Swarming – Doctrinary-Operational Concept – Possible Solution to the Challenges of the Current Military Confrontations

Scientific Bulletin Vol. XXI No 2(42) 2016

SWARMING – DOCTRINARY-OPERATIONAL CONCEPT – POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE CURRENT MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS

“NICOLAE BĂLCESCU” LAND FORCES ACADEMY, SIBIU, ROMANIA

ABSTRACT: Swarming is a current doctrinary-operational concept, by means of which one seeks to make the transition from a traditional, conventional, cumbersome, bureaucratic army to more numerous structures/units and of reduced dimensions, with remarkable firepower and mobility, which can act on an opponent from multiple directions simultaneously, leading to its increased vulnerability by disorientation and by the inability to concentrate their forces and effort to respond effectively. The creation of forces able to act according to this conception implies radical changes in the modalities of organizing, acting and leading-coordinating, and last but not least, in the equipment of the military/units and in the organizational culture.

KEYWORDS: Concentrated dispersion, omnidirectionality, pulsatory simultaneity, swarming

1. Introduction In nature, the studies that have been At first glance, swarming as carried out have identified several types of organization and action is typical to the swarming and the principles of organization animal world, but it can also be analysed and of action, respectively. from the perspective of human beings. Thus, a first form of swarming can be Moreover, swarming in the human/military found in the hive- or nest-type action cannot be modelled identically after organizations, this being best exemplified the one existing in nature, but there are in the case of bees, ants and other social some lessons that can be learned. insects. These insects use swarming when

128 attacking (the enemy or prey) from all Submarines Campaign” (Trueman, 2016) directions, the ultimate goal being “the and of the air defence operations against overwhelming/neutralization of the enemy”. bombers during the Second World War. Although, under normal conditions, these Very often, swarming represented a insects move in linear formations, the multiplier of the combat power, which moment the battle starts, they adopt the enabled, for example the Vietnamese forces, swarming tactics fast and with great to attack an opponent that was superior flexibility. from a numerical or technological point of The ants use the “swarming” tactics view, this approach being based on a not only to obtain food or to defend their concept borrowed from the tactics of nest, but also to expand their territory Genghis Khan. through direct combat with other ants. These operations offered the possibility These confrontations are of a complexity of presenting the principle of dispersion of resembling human actions in military the forces in correlation with the conflicts (Bernard, 2015). multidirectional and pulsatory attack in a very clear manner. From the perspective of 2. Theoretical-Methodological the theoretical approach to the concept of Considerations swarming, the German strategist Otto The swarming of ants also differs Heilbrunn (1965, p. 45) had a first initiative, from other insects in that ants, armed with (as far we know) developing and presenting powerful mandibles and some acid-spraying a systemic and systematic vision regarding capability, sustain their behavior throughout this concept. He was preoccupied with the an engagement, and over an entire campaign. problem of increasing the chances of Bees, on the other hand, have individuals survival of the conventional forces in the that can swarm just once, as the act of tactical nuclear field specific to a possible stinging results in the stinger’s own death. major confrontation between the main In this respect, ants actions may provide a actors of the Cold War. The solution more useful model of what we call the proposed the application of new doctrinal sustainable operations of forces, while bees elements by means of which the concept of may resemble more the swarming of fire, as concentrated dispersion of the forces was their stinging deaths seem analogous to emphasized. This concept meant the “fire-and-forget” precision-guided munitions development of new units of manoeuvre of (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 26). small dimensions, scattered in the area of As far as swarming in human actions operations, but with a very good is concerned, specifically in military communication system, which would join confrontations, and in order to be able to efforts only at the appropriate moment to draw the relevant conclusions and learn the carry out an attack. After the attack, the lessons, we made a content analysis, based forces would regroup and redeploy in a on logical argumentation, of some important coordinated manner, preparing for the next global battles of the past 200 years. attack or for defence, if the situation Thus, we can affirm and demonstrate required it. the fact that in these battles the types of Furthermore, swarming is based on actions that were predominant were the what Martin Libicki (1994, p. 28) called the frontal attack, the flanking manoeuvre/ “the many and small” and on David envelopment manoeuvre or the concentration Gelernter’s conception (1992, chapter 3) of forces/effort, but in some cases, the regarding a command and control element characteristics of swarming as form of that can collect and process information in a approach of the fight were also present. short time and has the possibility to engage Sometimes these swarming tactics played a the available forces when needed. decisive role as in the case of the “U-boat Another interesting approach and

