well, and whether Asian activism requires its own the- orizing. Most of all, it is a plea for a careful and ethnographically informed approach to digital activism. Although outwardly they look similar and use the same templates, manuals, or even similar media strategies, not all forms of online activism promote democratic values. Furthermore, we argue that much of what happens under the ban- ner of digital activism is not necessarily politics with a capital P but, rather, consists of everyday forms of engagement, with sometimes seemingly vulgar contents and often familiar routines and natural forms, yet in their impact such ‘banal activism’ may have political implications. Keywords Asia – civic engagement – digital activism – mediatization – online community – social media © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/22142312-bja10004Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 02:48:27AM via free access 6 Barendregt and Schneider 1 Hopes and Hoaxes New media have always held not just the promise of compressing space/time but also, and inherently, of spreading the values of transparency and democ- racy and of serving as a potential means of better and just governance. -
Drone Swarms As Networked Control Systems by Integration of Networking and Computing
sensors Review Drone Swarms as Networked Control Systems by Integration of Networking and Computing Godwin Asaamoning 1,2,* , Paulo Mendes 3,4 , Denis Rosário 5 and Eduardo Cerqueira 5 1 COPELABS, Universidade Lusofóna, 1749-024 Lisbon, Portugal 2 Bolgatanga Technical University, Sumbrungu UB-0964-8505, Ghana 3 School of Communication, Architecture, Arts and Information Technologies, Universidade Lusofóna, 1749-024 Lisbon, Portugal; [email protected] 4 Airbus Central Research and Technology, Willy-Messerschmitt-Str 1, Taufkirchen, 82024 Munich, Germany 5 Computer Science Faculty, Federal University of Pará, Belém 66075-110, Brazil; [email protected] (D.R.); [email protected] (E.C.) * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: The study of multi-agent systems such as drone swarms has been intensified due to their cooperative behavior. Nonetheless, automating the control of a swarm is challenging as each drone operates under fluctuating wireless, networking and environment constraints. To tackle these challenges, we consider drone swarms as Networked Control Systems (NCS), where the control of the overall system is done enclosed within a wireless communication network. This is based on a tight interconnection between the networking and computational systems, aiming to efficiently support the basic control functionality, namely data collection and exchanging, decision-making, and the distribution of actuation commands. Based on a literature analysis, we do not find revision papers about design of drone swarms as NCS. In this review, we introduce an overview of how to develop self-organized drone swarms as NCS via the integration of a networking system and a Citation: Asaamoning, G.; Mendes, computational system. In this sense, we describe the properties of the proposed components of a P.; Rosário, D.; Cerqueira, E. -
Larry Diamond Ukraine: Democracy in Danger? Henry Hale Gwendolyn Sasse
July 2010, Volume 21, Number 3 $12.00 Afghanistan & Iraq: Taking Stock Zalmay Khalilzad Scott Worden Adeed Dawisha Liberation Technology Larry Diamond Ukraine: Democracy in Danger? Henry Hale Gwendolyn Sasse S.B. Yudhoyono on the Indonesian Experience Mvemba Phezo Dizolele on the DRC Juan Pablo Luna & Rodrigo Mardones on Chile Ephraim Ya’ar & Yasmin Alkalay on Muslim Attitudes Jacques Rupnik on Václav Havel Judith Kelley on Election Observation The Rise of the “State-Nation” Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz & Yogendra Yadav liberation technology Larry Diamond Larry Diamond is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Free- man Spogli Institute for International Studies, director of Stanford Uni- versity’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy. In March 2003, police in Guangzhou (Canton), China, stopped 27-year- old Sun Zhigang and demanded to see his temporary living permit and identification. When he could not produce these, he was sent to a deten- tion center. Three days later, he died in its infirmary. The cause of death was recorded as a heart attack, but the autopsy authorized by his parents showed that he had been subjected to a brutal beating. Sun’s parents took his story to the liberal newspaper Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis Daily), and its investigation confirmed that Sun had been beaten to death in custody. As soon as its report appeared on April 25, “newspapers and Web sites throughout China republished the account, [Internet] chat rooms and bulletin boards exploded with out- rage,” and it quickly became a national story.1 The central government was forced to launch its own investigation and on June 27, it found twelve people guilty of Sun’s death. -
Drone Swarms
