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Preventing Another (high-risk commandos) carrying out piracy dimension to the attack.6 Once the Mumbai assault were willing to risk the terrorists landed in Mumbai, they Mumbai: Building a Police everything for the cause, and exercised maintained the advantage of surprise Operational Art enough security to hide their pre- and complicated the Indian police’s operational planning. response by attacking in several By John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus locations simultaneously. Attackers The Mumbai attackers achieved generated operational shock through half a year after the devastating high levels of mobility through tight the combination of heavy weapons and Mumbai attack in November 2008, its coordination, synchronicity, and unit speed.7 They were armed with Chinese lessons have yet to be learned. Many autonomy. This was enabled by real- assault rifles, MP-5 submachine guns, have commented on the disorganization time digital communications networked multiple hand grenades, and a host of the Indian police and security via handheld devices.2 The terrorists of improvised explosive devices.8 forces’ response, but fail to address also exploited a remote command and Indian police were outgunned and the problem’s root cause. The Mumbai control node that provided a common unprepared to deal with the well-armed police’s command and control failures, operating picture.3 Using these tools, adversaries. slowness and disorganization of tactical the terrorists were able to greatly response, and inability to prevent increase their mobility and lethality. In Another lethal element of the attack the terrorists from entrenching are short, they “swarmed”:4 was “pulsing.” In swarming theory, rooted in a central doctrinal flaw: the pulsing is when the attacking units lack of police operational art. Police The attack was sequential and change the point of attack, often rapidly. operational art is defined as the capacity highly mobile. Multiple teams The Mumbai terrorists exploited the to go beyond managing single tactical attacked several locations at freedom of action generated by their incidents to influencing the effects of once—combining armed assaults, operational maneuver to rapidly pulse multiple incidents in multiple locations carjackings, drive-by shootings, in response to the situation’s changing over time. Current police practice, for prefabricated IEDs, targeted conditions. During the attack, assault example, conceives response as a series killings (policemen and selected elements repeatedly switched the point of tactical engagements, rather than a foreigners), building takeovers, of engagement, further confusing police campaign with many different elements and barricade and hostage response. that must be intricately coordinated situations…By dispersing into to achieve a larger aim. Operational separate teams and moving from Without an effective police response, myopia is not exclusive to Mumbai— target to target, the terrorists attackers continued to rampage at will even the best American police units do were able to sow confusion and throughout the city until they settled not effectively recognize or utilize the create the impression of a greater into an entrenchment pattern and took operational level of maneuver. number of attackers. The explosive hostages. The hostages were soon killed devices that would go off after the and police faced a daunting room-to- A piecemeal, tactic-focused response will terrorists departed heightened the room fight, with the terrorists often work in isolated tactical engagements, confusion.5 moving through previously secured but it founders against an opponent areas as police command and control utilizing multiple forces and resources The attackers arrived in Mumbai weakened within the confines of the to achieve an operational aim. When at multiple locations. After leaving buildings. Police observers noted after such a foe emerges, police command Karachi on a Pakistani vessel, the the attack that they were intimately and control breaks down and the terrorists hijacked an Indian trawler aware of the buildings’ layouts, adversary achieves success. To defend mid-route to Mumbai, adding a maritime suggesting that the attackers intended against future urban sieges, police to reach the buildings once their relative forces must generate an operational— battlespace in an earlier paper published in Small Wars advantage had eroded to finish their instead of purely tactical—response to Journal. See John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Postcard assault with a Beslan-style siege. paramilitary terrorism. This approach from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,” Small Wars Jour- must integrate operational swarming, nal, February 18, 2009. The attack was not spontaneous—it took maneuver tactics, and real-time 2 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Mon- a high degree of preparation, training, intelligence support across the entire ica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp., 5, 7. and some reflexive control by superiors urban operation or battlespace. 3 According to case documents released by the Mum- in the rear during combat. Precise bai police, the attackers allegedly spoke to a Pakistani planning may have started in mid-2007, A Modern Massacre colonel during the entire incident. The cell phone calls and pre-operational reconnaissance 9 Mumbai, like many modern “global were made using Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), was detected in February 2008. The cities,” is a commercial and cultural and the call was traced to an IP address created with a attackers’ preparation enabled the megapolis rich with symbolic and “soft” New Jersey-based VoIP provider. See C. Unnikrishnan, targets. The complexity of the urban S. Ahmed Ali and Kartikeya, “26/11 Calls Traced to Pak 6 Ibid., p. 3. battlespace makes command and control Serving Colonel,” Times of India, February 26, 2009. 7 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver- difficult to maintain when defending 4 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (New York: Ballantine 1 against swarming attacks. The fidayin Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Books, 1991), p. 31. 2000). 8 Rabasa, p. 4. 1 The authors elaborated on the urban operations or 5 Rabasa, p. 5. 