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Ro~v" j~;/sYvlev'.~ I• Thesis title l(Ah I1fvcsi:, or Free,JoM Ii: 'J. 1ft h!.lM flv1 .' I - ~ Date / ·/0.)'-/ ! g I ZOOS T '

Accepted for the Libraries Date accepted c.:.L;-'-·/---:-_..:::...... :~ _ "An Illusion of Freedom": 's Vietnam, 1961-1963

by

Mark Hobel

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor ofArts with Honors in Political Science

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Williamstown, Massachusetts

May 10,2005

© Mark Hobel, 2005 To be sure it is desirable that South Viet Nam remain free ofCommunism but it is also desirable that we do not spend countless American lives and billions ofdollars to maintain an illusion offreedom in a devastated South Viet Nam.

Senator Mike Mansfield, August 19, 1963, in a letter to President John F. Kennedy.l

One sign ofthe presidential distaste and disillusion with Vietnam was the change and rise ofHUsman. He was, if anything, a talisman ofthe Kennedy years in both strengths and contradictions.

- , The Best and the Brightest (1969).2

I Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1961-1963. Vol. III. Vietnam, January-August 1963. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 587. 2 Ha1berstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: , Inc., 1969, p. 254. Mark Hobel. Introduction.

Introduction

It was a Saturday in late August, and President John F. Kennedy had taken advantage ofone ofthe last summer weekends of 1963 to spend some time at the family compound in Hyannisport. Several ofhis top lieutenants had opted to vacate

Washington, D.C., as well: Secretary ofState , Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara, and

Attomey General Robert Kennedy. Other top advisors, Cabinet members, and their deputies took advantage ofthe weekend to kick back and engage in favorite pastimes:

Undersecretary ofState George Ball, for example, headed for the golfcourse. Left manning the assorted offices ofthe national security bureaucracy were a host ofsecond­ tier officials. Among them was Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary ofState for Far

Eastem Affairs, whose actions on that particular day in August would have far-reaching consequences.

In Saigon, business didn't stop for the weekend. New American Ambassador

Henry Cabot Lodge was faced with a severe crisis that had exploded before he even stepped offthe plane in the South Vietnamese capitol. Since May, the cities ofSouth

Vietnam had been in the throes ofthe "," in which Buddhist monks and other politically disaffected groups had drawn attention to the repressive policies of

President and his govemment [the GVN]. The monks had used, among other forms ofprotest, public self-immolation. Diem, America's ally in Saigon since

1954, had chosen confrontation over conciliation: the unrest in the cities now threatened, in the eyes ofmany Amelican officials, to undermine the regime's struggle against the communist National Liberation Front (NLF). On August 21, 1963,

1 Mark Hobel. Introduction.

Diem's increasingly influential brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had ordered his Special Forces, operating independently ofthe Army ofthe Republic ofSouth Vietnam (ARVN), to smash a Buddhist sanctuary in Saigon under cover ofdarkness. Apprised ofthe situation,

Ambassador Lodge considered his options. He knew that several ARVN generals, unhappy with the Diem regime, would seek to organize a coup ifpromised non- interference by the American government. In a cable to State Department headquarters on August 24, he reported, "Nhu, probably with full support ofDiem, had large hand in planning of action against Buddhists, ifhe did not fully mastermind it. His influence has also been significantly increased...Suggestion has been made that U.S. has only to indicate to 'Generals' that it would be happy to see Diem and/or Nhus go, and deed would be done. Situation is not so simple in our view."} The touch ofambiguity masked

the surprising reality; America's powerful new ambassador was suggesting that the previously strained relations between the Kennedy Administration and the Diem regime

had reached a breaking point, and that the U.S. should now tum on its ally.

Roger Hilsman received the cable in Washington. Hilsman believed that Saigon's

counterinsurgency campaign against the NLF depended most prominently on political

factors. Ifthe Diem regime could win the hearts and minds ofthe rural peasantry of

South Vietnam, it could destroy the NLF insurgency. Ifit could not win political

legitimacy and popular appeal, then no amount ofmilitary force could quell the

communist uprising. The year 1963, for Hilsman, had demonstrated that Nhu's

increasing power would lead to the fall ofSaigon. He wrote later that while there were

many arguments against a coup, he believed strongly that "there would be even more

1 Lodge to Hi1sman, Aug. 24, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 620. [Note: Documents from the FRUS volumes will hereafter bear a date in citation only ifthe document's date is not noted nearby in the text.]

2 Mark Hobel. Introduction. political instability ifthe Diem-NUu regime continued as it was."z With two strong allies in the administration, ofthe National Security Council and W. Averell Harriman, Undersecretary ofState forPolitical Affairs, Hilsman drafted. a cable for Lodge:

US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself ofNhu.... If, in spite ofall of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himselfcannot be preserved.3

Hilsman and his allies managed to gain presidential approval for the cable, although under somewhat questionable circumstances. Hilsman's superior, Dean Rusk, approved the cable from New York, believing that Kennedy had already given a pass to its text. At Defense, Deputy Secretary vetted the cable in the absence ofMcNamara. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff, would claim that he had been left out in the cold.

On Monday, August 26, the President convened an urgent meeting ofhis Vietnam policy team. He questioned the contents ofthe cable; several ofms most powerful advisors dissented, among them McNamara, CIA director John McCone and Taylor.

Taylor would later call the cable an "egregious end-run" by Hilsman.4 These men were no longer charmed by Diem, as many had been at the dawn ofthe Kennedy

Administration; rather, they argued that the military effort in the countryside required strong, stable leadership at the top, and Diem still provided that command. Vice

President Lyndon Johnson sided with the pro-Diem faction ofKennedy's advisors.

2 Hilsrnan, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics ofForeign Policy in the Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967, p. 486 3 Department of State [hereafter "State"] to U.S. Embassy in Saigon [hereafter "Embassy"], FRUS, III, pps. 628-629. 4 Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 292.

3 Mark Hobel. Introduction.

President Kennedy, however, allowed the text ofthe cable to stand; although

angry at Hilsman for the controversy arising from the cable, he nevertheless approved of the message. The Diem regime had lost the faith ofthe American President as a vehicle

for combating Communist insurgency, and its days were thereafter numbered. On

August 29, 1963, Lodge cabled to Washington, "We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: The overthrow ofthe Diem govemment."s

The Diem regime was indeed overthrown; in the aftermath ofan ARVN generals'

coup in early November 1963, Diem and Nhu's bullet-riddled bodies were fOlmd in the back ofan armored personnel carrier in the Saigon suburb ofCholon. A string of

generals, subsequently brought down in successive coups, took their places. Diem would

not be the only president shot dead that November. JohnF. Kennedy, who had rejected

early on the idea ofAmerican combat troops in , but who had steadily

escalated the American commitment there nevertheless, was shot and killed in Dallas on

Nov. 23, and Johnson took his place as commander-in-chief. In less than a year, the

United States would commence the bombing ofNorth Vietnam; in a year and a half,

Marines would land at Danang, completing the Americanization ofthe .

Writing about a foreign policy failure is in some ways like investigating a crime

scene. What one sees is the violent, tragic aftermath; this inevitably colors one's view

when one seeks to reconstruct the failure as it occurred. It is hard to tum a cold, hard eye

on the decisions leading up to the Vietnam War, when the fallout and consequences loom

larger in the foreground. The fall ofSaigon in 1975 and continued Communist rule; the

devastation ofVietnam and its people prior to that date, and their abject poverty for years

5 Embassy to State, Foreign Relations o/the United States. Vol. IV. Vietnam August-December 1963. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 21.

4 Mark Hobel. Introduction. afterwards; the ascendance ofthe Khmer Rouge in Cambodia; the regional consequences were many and gruesome. Closer to home: the names on the Vietnam Memorial; the many thousands more gravely wounded; the POWs, chained down in squalor for years on end. And politically, the destruction ofthe liberal foreign policy consensus and the wreckage ofmany promising careers among the men whom David Halberstam called

"the best and the brightest." The legacy colors and obscures the examination ofthe events as they happened.

The ideas and motivations behind John F. Kennedy's Vietnam policy have been somewhat obscured as well. That is not a surprising development in the historiography of the escalation ofthe Vietnam War, given that the Kennedy Administration's policy, at least outwardly, appeared to contain a significant contradiction.

In early Sept. 1963, as press reports proliferated that the U.S. might be moving towards severing ties with the GVN over Diem's response to the Buddhist Crisis,

Kennedy appeared on CBS News with Walter Cronkite. In response to Cronkite's questions, Kennedy seemed to set important limits on the American commitment to

South Vietnam: "In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out their as advisors, but they have to win it, the people ofViet-Nam, against the Communists.,,6

Yet a week later, Kennedy appeared to expand the American stakes in the war's outcome.

Appearing on the "Huntley-Brinkley Report," Kennedy was asked whether he believed in the "so-called 'Domino Theory,' that ifSouth Vietnam falls, the rest ofSoutheast Asia will go with it?" Kennedy responded: " .. .I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that ifSouth

6 Interview with the President, Sept. 2, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 93.

5 Mark Hobel. Introduction.

Viet Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographical position for a guerilla assault on Malay, but would also give the impression that the wave ofthe future in Southeast Asia was China and the commtmists.,,7

Kennedy's responses, casting American stakes in the defense ofSouth Vietnam in different ways when confronted by different lines ofquestioning, have helped give rise to the notion that Kennedy saw Vietnam primarily through the prism ofdomestic politics.

Historians have depicted Kennedy's Vietnam policy as a detennined search for the

politically expedient "middle route" whenever a potentially dangerous decision loomed

on Vietnam. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts have situated Kennedy comfortably in their

systemic analysis ofthe escalation ofthe Vietnam War: Kennedy consistently did the

minimum possible to preserve South Vietnam, avoiding the politically treacherous

options ofwithdrawal or full-scale Americanization ofthe war.8 Fredrik Logevall, whose

more recent analysis differs sharply with Gelb and Betts's on many issues, nevertheless

agrees that the Kennedy's Vietnam policy consisted oflittle more than maintaining

freedom ofpolitical movement.9 The most recent Kennedy biographer has gingerly noted

that when considering Kennedy's decisions on Vietnam one must remember that for

Kennedy, "politics and policy-making were the art ofthe possible."lo

Kennedy, ofcourse, devoted a great deal ofenergy to ensuring that the image of

the American role in the Vietnamese conflict remained positive, and even more

importantly, quiet. As Max Frankel ofthe New York Times wrote astutely in the summer

7 Interview ofthe President, Office ofthe White House Press Secretary, Sept. 9, 1963, JFKL NSF B199. 8 Gelb, Leslie H. and Richard K. Betts. The Irony ofVietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: The , 1979, p. 25. 9 Logevall, Fredrik:. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation ofWar in Vietnam. Berkeley, Ca.: University ofCalifornia Press, 1999, p. 73. 10 Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003, p. 668.

6 Mark Hobel. Introduction. of 1963: "Once in a while, Washington remembers that there is a war on in Vietnam....

But for long stretches, the war against communist-led guerillas in Vietnam fades from memory here, not because no one cares, but because the men who care most decided long ago to discuss it as little as possible."ll

There were indeed men in the Kennedy Administration who cared deeply about the future ofSouth Vietnam. One was Kennedy himself. Another was Roger Hilsman,

one ofhis top officials on Vietnam, and also one ofthe most responsive to Kennedy's

instincts and ideas. Kennedy did have a series ofbeliefs that guided the American

engagement with South Vietnam during his administration. As his September interviews made clear, deep, fundamental contradictions existed within these beliefs, and thus within

his administration's strategy for saving South Vietnam. The chief confusion was the size

ofthe American stake in South Vietnam's defense, and therefore also the point at which

the U.S. could go no further to defend it. As one ofKennedy's best and most loyal

advisors on Vietnam, Hilsman worked to transform the President's instincts, which

closely matched Hilsman's own ideas, into practical policy. Kennedy did have a strategy

for saving South Vietnam, and investigating Hilsman's role in its implementation helps

illuminate that policy and why it failed so disastrously.

Hilsman was the Assistant Secretary ofState for Far Eastern Affairs (and had,

prior to 1963, been director ofState's Bureau ofIntelligence and Research). He therefore

stood as the day-to-day point man for diplomacy towards Southeast Asia. In late 1963,

however, one might have expected that more senior figures would have come to dominate

Vietnam policy as Kennedy spent more time considering it. Yet Hi1sman and his allies

managed to outflank opposition to a coup from virtually the entire Defense Department,

11 Ibid., p. 670.

7 Mark Hobel. Introduction.

including McNamara and Taylor, and the director ofthe CIA. This was no mean feat for

an Assistant Secretary ofState. Lodge's machinations in Saigon may have provided the

spark for the coup itself; however, it was Hilsman who provided the intellectual justification in Washington for Diem's removal that swayed a skeptical president. He performed essentially the same role for the in 1962, that year's most important political initiative in South Vietnam.

Fiercely loyal to Kennedy, and marginalized under Johnson, Hilsman left

government in January 1964. In articles, and in his 1967 book To Move a Nation,

Hilsman criticized the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War. He argued that the

political aspects ofcounterinsurgency had been forsaken in favor of a massive military

effort that could not defeat the NLF. He was wrong on many issues; he was right,

however, that the bombing ofNorth Vietnam and the deployment ofD.S. combat troops

would do little, in the long run, to stop the NLF insurgency.

In A Bright Shining Lie, wrote ofhis subject Col. John Paul Vann:

"By an obsession, by an unyielding dedication to the war, he had come to personify the

American endeavor in Vietnam.,,12 I make no such claims about Roger Hi1sman.

However, Roger Hilsman does stand as an unfairly neglected proxy for much ofwhat

John F. Kennedy hoped to accomplish in South Vietnam, and for many ofthe reasons

why his policies ultimately failed. Hilsman never enjoyed close to the level ofinfluence

over Kennedy, obviously, ofBundy, McNamara or Rusk. Yet when the chips were down

in late 1963, Kennedy backed Hilsman and his allies, and saw the commitment to

Vietnam in very similar ways.

12 Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New Yark: Vintage Books, 1988, p. 3.

8 Mark Hobel. Introduction.

In writing on Hilsman, it is necessary to mention at the start that ofKennedy's advisors, he was among the most knowledgeable, or at least believed himselfto be, on the subject of guerilla warfare. During the Second World War, Hilsman, then an officer with the OSS, had commanded a brigade oflocal guerilla partisans against the Japanese in

Burma. Kennedy, who had also served with exceptional valor in the war, loved war heroes, and "it was known that Kennedy had questioned [Hilsman] at length about his days as a guerrilla.,,13

In short, Hilsman believed that experience as well as intellect made him an expert on counterinsurgency, and this contributed to the confidence that allowed him to challenge leading military figures on strategy in Vietnam. The confidence and tendency to draw connections to his past are on display in To Move a Nation: in a passage describing the development ofthe "strategic hamlet" program in South Vietnam in early

1962, Hilsman wrote, "The more I reflected on my own experience as a guerilla in Burma and imagined what it would have been like ifwe had been facing strategic hamlets during

WWII, the more I was persuaded.,,14 Hilsman was hardly the only man in the

Administration, civilian or military, to draw a connection between his own personal War

and the foreign policy in the early 1960s. World War II in general stood as a powerful historical symbol for the policy-makers who had once fought in it. It is notable, however, that Hilsman's experiences came in a highly unconventional setting, and shaped his

views on strategy and tactics accordingly.

Any serious inquiry into the origins ofthe Vietnam War must take into account

the enormous body ofhistorical scholarship and analysis already existent. Ofthese

13 Ha1berstam, p. 123 14 Hilsman, p. 434

9 Mark Hobel. Introduction. works, I found most helpful those based on the extensive official documentation from the period. For me, the most useful and influential works were Fredrik Logevall's Choosing

War, Lawrence Freedman's Kennedy's Wars, David Kaiser's American Tragedy, Philip

Catton's Diem's Final Failure, Anne Blair's Lodge in Vietnam, and David Anderson's

Trapped by Success. Several earlier works were also helpful: Leslie Gelb and Richard

Betts's The Irony ofVietnam: The System Worked, Paul Kattenburg's The Vietnam

Trauma in American Foreign Policy, David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest,

Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History, Neil Sheehan's incomparable A Bright Shining

Lie, and, ofcourse, Hilsman's own memoirs, To Move a Nation. Setting aside To Move a

Nation, the best depiction ofRoger Hilsman in the existing historical literature is

undoubtedly contained in American Tragedy.

The bulk ofthis history is drawn from the enormous primary documentation of

the Kennedy Administration's Vietnam policy. The most important sources for these

documents are the four heavy volumes ofthe official Foreign Relations ofthe United

States, 1961-1963, Vietnam [FRUS], a compendium ofthe key U.S. government

documents from the period. To fill in the gaps, I benefited from an additional resource

not usually available to an undergraduate: my advisor, Professor James McAllister, had

painstakingly collected photocopied documents from archives all over the United States

pertaining to the Vietnam War but left out ofthe FR US. I am very grateful to Prof.

McAllister for allowing me access to his document collection from the Kennedy

Administration, which proved an invaluable source for this project.

The common thread uniting these various and varied studies is the reminder that

the Vietnam War was the product oftalented, flawed men, who viewed the world and its

10 Mark Hobel. Introduction. challenges in a particular way, responded to the pressures ofthe system in which they worked, and together led the United States into conflict. Some figures, obviously, loom larger than others. Others, like Roger Hilsman, do not stand as tall as presidents, but their ideologies, histories and choices can serve as valuable prisms for viewing the events in which they participated.

Hilsman's tenure in the State Department was defined in the end by his faith in the ability ofthe United States to help its South Vietnamese allies destroy the NLF insurgency. More broadly, he believed that during the 1960s the communist challenge in the Third World would increasingly take the form ofnative insurgencies funded by the

USSR and China, and that sustaining American prestige and credibility required finding a successful formula to defeat these insurgencies. He held above all that the foundation of an effective counterinsurgency campaign lay in establishing the political legitimacy of the non-communist government among its people, and that political reform was therefore critical in the struggle. Hilsman was also extremely skeptical ofthe effectiveness of conventional American military power in defeating an insurgency; bombing and

American ground troops could prove worse than useless. The idea that counterinsurgency represented a fundamentally different approach to warfare than that seen on traditional battlefields found a sympathetic ear with the President, and indeed many in the Administration. Hilsman was able to provide the intellectual and bureaucratic impetus for the strategic hamlet program in 1962, and regime change in

Saigon in late 1963.

However, Hilsman was a forceful advocate for the commitment to South

Vietnam, and a strong opponent of any sort ofnegotiated settlement. He did not question

11 Mark Hobel. Introduction. the United State's role in Southeast Asia, or the tenets ofa worldwide containment policy. He believed in the preservation ofan anti-Communist South Vietnam, and that victory could be achieved there. In the end, however, the policies he advocated to secure those goals, especially support for the coup against Diem, undermined core concepts of his counterinsurgency strategy. To wage an effective campaign against the NLF, Saigon had to win the support ofthe people ofSouth Vietnam; the end ofthe Diem regime, odious and incompetent though it was, ushered in a political vacuum filled by a parade of generals. The Americanization ofthe Vietnam War had begun, and under Johnson it would accelerate. Hilsman, had he had the opportunity, likely would not have counseled

Kennedy to follow Johnson's path of Operation Rolling Thunder and American combat troops. The Kennedy Administration, however, created the conditions under which its

successor would see these choices as logical.

12 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the in South Vietnam.

Chapter I

Roger Hilsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam

Although Roger Hilsman would exercise substantial influence over the Kennedy

Administration's Vietnam policy in 1962 and especially 1963, he had little say in the

administration's important decisions in its first year in office on the American

commitment to the defense ofSouth Vietnam. As the newly appointed director ofthe

State Department's Bureau ofIntelligence and Research, Hilsman's immediate responsibility was "streamline[ing]" INR and pushing its staffto write "policy-oriented"

intelligence reports more likely to be read by top officials than the "somewhat plodding

tomes" ofthe past. 1 In fact, Hilsman's first forceful entry into the administration's

Vietnam policy discussion came in November 1961, almost a year into Kennedy's first

term, and after several key decisions had already been made on South Vietnam.

Yet Hilsman gained influence over Vietnam policy in the same way that virtually

all successful presidential advisers and governmental administrators make their voices

heard: by being responsive to the policy instincts ofthe President, offering advice to and

creating opportunities for Kennedy that accorded with the latter's own general ideas

about how the United States should proceed in supporting South Vietnam. It became

clear during the Kennedy Administration that Kennedy and Hilsman held fundamentally

similar beliefs about the nature ofthe struggle for South Vietnam; it is important to note,

however, that since Hi1sman only became an influential adviser on Vietnam in late 1961,

he had the opportunity to observe the basic course ofdecision-making during that year

before jumping into the fray. To understand the importance ofHilsman's policy

1 Hilsman, p. 51.

13 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hi/sman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. recommendations in 1962-1963, his connection to and influence over Kennedy, and

Hi1sman's key place within the framework ofthe Kennedy Administration's escalation of the war in South Vietnam, it is necessary to examine the basic structure ofthe renewed

American commitment to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime that took place in 1961.

President Kennedy had entered office on a razor-thin margin ofvictory over Vice

President . The Massachusetts Senator had promised a "New Frontier," a reinvigoration ofthe American government on both the domestic and the international stage. The problem ofdefending anti-communist South Vietnam was an inherited one from the Eisenhower Administration, but it was a commitment that Kennedy approached with vigor. The new President believed that Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" containment strategy did not adequately address the threat ofcommunist guerilla and subversive warfare, which could not be countered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent; the solution, Kennedy and his top advisors believed, was a "flexible response" strategy that allowed for different levels ofmilitary response to greet different levels ofwarfare. As

John Lewis Gaddis notes, the New Frontier's version ofcontainment had risen initially out ofunresolved foreign policy questions from the 1950s: " .. .it had been Eisenhower's inability to deal with [Vietnam] and comparable problems that had produced the 'flexible response' critique in the first place.,,2

Most historians agree that Kennedy's commitment to the defense ofanti- communist South Vietnam rested on a "middle route" strategy. They believe that

Kennedy considered it political anathema to withdraw and allow communist forces to topple the Diem regime; by the same token, he was unwilling to fully Americanize the

2 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies ofContainment: A Critical Appraisal ofPostwar American National Security Policy. Oxford: , 1982, p. 237.

14 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. war and order American combat troops to take over the bulk ofthe fighting from the

South Vietnamese. Gelb and Betts argue that Kennedy, in a pattern that characterized all

American Presidents involved in the escalation ofthe Vietnam War, "did what [he] deemed to be minimally necessary at each stage to keep...South Vietnam out of

Communist hands.,,3 Fredrik Logevall, whose interpretation diverges significantly from

Gelb and Betts's over the personal culpability ofLyndon Johnson and his advisors for the

Americanization ofthe war, nevertheless agrees with Gelb and Betts's general approach to Kennedy's Vietnam policy:

His decisions on Vietnam.. .led to a significantly expanded American presence in the war, but they had usually been compromise decisions, between the extremes ofan Americanized war and an American withdrawal, both ofwhich he seemed to fear in equal measure. 'We'd cross that bridge when we came to it,' was his brother Robert's description ofthe administration's thinking about the prospect ofa complete deterioration in South Vietnam. It is an expression that effectively summarizes Kennedy's entire approach to the war.4

The trouble with the orthodox interpretation ofKennedy's Vietnam policy is that

it does not adequately explain his motives and strategy. It contains a great deal oftruth, to be sure, and certainly on several occasions Kennedy chose the path ofleast political resistance to settle internal debates on how to manage the commitment to South Vietnam.

The "middle route" explanation is based primarily on the most important effects of

Kennedy's policies, namely forestalling the collapse ofanti-communist South Vietnam

and pushing the truly painful decisions on combat troop deployments and expanding the

war to back to 1964-1965. However, it vastly oversimplifies the motives

ofthe Kennedy Administration in expanding the American commitment to South

Vietnam, and subordinates strategic logic to political logic in interpreting Kennedy's

3 Gelb and Betts, p. 25. 4 Logevall, p. 73.

15 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. decisions. It also obscures how Roger Hilsman, an official truly enthusiastic about aiding the GVN in defeating the NLF, could rise to become one ofKennedy's chieflieutenants on Vietnam.

Kennedy's Vietnam policy rested on the firm commitment that the u.s. should aid the people ofSouth Vietnam in their struggle against communist insurgency, The

U.S. could offer high levels of advice and assistance to the South Vietnamese government; Kennedy believed, however, that the U.S. should not under any circumstances follow the French example in Indochina. Since the 1950s, he had argued that it would be disastrous to send American soldiers to undertake the bulk ofthe fighting in South Vietnam.

In practice, Kennedy's commitment extended to the Saigon regime ofNgo Dinh

Diem. Kennedy grasped that the political components ofthe counterinsurgency struggle were as important as, ifnot more so than, the military components, a position espoused loudly by Hilsman. The extensive military support Kennedy wanted to provide to the

GVN therefore came with a caveat: Diem eventually had to undertake critical political reforms or the entire U.S.-GVN alliance would come to naught and Saigon would fall.

Diem, however, and true to form, proved unwilling to bend. The initial dilemma facing the Kennedy Administration in South Vietnam was a resilient one, and one which

Hilsman would confront in 1962. How might the U.S. sustain the short-term military

commitment to South Vietnam necessary to hold offthe NLF while at the same time push

Diem toward the critical refoffils necessary for his state's ultimate survival?

Historians have pointed to Kennedy's relative youth and inexperience upon

gaining the presidency, and those perceived shortcomings seemed most acute in the realm

16 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. offoreign policy. He could not help suffering in comparison to Eisenhower, and even to

Richard Nixon, when it came to Cold Warrior gravitas. Yet Kennedy had been engaged for a decade in the politics surrounding the U.S. response to France's defeat in Indochina, and the creation of a fragile anti-communist state in South Vietnam. Vietnam "had a special meaning for Kennedy, because it was the first issue on which he had gained some recognition as an expert on foreign policy."s As a young congressman touring America's worldwide Cold War defenses in 1951, Kennedy had put down for a day in Saigon, where the u.s. was largely financing a French war to retain its Indochinese colonies against the communist and nationalist Viet Minh. Edmund Gullion, a Foreign Service

Officer whom Kennedy would appoint Ambassador to Congo in 1961 to handle a brewing crisis there, told the politician, "We're going nowhere out here. The French have lost. Ifwe come in here and do the same thing we will lose too, for the same reason.,,6

Gullion's argument, which appealed to Kennedy's senseofliberal anti-communism, was not that Vietnam was a lost cause; rather, that communism had usurped the mantle of nationalism and was laying waste to the colonial empires ofold. The United States, untainted by an imperialist history, could beat back Communist insurgency by supporting indigenous nationalist leaders with programs ofmodemization. In 1953, Kennedy argued that the Eisenhower Administration should use its aid as leverage to force the French to grant independence to Vietnam, and then support the formation of"a reliable and

5 Basset, Lawrence 1. and Stephen E. Pelz. "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War", in Kennedy's Questfor Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. by Thomas G. Paterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 225. Basset and Pelz's essay, part ofa revisionist and sharply critical collection ofessays on Kennedy's foreign policy, goes overboard in criticizing Kennedy. Their response to glowing Camelot rhetoric is to present Kennedy as at once an inveterate Cold Warrior drunk on the lessons ofMunich and a cynical politician aware ofthe futility ofthe cause in South Vietnam but cowering before hard-line Republicans ready to smack him for being "soft". His Vietnam policy is portrayed as profoundly misguided: "Kennedy's program ofindustrialization, rural aid, re~.:ttlement, and helicopter assaults carried little appeal in the countryside." 6 Reeves, Richard. President Kennedy: Profile ofPower. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1 )3, p. 254.

17 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

crusading native army with a dependable officer corps." Otherwise, it would be "self-

destructive...to pour money, material, and men into the jungles ofIndochina," and

especially to contemplate sending in American troops to support the exhausted French.

Kennedy's theme was similar after the Geneva agreements of 1954, when he encouraged

full-hearted U.S. support for the new prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who could wield

"the latent power ofnationalism to create an independent, anti-Communist Vietnam" by

forming a government of"a determined band ofpatriotic Vietnamese around one man of

faith."?

The case for Kennedy's fundamental aggressiveness on Vietnam also

encompasses his association with the American Friends ofVietnam (AFV) organization,

formed in 1955 as a sort of lobbying group for continuous American aid to the fledgling

Diem regime in Saigon. In 1956, Kennedy gave a rousing speech to AFV members,

proclaiming South Vietnam the "finger in the dike" preventing "the red tide of

Communism" from flooding Southeast Asia. 8

But reliance on Kennedy's rhetoric, which never wavered from an American

commitment to the defense ofanti-communist South Vietnam, misses the crucial point,

acknowledged by most scholars, that Kennedy's hawkishness commingled with a kind of

fatalism about the extent to which U.S. power could compel favorable results in

Southeast Asia. In 1953, for instance, Kennedy stopped short ofsupporting Senator

Barry Goldwater's proposal for an ultimatum to France on Vietnamese independence,

arguing that while French stubbornness in the face ofcalls for political reform was

certainly damaging the war against the Viet Minh, "such harsh words to say about an

7 Basset and Pelz, p. 226. 8 Anderson, David L. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961. New York: Press, 1991, p. 158.

18 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. ancient friend and ally" and the issuance of an ultimatum might well cause France to withdraw in anger and remove all defenses to a communist takeover ofSoutheast Asia.

Instead, Kennedy favored a compromise between complete toleration ofFrench behavior and ultimatums for reform, wherein American aid might be "administered in such a way as to encourage through all available means the freedom and independence desired by the peoples ofthe Associated States.,,9 In this case, Kennedy chose to navigate a middle course on political reform in Vietnam; the pattern would repeat itself a decade later when the obstinate regime in Saigon had a Vietnamese face.

The beliefin the limits ofAmerican power in Southeast Asia extended to the notion ofAmerican combat troops replacing the French; a notion that a decade after the

French withdrew became a sordid and violent reality. Kennedy, since his 1951 visit with

Gullion, was repelled by the concept, and believed that American troops would be completely useless and counterproductive marching and fighting across the Vietnamese landscape. The idea accorded with his beliefin the power ofnationalism - American combat troops would be seen as new sentinells ofimperialism and would undermine the nationalist credentials ofthe Saigon regime. Militarily, they might prevent the GVN from collapsing for a time. But politically, they would ring the GVN's death knell by giving resistance to communism in Vietnam an entirely American face.

Throughout 1961, Kennedy rej ected or ignored the advice ofofficials who believed that a deployment ofAmerican combat troops, even ifthey did not take part in

the fighting, was necessary to deter further infiltration ofcadres from North Vietnam and prevent the prospect ofChinese intervention. In response to a warning from

Undersecretary ofState for Economic Affairs George Ball that an American troop

9 Dallek, p. 186.

19 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hilsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. commitment to South Vietnam would eventually mean "three hundred thousand men in the paddies and jungles," Kennedy replied, "George, I always thought you were one of the brightest guys in town, but you're just crazier than hell. That just isn't going to happen." As Lawrence Freedman correctly points out, the statement itselfis ambiguous; but Kennedy made far more explicit statements to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Roger

Hilsman during the same period, in Nov. 1961 as advisors led bySpecial Military

Representative Gen. Maxwell Taylor urged a small combat troop commitment. He told

Schlesinger that some ofhis top advisors "want a force ofAmerican troops. They say its necessary to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be just like . The

troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days

everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told to send in more troops. It's like taking

a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another."lO

Ina decisive meeting with advisors on Nov. 15, Kennedy let it be known that "he

could even make a rather strong case against intervening in an area 10,000 miles away

against 16,000 guerillas with a native army of200,000, where millions have been spent

for years with no success."ll The American commitment, in line with Kennedy's own

instincts, would be limited. Limited, in this case, should not be seen to imply that

Kennedy rejected steps that might have resulted in an American victory against

Communism for fear ofdomestic repercussions. The Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts view,

that successive American presidents at each stage in the escalation in South Vietnam took

the minimum steps necessary to prevent defeat, does not adequately explain Kennedy's

10 Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 331. II NSC meeting, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1961-1963. VoL 1. Vietnam 1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 608. [Note: Documents cited from the FRUS series will be accompanied by document date in the citation only when the date is not mentioned in nearby text.]

20 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. attitude towards the American commitment to South Vietnam or his decisions in 1961. 12

Rather, American aid could be utilized to support the South Vietnamese nationalist leadership in Saigon; but in the final estimation the battle for the political allegiance of the population ofSouth Vietnam had to be won by a native government commanding a native army.

The corollary to that belief, ofcourse, was that such a government might exist in

Saigon. It was a matter ofcontroversy whether the regime ofPresident Ngo Dinh Diem had by 1961 through repressive and authoritarian policies forfeited the opportunity to create for itself a broad base ofpopular support.:. As Gen. Edward Lansdale, a former CIA operative and veteran advisor in Saigon, reported to Robert McNamara in Jan. 1961:

"There are plenty ofAaron Burr's, a few Alexander Hamilton's and practically no

George Washington's, Tom Jefferson's or Tom Paine's in Saigon today... largely as a result ofour U.S. political influence. This celiainly is not the U.S. policy we had hoped to implement.,,13 The analogy to American history, awkward though it may be, expressed what had become a widespread, though by no means unanimous sentiment among

American officials involved in Vietnam policy. Ngo Dinh Diem may have been a deeply flawed, potentially disastrous figure to support as the leader ofSouth Vietnam; but the other options were so unpalatable that they were not really options at all. At the start of the Kennedy Administration, the paucity ofalternative policies was acknowledged, and a policy ofwhat journalist Homer Bigart called "sink or swim with

12 Ge1b and Betts, p. 25. 13 Lansdale to Secretary and Deputy Secretary ofDefense Memorandum, Jan. 17, 1961, in United States­ Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. Washington, D.C.: GovemmentPrinting Office, 1971, pps. 1-13.

21 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

Ngo Dinh Diem" was enacted. 14 Despite objections from within the State Department, top officials including President Kennedy believed that pressures and attempts at coercion towards political reform had resulted in deeply deteriorated relations with the

Diem regime, and had aided the resurgent NLF in quickly gaining control over much of the SouthVietnamese countryside. The hopeful alternative was persuasion towards reform in the GVN, while at the same time upping the commitment ofaid, arms, and advisors to tum the tide on the NLF.

David Anderson paints a bleak portrait ofan American commitment to South

Vietnam that had evolved perversely during the Eisenhower Administration. American support to the French, following the siege ofDienbienphu and the signing ofthe Geneva agreements, was transferred to support for Ngo Dinh Diem's Saigon regime, which jostled for authority over territory south ofthe 1i h parallel with the armies ofreligious sects, the thugs of a vast Saigoncriminal gang, and the stay-behind cadres ofthe Viet

Minh looking forward to reunification after planned national elections in 1956. The elections, which were expected to produce a decisive victory for Ho Chi Minh's communist regime in Hanoi, never occurred; Diem claimed that his regime had not been a signatory to the agreements, and did not recognize the legitimacy ofthe government of

North Vietnam. Anderson writes: "It was inconceivable that Diem would have submitted willingly to an electoral contest with Ho Chi Minh under any terms." The Eisenhower

Administration ran diplomatic cover for Diem, convincing France and Britain that the

U.S. would bear responsibility for the consequences ofnot holding an election; it benefited at the time from clear signals from major Communist powers that the USSR

14 Prochnau, William. Once Upon a Distant War: Young War Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Times Books, 1995, p. 49.

22 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hilsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. and China "wanted no more trouble over Vietnam than necessary." In short, u.s. policy towards South Vietnam became a matter of, in the words ofDillon Anderson,

Eisenhower's special assistant for national security affairs, "[looking] to the possibility of saving a separated South Vietnam from Communist domination, even ifthe non-

Communist forces could win an all Vietnam election.,,15

Preserving an anti-commlmist South Vietnam meant supporting an anti- communist South Vietnamese government, and Diem's regime emerged, somewhat surprisingly, as the best, and probably only option. The doubts about Diem emerged early, and though the South Vietnamese President attracted a number ofvery influential supporters, including Senators John F. Kennedy and Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority

Leader, he never won over the American diplomats in Saigon. In Nov. 1954, departing

American Ambassador Donald Heath warned his replacement, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, that Diem's conservative mandarin's outlook and exceedingly narrow popular base of support were liabilities that "may be greater than all support and guidance we give him and a possible successor must be sought.,,16 Collins, for his part, soon came to echo the sentiments ofhis predecessor, writing to Secretary ofState Jolm Foster Dulles on April 7,

1955, the following:

During the five months that I have been here I have come to admire Diem in many ways. He has valuable spiritual qualities, is incorruptible, is a devoted Nationalist, has great tenacity. However, these very qualities, linked with his lack ofpractical political sense, his inability to compromise, his inherent incapacity to get along with other able men, and his tendency to be suspicious ofthe motives ofanyone who disagrees with him, make him practically incapable ofholding his government together. As I have often pointed out, he pays more attention to the advice ofhis brothers Luyen and Nhu than he does to ...me. I must now say that my judgment is that Diem does not have the capacity to achieve the necessary unity ofpurpose and action from

15 Anderson, p. 123-124. 16 Ibid., p. 93.

23 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

his people which is essential to prevent this country from falling under Communist control.l?

Many diplomats in Saigon in 1955 and afterwards would agree with Collins' basic

description ofDiem. Even his opponents in the American foreign policy bureaucracy

commended him for his staunch nationalism and incorruptibility. His most vocal

defenders would admit to Diem's authoritarian streak. William Colby, CIA chiefof

station in Saigon from 1959-1962, argued, "Diem's style was that ofthe traditional

Mandarin, assuming the legitimacy ofhis position to be beyond challenge and

manipulating the currents ofthe distant imperial court (now in Washington) to ensure the

continued support necessary to his mission ofmodemization.,,18 The influence ofhis

brothers was likewise undisputed. Darkly, in times ofcrisis the influence ofNgo Dinh

Nhu seemed to grow over his brother. Nhu had built the shadowy Can Lao organization,

an instmment of authority reaching throughout the GVN bureaucracy. Critics ofthe Ngos

likened it to the secret police ofa fledgling totalitarian regime. Ambassador Elbridge

Durbrow reported to Washington in 1959 that the Can Lao "has created an authoritarian

organization largely modeled on Communist lines," which enforced loyalty to the Diem

regime and "took a cut ofevery maj or economic transaction."19

During the Eisenhower Administration, the debate over Diem seemed to be cut

short repeatedly by events on the ground in Saigon. Thus, soon after Collins telegrammed

his profound misgivings, and Eisenhower began to shift towards authorizing a policy of

searching actively for an alternative, Diem (possibly warned ofdevelopments in

Washington by Lansdale) moved against his nemesis, the Binh Xuyen criminal gang of

17 Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1955-1957. Vol. 1. Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 219. 18 Colby, William, with James McCargar. Lost Victory. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989, p. 29. 19 Kaiser, David. American Tragedy. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 2000, p. 61.