129 close to the actual meaning of swarming is Moreover, the key element of the that of the two officers from the Chinese military concept of swarming is the popular army, Qiao Liang and Wang sustained pulsation, achieved either by Xiangsui (1999, p. 2), who talk about a war distance firing or by engaging the manoeuvre without rules and without restrictions, about units. According to this view, the structures innovative thinking in order to find ways to that make up the force will occupy fight any opponent and any capabilities. dispersed positions, but they will be capable The main idea of the two Chinese authors is to group and to concentrate their fire and that unrestricted war means multiple types forces to hit the important identified targets of attacks on the social, economic, and from all directions. After carrying out the political systems of the enemy, together hits, they will reposition themselves in an with atypical attacks in the context of organized manner in order to avoid the military irregular war planned/carried out in possible countermeasures of the enemy, a certain rhythm and synchronicity, in order while, at the same time, being prepared to to weaken the opponent and to create attack again when the circumstances permit it. opportunities for a favourable outcome. We infer the fact that swarming can be achieved both by means of the fire of 3. Identification of the Main those means of combat that can perform Characteristics of Military Swarming shootings at relatively large distances and By an objective assessment of the by means of the combat military structures, tackled issues, without any preconceived engaging the enemy directly. Thus, with the ideas or conjectural interpretations, we have advent of artillery, of missiles or of other come to the idea that swarming presents at high accuracy hitting systems, the concept least two fundamental requirements. of swarming can be put into practice by any The first requirement is the ability of army that possesses such systems, but the a force to hit the enemy from multiple concept to which we refer is that involving directions, with a large number of small forces, by close engagement. units of manoeuvre that are closely The swarming achieved by means of interconnected. forces was most present in guerrilla warfare The second requirement refers to the (such as the operations conducted by the fact that the force that applies the concept Chechens in the war of 1994-1996 against of swarming should not only engage the the Russians), and in the theatres of enemy, but should also constitute a sensorial operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. organisation, providing the necessary Actually, we believe that swarming information and permanent surveillance in by using forces is possible and perhaps it is order to create and maintain an overview the best solution to stabilize the situation in image of the space of the battle. South-Eastern Ukraine (in the case of the Also, the main characteristic of conflict between the governmental Ukrainian swarming for achieving the goal of the forces and the pro-Russian separatists), military confrontation is not so much the although this capacity is not cultivated by physical destruction of the opponent, the Kiev government. The strategy conceived although numerous damages can occur, but by Ukraine was based on a classic “hammer it is especially based on the achievement of and anvil” (Romania Military Site, 2014) surprise and on its disorganization. manoeuvre where units of border guards The consequence would be the following: were in the position of “anvil” along the once the leadership system and the common border with the Russian Federation, components of the deployed unit have lost and the manoeuvre groups acting from the their focus and freedom of action, they can West were the “hammer” that struck the no longer organize themselves to respond separatist forces. Taking into consideration effectively to the attack. the position of the Ukrainian forces, we can

130 use the concept of swarming, as there rebel forces/controlled space requires a existed the possibility of attacking the broader dispersion of the pro-Russian separatist forces from all the directions, at troops. Dispersion creates opportunities for the same time resorting to the initiative of multidirectional attack, i.e. swarming. Here the manoeuvre units. we can only remember the saying of While the concept of “swarm” takes Frederick II of Prussia “in trying to defend shape around an image of attackers (task everything, he defended nothing” (George, forces, missiles, bombers) hitting a target 2014). This is the situation that Kiev should from all the directions, less clear aspects take advantage of. have been identified, namely: if these attackers operate autonomously or follow 4. Challenges in Developing the an authority. In nature, swarms are Concept of Swarming composed of independent units whose The new risks and threats in the actions are instinctive. In military conflicts, security environment, the evolution of swarms may be independent or controlled. technology, the transition from the industrial For example, the offensive of the Viet Cong age to the information age have brought forces, in January 1968 on the town of Têt profound changes in the physiognomy of (Sorley, 1999, p. 12); although they were war. In this context, swarming, one of the coordinated from Hanoi, they enjoyed great solutions within the reach of the actors in freedom of action, consistent with the the field of security, requires more concept of Mao regarding the centralization organizational innovations, new processes for strategic purposes and the in the leadership system and new decentralization for tactical objectives information and processing capabilities. (Griffith, 2005 p. 114). On the other hand, In the organizational field, and for the during the Battle of the Atlantic in World armies and the military decision-makers, War II, the submarine U-boat group that the challenge of change from large and few attacked the convoys of supplies was tightly units to “many and small” units is an controlled by the direct orders of Admiral important step. Over time, the principle of Doenitz (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 21). using a small number of large or very large From the case studies in the theatres military units was often applied in the of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq or universal military thinking. The army corps, Bosnia-Herzegovina, there appears the fact the group of aircraft carriers as well as the that swarming with forces depends heavily expeditionary forces are all large scale and on the support of the local population, and a have been designed in order to be used in group of forces operating within a territory major military operations (e.g., the Gulf with hostile population may have major War of 1990-1991). difficulties. Hence, one could infer that The division level structures, the swarming operations would be easier to largest unit of the land forces, were implement in the defensive, being more appropriately used in major conflicts, but in comfortable to fighting in known territory the unconventional or guerrilla ones, the as, apparently, was the case of the Soviet large units were not effective. In order to antitank networks (minefields and artillery) particularize, there were many views that had a major role in defeating the regarding the conflict in Vietnam, opinions Germans in the Battle of Kursk (OMICS expressed by renowned analysts and experts International, 2014). (Alain C. Enthoven and Robert William Referring again to the Ukrainian Komer), which emphasized the need for a forces, these forces fight in a known greater number of small units, which, by territory, thus, the territory should not means of another approach, would have had represent an obstacle. Moreover, a reduced better results (Sorley, 1999, pp. 8-11). ratio of fighters emerged from the formula In the case of the in-depth

