DOCSLIB.ORG

Download PDF Van Tekst

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Download PDF Van Tekst Memoires 1979-A Willem Oltmans bron Willem Oltmans, Memoires 1979-A. Papieren Tijger, Breda 2010 Zie voor verantwoording: http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/oltm003memo26_01/colofon.php © 2013 dbnl / Willem Oltmans Stichting 7 Inleiding Recently I was invited by the television company Het Gesprek to join the host Frits Barend on the programme Dossier BVD. The programme is designed to take a retrospective look at guests who had appeared on the now legendary show, Barend en van Dorp and Willem Oltmans had been a frequent guest. Clips were shown, discussed, and questions followed. Once again the re-occurring theme reared its head. ‘Would Willem be remembered as a great journalist or as a charlatan?’ Without presumption I say that I probably knew Willem better than anyone else, and the word ‘charlatan’ does not enter my vocabulary. I saw Willem as a man who hated lies, hypocrisy and cover-ups. His diaries, meticulously notated, and which he himself referred to as ‘my brain’, speak for themselves. Willem was also capable of being Spartan with detail when the noted facts were painful to him. 19th of May 1979, thirteen years exactly to the day that we first met, he writes of a painful incident and refers to it simply as ‘a sort of rape’. I was the subject of that rape and the same uninvited, explosive sexual attack was forced on me again two weeks later in the home of his mother. We never spoke of it, and so I find it a revealing characteristic of the complex Oltmans brain that he chose to acknowledge his darker sides and demons, albeit without any emotion. Willem was impressed with the study of ancient Greek homosexuality as written by Professor K.L. Dover, and identified with the rite of passage between the older and the younger man. The erotic association between the role model and the pupil regarded as a ‘compound of an educational with a genital relationship’. Ideally the beautiful young man should inspire love, but not give himself to his lover. Even Aristophanes, known for his conservatism, would never describe love between men as ‘unnatural’, placing modern religious ideologies with their violent aversion to homosexual love, under a critical spotlight. Oltmans found anything pertaining to organized religions repellent and described evangelist Billy Graham as an ‘American ayatollah’. Esquire magazine called Graham ‘Christ's American Son’, prompting Willem to write that it was all very sick and not something uplifting to read over breakfast. Willem Oltmans, Memoires 1979-A 8 Given the situation today with the Roman Catholic Church embroiled in sex-scandals rocking its archaic and institutional foundations to the core, one wonders what Willem's comments would have been? With his distinctive sardonic smile he would no doubt have been inclined to quote Nietzsche, ‘Christianity gave Eros poison to drink. However he did not die, but simply degenerated into vice’. I recall a conversation I had with the great social anthropologist Dr Margaret Mead, during which she said, ‘Peter, the Vatican needs a bomb’. That was many years ago and now the boil is finally beginning to burst. What would Willem's vision have been about the rising tide of Islam, the fall of the Dutch government and the ensuing political chaos? The party's endless cacophony of confusing arguments, the lack of leadership and the national identity dwindling under the pressures of absurd political correctness. The list is endless and at times like these we could all benefit from a dose of Oltmans sanity and to hell with the cynics who sneered at his wisdom and doubted his sincerity. Willem was acutely aware that we have all, in larger and smaller degrees been brainwashed and robotized by political slogans and misinformation. This struck a certain fear in him and he spent many hours in discussion with his close friend Professor Delgado whose views on robotization were alarming. Delgado reinforced Willem's apprehensions that the tremendous force of communications and educational media were forming or deforming our neutrons, our thoughts, our behaviour and our biology. Perhaps Willem's obsession with the brain made him forget that we also have a heart. That love, in all its senses, seems to have eluded him is touchingly referred to in his diary when he writes that even on his birthday he received no kiss from his mother. Had his mother ever