24 Mark Habel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

Saigon. In a battle on the streets ofthe capitol, Binh Xuyen's fighters were cmshed with surprising ease by an ARVN force led by General Duong Van ("Big") Minh. Soon afterward, during talks with the French Foreign Minister in early May 1955, Foster

Dulles told his counterpart that the U.S. would "have to take a gamble we can succeed with Diem." He added that, "in that part ofthe world, there was no such thing as a

'coalition' government, but one-man govermnents.,,20

Similarly, a failed coup attempt by reform-minded ARVN paratroopers on Nov.

11, 1961, might have succeeded, William Colby claims, had the paratroopers been more

decisive. They had made the fatal error of allowing Diem to stall with negotiations,

giving the President time to call for aid from army units billeted outside Saigon?] Prior to

the coup attempt, and in the face ofNLF gains in the countryside,22 Durbrow had brought pressure to bear on Diem, confronting Diem on Oct. 14 with a stern request for changes

in policy and personnel, including the transfer ofNhu to a position outside ofSouth

Vietnam. When the coup plotters presented similar demands to Diem a month later, and

"the U.S. embassy initially adopted a neutral stance toward the surprise uprising," any 23 tmst that remained between Diem and Durbrow was shattered. That Diem weathered

the storm meant he also gained a new lease on political life; some ofhis most dangerous

opponents in the military and in domestic opposition had exposed themselves to GVN

retribution in the failed coup attempt. The tension between the American mission in

Saigon and the Presidential Palace undermined the position ofDiem's detractors.

20 Anderson, p. 117. 21 Colby, p. 77. 22 The NLF had resumed armed subversive activities in 1959, after attaining authorization from Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam. 23 Anderson, p. 192.

25 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

The great irony ofthe Diem debate was that both his admirers and critics were right. Supporters, like William Colby, argued that a strong, autocratic leader was required to hold the fragile state together, and that no viable opposition or alternative existed.

Critics countered that, in the long run, Diem could not muster the broad political support needed totum back the challenge from the NLF insurgency. Both sides made important points. The trouble, however, was that the US. had made what amounted to an irrevocable commitment to defend anti-communist South Vietnam, and could not effectively threaten to withhold aid without harming the war effort. Diem's tendency was to centralize and allow few openings for any sort ofreal opposition to emerge; he knew that with his tenuous relations with the US., the emergence ofa powerful opposition would be his downfall. At every stage, Diem believed it to be more dangerous to provide openings to opponents and enact governmental reforms leading to a diminishment ofhis clan's power than to flaunt the wishes ofthe U.S. ambassador. His political survival hinged on the lack ofviable alternatives to his rule.

In late 1954, for example, Collins sought to convince Diem to broaden his government to include Phan Huy Quat, whom Collins believed was a "first rate" nationalist and government minister. He lobbied Diem to give Quat the portfolio of

Minister ofDefense. But Nhu lobbied harder in the opposite direction. Anderson writes:

"The Ngo regime was unwilling to risk allowing a highly respected nationalist rival to assume charge ofthe vital reform ofthe armed forces.,,24 By June 1961, Quat was reduced to calling on the American Embassy with an absurd proposal: "Quat came to the purpose ofhis visit, which was to request US. assistance and encouragement in detaching two or three Vietnamese provinces from regular Government administration in

24 Anderson, p. 96.

26 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. order to enable Quat to show that he could rally all nationalists and Sects in those provinces in the fight against the Communists." The visit moved , one ofthe top diplomats at the U.S. Embassy and one ofits sharpes(critics ofDiem, to declare, "His approach to us shows that he feels himselfpowerless to do anything without u.S. support, thus indicating that he has no real political base on which he can rely within the country.,,25

The lobbying power ofthe American Embassy decreased accordingly. Durbrow, by then universally acknowledged to be exhausted and in need ofreplacement, sent word to his successor, Fritz Nolting, a career Foreign Service Officer stationed at NATO headquarters in , that representatives ofthe U.S. must maintain pressure on Diem for political reforms, even ifit created tension in the relationship between allies: "For over year and a halfwe have been making suggestions to GVN ofmuch more delicate nature, i.e., Can Lao Party, Diem's entourage, inefficient use of security forces, of corruption, desist in anti-Sihanouk [Norodom Sihanouk, the neutralist prime minister of

Cambodia] activities, etc.... In order help them help themselves we have to press for many things which are not palatable to Diem or others.,,26 But little more than a week earlier, on March 29, Durbrow had approached an ARVN general rumored to have turned anti-Diem: "Without trying to draw Kim out I told him, as I have told other Vietnamese critical ofDiem, how fortunate Viet-Nam was that group which led abortive coup in

November had not been successful. Ifit had won out, it would still be floundering on who

25 Mendenhall to State, June 17, 1961, 751K.OO/6-1761 HBS. 26 Durbrow to State, April 7, 1961, 751K.5-MSP/4-761 CS.

27 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

should be in Cabinet and Communists would be knocking on door or already would be

into the government.,,27

In practice, that meant that regardless ofwhether the U.S. ambassador sought to

pressure and coerce, issuing demarches and threatening aid cuts, or whether the

ambassador chose to persuade gently, making political reform a secondary objective, he would have virtually no real power to make Diem reform his government in ways the

Ngos opposed. Gelb and Betts hit the nail on the head in their landmark 1979 study: the

U.S. lacked any real political leverage over Diem, because "political instability made

reforms imperative for the long run but also made it imperative not to throw the fragile

government into chaos in the short run; leverage required knocking South Vietnamese

heads, but ifthey were knocked hard enough to matter, the Communists would profit.,,28

In early 1961, the Kennedy Administration's method ofbreaking the impasse on

political reform was to resort to a tactic ofpersuasion. Rostow wrote to Kennedy that "we

must help Nolting persuade [Diem] that our support for him is unambiguous, but that he

must face up to the political and morale elements ofthe job, as well as its military

component." In the same memorandum, Rostow advocated sending Lansdale to Saigon,

ostensibly to do some ofthe persuading ofDiem, and then segued on to military 29 "unexploited counter-guerilla assets" including helicopters and Special Forces.

Nolting, upon arrival in Saigon, took the ball and ran with it, reporting on June 12

that "political liberalization is probably less important than Government effectiveness in

its effect on coup prospects since those dissatisfied with inadequate opportunity to

27 Durbrow to State, Apri19, 1961, 751K.OO/4-861 RBS. 28 Ge1b and Betts, p. 83. 29 Rostow to Kennedy, March 29, 1961, JFKL B193 NSF.

28 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hitsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. participate in political life have no power base themselves to overthrow government.,,30

On July 14, he relayed that he believed "the United States should have no hesitation on moral grounds in backing Diem to the hilt.,,3] By October, the Kennedy Administration found itselflodged in a situation where it wished to pony up with aid and advisors at unprecedented levels, while at the same time would not, and indeed could not, ask for political reform as a quid pro quo, although such reform was still looked on ruefully in many quarters as a necessity for eventual victory over the NLF. In advance ofGen.

Maxwell Taylor's visit to Saigon in Oct. 1961 as Kennedy's special envoy to examine the deteriorating security situation in South Vietnam and issue recommendations for reversal, the regime issued a warning via the U.S. Embassy. Diem's intelligence chief"cited the example ofthe serious breach between Ambassador Durbrow and President Diem which was occasioned by the former's blunt insistence on the need for government reforms. Dr.

Tuyen also ruled out any such recommendations by General Taylor as inappropriate and unacceptable to President Diem." A covering note on the memorandum, passed on to

McGeorge Bundy by Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary ofthe National Security

Council, reads, "Ifthis is true, Gen. Taylor is really up against something.,,32

Interestingly, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who never played a major role in

Vietnam policy-making during the Kennedy Administration, seemed to intuitively grasp the contradiction in American support for Diem. On a visit to South Vietnam in May

1961, the purpose ofwhich was to publicly assert continued American support and enthusiasm for the Diem regime and the cause of"Free Vietnam", Johnson proclaimed

Diem the "Winston Churchill ofAsia," and stated furthermore that "the battle against

30 Nolting to State, June 12, 1961, FW 751K.OO/6-1261. 31 Nolting to State, FRUS,I, p. 218. 32 Smith to Bundy, Oct. 18, 1961, JFKL B194 NSF.

29 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger HUsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam.

Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination... or the

United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up defenses on our own shores.,,33 It is manifest from Johnson's clear-·headed report on his trip that he did not view Diem as a Churchillian heir, writing that "there are disturbing suggestions that the government not only fears the Viet Cong and terrorists but its own people as well."

Nevertheless, "the existing government in Saigon is the only realistic alternative to Viet

Minh control in South Viet Nam.,,34 Or, as Johnson replied when the journalist Stanley

Karnow asked after the "Churchill" speech whether the Vice President truly believed what he'd said: "Shit, Diem's the only boy we got out there.,,35

By the end of 1961, the South Vietnamese regime ofPresident Ngo Dinh Diem appeared assured ofimmense American military and economic aid in turning the tide on the NLF guerrillas. For the moment, Diem could afford to defy the obvious American desire that he reform his government, dilute the influence ofms family, and allow the creation of a real opposition that might one day challenge him democratically for control ofthe government.

In Washington, the dimensions ofthe Kennedy Administration's Vietnam policy had sharpened. Kennedy hoped to harness the power ofnationalism to repel Communist advances in Southeast Asia. In 1961, for lack ofbetter alternatives, Ngo Dinh Diem and the GVN had to be the instruments to accomplish this objective. The U.S. could contribute a substantial and growing amount ofmilitary and economic assistance; but under no circumstances should U.S. forces take over the actual fighting ofthe war and

33 Kamow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 250. 34 Vice President's Report, May 23, 1961, FRUS,I, p. 154. 35 Kamow, p. 214.

30 Mark Hobel. Chapter 1. Roger Hilsman and the New Frontier in South Vietnam. the actual governing ofSouth Vietnam, and in so doing replicate the imperial model of the French in Indochina that had resoundingly failed.

The chiefdilemma that confronted Kennedy and top officials in the administration was the complex nature ofthe struggle for South Vietnam. On the one hand, military force had to be deployed immediately to tum back recent NLF gains in the countryside. On the other hand, however, Diem's autocratic tendencies, on display since the initial days ofhis presidency, threatened to doom the GVN to defeat in the long run.

Measures that turned the tide militarily in the short-term helped solidify an ultimately ruinous political status quo; by the same token, attempts to push Diem to reform had demonstrated the potential to disrupt the fragile balance ofthe GVN and therefore jeopardize ARVN's efforts outside Saigon.

In late 1961, Kennedy had developed a need for advisors who could split the

difference on his administration's Vietnam policy, and create ways to help the GVN win

the political struggle for South Vietnam while at the same time avoid defeat in the

military sphere.

Roger Hilsman at INR, who sensed the President's needs, began to craft a strategy

that could accomplish those dual, delicate objectives. His ideas would form the basis of

much ofthe administration's Vietnam policy in 1962. As it had so many other American

officials, however, the defiant, stubborn, exasperating Diem regime would come to

bedevil Hilsman.

31 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Chapter II

An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962

2.1: Genesis ofthe "Strategic Concept for South Vietnam"

Roger Hilsman, who in good time would rise to become one ofNgo Dinh Diem's most powerful, vociferous, and effective critics within the United States government, began with a relatively benign view ofthe South Vietnamese President. In a memorandum to Secretary ofState Rusk in mid-November 1961, Hilsman sympathized with Diem's suspicion oftop ARVN military leaders, writing: "We have an obligation in

Vietnam and elsewhere to bolster the civilian components ofthe government. An enhancement ofcivilian power and prestige in Saigon and in the provinces will do much to offset the fear ofthe military so prevalent in Diem's thinking."l Several weeks later,

Hilsman warned Rusk and Taylor ofINR intelligence on coup plotting in South Vietnam, involving the influential ARVN Gen. Duong Van Minh. Hi1sman cautioned that the generals had been closely monitoring the ongoing policy debate in Washington, and that

"their estimate ofUS intentions could strongly influence a decision to undertake a

COUp.,,2 In late 1961, Hilsman saw Diem as a flawed but capable leader menaced by predatory generals within his own armed forces. He believed it was necessary for the

United States to work with Diem to strengthen alternative, civilian sources ofpower and leadership in South Vietnam to prevent the Diem-ARVN rivalry from fatally destabilizing the war effort against the Viet Congo That process would necessarily mean a dilution ofDiem's personal power and that ofhis immediate Palace coterie; but

I Hilsman to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1961, FRUS, I, p. 628. 2 Hi1sman to Secretary ofState, Nov. 28,1961, FRUS, I, p. 683

32 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Hilsman certainly looked at the prospect ofa possible ARVN coup against Diem as a fearful and disastrous alternative. 3

By late 1963, many policy-makers in Washington, D.C., and Saigon, from the top level on down, would revise their initial views on the Diem regime's chances in the war against the NLF. Hilsman's estimation ofthe effectiveness ofDiem and the GVN changed earlier, more drastically, and more decisively than perhaps any other official's.

At the start of 1962, Hilsman would become the champion ofa particular counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized the political dimensions ofthe struggle for the South Vietnamese countryside and the hearts and minds ofits peasantry, and called for increased coordination between the South Vietnamese and their American advisors in both ARVN and the country's civilian administration. In harsh contrast, Diem and Nhu favored a strategy founded on extreme nationalism and the unpleasant, temporary necessity ofAmerican assistance. Trusting theirinstincts and keeping close counsel, the pair in 1962 went further in consolidating their own power and clamping down on domestic opposition; in addition, they moved viciously and with seeming impunity to limit American sources ofadvice, particularly those who might advance criticisms ofthe regime. A subtle but vitally important rift began to open in 1962 between the American officials, including Roger Hilsman, who believed their plans held the key to defeat of communist insurgency in South Vietnam, and the Ngos, who wanted to preserve their independence at all costs.

3 In contrast to John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador to India, who favored the eventual neutralization of Southeast Asia and the immediate toppling ofNgo Dinh Diem. On Nov. 22, he wrote to Kemledy: "It is a cliche that there is no alternative to Diem's regime. This is politically naIve .... It is a better rule that nothing succeeds like successors. We should not be alarmed by the army as an alternative. It would buy time and get a fresh dynamic." Galbraith to Kennedy, Nov. 22, 1961, JFKL B19S NSF.

33 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Hilsman's memo crossed McGeorge Bundy's desk on Nov. 16, 1961, too late to have anything more than a marginal impact on the Vietnam policy debate within the

Administration. The day before, Kennedy had made clear in a meeting with his top officials that he did not favor the deployment ofUS. combat troops to South Vietnam, but that he nevertheless favored a limited commitment ofUS. military advisors and financial assistance to the GVN. 4 Kennedy had also emphasized over the course of 1961 that American officials must seek to persuade Diem to embark on reforms, rather than use antagonizing pressures to force the GVN's hand. With that in mind, Hilsman's memo, a summary ofa four-month INR survey ofthe communist threat to South

Vietnam, was virtually assured a favorable reception. It emphasized that the guerilla threat had to be met with a "tactical doctrine quite different from the traditional doctrine ofregular forces," emphasizing police work, intelligence collection, civic action in the countryside, and close cooperation between American advisors and the South Vietnamese at all administrative levels. Hi1sman also wrote that the small-scale deployment of

American combat forces envisioned by Gen. Maxwell Taylor might well place the US.

"in a worse diplomatic and strategic posture than ifwe had not sent any units in to begin with."

As stated earlier, Hilsman added his voice to the chorus that favored persuasion and cultivation rather that pressure in prodding Diem towards important internal reforms.

Rather than accepting the political status quo in South Vietnam, however, Hilsman urged that the U.S. seek to go around Diem ifnecessary to gain reforms in the countryside, by developing close advisory relationships with Diem's province chiefs. Diem had constructed South Vietnam's military command system, anchored by the province chiefs,

4 NSC meeting, Nov. 15,1961, FRUS,I, pps. 607-610.

34 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. to undermine and defang possibly treacherous ARVN generals; Hilsman recognized that,

"under such circumstances, the establishment ofthe provinces as a source ofpower apart from Diem will be a most difficult undertaking." Yet he maintained that a "move to broaden the base ofpolitical power" in South Vietnam was necessary and success in that endeavor possible, and that the "strengthening ofthe civilian bureaucracy" might be accomplished without direct confrontation with Diem.s This was an appealing conviction to many in the Kennedy Administration, including the President himself, which would prove, in the end, unworkable.

Hilsman's analysis ofstrategy in South Vietnam turned heads in the Kennedy

Administration, and along with an article in the Marine Corps Gazette espousing similar points about counterinsurgency in general,6 as well as a job offer in academia that

Hilsman was keen to accept, gained the director ofINR an audience with the president.

The Jan. 10, 1962, meeting with Kennedy, faithfully described in Hilsman's To Move a

Nation, in which Kennedy persuaded Hilsman to remain with INR, provides the pretext for Hilsman's subsequent visit to South Vietnam. Hilsman remembers:

For almost forty-five minutes, we had a spirited conversation - the President firing questions about my wartime experiences, exchanging arguments with me on the theory of fighting and meeting guerilla wars, and repeating his own conviction that the most likely and immediate threat from the Communists was neither nuclear war nor large-scale conventional wars, as in Korea, but the more subtle, ambiguous threat ofthe guerilla. To me this threat, new military tactics had to be developed which he hoped the Special Forces would do. But new political tactics also had to be devised, and, most importantly, the two - the military and the political had to be meshed together and blended.7

5 Hilsman to SecState, FRUS, I, p. 619-628. 6 Hilsman, Roger. "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic", in Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerilla Movements, 1941-1961, ed. by Franklin Mark Osanka. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, pps. 452-463. 7 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 53. [Note: "Hilsman" will continue to be used to denote To Move a Nation in citations.]

35 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Hilsman's analyses had touched a nerve with Kennedy, whose interest in counterinsurgency strategy has been thoroughly documented. 8 On Jan. 18, the President would sign NSAM 124, establishing the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), "to assure unity ofeffort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms ofindirect aggression in friendly countries." Taylor and Robert Kennedy were key members ofthe Special Group

(C.r.), indicating the importance Kennedy attached to the group's efforts.9 Several days after Hilsman's meeting with Kennedy, Taylor asked Hilsman to travel to Saigon to assess the situation there and report back to Taylor and Kennedy. 10

Hilsman spent the latter halfofJan. 1961 in South Vietnam, and came away shocked at the massive deterioration ofsecurity in the countryside. "Everywhere we could see the signs ofViet Cong terrorism - bridges blown up, ditches dug across roads, and wrecked trucks beside them," Hilsman wrote in To Move a Nation. "In each province, the evidence of damage went right up to the gates ofthe provincial capital and this was true even for Saigon itself."II The GVN still held sway over the cities of

South Vietnam, but Hilsman observed that the cities would soon come under siege ifthe

GVN's losses in the countryside were not reversed. The bulk ofSouth Vietnam's population lived an agrarian existence in the thousands oftiny villages and hamlets dotting South Vietnam's expansive countryside; and the NLF had made substantial

8 The best description ofKennedy's abiding fascination with the art ofcombating Communist guerilla tactics and "wars of national liberation" is in Lawrence Freedman's Kennedy's Wars, pps. 287-292. A sharp, savage critique ofcounterinsurgency, "a doctrine without serious analytic foundations" feeding "U.S. nation-building fever," is in Paul Kattenburg's The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy. Kattenburg, Paul. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1975. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980, pps. 110-113. 9 NSAM 124, Foreign Relations o/the United States. Vol. II. Vietnam 1962. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 49. 10 Hilsman, p. 427. 11 Ibid., pps. 427-428.

36 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his RivaL, 1962. inroads in capturing their loyalty. With that in mind, Hilsman wrote in hiseport following his trip: "The struggle for South Vietnam, in sum, is essentially a battle for control ofthe villages.,,12

Hilsman's long report, "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam", which he submitted to Taylor on Feb. 2, 1962, proved extremely influential among American officials. It represented a synthesis ofthe various elements needed to wage a successful counterinsurgency, and a possible solution to one ofthe chiefquandaries facing

American policy-makers in the wake ofKennedy's decision to expand American advice and assistance to South Vietnam. Put simply, administration officials believed that through the provision ofAmerican advisors and materiel, including helicopters and aircraft, to ARVN, the U.S. could halt the degradation ofthe South Vietnamese military effort against the NLF guerillas. The expansion ofthe American military mission in

South Vietnam was astounding: in Jan. 1962, the total American military advisory presence numbered a little less than 3000; by the end ofMarch there would be more than

5000 American advisors in the country, with the number still rising. 13 Yet officials, including Kennedy most prominently, believed that victory could not be achieved through military means alone, or even through military means foremost. A political order had to be forged in South Vietnam that could win the allegiance and command the support ofits population, from the upper class elites in Saigon and Hue to the peasants of the South Vietnamese countryside. Pressing Diem for internal reform had resulted in antagonistic stalemate; an alternative method ofreshaping the South Vietnamese political environment seemed necessary.

12 Hilsman for Taylor, FRUS, II, p. 75. 13 State to Saigon, Jan. 3,1962, JFKL 3-195 NSF.

37 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962.

In his "Strategic Concept", Hilsman downplayed the importance ofinfiltration

from the DRV into South Vietnam. While the trained cadres making their way south "are

important. .. cutting offthe infiltration route would not by itselfsettle the Viet Cong problem. It is the people and villages ofSouth Vietnam that are the Viet Cong's real

source ofboth supplies and recruits." The distinction was a critical one; emphasis on

infiltration during the previous year hadled to calls for the insertion ofD.S. combat

forces into South Vietnam, not to do any actual fighting but to deter further escalation

and infiltration by the DRV and Communist China. But Hilsman claimed that such a

force would be at best irrelevant, and that the NLF could subsist and even thrive if

infiltration was curtailed. The Viet Cong position, he argued, "depends primarily upon

maintaining access to the villages in areas under Viet Cong control or influence," which

meant that the conflict "must be won by cuttingthe Viet Cong offfrom their local

sources ofstrength, i.e., by denying them access to the villages and the people." At the

heart ofthat effort, Hilsman proposed, should be the strategic hamlets. 14

Trying to explain the strategic hamlet program has proved an enormously

frustrating experience for many commentators and historians. The explanation may lie in

the fact that there existed, and commingled, two discreet plans for strategic hamlets: the

first, the brainchild ofSir Robert Thompson, Head ofthe British Advisory Mission in

Saigon, and based primarily on Thompson's own successful experience battling

Communist insurgents in colonial Malaya in the early 1950s; the second, and more

important plan the work ofNgo Dinh Nhu. Much ofthe confusion surrounding the

14 Hilsman for Taylor, FRUS, II, pps. 73-90.

38 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962. strategic hamlets, both at the time and in subsequent histories ofthe period, stems from that division. 15

In fact, one ofRoger Hilsman's greatest accomplishments was to transmit the gist ofstrategic hamlets to Washington officials in understandable terms, wedded to a politically oriented concept for how to defeat the NLF. In his report to Taylor, Hilsman credited Thompson with the creation ofthe plan, and the description ofstrategic hamlets is virtually lifted from Thompson's Delta Plan. Thompson, a British advisor unaffiliated with the U.S. Mission, had ironically been persona non grata with U.S. Ambassador

Nolting just a few months previously. In a fascinating telegram to the Vietnam Task

Force in Washington on Nov. 30, 1961, Nolting wrote that the "British initiative has

introduced knotty problem in our discussions with GVN." While claiming that he

admired much ofThompson's plan, and that "we can easily agree with ninety percent of

it," Nolting wrote that the Delta Plan undercut American negotiating attempts to convince

a reluctant Diem to delegate authority to "a proper military command structure headed by

a field command." Adopting the rudiments ofthe Delta Plan, which technically allowed

Diem to retain a central command under his own control, gave Diem an opportunity to

resist delegating military authority.16

Hilsman's "Strategic Concept" popularized Thompson's ideas in Washington,

especially the notion that "strategic villages" might hold the key to victory in South

Vietnam. Hilsman wrote that a successful strategy should first target the Mekong Delta

15 It is instructive to examine 's take on strategic hamlets. He starts offon the right foot by noting "divergent attitudes" present in the implementation of the strategic hamlet program. Yet his subsequent analysis, that "the plan was to corral peasants into armed stockades", an attempt by Americans to spread irrelevant Western political norms and the Ngos to increase their own authority over the countryside, is not so much wrong as attached to the plan's eventual failure. Karnow, p. 255. 16 Nolting to State, FRUS, I, p. 698.

39 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. region, the agricultural heart ofSouth Vietnam. Starting in relatively secure and GVN­ controlled areas and working outwards, the loosely organized villages and hamlets could be consolidated into "compact, easily defended area[s]," the new strategic villages. The villages could be heavily fortified against external attack, with the assistance ofD.S. military advisors. Additionally, modem communications equipment might be installed within the villages, allowing them "to maintain direct communication with the government administrative and the military-security command structure at the district level, and ultimately up to the central government complex in Saigon." The goal,

Hilsman maintained, was to provide the peasants with effective security against NLF intimidation. "Physical security," he wrote, "coupled with controls on the movement of people and supplies, will protect the villagers from being intimidated into selling the Viet

Cong rice and from being persuaded or intimidated into joining the Viet Cong, and will prevent Viet Cong sympathizers from surreptitiously providing the guerillas with

supplies."

Beyond physical security, Hilsman argued, the strategic villages could provide an

avenue for increased GVN contact with isolated villages, and the forging ofa more

cohesive national identity. GVN civic action teams could help build the strategic

villages, then "set up village government and tie it into the district and national levels

assuring the flow ofinformation on village needs and problems upward and the flow of

government services downward." While ARVN kept the NLF guerillas off-balance

countrywide with aggressive small-unit patrolling and ambushing, the fortified little

municipalities would spread across the provinces, from safer areas into more dangerous

ones, creating ever larger no-go zones for the NLF (or, to use Hilsman's term, "meat

40 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. grinders"). When the NLF forces were finally banished to a few mountainous and remote regions in the South Vietnamese highlands, Hilsman argued, the ARVN could employ more conventional tactics, aided by American weaponry, to wipe out the dying insurgency once and for all.

Hilsman may be forgiven for his concept's greatest, and ultimately fatal flaw, concerning, unsurprisingly, the U.S. relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem. The South

Vietnamese President continuously bedeviled American policy-makers, and Hilsman simply tried to construct a strategy that would emphasize Diem's strengths while negotiating his treacherous weaknesses. "As General Taylor reported," Hilsman wrote,

"President Diem is an old-fashioned Asian ruler who hesitates to delegate authority.

Nevertheless, he does have the respect ofhis people." His personal shortcomings aside,

Diem faced "the real possibility ofcoup attempts by elements within South Vietnam....

Although he seems to be convinced that present United States policy is to support him, he is concerned that the United States will someday decide to engineer a coup ifhe lets

American influence in South Vietnam become too great." Hilsman, ofcourse, was right

on the money with that analysis.

A possible solution, Hilsman believed, was to take the fight for reform down to

the village level. There was little point in antagonizing Diem by trying to score political points in Saigon ("Some easing ofUnited States pressure on Diem for major reforms and

reorganization ofhis government at the top seems called for."); instead, "we should tum

our attention to providing help at the local level. What we need are sergeants, lieutenants,

41 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. and Civic Action teams, including police trainers and public administrators, to work with the Vietnamese Government officials in the villages and with the troops in the field.,,17

Hilsman'ssolution for the Diem conundrum was essentially an end-run. The

South Vietnamese President might be an autocrat, and he might be politically illiberal; these characteristics were not necessarily problems for Hilsman. The GVN's lack of

efficiency was a problem, however, and Diem's resistance to delegation, while

understandable, was playing right into the hands ofthe NLF. The battle for South

Vietnam's villages depended upon security and prosperity, and Hilsman believed that by

dropping the bulk ofAmerican advice down to the local level, US. assistance could help

create a cadre ofcivil servants who could accomplish at the village level what Diem

could not from his perch in Saigon. Yet Hilsman, while paying lip service to Diem's

suspicions, had drastically underestimated the Ngo brothers' resistance to close

coordination with the US. That resistance was especially fierce at the village level.

Hilsman believed that counterinsurgency necessitated close cooperation between the US.

and South Vietnam, and hoped that the strategic hamlet program would provide openings

and opportunities for coordination. Diem, and to an even greater extent Nhu, would

come to see the strategic hamlet program as their own protected bailiwick, a project

which might sow the seeds for the end ofthe GVN's dependence on American assistance

and cooperation. The year 1962, which in many ways seemed outwardly to be the last

year marked by mutual optimism and even trust, was deceptive. In the various aspects of

the alliance, and in particular the strategic hamlet program, subtle but important rifts were

opening between the reluctant allies.

17 The preceding long discussion is drawn from Hilsman for Taylor, FRUS, II, pps. 73-90. A copy of Thompson's "Delta Plan" is in the same volume, pps. 102-109.

42 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962.

2.2: "Whistle while we work"

The American advisory effort in South Vietnam during 1962 was marked by outward good cheer and optimism. In late 1961, the GVN had looked like the losing side. The NLF had staged battalion-sized attacks on several provincial capitals - the

Communist insurgency seemed to be gobbling up an ever-increasing share ofthe countryside. Ngo Dinh Diem skulked in his palace; the nationalistic president had even gone so far as to request a limited deployment ofAmerican combat troops from Gen.

Maxwell Taylor in the hope ofturning the tide. Yet the inflow ofAmerican advisors and military equipment had seemingly done wonders for GVN morale and the war effort against the NLF. By late 1962, most American officials, while admittedly still espousing caution, were undeniably optimistic. In 1961, "there was an air ofnear panic in Saigon," the State Department's Theodore Heavner and Chalmers B. Wood recalled. "Now, a year later, the Viet Cong are not winning the war. As in 1862 and 1942, no one clearly has the initiative. However, VC are clearly further from their objective than they were in

October, 1961. The most dramatic change is in mora1e.,,18

Officials in the American Embassy in Saigon and the Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam (MACV) were often ebullient in their assessments ofthe war effort.

William Trueheart, the Embassy's Deputy ChiefofMission, told officials at a meeting in

Washington on Sept. 19, 1962: "The military progress had been little short ofsensational and the intelligence capability had been greatly improved.... He said the Strategic Hamlet program has transformed the countryside and that he did not think the Viet Cong could

18 State Department Paper, FRUS, II, p. 679.

43 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. now destroy the program.,,19 Part ofthe explanation for the high optimism oftop Saigon officials may have stemmed from a need to justify their own efforts to their superiors in

Washington, as well as to instill in both Americans and Vietnamese in South Vietnam a better fighting spirit. When W. Averell Harriman, the august Assistant Secretary ofState for Far Eastern Affairs, cabled Ambassador Nolting on Oct. 12 about "the dangers of over-optimism in Viet-Nam,,,2o Nolting responded, more than a month later, that, while he found it "difficult at times to be optimistic at all, in face of setbacks, non-activation or poor execution ofplans, dissensions among the Vietnamese, and a general stickiness which pervades this place.... We are making progress." He cited his colleague, Gen. Paul

Harkins, commander ofMACV and the most unabashedly optimistic American official in

South Vietnam: "But, as General Harkins put it the other day, we must 'whistle while we work', for the sake ofour own and everyone else's morale here.,,21

In a Nov. 16 memo to the StateDepartment, titled "Viet-Nam's War- The Turn ofthe Tide?", Melvin Manfull, the Saigon Embassy's Counselor for Political Affairs, addressed directly the causes for optimism. "In sum," Manfull wrote, "we find that the basis for encouragement is small, but from this we take heart, for last year there was none at all." The positive assessment ofthe war effort rested on a statistical analysis offactors including the weapons lost ratio between sides, the scale ofNLF attacks, including fewer battalion- and regimental-sized attacks, and the increased frequency ofNLF attacks for food, indicating that the strategic hamlet program had narrowed the NLF's ability to restock through non-violent means.22

19 Southeast Asia Task Force meeting, FRUS, II, pps. 655-656. 20 Harriman to Nolting, FRUS, II, p. 693. 21 Nolting to Harriman, FRUS, II, p. 738. 22 Embassy to State, Nov. 16, 1962, 751K.OO/11-1662.

44 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962.

In a rather extraordinary development, Roger Lalouette, French Ambassador to

Saigon and traditionally one ofthe sharper critics ofthe American policy, indicated to

Nolting on Oct. 17 that "for the first time since his arrival four years ago he has filed an

'optimistic report' on situation SVN covering both military and political aspects."

Lalouette based his surprising assessment on both military success in the countryside and the "progress ofthe strategic hamlet program, apparent intention GVN ensure strategic hamlets become cradle ofpolitical, economic and social development and opportunities this provides for developing sense ofaffiliation ofpeople with GVN and vice versa.,,23

In short, the year 1962 seemed a moment ofrare optimism for the U.S. and the

GVN in the midst ofa long, dark and bitter struggle. American firepower for a time had turned back previous NLF gains in the countryside. Despite some hiccoughs, coordination between American military advisors and their ARVN counterparts was relatively smooth, although Diem would allow no such official cooperation in the political and administrative realm. Finally, the strategic hamlet program appeared to many U.S. officials, based on building statistics passed along by the GVN, to be having a profound and transfoTInative effect on the South Vietnamese countryside, and to be slowly succeeding in the hard but vital work ofseparating the NLF guerillas from the peasants. Roger Hilsman, whose assignment at the beginning of 1962 had been to travel to Saigon to see ifhe could knit the various strands ofincreasing American advice and assistance into a coherent and workable strategy, and whose "Strategic Concept" proved highly influential in gaining whole-hearted American support for the GVN's incipient strategic hamlet program, might have been thrilled by the results so far.

23 Nolting to State, Oct. 20, 1962, 751K.00/10-2062.

45 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Yet Hilsman, earlier than most other American officials heavily involved in

Vietnam policy, had soured on the fruits ofhis strategy. On a follow-up visit to Saigon in

March 1962, Hilsman consulted with Nolting, Harkins, Diem and Nhu on joint military operations in the countryside and the GVN's first moves in the strategic hamlets campaign. He came away disturbed that Nhu's plans were a profound misapplication of the Thompson's hamlet strategy, and that misdirected GVN enthusiasm would allow the

NLF to "discredit the Strategic Village concept throughout South Vietnam.,,24 In addition, he worried that the GVN, "on the basis ofthe flimsiest kind ofintelligence", had been directing air strikes using new American fighter aircraft "at targets...where the

GVN does not have access." The results ofthis "interdiction" bombing were predictable:

South Vietnamese civilians dead at the hands ofthe Americans and GVN, ineffective military tactics translating into big propaganda victories for the NLF. Hilsman warned:

"The whole business could blow up in any number ofhorrendous ways.,,25

In the same memorandum, recorded and sent only to his deputies at INR on

March 19, Hilsman summed up his impressions from the trip: "I find that I am a little uneasy about the way things are going in South Viet-Nam.,,26 To his discredit, Hilsman's honest doubts vanished in an April 3 memorandum to Harriman summarizing "recent progress" in the implementation ofstrategic hamlets.27 By the end ofthe year, however,

in a report to Harriman that foreshadowed his strong tum in 1963 against the Ngos,

Hilsman wrote that the GVN had been imperiled by an unfaithful interpretation ofthe

"Strategic Concept": "There appears to be no reason as yet to question the soundness of

24 Hitsman to Taylor, FRUS, !J,p. 246. 25 Hilsman memorandum for the record, FRUS, II, p. 247. 26 Ibid., p. 246. Hilsman did, however, advise his deputies to "give some thought to this and how we might intervene at the White House with Bobby Kennedy or in some other way." 27 Hilsman to Harriman, FRUS, II, p. 291.

46 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962. the concept. But there is a very real question as to how well and wholeheartedly it is being put into effect.,,28 Hilsman's skepticism was just. His "Strategic Concept" was a sharp analysis ofthe measures necessary to destroy the NLF in South Vietnam. He had emphasized the overriding importance ofeffective and imaginative coordination, between the political, economic, and military aspects ofthe struggle, and between Americans and

South Vietnamese. Unfortunately, Hilsman had not perceived that elements within both governments, and especially within the Saigon Palace, would render true coordination impossible.

2.3: Taking on the Military

In his recent study ofthe origins ofthe American war in Vietnam, David Kaiser provides an excellent description ofthe course ofthe war in 1962, drawing heavily on official American documentation only recently declassified. Kaiser writes: "The war against the Viet Cong was complicated by the existence ofthree different strategic concepts: one developed and pushed by senior American military leaders; a second, first promulgated by Roger Hilsman ofthe State Department but also adopted by some

American aid workers in the field; and a third, far more important than either ofthe others, belonging to the South Vietnamese themselves.,,29 Kaiser is fundamentally right in noting the discord between the different elements on the anti-communist side. While the most explosive confrontations between different factions would have to wait lmtillate

1963, during 1962 convincing evidence ofthe splits and tensions emerged. Hilsman and his bureaucratic allies, clustered mainly in the Department ofState, presented the most compelling and coherent broad strategy for turning the tide against the NLF. Elements in

28 Hilsman to Harriman, Dec. 19, 1962, FRUS. II, p. 790. 29 Kaiser, p. 150.

47 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. the American military and Department ofDefense paid lip service to the important political dimensions ofcounterinsurgency in South Vietnam, but concentrated mainly on applying the boost ofAmerican advice and weaponry to offensive operations in the countryside. The Diem regime, meanwhile, made good use ofAmerican assistance to the strategic hamlet program; Ngo Dinh Nhu, however, directed the construction ofthe hamlets with a profoundly different ideological vision for what they meant to nation'- building and the struggle for South Vietnam.

In both ofthese cases, American and South Vietnamese planners had confidence that they could crush the NLF by applying superior resources to the conflict. Early success bred confidence, but the war effort's foundations were built on mud; departing from the innovative spirit ofHilsman's concept, officials did not account for the NLF's demonstrated capacity to adapt in the face ofresistance.

American civilian officials were especially enthusiastic about Hilsman's strategic concept in early 1962. The United States Infonnation Agency's (USIA) Edward

Murrow, for example, told Hilsman after reading the latter's report that "by God, [it was] the first time in many months...that he had read prose that is not only intelligible but has a small cutting edge.... Reading the first three pages was like having a long mint julep at the end of a hot day.,,3o Sterling Cottrell, director ofthe Vietnam Task Force, briefed

Harriman on the "Strategic Concept" in advance ofRobert McNamara's monthly conference in Honolulu on Feb. 19: "You might want to review ["A Strategic Concept for

South Viet-Nam"] on the way out since it's the best statement ofhow counterguerilla

30 Latham, Michael. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 'Nation Building' in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill, NC: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2000, p. 238.