Future Warfare Series No. 1020304060 DefendingAvoidingTheThe “WorriedAnthraxAre thePanic Drone American Vaccine Well”and Swarms Keeping Response Debate: Homeland the A WeaponsMedicalPorts Opento Review ofCBRN1993-2003 Massin a Events:forChemical Destruction? Commanders and BiologicalAnalysis Threat and Solu�onsEnvironment A Literature Review TanjaLieutenantRandallMajor M. Korpi Zach J.Richard ColonelLarsen aandry Kallenborn A.Christopherand Fred Hersack, Patrick P. Stone, USAF D.Hemmer EllisUSAF United States Air Force 60 Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies 30204010 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass Destruction? by Zachary Kallenborn The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 60 May 6, 2020 U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 Table of Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer.…………………………………….…………..….……….………… ii Abstract…………………………………………………….….…………………iii Chapter 1. Introduction……………………………………….….……….………1 Chapter 2. Are Drone Swarms WMD?.………….………………………………9 Chapter 3. The Question of Autonomy…………………..………….….………15 Chapter 4. Drone Swarms in WMD Roles…………………………..…………….…19 Chapter 5. Conclusion……..…….…………...……...……...……...……...……27 i Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. ii Abstract Public discussion has raised significant fears over armed drone swarms being used in a manner like weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, should they be considered WMDs? The first half of the article explores the question of comparing drone swarms to various conceptions of WMD. Overall, it finds that a subset of drone swarms, armed fully autonomous drone swarms (AFADS), are WMD. -
December 1, 2018 1:00 Pm – 1:45 Pm Panel 6 Star Wars: What
DECEMBER 1, 2018 1:00 PM – 1:45 PM PANEL 6 STAR WARS: WHAT DOES SDI TEACH US ABOUT TECHNOLOGY IN MILITARY COMPETITION? Panelists: • General Hawk Carlisle (USAF, Retired), President and CEO, National Defense Industrial Asscociation (NDIA) • Dr. Thomas Kennedy, Chairman and CEO, Raytheon • Senator Jon Kyl, U.S. Senate, Arizona Moderator: Ms. Morgan Brennan, CNBC Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_IZcFxkIY&list=PLHNOi2zcxo7sBxM7HfhmB_tf6QXeqj 48K&index=9 Brennan: Well first I want to say thank you all for being here today, it's been an incredible forum so far. I just want to introduce our panelists. Star Wars: What Does SDI Teach Us About Tech and Military Competition? Brennan: Sitting next to me is Senator John Kyl, US Senator representing Arizona. Dr. Tom Kennedy, Chairman and CEO of Raytheon, and General Hawk Carlisle, 4-Star retired US Air force General, and now President and CEO of the National Defense Industrial Association. Brennan: So great to speak with all three of you today. Brennan: So, I think the first place to start is, what actually was SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and how did it birth modern day missile defense, and the technology we're now talking about today? Brennan: So, Senator Kyl, I would love for you to just start with a little bit of background on this, given the fact that you have been a life-long advocate of nuclear defense, and your public service does date back to the Reagan years. Kyl: Thank you very much. Kyl: You can think about SDI as a roughly decade long effort, first begun by President Ronald Reagan, to create a new system. -
Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020 Cover Photo Credit: NASA Future of Defense Task Force
draft Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020 Cover photo credit: NASA Future of Defense Task Force FUTURE OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE September 23, 2020 The Honorable Adam Smith Chairman House Armed Services Committee 2216 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable William “Mac” Thornberry Ranking Member House Armed Services Committee 2216 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Thornberry: Thank you for your support in standing up the Future of Defense Task Force. We are pleased to present you with our final report. Sincerely, Seth Moulton Jim Banks Chair Chair Future of Defense Task Force Future of Defense Task Force Susan Davis Scott DesJarlais Member of Congress Member of Congress Chrissy Houlahan Paul Mitchell Member of Congress Member of Congress Elissa Slotkin Michael Waltz Member of Congress Member of Congress Future of Defense Task Force Table of Contents PROLOGUE ............................................................................................... 1 TASK FORCE MEMBERS ........................................................................ 3 FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 5 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................... 13 EVIDENCE .............................................................................................. 21 EMERGING -
Digital Natives in the Name of a Cause. from “Flash Mob” to “Human Flesh Search”
Digital Natives in the Name of a Cause: From “Flash Mob” to “Human Flesh Search” YiPing (Zona) Tsou The emergence of newly imagined communities The dominant discourse around use of digital and internet technologies has been either mired in celebration or pathologisation. On one hand are thepeoplewhobaskintheparticipatorypowerofWeb2.0technologies, announcing the emergence of new public spheres and democratic spaces of engagement and expression. On the other hand are the detractors who remain sceptical of the ‘newness’ that digital technologies bring, often repeating the axiom of how, more the things change, the more they remain the same. In this discourse, even though the warring lines are clearly drawn and the dialogue is often fraught and tense, there is something that remains unexamined and unquestioned – In the imagination of either of the warring factions the users who remain at the centre of the discourse are identical. Scholars and practitioners alike, whether they are hopeful all the way, waiting to witness the bright, promising future that the information and communicationtechnology(ICT)isgoingtobestowuponus,liberatingall the oppressed from the tyranny of the authoritarian regimes and repres- sive censorship, or skeptics who stay alert of “the dark side of internet freedom”and are addressing the issue with sentiment of disillusionment, mourningforthefailed(ornotyetfulfilled)promiseofadigitalutopia, presumethatthebeneficiariesandarchitectsofthisnewpublicspheresare still well intentioned, progressive, liberal and tolerant users. Sure, there might be occasional exclamations at questions of piracy, pornography, bullying, etc. -