kissed or hugged him, might he have seen the world through different eyes? As a journalist and writer, Willem's house was always home to a thousand books, so it would be impossible to single out a favourite. But Freud's The Future of an Illusion was one he often read and quoted. Freud's idea of maturity appealed to Willem. Between infancy and maturity one should gradually free oneself of the gods and kings and myths and see them for what they really are. Vehicles to evade reality. As Willem wrote, ‘Physics, chemistry and natural laws reign in the universe, not Zeus and his associates’. ‘History is a set of fables agreed upon’ Voltaire Peter van de Wouw, Amsterdam 2010 Willem Oltmans, Memoires 1979-A 9 Florida 4 april 1979 Deerfield Beach, Howard Johnson's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is opgehangen. Robert Trumbull meldde dat eerst nog de drie villa's van de oud-premier van Pakistan door de politie waren doorzocht en ‘secret documents of an extremely sensitive nature’ waren meegenomen. De coupgeneraals zijn flink bezig geweest. Bhutto werd om 02.00 uur opgehangen en per vliegtuig overgebracht naar Gari Khuda Baksh in de provincie Sind, om in een familiegraf te worden bijgezet. Zijn vrouw en dochter bevinden zich in Rawalpindi nog steeds onder huisarrest. The New York Times schrijft: ‘The way they did it is going to grow into a legend that will some day backfire.’ Het herinnert allemaal aan de wijze waarop Sukarno, na te zijn doodgepest door zijn generaals, werd weggemoffeld naar Blitar in een uithoek van Oost-Java. Bernhard Weinraub presenteert een balanced view van Bhutto in de The New York Times.1 Kots alweer over van alles om me heen. Het blad Esquire zette Billy Graham op de omslag, ‘How “Christ's American Son” lost himself in the halls of power,’ met zeven oud-presidenten om zich heen.2 Volgens Marshall Frady ziet de 60-jarige Billy er uit als ‘some blond, gallant, crystal-eyed prince out of a Nordic fairy tale - young Hansel grown to a stalwart golden manhood, unaging, changeless....’ ‘You can say of Jesus Christ what you want,’ schreeuwt Billy in zijn preken, ‘you can say He was a great revolutionary, you can say He was mad, you can say He was the son of a loving God, He loves you, loves you, loves you!’ Graham is een Amerikaanse ayatollah. ‘To a lot of church-going folks in this country, Billy has become nothing less than the nearest thing to Jesus on this earth,’ aldus een Baptistische predikant, die zijn kruistocht volgt. ‘He is sort of like Christ's American son.’ Het is allemaal goed ziek en geen opkikker om bij het ontbijt te lezen. Esquire is wel diep gezonken om op de markt te kunnen blijven. 1 Zie bijlage 1. 2 Esquire, 10 april 1979. Willem Oltmans, Memoires 1979-A 10 Ik zit aan het strand en geniet van de ruwe zee en de geur van de golven. Met weemoed denk ik hoe zalig het hier nu met Peter zou zijn. Jammer dat hij niet mee kan genieten. Verwonder me over de snelheid waarmee pelikanen van vrij grote hoogte in het water duiken. Die arme vissen won't know what hits them. Dan Rather schrijft in Playboy dat de moord in Dallas de moeilijkste reportage was geweest uit zijn carrière. Het blad publiceert een brief waarin schande wordt gesproken dat de staat Ohio 675.000 dollar heeft uitbetaald aan de families van de slachtoffers, waaronder vier vermoorde studenten, bij demonstraties tegen de oorlog in Vietnam aan de Kent University in 1970. Om 12.00 uur een lunch en daarna een lezing in Boca Raton Woman's Club, die in de Royal Palm Yacht and Golf Club bijeenkomt. Ik wist het drukke gebabbel van de dames te ontvluchten in een andere kamer, onder het mom dat ik me op de lezing wilde voorbereiden. Waar zal ik het over hebben? Een dame, Rhoda Lund, lid van het National Republican Women Committee, zei nog altijd niet te begrijpen waarom Nixon de beruchte tapes niet in de Potomac had gesmeten. ‘We all still like Nixon....’ Een andere dame vroeg of ik het boek had gelezen waarin werd verklaard hoe de Trilaterale Commissie van Rockefeller & Co via Jimmy Carter de macht in de VS had overgenomen, ‘while Japan and West Germany are delivering the world to the Communists.’ Mrs. Rufus Hedges legde uit dat de pers nooit werd uitgenodigd tot een ‘lavish luncheon’, alhoewel mijn lezing wel in de pers werd aangekondigd.3 Na afloop nam ik een bus naar Miami en het vliegtuig naar Key West. Viel tijdens de vlucht in slaap en droomde van Peter. Maar in tegenstelling tot Frederik van Eeden weet ik dus nooit wat ik heb gedroomd, of bijna nooit. Hotel The Pines was vol dus ben ik gaan overnachten in de lokale Thermos. 5 april 1979 Key- West Vóór middernacht pakte ik een neger. Een blonde jongen voegde zich bij ons en het werd een levendig trio. The New York Times wijdt een hele pagina aan het ophangen van premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ik blijf het zeer schokkend vinden. Met zijn dood heeft het militante mohammedanisme weer een overwinning geboekt. Wanneer ik in Den Haag iets 3 Zie bijlage 2.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Nbc News White Paper Vietnam Hindsight Part Ii