9 Ibid., p. 3. june 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 6 flexibility and mobility of the assault are used to accomplish strategic concerns itself with the winning of inherent in the their swarm-pulse objectives. While campaigns consist campaigns. The operational commander approach.10 of battles, operational victory is not uses individual battles and maneuver an accumulation of tactical victories; to implement the strategic objective. Police failures during the Mumbai rather, operational art is defined as Obviously, many routine police response can be characterized broadly “the skillful orchestration of military operations occur on a much smaller scale as deficiencies in intelligence, resources and activities.”15 Operational than a traditional military campaign. A prevention, command and control, and art is the meeting point between the raid, for example, constitutes a police counterterrorism capability. When strategic accomplishment of grand “battle,” something that would barely terrorist groups, nominally dispersed objectives and the tactical winning of rise to the level of a skirmish in a and hidden, wish to launch an attack, battles. traditional force-and-force maneuver they slowly assemble a “kill chain”11 that warfare campaign. can be seen and targeted. Indications Current U.S. police practice and and warning missed the emergence informal doctrine concerns itself with The operational level for Los Angeles of this “kill chain” due to gaps in tactics. Police drill endlessly for tactical County, for example, is the usage coastal surveillance and processing of response with Special Weapons and of police forces in a combination information.12 Moreover, security at Tactics (SWAT) units, and programs of operational-level strategies for many of the chief targets such as the for specialized emergency responder accomplishing a strategic aim such as Oberoi Hotel was minimal at best. Yet mobilization and “active shooter” community policing, tactical urban while poor synthesis of intelligence response are becoming more common. response, and countergang raids. and poor protection of “soft” targets The problem, however, is that few Intelligence Preparation for Operations created the opportunity for the attack, law enforcement agencies and police (IPO) is the primary tool for creating it was inadequate command and control tacticians consider the “operational operational plans for usage of police and counterterrorism capability that dimension of maneuver” involved in and paramilitary forces in urban allowed it to succeed. complex responses, instead focusing on environments. IPO helps not only excellence in tactical operations. properly define the parameters of the Fire and emergency first responders operational space, but creates courses were unable to contain the damage and Police often operate in limited time of action (COA) for combined response operate effectively in combat conditions. and space, responding reactively to from different types of security forces.16 There was no plan for dealing with “calls” for service. This results in an Like its military analog Intelligence the media, whose 24-hour coverage organizational framework built from the Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), IPO increased the chaos and allowed the bottom up that is tailored from tactical systematically identifies all elements of attackers’ handlers to give them real- engagements. The bulk of routine police the operational space and creates COA time tactical intelligence and advice.13 activity is also focused on a “beat” or for forces in the field. Most importantly, Hostage rescue response and tactical neighborhood, which results in an IPO stresses a holistic “geosocial” planning were not up to the task of emphasis on a much smaller scale than approach to building operational plans. fighting through the entrenchments a traditional theater of war. terrorists created. Command, control, The concept of “full spectrum intelligence, surveillance, and Large operations, especially those policing” is also important to create reconnaissance were not integrated and involving an opposing force with the tactical and operational capability provided in real time.14 There was no multiple fronts and points of contact, for police response. Full spectrum immediate action to stop the attackers’ require sophisticated coordination, policing units have the ability to momentum—and ordinary Indian police harnessing of police and civil resources, transition between traditional policing were simply unprepared to deal with real time intelligence support, and tasks such as community policing, the militants’ operational shock. These excellent command and control. investigations, countergang operations, problems arise from a lack of operational Operational planning is necessary to and “high-intensity” tasks such as doctrine and capabilities and are not delegate objectives to subordinates, riot control, counterterrorism, and unique to the Indian police. deal with the fog and friction generated counterinsurgency. In Europe and in conflict, and react to the adversary’s Israel, gendarme-type units and Thinking About the Operational Level plan in its entirety instead of simply “formed” paramilitary policing units are As British Lieutenant General Sir John responding tactically without an overall capable of carrying out full-spectrum Kisely noted in the Royal United Services common operating picture or concept of policing and frequently deploy abroad Journal, the operational level refers to operations. in peacekeeping missions.17 the theater level of engagement where campaigns and major operations Translating operational thought to 16 John P. Sullivan and Alain Bauer eds., Terrorism Early police operations is difficult, but it can Warning: 10 Years of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism 10 Ibid. be accomplished. In traditional military and Crime (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 11 A “kill chain” is a sequence of events that must occur thought, the operational level primarily Department, 2008). for a threat to successfully engage and kill its target. 17 For a discussion of expeditionary police (Expol) for 12 Ibid., p. 9. 15 Lt. Gen. Sir John Kisely, “Thinking About the Op- stability policing, see John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, 13 Ibid., p. 17. erational level,” Royal United Services Journal, December “Expeditionary Law Enforcement,” Small Wars Journal, 14 Ibid., p. 11. 2005, p. 38. July 2, 2008. The authors also introduced the concept june 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 6