48 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. actions should be conducted in Viet-Nem [sic] that I have seen. However, ifyou use these ideas I would not cite Hilsman or his book since the military are resentful ofit.,,31

The antipathy oftop military officials towards Hilsman stemmed from the sentiment that Hilsman had overstepped his bounds in drafting his comprehensive counterinsurgency plan. As a State Department official, he had not limited himselfto discussing the political aspects ofthe war: diplomacy with Diem, the distribution of economic aid, and pacification programs like strategic hamlets. Rather, Hilsman envisioned a tightly coordinated political-military effort, with military goals effectively subordinate to political considerations. That meant, to put it bluntly, getting in the military's face about tactical shortcomings. I-Iilsman later wrote: "The political and civic action effort at the village level had to be given central emphasis, as in Thompson's plan,

and so did police work. Ifmilitary measures were effectively meshed in, the orthodox military priorities would have to be turned around. ,,32

Top American military and Defense Department officials in general reacted

favorably to the strategic hamlet program as a complement to the augmentation and

rejuvenation ofARVN; but they considered military operations to be the absolute top

priority. An early move in this direction was the appointment, at the request of

McNamara, offour-star Gen. Paul Harkins as the head ofthe newly-formed MACV, on a

level of seniority in Saigon equal and not subordinate to that ofthe Ambassador,

retaining "his direct line ofauthority via the JCS to [the Secretary ofDefense], and

thence to the President".33 That initiative was fought bitterly and unsuccessfully by

Nolting, and acquiesced to by Rusk. Future Chairman ofthe JCS Gen. Earle Wheeler

31 Cottrell to Harriman, FRUS, II, p. 142. 32 Hi1sman, p. 435. '3 o McNamara to Rusk, FRUS, I, p. 720.

49 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. gave a speech in the same vein at Fordham University on Nov. 7, 1962: "It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence ofthe problem in Vietnam is military.,,34

The commanding officers ofthe American advisory mission in South Vietnam, including Harkins, his predecessor Gen. Lionel McGarr, and the Commander in Chief,

Pacific (CINCPAC), Adm. Harry Felt, believed that by late 1961 that ARVN had

"suffered from its dispersal around the country in static defense positions." Their chief objective was to get ARVN moving again, to encourage it to go on the offensive against perceived NLF strongholds and basing areas. Felt, for example, encouraged plans in

Dec. 1961 for sending "mobile, hard-hitting forces, efficiently organized and commanded, against VC at proper time and place." While allowing that "clear and hold" operations, involving ARVN sweeps in relatively populated rural areas combined with pacification activities involving civic action teams, could be useful, they maintained that hunting down and destroying NLF main force guerillas in "secure base areas" was the key to victory.35 By Sept. 1962, Harkins was thrilled with the perceived results of

ARVN's newfound offensive-mindedness. On Sept. la, Harkins "expressed to [Diem] his pleasure with the splendid results ofARVNAF aggressiveness during the preceding month." Later in their meeting, he "remarked that the government had enough troops to keep the VC moving everywhere, all ofthe time. Ifthey were kept moving constantly for two weeks they would be so tired that they would have to rest and they could all be

34 Hilsman, p. 426. 35 Kaiser, p. 150-152.

50 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance.' Roger Hi/sman and his Rivals, 1962. killed.,,36 Top military commanders believed the overriding emphasis in South Vietnam had to be on aggressive and large-scale ARVN offensives.

In his "Strategic Concept", Hilsman disagreed with that emphasis: "Ifthe Army tmits were taken offtheir defense positions, the villages, bridges, and other protected installations would be at the mercy ofthe Viet Cong, and the economy would grind to a halt." He proposed an alternative: "Counterguerilla forces must adopt the tactics ofthe guerilla himself. Conventional military tactics are ineffective against guerillas." The ideal was small ARVN units, with American Special Forces advisors, "highly mobile, never sleeping in the same place twice, and patrolling and ambushing at will." Once contact had been made with NLF guerilla units, Hilsman wrote, high-power ARVN strikes could be called in, featuring artillery and air power, to obliterate the NLF units.

The result would be a far less destructive profile for ARVN in the countryside, and virtually eliminate the horrific incidents in which strikes were called on villages on the basis of flimsy intelligence, or after guerilla units had left.

According to Hilsman, ARVN tactics had been disastrous in a Jan. 1962 assault on a suspected NLF battalion. He cited most prominently preparatory bombing, which the

GVN often requested during operations, and MACV approved, to soften up suspected

NLF positions. "The preparatory bombing...gave the guerillas warning," Hilsman reported. "In addition, it ran the risk ofkilling innocent or at least persuadable villagers and thus recruiting more Communists than were killed." ARVN had to do everything in its power to minimize civilian casualties, Hilsman believed, or firepower increases would eventually become counterproductive. Only when a combination ofaggressive guerilla tactics and strategic hamlets had isolated the NLF from villagers could more conventional

36 Memorandum for the record, FRUS, II, pps. 622-633.

51 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962. strikes be called on "the remnants ofthe Viet Cong hiding in the underpopulated mountains and jungles.,,37 Fundamentally, military strikes had to be subordinated to political initiatives; ARVN tactics had to complement the aims ofthe strategic hamlet program.

The tension between Hilsman's strategy, which became popular quite rapidly within the State Department, and the military strategy put into play by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Felt, and Harkins came to the fore during a meeting on Feb. 9, shortly after

Hilsman had presented his report to Kennedy and Taylor. According to State Department notes, aggressive questioning by Naval ChiefofStaffAdm. George Anderson turned the meeting into a confrontation:

Admiral Anderson asked ifhe was correct in assuming that Mr. Hilsman did not feel that the u.s. military in Viet Nam had been sufficiently effective, helpful, imaginative and resourceful. Mr. Hilsman said that our decision to support rather than just advise the Viet Namese was a very recent one and that until that time our people in Viet Nam were merely advisors, as we all were. He said that probably no government ever had so much advice. Accordingly, we cannot blame our people on the spot for any lack ofpositive action since they were instructed to act as advisors. 38

Hilsman's critiques did little to shake the top echelon ofthe American military's

faith in the transformative capacity ofincreased American firepower and advice in the

South Vietnamese countryside. Hilsman would repeat his arguments often over the next

two years, to little avail. He did succeed, however, in becoming extraordinarily

unpopular with the military and Department ofDefense.

During 1962, the tension between the State Department and the military (along

with civilians in the DOD) coalesced around the use ofAmerican firepower to assist the

GVN in three controversial tactics: interdiction bombing by American aircraft against

37 Hilsman for Taylor, FRUS, II, pps. 73-90. 38 Memorandum on State-JCS meeting, FRUS, II, p. 116. Kaiser remarks: " ...the news that a second-level State Department official had critiqued American military strategy disturbed the JCS, who did not want State Department officials telling them how to fight a war." Kaiser, p. 154.

52 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962.

GVN-selected targets, crop destruction, and chemical defoliation. 39 Hilsman had already demonstrated his alarm at the results ofinterdiction bombing during his visit to South

Vietnam in March 1962: "On several occasions the Viet Cong, after an air strike, have removed their own dead and then laid out in the middle ofthe street the women and

children killed by our air strikes, so that the villagers on returning would find only women and children dead rather than Viet Cong.,,40 In meeting at the White House with top officials on May 1, Kennedy "raised the question ofdefoliants saying that he was

inclined to think they were not very useful." Hilsman responded that defoliants used to

clear lines offire on the side ofmain roads were not particularly helpful, because the

NLF tended to use terrain cover, rather than foliage cover, to set its ambushes. In fact,

defoliation might have even been counter-productive; GVN troops could make effective

use offoliage cover to beat back ambushes. Hilsman then argued that "our problem was

going to be with President Diem who seemed enamored with the idea ofusing defoliants

against crops." In his notes on the meeting, Hilsman records the following exchange with

the President's Special Military Advisor: "Gen. Taylor said that he thought there was a

great deal ofmerit in the idea ofusing defoliants on crops. I argued that the use of

defoliants against crops at the present stage ofthe war would not be very helpful since the

39 The division between State and the DOD was ofcourse not absolute. On Aug. 2, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofState for Far Eastern Affairs Edward Rice noted in a memorandum to Harriman that the top officials on State's Vietnam Task Force, Sterling Cottrell and Chalmers Wood, both favored authorizing American assistance in GVN crop destruction, presumably to placate Diem. Rice himself opposed. Rice to Harriman, FRUS, II, p. 570. On Aug. 24, Secretary ofState Rusk came down hard against crop destruction in contested areas ofthe countryside, arguing to Kennedy that "destroying crops will inevitably have political repercussions," which would almost definitely outweigh any military advantage gained. He thus solidified State's opposition to crop destruction. Rusk to Kennedy, FRUS, II, p. 607-609. 40 Hilsman memorandum for the record, March 19, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 247.

53 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Viet Cong still have access to non-communist villages until the strategic village plan had been implemented.,,41

The debate captured the conceptual division between elements in the Kennedy

Administration aligned with Hilsman, and those who saw the war in similar terms as

Taylor and the JCS. The first group tended to prioritize the political struggle in South

Vietnam: NLF guerillas had knitted themselves tightly within the general rural population, and the most precise, coordinated, innovative measures, combining political and military tactics, had to be taken to separate and isolate the guerillas from their source ofsupport. Conversely, the top ofthe Defense establishment tended to see a conventional battle, in which a slippery enemy force emerged out ofsecure base areas to prey on GVN forces and villagers. The guerillas had to be hunted down mercilessly, and destroying suspected NLF food sources seemed a logical extension ofthat strategy.

Interestingly, the debate over authorizing American involvement in GVN crop destruction operations foreshadowed the battle lines over supporting the Diem regime during the Buddhist Crisis a year later. Hilsman's strongest allies in resisting crop destruction, which the GVN strongly advocated as necessary to the war effort, were

Harriman and Michael Fouestal, the National Security Council staffer reporting to

McGeorge Bundy on Southeast Asian affairs. The most vocal supporters of approving crop destruction assistance, besides Nolting and Harkins in Saigon, were Lemnitzer,

Taylor, and McNamara. In a State-JCS meeting on Aug. 24, Lemnitzer, with apparent irony, remarked that "it is strange that we can bomb, kill, and burn people but are not permitted to starve them.,,42 Kennedy, with apparent reservations, ovenuled Hilsman,

41 MemCon, FRUS, II, p. 367. 42 State-JCS meeting, FRUS, II, pps. 610-611.

54 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals. 1962.

Harriman and Forrestal on Oct. 2, authorizing crop destruction assistance along guidelines submitted by the Saigon Embassy. Forrestal reported to Bundy: "I believe his main train ofthinking was that you cannot say no to your military advisors all the time, and with this I agree.,,43

To what extent was Hilsman right to confront the military on its perceived tactical miscalculations? The semblance ofan answer can be found in some ofthe recent scholarship concerning the efforts ofthe NLF and North Vietnam to fight back against a revivified ARVN in 1962. First, Hilsman understated the extent to which the Ho Chi

Minh Trail through the Laotian jungles had become an important supply conduit ofmen and weaponry for communist forces by 1962. According to William Duiker's recent biography ofHo Chi Minh, "One reason for the rapid growth ofthe Viet Cong was the steady increase in the numbers infiltrated down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, doubling between

1959 and 1961 and topping five thousand the following year.,,44 The Trail had become a critical factor in the struggle; the cadres entering South Vietnam via its jungle paths were highly trained and motivated leaders, often natives ofSouth Vietnam destined for their old homes to galvanize NLF recruitment. IfHilsman underestimated the absolute importance ofthe infiltration by the Trail to the communist war effort, however, he accurately assessed its relative importance. Duiker notes that local recruitment was in the end more significant to the NLF's "expansion" in South Vietnam than infiltration.45

43 Memorandum for the record, Oct. 2, 1962, JFKL NSF Vietnam Country Series; Forresta1 to Bundy, Oct. 4, 1962, NSC StaffMemoranda, Michael Forrestal, 6/22-10/62, JFKL NSF Vietnam Country Series. Both cited in FRUS, JI, p. 675. 44 Duiker, William J. Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 528. Duiker also notes that the NLF had "carved out a liberated base area in the Central Highlands, which they hoped to u~' as a launching pad for an eventual offensive against the densely populated lowlands." Harkins' conceptio' ofremote NLF base areas was not entirely off the mark. 45 Ibid., p. 528.

55 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962.

The Military History Institute ofVietnam's (MHN) official study ofthe

"American War", recently translated, also attaches great importance to the Trail.

Hilsman, in the "Strategic Concept", had been even more dismissive ofthe notion that principal NLF weaponry came down the Trail than he had been ofthe argument that the

Trail served as a critical source oftechnical cadres and fighters. Yet the MHIV records:

"Hundreds oftons of. ..military equipment were also sent south by Group 559 [The North

Vietnamese Anny's (NYA) Military Transportation Group for the Trail] during this period, increasing the combat power ofour fun-time troops and enabling our battlefield forces to defeat the new enemy tactics.,,46 The MHIV also demonstrates that the

ARVN's newfound aggressiveness in 1962, aided especially by American helicopters, put the NLF on its heels temporarily: "The enemy's 'helicopter assault' tactics were even more effective here, in terrain cut by many canals and streams, and our soldiers had not yet found an effective method for countering this enemy tactic.... The tactical and technical capabilities ofour troops had not kept pace with the changes the enemy had made in his own tactics and teclmical capabilities.,,47

What Hilsman had disputed, however, was that conventional military tactics could be successful in the long term against an NLF force with the proven capacity to survive, adapt, innovate, and ingratiate itselfwith South Vietnamese villagers. The application of

American military resources to the conflict could for a short time reverse the course of

46 The Military Institute ofVietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History ofthe People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975. Translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press ofKansas, 2002, p. 115. The MHIV's study is prone to extreme overstatement, for instance in its inflated accounts of helicopters shot down or its intense and exaggerated glorification of the Battle ofAp Bac. Yet it is an interesting source ofinformation on the relative importance ofvarious aspects ofthe communist side ofthe war. One could make the argument that the Trail's significance at this stage in the conflict is played up to magnify the role ofNortherners, but it seems likely that the Trail was a greater armory for the NLF guerillas than Hilsman realized at the time. 47 Ibid., p. 113.

56 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. the war. Yet within less than a year, ARVN's conventional tactics, divorced from any sort ofpositive political program to simultaneously win the allegiance ofrural South

Vietnamese, had helped to further alienate peasants from the GVN. At the same time, the

NLF began to adapt to the new ARVN tactics and firepower throughout 1962. In Jan.

1963, in the wake ofthe climactic Battle ofAp Bac, a limited number ofobservers, including Hilsman, would recognize the deterioration ofthe war effort in the countryside.

In the next chapter, that incident will be examined and its political implications will be assessed.

2.4: Concept Overthrown: Ngo Dinh Nhu's Strategic Hamlets

On his own ideals concerning the strategic hamlet program, Hilsman wrote: "A governmental structure would be set up for the first time in the history ofVietnam in which information about villagers' needs would go up the ladder and simple government services would go down.,,48

Douglas Pike, in his 1966 study ofNLF tactics, recalled attending the ceremonial dedication ofa new strategic hamlet in 1962, at which Ngo Dinh Nhu spoke. The

President's brother, quickly becoming Diem's most important advisor, had taken control ofthe GVN's strategic hamlet oversight committee early in the year, and was pushing the program forward at breakneck speed across the entirety ofSouth Vietnam. After the ceremony, a group ofvillage elders took Nhu aside to petition him for funds to build a new school. Nhu's response was dazzling: "The government's means are now stretched to their limit. Do not rely on outside aid. First build a revolution within yourself. Then build the school with your own hands." Questioned afterwards by Americans on the

48 Hilsman, p. 432.

57 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. scene, Nbu responded: "You do not understand these villagers. Satisfy one demand and they would return with ten more.,,49

For Hilsman, strategic hamlets were a vehicle for increased coordination between the GVN and U.S. advisor, part ofa comprehensive pacification strategy by which the

Diem regime might hope to win the allegiance ofthe majority ofpeasants and isolate the

NLF from their principal source ofstrength. Nbu demonstrated even greater enthusiasm for the hamlet program than did Hi1sman; yet in directing the program he aimed specifically at cutting Americans out ofthe loop. Instead ofgreater coordination, Nbu's aim was a severance ofthe temporary, necessary evil ofdependence on U.S. assistance.

The strategic hamlet program ended its life in late 1963 after the fall ofDiem as a perverse failure, which, Stanley Karnow eulogizes, "often converted peasants into

Vietcong sympathizers." In Kamow's intensely negative assessment ofstrategic hamlets, the fingerprints ofDiem and Nbu are all over the disaster: "Diem and Nbu saw the strategic hamlet program as essentially a means to spread their influence rather than a device to infuse peasants with the will to resist the Vietcong. Nbu, personally taking charge, was obsessed by numbers. He tried to build stockades as fast a possible.. .. ,,50 In

Jeffrey Race's influential War Comes to Long An, strategic hamlets are remembered as monstrosities. Local officials, Race writes, under intense pressure emanating directly from Nhu, sped ahead with the program without regard for the political damage they were incurring. They ripped peasants from traditional homesteads, forced them to labor without compensation to construct new hamlets, and then armed them with laughable weapons. The "completed" hamlet might then be garnished with ineffective perimeter

49 Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques ofthe National Liberation Front ofSouth Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.LT. Press, 1966, pps. 66-67. 50 Kamow, p. 256.

58 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. defenses, such as incomplete barbed wire fencing. According to Race, "Strategic hamlets in Long An [a province south ofSaigon] ...are remembered with such distaste that even many ofthe local government officials charged with their construction and defense viewed their collapse as a blessing in disguise.,,51

From the initial conception ofthe strategic hamlet program, Nhu had been careful to keep a firm grip on its control and direction. Philip Catton's recent research makes clear that by late 1961, Diem and Nhu had begun planning the rudiments ofthe strategic hamlet program, in the hope ofimproving on the dismal and disappointing results oftheir agroville program. That program, begun in 1959 and terminated in late 1961, sought to regroup inhabitants ofthe Mekong Delta into a series ofsecure, agriculturally modernized communities. The stimulus for the program was increased resistance to the regime in the countryside, and its progress coincided with the rise ofthe NLF. Diem had pushed for a fast pace, leading province officials to try to forcefully regroup peasants.

Resistance at the village level and the rising fortunes ofthe insurgency combined to doom the agroville program. Notably, Diem had sought to keep American Ambassador 52 Durbrow and his staffas far as possible from the coordination ofthe program.

As a result ofits tangled origins, the strategic hamlet program, under the command ofNhu, evolved in a direction antithetical to Hilsman's vision. Instead oftying

Americans into a comprehensive political strategy for the future ofSouth Vietnam, Nhu sought through strategic hamlets to eventually keep out foreign interference and eliminate the necessity for American assistance. Historians generally interpret strategic hamlets as

51 Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: RevolutionalJ! Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. Berkeley, Ca.: University ofCalifornia Press, 1972, p. 173. 52 Catton, Philip E. Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press ofKansas, 2002, pps. 63-71.

59 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance.' Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Nhu's unique political ideology put into practice. Nhu subscribed to a French political philosophy known as "personalism", which essentially sought to combine elements of communism and capitalism into a third way: a celebration ofthe individual within a framework for valuing the community. 53 In practice, and combined with the Ngos' intense Vietnamese nationalism, this translated into a subtle "contempt for the south's urban elite, the prospective beneficiaries ofany broadening ofthe government's base; they regarded its members as talentless, self-interested, disloyal, and tainted by collaboration with the French."s4 It also meant that the Ngos, especially Nhu, placed a great premium on self-reliance, and looked forward to the day when South Vietnam could be reunited under non-Communist leadership, free ofany dependence on the world's superpowers for aid. In a Feb. 12, 1962, assessment ofprogress so far in the program

(demonstrating, incidentally, that the GVN had already begun to move on strategic hamlets before Hilsman popularized them in Washington), the Saigon Embassy's Robert

Barbour wrote:

Nhu defines the objective of the strategic hamlets as the carrying out ofthe 'personalist' revolution in the countryside, from whence it will spread to the towns and cities to encompass the entire nation. He sees the strategic hamlet as one ofthe means of recasting Vietnamese society, with social status to be derived not from the existing order but according to the individual's contributions in combating what Nhu believes are the three main evils confronting Viet-Nam - backwardness, disunity and communism. 55

Additionally, as a memorandum from Rufus Phillips, Special Consultant for

Counterinsurgency, United States Operations Mission (USOM), a close Lansdale

53 For relatively sympathetic explanations ofNhu's personalism, see Catton, pps. 25-50, and Colby, pps. 33-34. A detailed discussion ofNhu and the philosophy ofpersonalism lies outside the bounds ofthis study. Colby's short description is helpful, however: "Nhu saw this philosophy as a way to integrate the modem (in the East) Christian emphasis on the individual with the traditional Confucian stress on order and hierarchy. On occasion Nhu was quite critical ofwhat he considered his brother's overemphasis on the tangible elements ofmodernization...when they lacked, in Nhu's view, the requisite political and revolutionary content." Colby, p. 33. 54 Catton, p. 33. 55 Barbour to State, Feb. 12, 1962, 751K.OO/2-l2l6.

60 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hilsman and his Rivals, 1962. associate, and top USAID administrator for the strategic hamlets, makes clear, Nhu argued that the strategic hamlet program could spark the beginning of a democratic revolution in South Vietnam: "[Nhu] said the imposition ofdemocracy at the top in an underdeveloped country brought anarchy which resulted in dictatorship. Democracy must be instituted at a level where the people can understand it and where it can be a revolution to eliminate the existing system ofprivileges and the defeatism and separatism which exists in the minds ofthe people.... Free elections ofthe hamlet chiefand hamlet council are the key to success ofthe strategic hamlets.,,56

In Nhu's defense, he made a passing effort to explain the ideology behind the growing strategic hamlet program to Americans. During a meeting with Gen. Taylor in

Saigon on Sept. 11, Nhu went on at length in his usual way about the revolutionary aspects ofstrategic hamlets. Nolting, well-acquainted with Nhu's arguments,

"commented that this was a hard philosophy and hoped there might be some way in which it can be softened.,,57 Taylor, mystified by Nhu's ramblings, responded by expressing general approval ofthe progress ofthe strategic hamlet program. Harkins, also in attendance, later told an interviewer that Taylor had no idea what Nhu was going on about.58

Nhu's direction ofthe strategic hamlet program may well have stemmed from an honest application ofa particular ideology. In practice, however, his efforts failed miserably, appearing to herald a new and brutal effort to assert Palace authority in the countryside and obliterate resistance. The ARVN's conventional and often- indiscriminate military tactics, described earlier, served to reinforce that image. As

56 Phillips to Fippin, June 25, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 470. 57 Memorandum for the record, Sept. 14, 1962, FRUS, lJ, p. 638. 58 Kaiser, p. 175.

61 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance." Roger Hi/sman and his Rivals, 1962.

Douglas Pike's anecdote ofl',Thu and the hamlet elders makes clear, Nhu's brand of personalism was plagued by inconsistencies. On the one hand, he saw the rural peasantry as the untainted hope for the future ofSouth Vietnam, and believed that local elections could hold the key to a democratic revolution in his country. On the other hand, however, Nhu could be disdainful ofrural concerns, imputing their requests to greed, and believed that authoritarian and often-brutal measures might be necessary to jumpstart the

"revolution within [themselves]". In contrast to Hilsman's beliefthat the strategic hamlet program must originate in relatively secure areas, and slowly work its way outward after defensive and civic actions appeared to be taking hold, Nhu believed that strategic hamlets had to proliferate countrywide as quickly as possible.

Race describes the reaction ofthe province chiefofLong An to Nhu's demands:

"The pressure on Thanh to 'go fast', however, was irresistible, and he remembered with some bitterness that he had to make a monthly trip to Saigon to report on progress in the strategic hamlet program, only to be reprimanded by Ngo [DinhJ Nhu for his failure to push the program fast enough." According to USOM statistics, the province chiefforced a quarter ofthe province's population into giving their time, energy and material resources to constructing strategic hamlets in 1962.59

One ofthe largest and most important pacification operations involving strategic hamlets took place starting in late March 1962 in Binh Duong province, northwest of

Saigon. Operation Sunrise would begin Hilsman's disenchantment with Nhu's direction ofthe strategic hamlet program; Hilsman worried, with justice, that the operation was a blatant misapplication ofstrategic hamlets in the context ofhis "Strategic Concept".

Although Hilsman, Harkins, and Nolting voiced apprehension about Sunrise in advance

59 Race, p. 132.

62 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962. ofits start date, they were hindered by the fact that the operation had originated with a reconmlendation by Gen. McGarr to Diem for military strikes and pacification operations in Binh Duong, during the course of a lengthy meeting on Jan. 11. 60

On his visit to Saigon in mid-March, shortly before Operation Sunrise commenced on March 26, Hilsman noted with trepidation that Trueheart had informed him ofconcern "that Brother Nhu, who is enthusiastic about the strategic village approach, might attempt to apply it simultaneously all over the country rather than systematically by phases." Characteristically, "Ambassador Nolting feels that it would be most unwise to raise with President Diem any question about Brother Nhu at this time." Hilsman expressed concern, echoed by Harkins and Nolting, that the areas selected in Binh Duong province were situated between known "heavy concentrations of regular Viet Cong units." In his report to Taylor, Hilsman wrote: "I said that the strategic village concept called for building zones ofsuch villages beginning with less dangerous areas and then fanning outwards, and that my fear was that the Viet Cong would try to make an example ofthese villages and so discredit the Strategic Village concept through- out South Viet-Nam.,,61

The flaws in Sunrise proved fatal. Province officials, driven by Nhu's hard schedule and their own thirst for results, forced peasants to pay for their own relocation, and then work for six weeks without compensation in some cases to construct strategic hamlets. ARVN sweeps predictably failed to create a secure enviromnent, and the NLF maintained its access to the completed strategic hamlets. In September, MACV informed the JCS that the Sunrise hamlets contained "between 50 percent and 100 percent more

60 Memorandum for the record, FRUS, II, pps. 23-26. 61 Hilsman to Taylor, FRUS, II, pps. 244-246.

63 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. adult women than adult men, suggesting that many ofthe latter had fled to the hills with the Vc.,,62 In shQrt, Operation Sunrise had done virtually nothing to isolate the NLF from the peasants in Binh Duong, while at the same time further alienating many from the GVN cause.

Nevertheless, the strategic hamlet program exploded countrywide under Nhu's watchful eye. Briefing Harriman at the very end of 1962, Hilsman cited GVN statistics to demonstrate the speed and momentum ofthe program: "According to the GVN, more than 3,500 strategic hamlets have been completed, and more than 2,000 are under construction. The current rate ofconstruction is 300-400 a month.,,63 As with ARVN's new firepower, the strategic hamlet program appeared to catch the NLF offguard in the early months of 1962. According to the MHIV account, "These new enemy plots and schemes created many problems for our armed forces and our people." The Vietnamese military historians admit that "a number ofour local areas and units underestimated the enemy plot to establish strategic hamlets.,,64 According to Ho Chi Minh's biographer,

"Hanoi quickly recognized that the program represented a serious threat to the revolutionary movement." At a Politburo meeting in Nov. 1962, Ho told assembled delegates: "We must figure out a way to destroy them. Ifso, our victory is assured.,,65

Capitalizing on increasing success infiltrating and destroying hamlets by the end of 1962, 66 the NLF prepared a new offensive against the strategic hamlet program for early 1963.

62 Kaiser, pps. 169-170. 63 Hi1sman to Harriman, Dec. 19, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 791. Hi1sman added: "It is not certain, however, how much ofthe strategic hamlet program has been carried out. In many, nothing seems to have been done but to construct a barbed wire or bamboo fence." 64 MHIV, pps. 109-110. 65 Duiker, pps. 530-531. 66 Kaiser, p. 176.

64 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962.

The North Vietnamese and NLF reaction demonstrates, contrary to what Jeffrey

Race has claimed,67 that communist forces had not yet consolidated their political gains in the countryside to the point where they could face strategic hamlets without genuine anxiety. Fortified strategic hamlets, serviced by civic action teams forming a genuine bond between the hamlet and the GVN, defended by Self-Defense Corps volunteers and

Civil Guardsmen and reinforced by ARVN, in which real administrative and political reform might have been carried out: these might have dealt a true blow to NLF operations in South Vietnam. In short, based on what we know ofthe communist response, a faithful application ofthe Hilsman plan could well have given the GVN a fighting chance. Yet Diem and Nhu chose to follow a distinctly different path, seeking to limit as much as possible coordination with American advisors. The eventual result mirrored the consequences ofthe advisory and assistance relationship with ARVN. By applying massive resources to the battle for control ofthe South Vietnamese countryside, the GVN made initial gains in the face ofNLF shock. Yet strategic flaws opened the way for NLF innovation to recoup the massive commtmist gains of 1961, and eventually explode the military advisory relationship and Nhu's strategic hamlets as effective tools for counterinsurgency.

In the final analysis, American officials, deprived ofaccurate statistics and measures for assessing the strategic hamlet program, responded positively to the fact that

GVN morale seemed high, and the Diem regime was finally taking offensive action on various fronts against the insurgency.68 One extreme exception was Joseph Mendenhall, long the Saigon Embassy's counselor for political affairs, and an outspoken critic ofthe

67 Race, p. 180. 68 See, e.g., Heavner Report, Dec. 11, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 765: "The strategic hamlet program is the hear of our effort and deserves top priority.... This program is offto a good start."

65 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger HUsman and his Rivals, 1962.

Diem regime. Returning permanently to Washington in August, Mendenhall reported

that "the future trend is likely to continue to be gradual deterioration...." He argued: "The

political approach used under Nlm's tutelage in the strategic hamlets (establishment of

mass organizations and reliance on 'self-help', i.e. forced labor) is more likely to alienate

than win the people.... There is a serious risk ofcompromising the strategic hamlet

program in the eyes ofthe people." Mendenhall then recommended the extraordinary

measure ofUS. officials helping to spark a coup against the Diem regime, maintaining

that change at the top was the only way to reverse the steady deterioration ofthe war

effort.69

Mendenhall's report, however, remained in stasis in the corridors ofthe State

Department. Much more typical was the guardedly optimistic report filed just a week

earlier by Mendenhall's successor at the embassy, who wrote in a report to State

Department officials in Washington that, "Whatever its detailed shortcomings, the

strategic hamlet program has undeniable momentum.,,70 And in a reaction that truly

typified sentiments at the top level in Washington towards the strategic hamlet program

in 1962, Gen. Taylor, in a Nov. 17 memorandum to McNamara describing recovery in

the face ofinitial setbacks in the program, declined to include his aide's reservations on

the lack ofinformation being provided by the GVN: "Continuing assessments ofthe

effectiveness ofthe strategic hamlet concept requires better information than is now

available....,,71 So long as the GVN seemed to maintain its momentum against the NLF,

69 Mendenhall to Rice, August 16, 1962, FRUS, 11, p. 598. 70 Manfull to State, Aug. 9, 1962, 751K.5/8-962. 71 Bagley to Taylor, Nov. 12, 1962, FRUS, 11, p. 729; Taylor to McNamara, Nov. 17, 1962, FRUS, 11, pps. 736-738. On Aug. 7, Wood wrote to Nolting about information gleaned in a meeting with Forrestal: "There is here a general feeling from the President down that we must continue our effort to support Viet­ Nam. This is coupled at the top levels with a sense that there is lacking [sic] evaluations as to how the war

66 Mark Hobel. Chapter II. An Uneasy Alliance: Roger Hitsman and his Rivals, 1962. top officials in the Kennedy Administration were content to rely on the statistics and markers they had for South Vietnam, and concentrate on other, more pressing concerns.

Hilsman, however, examining intelligence reports in Dec. 1962, noted again with unease that the war effort in South Vietnam had deviated far from his "Strategic

Concept". The Diem regime, he wrote, "looks upon the strategic hamlet program as a panacea.... The GVN has overemphasized the establishment ofstrategic hamlets per se and has only begun to fit them into integrated military-political pacification efforts."

Meanwhile, "the Army has overemphasized large-scale actions and the use ofartillery and airpower, as compared with small-unit actions and intelligence collections." Hilsman closed: "Much depends on the ability ofthe government to show convincing evidence of its intent to improve the lot ofthe peasants. Instead, government efforts appear to be

aimed largely at increasing government control over peasants."n

By the end of 1962, Hilsman's rivals in the Kennedy Administration, the

American military, and the GVN had trumped the comprehensive vision contained in his

"Strategic Concept" with more narrow strategic initiatives oftheir own. Events in early

1963, inherited from the tensions ofthe previous year, would further Hilsman's distress

at the course upon which the GVN had embarked. The political fallout would come to

mirror conditions at the end ofthe Eisenhower Administration, as the Kennedy

Administration's united front behind Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed.

is going." Wood to Nolting, FRUS, II, p. 581. By November, Gen. Taylor did not seem particularly concerned about the lack ofreliable information on the strategic hamlet program. 72 Hilsman to Harriman, Dec. 19, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 792.

67 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Chapter III

Hilsman's War: Images and Realities

In late 1962 and early 1963, for Roger Hilsman and other perceptive officials involved in the vast American effort to save South Vietnam, the gulfbetween the image ofthe warthat the Kennedy Administration had carefully cultivated and the realities of the US.-GVN relationship yawned increasingly wide. For top officials in the American government, 1962 had been a year ofoptimism, when it seemed US. assistance might help the GVN overcome the NLF insurgency. On the ground in South Vietnam, a host of

American military and civilian advisors devoted themselves to the task ofturning the tide and defending anti-communist South Vietnam. Hilsman, meanwhile, despite reservations about GVN implementation ofthe strategic hamlet program, hoped that his "Strategic

Concept for South Vietnam" might provide the blueprint for ultimate victory. A series of events and reports at the turn ofthe year, however, suggested that the optimism ofUS. officials had been profoundly misplaced.

Based on these developments, Hilsman and other officials concluded that beneath the veneer ofproductive partnership existed a more dysfunctional reality. Much ofthe progress in winning the counterinsurgency struggle against the NLF that the Kennedy

Administration had hoped for in 1962 seemed to have been negated by the policies and governance ofthe Diem regime. Furthermore,. Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu had begun to sour on aspects ofthe alliance as well. The result was a collision course between officials in the US. State Department and the GVN: both sides had the same goal, the defeat ofthe NLF and the survival ofanti-communist South Vietnam, but increasingly antagonistic strategies for how to accomplish it.

68 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Irnages and Realities.

Over the course of 1962, as the United States poured increasing numbers of advisors and funding into SouthVietnam, and while Hilsman fretted over the Diem regime's implementation of strategic hamlets, top officials in the Kennedy

Administration sought to impose strict message discipline over all Americans involved in

Vietnam policy. Beset with a series ofglobal crises, culminating in the October 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy hoped to maintain the image ofthe American role in the

Vietnamese conflict, at least in the eyes ofthe American public, as limited, relatively simple, nearly cost-free, and producing steady gains towards ultimate victory. So long as the image was maintained, the Kennedy Administration kept its maximum political range ofmovement; public exposure ofserious flaws, however, could force Kennedy's hand, either into lessening the American commitment to South Vietnam, or more likely, escalating the war. The corollary ofKennedy's Vietnam press doctrine, ofcourse, was that coverage, and particularly critical coverage ofboth the U.S. advisory effort and the

GVN, could be kept, hopefully, to a minimum.

Kennedy's reaction to a speech by Undersecretary ofState George Ball in late

April 1962 in Detroit offers an interesting glimpse into the Administration's approach to

Vietnam image management. Ball, one ofKennedy's most skeptical advisors on

Vietnam, had sought to respond to assorted "Republican charges that we are already engaged in a shooting war." In his speech, Ball sought to tie a limited American commitment to South Vietnam into the global framework ofcontainment, and more

importantly from a political point ofview, explained that the commitment was one

defined and honored by Eisenhower, thereby establishing a Republican pedigree for

defending South Vietnam. He stressed that, "inevitably, the main burden ofbeating the

69 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Viet Cong threat must fall on the people ofSouth Viet-Nam, on their Government, and on their armed forces," and referred specifically to a "limited effort". However, in words that seem to have provoked considerable consternation from Kennedy and his top White

House advisors, Ball told his audience: "This is a task that we must stay with until it is concluded, But we should have no illusions. It will not be concluded quickly. It took eight years in Malaya. Since then we have learned much - but it will still take time." It was this section ofhis speech, presumably, which led ofthe New

York Herald Tribune to write: "American retreat or withdrawal from South Viet-Nam is unthinkable, according to Mr. Ball. The American commitment, moreover, is now irrevocable."]

By describing a protracted struggle in which the U.S. played a crucial role, and in leaving the door open to an aggressive interpretation like Higgins', Ball had committed a serious error, and he was quick to write a long memo to McGeorge Bundy clarifying his statements. On May 5, after a detailed review ofBall's speech, Michael Forrestal informed Bundy that while "the Ball speech is a good description ofthe type ofconflict which is going on in Vietnam and the measures which we are assisting the Vietnamese to take in resolving it favorably," its flaws lay in the delivery: ".. .it does not tell why we are helping, nor does it emphasize that this is their war and not ours."z In other words, Ball had not been careful enough in his description ofa Vietnamese war with limited, albeit necessary, American assistance.

Similarly, officials in the Kennedy Administration sought to shield the GVN to the greatest extent possible from critical evaluation in the American press. The best

1 Ball to Bundy, May 1, 1962, JFK.L BI96 NSF. 2 Forrestal to Bundy, May 5, 1962, JFKL B196 NSF. Underlining in source document.

70 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsrnan 's War: Images and Realities. method to counter negative press emanating from Saigon proved to be sending key officials to meet with editors and veteran reporters in Washington. In an early example,

Edward Lansdale, after approval from· Secretary McNamara, lunched with editors ofLife magazine on February 23, to answer questions, Lansdale wrote, "sparked to some extent by Stan Karnow ofthe Hong Kong office, who is violently opposed to Diem." Lansdale exhorted the journalists: "We should be desiring a Churchill, not a Chamberlain, for these critical moments in Vietnam. Some reforms are needed but we must help Diem and the

Vietnamese towards practical ways ofsolving their problems, not just sit on the sidelines and give orders for actions which are not solutions.,,3

In attempting to manage the image ofthe American commitment to South

Vietnam, Kennedy had, in practice, laid down a series ofinformal guidelines. The commitment was inherently limited to advice and assistance; the war was in the end the

GVN's to win or lose. The Diem regime, despite its manifold flaws, had to be supported for lack ofa better alternative, and the U.S. should seek to bolster its confidence rather than use negative publicity as a sort ofstick to try to negotiate reform. 4 Finally, the timely intervention ofadditional American military assistance and advisors had laid the framework for victory over the NLF. The present commitment level, which would grow during Kennedy's presidency in quantity but not in quality, was the upper bound for

Kennedy. On January 3,1962, while discussing the impending appointment ofGen.