    AN NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT PART II: THE DEATH OF DIEM BROADCAST: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1971 10:00 - 11:00 CREDITS Opening Title: NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT PART II: DEATH OF DIEM Credits: NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT Copyright c The National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 1971 All Rights Reserved Produced and Written By FRED FREED Directed by PAMELA HILL Associate Producers ALVIN DAVIS PAMELA HILL Researcher HELEN WHITNEY Production Assistant BARBARA SPENCE Film Researcher JACK GOELMAN Unit Manager KLAUS HEYS Supervising Film Editor DARROLD MURRAY Film Editors MARY ANN MARTIN STUART M. ROSENBERG DAVID J. SAUL JEAN BAGLEY Cameramen STEVE PETROPOULOS WILLIAM RICHARDS Sound JAMES ZOLTOWSKI JOSE VALLE JOHN SINGLETON JEROME GOLD HENRY ROSSEAU IRVING GANS SHELLY FIELMAN Still Pictures by JACQUES LOWE BLACK STAR MAGNUM GEORGES TAMES - THE NEW YORK TIMES THE JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY YOICHI CKOMOTO HORST ?HAAS PEOPLE WHO WERE INTERVIEWED FOR VIETNAM HINDSIGHT IN ORDER OF THEIR APPEARANCE AND POSITION HELD AT THE TIME GEORGE BALL Under-Secretary of State 1961-1966 MAXWELL TAYLOR- Military Adviser to JFK 1961 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1962- 64 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH Ambassador to India 1961-63 DAVID HALBERSTAM Correspondent - New York Times - Vietnam 1962-63 WALT M. ROSTOW Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security 1961-64 MME. NHU Wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of Ngo Dinh Diem ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Special Assistant to the President 1961-64 PAUL HARKINS US Military Commander - Vietnam 1962-64 • JOHN VANN American Military Adviser in Vietnam MICHAEL FORRESTAL Senior Member - White House National Security Staff 1962-66 ROGER HILSMAN Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 1963-64 ■ RUFUS PHILLIPS American AID Mission - Vietnam -2- FREDERICK NOLTING U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes and References
    Notes and References 1 Finding the HRight Key:" Kennedy and the New Pacific Community 1. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York, 1960), pp. 163, 233. 2. "The United States and Our Future in Asia," Excerpts from the Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy (Hawaii, 1958), JFK Library, Senate Files. 3. Ibid. Championing America's virtue and image abroad, as weil as Amer­ ican self-interest, always remained a difficult task for Kennedy. See Ronald Nurse, "America Must Not Sleep: The Development of John F. Kennedy's Foreign Policy Attitudes, 1947-1960" (Ph.D. dissertation: Michigan State University, 1971), James Dorsey, "Vietnam 'a can of snakes,' Galbraith told JFK," Boston Globe (28 January 1974), Stephen Pelz, "John F. Kennedy's 1961 Vietnam War Decisions," lournal of Strategie Studies (December 1981), lan McDonald, "Kennedy Files Show President's Dismay at CIA Power," The Times (London, 2 August 1971), JFK Library, Excerpts from Biographical Files. 4. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Kennedy, 2 February 1961, and "The New Pacific" (Speech in Hawaii, August 1960), JFK Library, POFlBox 111 and Senate Files. 5. John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President, 1961) (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 174-5. These comments were made during the Presi­ dent's push to create the "Alliance for Progress" program for the Latin AmericaniCaribbean states. 6. Kennedy, Public Papers ofthe President, 1961, p. 399. 7. Ibid., 1963, p. 652. 8. Kennedy's early cabinet meetings on foreign affairs topics often became energetic discussions on how to win the Cold War. A winning strategy, wh ether in allied favor or not, was acceptable.