131 understanding of the concept to which we terrorist organizations, to organized crime refer, the military structures should strive to organisations or NGOs, we consider that it serve multiple functions/purposes. Thus, is appropriate that the military/security even a mechanized division of the USA has structures should adopt the network principle infantry battalions and other combat or both for organizational design and for the support structures that can fulfil independent leading of actions. This, of course, brings missions (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 56), up the problem of the dissolution of the and the new doctrinary conception of the command authority. But, where possible, a Russian Federation stipulates the use of solution could be hybrid structures – classic battalion-type tactical groups composed of command structures with an innovative one armor company, three mechanized design and based on computer networks –, infantry companies, one anti-tank company, which should help to solve the issues raised two to three companies of self-propelled by institutional redesign. artillery and Multiple Launch Rocket From the thing presented so far, it is Systems, and two air defense companies obvious that this doctrinаry concept can not (Karber & Thibeault, 2016). These groups be achieved without informational capabilities of joint forces provide effectiveness, of surveillance and communication. This manoeuvrability and protection to operate doctrinary vision will help the military in dispersed and decentralized environment. organization turn into a sensory organization, On the other hand, armies can not while an integrated information system – achieve swarming if the forces remain C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, structured the same as before, trained to Computers, Information, Surveillance and fight in the classic way with a conventional Recognition) will be crucial for the adversary. It is deemed necessary to make interconnection of the operational units the transition from light fighting vehicles, (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2010). avoiding the heavy ones like the tank. Light Another challenge for swarming is combat vehicles will be organized into that of achieving logistic processes that dispersed cells, of small dimensions, that should make sense on a battleground where will represent, in the vision of swarming, the friendly forces are dispersed. A swаrming- the new units for manoeuvre. These cells type of force needs a very different logistics must go beyond physical collaboration, from the one that has been in use so far, in beyond simple cooperation, being an which the supply with ammunition, food, imperative for the achievement of the full materials and other equipment has been integration of all the structures (perhaps in made en mаsse. Within swаrming, these groups) and the implementation of coherent goods and services will not be delivered to and pulsatory actions from all the directions fixed locations, but they must reach units and the concentration of effort in the right that always change their location. However, place and at the decisive moment. the solutions come from the fact that a The action of these cells can be truly swаrming-type of force being small, the integrated and coherent only if the demand for supplies will also be structures and the elements of the diminished, which may lead to the leadership and coordination system would achievement of new methods of delivery sufficiently use the options and the facilities and the logistical support can be much of the information age, also applying the better achieved. principles of the Network-Centric Warfare. Entering the depth of the problem 5. Conclusions (command-control), the types of hierarchies Swarming is a maximum novelty required by swarming are questioned. doctrinary-operational concept with real Given the experience of other actors in the perspectives for development, by means of security environment, and we refer here to the shift from mass armies to numerous

132 small size units, with great firepower, concept entails the repeated firing at the remarkable mobility and which can to act enemy or attacking them using military on the enemy simultaneously from several forces, from all directions and then directions in order to disorient them, to regrouping these forces and repeating the make it impossible to focus their effort on cycle. a certain direction, to weaken their combat The swаrming-type of force will be capability and thus increase their less visible, because it is characterized by vulnerability to other attacks. the fact that it will be amorphous, at least In order to adopt the concept of in the eyes of the enemy. The small units swаrming, we must analyze orgаnisаtionаl that will be deployed in a dispersed manner issues in depth, issues concerning the will contribute to a passive yet ubiquitous leadership processes as well as aspects image, a sort of ubiquitous invisibility. related to the integration of the new Thus, the force will be harder to detect, but informational capabilities in the it will be capable of regrouping and functioning of military structures. In order attacking anywhere on the battlefield for swаrming to function, emphasis must without limits imposed by the front line. be put on the comprehensive approach (of Such a potential, in our opinion, is specific all the components), this thing being seen to a swаrming-type of force, the as a necessary condition of swаrming, conception of which is based on a which seeks to integrate information as centralized approach and, at the same time, well as the action capabilities of all the on the use of decentralized tactics and on participants. methods of leading dispersed units. Besides the expansion of cooperation Last, the fundamental principles and and even the deepening of the integration, aspects of the Network-Based Warfare, a decentralization of the command and which contributes significantly to control of the dispersed forces that operate interconnection and decentralization, in a non-linear battlefield is needed. should be implemented first. These issues Furthermore, the need for provide a good chance to make the information of a swаrming-type of force transition from a classic and hierarchical will be accomplished when a swаrming- approach to warfare to an alternative type of operation involves concentration of paradigm in which hierarchies and hybrid the effort in the right place and at the command and control networks may decisive moment. Through content, this develop.

Acknowledgement This paper has been elaborated in accordance with the Scientific Research Plan of the Faculty of Military Science, the “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu. Translator and collaborator: Assoc.prof. Gabriela Mihăilă-Lică, PhD.

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