Harkins and the creation ofMACV with the JCS, Kennedy, Deputy Secretary ofDefense

Roswell Gilpatric noted, "re-emphasized the importance ofthe U.S. not becoming further

3 Lansdale to McNamara, February 26,1962, FRUS, II, p. 178. 4 It is interesting to see this relationship played out in miniature in Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, between the American military advisor Lt. Col. John Paul Vann and the ARVN's i h Infantry Division commander Col. Huyn Van Cao. Sheehan, pps. 75-76, 92.

71 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images andRealities. involved militarily in that area. The President also emphasized the importance ofplaying

down the number ofUS. military personnel involved in Vietnam and that the US. military role there was for advice, training and support ofthe Vietnamese Anned Forces

and not combat."s

Officials soon translated the image ofprogress into practical policy. At

McNamara's sixth monthly Honolulu conference on July 23,1962, the Secretary of

Defense told numerous military and civilian officials in attendance that, contrary to Ball's

estimate, the US. role in the Vietnam conflict could be a swift and relatively painless

one: "SecDefdirected that a long-range program be laid out to include training

requirements, equipment requirements, US advisory requirements, and US units

assuming that it is going to require approximately 3 years to bring the VC in SVN under

control.,,6 The most optimistic assessments, ofcourse, emanated from Gen. Harkins. On

Sept. 7, 1962, he argued to Diem that a vast offensive in early 1963 by all ARVN and

territorial units against the NLF could have devastating results: "He felt that one year

would be enough to achieve victory.,,7

For most of 1962, the image ofprogress and the fayade ofunity, both between the

US. and the GVN and within the Kennedy Administration, remained largely intact; the

5 Gilpatric's Memorandum for the Record, FRUS, II, p. 4. 6 Record ofSixth Secretary ofDefense Conference, FRUS, II, p. 549. McNamara's directions stood in contrast to his own estimate of the situation in mid-January: "Thus in approving a 12 Y, million dollar communications package for Viet-Nam, [McNamara] commented that the U.S. would probably be involved in Viet-Nam for a long time." Martin to Cottrell, January 19, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 53. McNamara's July appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam probably emerged out oftwo factors: impressive new statistics on ARVN's offensives in the countryside, and Kennedy's own desire for a quiet, limited, relatively quick intervention in South Vietnam. 7 Memorandum for the Record, FRUS, II, p. 627.

72 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. reservations ofHilsman and other officials, generally voiced mildly, as well as the occasional critical comment in the American press, were the most important exceptions.8

A series ofevents in late 1962 and early 1963, however, served to widen the rifts that had been growing in the advisory relationship between the two countries, as well as breathe new life into policy debates hitherto lying latent in the Kennedy Administration.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's Dec. 1962 report to Kennedy called into question the basis for reports ofprogress, and the rationale behind the American commitment to South Vietnam. It heartened critics ofthe Diem regime, disturbed

Kennedy, and further inf1uenced the Ngos in their growing conviction that the U.S. was not a reliable defender of anti-communist regimes in Southeast Asia. To get an insider assessment ofMansfield's conclusions, Kennedy sent Hilsman and Forrestal to Saigon in early Jan. 1963, where Hilsman's previous unease at the progress ofthe war effort grew.

Hi1sman also found himselfgravitating towards the beliefs shared by Michael Forrestal and Averell Harriman: the Diem regime and its repressive policies, and particularly the enormous and growing influence ofNgo Dinh Nhu over his brother, were the greatest weapons the NLF had in its arsenal.

During Hilsman's visit, a large battle at the hamlet ofBac turned into a travesty for ARVJ'J forces, exposing the incompetence ofthe army charged with destroying the communist insurgency and, in the eyes ofobservers and participants ranging from military advisors to American correspondents to officials in Washington, putting to shame MACV reports that the GVN was winning its war. Yet officials in the GVN and

8 e.g. Jacques Nevard in The New York Times, July 29, 1962: "The Kennedy administration's cautious optimism on the progress of South Vietnam's war against the Communist insurgents is not widely reflected among Americans stationed here to help in that fight." Quoted in: Hallin, Daniel C. The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 41.

73 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities.

the American military sought to portray the Battle ofAp Bac as a victory, resulting in

further hostility in Saigon, particularly between American reporters and the GVN. As

controversy grew between the GVN and the Kennedy Administration, officials on both

sides contemplated taking drastic steps to address what they perceived to be the dangers

in the relationship. In the early months of 1963, however, American officials, including

Roger Hilsman, who believed that fundamental changes in the behavior ofthe Diem regime had to occur, were forced to wait. So long as the military elements of

commitment to South Vietnam held center stage, optimistic military and Defense

Department assessments ofthe war's progress had the upper hand in determining whether

policy changes had become necessary. The result was intense frustration on the part of

Diem's American critics, and concurrently, a hardening oftheir conviction that Diem had

to be confronted.

On Oct. 18, 1962, just as the was breaking in Washington,

President Kennedy wrote Sen. Mansfield, asking him to lead a bipartisan group of

Senators on a tour ofUS. operations in Berlin and Southeast Asia, particularly South

Vietnam, to report on the status ofAmerican commitments in those places. Mansfield and

his fellows left the U.S. on Nov. 7, and arrived in Saigon at the beginning ofDecember.9

They met with the full cast ofGVN notables, including President Diem, whom Mansfield

noted in his report to Kennedy on Dec. 18, "is older and the problems which confront him

are more complex than those which he faced when he pitted his genuine nationalism

against. .. the sects with such effectiveness."lo Mansfield had been in the mid-1950s,

along with Kennedy, one ofDiem's most vocal supporters in American politics. Yet on

9 Footnote, FRUS, II, p. 750. 10 Mansfield Report, FRUS, II, p. 781.

74 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. this visit, according to one ofMansfield's aides in conversation with the State

Department's Heavner, "the Senator got the impression that Diem is a good deal older and more withdrawn from reality than when he last saw him."ll

By contrast, in a meeting with Nhu, Mansfield gained the disturbing impression that the President's brother was the ascendant political force in the GVN. In a far-ranging conversation, Nhu explained to the visiting Senators the philosophy behind the strategic hamlet program, which he envisioned would be the weapon with which to destroy the

NLF. In the draft record ofthe conversation, Mansfield seems mildly approving ofNhu's description ofthe program, although Nhu's noting that "the West pays too much attention to winning the sympathy ofthe population, and not enough to organizing it," must surely have disturbed Mansfield. The Senator, however, got nowhere with Nhu on two items of major concern and controversy: the GVN's surly treatment offoreign correspondents, including the recent expulsion ofl'ffiC's Jim Robinson, for critical coverage ofthe regime, as well as its bitter and hostile reaction to the fragile neutralization process in neighboring Laos. When pressed on the first issue by Mansfield, Nhu replied that

"American newspaper correspondents in Vietnam are young and inexperienced." After

Mansfield sought to explain that the American policy of Laotian neutralization certainly did not extend to South Vietnam, arguing that "there was a difference in the Laotian and

Vietnamese problems because Laotians would not fight," Nhu replied after a long discussion of"subversive war" that "the Vietnamese had been humiliated...by the United

States policy in Laos and Cambodia."l2

II Heavner memorandum for the files, Dec. 27, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 797. 12 Memcon, Dec. 1, 1962, FRUS. II, pps. 750-757.

75 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

In his report, Mansfield alerted Kennedy: "The energizing role which [Diem] played in the past appears to be passing to other members ofthe family, particularly to

Ngo Dinh NhU.,,13 According to Heavner, Mansfield's aide told him, "The Senator also got the impression that the N1m's now had more real power than ever before, and he considers this unfortunate.,,14 Even with all his misgivings, Mansfield may not have grasped the true extent ofNhu's grab for power. Ambassador Nolting reported on Dec.

22 that Nhu had convened a secret meeting ofthe Can Lao Party on Dec. lO, the shadowy organization's first meeting in a year. Nhu's "stated purpose was to revive and reorganize Can Lao Party, which he said had become almost dormant as active political mechanism in SVN." His message to party members, as well as to Can Lao-affiliated delegates in the National Assembly: " ...American financial and weapons support eventually would be eliminated or greatly diminished. Stated it essential therefore that new mechanisms be devised in each province for funding these programs independent insofar as possible from national budget. Nhu instructed Can Lao leaders begin organizing various fund-raising activities, induding more effective use ofmonopolies and concessions." Nolting commented that Nhu's attempt to bring back the Can Lao accorded with his "assumption leadership ofRepublican Youth and his well-publicized

5 sponsorship and close direction ofstrategic hamlet program."I Mansfield grasped, but did not comprehend completely, Nhu's concerted move to dominate the GVN through the creation ofpowerful organizations reporting directly to him.

Sen. Mansfield's final report to Kennedy, the details ofwhich would become public following congressional testimony the following March, made clear Mansfield's

13 Mansfield Report, FRUS, II, p. 78l. 14 Heavner's memorandum for the files, Dec. 27, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 797. 15 Nolting to State, Dec. 22, 1962, unnumbered State decimal file.

76 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. own grave doubts about the progress engendered by the American commitment to South

Vietnam and about the wisdom ofits continuation. Despite optimistic assessments from top officials in Saigon, Mansfield wrote, "it would be well to face the fact that we are once again at the beginning ofthe beginning." Comparing "optimistic predictions" about the introduction of"new concepts" to similar optimism "beginning with French General

Navarre in Hanoi in 1953," Mansfield argued that these reports were extremely premature. In the first place, military reports heralding the ability ofAmerican firepower to generate massive suspected enemy body counts had to be contrasted with intelligence reports on rising "Vietcong core strength"; the NLF total of20,000 estimated by

CINCPAC "is the highest which I have ever encountered since the Geneva Accords of

1954." Meanwhile, the continued apparent success ofthe strategic hamlet program, at the time progressing rapidly across the country, "would seem to depend on the assumption that the Vietminh will remain wedded to their present tactics and will be unable to devise significant and effective revisions to meet the new concepts and the new highly mobile firepower ofthe American-trained forces.,,16 The NLF, in fact, would prove Mansfield prophetic on its capacity for military innovation sooner than anyone expected.

After voicing his doubts about the continuing viability ofPalace leadership, noting both Diem's exhaustion and Nhu's ascendance, Mansfield breathed fresh life into the arguments ofAmerican officials who believed that only real political reform along democratic lines in South Vietnam could create the basis for long-term victory against communist subversion. These arguments had largely been silenced in 1961 in the face of massive NLF gains in the countryside and Kennedy's determination to win back Diem's

16 Mansfield Report, Dec. 18, 1962, FRUS, II, pps. 779-787.

77 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. confidence, and had lain dormant throughout the general and often giddy optimism of

1962. Yet Mansfield brought them back to the fore:

The difficulties in Vietnam are not likely to be overcome by a handful ofpaid retainers and sycophants. The success of the new approach in Vietnam presupposes a great contribution ofinitiative and self-sacrifice from a substantial body ofVietnamese with capacities for leadership at all levels. Whether that combination can be obtained remains to be seen. For in the final analysis it depends upon a diffusion ofpolitical power, essentially in a democratic pattern.

In closing the section ofhis report that dealt directly with South Vietnam,

Mansfield took another radical step. While not explicitly arguing for the eventual neutralization ofSouth Vietnam, a line ofargument that had gotten previous Kennedy advisors nOWhere, Mansfield recommended that Kennedy rethink the basis for a limited

American commitment to the defense ofanti-communist regimes in Southeast Asia. If the region was a crucial bulwark in the U.S.'s defenses against China, then the U.S. must be prepared to meet communist escalation with "at least a commensurate escalation of commitment ofour own." If, however, holding the region was non-essential to American global security, then the U.S. should work in South Vietnam towards "strengthening our diplomatic hand in Southeast Asia"; in other words, a strategy geared towards a diplomatic solution, rather than a military confrontation, with the Communist powers in the region. It was clear from the tone ofthe report that Mansfield tacitly favored the

. 17 second optIOn.

Mansfield's report unnerved Kennedy, who had become used to receiving routine optimistic updates from advisors. At a Palm Beach meeting in late Dec., Kennedy had browbeat Mansfield on the gulf separating the Senator's report from most ofthe others

17 Mansfield Report, Dec. 18, 1962, FRUS, II, pps. 779-787.

78 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. crossing Kennedy's desk. 18 Kennedy, however, later told his assistant Kenneth

O'Donnell: "I got angry with Mike for disagreeing with our policy so completely; and I got angry with myselfbecause I found myself agreeing with him.,,19

The Mansfield Report tipped Kennedy offto a new, big, and potentially very worrying issue: the supposed optimistic consensus in his government on American policy towards South Vietnam was in fact an illusion. Disagreement existed on the accuracy of

GVN statistics on progress in the war effort, the applicability ofAmerican interpretations ofreported trends, and the wisdom ofcontinuing current policy towards South Vietnam.

Concerned, Kennedy turned to Hilsman and Michael Forrestal, requesting that the two· officials travel quietly to South Vietnam to prepare a further assessment ofthe progress ofAmerican advisory and assistance efforts.2o

The selection ofHilsman and Forrestal to undertake this trip speaks volumes about Kennedy's growing skepticism about the health ofcurrent Vietnam policy. The ostensible point ofthe trip was to evaluate and help Kennedy come to terms with conflicting reports emanating from South Vietnam. Yet Kennedy must have been aware ofthe fact that both Hilsman and Forrestal harbored grave doubts about the

Administration's policy, in terms ofmilitary strategy and relations with the Diem regime.

18 The most negative report generated by an American official intimately familiar with South Vietnamese politics in 1962 had been Mendenhall's Aug. 16 memorandum to Rice advocating a coup against Diem. Although loaded with trenchant and probing criticisms ofthe regime, that report evidently did not make it out ofthe Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Mendenhall to Rice, FRUS, II, pps. 596-601. 19 Dallek, p. 666. Dallek's source on this line is Kenneth O'Donnell's own 1970 account ofthe Kennedy presidency, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye". While the quotation may seem a little too revealing of Kennedy's own doubt about the wisdom ofcontinuing the present policy, or for that matter escalating in South Vietnam, especially given its first appearance in a, book by a friend, assistant, and great admirer of Kennedy's, nevertheless there is good reason to trust its veracity. For one thing, in late 1962, despite a bevy ofoptimistic reports on South Vietnam making their way to the White House, Kennedy still felt that he lacked adequate measures for assessing the war effort. For another, Kennedy respected Mansfield as an astute and experienced observer ofAsian politics, and knew that the Senator's knowledge ofSouth Vietnam was among the deepest ofall observers in the U.S. government. 20 Hilsman, p. 453.

79 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Hilsman, in his Dec. 19 INR report, had expressed his worry over what he considered to be lax and ineffective efforts at implementation ofhis "Strategic Concept".21 Forresta1 had been even blunter. The NSC staffer, extremely loyal to both Kennedy and Averell

Harriman, had not minced words previously about his beliefthat the U.S. negotiating position with Diem had become unacceptably weak. On Aug. 8, he had told Bundy: "At

the moment I suspect that our pressures on Diem are a little too slow acting and need to

be stepped up even at some risk."n Harriman, for his part, had become aggravated by

what he considered to be unacceptable softness on Nolting's part in pursuing U.S.

interests with Diem. During a particularly aClimonious moment stemming from Diem's

refusal in October to accept the neutralization ofLaos specified in the 1962 Geneva

Accords, Harriman cabled Nolting to inform him that "you and I are not on the same

wavelength" over how to approach Diem.23 Forrestal summed up the pair's position on

Nov. 7 to Robert Kennedy: "Averell and I feel that the war is not going as well out there

as one might be led to believe.... The political problem is growing relatively worse....

The major fault lies with the GVN.,,24

Hilsman arrived with Forrestal in Saigon on the last day of 1962, after a stop at

CINCPAC headquarters in Honolulu. On Jan. 2, 1963, according to Hilsman's notes, the

pair met with the top officials ofall American civilian agencies operating in South

Vietnam, as well as Gen. Harkins ofMACV. The general described steady ARVN

success in the countryside and the details of"clear and hold" operations set to begin that

day. Hilsman noted: "General Harkins also mentioned that following Tet he hoped for a

21 Hilsman to Harriman, FRUS, II, pps. 789-792. 22 Forrestal to Bundy, FRUS, II, p. 584. 23 Harriman to Nolting, Oct. 22,1962, FRUS, II, p. 717. 24 Dallek, p. 665. The document is in the RFK Confidential File at the JFKL.

80 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. nationwide intensification ofARVN offensives. This is his word now for the so-called

explosion.,,25 For several months, Harkins had been pitching Diem and American military superiors on a general offensive against suspected NLF positions and

strongholds throughout South Vietnam in the first months of 1963; he claimed that such

an attack, harnessing the whole ofARVN's bolstered firepower and new tactics, would

lay waste to the communist insurgency once and for all. On the very day that he sought

to enlist the support ofHilsman and Forrestal, however, a military debacle in the key

northern Mekong Delta region convinced those who did not share Harkins' optimism that

the war in the countryside had taken a sharp tum for the worse. Important and influential

American officials, members ofthe foreign press corps in Saigon, and key U.S. military

advisors interpreted the Battle ofAp Bac as an unambiguous sign that within ARVN

leadership, all the way up to Diem in the Saigon Palace, the rot ran deep.

By the middle of 1962, members ofthe recently expanded American military

advisory mission had begun to notice a disturbing trend ofseeming cowardice and

incompetence running through the officer ranks ofARVN. Lt. Col. John Paul Vann, a

talented and outspoken advisor to the South Vietnamese commander ofthe i h ARVN

Division in the northern Delta region, warned superior officers, including Harkins, that

ARVN officers invariably failed to give pursuit to NLF guerilla forces on the run after

probing helicopter-borne strikes. ARVN seemed to be content to rack up initial NLF

casualties after surprise raids, then forego more risky blocking actions that might have

enabled South Vietnamese troops to wipe out entire NLF battalions. Vann and other

American advisors believed that the initial advantage ofhelicopters and advance

firepower was being squandered, as guerillas escaped, living and learning to fight another

25 Hilsman memorandum for the record, FRUS, III, p. 13.

81 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. day. Additionally, seemingly petty rivalries between ARVN officers and overlapping chains ofcommand made essential coordination between various ARVN units virtually impossible. After a particularly egregious incident on July 20, 1962, resulting in guerillas escaping from an un-sprung ARVN trap, Vann wrote in his after-action report:

A deplorable condition...exists because commanders at all levels who do nothing can still retain their command, and even advance, while those who are aggressive may be relieved ifthey suffer a setback or sustain heavy losses.... Petty jealousies among battalion and regimental commanders take precedence over, and detract from, the primary mission ofclosing with and destroying the enemy. Regimental and battalion commanders obey orders that suit them, ignore or change those that do not. ... Unless the entire ARVN can be retrained to function on a chain ofcommand, orders will be obeyed basis, then an acceptable degree ofcombat effectiveness will not be achieved.26

In short, ARVN forces fought in a risk-averse command environment, plagued by the

excessive politicization ofthe officer class; nothing short ofa revolution in training and a

complete reorganization ofthe chain ofcommand, Vann believed, would redeem ARVN

and deliver it final victory. Initially, advisors stood at a loss as to the reasons behind

ARVN's lack ofkiller instinct. Gradually, however, advisors, officials and journalists

came to the disturbing conclusion that ARVN fought the way it did because Ngo Dinh

Diem wanted it to fight that way.

On Sept. 10, 1962, Harkins confronted Diem on ARVN cowardice and risk-

aversion during the course ofa long conversation chiefly concerning Harkins'

"explosion" concept. The MACV commander mentioned that he had twice heard the

story of an ARVN officer who had refused to bivouac at a specific site because the area

was known to be occupied by NLF guerillas. According to the notes oftheir

conversation, Harkins told Diem: "When [the ARVN officer] was asked why he did not

go after them he replied, 'as long as we don't bother them, they won't bother us.' The

26 Sheehan, p. 91. Italics are in the original.

82 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images andRealities.

President said that this commander was a lazy man and admitted that there were areas where his commanders hesitated to attack.... The President said that he had spoken strongly to General Don [Tran Van Don, one ofARVN's most senior generals], telling him there could be no war without men being killed or wounded." Harkins accepted

DIem·,s reassurance, andt h e conversatIOn .move don to ot her tOPICS. . 27

The issue would not die with Diem's good word, however. A month after

Harkins first broached the issue, Col. Frank P. Serong, an Australian with extensive counterinsurgency experience serving as Harkins' special advisor, submitted a lengthy report to Harkins that restated the problem in very strong terms. One section ofSerong's comprehensive report addressed the persistent problem oflow morale among ARVN soldiers in the field. "With the resources at GVN disposal," Serong wrote, "this attitude

appears extraordinary." Along with rather extraordinary neglect at the top levels ofthe

South Vietnamese military and theGVN for the well-being ofthe common soldier,28 low

morale resulted from a compulsion within the ARVN officer corps to avoid aggressive,

risky, and potentially decisive tactics: "The GVN officer is afraid offailure. He believes

that, one way or another, he will be punished for it. This attitude goes all the way up. A

higher commander will not protect a junior who has made an honest attempt and failed,

because he fears he himselfwill then bear the blame, and consequently, the punishment.

So there are no small scale operations - only small scale results oflarge scale

operations.,,29

27 Memorandum for the Record, FRUS, II, p. 630. 28 Serong noted, vis avis problems oflow morale: "It might help too, ifthe ration allowance for the soldier were a little higher than that ofa dog." 29 Serong Report, Oct. 1962, LBJL PWW #1 (History Backup) Box 1.

83 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities.

There is no good evidence, however, that Harkins ever paid more than glancing attention to the message, substantively the same, coming from both Vann and Serong: that orders emanating from the very top ofthe GVN, reaching down to the very bottom of the military ranks, told officers to disregard the offensive-minded plans ofAmerican advisors, and to avoid high casualties in the war against the NLF. Harkins continued pushing Diem to implement his national explosion plan, which the South Vietnamese

President predictably filibustered. Regardless ofthe plan's strategic merits, which were dubious, Harkins, had he been listening to his subordinates, should have known that the

GVN mindset precluded the enactment ofa grand and decisive offensive in early 1963.

Officials in the State Department, however, did take note ofthe quiet but growing controversy. Theodore Heavner, deputy director ofState's Vietnam Working Group, reported on Dec. 11, 1962, after a lengthy visit to South Vietnam: "Connected with chain ofcommand difficulties is the matter ofGVN reaction to combat losses. A number of

MAAG advisors feel that good Vietnamese commanders are hamstrung by fear of casualties. They describe these officers as personally brave, but professionally cowards.

By this they mean that Diem will remove or demote any officer who suffers heavy losses, even though he is successful.,,30 Such accounts reinforced doubts about Diem's

30 Heavner Report, FRUS, II, p. 776. Heavner also conveyed the story ofCol. Cao, Vann's counterpart in 7th Division. Cao had seen relative success on the offensive against the NLF in the northern Delta, but suffered Diem's wrath after an NLF ambush killed 18 Civil Guardsmen in the region. Heavner reported: "The President kept him waiting without breakfast or lunch, so frightened him - he was on pins and needles hoping to make Brigadier - that he cut back heavily on his operations." Heavner's report jibes with the account given by Vann in Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie. Sheehan, pps. 120-121. Heavner's report circulated among the members of Special Group (Cl). Forrestal passed a copy along to Kennedy, calling it one of"the more informative reports we have." Footnote, Heavner Report, FRUS, II, p. 763. An attentive American official in Washington could therefore have connected the dots after Ap Bac, tracing the resistance oftroops under Cao to attack fortified NLF positions to a direct order from Diem to his 7th Division commander.

84 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. leadership, and belied the impressive GVN military statistics being touted by the Defense

Department as evidence ofsteady progress in the war effort.

The Battle ofAp Bac was a perfect storm ofARVN incompetence. According to

Neil Sheehan's exhaustive account, Ap Bac represented a major defeat for the Diem regime in morale as well as military terms. Throughout 1962, American military advisors had speculated about the carnage ARVN might wreak ifNLF battalions would

"stand and fight" rather than practice the traditional guerilla tactics of ambush and retreat.

By late in the year, NLF commanders in the northern Mekong Delta region had reached the conclusion that they could no longer avert a major confrontation. ARVN's U.S.­

supplied helicopters and M-113 armored personnel carriers had shifted the military momentum in the war to Diem's forces. According to NLF documents captured several

months after Ap Bac, NLF support amongst the peasantry showed dangerous signs of

ebbing. Guerilla leaders felt pressured to demonstrate that their forces could stand up to

ARVN's destructive new power and its American supporters.31

On Jan. 2,1963, an NLF battalion ofabout 350 guerillas pinned down by the

advance ofGVN forces from three sides, outnumbered by nearly four to one and facing

helicopters, M-l13s and heavy artillery, chose to dig in and defend the hamlet ofBac.

ARVN commanders and American advisors, including Cao and Vann, had not expected

to meet such heavy resistance, but their forces were well-equipped to handle it. At 7:45

am, Civil Guardsmen advancing from the south drew the first barrage ofNLF fire from

the Bac tree line. At nightfall, the guerillas retreated, carrying the bodies oftheir

relatively few dead and wounded with them, anddisappeared into the landscape. The

intervening hours showcased, in brutal detail, virtually all ofthe extraordinary

31 Sheehan, p. 206.

85 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities. shortcomings and failures ofARVN that advisors like Vann and Serong had for some time been trying to bring to Harkins' attention.

Superior numbers and firepower meant nothing when units commanded by rival

ARVN officers failed to advance and support their imperiled counterparts in other units witheringunder heavy NLF fire; the overlapping chain ofcommand, engineered by the

Palace to play ARVN officers offone another, did its job too well. Well-trained ARVN officers, including the commanding officer 0 fan M-113 brigade, showed extreme timidity and delayed sending their units into combat, preferring to hold back and, they believed, preserve their careers and lives. The guerillas had made great strides in anti­ helicopter tactics, and succeeded in shooting down five American helicopters in the fields outside the hamlet. Finally arriving from the north to relieve an ARVN division and its

American advisors pinned down to the west after the incapacitation ofthe helicopters, the

M-I13s encountered stiffresistance as well, and had to fall back. An airborne battalion sent in the evening to reinforce was not landed to the east to cut offthe guerillas' logical escape route, as American advisors begged, but to the west, in Cao's obvious attempt to intimidate the guerillas into retreating; botched coordinates resulted in the battalion being dropped frighteningly close to NLF positions, and the unit sustained heavy losses.

Throughout the day, Vann flew above the battlefield in a spotter plane, frustrated and impotent, attempting to countermand ARVN orders and issue his own. But in battle, and mindful ofDiem's attitude, ARVJ'J officers ignored their American advisor, and the result was 80 dead, over 100 wounded, three dead American advisors and five downed helicopters. The NLF escaped with only 18 dead and 39 wounded, and a massive

86 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. propaganda victory.32 Vann, who had spoken to the press on previous occasions in generally optimistic terms, abandoned the positive exterior. He told reporters memorably: "It was a miserable damn performance.,,33 Those words, attributed to an anonymous American advisor, blazed across the mastheads ofmany US. papers, and alerted most readers for the first time that serious problems plagued the American advisory effort in South Vietnam.

American correspondents in Saigon reacted particularly fiercely in the aftermath ofthe battle. Already despairing ofthe Diem regime for its harshly restrictive controls on information and press freedoms, and its propensity to seek the expulsion ofcritical reporters on the flimsiest ofinvented pretexts, young reporters like Sheehan ofUPI and

David Halberstam ofThe New York Times were galvanized by ARVN's failure at Bac and Vann's furious comments. On Jan. 7, 1963, The Washington Post published a front- page piece by Sheehan reporting that "angry United States military advisors charged today that Vietnamese infantrymen refused direct orders to advance during Wednesday's battle at Ap Bac and that an American Army captain was killed while out front pleading with them to attack.,,34 Halberstam probed further in the Times: "American officers throughout the Mekong Delta feel what happened at Ap Bac goes far deeper than one

battle and is directly tied to the question - whether the Vietnamese are really interested in

having American advisors and listening to them.35 The veteran Times columnist Arthur

Krock wrote the following day that in the wake ofAp Bac Kennedy should undertake a

"fundamental review" ofVietnam policy; the fiasco had demonstrated the lingering lack

32 Neil Sheehan's incomparable account ofthe Battle ofAp Bac is in A Bright Shining Lie, pps. 203-265. 33 Sheehan, p. 277. 34 Editorial Note, FRUS, III, p. 2. 35 Hallin, p. 41.

87 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. ofwill on the part ofthe South Vietnamese to defend themselves, and that absent that necessary ingredient for success, the Administration needed to examine possibilities besides "starry-eyed diplomacy and.. .ingenuous commitments.,,36 A State Department report on Jan. 15 warned that "since Ap Bac the complaint has been increasingly heard that the American public is not 'getting the facts' on the situation in Viet-Nam, even at this time when American casualties are mounting.,,3?

The White House reacted with alarm to the sudden explosion ofnegative press; the fallout from Ap Bac had begun to crack the carefully cultivated image ofprogress in

Vietnam. The public criticism after the battle, combined with the private doubts sowed in

Kennedy's mind by the Mansfield Report, led the President to consider a reassessment of

American policy on South Vietnam. Yet under the circumstances, no honest reassessment may have been possible. Top American military officials rushed to defend the advisory effort and their South Vietnamese counterparts, while critics ofthe Diem regime sought to press their new advantage. Where an honest and searching inquiry into the wisdom ofcurrent policy was necessary, and acrimonious internal debate developed.

Chiefly at fault were American military officials, who in 1962 had passed on to

Washington without question dubious GVN statistics on progress in the war effort. In the aftermath ofAp Bac, American generals swallowed whatever reservations they may have held and defended the South Vietnamese wholeheartedly against, in their view, a hopelessly biased Saigon press corps. Gen. Harkins was first out ofthe gates, telling reporters a day after the battle: "I consider it a victory. We took the objective.,,38 Adm.

36Kaiser,p.183. 37 Editorial Note, FRUS, III, p. 2. 38 Sheehan, p. 283. Incredibly, by March 1963, the GVN had again ceded control ofthe emptied and battle­ scarred hamlet to the NLF. Serong reported to Harkins on March 14: "The people ofAp Bac have begun to

88 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Felt of CINCPAC, despite his initial report to the JCS on Jan. 4 that Ap Bac was "one of the bloodiest and costliest battles ofS. Vietnam war" and "will provide enemy with morale-building victory",39 cabled the State Department on Jan. 11 that "I think it important to realize that bad news about American casualties filed immediately by the young reporters representing the wire services without careful checking ofthe facts ....

Secretary Thuan pointed out that in the overall, the VC had been routed and suffered heavier casualties than the GVN forces.,,4o An investigative team led by Army Chiefof

StaffGen. Earle Wheeler and Marine Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak traveled to Saigon,

consulted with Harkins at MACV, and returned in late January to issue a highly

optimistic report to Kennedy. The report adhered to the Harkins line on Ap Bac: "The

unfortunate aftermath ofreports ofthe fight at Ap Bac.. .is a prime instance ofthe harm

being done to the war effort. Press members.. .insist defensively, and contrary to the facts, that the battle was a defeat....,,41

In their report delivered to Kennedy on Jan. 25, Hilsman and Forrestal shied away

from a detailed discussion ofAp Bac, noting only the battle's "telling results" in a section

on recent NLF successes.42 Although he and Forrestal had been in Saigon for several

days at the time ofthe battle, Hilsman does not seem to have investigated the particulars

ofAp Bac.43 In To Move a Nation, however, Hilsman recalled Ap Bac as "a stunning

defeat for the government forces." He added, in commentary that would come to

approximate his thinking later in the year but which, in Jan. 1963, he would have

drift back to their destroyed hamlet because their fields are there. The VC are helping them. Once this move is completed, Ap Bac will be a classic symbol in the VC's own psywar programe." Serong Report, March 14, 1962, LBJL PWW #1 (History Backup) Box 1. 39 Editorial Note, FRUS, III, p. 2. 40 CINCPAC to State, DDRS, Box 197, 1/10-1130, NLK-84-133. 41 Wheeler Team Report, January 1963, FRUS, III, p. 89. Italics added. 42 Hilsman/Forrestal Report, Jan. 25, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 50. 43 Hilsman memoranda for the record, Dec. 31, 1962-Jan. 9, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 3-16.

89 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. moderated: "What Colonel Vann and Halberstam had been saying about the inefficiency, bad leadership, and lack ofaggressiveness ofthe government forces seemed to be confirmed - ifnot their conclusion that the cause ofit all was the corruption and unpopularity ofthe Diem regime.,,44

In South Vietnam, Hilsman's nervousness about the implementation ofthe strategic hamlet program was assuaged somewhat by a positive meeting with the influential British advisor Robert Thompson. Yet discussions with U.S. military advisors confirmed some ofhis worst fears about battlefield strategy and tactics. He concluded, along with Forrestal, that while American assistance had had a beneficial effect in South

Vietnam, the present course ofthe struggle did not augur well. A comprehensive, coordinated long-term strategy still had not been agreed upon among American agencies, let along between the U.S. and the GVN. In Jan. 1963, Hilsman came closer to the more critical opinions ofthe Diem regime held by Forrestal and Harriman, and came to concur that new American leadership was necessary in Saigon to exert greater pressure on Diem for refonn.

In his Dec. 19, 1962, INR report, Hilsman had accentuated the negative on the strategic hamlet program, drawing attention to major problems in implementation and

Nhu's strategy, in contravention ofthe Strategic Concept, ofbuilding strategic hamlets simultaneously across the countryside. In conversation with Thompson in Jan. 1963, however, Hilsman found "the most respected authority on this problem" to be "the most optimistic ofthem all." Flying with Thompson over the countryside, Hilsman was impressed by "a nucleus ofhamlets that were good," although many still "were nothing

44 Hilsman, p. 449.

90 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities. but a shell, a strand ofbarbed wire with nothing inside.,,45 In his notes, Hilsman expressed surprise that Thompson credited Nhu with midwifing the strategic hamlet program effectively: "R.K.G. Thompson also mentioned that without Nhu's enthusiastic and vigorous backing, the strategic hamlet program would probably not have gotten off the ground." Thompson'sprevious unease, which had been shared by Hilsman, that

Nhu's massive proliferation strategy would endanger the program in its infancy had given way to admiration. Hilsman recorded: "He now feels that Nhu was not wrong in doing this because it attracted a great deal ofattention to the program all over Vietnam and hence got an essential momentum.,,46

Thompson would travel to Honolulu and then Washington in early April to give optimistic briefings on the war to top American officials. In Honolulu, Adm. Felt reported to the JCS that Thompson had told him "we are definitely winning," and that the

"strategic hamlet program has gone much betterin the last six months than he had ever expected." He suggested to Kennedy in Washington that the U.S. announce the redeployment of 1000 American military personnel before the end ofthe year as a show ofconfidence and a counter to communist propaganda. Remarkably, he sketched out a probable endgame in South Vietnam to Felt: "Looking ahead, he thinks that when Hanoi and VC decide they are not winning in RVN they will try for political solution consisting ofa peaceful neutralist RVN." And he announced to all who would listen, including virtually every top American official involved in Vietnam policy, that Diem provided strong leadership for his country and disaster would result from his toppling. When

Kennedy expressed interest in the prospects ofpolitical opposition figures in Saigon,

45 Hilsman, p. 462. 46 Hilsman memrec, FRUS, III, p. 5.

91 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Thompson responded that "the quality ofthe political opposition was very poor. He said that ifDiem disappeared there would be a risk oflosing the war within six months since there was no other leader ofhis caliber available." On April 4, Chalmers Wood ofthe

Vietnam Working Group cabled Ambassador Nolting that Thompson's visit had been

"most helpful" in rallying support for the American advisory effort in South Vietnam, recently so savaged by domestic criticism.47

Thompson's reassurances in January had the same calming effect on Hilsman, although the British advisor did not completely clear up his unease about the strategic hamlets. ill their final report, Hilsman and Forrestal come across as more confident about strategic hamlets than other elements ofthe war effort, conveying confidence while at the same time urging against complacency. More disturbing for the pair were conversations with American military advisors, who described ARVN incompetence in vivid terms and reinforced Hilsman's own prior concerns over ARVN and MACV tactics.

Maj. Gen. Edward Rowny's account offailure and brutality in the countryside particularly impressed Hilsman. Rowny had earned his graduate degree in at Yale alongside Hilsman some 15 years before, and so his judgments carried

"great weight" with the director ofINR. He described the "typical" ARVN operation as a textbook example ofhow not to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. According to

Rowny, an air strike on suspected NLF positions preceded most ARVN operations. ill the aftermath ofthe bombardment, Hilsman noted,

The helicopters then move out, the troops are landed outside the village and they start forward. After a little while there is a flurry on the right and someone drags a peasant out ofa rice paddy where he had been hiding. The peasant is bound and taken prisoner as a "suspected Viet Cong." They then proceed up the road towards the village. Some time

47 CINCPAC to JCS, March 1963, JFKL NSF Bl97; Memcon, White House, Apri14, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 198-200; Wood to Nolting, Apri14, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 204.

92 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities.

later another flurry appears on the left and a man runs towards the jungle. He is shot and killed and marked down as a Viet Cong since he ran. They then proceed to the village which is deserted except for an old man or perhaps an addlepated girl - an Ophelia as Rowny describes her.48

To Hilsman's dismay, ARVN still relied heavily on "search and destroy" sweep operations, which ironically neither searched for NLF nor destroyed. Rowny repeated charges reminiscent ofVann and Serong, and Hilsman noted sympathetically: "We discussed why [there are] such elaborate operations, which are preceded by bombing, warning the VC and proceeding so slowly as to give the VC ample time to escape....

Diem's cold propaganda line, as we well know, is that there must never be a defeat [,] even a small one, but only one long series ofvictories.... This pressure for victories and only total victories at that, leads to excessive caution on the part ofARVN, in Rowny's opinion.,,49

The sole encouragement Hilsman noted from his conversation with Rowny on the military situation in South Vietnam was that the number of"clear and hold" operations conducted by ARVN, necessary for the construction ofadditional strategic hamlets, had creeped upwards. Yet in their report to Kennedy, Hilsman and Forrestal wrote with worry that "the proportion of 'clear and hold' operations, in which troops clear an area and then remain to protect the civic action teams and villagers while they build strategic hamlets, is too low in proportion to the 'hit and withdraw' operations designed to destroy regular Viet Cong units."so In other words, ARVN heavily favored operations aimed at destruction and intimidation over operations creating the favorable conditions for the establishment ofstrategic hamlets. Yet hamlets popped up all over the countryside

48 Hilsman memorandum for the record, FRUS, III, p. 8. 49 Ibid., pps. 8-9. 50 Hilsman/Forrestal Report, FRUS, III, p. 55.

93 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities. nonetheless, though minimal security had not been established for most; Nhu still pushed for results from provincial officials.