    [Show full text]
  • John F. Kennedy and the Advisory Effort for Regime Change in South
    Imperial Camelot: John F. Kennedy and the Advisory Effort for Regime Change in South Vietnam, 1962-1963 A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Millersville University of Pennsylvania In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts By Shane M. Marino © 2018 Shane M. Marino May 2018 This Thesis for the Master of Arts Degree by Shane Michael Marino has been approved on behalf of the Graduate School by Thesis Committee: Dr. John M, McLarnon III (Signature on file) Research Advisor Dr. Tracey Weis (Signature on file) Committee Member Dr. Abam B. Lawrence (Signature on file) Committee Member May 10, 2018 Date ii ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS IMPERIAL CAMELOT: JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE ADIVSORY EFFORT FOR REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1962-1963 By Shane M. Marino Millersville University, 2018 Millersville, Pennsylvania Directed by Dr. John McLarnon This thesis uses government documents, oral histories, and secondary sources to explore changes in the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policy to determine the factors that contributed to the decision to support a coup d’état in 1963 that overthrew the President of the Republic of Vietnam and subsequently led to his assassination. The thesis specifically looks to connect administrative changes in organization and personnel to changes in policy that ultimately determined the fate of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. In general, this thesis reveals that rejection of military intervention led to the adoption of a kind of political aggression that envisioned covert regime change as an acceptable alternative to the use of combat troops.
    [Show full text]
  • Harkins, Paul D
    Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project GENERAL PAUL D. HARKINS Interviewed by: Ted Gittinger Initial interview date: November 10, 1981 TABLE OF CONTENTS Early career Boston National Guard West Point Fort Bliss horse cavalry school Fort Riley, Kansas - Cavalry School - Instructor Fort Myer, Virginia - F Troop - Third Cavalry Second Armored Division North Africa Landing, World War II - Deputy Chief of Staff Operation Torch Western Task Force Sicily invasion Europe - Third Army General Patton When the Third Cracked Europe West Point - Assistant Commandant Pentagon - Chief of Plans 1951 Korea - Eighth Army - Chief of Staff Commander of Forty-fifth Division Infantry Pentagon - MAAG Chief International Branch Izmir, Turkey - Greek and Turkish Commander Armies in NATO - Commander 1 Hawaii - Deputy Army Commander Vietnam situation General Maxwell advice Vietnam - Commander of U.S. forces President Kennedy Appointment - Four Stars North Vietnam Training Infrastructure Strategic Hamlet Program Farmgate program Combat Fighting units Diem Tran Van Don Big Minh Presidential palace bombed Laos U.S. raid Harriman plan Ho Chi Minh Trail Communists Saigon, Vietnam Ambassador Nolting Embassy country team Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Diem’s coup Buddhists versus Catholics Thich Tri Quang Ambassador Richardson Fact finding visits U.S. policy Viet Cong activity Nhu and Diem Murders U.S. reaction to Assessment of progress Effect on military situation Big Minh Regime Popularity 2 Tran Thieu Khiem Embassy Reassignments Trueheart Nes Lodge General Nguyen Khanh Background Assessment U.S. policy Halberstam reports Press relations U.S. reporters Return to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 11/30/1970 Administrative Information
    McGeorge Bundy Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 11/30/1970 Administrative Information Creator: McGeorge Bundy Interviewer: William W. Moss Date of Interview: November 30, 1970 Place of Interview: New York, New York Length: 27 pages Biographical Note Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (1961 - 1966); President, Ford Foundation (1966 - 1979); History Professor, New York University (1979 - 1989), discusses John F. Kennedy’s [JFK] decision making style, relationship with Dean Rusk, issues in the National Security policy, and National Security personnel, among other issues. Access Open Usage Restrictions Copyright of these materials has passed to the United States Government upon the death of the interviewee. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form.
