Social Swarming: Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future Conflict

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Social Swarming: Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future Conflict SOCIAL SWARMING Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future Con flict Major David Faggard, U.S. Air Force WEETING DURING THE Arab Spring? That’s so 2010. A future Ttactic in cyber-based-information warfare is built upon mobile-media wielding e-citizen soldiers employing social swarming tactics to overwhelm Major David Faggard is a U.S. Air Force a system, a decision maker, or a critical node. 1 public affairs of ficer and most recently worked with the 82d Airborne Division These mobile networks are vital to starting and maintaining cyber-based in Afghanistan. He currently serves as insurgency, drawing physical and moral strength from super-empowered the director of public affairs for U.S. Air Forces, Central Command. individuals, while also using super-connected-individual networks to spread information, move undetected, and muster support, constantly one step ahead PHOTO: A man shouts after a missile of authorities. It is possible for this swarm to move from the online world hits in a house in Aleppo, Syria, 3 into the real world where violence may ensue. January 2013. The fighting is part of the escalating violence in the Syrian civil war that the United Nations estimates Understanding Swarming has killed more than 60,000 people To understand the nature of communication-based social swarming, one since the revolt against President must understand the concept of “battle swarm,” introduced by John Arquilla Bashar Assad began in March 2011. 2 (AP Photo/Andoni Lubaki) and David Ronfeldt of the Rand Corporation in 2000. Their essay, “Swarm- ing and the Future of Con flict,” studied historical con flicts placing context on smaller, less-equipped individual forces defeating larger, more equipped forces by overwhelming the system and decision makers. Using swarming tactics, by building off the past warfare approaches of melee, massing, and maneuver, “social revolutions would, in coming decades, help bring about the downfall of empires,” according to the Rand study. 3 Swarming as a mili- tary tactic “implies a convergent attack by many units.” 4 The Rand report MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2013 79 Resources: Promotion, Price, Place, Product Resources: Time, Money, Physical, Mental Opportunity Ability Motivation 1 2 3 4 5 6 Scream Narrative Medium Recruitment Political Political Rage Change . Potential for Violence Target Selection Super-Connected Individual Major David Faggard Super-Empowered Individual 1. Preparation Phase 4. International Buy-In 2. Ignition Phase 5. Climax 3. Protest Phase 6. Follow on Information Warfare Hussain and Howards Figure 1. Communication-based social swarm argued that swarming must be able to be employed Swarming model . A working de finition for this from multiple directions, which clearly the hyper essay would be that social swarming employs the connectedness of the Internet and digital devices full computing power of mobile technology with allow, and that the swarm must also perform sensory real-time network updates to strategically organize operations on the selected target. 5 e-citizen forces to overwhelm an opposing force Imagine a mob of hyper-connected actors— online achieving one’s own political ends. Howard Rheingold referred to it as a “smart mob”— The overall objective of this information-based constantly one step ahead of authorities because it social swarm would not be the kinetic destruction employed real-time, GPS-enabled devices. With of a system or node, but the disruption of the node’s these devices it could data-burst updates to its ability to make a decision. 9 The implications of swarm. 6 The only things in the swarm’s way attenuat- this aspect of cyber- or net-centric warfare on a ing communications among members are the seconds decision maker’s ability to keep order are critical it takes for servers to refresh. These conditions mean in humanitarian or homeland operations. However, the 24-hour news cycle would be obviated. This dark-actors, either homegrown or transnational, smart mob, as we saw in the 2009 Iranian presiden- could potentially employ social swarming for tial elections, created melee, had mass, and through purely kinetic reasons, as was the case with the exploitable off-the-shelf and widely available data 2011 Mumbai attacks. 10 In addition, social swarms technology, was able to maneuver where government might be used by insurgents of a “connected” state forces were not. 7 in “phase four” operations. Social swarming is more than using the Internet or Overlaying on recent communication-based social media; it entails network envelopment of the events, Mia Stockmans’ re fined MAO-Model of information aspect of modern command and control. Audience Development, as well as this author’s per- These complex networks are optimal when fully con- sonal observations on advocacy-based communica- nected and flat with opportunity for direct “horizontal tion, provides a working model for communication- communication” between network peers. 