A second and related problem concerned potential abuse ofthe American

"Farmgate" air support to the South Vietnamese Air Force. Over the course of 1962,

State Department officials had cautioned that "interdiction" air strikes against targets pinpointed by GVN intelligence as potential NLF bases and strongholds might result in egregious civilian deaths and a major propaganda victory for the guerillas. Rowny alerted Hilsman that the U.S. Air Force in South Vietnam, eager to see its own role in the war further increased, played to ARVN enthusiasm for the interdiction air strike: "The

Air Force is very reluctant to provide escort aircraft for helicopter missions. They put

'interdiction' on a higher priority than supporting or escorting helicopters.... Apparently what they mean by interdiction is precisely the air strikes on reported VC villages.,,51

Hilsman, in a later conversation with Gen. Roland Anthis, the U.S. Air Force

(USAF) commander in South Vietnam, learned that about 1000 air strikes took place each month, and the number was increasing; the South Vietnamese and the USAF had requested an augmentation in Farmgate. Ofthose 1000, "32 percent. ..were interdiction,

53 per cent were in direct support and 15 percent were other, i.e. reconnaissance and so

forth," Hilsman noted. "Thus over 300 strikes per month are pure interdiction and it is unknown how many ofthe 15-53 percent are strikes based on intelligence rather than

strike on people who are actually shooting at the ground forces." Most ofthe intelligence

for interdiction strikes came from ARVN divisions, and was not checked independently

by Americans before American planes strafed and bombed.52 Hilsman knew, based on

51 Hilsman memorandum for the record, FRUS, III, p. 10. 52 Memcon, Hilsman and Anthis, FRUS, III, p. 15.

94 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. his conversations with advisors, that ARVN divisions often called air strikes to avoid direct confrontation with NLF forces; he also knew ofthe devastation wrought by strikes in the countryside. Brutal and indiscriminate" based on suspect intelligence, the high rate ofinterdiction air strikes threatened the principles underlying Hilsman's Strategic

Concept: the forging ofa bond ofmutual trust and loyalty between the GVN and the population ofSouth Vietnam.

Many American officials in Saigon reacted with dismay to the evidence ofARVN incompetence and cowardice and the rising number ofair strikes. But the top Americans in Saigon demonstrated unwillingness to acknowledge the fundamental problems plaguing the war effort, let alone confront their South Vietnamese counterparts. During a meeting with the heads of all American agencies in Saigon on Jan. 2, Hilsman witnessed a discussion ofthe use ofnapalm in rural areas. While Nolting attested that the GVN

"already had napalm and we could not completely control their use ofit," Harkins made

"the point that napalm really put the fear ofGod into the VC and was very effective.,,53

The most important message contained in the Hilsman/Forrestal Report to

Kennedy was that Nolting and Harkins were simply not up to the challenge ofdirecting

American efforts in Saigon. Nolting did not possess the clout to rein in the various

American civilian agencies assisting the GVN: "The most serious lack in South Vietnam is that of an overall plan, keyed to the strategic concept. ..through which priorities can be

set and the coordination ofmilitary and civilian activities accomplished." Nolting, of

course, had gained the ambassadorship in 1961 with directions to gain Diem's confidence

through persuasion; in the year and a halfsince he had been loath to jeopardize the South

Vietnamese President's trust by issuing demarches and using pressure tactics. Now

53 Hilsman memorandum for the record, FRUS, III, pps. 12-13.

95 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hi/sman 's War: Images and Realities.

Hilsman and Forrestal wrote that the Embassy would have to curb Diem's worst tendencies by more actively negotiating with the GVN.

Hilsman's report with Forrestal marked a new departure for the director ofINR.

He had previously advocated that the U.S. step back from pressuring Diem directly for reforms, and instead concentrate on gaining desired outcomes at the village and provincial level through close advisory relationships. In Jan. 1963, however, Hilsman began arguing for a position more closely identified with Forrestal and Harriman: the

U.S. Ambassador should not be afraid to confront Diem when he felt it was in the best interests ofthe joint war effort. A year spent neglecting the diplomatic challenges ofthe

U.S.-GVN relationship in the excitement over the arrival ofgreater American assistance and advisors and the implementation ofthe strategic hamlet program had allowed the manifold failings and flaws ofNgo Dinh Diem to fester and multiply. Major political problems reported by Ambassador Durbrow remained uncorrected. Important political reforms had been neglected - for instance, the National Assembly remained a body largely in existence to rubber-stamp Palace directives. No meaningful, organized, peaceful domestic opposition existed; the GVN's political base remained exceedingly narrow. As Ap Bac demonstrated, ARVN's chain ofcommand problems, which MACV had tagged as a top priority to solve, remained egregious, largely because Diem and Nhu intended to keep playing officers against one another.

Addressing South Vietnamese foreign policy, rabidly anti-communist to the point ofresisting American policy towards Cambodia and Laos, Hilsman and Forrestal wrote that "U.S. interests are so heavily involved in the country that our voice should carry more weight." The sentiment hearkened back to the waning days ofthe Eisenhower

96 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

Administration, when many State Department officials saw Diem's recalcitrance as a key impediment to victory over the communist insurgency. Hilsman and Forrestal once more rose what they had come to consider the key question of"how to increase our leverage in the face ofDiem's biases and general resistance to advice."s4

In an "Eyes Only Annex" to their report, intended exclusively for Kennedy, the pair wrote in more blunt terms: "In general, we don't use all the leverage we have to persuade Diem to adopt policies which we espouse." The Embassy, they believed, had made "virtually no contact with meaningful opposition elements and we have made no attempt to maintain a U.S. posture independent ofDiem." Hilsman and Forrestal advocated "a more outspoken attitude on public policies we disapprove of," with the goal of"a gradual liberalization ofthe authoritarian political structure...." Long-term success in winning the allegiance ofthe peasantry in the countryside now depended, Hilsman believed, on the reform ofthe central government, and its ability to retain the loyalty and enthusiasm ofthe elites and mid-level officials charged with implementing counterinsurgency policy.

Hilsman also concurred with Forrestal (and Harriman) that Kennedy should replace Amb. Nolting, whose tour was scheduled for completion in mid-1963, with "a single strong executive...a civilian public figure whose character and reputation would permit him to dominate the representatives ofall other departments and agencies."ss The proposal had far-reaching connotations: U.S. authority in Saigon should be centered on a diplomat whose stature might allow him to harness the hitherto divided powers ofthe various American agencies in Saigon, with the express purpose ofleaning on President

54 Hi1smanlForresta1 Report, Jan. 25, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 59-69. 55 Eyes Only Annex: Performance ofU.S. Mission, Hi1smanIForresta1 Report, FRUS, III, pps. 60-61.

97 Mark Habel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities.

Diem to gain greater American say in the conduct ofthe war. The Hilsman/Forrestal

Report made clear that South Vietnamese domestic politics should be considered vital to the counterinsurgency campaign, and thus internal reform represented a legitimate target for American pressure.

The HilsmanIForrestal Report struck a moderate chord between the nearly unbridled optimism oftop military officials and the warnings ofimpending disaster coming from Saigon correspondents and their sources in the advisory corps and the eternally frustrated South Vietnamese opposition. The pair concluded cautiously that

"the war in South Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago."S6 Later in their report, they noted, "Our overall judgment, in sum, is that we are probably winning but certainly more slowly than we had hoped. At the rate it is now going the war will last longer than we would like, cost more in terms ofboth lives and money than we had anticipated, and prolong the period in which a sudden and dramatic event would upset the gains already made."s7 In other words, the Kelmedy Administration's expanded assistance and advisory effort had produced a net positive result since its inception, but simply pumping resources into South Vietnam would not be enough. The strategic hamlet program had not been sufficient to generate the broad political support necessary for the GVN to defeat the insurgency in the long-term.

Coming on the heels ofthe Mansfield Report and Ap Bac, the HilsmanJForrestal

Report uill1erved President Kennedy still further. His greatest concern centered on the nexus ofdomestic politics and foreign policy: ifAmericans awoke to the fact that the quiet war in South Vietnam had not been going as smoothly as the Administration had

56 HilsmanIForrestal Report, FRUS, III, p. 49. 57 Ibid., p. 52.

98 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman's War: Images and Realities. hoped, Kennedy's hand might be forced into dramatic action, either to withdraw assistance or to escalate in South Vietnam. As American prestige was already publicly tied into the defense of anti-communist South Vietnam, escalation would seem the direction associated with fewer short-term political risks. Therefore, in his first response to the waveofbad news, Kennedy attempted to diminish the public stature and image of the American commitment.

On Jan. 25, McGeorge Bundy alerted Defense, State and USAID that Kennedy had ordered "that official visits by high ranking military and civilian personnel to South

Vietnam be coordinated with Governor Harriman... [and] cleared with his office." The revised visit policy, Hilsman stated later, originated with a string ofunscheduled voyages to Saigon by top US. officials. Kennedy had alerted Hilsman that the visits had the

effect ofraising the public profile ofthe US. commitment to the defense ofthe GVN.

Hilsman recalled Kennedy telling him, "That is exactly what I don't want to do."s8 The

directive also demonstrated Kennedy's growing trust of, and reliance on, the axis of

Averell Harriman, Michael Forrestal, and Roger Hilsman as the gatekeepers and agents

ofAmerican diplomacy towards South Vietnam. The Defense Department, ofcourse,

still maintained enormous influence on military policy based on the substantial

commitment ofUS. armed forces in the country.

During the first few months of 1963, Hilsman was far less active than Harriman

and Forrestal in seeking to force changes in the US.-GVN working relationship. He was

disturbed, as were virtually all senior American officials, at the ascendant influence of

Ngo Dinh Nhu. In To Move a Nation, Hilsman wrote that Nhu "seemed to be an

58 NSAM 217, Jan. 25, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 63. Hilsman's comments serve as a footnote to the document; the original source is a 1984 State Department oral history interview. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews, Roger Hilsman, May 15, 1984.

99 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. influence leading to disaster. He had a paranoiac suspiciousness in his make-up and a grandiose, apocalyptic view ofhimselfand his family that hinted ofmadness." At a dinner in Saigon hosted by Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the GVN Secretary ofState at the

Presidency, Nhu gave Hilsman the fits by proclaiming that he had a solution to the problem ofthe world communist movement: the U.S. should make war on China in Laos,

"an ideal theater and battleground."s9 Both Hilsman and Forrestal had concluded on the trip that Diem could potentially lead the GVJ\T to victory ifNhu did not first mislead his brother into calamitous defeat.

Yet Thompson's reassurances also calmed Hilsman on the question ofthe

strategic hamlet program. According to the most respected expert in Saigon, the key

component ofthe Strategic Concept had established a strong foothold in the countryside,

and as American advisors became more involved in the program's administration, earlier missteps might be corrected. On May 1, 1963, Hilsman wrote to , Deputy

Assistant Secretary ofDefense for International Security Affairs, that a U.S. transfer of

reconnaissance jets to the South Vietnamese Air Force would be seen as an escalation of

the terms ofthe war and might engender a similar escalation from the communist patrons

ofthe NLF. "The war seems to be going our way under the terms in which it is now

being fought," Hilsman wrote. "We shouldn't give the other side a pretext to change the

terms unless we thereby obtained a decided advantage.,,6o

59 Hilsman, p. 461. Hi1sman's recollection ofNhu's frightening comments echoes a story told by John Mecklin, the admired USIA chiefin Saigon. On Nov. 19, 1962, Nhu, during a meeting with Mecklin, apparently "made the reckless (and psychotic?) remark that the US should now mount an atomic attack on Peking." Mecklin to Nolting, Nov. 27, 1962, FRUS, II, p. 744. It is doubtful that Nhu really meant what he said; rather, it is probable, based on Nhu's well-documented suspicion ofAmerican intentions, that he intended to rattle and test his American interlocutors. Yet the tactic had more in common with the bluster ofSoviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev than what U.S. officials expected from Cold War allies. 60 Hilsman to W. Bundy, FRUS, III, p. 260.

100 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images and Realities.

Michael Forrestal, however, from his perch in the White House became the

Administration's most outspoken and active advocate for a change in American posture and negotiating tactics towards the GVN. The report from the Wheeler team, following closely behind Hilsman's and his own, emaged the young NSC staffer. The generals exuded optimism, castigated the Saigon correspondents for their coverage ofAp Bac, and hinted that escalation ofthe war effort might be in order, by requesting more aggressive rules ofengagement for American helicopters and arguing that "we have not given Ho

Chi Minh any evidence that we are prepared to call him to account for helping to keep the insurgency in South Vietnam alive...we should do something to make the North

Vietnamese bleed." Also egregious to Forrestal was the suggestion that the current

American diplomatic and advisory stance towards the GVN was satisfactory: "United

States officials, military and civilian, are not in a position to command, control or direct

[GVN] military, economic or political activities.... Fortunately, excellent relations exist between United States and [GVN] authorities in all major fields ofjoint endeavor and

United States advice is generally, though not always, accepted. The team feels these relationships will continue to strengthen and United States advice will increasingly be followed as [GVN] confidence in themselves and their advisors continues to groW.,,61

The generals gave a vote ofconfidence to the leadership ofNoHing and Harkins, and argued for a diplomatic policy that was virtually the opposite ofForrestal's.

Forrestal, in advance ofKennedy's Feb. 1 meeting with the Wheeler team, sent the President a list ofpossible questions to pose to the generals.62 The list was copied virtually verbatim from the criticisms and worries ofthe HilsmanIForrestal Report, and

61 Wheeler Team Report, Jan. 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 91, 87. 62 Forrestal to Kennedy, FRUS, III, pps. 94-95.

101 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. had the President chosen to follow Forrestal's advice, would have sent a clear signal to the generals ofdispleasure at the contents oftheir report and the current course ofthe war. Kennedy, in a strategy typical ofhis presildency, evidently did not betray his sympathies for either side ofthe growing gulfbetween his advisors on Vietnam policy at the meeting: Forrestal tried again: afterwards he wrote to Kennedy that "the meeting...was a complete waste ofyour time for which I apologize." He decried the generals' "rosy euphoria" and suggested an alternative tactic. Subject to Kennedy's approval, Forrestal and Harriman would "start a quiet campaign in the appropriate departments" for a series ofobjectives necessary to reinvigorate the war effort and fix the errors ofthe past year. Crucially, Forrestal asked for authorization to "look for a replacement for Fritz Nolting when his 2-year tour is up in April," and to "encourage our civilian and military people in Saigon to put across more forcefully to the GVN U.S. views on fighting the war and on foreign policy." The evident aim was to "develop

gradually a more independent posture for the U.S. in South Vietnam and very carefully to

dissociate ourselves from those policies and practices ofthe GVN ofwhich we

dIsapprove·WIt . hgoo d reason.,,63

There does not seem to be a documentary record ofKennedy's response to

Forrestal's request for authorization, but the NSC staffer's next moves strongly suggest

the President gave him the go-ahead. On Feb. 8, Forrestal, in a memorandum to Harriman

copied only to Hilsman, wrote that officials should work on "expanding the contacts

between U.S. personnel in Saigon and non-communist elements ofthe Vietnamese

opposition." He added: "I think that the risks in remaining too closely tied to Diem's

63 Forrestal to Kennedy, Feb. 4, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 97.

102 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. government will increase rather than decrease as time goes on.,,64 Heavner had warned

Harriman on Jan. 29 that "State Department personnel are not permitted to maintain contacts with known oppositionists.... This has been the policy for the last five years to my knowledge. A change now would almost certainly be interpreted by Diem as an effort to undermine his regime.,,65 Despite Heavner's injunction, Harriman wrote to Nolting on

Feb. 18 suggesting increased contacts with the domestic opposition.

The Ambassador smelled a rat and responded acidly on Feb. 27: "I should have been glad to introduce [Forrestal] to dozens ofnon-commie members ofthe Vietnamese opposition at our home. These might have included a wide assortment ofVietnamese friends ...who would doubtless have had a field day criticizing the government in varying degrees and from various angles. But what this would have done - outside of demonstrating a point and possibly stimulating a coup -I don't know!" Then Nolting turned selious and defended the policy he had been pursuing:

In brief, I tlrink we have been doing all along what Mike suggests, ifI interpret the suggestion correctly. If, however, the idea is to try to build up an alternative to the present govemment, I believe you already know that I am opposed, for reasons: (1) that I see no viable or better alternative; (2) that any such attempt would ruin the carefully-built base ofour advisory and supporting role here, which must rest on persuasion and on confidence in our integrity. 66

A CIA operative in Saigon, reporting on the claims ofnumerous oppositionists on

March 20, substantively backed up Nolting's position: many elements ofthe

"opposition", lacking any sort ofpopular bases ofsupport, and under the Diem regime

lacking the political avenues to build them, doom-sayed the Diem regime in the hopes of

64 Forrestal to Harriman, FRUS, III, pps. 105-106. 65 Heavner to Harriman, FRUS, III, p. 65. 66 Nolting to Harriman, FRUS, III, p. 127.

103 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. gaining American support for a coup. The operative had entitled his cable "The Seeking ofAmerican Support for the Overthrow ofthe Diem Regime".67

Nolting, ofcourse, was right about the viability ofthe anti-communist domestic opposition. In 1961, the Kennedy Administration had made the judgment that no viable alternatives existed to the rule ofNgo Dinh Diem, and cast American support behind him wholeheartedly. In response, the President ofSouth Vietnam had recognized his unprecedented position ofstrength and consolidated his power and authority over the

GVN, allowing no room for the strengthening ofpossible challengers to his rule. By early 1963, the dynamic had worsened. Short ofseveral dubious ARVN generals, there were no non-communist figures left in South Vietnam with the clout to challenge the

Palace, with or without encouragement from the American Embassy.

Forrestal, however, remained undeterred in his campaign ofpersuasion. After

Harriman showed Forrestal a copy ofNolting"s letter, Forrestal noted angrily that "It's about what I expected, since this is more a question ofattitude than ofmaking a case one way or another.... Fritz tends to be more concerned about preserving the legitimate government than keeping in touch with the opposition." He disseminated copies ofthe letter to Presidential Assistants Carl Kaysen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The latter told

Forrestal that Nolting's letter was "one ofthe most dismal documents I have ever encountered.,,68

Forrestal's campaign may not have altered political realities on the ground in

South Vietnam, but it did capture Kennedy's attention, and clearly, his tacit approval. In late March, Kennedy promoted Averell Harriman to Undersecretary ofState for Political

67 CIA information report, March 20, 1963, JFKL NSF B197. 68 Editorial Note, March 7-9,1963, FRUS. III, pps. 132-133.

104 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities.

Affairs, making him the third-ranking official in the State Department behind Dean Rusk and George Ball, neither ofwhom took great interest in Vietnam policy in early 1963.

Roger Hilsman moved up to become the Administration's new Assistant Secretary of

State for Far Eastern Affairs, gaining new power and influence over America's Vietnam policy.69 Nolting, however, would soon be called back to Washington at the end ofhis tour.

Ifthe events oflate 1962 and early 1963, including the Mansfield Report and the

Battle ofAp Bac, sharpened divisions between officials in the Kennedy Administration, they had an even more destabilizing effect on fragile US.-GVN relations. Diem and Nhu fretted increasingly over two trends affecting the alliance. First, they believed, the U.S. had demonstrated in its support for neutralism in Laos and Cambodia that it was not wholeheartedly committed to an anti-communist bulwark in Southeast Asia. It was not inconceivable that the US., for the right price, might be willing to sell out the GVN at the negotiating table in a new Geneva conference. The prospect ofan end ofUS. support might not have been so daunting for the ardent nationalists were it not for the second trend: the growing number ofAmerican advisors in South Vietnam, specifically civilian advisors now assisting and exerting increasing influence on the pair's prized strategic hamlet program. In tandem, the two trends would add up to a collapse ofGVN, and specifically Palace authority, should the US. begin negotiating for withdrawal. The

Mansfield Report and the American press reaction to Ap Bac convinced the Ngos that they had to re-exert their authority decisively over the keystone ofnational regeneration, the strategic hamlets.

69 Hilsman, p. 466.

105 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images andRealities.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's public release on Feb. 25 ofthe text of the Mansfield Report, which garnered relatively limited attention in the US., lit a fuse in

South Vietnam. American officials in Saigon and Hue reported that the GVN interpreted the Report as a stinging rebuke ofGVN governance and a potential prelude to American withdrawal.70

Nevertheless, it seems that officials initially underestimated the extent to which the Mansfield Report exacerbated longstanding Saigon Palace fears. Immediately after its release, the USIA's John Mecklin visited :Nhu on unrelated business, but "it was quickly evident that what he really wanted to discuss was Mansfield." In his report on the meeting, to an official in Harriman's Bureau ofFar Eastern Affairs, Mecklin noted that Nhu referred to the report as "treachery" and told Mecklin cryptically that "it changes everything." The President's brother apparently believed that the report represented US. policy ("on the assumption that it could not have been released without

[Kennedy's] approval"). Mecklin demurred, and stated that he hoped "nothing should be permitted to weaken the existing close US. working relations with the GVN in Viet-

Nam." In his memorandum, Mecklin speculated that while the release ofthe report might lead to confrontation between the US. and the GVN, it could also complement nascent

American attempts at pressure to refonn the GVN's repressive press policies. Mecklin wrote that "getting tough with Diem" might be "the only way to get urgently essential things done.,,7!

The initial crisis in the US.-GVN advisory relationship occurred over the so- called "counterinsurgency fund," which paid for the American advisory and assistance

70 Editorial Note, FRUS, III, p. 124. 71 Mecklin to ManeIl, March 15, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 153-155. Italics in the original document.

106 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. effort to the strategic hamlet program. The U.S. contributed the bulk ofthe fund, but the

GVN paid a smaller portion in piasters, the South Vietnamese currency. By March 1963, the fund was very nearly tapped, and U.S. officials had made it a top priority to negotiate its extension. The increasing role ofAmerican civilian advisors in the strategic hamlet program, coordinated through Rufus Phillips at USAID Rural Development, had been one ofthe few real bright spots for Thompson and Hilsman, among others, in late 1962 and early 1963, in the non-military dimensions ofthe war against the NLF. Hi1sman, of course, believed that the influx ofAmerican advisors would have a positive influence on the program's implementation; more darkly, from the Palace's perspective, increased connections at the local civilian administrative level allowed American officials greater opportunity to circumvent the top levels ofthe GVN should the need arise.72

Diem and Nhu were deeply cognizant ofthat potential. On March 28, Nolting, believing Diem had accepted "in principle" the U.S. proposal for a joint fund, approached

Thuan to pound out any remaining differences. Thuan indicated that Nhu had since withdrawn his own support for the deal; Thuan told the ambassador that "Nhu had been

frightened offfrom close collaboration envisaged in this counter-insurgency proposal by the 'atmosphere' now prevailing in US-GVN relations." In his cable to Washington,

Nolting wrote to stress that the Kennedy Administration should not overreact to what

appeared to be a serious affront: "I would like again to stress my conviction...that the

sine qua non ofwhat we can get done here under present policies is mutual confidence.,,73

Hilsman's response from his new post at the BureauofFar Eastern Affairs was

measured: Nolting should tell Diem that "US policy remains full support ofDiem's

72 "It therefore is becoming possible to accomplish much ofwhat we want at the local level without going through the vastly inefficient national bureaucracy." HilsmanIForrestal Report, FRUS, III, p. 59. 73 Nolting to State, FRUS, III, p. 184.

107 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

government," but that the continuation ofthe counterinsurgency fund represented a "test

ofmutual confidence."74

On AprilS, Nolting learned that Nhu had swayed Diem's opinion on the fund, and

that the crisis cut deeper than the ambassador had realized. Initially, the controversial

issue seemed to be the one exposed by the Mansfield Report: whether American support

to the GVN would continue. Diem, however, explained to Nolting that he could not

tolerate the extension ofthe fund because it would continue the expansion ofthe

American role in South Vietnam. Nolting reported that Diem "is apparently sincerely

convinced...that Americans, particularly at lower levels and in all branches ofGVN

activity, are, by their very number and zeal, creating within the governmental structure of

the GVN and among the population the impression ofassuming an American

'protectorate' over SVN.,,75

The Palace's fears were threefold. First, their nationalist credentials, vital to

winning the sympathy ofthe population in the war against the communist insurgency,

were threatened by the highly visible and increasing role ofAmericans in civil

administration. Secondly, South Vietnam's civil servant class remembered the days,

Diem and Nhu maintained, when they took orders from the French, and had begun

lapsing back into their old habits ofunquestioning subservience; an integral part ofthe

Palace's personalist philosophy involved weaning the South Vietnamese offoftheir

colonial habits. They had ordained the strategic hamlet program as the primary vehicle

for the population's deliverance from this paJiicular threat to its independence, and were

therefore loath to allow major penetration ofthe program by U.S. advisors. Most

74 State to Nolting, March 29, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 185. 75 Nolting to State, FRUS, III, p. 208.

108 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. importantly, however, Diem and Nhu rationally worried that the expansion ofAmerican influence over the strategic hamlet program and civilian administration, mirroring its influence over ARVN, could pose a serious threat to Palace authority. Ifthe GVN began to rely on American support and advice at the local governing level, then the threat of

American withdrawal could generate serious leverage for the U.S. in negotiations for political reforn1s, leverage that the U.S. had long desired but never possessed.

By April 9, Diem appeared willing to deal on the particular issue ofthe counterinsurgency fund, and by April 18 Nolting and Thuan had worked out a fragile compromise.76 Yet the general problem loomed large for Nhu: there were far too many

Americans in South Vietnam. On April 12, l%u told an American official that "it would be useful to reduce the numbers ofAmericans by anywhere from 500 to 3,000 or

4,000.,,77 Nhu had made his point, and he would makeit again more publicly.

In early May, Nhu made a series ofincendiary remarks during an interview with

The Washington Post's Warren Unna that landed on the front page ofthe May 12 Post.

In Unna's article, Nhu came across as an anti-American zealot, and the real center of power in South Vietnam. Unna quoted Nhu: "South Viet Nam would like to see halfof the 12,000 to 13,000 American military stationed here leave the country." According to the article, Nhu believed that many ofthe advisors worked for American intelligence services. For good measure, he made the extraordinary comment that "many ofour

76 Nolting to State, April 9, 1963; State to Nolting, April 18, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 216, 235. 77 The official's identity has not been declassified. It is likely, however, that the American was John Richardson, the CIA's Station Chiefin Saigon. Richardson was known in official circles to have cultivated a close relationship with Nhu. Richardson's predecessor, Bill Colby, had also conferred extensively with Nhu. Memcon, FRUS, III, p. 223.

109 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.

American friends who died here are cases ofsoldiers who exposed themselves too readily."n

American officials certainly had been aware ofNhu's growing hostility towards the advisory relationship. Yet they did not anticipate that he would express these views publicly, and in such strident and offensive terms. The Kennedy Administration had weathered the storm ofpress criticism after Ap Bac, and correspondents in Saigon continued to highlight growing tensions between the U.S. mission and the GVN. Yet the

Unna interview represented an unprecedented blow to the carefully constructed image of the war in South Vietnam. The Administration's extensive support to the GVN, and its commitment to the defense ofan anti-communist bulwark in Southeast Asia, had been publicly associated with a figure who evidently did not desire such support and made flippant remarks about the sacrifices ofAmeJican soldiers (who, the interview reminded readers, were suffering casualties in the Vietnam shooting war). The rise to prominence ofNhu and his virulently outspoken wife "," both in the corridors ofGVN power and in the American press and public eye, represented a foreign policy crisis ofthe first order for the Kennedy Administration.

Hilsman, who had stayed quiet and remained relatively alooffrom the machinations ofForrestal and Harriman, felt that he had been ambushed. At his first

Congressional hearing since assuming his new post, on May 14, before the House

Foreign Affairs Committee debating the foreign assistance budget for the corning fiscal

year, Hi1sman faced tough questioning on the recent interview and the status ofthe

American advisory effort in light ofNhu's remarks. "Mr. Nhu does not speak for the

Vietnamese Government," Hilsman told the Committee. " ...Whether because ofbitter

78 May 12 WP interview quoted in footnote to State to Nolting, May 13, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 294.

110 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities.. memories ofcolonialism or what, he has apparently made a regrettable statement." When

Rep. E. Ross Adair asked whether Hilsman considered Nhu's comment that halfofthe

U.s. advisory force could depart South Vietnam immediately to be "very significant," the

Assistant Secretary replied, "It will have to be clarified. Both he and his wife have made such regrettable statements before.,,79

The incident galvanized Hilsman, and he began preparing for a diplomatic confrontation with America's unruly ally. Nlm had taken steps to force the Kennedy

Administration's hand into reducing its advisory effort, and Hilsman speculated that the

U.S. would have to find a way to exert pressure in return to force the GVN to back down.

Accordingly, he asked Heavner to prepare "a list ofactions we might take which would hurt Diem but not the war effort." Heavner responded on May 15 that the two might not be distinguishable, and "given Ngo psychology, most likely the result would be not more but less GVN cooperation, less trust certainly, and quite possibly, more outrageous public statements." He warned that "there is a very real chance that Diem will not bend, and that once started down that road we will be unable to stop short ofanything except a change in government. We don't want to blunder into that."so For Hilsman, however, weary ofDiem's obstinance, the inflexibility ofGVN policy, and the rise ofNhu, and thoroughly disturbed by Nhu's recent outrage, quiet acquiescence seemed an even greater blunder.

By May 1963, the top officials, military and civilian, in the Kennedy

Administration, stood united in their irritation with the antics ofthe Diem regime, and sharply divided over what to do about it. Defense Department and military officials

th 79 Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House ofRepresentatives, 88 Congress, May 8,9, 13, 14, 1963, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, p. 768. 80 Heavner to Hi1sman, May IS, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 305.

111 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. believed that the war was progressing well in the countryside, and that therefore the

Ngos' behavior, however tiresome, could be tolerated. Nhu's growing influence over his brother disturbed Nolting, but he had worked for two years on building confidence between the two governments, and he was loath to jeopardize his accomplishments. The

Hilsman-Harriman-Forrestal axis was distinguished by its refusal to tolerate the status quo in U.S.-GVN relations. They believed that no long-tenn victory was possible over the NLF without GVN refonn to create a broad base ofpolitical support, and trust and sympathy between government and citizenry in both cities and countryside. The trio had not yet begun actively working for the Diem regime's downfall, although they were gradually coming around to the idea that Nhu could not be allowed to retain his power and influence. Rather, they rejected the argument, voiced in various fonns by officials in both the South Vietnamese and American governments, and which had effectively quelled State Department calls for GVN political refonns in 1961, that weakening the grip ofthe Diem regime on power in South Vietnam would collapse the government and let the communists in the door. They argued the reverse instead: refonn could not be delayed or the gains ofthe past year would be jeopardized.

Hilsman and his allies gained influence with President Kennedy in the first halfof

1963, but they were hampered by the fact that the American commitment to South

Vietnam was still seen in primarily military tenns. The Defense Department and the military retained their great influence on U.S. policy, and military logic could still serve as a trump card in internal debates. The military had traditionally frowned on the U.S. exerting pressure for political refonn in South Vietnam, believing that doing so might jeopardize a fruitful military partnership.

112 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hilsman 's War: Images andRealities.

Finally, a division had opened within the ranks ofAmerican officials that was deep, strange, and somewhat ironic. Defense and military officials, and Amb. Nolting as well, were generally satisfied with the amount ofinfluence the U.S. possessed over the

GVN. Their confidence in the Diem regime mixed with optimism over progress in the war effort to produce a sense that the U.S. should begin preparing for the war's end.

Tasks performed by Americans could be delegated to South Vietnamese. On Jan. 19, during the internal debate over authorizing the delivery ofreconnaissance jets to the

GVN, Nolting weighed in: "After careful consideration, I recommend that department concur in delivery these aircraft to GVN soon as possible. Critical point which has led me to this recommendation is desirability ofVNAF beginning to develop own effective photo recce capability over long term."Sl Similarly, Secretary McNamara, buoyed by

encouraging reports and statistics emanating from ARVN and the GVN, and responding

to Kennedy's obvious desire to wind down the American role in the war to a successful

conclusion, told assembled officials at his monthly Honolulu Conference on May 6 that

he "still desires that we lay down a plan to have the RVNAF take over some functions

this year so that we can take out 1,000 or so personnel late this year ifthe situation

allows. The Secretary repeated that we should lay down a plan to expedite training to get

VN personnel to take over tasks being performed by US personnel."S2

By contrast, Hilsman and his allies, who argued most passionately for the

prioritization ofpolitical concerns over military in the South Vietnamese

counterinsurgency campaign, and who believed most strongly that the legitimacy ofthe

GVN among the citizens ofSouth Vietnam and its capacity to win hearts and minds in

81 Nolting to State, Jan. 19, 1963, 751K.571-1963. 82 Memorandum for the record, Secretary ofDefense Conference, May 6, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 270.

113 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. HUsman's War: Images and Realities. the countryside would be the key to final victory, nevertheless worked in 1963 towards expanded American influence in South Vietnam. They believed that only a greater

American role, especially in the strategic hamlet program, could save the GVN from its own worst tendencies. Accordingly, Hilsman" Harriman, and Forrestal searched for the elusive answer to a question that had long frustrated American officials: how could the

U.S. turn aid to South Vietnam into leverage with its government?

Neil Sheehan had spotted the same attitude at work in Lt. Col. John Paul Vann at the very same time: "He set out to convince Harkins in Saigon, and ifHarkins would not listen then to reach over his head and to convince the military and political leadership in

Washington, that the only way the United States could avoid being beaten in Vietnam was to drastically change strategy and coerce the Saigon side into accepting direction from him and the other American officers in the field."s3 Slowly but relentlessly, with the best ofintentions and the most impeccable logic, these officials moved towards the

Americanization ofthe Vietnam War.

By the spring of 1963, American officials including Roger Hilsman had realized that the grounds for optimism about the war in South Vietnam had become increasingly shaky. The NLF had proven resilient and innovative in the face ofnew firepower and tactics. Even more threateningly, the Diem regime appeared as umesponsive as ever to

American overtures for reform. Ngo Dinh Nhu had even signaled hostility to the

American civilian advisory effort that Hilsman considered necessary for saving the strategic hamlet program. Yet while observers such as Sen. Mike Mansfield counseled a carefully reduced commitment in the face ofsetbacks in the US.-GVN relationship,

Hilsman and his allies in the Kennedy Administration, with the tacit support ofKennedy

83 Sheehan, p. 269.

114 Mark Hobel. Chapter III. Hitsman's War: Images and Realities. himself, chose to commit even more forcefully. To rescue the image and save the realities ofthe war in South Vietnam, Hilsman believed the U.S. once again had to exert diplomatic pressure on the GVN to respond to the injunctions ofits American ally.

115 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Chapter IV

Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Recall that in their Jan. 1963 report to President Kennedy, Roger Hi1sman and

Michael Forrestal had concluded with considerable unease: "At the rate it is now going the war will last longer than we would like, cost more in terms ofboth lives and money than we anticipated, and prolong the period in which a sudden and dramatic event would upset the gains already made."!

That "sudden and dramatic event" broke over South Vietnam on May 8, when

GVN troops fired on Buddhist demonstrators rallying in Hue for religious equality. The aftermath ofthat initial spasm ofviolence, the so-called "Buddhist Crisis", aggravated developing trends in U.S.-GVN relations and reinforced the hardening views ofofficials in the U.S. State Department. Hilsman and his allies believed that in the absence of serious political reform, the Ngo Dinh Diem regime would jeopardize military gains in the war against the NLF by forfeiting the more important, intrinsically political struggle for the hearts and minds ofthe citizens ofSouth Vietnam. The GVN's actions during the

Buddhist Crisis, which pitted essentially peaceful protestors from South Vietnam's nominal majority religion against what appeared to be a harsh, despotic, nepotistic regime, endangered both American and South Vietnamese support for the war, they argued. The Buddhist Crisis therefore became a lodestone for Hilsman and other

American officials: ifthe GVN could not bring the Crisis to a satisfactory and peaceful resolution, then it certainly lacked the long-term ability to win the political war against the NLF.

1 HilsmanIForrestal Report, Jan. 25, 1963.FRUS, III, p. 52.

116 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

It became clear, however, that the Diem regime, especially Ngo Dinh Nhu, also regarded the Buddhist Crisis as a critical test ofthe U.S.-GVN alliance. Nhu believed two trends marked the U.S. commitment to anti-communism in Southeast Asia: a willingness to negotiate with the Communist powers for the right price, as in Laos; and for the moment in South Vietnam, a desire to gain greater control over administration and governance in addition to the military. The intersection ofthese two trends posed an enormous threat to the Diem regime. Therefore, the brothers perceived renewed

American pressure during the Buddhist Crisis (which they believed at any rate to have been incited by communist agents) for conciliation and reform to be an opening offensive in a diplomatic battle to force the GVN to bend to American will.

Accordingly, Diem and Nhu resisted Punerican pressure and sought to destroy the

Buddhist movement. The rising cycle ofprotest and repression cuhninated in an act of

GVN violence that convinced Hilsman and other top officials ofNhu's undeniable ascent to dominance in South Vietnam. American officials regarded Ngo Dinh Diem with ambivalence: a mix ofequal parts admiration and frustration. However, most hated Nhu with a passion, believing him the man in the best position to alienate American public opinion in support ofthe war effort, utterly destroy the political basis for victory in South

Vietnam, and thereby hand Ho Chi Minh Saigon on a silver platter. In response to Nhu's rising power, Hilsman and his allies conspired to gain new ambassador Henry Cabot

Lodge the authorization to support dissident ARVN generals in a coup d'etat against

Diem and Nhu. On Nov. 1, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu were killed in the back of an ARVN armored car as it rumbled through the streets ofSaigon.

117 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Certainly, the events leading up to the coup, and the role ofAmerican officials in

"climatizing" Diem's downfall have received a great deal of attention and analysis.2 Yet the discussion surrounding the origins ofthe coup has been far more limited than the discussion ofits consequences. Historians interested in the coup as a turning point, or as an extraordinarily significant political step in the war's escalation, often miss the extent to which the coup did not emerge whole cloth out ofthe Buddhist Crisis and a sudden downturn in U.S.-GVN relations.3 Rather, the coup had its origins in the terminal contradictions ofthe nearly decade-old U.S.-GVN alliance.

Hilsman's role in the American response to the crisis is frequently noted in the literature on the early stages ofthe Vietnam War, but generally only in conjunction with a controversial cable sent from Washington to Saigon on Aug. 24. However, he was not merely a peripheral actor stepping onto the main stage only briefly. His actions and decisions, combined with those ofhis allies among Kennedy's top advisors, played a crucial role in the direction ofAmerican policy during the Buddhist Crisis, and were extraordinarily influential in the Administration's support ofthe coup against Diem.