    [Show full text]
  • Tragedy Or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside The
    Tragedy or Choice in John Garofano Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box A Review Essay Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins ofthe Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. In 1965, the United States launched a major air and ground war on behalf of a weak ally against an experienced and committed enemy. Policymakers understood that domestic support would not last forever and would likely decrease as casualties mounted. War games and simulations had suggested that Washington might end up isolated internationally. Yet the nation embarked on a war that reduced U.S. power and prestige, claimed the lives of some 58,000 of its citizens, and led to a skepticism of limited war that still shapes civil-military relations and foreignTragedy or Choice in Vietnam? policy today. Given the risks and uncertainties, why did the United States go to war in Vietnam? After three decades there still is no consensus on this or any number of other basic questions regarding U.S. policy. The exchanges that followed U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s conditional apologia in 1995 demonstrated that neither a central architect nor his critics could agree on 1 whether the war was inevitable or winnable. In 2001, on the thirtieth anniver- John Garofano is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Robert and Renée Belfer Cen- ter for Science and International Affairs, John F.
    [Show full text]
  • Moral Masculinity: the Culture of Foreign Relations
    MORAL MASCULINITY: THE CULTURE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jennifer Lynn Walton, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Michael J. Hogan, Adviser ___________________________ Professor Peter L. Hahn Adviser Department of History Professor Kevin Boyle Copyright by Jennifer Lynn Walton 2004 ABSTRACT The Kennedy administration of 1961-1963 was an era marked by increasing tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, culminating in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. This period provides a snapshot of the culture and politics of the Cold War. During the early 1960s, broader concerns about gender upheaval coincided with an administration that embraced a unique ideology of masculinity. Policymakers at the top levels of the Kennedy administration, including President John F. Kennedy, operated within a cultural framework best described as moral masculinity. Moral masculinity was the set of values or criteria by which Kennedy and his closest foreign policy advisors defined themselves as white American men. Drawing on these criteria justified their claims to power. The values they embraced included heroism, courage, vigor, responsibility, and maturity. Kennedy’s focus on civic virtue, sacrifice, and public service highlights the “moral” aspect of moral masculinity. To members of the Kennedy administration, these were moral virtues and duties and their moral fitness justified their fitness to serve in public office. Five key elements of moral masculinity played an important role in diplomatic crises during the Kennedy administration.
    [Show full text]
  • An Exploration of the Concept of National Credibility Within the Kennedy Administration and Its Impact on Policy Towards Southeast Asia
    AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CREDIBILITY WITHIN THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA. by ALEXANDRA LINDSAY FORBES A Thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOHY (B) School of English, Drama and American and Canadian Studies College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham August 2014 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This exploration of the principle of credibility demonstrates its abstract nature and suggests the danger implicit in making it central to the process of government. For the United States, the principle of credibility has played a major role in the formation of post-World War II politics; initially with it centring on the concept of demonstrating reliability to allies and believability to adversaries. It gained increasing power throughout the presidency of John F. Kennedy on account of a broadening of its scope: For Kennedy there was a need to demonstrate credibility through international relations, whilst projecting a credible image of strength domestically. This dissertation identifies how the expanded notion of credibility influenced the foreign policy decisions of the Kennedy administration, with particular emphasis on how it related to policy in Southeast Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • Ears, .Er- Nbe Your Unpublished Thesis, Submitted for a Degree at Williams College and Administered by the Williams College
    WILLIAMS COLLEGE LIBRARIES Your unpublished thesis, submitted for a degree at Williams College and administered by the Williams College Libraries, will be made available for research use. You may, through this form, provide instructions regarding copyright, access, dissemination and reproduction ofyour thesis. _ The faculty advisor to the student writing the thesis wishes to claim joint authorship in this work. In each section, please check the ONE statement that reflects your wishes. I. PUBLICATION AND QUOTATION: LITERARY PROPERTY RIGHTS A student author automatically owns the copyright to his/her work, whether or not a copyright symbol and date are placed on the piece. The duration ofUS. copyright on a manuscript--and Williams theses are considered manuscripts--is the life ofthe author plus 70 years. _ I1we do not choose to retain literary property rights to the thesis, and I wish to assign them immediately to Williams College. Selecting this option vvill assign copyright to the College. This in no way precludes a student author from later publishing his/her work: the student would, however, need to contact the Archives for a pennission form. The Archives would be free in this case to also grant pennission to another researcher to publish small sections tl'om the thesis. Rarely would there be any reason flJr the Archives to grant permission to another party to publish the thesis in its entirely: if such a situation arose. the Archives would be in touch with the author to let them know that such a request had been made. _I1we wish to retain literary property rights to the thesis for a period ofthree years, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to Williams College.