Lastly, real-time intelligence support The “extraordinary” force will require and follow-on pulses and sieges. Most in the operational space, especially the creation of more regional high- importantly, the attack demonstrates in the midst of a chaotic battle such quality SWAT units capable of the need to develop operational art as a as the Mumbai incident, is needed to deploying at a moment’s notice. If key component of “full spectrum” police coordinate police response. This can and when another Mumbai or Beslan practice that addresses the full range of be accomplished through the use of attack happens, local police cannot crime control and public order issues command and control visualization afford to wait for a national tactical facing contemporary cities and their technologies and a competent command team to activate and deploy. In fact, public spaces. staff monitoring the engagement. one of the key problems of the Mumbai response was the long deployment The contemporary police service—in Operational Art and Tactics time of high-quality special operations Mumbai and elsewhere—lacks the When translated to the tactical realm, forces into the urban conflict zone. The doctrinal foundation to recognize police operational art is distilled into “extraordinary” force, however, does and exploit the operational level of active shooter response and swarming. not inherently have to be a designated maneuver. Operational art needs to be Modern urban terrorists thrive on the tactical team, as the purpose is merely fully developed within police practice, a unimpeded use of kinetic energy to drive to neutralize the terrorist group fixed necessary step toward developing police force. Police must immediately act to in place by the “ordinary” force. This doctrine for addressing terrorism and fix the attackers in place and halt their can be achieved with well-trained local high intensity crime. Mumbai is neither momentum. Once stalled, terrorists police prepared to form into flexible the first nor the last paramilitary urban are disrupted and vulnerable to well- immediate action, rapid deployment siege in a “global” city.19 Paramilitary equipped reinforcements that can arrive teams built from “beat” patrol officers, terrorism and urban siege in major and neutralize the threat. Non-tactical as well as local SWAT teams. cities is more likely to occur than the units must form active shooter response use of weapons of mass destruction, teams and quickly counterattack the Swarming is also an integral part of and if tactical excellence continues to be terrorists’ lead assault elements. police response. Since building mass confused with operational virtuosity, Opposing forces’ lines of operations are in urban environments is extremely another tragedy is inevitable. thin, dispersed, and will not hold up once difficult, slows down response, and their movement has ceased. The very makes police vulnerable, small teams John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. qualities that enable criminal-terrorist must quickly move through the city in He currently serves as a lieutenant with the operational swarming to be successful a semi-autonomous manner to reach Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department where he present an inherent weakness that can the zone of engagement and fix the is assigned to the Emergency Operations be exploited by police and military adversary or engage criminals. In urban Bureau. He is also a Senior Research forces. Once fixed in time and place they counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies can be captured or neutralized with the this will require real-time distributed on Terrorism (CAST). His research successful and surgical usage of special situational awareness and active focuses on counterinsurgency, intelligence, operations forces, SWAT teams, or intelligence support. terrorism, transnational gangs, and urban hostage rescue-level tactical response operations. He is co-editor of Countering forces. Streets, roads, subways, and other Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global access roads that police know Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, To conceptualize what is required for intimately can be used to rapidly swarm 2006). such operational fixing, one can examine adversaries. Police forces should Sun Tzu’s concept of the “ordinary” and practice mobilization, especially along Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in “extraordinary force.” An “ordinary” alternate routes that could be used in foreign policy and security. He is currently force holds the adversary in place while case of a disruption of traffic during Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. the “extraordinary” force loops around an urban assault. The key to tactical His articles have been published in Red to assault them at the weak point.18 success is refusing to move along Team Journal, Small Wars Journal Transposed to an urban setting, the traditional lines of urban maneuver and and other publications. Mr. Elkus blogs “ordinary” forces are “full spectrum” utilizing the various lines of the city to at Rethinking Security, Dreaming 5GW, patrol units capable of standing up fix and destroy urban assailants spread and the Huffington Post. He is currently to operational shock. Ordinary police around dispersed lines of operations. a contributor to the Center for Threat must fix the threat in place. Otherwise, Awareness’ ThreatsWatch project. command and control fragments, public Conclusion panic ensues, the enemy maintains and The Mumbai attack was essentially enhances his relative advantage, and a virtual urban siege. It combined deaths accumulate. swarming and pulsing with tactical urban sieges to generate mass casualties to further the terrorists’ strategic goals and message. In their adept blend of these tactical approaches, they were able of “full spectrum policing” in the essay “Postcard from to dominate the urban operational space. Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege.” Police response was compromised by its 19 John Robb, “The Coming Urban Terror,” City Journal, 18 Leonhard, p. 31. inability to rapidly adapt to the swarm Summer 2007.