* **

On May 8, 1963, all hell temporarily broke loose in Hue, South Vietnam's second city and an important center for both Catholic and Buddhist activity. That night, troops and police controlled by the Catholic-dominated GVN fired on a large crowd ofBuddhist

2 Paul Kattenburg, then head of State's Vietnam Working Group in Hilsman's Bureau ofFar Eastern Affairs, writes that the word "climatize" was used at the time to describe U.S. policy. Kattenburg, p. 117. 3 In her recent and otherwise excellent study ofHenry Cabot Lodge's fIrst tour in South Vietnam, Anne Blair falls into this interpretive trap. An overly restrictive view ofthe confrontation between the U.S. and the Diem regime, focusing too heavily on the Buddhist Crisis, leads her to portray Lodge as a neocolonialist "proconsul" arrogantly and recklessly dragging American offIcials in Washington along behind him in a "game ofchicken" with the Diem regime. The interpretation is tempting, given the Kennedy Administration's general ambivalence and Lodge's own decisiveness, but in fact Lodge's efforts were applauded, encouraged, and to a large extent inspired by the Hilsman-Harriman-Forrestal axis. Blair, Anne. Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Press, 1995.

118 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. demonstrators, who had assembled at the Hue Radio Station to protest what ley considered to be religious repression in the enforcement ofedicts in the South

Vietnamese Constitution. In the chaos that followed the initial shots, eight ofthe protestors died, including two children crushed beneath the wheels ofGVN armored vehicles. In his initial report, the American consul in Hue warned offurther Buddhist demonstrations to protest the atrocity: " ...situation very fluid.... Buddhists very upset.,,4

American officials, in the incident's immediate aftermath, did not respond with particular vigor or acuity towards the potential ramifications ofthe killings in Hue, although the State Department did instruct the Saigon embassy to "urge GVN take no repressive measures against Buddhists...make any other appropriate gestures toward restoration oforder and amity between religious groups."s Officials, however, simply could not grasp that the Diem regime might be foolish enough to allow a local incident to explode into a national conflagration, pitting the GVN against South Vietnam's majority religion. In the days that followed, American officials concerned themselves with various other tensions arising between the u.s. and GVN, particularly the resolution of the CI fund mini-crisis and Nhu's inflammatory interview in The Washington Post. By mid-late May, even the regime's toughest critics believed American pressure had gained some tentative results. On May 17, Hilsman wrote Nolting to congratulate the ambassador on a joint communique with Diem detailing a CI fund truce and affirming the

GVN's commitment to an advisory relationship, noting that it was an "excellent device permit Diem disavow Nhu remarks indirectly and without loss offace.,,6 The next day,

Forrestal forwarded to Kennedy an enthusiastic cable from Nolting on Diem's recent

4 Helble to State, May 9, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 278. 5 State to Embassy, May 9, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 283. 6 Hilsman to Nolting, May 17, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 308.

119 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. series oftrips out into the countryside, along with the wry covering memorandum: "I believe it should be read with a grain ofsalt, although the fact that Diem has gotten out into the country is in itselfhopeful.,,7

The early stages ofthe Buddhist Crisis caught American officials off-guard.

Hilsman, Harriman, and Forrestal had expected conflict and tension between the U.S. and

GVN, and in fact urged that differences be cultivated for possible leverage rather than smoothed over, but they had not anticipated that the worst split yet might emerge out of differing perceptions from such a volatile and uncontrollable source. As Forrestal told an interviewer in 1964: "No American, that is no American whose report was read in

Washington, was aware that there was an incipient problem between Buddhists and

Catholics...we didn't have any contact with Buddhists. We didn't even know who they were... We knew who the Catholics were because the government was Catholic."g

According to intelligence reports generated as the crisis picked up steam, the

Americans were not the only ones to make the mistake ofignoring religious repression as a potentially powerful focus for opposition to the Diem regime. In June, CIA officials would report: "Because ofthe passive character oftheir religion and the looseness of their organizational ties, the [GVN] up to now has not looked upon the Buddhists either as a force for effective support or as one whose disaffection might have serious consequences.,,9 In fact, CIA officers in Saigon had been the first to sound the alarm that the growing Buddhist movement post-May 8 might "further narrow, possibly to a fatal degree, the base ofsupport for the regime." In a May 18 transmission, the CIA's Saigon

7 Embassy to State, May 17, 1963, FRUS, JJJ, p. 306. 8 Bird, Kai. The Color ofTruth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, p. 253. 9 "The Buddhists in South Vietnam", Special Report ofthe Office ofCurrent Intelligence, CIA, June 28, 1963, JFKL NSF B197.

120 Mark Habel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Station wrote: "Certainly the stupid suppression ofBuddhist religious flags ...and consequent fatalities will arouse the antagonism ofpredominately Buddhist Vietnam against both the regime and the Catholics."IO

In the days following the Hue incident, Nolting believed that he could use his influence with Diem to gain concessions that might calm "the Buddhist ranks" before tensions worsened. Moderate religious leaders still appeared to hold sway over the

Buddhist community, and had voiced relatively limited demands for resolution from the

GVN, principally a GVN apology and statement ofresponsibility for the events ofMay 8.

Unfortunately, Nolting wrote to officials in W"ashington, the GVN had so far clung to its initial reaction "to blame incident on VC agitation." The stance could be explained, he thought, "perhaps for reasons offace, perhaps because offear that GVN acceptance of responsibility for deaths would have even more damaging repercussions, or perhaps because GVN wished avoid publicity to extent possible." The posture, he believed, was damaging: "main result has been to damage GVN credibility and to further irritate

Buddhists." The more time that passed, according to Nolting, the harder it would be for the GVN to appease the Buddhists, and the greater would grow Buddhist demands and the potential for further violence. But he took heart that during a May 15 meeting with

Diem, the President had "now indicate[d] some willingness accommodate Buddhists.,,11

On May 22, however, the normally unflappable Nolting was disturbed to discover that the Diem regime's stance towards the Buddhist demands and the history ofthe Hue incident was not merely a posture. After a long discussion with Diem, he came away convinced that the latter truly believed the Hue deaths had been the result of a coveli

10 CIA Information Report, May 18, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference Service. 11 Embassy to State, May 18, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 309-312.

121 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C

NLF attack, and that figures within the Buddhist movement were manipulating the incipient crisis for their own political ends. Nolting wrote: "I said I hoped he had not underestimated seriousness ofsituation; that our information re facts and attitude of people was considerably different from his.,,12

Perhaps Diem was justified to wonder how Buddhist leaders could conscience leading a protest movement against the GVN during a bloody and perilous moment in an internal war, and how the Kennedy Administration, despite the many developing U.S.-

GVN differences, could fail to stand steadfast behind him. American officials would indeed bring up these concerns, and whether the u.s. should simply have held strong in its diplomacy behind the GVN in the early stages ofthe crisis; but these were military officials, brought in far later when crisis had raged out ofcontrol and Kennedy had drawn on all ofhis top advisors to try to find a solution. On Sept. 11, for instance, Gen.

Maxwell Taylor asked a tense meeting oftop officials "who would organize a religious, political movement in opposition to an existing government during a time when that

government was fighting a civil war. He said he doubted that Lincoln, during the Civil

War, would have acted in a way to meet the protests ofa religious political movement.,,13

However, just as military arguments would generally trump those ofthe State

Department on the conduct ofthe war in the countryside, in the same way the military

was virtually cut out ofthe American diplomatic response to the obviously political

problem ofGVN foot-dragging during the Buddhist Crisis. Before late August, when

events would force virtually all ofKennedy's top advisors to pay attention to South

17- Embassy to State, FRUS, III, p. 314. 13 MemCon, Sept. 11, 1963, FRUS, IV, 185. The historical analogy was a crude one; but it captured Taylor's beliefthat the Buddhist Crisis was a distraction from the war effort, and that so long as the Diem regime stood fIrm in the face ofthe communist insurgency and the military effort appeared to be going well, the U.S. had to support Diem.

122 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Vietnam, the Washington end ofthe American political relationship with the GVN was managed primarily by three officials: Roger Hilsmanand Averell Harriman in the State

Department, and Michael Forrestal at the Wbte House. All three believed strongly that in the war for South Vietnam, the political battlefield mattered more than anything ARVN could land its helicopters on. The Diem regime's repressive and autocratic tendencies had prevented the formation ofa positive political program and a broad base ofcivic participation and support, they believed, and the GVJ\T's arrogant and misguided policy towards the Buddhists had the growing potential to render that goal impossible. Hilsman later wrote: "There was really no lack ofpublic and political support for aiding the

Vietnamese...at that time, but there was considerable distaste about the corollary that supporting Vietnam also meant supporting Diem and his regime.,,14

What this meant in practical policy terms was that Hilsman and his allies had grown sick and tired ofthe identification ofthe South Vietnamese cause with the survival ofthe Diem regime; they felt that to do so and therefore acquiesce in bloody and public repression in the service ofthe regime's own prolongation would doom the South

Vietnamese struggle against the communist insurgency and the U.S.'s ability to continue aiding that struggle. The regime had to engage in serious political reform, both ofGVN structure and practice, or it would lose the war. Hilsman, Harriman and Forrestal had been moving in the direction of a confrontation with the GVN and its more unquestioning

American backers. For them, the Buddhist Crisis represented the ultimate emergency for the counterinsurgency campaign; the Diem regime might finally succeed in fully alienating the mass ofits citizens, or it might be pushed back from the brink by American pressure and forced into necessary reforms.

14 Hilsman, p. 475.

123 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Ambassador Nolting, though worried about the divergent views ofthe u.s. and

the GVN on the significance ofthe growing Buddhist demonstrations, nevertheless believed the Buddhist Crisis to be one more issue which could only be smoothed over by

trust and persuasion. IfDiem trusted that U.S. officials had the GVN's best interests in

mind, Nolting reasoned, the South Vietnamese President could be convinced to make the

necessary conciliatory gestures towards the Buddhists and defuse the crisis. But

Nolting's tour as ambassador was scheduled to finish in the fall, and by coincidence, he

had asked for two months' relief for family reasons to begin in late May. Accordingly,

Nolting left South Vietnam on May 23, leaving his deputy in charge

ofthe U.S. mission as charge d'affaires. IS Clearly, Nolting believed that at the time ofhis

departure the "Buddhist situation" was well on its way to being smoothed over; in his

final cable to Washington on May 23, Nolting mentioned the crisis only in passing. Vice

President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, a largely ceremonial and impotentfigure and a Buddhist

himself, while "more bullish on situation here than [Nolting] had ever seen him," was

nevertheless worried about the Buddhist protests. 16

Nolting's confidence in the GVN's ability to defuse the crisis was certainly

misplaced. It was unfortunate from the American standpoint, however, that the

ambassador should leave South Vietnam at such a perilous moment. In Trueheart's first

few days in charge, the Embassy seemed to take its eye offthe ball. On May 29,

Chalmers Wood cabled Trueheart to inquire about further developments in the crisis:

15 Nolting subsequently left the U.S. on a long sailing vacation with his family in the Aegean Sea. He claims he was kept uninformed as the Buddhist Crisis grew in intensity over the following month. Based on the attitudes ofleading officials, specifically Haniman and Fonestal, towards Nolting at the time, it is not hard to believe that Nolting was kept out ofthe loop. Nolting, Frederick. From Trust to Tragedy. New York: Praeger, 1988, p. 113. 16 Nolting to State, FRUS, III, p. 325.

124 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

"New York Times today reports Buddhists still very upset by Hue incident and failure

GVN take meaningful steps toward religious equality...You may wish again raise problem with Diem, in whatever terms you think best in order to persuade him take further actions meet Buddhist demands."]? American journalists in South Vietnam, who already loathed the Diem regime for its repressive press policies, had not missed the opportunity to gain sources in the growing Buddhist opposition movement. By late May, the State Department had gained more information on the Buddhists from the newspapers than from its own representatives in Saigon.

Trueheart duly responded on May 31, reporting that "we are no longer dealing with purely religious issue." The GVN's failme to take responsibilityimmediately for the killings, prosecute those directly responsible, and affirm religious equality by repealing repressive statutes, had allowed the protest movement to grow into something more akin to a "political opposition." From genuinely religious grievances, "these issues...are now being used as label and fayade behind which other groups seek express opposition to

Diem government and exploit situation for various aims." The crisis became that much harder to resolve for every moment the GVN continued to maintain that the NLF had been behind the killings. Now, even a May 29 GVN communique "which clearly reaffirmed religious freedom...and gave firm assurance against discrimination...appears to have had no effect on militants." In short, Trueheart reported, the GVN faced an

escalating crisis in which radical and more avowedly anti-Diem elements in the Buddhist movement were gaining control, and which by late May defied quick resolution. Even

worse, he noted, "for first time many civil senrants faced with religious issue and forced

]7 State to Embassy, FRUS, III, p. 335.

125 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

to take a stand, which cannot help but affect their morale.,,18 Mansfield, Hilsman, and

Forrestal had written ofthe dangers ofthe Saigon elites and the middle-ranking officials

and officers becoming steadily alienated from the struggle against the NLF by Diem's

autocratic and repressive rule. The Buddhist Crisis gave their ambivalence a religious

dimension.

Hilsman, while surprised at the source ofthe opposition movement, was not

shocked that the GVN had failed to take the necessary steps early on to assuage the

population and build support for the regime. In To Move a Nation, he recalled that "at

first, the Buddhist effort was tentative and groping." But as the weeks passed, "they

developed an excellent organization, capable ofmaking politically strategic decisions, of

planning demonstrations to further their cause, and ofmounting demonstrations and

bringing them offwith almost military precision.,,19 The GVN, he now believed, had

always prioritized asserting its authority over building popular support. That had been

true in the early stages ofthe hamlet program, in orders to ARVN officers, and in

repressive measures againstthe Buddhist and refusal to take the necessary appeasement

steps early on that might have satisfied the Buddhist religious leadership and sent them

back to their pagodas. Now, the stubbornness had resulted in a political opposition

movement whose claims appealed to a large segment ofsociety, and which was steadily

proving far more adept than the GVN at rallying popular support for its cause.

Hilsman also recognized that the Buddhist Crisis could be dangerous politically

for the Kennedy Administration in addition to the Diem regime. In a cable to Trueheart

cleared by Hilsman, Wood wrote: "While recognizing Diem's sensitivity it is also true

IS Trueheart to State, FRUS, III, pps. 337-339. 19 Hilsman, p. 472.

126 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. that it is difficult for US with its large stake in Viet-Nam to support GVN in face of almost worldwide liberal criticism plus Buddhist criticism."zo The Kennedy

Administration, ofcourse, put a high premium on managing the image ofits commitment to South Vietnam: enlightened assistance in a trusted ally's struggle against vicious communist guerillas. Press coverage ofthe Buddhist Crisis, however, showed a cruel

Catholic autocracy persecuting the Buddhist minority. Hilsman feared that ifthe crisis continued to boil, Congress and the American public might sicken ofsupporting the

GVN. On the one hand, the GVN's behavior and its plummeting popularity in the U.S. posed an acute problem for the Kennedy Administration in continuing to justify support.

Paradoxically, however, Hilsman understood that Congressional and public disapproval domestically could prove a potentially powerful source ofleverage on the GVN.

In the early stages ofthe crisis, however, American officials hoped to convince

Diem to assume a conciliatory pose with the Buddhists, while acknowledging that with passing time the demands on the President grew bigger. Diem's temperament, his derisive opinion ofpolitical opposition, and his beliefthat the GVN had to assert complete authority in South Vietnam or it would be picked apart by its enemies all meant that he would move exceedingly slowly, if at all, towards reconciliation. Radical elements on all sides moved with far more speed.

In early June, Tri Quang, the chiefBuddhist bonze in Hue, and among the movement's most popular and militant leaders, told followers that the situation had

grown "beyond compromise," and that in a confrontation with the GVN, the Buddhist

-70 State to Embassy, June 1, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 342.

127 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. movement "should seek help from anysource, including Vc.,,2! Radical statements like

Quang's poured fuel on the fire and reinforced the GVN's beliefthat the Buddhist

movement and the NLF were deeply intertwined.22 Drivinghome the wedge between the

GVN and the Buddhists, and between the GVN and the U.S., was obviously Quang's

intent.

As radical, politically-charged elements began to gain control over the Buddhist

movement, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu sought to assert their influence over Diem.

They issued provocative statements and counseled the President that the crisis

represented a test ofwills with the NLF, a seditious movement, and perhaps most

importantly, the u.s. Given his opinion ofthe u.s. advisory commitment in the spring of

1963, Nhu probably assumed early on that American officials would attempt to use the

Buddhist Crisis to further their effort to gain a greater say in GVN political affairs.

Additionally, the u.s. Embassy's desire that the GVN appease what he believed to be

unforgivable sedition spoke to his other fear: the U.S.'s interest in negotiation over the

future ofthe Diem regime. Nhu and his wife set out to hijack the incipient U.S.-

sponsored GVN-Buddhist peace process.

On June 4, Diem announced the appointment ofa commission headed by Tho to

investigate Buddhist grievances. Additionally, the GVN had sent "unofficial emissaries"

to meet with important Buddhist leaders, potentially to open negotiations to end the

standoff. Trueheart cabled the State Department that Diem's most recent action "strikes

21 Trueheart to State, June 1, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 341. "Bonze" is a term for a monk in the Buddhist leadership. 22 On June 28, Trueheart reported a conversation with a GVN official obviously very loyal to Diem. The official "said that the VC are behind the Buddhists and that this was proven by the fact that the demonstrations...were too well organized to be other than vc." Trueheart to State, June 28, 1963, JFKL NSF B197.

128 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. me as somewhat more than half a loaf," and that the announcement, coming a day after the tear gassing ofBuddhist demonstrators, was "satisfyingly swift." He recommended that he and other American officials at that moment back off and let the Tho commission do its work. Hilsman and other officials in V.lashington tentatively agreed. 23 Madame

Nhu, in what could only be considered an attempt to derail the Tho commission before its work even started, subsequently declared in a public statement on June 8 that "robe does not. ..make bonze and that it is necessary examine very closely comportment ofcertain so-called monks ofViet Nam who continue make...not only inconsiderate but false utterances." She also linked the monks to the NLF, referring to their movement as

"subversion".24

Hilsman was apoplectic that a potential breakthrough was in danger ofbeing lost through Madame Nhu's inflammatory action. He ordered a Department cable fired offto

Trueheart:

You should inform GVN orally or by note that in official U.S. view Madame Nhu's intolerant statement has seriously weakened GVN's position as defender offreedom against Communist tyranny and has great!y increased difficulty ofU.S. role as supporter ofGVN. Her statement will damage American public and Congressional support for GVN. u.s. Government cannot be expected continue aid and assist GVN at heavy cost in men and material unless this policy fully supported by American citizens.25

Hilsman wanted Trueheart to issue what amounted to a demarche when he next met with

Diem, although Hilsman was vague as to the consequences ofnoncompliance.

Nevertheless, the message was clear: marginalize and quiet Madame Nhu to appease both

Vietnamese and American public opinion, or face a further dangerous deterioration in

U.S.-GVN relations.

23 Trueheart to State, FRUS, III, p. 353. 24 Trueheart to State, June 8, 1963, JFKL NSF B197. 25 State to Embassy, June 8,1963, FRUS, III, p. 363.

129 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Diem, however, put an extremely high value on the counsel ofhis brother and sister-in-law, and clearly favored their advice to that ofAmerican officials. Upon his arrival at the Palace to protest Madame Nhu's declaration, Trueheart encountered an

"entirely relaxed and friendly," but completely inflexible Diem. In a summary cable,

Trueheart informed Hilsman: "I have no reason to believe that anything I said to him moved him." He had urged Diem to immediately dissociate himself from Madame Nhu's declaration, but Diem had responded in such terms that Trueheart was left with the impression that "the general sentiments of [Madame Nhu's statement] are close to his own." Diem then moved to blasting Hue officials; but for their appeasement ofmore energetic Buddhist elements in the city prior to May 8, rather than for their role in the violent events ofthat day. Trueheart reported to Hilsman that he feared the GVN would resort to "stronger measures" in the event of future Buddhist demonstrations.26

In the further escalation ofthe Buddhist Crisis, hard-line religious elements in the

Buddhist movement struck first. On the moming ofJune 11, several days after

Trueheart's unproductive meeting with Diem, foreign correspondents in Saigon received a telephone tip to come quickly to one ofthe city's many pagodas. Only Malcolm

Browne ofthe Associated Press obliged. FoJllowing an hour ofrituals, a group ofmonks departed the pagoda and headed for downtown Saigon, carrying protest banners written in Vietnamese and English. Browne watched as the monks stopped in the middle ofan intersection. The oldest ofthe monks sat dmvn on a cushion placed in the street. Another monk approached with a can ofgasoline, which he poured over the seated monk. All stood quietly as the monk lit a match and tumed into a column offlame. It was the first of the Buddhist "self-immolations" in protest against the Diem regime, and Browne's

26 Trueheart to Hilsman, June 9, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 366.

130 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. camera captured it all. The next morning, editors plastered pictures ofthe burning monk on the front pages ofthe world's newspapers. The Kennedy Administration's image of progress and hope in South Vietnam, ofthe GVN's brave struggle against the forces of communist subversion, fell to pieces; the Diem regime would henceforth come to be associated in popular opinion with repression and religious strife. Only Madame Nhu seemed undisturbed in public, remarking to British journalists that the incident amounted merely to Buddhists "barbecuing a bonze," and doing so unpatriotically by using

"imported gasoline.,,27

The reaction from the State Department was quick and fierce. Hilsman and

Harriman authorized a telegram to Trueheart strengthening their earlier warning. Calling previous Buddhist demands "reasonable and/or insubstantial", the pair wrote that Diem now had to not only meet these demands but also do so in such a way as to "state clearly" that it was doing so. In other words, Diem could not wiggle out with compromises and half-measures. He had to make it clear that Buddhist demands were just and that the

GVN was largely to blame for the recent crisis. Harriman and Hilsman did not reject the obvious argument that appeasing the Buddhists on their first set ofdemands would lead to more and greater demands ofthe Diem regime; they wrote that "GVN must be prepared to face and very likely accede to such further demands unless they are so substantive as to endanger GVN defense effort." Required immediately was ajoint communique with the moderate Buddhist leadership, stressing that the GVN had moved to a conciliatory posture. Failure to do so would bring American public dissociation from the actions and policies ofthe GVN during the Buddhist Crisis. The pair closed with a warning to Trueheart: "FYI - ifDiem does not take prompt and effective steps to

27 Prochnau, pps. 307-310. See also Trueheart to State, June 11, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 374.

131 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. reestablish Buddhist confidence in him we will have to reexamine our entire relationship with his regime.,,28

The pair did not authorize Trueheart to repeat the gist ofthe final words ofthe message to Diem. But it is quite possible that Hilsman and Harriman decided to exert pressure on Diem through other channels. On June 14, a NYT front-page story indicated that "U.S. has warned Diem it will publicly condemn his treatment ofBuddhists unless he takes prompt action meet their grievances.... U.S. wishes dissociate itselfDiem's policies.,,29 Officials in the State Department may have leaked for several reasons. The story assured the American public that the DoS. did not support the GVN's Buddhist policy in the wake ofthe first self-immolation. Additionally, it served as a source of pressure on Diem and Nhu, indicating that Trueheart's instructions came from the top: the article noted that the "matter may soon lead to a personal message from President

Kennedy." Finally, it publicly moved the u.s. in the direction that Hilsman, Harriman, and especially Forrestal had been advocating since the beginning ofthe year: towards a more independent American posture concerning the South Vietnamese leadership, particularly over domestic affairs.

The regime's opponents sensed the last connotation ofthe message. The next day, GVN Secretary ofState Thuan told Trueheart that the NYT story had led to a more stubborn line from Buddhist leaders during negotiations over a joint communique. He

28 State to Embassy, June 11, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 381-383. Kennedy, turning his attention to the situation in South Vietnam on June 14 during a summer spent mostly on seemingly more pressing issues, noted a report ofHi1sman's June 11 cable with some alarm. A memorandum for the record at the White House on June 14 notes: "The President noticed that Diem has been threatened with a formal statement of disassociation. He wants to be absolutely sure that no further threats are made and no formal statement is made without his personal approval." Dallek, p. 669; FRUS, III, p.386. -79 State to Embassy, June 14,1963, JFKL NSF B197.

132 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

3o feared it might "ruin" the negotiations. Meanwhile, the crisis energized the assorted

anti-Diem oppositionists and disaffected elements ofSaigon. The city had always buzzed with coup rumors, but the growing ambiguity ofthe American posture produced a whole

hive. An American official reported on June 26 that he had been approached by a member ofan ancient oppositionist group, thought to be largely defunct, who claimed to have entered into talks with "leading Buddhist officials" about a coup attempt. The

official notified the oppositionist ofstated U.S. policy: "USG supporting and would

support legitimate GVN" in the event ofa coup attempt. 31

On June 16, despite ominous rumblings from more militant elements on both

sides, including Madame Nhu, the GVN, represented by Tho, and the Buddhist leadership

announced a joint communique acceding in principle to most ofthe major Buddhist

demands. Diem, however, noted along with his signature on the communique that "the

articles written in this joint communique have been approved in principle by me from the

beginning,,;32 the President had made concessions but refused to call them concessions,

probably in an attempt to save face. Hilsman would later write: "In the end Diem behaved

so as to get the worst ofboth worlds. He made concessions, but he made them grudgingly

and too late - losing his mandarin dignity by appearing to do so only under pressure as

well as losing the political gain that would have come ifthe concessions had been

timely."33

Hilsman had intended these words to describe Diem's self-defeating posture

towards the Buddhist movement, but he might have used similar terms to describe the

30 Embassy to State, June 15, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 397. 31 NSC copy ofTmeheart to Hilsman, June 26, 1963, JFKL NSF B197. 32 Editorial Note, FRUS, III, pps. 397-398. 33 Hilsman, p. 476.

133 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. ShOlvdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. status ofthe U.S.-GVN relationship. In late June 1963, after the joint communique had stabilized the crisis into a fragile truce in South Vietnam's cities, all major actors stepped back and analyzed their relative positions. Roger Hilsman examined the early stages of the Buddhist Crisis and evidently concluded that Harriman, Forrestal and he had been correct about two major facets ofthe U.S.-GYN diplomatic relationship.

Trueheart cabled the Department immediately after the announcement ofthe joint commlmique suggesting that he be given the authority to "press Diem directly and

indirectly to accept Buddhist crisis as blessing in disguise and to use agreement reached

as stepping stone to concessions to other groups." This would have represented a return

to the "persuasion" approach favored by Nolting, as it would not be accompanied by any

implicit threats. Trueheart warned, however, that "my own ability...may have been

diminished by my actions on Buddhist affair and...GVN confidence in our ability to

carry out private diplomacy is gravely undermined by NY Times story.,,34 Flying in the

face ofTrueheart's concerns, Hilsman cabled back several days later that what was

needed was a "very hard-hitting approach to Diem.,,35

For Hilsman, the joint communique seemed evidence that American officials did

have leverage on Diem: pressure and threats ofdisassociation had resulted in a

breakthrough, and the potential resolution ofan emergency caused by Diem's autocratic

tendencies and repressive rule. The U.S., he believed, now had to push its advantage. In

the wake ofthe communique, the GVN and the Buddhist movement would eye each

other warily to monitor compliance. In a direct reference to the Nhus, Hilsman wrote:

"News ofthese events reaches Washington promptly and any evidence that elements

34 Embassy to State, June 16, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 398-399. 35 Hilsman to Trueheart, June 19, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 402-404.

134 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. within the GVN were seeking to hold back on the agreements or to criticize the Buddhists publicly or privately would be met with grave consequences." Hilsman did not limit his veiled threat oLan end ofAmerican support to the regime to the immediate question of the Buddhist Crisis; rather, he tied the GVN's behavior in the current situation to long- term reforms he believed had to be taken to build the political basis for victory in the war:

"The GVN must seriously consider such steps as permitting opposition candidates to run without harassment. ..and broadening the Cabinet." At the end ofthis extraordinary cable, in which the relatively new Assistant Secretary ordered the overthrow ofthe old Saigon policy ofpersuasion and trust personified by Nolting, Hilsman added that ifTrueheart could not convey with sufficient force the "bluntness" ofHilsman's words, he might give

Diem a copy ofthe cable's text.36

Hilsman's beliefthat American pressure could and must be brought to bear to reform the Diem regime had a corollary: Ngo Dinh Nhu stood as the State Department's main antagonist. Diem might resent American pressure tactics; Nhu would actively work against them. Fearing above all a U.S.-GVN dynamic that might lead to an impotent

Diem taking marching orders from American officials, Nhu began a campaign to break the GVN truce with the Buddhists and reassert total GVN authority over the cities of

South Vietnam.

During a two-week truce between the Buddhist leadership and the GVN following the joint communique, Trueheart became convinced that "a deliberate campaign was being mounted, specifically by the Nhus, to sabotage the agreement." He voiced his concerns to TIman, who "confirmed them indirectly by saying that he had been doing

36 Hi1sman to Trueheart, June 19, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 402-403. In the event, Trueheart did not hand Diem a copy ofHilsman's cable. Trueheart did, however, inform Diem that Diem "was in a very grave position, in my opinion." Embassy to State, June 22, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 411.

135 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. everything he could to persuade Diem not to accept advice being given him by his family.,,37 Trueheart may have made a serious miscalculation in bringing up the matter up with Diem; the conversation turned "heated" and "offensive".38 The charge d'affaires' blunt accusation ofNhu's intrigues may have convinced Diem that American officials would soon demand that he dump his brother from the government. At the time, that was not American policy, nor was it foreseen to be, although American officials clearly hoped Nhu's influence could be lessened; but Diem's fears may have resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy, as American warnings led to even greater efforts to sabotage the agreement from 1\lhU.39

Even as Hilsman instructed Trueheart to switch to a "hard-line" negotiating posture with Diem, he continued to claim that U.S. policy towards the GVN remained substantively the same. He cabled Trueheart: "officially there is no change in consistent

U.S. policy supporting Vietnamese Government and people against Communist attack.,,40

Kennedy, ofcourse, had sanctioned no "official" change in policy. Since 1961, however, the Kennedy Administration's general Vietnam policy had held steady. It had undertaken to support the GVN in its war against what the allies believed to be externally-directed aggression masquerading as an indigenous insurgency. The Kennedy Administration's key concern was the war in the countryside: so long as ARVN continued to function effectively against the guerrillas, the GVN could be forgiven its political failings. The

U.S. ambassador might use persuasion with Diem to try to gain reforms and moderate the

37 Embassy to State, June 22, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 409. 38 Embassy to State, June 22, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 411. 39 A CIA report in late June warned that American officials would do best to drop the notion that any amount ofpressure or persuasion might suffice to remove Nhu from Diem's side: "President Diem will not discard any family member under pressure. He has a strong traditional sense offamily loyalty and is convinced that he is the only person ofsufficient stature to lead his country in the battle for survival." CIA Information Report, June 28,1963, FRUS, III, p. 424. 40 State to Embassy, June 26, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 415.

136 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

GVN's autocratic and repressive tendencies; but alienating Diem through pressure and coercion could have disastrous results on the war effort. Nolting, certainly, had adhered to this policy.

Had Hilsman believed in the fundamental correctness oflongstanding policy, that the u.s. defense ofanti-communist South Vietnam sank or swam with Diem, that a strong Diem helped the war effort and a weakened Diem hurt it, he might have responded very differently to the temporary lull in the Buddhist Crisis. Certainly, Hilsman had no basis for the conclusion that the Buddhist CriSJlS had already weakened the war effort

(although he certainly, after his January trip, had doubts about the basis for the Defense

Department's optimistic assessments); Forrestal, whose own views about the essentially political nature ofthe war accorded with Hilsman's, returned from a trip to South

Vietnam in late June with the observation that "there appeared no evidence that the front line counterinsurgency effort has yet been impeded or decelerated at all by the crisiS.,,41

Hilsman might have moved, through statements or leaks, to indicate that the U.S. was satisfied by the GVN effort so far, in the hopes that an unqualified statement ofU.S. support for the regime would cow the Buddhist movement into submission and discourage dissident elements in ARVN, the GVN bureaucracy, and the opposition from plotting against the regime. He might have instructed Trueheart to try to regain Diem's trust through a gentle tone and attempts at persuasion.

For Hilsman, however, the Vietnam conflict was a political struggle far more than a military war. The Buddhist Crisis stood as the clear symptom ofa dangerous GVN

41 Forrestal, Michael V. "Visit to Vietnam: 25 June-lJuly 1963". Declassified Documents Reference System. Forrestal also noted: "As to whether the affair has affected the war itself, Americans and Vietnamese ofall stations were queried, and the nearer to the battle, the less gravely the problem was regarded."

137 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. disease: the Diem regime's complete inability to win popular support for itsNar against the NLF. The root cause ofthe problem, Hilsman believed, was the regime's obsession with authority and control. In the cities and the countryside, promising ideas like strategic hamlets had been warped into instnnnents ofGVN authority at the expense of popularity. The smaller the American influence over the direction ofthe project, the more it seemed to benefit personally the Diem regime, and the less it seemed to win hearts and minds. Ngo Dinh Nhu personified this dangerous trend. Hilsman believed that the

Buddhist Crisis could not be swept under the rug, and that the US. should not seek to return to the diplomatic status quo with the G\lN.

Hilsman wanted to link continued US. support for the GVN to the GVN's compliance with the terms ofthe June 16 agreement and continued conciliation ofthe

Buddhists. In tum, he wanted to tie GVN behavior in the current crisis to the Diem regime's ability to rally the population and defeat the GVN insurgency. Hilsman and his aides therefore insisted that Trueheart make Diem understand that continued repression would not only alienate his own population, it would make US. support for the regime increasingly difficult to justify to American popular opinion: "US. liberal and press

opinion increasingly and now almost unanimously critical ofreligious situation in Viet-

Nam." Further conciliatory steps towards the Buddhists were seen as a litmus test: " ...if

[Diem] is so incapable ofrational consideration ofwhat we believe are the extreme

dangers ofthe Buddhist crisis, and can behave only emotionally, then we have no

confidence in his ability to lead an effective fight against the Viet Cong.,,42

42 State to Embassy, July 2, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 443-444. This cable to Trueheart was cleared by Hilsman, Harriman, Forrestal and George Ball, who agreed with the other three that the Diem regime's behavior during the Buddhist Crisis had endangered American liberal support for the war efJrt.

138 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Therefore, the burden ofprooffor keeping the fragile peace in the streets ofSouth

Vietnam's cities rested on Diem and Nhu. Trueheart had notified the Department that

"there is a group ofBuddhist activists who are dissatisfied with agreement Buddhist leaders reached with GVN.... Others in activist group without doubt have 'tasted blood' ofpolitics and either see religious issue as way for political changes or have discarded religious issue for outright political objective - change in regime. ,,43 The Department, however, did not register nearly as much concern over the possible intrigue by radical

Buddhist elements than it did over the intentIons ofNhu; it would be the responsibility of the GVN, Hilsman argued, to assure that moderate Buddhist leaders retained control of the movement.44

Certainly, Hilsman invoked a double standard. He may be forgiven, however, because Nhu had obviously set out to sabotage the agreement, and no amount of gentle persuasion could have convinced Diem to stop his brother. In fact, Diem's admiration for

1\llu's political talents appeared to have reached new heights, lending credence to the observations ofsuccessive American ambassadors that the Nhus seldom took actions

Diem had not approved. 45

In early July, as the two-week truce came to a close, rumors swirled in Saigon that the GVN did not intend to follow through with further conciliatory actions, and might

43 Embassy to State, June 29,1963, FRUS, JIl, p. 430. 44 Hilsman, Harriman and Forrestal stood adamant that any further self-immolations would be disastrous and the GVN would be held responsible. On June 29, Trueheart "repeated to Thuan that Diem must accept that he can not afford to have more demonstrations and bonze bunlings, virtually no matter what concessions he has to make." On July 1, Forrestal told Blmdy that Hilsman, Haniman, Ball and he believed that another "burning bonze" would require a "strong public statement" against GVN repression, for the sake ofU.S. public opinion, although this would potentially increase the odds ofa coup attempt. Fonestal also urged Bundy to keep "under consideration" a demarche to Diem to exile Nhu and Madame Nhu in the aftennath ofa self-immolation. During July, however, self-immolations brought no authorization for either of the two steps. Embassy to State; Fonestal to Bundy, FR US, JII, pps. 430, 432. 45 For Diem's support ofthe Nhus, see: Embassy to State, June 28, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 427.

139 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. soon take harsh action against Buddhist protestors. Trueheart, on Hilsman's instructions, suggested that Diem read a statement prepared by the Embassy, calling for religious toleration and meetings between Diem and Buddhist leaders. The South Vietnamese

President coolly told the charge that he would think about it; which Trueheart correctly 46 interpreted as a refusal. Nhu, meanwhile, issued provocative challenges to both the

Buddhist leadership and the U.S. An article appeared in the Times ofVietnam, a Saigon newspaper known to American officials as a mouthpiece ofthe Nhus, announcing that since no major Buddhist protests had occurred after the movement's two-week deadline for GVN compliance with their demands had passed, the Buddhists must therefore have been satisfied.47 An article several days later claimed that new evidence had surfaced of

U.S. involvement in the Nov. 11, 1960, coup attempt.48

Nevertheless, GVN officials perceived by American officials as moderates, including Tho and Thuan, seemed to be working hard to satisfy the Buddhists and keep the peace, as well as placate the U.S. Trueheart noted the apparent GVN disconnect on

July 6: "I was finding situation more than usually puzzling...." He asked Thuan, "What the hell was going on?,,49 Thuan seemed to be in the same position as Trueheart; completely cut out ofDiem's confidence. He urged that Nolting cut his vacation short and hurry back to Saigon. Trueheart had "used all [his] ammunition." Perhaps, Thuan said, Nolting's "personal relationship" with Diem could persuade the President to listen to reason and not to Nhu.50

46 Embassy to State, July 3, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 445. 47 Footnote, July 1, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 433. 48 State to Embassy, July 5, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 49 Embassy to State, July 6, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 50 Embassy to State, July 4, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 449.

140 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Surprisingly, top State Department officials had come to the same conclusion, but

for different reasons. " ...We believe Nolting must return by end ofweek at latest,"

Forrestal told Bundy on behalfofBall, Harriman and Hilsman. "Although Trueheart has

done excellent job we feel U.S. must have ambassador present during this dangerous

period." In other words, Trueheart's methods had been sound, but as Nolting's deputy he

had lacked sufficient stature to effectively confront Diem. Forrestal added that the

Department hoped to move up the arrival date ofHenry Cabot Lodge, the ambassador

designate, from September to August. 51

Members ofDiem's inner circle believed that the withdrawal ofNolting and the

announcement ofthe appointment ofLodge augured a new U.S. policy. Madame Nhu,

upon first hearing the news on June 20, allegedly announced, "They have sent us a

proconsul!" Hilsman, in To Move a Nation, wrote, "She was right.,,52 Thuan told

Trueheart on June 25 that Diem's reaction to the news had been fierce: "Diem thought a

new American policy was involved and an effort to force him to do our bidding or unseat

him." Diem had added vigorously that "they can send ten Lodges, but I will not permit

myselfor my country to be humiliated, not ifthey train their artillery on tllls Palace.,,53

IfThuan told Trueheart the truth, then it is probable that paranoia led Diem to

overestimate the significance ofthe Lodge appointment. True, Hilsman and his allies

favored a confrontational negotiating posture with Diem when they believed that the

GVN President acted against American interests. But they certainly had not begun to

consider actively supporting a coup ifDiem did not bend. Harriman advised Lodge in

~l Forresta1 to Bundy, July 2, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. ,2 Hilsman, p. 515. 53 Embassy to State, June 25, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 414.