    [Show full text]
  • Window Into the White House
    Social Education 72(3), pp 130–135 ©2008 National Council for the Social Studies Window Into the White House Stephanie van Hover, Marc J. Selverstone, and Patrice Preston-Grimes Have you ever wanted to eavesdrop on American presidents as they deliberate, Designed for use by the research and agonize, debate, discuss, or reflect on key policy issues? An exciting online resource, teaching communities, whitehousetapes. www.whitehousetapes.org, makes this possible. From 1940–1973, six presidents (from org provides teachers and students the Franklin D. Roosevelt to Richard M. Nixon) secretly taped almost 5,000 hours of opportunity to learn more about how conversations, including telephone calls, meetings, and memoirs. Hosted and main- American presidents have made deci- tained by the Presidential Recordings Program at the University of Virginia’s Miller sions and exercised leadership dur- Center of Public Affairs, whitehousetapes.org offers free access to presidential record- ing pivotal moments in United States ings covering myriad topics that range from the significant—World War II, the Cold history.1 These fascinating historical War, the Space Race, the War on Poverty, the Civil Rights Movement, the Cuban sources offer students the opportunity Missile Crisis—to the mundane—President Lyndon B. Johnson ordering some custom- to explore the presidency beyond the made pants. All presidential recordings, declassified and released by the respective pages of the textbook. They practice key presidential libraries, are available on the website. In addition, the site offers links historical thinking skills as they listen, to numerous recordings that the Miller Center has augmented to include a scrolling analyze, and discuss the revealing con- transcript with the audio, so teachers and students can both see and hear the conversa- versations that often provide conflict- tion as it plays (see Figure 1).
    [Show full text]
  • Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
    t AIR POWER AND THE GROUND WAR IN VIETNAM IDEAS AND ACTIONS by DONALD J . MROZEK Senior Research Fellow Airpower Research Institute Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532 January 1988 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mrozek, Donald J. Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam. Includes bibliographies and index. 1 . Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975-Aerial Operations, American. I. Title. DS558.8.M79 1988 959.704'348 87-31931 ISBN 1-58566-015-9 Fust Printing January 1988 Second Printing December 2000 Third Printing September 2002 Disclaimer This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opin- ion of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE) or the Department of the Air Force. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents US Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 g -qn . EIm.o ofcqolE z a,iorzF. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . FOREWORD . ix ABOUT THE AUTHOR . xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . xiii INTRODUCTION . xv PART ONE EVERYBODY'S WAR, NOBODY'S WAR 1 AIR POWER THEORIES, AIR FORCE THINKING, AND THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM : THE PAST WAS PROLOGUE . 3 The Thrust of US Air Power Theories . 5 The Ascendancy of the Offensive . 7 Limited War as a Challenge to Doctrine . 13 Vietnam and the Burden of the Past . 17 Notes . 24 2 INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, ANDTHE CONDUCT OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . 27 Interservice Differences in the Post-World War II Context .
    [Show full text]
  • What Would He Have Done?
    What Would He Have Done? JFK AND VIETNAM Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. By John M. Newman. Illustrated. 506 pp. New York: Warner Books. $22.95. By Arthur Schlesinger Jr. OULD President John F. Kennedy have finally sent in combat units and thereby Americanized the war in Vietnam? Or was he planning to withdraw the 16,000 United W ments. I should add, however, that though Oliver Stone States military advisers he had sent to the South Viet- namese armed forces? These questions, long debated helped find Mr. Newman a publisher, and though some- both by scholars and by former members of the Ken- one (the publisher?) has added a sensational subtitle, nedy and Johnson Administrations, have now been "Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power," Mr. thrust into public controversy by Oliver Stone's cine- Newman rigorously avoids conspiracy theorizing about matic fantasy "J.F.K." In recent weeks, for example, Kennedy's murder. two former Government officials deeply involved in • • • • Vietnam policy, Roger Hilsman, the Assistant Secre- tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1963-64, and His book's thesis is that Kennedy "would never Walt W. Rostow, then head of the State Department's have placed American combat troops in Vietnam" and Policy Planning Council and later President Lyndon B. that he was preparing for the withdrawal of the mili- Johnson's national security adviser, have given the tary advisers by the end of 1965. The Joint Chiefs of questions diametrically opposed answers in forceful Staff began urging the commitment of combat units, letters to The New York Times.
    [Show full text]