8 based social swarming (Figure 1). 80 March-April 2013 MILITARY REVIEW ASYMMETRIC WAR Additionally, incorporating Muzammil M. Hus- party advocacy or kill it. 18 Defense Department sain and Philip N. Howard’s working “6-Stage communicators build reputation-based narrative in Framework for Political Change” offers an in-depth the world every day, according to Gallup con fidence study on the recent Arab Spring (March 2012), surveys, which indicate the U.S. military has the which validates the working model of communica- highest con fidence amongst Americans. 19 Defense tion-based social swarming. 11 After explaining the Department Public Affairs’ efforts shape these models of Stockmans and Hussain and Howard, this narratives for Americans. Moreover, the narratives author provides a working graphical representation shape network-based power. 20 However, depending of the communication-based social swarm model. on the receiver’s lens and narrative interpretation, Here, I interpret Stockmans’ model while over- tremendous effects may result. laying it with personal experience from years of Medium . The medium for the communication- advocacy-based public-communication campaigns. based social swarm can be the regional, national, Stockmans’ re fined motivation, ability, opportunity or tribal online network based off the globally con- (MAO) model of audience development provides nected information grid and its ability to employ a basic starting point for a dynamic model of mobile media. Target selection can occur before communication-based social swarming. 12 or after narrative development. However, if the Motivation . Where Stockmans’ model ends target is selected before narrative development, and the communication-based social-swarm the narrative may need to be reworked throughout model begins is motivation. Stockmans’ model the process or the final online endstate may not be explains that motivation for participation in an achieved. The narrative is then translated by way event is largely cultural, based on desire and past of a super-connected individual across the online experience, not life-threatening necessity. 13 Being medium to the mass base. compelled to overthrow an oppressive regime is a Recruit, rage, change . The mass base is signi ficant investment, a natural reaction to oppres- recruited into this movement, typically through sion, brutality, or another self-perceived injustice. 14 the already-established online followership of the In other words, this catalyst event, which she super-connected individual driving towards some calls the “scream,” is a force within oneself that form of political rage, otherwise known as the literally “motivates” one to commit some form of advocacy issue. At this point, there is a potential action you would otherwise not do under normal for violence, melee, or maneuver. Finally, after the circumstances. rage, there is a possibility for political change. If the Ability . The ability Stockmans describes focuses political change does not occur, a super-empowered on the resources of time, money, and physical and individual can re fine the narrative, or a super- mental capacity. 15 Time is relative online; quicker connected individual can increase the mass base, is paramount, while monetary resources are change the medium, or continue “pulse-attacking” minimal. In the ability step of the communication- the government communication apparatus while based social swarm model, it is appropriate to list striving to create confusion. 21 additional factors required to start mobilizing a Opportunity . Opportunity described by Stock- swarm online: narrative and medium, as well as mans follows “promotion, product, place, and target selection, all of which fit within Stockmans’ price” (the “4Ps” of marketing, which is a 1960s’ descriptions of resources. marketing formula that still applies to online com- Narrative . Narrative drives action. Narrative munication today). 22 A recent marketing brochure allows an audience to relate to the subject ratio- for this online technique says: “Where the voice of nally. 16 Narrative is as much about the receiver as one can quickly become the voice of one hundred it is about the message. Narratives explain societal or one million.” 23 “Promotion” for a social swarm fabric, “beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions,” is synonymous with recruitment based on narrative. and allow the receiver to connect with the sender “Product” is the “purchasing” of a continuation of through stories. 17 Moreover, culture, socioeconomic the current corrupt governmental practices or an status, and personal beliefs
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