141 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

June that "Diem is the best man," and while his antics grated, "who would succeed if

Diem dropped dead?,,54

Lodge boasted a long and storied career in public service, which had been

somewhat blighted by the loss ofhis Massachusetts Senate seat in 1952 to Kennedy at the

beginning ofthe latter's meteoric rise through American politics. 55 During the

Eisenhower Administration, Lodge had served as U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations, and on that relatively new stage he had shined. His greatest talent had been

theatrical, exploiting the medium oftelevision; "on a daily basis he defeated the Soviet

representative in the nation's living rooms, meeting every Communist charge with an

immediate and flourishing rejoinder.,,56 Eisenhower thought Lodge had been "an ace" as

lJN ambassador, "quick, agile and emotional, hitting back at the Soviet delegate

whenever an accusation was made, thus denying the Soviets the exclusive headlines for

the day.,,57

Headstrong and grandstanding, with enormous public stature, Lodge seemed the

public servant, in the words ofHilsman and Forrestal, "whose character and reputation

would permit him to dominate the representatives ofall the other departments and

agencies," and whose high profile would give him the ability to "use all the leverage we

have to persuade Diem to adopt policies we espouse.,,58 Hilsman later wrote that his

54 Blair, p. 14. 55 Lodge had lost a second race to Kennedy: he had been the Vice Presidential candidate on the Republican ticket in 1960. Moderate Republicans speculated that Lodge might make a good challenger to Kennedy in the 1964 presidential election. 56 Blair, p. 2. 57 MemCon, Eisenhower and John McCone, Sept. 19, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 58 Eyes Only Annex, Hi1smanlForresta1 Report, Jan. 25, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 60-61.

142 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

recommendations played a large role in "stimulating thinking" by Rusk and Kennedy

towards Lodge. 59

In reality, the choice ofLodge reflect~~d the recommendations ofthe

HilsmanIForrestal Report, but not for the effect it might have on U.S.-GVN relations.

Unlike Forrestal and Harriman, Kennedy believed Nolting had done a fantastic job in

Saigon, and pointedly said so to Hilsman, Harriman, Forrestal and Ball on July 4.

According to Hilsman's notes ofa meeting with Kennedy: "The President volunteered

that Ambassador Nolting had done an outstanding job, that it was almost miraculous the

way he had succeeded in turning the war around from the disastrously low point in

relations between Diem and ourselves that existed when Ambassador Nolting took

over.,,60 Instead, Kennedy's choice ofLodge mixed the political and the practical.

Unnerved by ambivalent and occasionally quite negative reports coming out ofSouth

Vietnam at the start of 1963, Kennedy decided to hope for the best and prepare for the

worst. Lodge, who had approached Rusk after a visit to South Vietnam in January, stating

that he'd like to return to government service, and that he was "available to take anything

that was challenging, seemed like the perfect bipartisan insurance plan for Kennedy's

Vietnam policy. Lodge in Saigon would put a prominent right at the center ofthe action,

a useful buffer for Republican criticism ifthe situation took a turn for the worst.

Additionally, as Kenneth O'Donnell recalled, after Rusk suggested Lodge for the post,

Kennedy "decided to approve the appointment because the idea ofgetting Lodge mixed

59 Hilsman, p. 478. 60 MemCon, July 4, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 453.

143 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. up in such a hopeless mess as Vietnam was inesistible.,,61 IfSouth Vietnam went down the tubes, then at least it would take a prominent political rival with it.

By June, however, problems with the Saigon press corps, and the deteriorating public image ofthe American commitment to South Vietnam, stood out as the chiefcrisis

Lodge might have the stature to correct. Unlike Nolting, Lodge was a professional politician, and as UN ambassador had shown a real gift for image management and press relations. In a meeting with Lodge, Kennedy reached for a picture ofthe June 11 self- immolation, and told the ambassador-designate: "I suppose these are the worst press relations to be found in the world today." He continued: "I wish you, personally, would take charge ofpress relations.,,62

-In the summer of 1963, Kennedy found himselffaced with a bevy ofother major issues tugging at his attention and that ofhis top advisors, including a defrosting ofthe u.S.-Soviet relationship, culminating in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and major civil rights demonstrations in the South.63 In particular, the latter problem seemed to require extraordinary political delicacy, and revelations in the U.S. press that a major U.S. ally persecuted adherents ofits majority religion therefore stood as the paramount crisis in

Vietnam policy for Kennedy. In July, he would dispatch Robert Manning, Assistant

Secretary of State for Public Affairs, to Saigon to meet with top officials in both governments, including Diem and Nhu. Mamling, in a report to Kennedy and a special briefing for Lodge, argued that while most ofthe correspondents held the

61 Blair, p. 13. 62 Ibid., p. 14. Blair's Lodge in Vietnam contains the best explanation of the Lodge appointment; it arose out of the intersection ofpolitical, personal, and press-related concems. Other accounts do not place as much emphasis on the image management dimensions of the appointment, and explicit assignment of Lodge to bring press relations under control. See, e.g., Freedman, pps. 367-368. 63 A good discussion ofthe major issues overshadowing South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 is in Kaiser, pps.209-210.

144 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

"conviction...the [GVN] is doomed," and therefore little could be done to improve relations between the GVN and the Saigon press corps, the best step the U.S. Embassy could take would be to "take them into our confidence more, give them an 'in' feeling."

Lodge told Manning and Hilsman that he would "do just that.,,64

Indeed, no sooner did Lodge arrive in Saigon in August than he scheduled a series ofprivate dinners with several ofthe young American correspondents, including David

Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, most aggressive in reporting on the abuses and failures of the Diem regime. He fed them little infonnation, but asked them for their confidential take on the situation in South Vietnam and the future ofthe Diem regime. Asserting control over press relations quickly, he told the USIA's John Mecklin, whom Manning had complimented, that "the leak is the prerogative ofthe ambassador. It is one ofmy weapons for doing this job.,,65 Mecklin later wrote that for Lodge and the U.S. Embassy,

"the so-called press problems ended then and there.,,66

Before Hilsman could bring Lodge to bear like a wrecking ball on the Diem regime, Nolting received a final chance to use persuasion and trust, ifany still remained between representatives ofthe U.S. and GVJ\r, to end the crisis. Returning to Washington on July 5, Nolting began his defense ofthe Ngos. Diem had "given his word" that the

GVN would live up to its agreement with the Buddhists, he told George Ball, and "it was

Nolting's experience that when Diem gave his word, he followed through although sometimes it was handled in his own way." J\rhu, the Department's bete noire, was obviously "troublesome," but he was also "chiefly responsible for gains which had been

64 MemCon, Hilsman, Manning and Lodge; Manning Report for President, July 26, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 529-530, 531-543. 65 Prochnau, p. 382. 66 Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment. Garden City, NY; Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965, p. 190. Quoted in Blair, p. 24.

145 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. made in the provincial pacification program." Robert Thompson, ofcourse, had made the same point about Nhu's galvanizing role in the strategic hamlet program to Hilsman and other officials in Washington in April. Above all, Nolting warned Ball, a coup would be disastrous: "...the country would be split between feuding factions and the Americans would have to withdraw and the country might be lost to the Communists.,,67

Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal demonstrated obvious reluctance in sending

Nolting back to Saigon in mid-July. The trio disagreed with Nolting on virtually all points. On July 9, Forrestal updated Bundy on the balance ofpersonalities and positions in the State Department. He noted that Nolting's "return to Saigon will tend to encourage

Diem to feel that he continues to enjoy our support." Forrestal, clearly ambivalent about sending Nolting back to Diem, repeated the proposal that Lodge's departure date be moved up, and took a not-so-subtle shot at Nolting's close relationship with Diem by complimenting Trueheart's lack of"personal involvement" in the situation. Forrestal avoided discussing the possible effects ofa coup, but did tell Bundy that he believed the

Harriman/Hilsman position was the right one, that the U.S. "must avoid allowing its own interests to be confused with those ofthe regime in Saigon." In other words, Hilsman,

Harriman, and Forrestal believed that ifa coup could bring in South Vietnamese leadership who could better win the political struggle against the NLF, then the U.S. would be wise to resist discouraging the plotters. In words that would have made Nolting

67 MemCon, July 5, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 466. In 1961 and 1962, several officials in the Kennedy Administration suggested that the Administration should seek a negotiated solution in South Vietnam as a prelude to withdrawal. Kennedy and his top advisors hadn't accepted these suggestions; but their sources had not been marginalized or targeted. In late 1963, however, during the Administration's increasingly vitriolic debates over the future ofthe Diem regime, the specter ofthe catastrophe ofwithdrawal and the "loss of Vietnam" became a sort ofthreat hanging over the proceedings.

146 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. cringe, and would have elicited protest from the Defense Department had its representatives been aware ofthem, Forrestal advocated a policy of"fence-sitting".68

Back in Saigon, Nolting set to work to save the GVN from both "political upheaval" and antagonistic forces within the State Department. He wrote on July 17 that he had begun to attain results. Coup plotting rem rampant in Saigon. American intelligence officers reported two significant mmored plots. One involved Tran Kim

Tuyen, the ousted former head ofthe Palace's intelligence service.69 A spectacular report, which caused considerable consternation in the Embassy, cited a source's report that Ngo

Dinh Nhu had approached a group ofARVN generals and propositioned them for an anti-

American, anti-Buddhist, and anti-Diem coup. Nhu reportedly told the generals that "if the army was thinking of a coup d'etat, he did not blame the officers and would be with them.... The Buddhist crisis might then be solved." The source also quoted Nlm to the effect that the South Vietnamese "could not depend upon those who might want to negotiate...an obvious allusion to the Americans." The generals did not believe Nhu spoke seriously; rather, it seemed obvious he hoped to keep any potential plotters among them confused and off-balance.70

In spite ofNhu's intrigues and posturing, Nolting believed he had succeeded in gaining the Counselor's approval for an emergency speech by Diem "aimed at calming the situation." The speech, Thuan told Nolting, would not only assure the South

Vietnamese population ofpositive steps taken by the GVN to fulfill its side ofthe agreement with the Buddhists, but would announce additional measures reaffirming the

68 Forrestal to Bundy, July 9, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 48l. 69 CIA Information Report, July 15, 1963, JFKL NSF B197. 70 CIA Information Report, July 13, 1963, JFKL NSF B198. The identity ofthe source and the text replaced here by the ellipsis remain blacked out on the original document.

147 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

GVN's commitment to religious freedom. Nolting, in his cable to the Department, requested a prompt statement of approval and support from a State spokesperson ifthe speech proved "sufficiently forthcoming and conciliatory." He argued that such a statement would discourage coup plotters and have a dampening effect on the extreme elements in the Buddhist movement.71

Nolting and Hilsman, however, now operated at cross-purposes. Nolting believed that the U.S. had to move to demonstrate its continued support for the GVN at the first plausible moment it could; Hilsman believed that only continued pressure on the Diem regime could force the necessary reforms and changes to regain popular confidence, and did not fear rumors ofcoup plotting. For Hilsman, these rumors put additional pressure on the Diem regime, and furthermore it was possible that a plot might emerge involving a cohesive alternative leadership with a better chance ofwinning the political war against the NLF than the tyrannical Diem regime. For these reasons, Hilsman did not wish to discourage coup plotting or marginalize the extreme elements ofthe Buddhist movement without extraordinary conciliatory moves by the GVN.

Diem's national broadcast on July 18 obviously did not live up to those standards. The President's address followed a day ofrenewed violence, in which

Buddhist demonstrations in Saigon resulted in a round ofpolice brutality. Nolting, in the midst ofattempting to build up Diem, nevertheless faithfully reported: "U.S. eyewitnesses report that without any apparent provocation from crowd, police kicked, slugged and clubbed bonzes and lay people and loaded them forcibly into trucks." Police also moved to barricade several large Saigon pagodas, to try to prevent further

7l Nolting to State, July 17, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 494-496.

148 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. gatherings. 72 The following night, Diem addressed the nation in a radio broadcast. He spoke in a conciliatory manner, expressing his hope that both sides "actively contribute to implementation ofjoint communique." Diem also made note of"the utmost desire of conciliation ofgovernment in settling Buddhist problem... .',73 The Buddhist leadership and Nolting both responded immediately. A group ofmoderate bonzes sent Diem a letter stating acknowledgement ofthe "high peaceful intentions ofgovernment," but maintaining that the GVN needed to move beyond generalities and take specific steps to end the crisis. Most importantly, Diem needed to order lower-ranking GVN officials to release all the protestors rounded up and held prisoner since May 8; to clarify that the

GVN would treat incidents occurring after the June 16 agreement in the same conciliatory manner as those before; and finally, to accommodate a demand the

Buddhists had voiced since the beginning ofthe crisis, Diem needed to punish the officials responsible for the May 8 massacre, take official GVN responsibility for the incident, and pay a victims' indemnity.74 Nolting, meanwhile, cabled the Department that he would continue working towards the release ofprisoners, but that Diem had gone as far as he would possibly go at that time, and the State Department now needed to reciprocate with a clear statement ofsupport for the GVN. 75 Three hours later, he cabled again: Tho, Thuan, and other "like-minded ministers...feel President is now right tract

[sic], despite strong contrary advice he receiving," an obvious reference to the Nhus. The crisis could be brought to a close provided Diem was not "undercut/rom any quarter.',76

72 Embassy to State, July 17, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 73 Embassy to State, 2:05 am, July 19, 1963, JFKL NSF B198. 74 Embassy to State, 10:25 am, July 19, 1963, JFKL NSF B198. 75 Embassy to State, July 19, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 515-516. 76 Embassy to State, July 19, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. Italics added. Again, Nolting alluded to the Nhus's persistent efforts to undermine any sort ofcompromise solution to the Buddhist Crisis; he may also have had the intentions ofHilsman and Harriman in mind.

149 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Nolting, however, had lost all say in the fonnulation ofthe State Department's

Vietnam policy. In stark contrast to the deference Lodge would soon receive, Nolting was

infonned that the Department was "inclined continue for present public posture of

noninterference this internal affair, neither favoring Buddhists or Diem in public

statements...."77

Nolting certainly appreciated that the tide had turned definitively against him in

Foggy Bottom. "I am very much disappointed in reftel," he replied on July 20. He then

launched into a virtual manifesto in defense ofDiem and the GVN. The GVN, he argued,

could be "counted on to be slow, sticky, and uncoordinated in adopting and implementing

any policy." However, he believed that his own work over the past two years had proven

that through the hard task ofpersuasion, American officials could coax Diem into making

the proper policy decisions to win the war against the NLF. He cited improvements in

the administration ofthe strategic hamlet program as a prime example ofthe virtues of

mutual trust. The GVN's intentions were good, in other words, and the U.S. had an

obligation to continue supporting it, especially in one ofits most perilous hours.78

Hilsman, ofcourse, could see Nolting's "personal involvement" with Diem at

work in the cable. The Assistant Secretary felt no such loyalty to the Diem regime. He

believed that American support should not flow to a government; it should flow to a

policy, namely, winning South Vietnamese hearts and minds in the struggle against the

communist insurgency. It was not clear in late July whether the Diem regime still had that

capacity, in light ofthe extensive damage done to its already limited popular appeal by

77 State to Embassy, July 19, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 517. Hilsman is not listed in the drafting information, although the contents ofa cable he sent several days later are consistent with the response to Nolting on July 19. 78 Embassy to State, July 20, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 521.

150 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. the Buddhist Crisis. There was ample question too, given Nhu's resolute presence by

Diem's side and his continued provocations, whether American and South Vietnamese policies were not at that moment starting to diverge.

IfNolting was correct in his assessment ofthe balance ofpersonalities surrounding Diem, then the U.S. faced a critical moment. Nolting had managed briefly to pin Nhu into supporting Diem's decision to make a new statement. More moderate voices such as Thuan and Tho had momentarily prevailed, and expected that Nolting could bring the U.S. around to reciprocating. Nhu's influence might not have diminished had the U.S. made a strong supportive statement; in the absence ofa clearly reciprocal signal, his influence was sure to continue to rise.

IfHilsman understood the moment's particular political logic, then his next cable to Nolting demonstrated that he considered the GVN virtually unredeemable. He told

Nolting coolly that "we have carefully considered present Buddhist problem against backdrop successful CI [counterinsurgency] program." The "current thinking" in the

Bureau ofFar Eastern Affairs was best represented by a July 10 Special National

Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), which he sent along to Nolting. 79 That SNIE commented darkly on the rise ofNgo Dinh Nhu, forecasting a continued "steady accretion ofpower and authority." It noted that Nhu "has long prilvately viewed the U.S. with some hostility and suspicion," and that the Counselor clearly saw himself as South Vietnam's future leader. Furthermore, Nhu was inclined to gamble with the continuation ofU.S. support, because he did not expect it to be transferred to him in the future anyway. Meanwhile, if the Buddhist Crisis carried on in South Vietnam's cities, and political tension continued to rise, "the chances ofa non-Communist assassination or coup attempt against Diem will

79 Hilsman to Nolting, July 23,1963, FRUS, III, p. 523.

151 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. be better than even." The U.S. did not necessarily have to fear chaos and defeat in the aftermath of a coup: "A non-Communist successor regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support from the U.S., could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort.,,8o

The SNIE clearly drew heavily from a June 21 INR report. It quoted verbatim from that report, put together by analysts working under the direction ofTom Hughes,

Hilsman's former deputy: a successor regime could draw on "a reasonably large pool of untapped or ineffectively used but experienced and trained manpower.,,81

With those reports in mind, Hilsman instructed Nolting that the American policy would be one of"watchful waiting." He put little stock in Diem's address; both the GVN and the Buddhist movement were moving inexorably towards further confrontation, as more militant elements on both sides gained power. "In these circumstances and in light

growing crop ofreports on coup plans," Hilsman wrote, "we judge odds favor coup

attempted coup within next few months ifnot weeks." Hilsman was inclined to think the

"odds also seem to favor success ofsuch coup." He noted that the U.S. could actively

seek to dissuade or encourage a coup, but given the unstable situation in Saigon, the best

course seemed to be a holding pattern: "More active role runs obvious risk ofputting us

III.pOSItIOn . .0 f havmg . bac ke d Ioser. ...,,82

Robeli McNamara noted in his 1995 memoir In Retrospect: "We all knew that

Hilsman sometimes went outside official charmels to increase the chances his views

80 SNIE, July 10, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System; FRUS, III, p. 484. 81 INR Research Memorandum, June 21, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 408; SNIE, July 10, 1963, FRUS, JIJ~ p. 485. 82 I-Iilsman to Nolting, July 23, 1963, FRUS. JIJ, p. 524.

152 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. would prevail.,,83 In this instance, Hilsman did not technically go outside "official channels"; he was right to question the continued wisdom ofunstinting American support for the Diem regime. However, the position he took in late July, that the U.S. should maintain a strategic neutrality between the GVN and possible alternative leadership, certainly represented a change in long-followed American policy. At least since Elbridge

Durbrow had warned a dissident general in early 1961 that the Nov. 1960 coup had failed for the best, the U.S. had worked actively to discourage coup plotting. Yet Hilsman does not seem to have asked for, nor did he receive, clearance from any official higher than

Harriman for taking this step.

While Nolting at the Saigon Embassy fought to win back U.S. support for Diem,

Hilsman's staffin Washington began work in earnest towards implementing the

"watchful waiting" policy. Paul Kattenburg, director ofthe Vietnam Working Group,

suggested sending Edward Lansdale back to Saigon to act as an agent ofHi1sman's policy. Kattenburg reported to Hilsman that Lansdale "definitely does not seem to me to be wedded to the regime. He has, I think, felt for a long time that it is moving to its own

funeral but he is not sure whether the moment has yet arrived." In the event ofa coup

attempt, "Lansdale would be most helpful in assessing prospects and in evaluating

potential leadership." Hilsman, perhaps cognizant that dispatching Lansdale would draw

attention and resistance to his efforts, especially from the CIA, did not respond

affirmatively. 84

83 McNamara, Robert, with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons a/Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995, p. 55. 84 Kattenburg to Hilsman, July 24, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 527. The idea ofsending Lansdale to Saigon to groom an alternative leadership, much as he had been seen to have groomed Diem years earlier, emerged again on Sept. 13. In a private letter to Rusk, Lodge wrote that he hoped CIA Station Chief John Richardson, perceived in Saigon to be too close to Nhu, could be replaced by Lansdale, who would be "sent over here at once to take charge, under my supervision, ofall U.S. relationships with a change of

153 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Nolting, frustrated, overworked, unheeded, feeling that in his final weeks in

Saigon he "had more influence with Diem than with my own government,,,85 committed a fatal blunder on July 28. In what Hilsman would later gallantly call a "casual aside to an interviewer,,,86 Nolting told UPI correspondent Neil Sheehan that he, "after almost two and one halfyears here, [had] never seen any evidence ofreligious persecution....,,87 This was technically true: the Diem regime had certainly practiced favoritism towards

Catholics, but it could not honestly be accused of any sort ofconcerted "religious persecution" towards Buddhists. Hilsman, however, noted that "following weeks oflurid pictures ofpriests being beaten a public statement to that effect was inept.,,88 Harriman hit the roof; the ambassador, he told Hilsman, "ought to be recalled at once." Hilsman placated Harriman by reminding the Under Secretary that Nolting was due to leave two weeks later anyway. Harriman subsequently demanded that Nolting clear his farewell remarks with the Department.89

Nolting felt exasperated and desperate with good reason. In the first week of

August, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame J\Thu moved publicly to bring the Buddhist Crisis to a violent final confrontation. Reuters reported on August 3 that Nhu had threatened to

"crush" Saigon's Xa Loi pagoda, a key headquarters for the Buddhist movement;

Madame Nhu, almost simultaneously announced in a speech to the Women's

Paramilitary Youth, her female version ofNhu's Republican Youth, that the Buddhist movement's leaders were "seditious elements...applying the most odious ofcommunist government here." Lodge to Rusk, Sept. 13, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 205. CIA director John McCone killed the idea on Sept. 17, telling Rusk he had "no confidence at all" in Lansdale. MemCon, McCone and Rusk, Sept. 17, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 241. 85 Nolting, p. 119. 86 Hilsman, p. 480. 87 Footnote, Aug. 1, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 550. 88 Hilsman, p. 480. 89 MemCon, Hilsman and Harriman, Aug. 1, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 550.

154 MarkHobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. tactics." Hilsman believed the "GVN may well be preparing move from conciliatory to strong repressive policy," and warned Nolting that ifXa Loi were attacked, the GVN

"must expect that USG would promptly and publicly denounce the action." A Buddhist self-immolation took place the following day.9o

With Rusk once again out ofthe country, Hilsman updated Acting Secretary Ball on the crisis: his update indicates that by early August Hilsman was already leaning heavily towards supporting a coup against the Diem regime. Estimating at even the

"chances of an attempted coup" in the coming months, and even again "the odds of success," Hilsman noted that "we are urgently seeking further but discreet contact with opposition elements, military and civilian, in order to give us a better chance to manipulate the outcome of a coup attempt." The alternative, continuing support for the

Diem regime, seemed bleak: Diem would most likely move to solve the Buddhist crisis through repression. "Ifso," wrote Hilsman, "it is quite possible that his popular support will be so reduced that he could no longer hope to defeat the Viet Cong.,,91

Kennedy, however, may not have been aware that Hilsman had reached these conclusions. On Aug. 9, Forrestal updated Kennedy on the situation in South Vietnam, but did not make any mention of"watchful waiting" and the possibility ofcultivating alternative leadership. He merely noted that Hilsman did not think "the time has come" for the U.S. to publicly and officially voice its disapproval ofthe GVN's recent policies.92

90 State to Embassy, August 5, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 553.; Text ofM. Nhu speech, Embassy to State, Aug. 3, 1963, JFKL NSF B198. 91 Hilsman to Ball, Aug. 6, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 554-555. 92 Forrestal to Kennedy, Aug. 9, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 559.

155 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C.

Even Nolting began to lose hope that moderating forces in the GVN would prevail over Diem. Although he cabled ridiculously on Aug. 7 that Nhu wa$ "supporting fully and with both hands Diem's announced policy ofconciliation," and on: Aug. 10 that

Madame Nhu was "out ofcontrol ofeverybody," by August 12 he felt forcep to confront

Diem with the conclusion that "his policy was in fact schizophrenic, that he had entmsted a policy of conciliation to the Vice President to implement and was himselfcondoning public attacks upon the Buddhists which mad,~ that policy impossible to implement.,,93 In an Aug. 13 press conference, which Nolting had indicated to Diem might serve as the latter's last chance to announce specific actions aimed at meeting Buddhist demands and ending the crisis peacefully, Tho, publicly making himself complicit in the GVN's unyielding policy, announced that prisoners atTested after June 16 would not necessarily receive clemency, that GVN prosecutions ofmonks for their role in inciting the May 8 demonstrations would not be suspended, and that furthermore the GVN had already demonstrated "leniency." In a move guaranteed to infuriate U.S. officials and public opinion, Tho compared Madame Nhu's dissension to Senator Mike Mansfield's.94

Although Nolting's departure from Saigon did elicit a small gesture from Diem,95

it had become clear that Nhu's stock had risen again with the President; Diem stressed

"particularly the absolute selflessness ofNgo Dinh J'Jlm's contribution to the cause" in

his farewell meeting with Nolting. 96 Leaving Tmeheart in charge at the Embassy, Nolting

departed for Honolulu and a scheduled conference with Hilsman and Lodge to briefthe

new ambassador before his arrival in Saigon. At the same moment, Tho's statement

93 Telegrams from Embassy to State, FRUS, III, pps. 556, 560, 563. 94 Embassy to State, August 13,1963, JFKL NSF B197. 95 Diem told Marguerite Higgins ofthe Herald Tribune that "the policy ofutmost reconciliation is irreversible." 96 Embassy to State, Aug. 14, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 566.

156 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. appeared to have precipitated a new round oftumult. On August 18, the consul in Hue reported students and protestors massing at the ancient city's main pagodas: "Believe lid is offthe kettle in Hue and additional political religious eruptions likely at any time.,,97

The next several days brought a twist in the crisis that convinced Hilsman of

Nhu's ascendance to the pinnacle ofpower in South Vietnam. The CIA Station in Saigon had received intelligence that Nhu had approached key ARVN generals in July; while his offer of support for an anti-Diem coup was considered to be bluster, several generals clearly appreciated his hard-line stance on the continuing Buddhist protests. Fearing that the continuing Buddhist Crisis would inevitably hurt the war effort, the generals, according to an Aug. 24 CIA report, met with Nhu in early August to discuss a declaration ofmartial law. ARVN forces, in conjunction with GVN police and Special

Forces, could then force open key pagodas in countrywide and arrest Buddhist leaders.

Nhu apparently assured Gen. Tran VanDon, Commander ofARVN, that no protestors would be hurt.98 Don confirmed to Harkins that ARVN had demanded martial law:

"Though Don explained that above all the President hates to see the military in charge, there was nothing left to do but demonstrate by show offorce that order must be preserved.,,99

On the night ofAug. 21, ARVN and police forces, as well as Special Forces troops loyal to Ngo Dinh Nhu, followed a declaration ofmartial law from Diem by moving on various important pagodas in Saigon and Hue. The first raid occurred at Xa

Loi, which Nhu had earlier vowed to "crush". "A number ofBuddhists were reported killed or wounded, and many others were arrested," noted the President's Intelligence

97 Hue to State, August 18, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 98 CIA Information Report, August 23, 1963, Declassified Documents Reference System. 99 Harkins to State, August 21, 1963, JFKL NSF B197.

157 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Checklist ofAug. 21. " ...These harsh measures may only serve to further alienate the

Vietnamese public and will further damage Diem's image throughout the world."lOO

Between Aug. 21 and Aug. 23, American officials did not know who held power in

Saigon. Forrestal on Aug. 21 appeared to believe a military regime had seized control, and recommended in a meeting with Hilsman that the U.S. "use the military regime to achieve some ofthe reforms which we have been advocating'",,Hilsman a little more

skeptical, ordered Lodge to hurry to Saigon to discover the true relationship between

Nhu, Diem and ARVN. 101

Lodge notified Hilsman on Aug. 23 that "weight ofevidence is that influence of

Nhus has not diminished.,,102 The previous day, Nhu had broadcast a communique to the

103 Republican Youth, praising the attack on the pagodas. Meanwhile, a petition that

supposedly demanded Diem declare martial law circulated through the ARVN general

staff; somebody was asking generals to sign on to it retroactively. 104 More definitive

reports soon trickled into the Embassy. Vo Van Hai, chiefofDiem's private cabinet, told

Paul Kattenburg that the "entire affair fully and carefully stage-managed by Nhu." An

earlier Defense Intelligence Agency report had noted that in the aftermath ofthe raids,

"population appears stunned but...at this point a quiet ferment ofresentment growing

against the current GVN actions against the Buddhist." Hai echoed those findings: "He

fears reaction in longer run will be progressive denial support and cooperation to

10­ government and armed forces on part ofpeople." )

100 Editorial Note, Aug. 21, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 598. 101 Memorandum for the record, Aug. 21, 1963, FRUS, III, p. 601. HJO- Lodge to Hl1sman,. FRUS. III, p. 605. 103 Embassy to State, August 23, 1963, JFKL NSF B197. 104 CIA IlllormatlOn-"' . Report, August 23, 1963, Declassified. Documents Reference System. 105 Embassy to State, Aug. 24, 1963, DDRS; DIA Report forwarded to White House, Aug. 23, 1963, DDRS.

158 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Separately, Thuan approached Rufus Phillips and confirmed Hai's message; "Nhu was in a dangerously triumphant mood." Thuan told Phillips that Nhu had "trick[ed]" the

generals; neither Thuan nor the generals had Imown about the Xa Loi raid in advance,

and police and Special Forces under the command ofNhu had carried it out. "Under no

circumstances," Thuan said, "should the U.S. acquiesce in what the Nhus had done. This would be disastrous.,,106

Even worse news awaited Hilsman. Not only had Nhu's power continued; it had

in fact evidently risen. In Saigon, reports flowed into the Embassy that posters ofNhu

had replaced posters ofDiem in government buildings. In addition, posters appeared

around the city left ostensibly by ARVN, justifying the raids: "The army is determined

not to tolerate the abuse ofreligion for political purposes.,,107

Nhu had nearly succeeded in tying ARVN to an extraordinarily unpopular policy.

The U.S. government had been implicated as well, officials learned. A CIA report on the

ARVN officer corps in the aftermath ofthe raids notedthat many officers believed "the

Americans planned the 21 August operation against the Buddhists." The report also cited

sources to the effect that disgruntled officers :felt afraid to take action because they

believed the regime enjoyed wholehearted American support. 108

ARVN generals belatedly caught on to the dimensions ofNhu's plan.

Approaching a member ofthe CIA Saigon Station, Don insinuated that a group of

generals had begun planning for a coup. The target would be Nhu. They hoped to keep

Diem as a figurehead, because, as Don admitted, "within the military there is no one who

could replace Diem." He described Nhu as DJlem's "thinker," a position that gave him

106 Embassy to State, Aug. 24, 1963, FR US, III, p. 611. 107 Embassy to State, Aug. 24, 1963, DDRS. 108 CIA Information Report, August 23, 1963, JFKL NSF B198.

159 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

"special power." Madame Nhu was Diem's "platonic wife." Diem would not dump either one ofthem by choice. Yet Don implied that the generals felt compelled to act. He had

"heard personally that the military is being blamed by Vietnamese public for the attack on the pagodas." However, it had been Nhu's police and Special Forces that had raided

Xa Loi, Don told the intelligence officer. 109 The story he told contradicted his version of events on Aug. 21, when he had told Harkins that "the two head bonzes they wanted to grab in the raid on the Xa Loi pagoda had escaped over the wall into the USOM compound....,,110

Lodge had doubts about the authenticity ofDon's message, and urged caution:

"Suggestion has been made that U.S. has only to indicate to 'Generals' that it would be happy to see Diem and/or Nhus go, and deed would be done. Situation is not so simple, in our view." There was no compelling evidence that any general commanding troops in the

Saigon area favored a coup. No real military leadership had emerged to challenge the

GVN. Lodge concluded: "Acting on our part in these circumstances would seem to be a shot in the dark."111

Lodge's cable arrived on a Saturday; Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, and McCone had all left Washington for the weekend. A skeleton crew, including Hilsman and

Harriman, manned the State Department. Upon receipt ofLodge's cable,Forrestaljoined them. The trio discussed the news from Saigon, and then Hilsman set about drafting the cable that would precipitate the end ofboth the Diem regime and Hilsman's short career in Kennedy's State Department.

109 CIA Saigon to Agency, Aug. 24, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 614-620. 110 Harkins to Secretary ofState, Aug. 21,1963, JFKL NSF B198. 111 Lodge to Hi1sman, Aug. 24,1963, FRUS, III, p. 620.

160 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C

Nbu had become Hilsman's nemesis. J[ronically, the two men had something important in common among the myriad officials, South Vietnamese and American, engaged in the struggle against the NLF. Roger Hilsman and Ngo Dinh Nbu both believed that defeating the insurgency would require a fundamentally political strategy.

Yet their respective strategies were almost perfectly antagonistic. Hilsman believed the key to the salvation ofthe South Vietnamese anti-communist cause lay in greater

American assistance and input to the GVN; he wanted to expand the ranks ofAmerican advisors working with South Vietnamese civilian officials. Nbu, by contrast, detested the growing American influence over the GVN and its war effort, and believed that only his family's continued rule could protect South Vietnam from communist takeover. The two officials had been on a collision course since early 1962, when Hilsman had noticed that

Nbu's conception ofthe strategic hamlet programseemed to make a mockery ofthe

"Strategic Concept."

Defense Department and American military officials would vehemently disagree with Hilsman's next move. These officials believed that ARVN's war in the countryside was progressing better than ever, that the Buddhist Crisis was "enmeshed with politics" and needed to be "resolved," and that under the present circumstances forcing a change in government would be an unthinkable error. The optimism ofmilitary officials clashed with the frustration ofthe diplomats. In early July, Marine Gen. Victor Krulak, the resident specialist on counterinsurgency on the Joint Chiefs ofStaffCommittee, reported

from South Vietnam to the JCS that his "visit. ..added substance to the view that we are indeed winning the war, that our present course is sound and that, resolutely pursued, it

161 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. will see the job done.,,112 On Aug. 20, one day before Nhu engineered the pagoda raids,

Gen. Taylor sent McNamara a detailed proposal for the withdrawal of 1000 U.S. military personnel by the close of 1963 that the Secretary ofDefense had requested in May.

Withdrawing 1000 Americans would make little difference in the course ofthe war effort, McNamara believed, but it would have "psychological impact," sending a message to the American public that the GVN was winning its war. 113

In contrast, Hilsman believed that the war effort had become seriously endangered by the events in Saigon. In his Aug. 24 cable to Lodge, he wrote that Nhu's

"commanding position" posed an emergency. The Kennedy Administration "cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands." Diem had to be given "chance to rid himselfofNhu and his coterie." But ifthe President would not do so, "then we must face the possibility that Diem himselfcannot be preserved." Lodge was authorized to approach Don's group ofARVN generals covertly, and inform them that the Nhus had to be removed for South Vietnam to continue receiving American support. While Diem deserved a "reasonable opportunity" to rid himselfofNhu and Madame Nhu, Hilsman wrote, he authorized Lodge to inform appropriate generals that ifDiem "remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem." He then gave Lodge a final instruction: "You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism." For years, the U.S. Embassy had received approaches from potential coup plotters, and had been able to discourage them by asserting that, should they succeed in toppling Diem, they could not be assured ofU.S.

11 ) ~ Krolak to JCS, July 1963, FRUS, III, p. 465. 113 TayIMor to. cNamara, Aug. 20. 1963, FRUS, IIf, p. 591.

162 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C. support for their new regime. The generals, should they succeed in toppling the GVN, would not have to face this uncertainty.

On its face, the cable seemed extraordinarily vague; it seemed to give Lodge no concrete instructions for how to proceed in deeply confusing circumstances in his first week in Saigon. Actually, Hilsman's cable was breathtakingly simple: Lodge gained the authorization to use his discretion and all the powers at his disposal to eliminate the Nhus from positions ofpower in South Vietnam. "You will understand that we cannot from

Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this operation should proceed,"

Hilsman concluded, "but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you

· b" ,,114 take to achleve our 0 ~ectlVes.

At a contentious meeting on Aug. 26, Hilsman let slip what he believed to be the probable outcome ofhis cable: "The President commented that he did not believe that

Diem would let his brother be ejected from the scene. Secretary Rusk demurred from this viewpoint stating that he was not at all sure this was the case, while Mr. Hilsman said that the Country Team believes that Diem and Nhu will rise and fall together."115

In To Move a Nation, Hilsman wrote that for him at the time, "it seemed more and more clear that ifNhu continued in power the regime would continue to follow the suicidal policies that were not only dragging Vietnam down to ignominy and disaster but the United States as well.,,116 Given the brothers' attachment, Hilsman had come to the conclusion that saving anti-communist South Vietnam would require destroying its government.

114 Hi1sman to Lodge, Aug. 24, 1963, FRUS, III, pps. 628-629. 1I5 Memorandum for the record ofa meeting, Aug. 26,1963, FRUS, III, p. 640. 116 Hi1sman, p. 485.

163 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D. C.

Presented with a situation in which the American commitment to the cause ofan anti-communist South Vietnam seemed salvageable, but U.S.-GVN relations seemed unsalvageable, Kennedy came to agree with Hilsman. In internal administration debates in the weeks following Hilsman's decision, Kennedy projected ambivalence about the wisdom ofan ARVN coup. That ambivalence, however, did not reflect any sort ofdoubt about the necessity of a continued American commitment to South Vietnam, or about the ethicality oftacit American support for military coups. Fredrik Logevall writes of

"Kennedy's quiet but firm endorsement and encouragement ofa showdown between

Diem and dissident generals. From late August onward, Kennedy's actions indicate that he had resigned himselfto the necessity ofremoving Diem." Kennedy's concerns were simply "pragmatic": whether the generals could successfully pull offthe coup.ll7 Failure might have exposed American support for the coup, leading to humiliation and a firm invitation from Diem to leave South Vietnam.