Crowdsourcing Crime Control
LOGAN.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/20 4:01 PM Crowdsourcing Crime Control Wayne A. Logan* Crowdsourcing, which leverages the collective expertise and resources of (mainly online) communities to achieve specified objectives, today figures prominently in a broad array of realms, including business, human rights, and medical and scientific research. It also now plays a significant role in governmental crime control efforts. Web and forensic–genetic sleuths, armchair detectives, and the like are collecting and analyzing evidence and identifying criminal suspects, at the behest of and with varying degrees of assistance from police officials. Unfortunately, as with so many other aspects of modern society, current criminal procedure doctrine is ill-equipped to address this development. In particular, for decades it has been accepted that the Fourth Amendment only limits searches and seizures undertaken by public law enforcement, not private actors. Crowdsourcing, however, presents considerable taxonomic difficulty for existing doctrine, making the already often permeable line between public and private behavior considerably more so. Moreover, although crowdsourcing promises considerable benefit as an investigative force multiplier for police, it poses risks, including misidentification of suspects, violation of privacy, a diminution of governmental transparency and democratic accountability, and the fostering of a mutual social suspicion that is inimical to civil society. Despite its importance, government use of crowdsourcing to achieve crime control goals has not yet been examined by legal scholars. Like the internet on which it predominantly relies, crowdsourcing is not going away; if anything, it will proliferate in coming years. The challenge lies in harnessing its potential, while protecting against the significant harms that will accrue should it go unregulated. -
Mapping Notions of Cyberspace
MAPPING NOTIONS OF CYBERSPACE: OPTIMISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE ISSUES OF IDENTITY AND SPIRITUALITY A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Communication of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Putut Widjanarko June 2005 This thesis entitled MAPPING NOTIONS OF CYBERSPACE: OPTIMISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE ISSUES OF IDENTITY AND SPIRITUALITY BY PUTUT WIDJANARKO has been approved for the School of Telecommunications and the College of Communication by Drew McDaniel Professor of Telecommunications Greg Shepherd Interim Dean, College of Communication WIDJANARKO, PUTUT. M.A. June 2005. Telecommunications Mapping Notions of Cyberspace: Optimism, Skepticism, and the Issues of Identities and Spirituality (151 pp.) Director of Thesis: Drew McDaniel This is a literature survey on concepts of the Internet and cyberspace and their influence, both on society at large and at the individual level. On society, it discusses the optimistic and skeptic views on the impact of the Internet. At the personal level, it discusses issues of self and identity, and spirituality and religiosity. Except for spirituality and religiosity issues of the Internet, this work chose one author to represent each category: Howard Rheingold for the optimistic view, Clifford Stoll for the skeptic view, and Sherry Turkle for the issues of self and identity. The author’s critiques on those notions are offered in the last chapter. The author argues that the diversity of notions on the Internet can be put in a broader historical and social context. These notions reflect the ever-present questions about the relationship between human and its technologies. Approved: Drew McDaniel Professor of Telecommunications To Elin, Faikar, Hanum and Ranti ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds. -
Ocean Transparency, Submarine Opacity, and Strategic Nuclear Stability
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 19, ISSUE 1 Studies Fluid Foundations: Ocean Transparency, Submarine Opacity, and Strategic Nuclear Stability Elizabeth Mendenhall The development and detonation of atomic weaponry at the end of World War Two so shocked established political and military thought that it can be accurately described as a “Nuclear Revolution.”1 The expectation that nuclear weapons would continue to be used in conflict, and the emerging bipolar tension, stoked premonitions of eminent international disaster. Aversion to their continued use, combined with fear of giving them up, produced a period of contradiction and adjustment in the missions and strategies of the armed forces. A nuclear strategy was needed to reconcile the extreme strength and extreme vulnerability attendant to the Nuclear Revolution, and to find a use for apparently un-useable weapons. “Deterrence theory” was meant to provide a practicable stopgap while more radical political solutions were formulated, but it was eventually fully incorporated into military doctrine, 1 Bernard Brodie, Some Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Revolution (University of Utah Press, 1959); Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).; Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000). ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2018 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES strategy, and force structure.2 Deterrence theory relies on the idea that the threat of nuclear retaliation will prevent an enemy from starting a nuclear conflict.