Kennedy and Hilsman, ofcourse, experienced different sorts ofpressures on their

Vietnam policy decisions. The President had to factor in a whole host ofcomplicated political concerns that seemed to limit his range ofmovement on the issue. Hilsman, as an important advisor to the President, had to translate Kennedy's instincts into practical policy and give Kennedy viable options that reflected presidential desires. Because both men viewed the American commitment to South Vietnam in fundamentally similar terms, however, examining Hilsman's choices on Vietnam policy helps make sense of

Kennedy's choices.

The coup against Ngo Dinh Diem represented the culmination of a sharply

negative trend in U.S.-GVN relations, which had seemed harmonious in 1962, but which

117 Logevall, pps. 72, 63.

164 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. had never truly been anything other than a marriage ofconvenience. The Kennedy

Administration and the GVN fought for the same end: the eradication ofthe NLF insurgency, and the defeat ofNorth Vietnam"s ambitions for unification under communist rule. Yet the Ngos believed that they represented the only hope for an independent South

Vietnam, while American officials in the Kermedy Administration believed at heart that

Ngo Dinh Diem represented merely the best option for the defense ofanti-communism in

South Vietnam. In other words, Diem and Nhu saw their own rule as an end in and of itself; Hilsman, for one, saw their rule as merely a means to a Cold War anti-communist end. The Diem regime would allow no American-suggested reforms that diluted its own power, and it had never, since 1954, wavered more than slightly on that stance. By 1963,

Hilsman insisted on such reforms, both to win popular support for the anti-communist cause and as proofthat the GVN could win the political struggle for South Vietnam.

The showdown in the summer of 1963 created conditions in which neither side would or could choose to return to a productive relationship. Hilsman and other

American officials including Forrestal and Harriman had bet that, in the emergency situation ofthe Buddhist Crisis, pressure could be brought to bear effectively on Diem.

They had lost the bet, and Nhu had gained in:lluence at the expense ofthe U.S. Embassy.

Three dangerous alternatives presented themselves. The U.S. might move in and seek to take over the war effort and the governance ofSouth Vietnam itself. In so doing, it would assume the former imperialist mantle ofthe French. Few, at that stage, recommended such a drastic step. John Mecklin, USIA representative in Saigon, was the exception. A highly regarded official whose views carried very little weight in the inner circles ofWashington power, Mecklin nevertheless had the opportunity in Sept. 1963 to

165 Mark Hobel. Chapter IV. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. present his views on South Vietnam to Kennedy. In advance ofhis visit, he wrote to the head ofthe USIA that "an unlimited U.S. commitment in Viet-Nam is justified." He continued, "This specifically means the use ofU.S. combat forces ifnecessary, both to promote unseating ofthe regime and against the VC, as well as a willingness to accept an engagement comparable with Korea ifthe Communists choose to escalate.,,118

On the other side ofthe spectrum, Paul Kattenburg, a similarly low-ranking official in the State Department with longstanding expertise on Vietnam, voiced an even more unpopular idea at a meeting with top officials (minus Kennedy) on Aug. 31.

Returning to Washington after a trip to South Vietnam and a conversation with Diem,

Kattenburg decided that "Diem's situation was desperate and that the masses, at least in the cities, but probably also in the countryside, desired a change and an end to the war," and also that "our [American] leadership...was almost entirely uncomprehending ofthe nature ofthe struggle in Vietnam and particularly ofthe enormous sociopolitical pulling power that the Viet Cong adversary possessed....,,119 Pulled into a top-level meeting by

Hilsman, Kattenburg voiced his opinion that the U.S. should consider "withdraw[ing] in a dignified way." The Ngos had done irreparable political damage to an already weak and fragile cause, Kattenburg argued. Rusk and Lyndon Johnson brutally shot him down, the former calling his comments "speculation," and the latter arguing, "Certainly we can't pull OUt.,,120

Mecklin and Kattenburg, despite their opposing prescriptions, agreed on the assumption that the problems ofthe American commitment to South Vietnam cut deeper than the nature ofthe particular regime in power. As a step taken on its own, supporting

118 Mecklin to Murrow, Sept. 10, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 150. 119 Kattenburg, pps. 119-120. 120 MemCon, Aug. 31,1963, FRUS, IV, pps. 73-74.

166 Mark Hobel. Chapter N. Showdown in Saigon and Washington, D.C. an ARVN coup against Ngo Dinh Diem did little to resolve the underlying problems plaguing the US.-GVN relationship.

Hilsman, however, adhered to the Kennedy Administration policy on South

Vietnam that had crystallized in 1961 but had its roots in the 1950s. US. assistance could help the people and government ofSouth Vietnam triumph over communist insurgency.

But the GVN was never exclusively one side in an ongoing civil war. It also represented, to American officials, a bulwark in the defenses against worldwide communism. Many

Americans, including Roger Hilsman, saw the Diem regime as less a sovereign entity

than an instrument ofpolicy, both for the people ofSouth Vietnam and the people ofthe

United States. With that in mind, the U.S. assistance that supported South Vietnam's

continued political survival carried strings attached: the GVN had to refrain from policies

that US. officials believed detrimental to the joint war effort. During the Buddhist Crisis,

Ngo Dinh Diem reached a tipping point with Hilsman, and soon thereafter with Kennedy.

Ifits governance threatened the future ofSouth Vietnam by alienating its citizens, then a

new regime might emerge to renew the alliance. The policy ofsupporting an ARVN coup

thus followed logically from the nature ofthe American commitment to South Vietnam

in 1961, and completed the Kennedy Administration's, Roger Hilsman's, and America's

torturous alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem.

167 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

Conclusion

On Aug. 19, 1963, in a personal letter to President Kennedy, Sen. Mike Mansfield argued in even clearer terms than he had the year before that the present American commitment to South Vietnam had been profoundly overvalued. Mansfield mentioned his knowledge ofcoup rumors in Saigon, and ofthe question ofAmerican support:

"Indeed, reports in the press suggest that this is now the subject ofintense discussion among the agency-technicians." The Senator, however, dismissed the issue ofthe Diem regime's survival as "the secondary or tactical question."

What mattered far more to Mansfield was the "fundamental" question: "Is South

Viet Nam as important to us as the premise on which we are now operating indicates? Is it really as important to us as it is to the Vietnamese themselves?" Ifthe outcome ofthe war in South Vietnam mattered as deeply to the Kennedy Administration as it did to the

South Vietnamese, then "we are stuck with it and must stay with it whatever it may take in the end in the way ofAmerican lives and money and time to hold South Viet Nam."

That seemed to be the premise upon which American officials were operating, Mansfield argued, and the situation's inherent logic therefore led to a massive American effort in

South Vietnam, especially ifthe South Vietnamese began to waver on the struggle. The

American commitment, and its accompanying rhetoric had cast the Republic ofSouth

Vietnam not as a party to a civil war but as a critical Cold War bastion. Mansfield counseled Kennedy to rethink this classification and its potentially grave consequences.

168 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

He warned: "To be sure it is desirable thatSouth Viet Nam remain free of

Commmlism but it is also desirable that we do not spend countless American lives and billions ofdollars to maintain an illusion offreedom in a devastated South Vietnam."]

IfMansfield was prophetic in predicting the consequences ofthe steadily escalating American commitment to South Vietnam, then he was also astute in labeling what Roger Hilsman and the Kennedy Administration sought to defend there. The

Kennedy commitment was not a cynical but straightforward show ofsupport for a dictator who boasted anti-communist credentials. Roger Hilsman certainly viewed the war as an opportlli1ity to deliver economic and political progress to the people ofSouth

Vietnam. His "Strategic Concept" served as a blueprint for the modernization ofthe

South Vietnamese countryside. During the Buddhist Crisis, Hilsman turned decisively against the repressive and autocratic policies ofthe Ngos, which he believed posed a dire threat to the war effort.

The war, however, stood as the fundamental pillar ofthe Kennedy

Administration's commitment to South Vietnam, as it had the Eisenhower

Administration's, and as it would the Johnson Administration's. At the core ofthe

American commitment stood the defense of"an illusion offreedom." In 1961, Kennedy,

Hilsman, and other American officials had sought to prove that American assistance could save South Vietnam and change the lives ofits citizens for the better. The U.S. would not abandon South Vietnam to the ravages ofcommunism. Nor would it send in combat troops and take over the war effort in the imperialist manner ofthe French.

Finally, it would resist paternalism and refrain from pressuring the GVN for political reform. The strategy had been one of extensive assistance and quiet persuasion.

1 Mansfield to Kennedy, FRUS, III, pps. 585-588.

169 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

Roger Hilsman had sought better government and greater economic opportunity for the people ofSouth Vietnam. He had been disturbed by Nhu's implementation of strategic hamlets, which seemed to function more as an instrument ofGVN control than for economic and political modernization in the countryside. He had chosen to confront the Diem regime, rather than placate it, over its repressive policies during the Buddhist

Crisis. Beneath these decisions, however, stood a cold calculation about the political nature ofthe war and what measures were necessary to win. So long as policies conducive to the political freedom ofthe people ofSouth Vietnam helped the war effort,

Hilsman supported them and fought for them. Ifthe policies seemed to threaten ultimate victory, then he, and the rest ofthe Kennedy Administration, would oppose them. His commitment to South Vietnamese political freedom was instrumental, and in the end su,bordinate to the pressures ofconducting a war to defend anti-communism in Vietnam.

Mansfield was right to argue that what the U.S. supported, and would later officially send troops to fight for, was merely "an illusion of freedom in a devastated

South Vietnam." There is no better illustration ofthe underlying logic that fueled the

American commitment than the conduct ofU.S. officials, including Hilsman, in the tumultuous weeks after the coup.

The author of a recent account ofthe coup against Diem has written that his

interest in the subject was piqued by an encounter in 1972 with a Vietnamese graduate

student. The student, asked his opinion ofthe "American engagement in his country,"

replied, "It was fine until you killed our president.,,2

In early Nov. 1963, precious few South Vietnamese would have echoed that

sentiment. The fall ofDiem brought on a wild celebration in the streets ofSaigon.

2 Winters, Francis. The Year ofthe Hare. Athens, Ga.: University ofGeorgia Press, 1997, p. vii.

170 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

Citizens who had wondered why the U.S. had continued to support the cruel and repressive rule ofDiem and Nhu now applauded their American benefactors and the

ARVN generals who had delivered them from the GVN. Henry Cabot Lodge basked in the glow ofthis temporary adoration. He cabled the State Department on Nov. 2:

"Believe the very great popularity ofthis coup should be stressed. Every Vietnamese has a grin on his face today.... When I drove to the office with a very small US flag flying, there were bursts of applause from the sidewalk, people shaking hands and waving.,,3

Both observations share a common theme: the South Vietnamese believed the

U.S. principally responsible for the toppling oftheir President and the instatement ofthe

ARVN generals' Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). That had been precisely the outcome Kennedy and his top advisors had wished to avoid. During a conference on Nov.

1, at a moment when American officials in Washington believed the coup's success to be near inevitable, Dean Rusk voiced his own major concern:

A current problem is how to overcome press speculation with respect to U.S. involvement in the coup. It can truthfully be said that the U.S. was not privy to this coup planning, which had been planned and carried out by Vietnamese. Americans were not involved in the planning nor were any Americans involved in the fighting. We had been receiving reports ofcoups for many months. 4

Kennedy and Rusk both wondered how to square official recognition for the MRC with American non-recognition ofmilitary regimes that had taken power in recent coups

in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. In a Nov. 4 State Department circular, top

officials including Rusk, Harriman, and Hilsman, as well as McGeorge Bundy at the

White House, argued that the difference was based on democratic principles underlying

American foreign policy: "The military takeover [in South Vietnam] appears to be a first

3 Embassy to State, FRUS, IV, p. 526. 4 MemCon with President, Nov. 1, 1963, DDRS.

171 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. step forward to representative govemment rather than away from it." They also, at the very end ofthe message, pointed to grim necessity as a major determinant ofrecognition.

It was difficult to apply certain general principles ofAmerican diplomacy to South

Vietnam, because of"the deep involvement USG in supporting Viet-Nam in its fight against the Viet Cong (approx. 16,500 US military personnel physically in Viet-Nam)."s

Given the generals' future attitude towards democracy and representative govemment in

South Vietnam, and U.S. acquiescence in continued military rule, the second justification surely held more truth than the first.

In the immediate aftermath ofthe coup, American and other Westem officials in

Saigon responded to the surprisingly smooth take-over by the generals and the enthusiasm in the streets with a series ofoptimistic reports and assessments. The ubiquitous Robert Thompson told Lodge, "Ifthe generals stay together, the coup should help very much to win the war.,,6 Lodge, after a meeting with Generals Don and "Big"

Minh, boasted in a cable to the State Department that the coup could lead to a "drastically shortened" war: "One observer, watching the performance ofthe ARVN, said ifthese men can perform like this when their hearts are in it, why isn't it reasonable to believe that they can do equally well against the Viet Cong.,,7

Lodge's questionable logic, comparing a power grab from a hopelessly unpopular regime to the bloody and slow counterinsurgency campaign against a very popular guerilla force, ignored the history ofAmerican involvement in the Vietnamese conflict; most anti-communist South Vietnamese seemed to have a far greater predilection for

Saigon political intrigue than for the necessary task ofbuilding a stable and appealing

5 State Department circular, Nov. 4, 1963, JFK.L NSF B201. 6 Embassy to State, Nov. 3, 1963, JFK.L NSF B201. 7 Embassy to State, Nov. 4, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 562.

172 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. political order in the countryside. However, American officials including Hilsman responded to Lodge in virtually the same terms: "We feel that generals committed to vigorous prosecution ofwar and will re-energize struggle not only in military but in civilian aspects."s

Before the coup, American officials had known little ofthe actual political intentions ofthe plotting generals. They had subsisted mostly on collected, speculative intelligence on the personalities ofthe key generals thought to be involved, as well as

Gen. Don's vague statements that ARVN had no desire to rule, but rather wished to turn power over to civilians quickly and return to the countryside to prosecute the war. In the weeks following the fall ofDiem, administration officials began to learn facts that challenged their hopes for a popular, representative civilian government of South

Vietnam. Gen. Ton That Dinh, one ofthe more outspoken generals, his ambitions already a source ofworry for his peers, held a press conference on Nov. 8 demanding "unity and the support of all to the Military Revolutionary Council.,,9 Gen. "Big" Minh, the MRC's leader, made it clear to a French newspaper on Nov. 12 that the military would rule South

Vietnam for a long time: "Let us be serious. The former regime destroyed all political life. There is not even a real party." Tellingly, Forrestal called Minh's interview "pretty good stuff," and told Bundy that the general appeared "politically sophisticated."lo

In The Irony ofVietnam: The System Worked, Gelb and Betts describe Hilsman,

Forrestal, Harriman, and officials who shared their views on the war as political hawks in the administration's "two-dimensional hawks versus doves division." That is, they were

"comparatively dovish," on the advisability ofincreased American military involvement

8 State to Embassy, Nov. 4, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 565. 9 Embassy to State, Nov. 8, 1963, JFKL NSF B202. 10 Forresta1 to Bundy with attached article, Nov. 12,1963, JFKOF, Vietnam Genera11963, B128a.

173 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. in South Vietnam, and "hawkish in [their] recommendations for twisting Diem's arm and manipulating South Vietnamese political forces." Hilsman was a hawk in that he supported a robust American commitment to the defense of anti-communist South

Vietnam; he was a "political hawk" in his conviction that political support for the Saigon government mattered far more than military firepower in defeating the NLF. Gelb and

Betts write that officials like Hilsman "were right in that the fundamental problems in the

South Vietnamese war effort were political and sociological. But until late 1963 they had as many illusions about the U.S. capacity to mold the situation politically as the military had about the U.S. capacity to produce a winning team on the battlefield."]]

Gelb and Betts' analysis may be taken a step farther. Forrestal's comments lend credence to the notion that Hilsman, Harriman and Forrestal's efforts to "manipulate

South Vietnamese political forces" stopped on the doorstep ofthe coup. Their nerve left them, and their vision ofpolitical war proved remarkably limited. In a Sept. 19 meeting, former President Eisenhower and CIA director John McCone had cursed the "in our image" advisors: the "liberals in [Kennedy's] government who want to reform every country.,,12 As it turned out, Hilsman, Harriman, and Forrestal did not fit this description

after their initially bold moves to encourage the toppling ofDiem and Nhu. They cared

little for political reform once Diem no longer mled in Saigon. In the wake ofthe coup,

the political situation in South Vietnam was dangerous and fluid, fraught with both peril

and opportunity for American officials. Inspired "political hawks" might have seized the

moment to push the generals towards handing over power to civilians and instituting

reforms aimed at representative government. Hilsman and his allies, however, lacked the

I J Ge1b and Betts, pps. 81, 85. 12 MemCon, Eisenhower and McCone, Sept. 19, 1963, DDRS.

174 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. stomach for that fight, allowed themselves to believe that the MRC was an adequate short-term replacement for the GVN, and as their military colleagues had before the coup, favored stability in Saigon over reform.

Several years after the fact, in To Move a Nation, Hilsman sought to justify the coup, and the revolving door ofmilitary leaders that followed it, by claiming that he had foreseen that result from the beginning. He wrote, however, that with Nhu in power

South Vietnam stood no chance. In time, and with enough coups, South Vietnam's military might cough up a suitable leader: "The picture was not a happy one. There might well be a series ofcoups, and the political turmoil in Saigon would inevitably hurt the war effort. The best that could be hoped for ifthe Diem regime was removed would be that, like Egypt, Vietnam would find her Nasser the second time around - or the third­ or the fourth.,,13 The passage reveals, and also conceals, much about Hilsman's views at the time. As the passage suggests, Hilsman did not worry that the coup would usher in a period ofmilitary rule; in fact, he believed that a popular, nationalist general represented the best hope for future leadership ofSouth Vietnam. However, ifhe did believe that the coup represented a means to an end, rather than an end in and ofitself, then why did he not urge that, in the aftermath ofthe coup, the MRC be pushed harder to enact the reforms ofwhich the generals spoke? IfAmerican pressure weakened the MRC, the result might have been chaos and further coups; but those further coups, in this hypothetical, might have eventually produced the Nasser South Vietnam needed.

Alternatively, given Hilsman's previous beliefin the beneficial effects ofAmerican pressure on the GVN, American officials might have gained the reforms they desired

13 Hilsman, p. 486.

175 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. from the GVN, paving the way towards representative government and popular leadership.

Hilsman, however, seemed to lose interest in the internal politics ofSouth

Vietnam after the coup. He had a misplaced faith that the MRC would not follow in the footsteps ofthe Diem regime, imitating the GVN's alienating pattern ofpolicies. A Nov.

15 State Department document prepared in the Southeast Asia section ofHilsman's

Bureau ofFar Eastern Affairs displays the dilemma Department officials felt they had on their hands:

The Council has implied an early move towards an open political system, with references to freedom ofspeech, press, political activity, and elections at a comparatively early date. In an open political system neutralist and perhaps even crypto-Communist groups might be freer to operate. A refusal by the generals to move towards the more or less open political system they have promised, however, would intensify opposition to the new regime, would require the re-institution of instruments ofrepression, and might seriously weaken the struggle against the Communists. 14

Confronting the generals and pressuring for the quick opening ofthe political system carried heavy attendant risks: there was no guaranteeing who would win popular support and take control ofthe South Vietnamese government. Instead, officials chose to accept the MRC's excuses that political reform would have to wait, and in so doing virtually ensured further steady political disintegration in South Vietnam.

The tests came quickly. Before the coup, the generals had indicated that they would move rapidly to open the government to broad civilian participation. Afterwards, with rival generals obviously jockeying for power, the MRC quickly reneged on its promises. Two weeks after the coup, the MRC announced the formation ofthe "Council ofSages," officially an advisory body for the MRC but quite obviously a holding tank for

14 "Review ofthe Political Situation in South Vietnam," State Dept. Paper, Nov. 15, 1963, JFKL NSF B204.

176 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. the various political, professional and religious leaders interested in taking part in the new government. The MRC quite simply did not know what to do with them, so it formed a nebulous group "for the sorting out and realignment oflong dormant political forces into new groupings reasonably in tune with the realities ofthe situation.,,]5 The plan seemed destined to perform two valuable functions for the MRC: it assured that no politically prominent civilian would gain real power anytime soon, and it kept track ofpossible oppositionists.

American officials recognized the political backsliding, and chose to prioritize a modicum oftemporary stability. On Nov. 20, at a Secretary ofDefense's Conference in

Honolulu, Lodge gave a "hopeful" prognosis, talking up the MRC to Washington officials. To the ambassador's discredit, Lodge proved even less interested in political reform than the MRC. He

doubted the wisdom ofthe U.S. making sweeping demands for democratization or for early elections at this time. He believed that in Vietnam the technique ofchanging governments by violent means is not yet ready to be displaced in favor ofchanging governments by election. He emphasized that if we can get through the next six months without a serious falling out among the Generals we will be lucky. 16

Several days later, Lodge met with Hilsman in Washington. The Assistant Secretary did not comment on Lodge's recommendation that the Embassy refrain from pushing "the military committee around on specific issues, but let them develop in their own way, at least until they had worked out a method ofoperating and their internal relationships.,,]7

There were extenuating circumstances, to be sure; but Hilsman showed remarkable, and misadvised, deference to the ambassador.

15 CIA Weekly Intelligence Highlights, Nov. 16, 1963, DDRS. 16 Memorandum ofDiscussion, Nov. 20, 1963, FRUS, IV, pps. 608-609. 17 MemCon, Hilsman and Lodge, Nov. 24, 1963, FRUs IV, p. 633.

177 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 23, 1963, three weeks after the fall ofDiem. Bundy had requested a new National Security Action Memorandum after the Nov. 20 Honolulu Conference, reaffirming the American commitment to South

Vietnam. After Kennedy's assassination, Bundy remained Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs, but presented NSAM 273 to a new President. NSAM 273 had little to say about the political dimensions ofthe struggle for South Vietnam; its innovative thrust was a call for increased covert action against North Vietnam. Hilsman, on Nov. 23, responded lamely to Bundy's request for his appraisal ofthe document. NSAM 273, he told Bundy, was "fine.,,18

Indeed, as new governments in Saigon and the United States set offdown the road towards the full-blown Americanization ofthe Vietnam War, Hilsman seemed to shrink in stature. In a way, he seemed to revert, and began recycling his vision from early 1962 when events in South Vietnam had long since outpaced the "Strategic Concept." To an

MRC emissary in Washington for Kennedy's funeral, Hilsman had little to say. To win the political war against the NLF, he "urged continued stress on modified, improved strategic hamlet program by new government, thereby avoiding danger ofslipping into purely conventional warfare approach in dealing with VC.,,19

Ifthe strategic hamlet program represented the last, best hope for the political side ofthe war, then by December all was lost. On Nov. 5, a CIA intelligence officer reported that generals in the MRC had begun to battle over control ofAmerican counterinsurgency funds used to support the strategic hamlet program.2° American officials failed to anticipate what would happen to the program ifthe program's funding became part ofthe

18 NSAM 273 and footnote, Nov. 26, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 637. 19 State to Embassy, Nov. 27, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 642. 20 CIA Information Report, Nov. 5, 1963, DDRS.

178 Mark HobeL Conclusion. spoils ofthe coup squabbled over by rival generals. On Dec. 20, Lodge passed to

McNamara a report "by an intelligent American who recently visited Long An and doesn't want to sign his name." The official wrote that in the strategically crucial province ofLong An, the strategic hamlet program lay in shambles: "Ofthe 219 hamlets previously reported as completed (with some 50 more supposedly in advanced stages of construction), no more than 35 now are considered to be capable ofachieving the purpose for which built - that is, ofseparating the people from the Viet Cong while providing them both security and an opportunity for social and economic development."

The report did not make clear whether the revelation ofthe program's impending collapse had more to do with phony statistics passed on by the GVN before the coup, or neglect in its wake.21 It is safe to say, however, that strategic hamlets faltered under Diem and Nhu, and died under the MRC.

McNamara and a team ofAmerican officials traveled to Saigon in late Dec. 1963 and brought back grim news ofthe course ofthe war against the NLF, echoing the painful assessment ofstrategic hamlets in Long An. Saigon was beset by a combination ofpolitical intrigue and governmental stagnation. In the countryside, the NLF had posted dramatic gains in recent months. The solution, Gen. "Brute" Krulak wrote for the team, was to forge ahead. American officials had to refocus the MRC on the crucial task of prosecuting the war and inspire them to victory through increased American support. At the same time, the NLF and its patrons had to be notified that "their success is a transitory thing," and that the MRC and the U.S. "are both resolute." He recommended that the U.S. begin considering "direct pressures which might be focused upon North Vietnam, in terms of actions ofescalating intensity, ranging from minor propaganda moves to

21 "Report on the Situation in Long An Province," Dec. 20, 1963, FRUS, IV, pps. 714-715.

179 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. destruction ofmajor resources by raid or bombing." Escalation against North Vietnam, the report implied, might be the best step towards the redemption ofthe anti-communist cause in South Vietnam. 22 McNamara wrote to Pres. Lyndon Johnson that the U.S. should "watch the situation very carefully, running scared, hoping for the best, but preparingfor moreforceful moves ifthe situation does not show early signs of improvement. ,,23

As the war effort in South Vietnam began to collapse, Hilsman's career in government took on a similar trajectory. In The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam writes, "Roger Hilsman had been a marked man from the day ofthe Kennedy assassination." Halberstam is correct that Hilsman had been fearless in challenging

McNamara and the military in their estimates and strategies.24 He had bequeathed to Tom

Hughes, his successor at INR, the same predilection for State Department interference in what seemed to be military matters, a strategy that madeDean Rusk uncomfortable.25 He had protected, cultivated and supported Vietnam experts in the State Department like

Joseph Mendeij.hall and Paul Kattenburg, who had directly contradicted the views oftop military and Defense Department officials in meetings ofKennedy's principal advisors.

Johnson seemed to distrust instinctively Hilsman's manner, particularly his lack ofdeference to generals, while Kennedy had valued him partially for the same reasons.

Hilsman, in To Move a Nation, insisted that he had resigned on the grounds that he opposed the direction Johnson appeared to be taking: "...his natural instinct was toward attempting a military solution to the question ofVietnam, although hedging it with

22 Krolak's Report on SecDefs visit, Dec. 21, 1963, FRUS, IV, pps. 721-727. 23 McNamara to President, Dec. 21, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 735. Italics added. 24 Halberstam, p. 374. 25 Hughes, Thomas 1. "Experiencing McNamara." Foreign Policy 5 (1995).

180 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. political qualifications.,,26 Halberstam, on the other hand, writes that Hilsman did not make "a personal decision;,,27 rather, Johnson forced Hilsman out ofthe new

28 administration. Indeed, Johnson made clear at the very beginning ofhis sudden

Presidency that he believed Hilsman had been dead wrong about Vietnam and Ngo Dinh

Diem. In a meeting with his top advisors on Nov. 24, Johnson stated that,

He was not at all sure we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime.... He wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs ofa foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms. 29

Hilsman, in other words, had spurred on a course that the new President believed had been foolish. His emphasis on the political dimensions ofthe conflict, and his advocacy ofpolitical reform in South Vietnam, which since the coup had actually, and unfortunately, receded, did not resonate with Johnson. Johnson, however, did not have to fire Hilsman personally. His words to the Secretary ofState gave Rusk and George Ball the courage to take a step they had been contemplating for some time.

In a 1971 Oral History for the Johnson Presidential Library, George Ball gloried in the memory ofHilsman's dismissal:

I fired Roger Hilsman, with the full approval ofMr. Rusk. He had become very difficult. He was so full ofhis omniscience with regard to Vietnam, and he was lecturing the generals on strategy. He became rather a nuisance. So we got rid ofhim.... I can tell you another story...And that is that Dean Rusk once said to me later, "You fired Roger Hilsman, but would you do a great favor for me?" I said, "What's that?" He said, "Would you let me say that I fired him.?,,30

-76 H'l1 sman, p. 535. 27 Ibid., p. 534. 28 Halberstam, p. 374. 29 Memorandum for the Record, Nov. 24, 1963, FRUS, IV, p. 636. 30 Transcript, George Ball Oral History Interview I, 7/8/71, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.

181 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

In the end, the top officials in Hilsman's own State Department finished him off.

Rusk and Ball's instincts on South Vietnam had been cautious, but Rusk especially had been deferential to McNamara and the Defense Department. In those circumstances,

Hilsman, with the encouragement ofForrestal, Harriman, and more subtly President

Kennedy, had sought to take the lead in making the State Department a competing voice in Vietnam policy. He had circumvented his superiors when necessary, contacting

Forrestal at the White House, or even Kennedy himself, to advance his own policy prescriptions. With his support network falling apart in the wake ofthe Kennedy

assassination, he found himselfsurrounded by bureaucratic enemies in late 1963 and

early 1964.

Ball may have gloated; but he and Rusk did Roger Hilsman a favor. Contrary to

Halberstam's description ofHilsman at the dawn ofthe Johnson Administration,3] the

Assistant Secretary seemed deflated and out ofideas after the fall ofDiem. He did not

push for political reform in Saigon as rival MRC generals moved to consolidate their

grasps ofthe levers ofpower. He did not protest NSAM 273, which made raids on North

Vietnam and the escalation ofthe war a greater possibility. He seemed tired, spent,

complacent, repeating his mantras about the overriding political dimensions ofthe war

while in Saigon a representative government with real popular appeal became an entirely

remote fantasy. In short, Hilsman stood little chance, and showed little inclination to

shape the course ofpolicy after the coup, though policy was then shaped in a climate that

he had helped to create. Exiting the Jolmson Administration in early 1964 meant he was

31 Ifhe hadn't been fIred, Hilsman, who "gloried in bureaucratic infIghting, would have been quite willing to weigh in" on the escalation debates of 1964. Halberstarn, p. 374.

182 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

not implicated in the events ofthe next year and the escalation and Americanization of

the Vietnam War.

In the historical literature on the escalation ofthe Vietnam War, Roger Hilsman

plays a mostly peripheral role, as Kennedy and Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, the Bundy

brothers, Walt Rostow and a host ofother important figures take center stage. He has

been unfairly neglected. Both for what he did and what he represented, Hilsman was a

critical figure in the Americanization ofthe Vietnam War, and in his successes and

failures illuminated the extraordinary contradictions underlying the American

commitment to South Vietnam as it evolved under three Presidents, and especially John

F. Kennedy.

U.S. support for South Vietnam was predicated on the existence ofa government

in Saigon that could fight the NLF effectively. Yet the struggle for South Vietnam had an

extraordinarily important political component. U.S. firepower and military advisors could

help ARVN hold offthe NLF in the countryside, but victory depended on the political

legitimacy and support ofthe GVN. Hilsman and Kennedy recognized the predominance

ofthe war's political aspects, as did Diem and Nhu in Saigon. The contradiction,

however, was that these views became increasingly antagonistic and divergent. The

Kennedy Administration thus had two options: it could cut its commitments to South

Vietnam in light ofthe unfavorable political situation, or it could seek more aggressive

political imoads into South Vietnamese politics to try to reverse the destructive course of

the Diem regime. Hilsman had no qualms about pushing for the latter course.

Kennedy's Vietnam policy translated into a steadily escalating commitment of aid

and advisors, and an attendant increased public profile ofAmerican support for anti-

183 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. communist South Vietnam. In early Sept. 1963, Kennedy had articulated the breadth of his policy. It fit somewhere in the thin space that could accommodate and render truthful two statements: "in the final estimation, it is their war," and "whatever helps the war, we support; whatever hurts the war, we oppose." Ifa contradiction existed, then Kennedy saw it resolved by American support for the ARVN coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, much as thousands ofAmerican military advisors and a flood ofequipment were consistent with a South Vietnamese war so long as ARYl\[ troops actually pulled the triggers.

Kennedy inherited a contradictory and terminally flawed policy from Eisenhower: the U.S. had to support anti-communism in South Vietnam, but the South Vietnamese had to bear the chiefburden for the U.S. He proceeded to renew and broaden the commitment, in men, material, and public protlIe, although he could never shake an underlying fatalism about the project. His advisors amplified the basic contradictions in the heart ofthe policy with recommendations that failed to address the core problems of

South Vietnam.

Roger Hilsman had grasped the fundamental underlying truth ofthe Vietnamese conflict. He understood, and defended aggressively, the political nature ofthe struggle, as opposed to its military dimensions. The "Strategic Concept" had forced administration officials to respect that distinction. Strategic hamlets were sound in theory, and provided an intelligent mechanism for separating the peasantry from the NLF guerillas and building a bond ofloyalty between the villagers ofSouth Vietnam and the government in

Saigon. American funds were far more constmctively allocated to Rufus Phillips's Rural

Development office than to the hangars ofFarmgate. Over the course of 1962, as

Hilsman became disturbed by the implementation ofstrategic hamlets, he spoke out and

184 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. pushed for greater American involvement in the program and in civic administration in general.

There was a disturbing and crucial fact, however, that haunted Hilsman's plans and ensured that they would never be successful. Hilsman and other counterinsurgency strategists tended to think ofSouth Vietnam as just another country on the front lines of the Cold War, like the and Malaysia, threatened by "wars ofnational liberation." Since its creation in 1954, South Vietnam had always been in some sense an artificial construction. The descendants ofthe Viet Minh monopolized political positions that held popular appeal and helped confer legitimacy: land reform, nationalism, an end to the near constant state ofwar in Vietnam. By contrast, on a political level, Ngo Dinh

Diem and the GVN had little to offer to Vietnamese, save Catholics and those who had worked for the French during colonial rule and feared retribution for their collaboration.

The GVN, and South Vietnam, survived because ofthe peculiar global dynamics ofthe Cold War. Neil Sheehan, in A Bright Shining Lie, recalls the words ofa British correspondent in Saigon in 1962: "The plincipal export ofthis country.. .is anti­

Communism.,,32 The United States could be counted on to bail the GVN out, because the survival of South Vietnam seemed almost as important to American officials as it did to their South Vietnamese counterparts.

Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, believing that the survival oftheir country rested on their own determined rule, and knowing that the voluntary empowerment of any rivals, military or civilian, was tantamount to suicide, behaved according to the logic of

South Vietnam. They understood that the United States lacked leverage, so long as no viable anti-communist alternative to their rule existed, to bend the Ngos to their wishes.

32 Sheehan, p. 123.

185 Mark Hobel. Conclusion.

They feared political refonn, a broadening ofthe political base, and the stre, nlining of

ARVN's chain ofcommand more than they ft~ared any type ofthreat the U.S. might issue. When, in 1961, Kennedy instructed Nolting to follow a policy ofpersuasion and build trust with Diem, Diem and Nhu became even more flagrant in their contempt for refonn suggestions.

For Hilsman, the artificial solution to the political problems ofartificial South

Vietnam boiled down to the same logic that drove Defense Department officials: send more Americans. An unpopular leader ruled in Saigon; Diem was naturally inclined towards unpopular and repressive policies, and Nhu's influence made Diem's autocratic tendencies even more pronounced. The solution for Hilsman, and it animated his thinking during 1962 and 1963, was that more Americans working with South Vietnamese administrators at the local level could circumvent the mess at the top and win the war in spite ofDiem and Nhu. But the nationalist Ngos, understanding Hilsman's logic well, stood adamantly opposed to an extension ofAmerican influence over the strategic hamlet program, and subsequently, the resumption ofAmerican pressure for political refonn immediately before the Buddhist Crisis. That crisis exacerbated the trends in the U.S.­

GVN diplomatic relationship, now under the day-to-day control ofRoger Hilsman, leading to violent confrontation.

The Americanization ofthe Vietnam 'War cannot be contemplated in its military dimensions alone. In late 1963, with the fall ofDiem, Hi1sman and his allies helped bring about the political take-over ofthe war effort by the U.S. There is little question that they were right about Diem and Nhu. With Nhu's influence growing, the GVN stood no

chance ofwinning the hearts and minds ofthe people ofSouth Vietnam. It was

186 Mark Hobel. Conclusion. extraordinary, however, that Roger Hilsman believed that a group ofARVN generals, taking their marching orders from the U.S. ambassador, could do better. Suddenly, not

Ngo Dinh Diem, not the MRC, and certainly not the people ofSouth Vietnam possessed control over the country's political destiny. The burden ofdefending "an illusion of freedom" had passed, fatally, to the United States

187 Bibliography

Primary Sources

Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1961-·1963. Vols. 1-4. Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988-1991.

Document Collection ofProfessor James McAllister, including United States government documents from:

• National Security File, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library • History Back-up File, William Westmoreland Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library • Declassified Documents Reference System • United States Department ofState Decimal Files

Secondary Sources

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Basset, Lawrence J. and Stephen E. Pelz. "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics ofWar", in Kennedy's Questfor Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961­ 1963, ed. by Thomas G. Paterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Bird, Kai. The Color ofTruth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.

Blair, Anne. Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995.

Catton, Philip E. Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press ofKansas, 2002.

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Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003.

Duiker, William J. Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York: Hyperion, 2000.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88 th Congress, May 8,9, 13, 14, 1963, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies ofContainment: A Critical Appraisal ofPostvvar American National Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Gelb, Leslie H. and Richard K. Betts. The Irony ofVietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979.

Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1969.

Hallin, Daniel C. The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Hilsman, Roger. "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic", in Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerilla Jvlovements, 1941-1961, ed. by Franklin Mark Osanka. New York: The Free Press ofGlencoe, 1962.

___. To Move a Nation: The Politics ofForeign Policy in the Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967.

Hughes, Thomas L. "Experiencing McNamara." Foreign Policy 5 (1995).

Jones, Howard. Death ofa Generation: How the Assassinations ofDiem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Kaiser, David. American Tragedy. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 2000.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: The Viking Press, 1983.

Kattenburg, Paul. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1975. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980.

Latham, Michael. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 'Nation Building' in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill, NC: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2000.

Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation ofWar in Vietnam. Berkeley, Ca.: University ofCalifornia Press, 1999.

McAllister, James. "The Lost Revolution: Edward Lansdale and the American Defeat in Vietnam 1964-1968". Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No.2 (Summer 2003). McNamara, Robert, James Blight, Robert Brigham, Thomas Biersteker and Col. Herbert Schandler. Argument without End: In Search ofAnswers to the Vietnam Tragedy. New York: Public Affairs, 1999.

_____, with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995.

Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965.

The Military History Institute ofVietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History ofthe People's Army ofVietnam, 1954-1975. Translated by Mede L. Pribbenow. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press ofKansas, 2002.

Nolting, Frederick. From Trust to Tragedy. New York: Praeger, 1988.

Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques ofthe National Liberation Front ofSouth Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.LT. Press, 1966.

Prochnau, William. Once Upon a Distant War: Young War Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Times Books, 1995.

Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. Berkeley, Ca.: University ofCalifornia Press, 1972.

Reeves, Richard. President Kennedy: Profile ofPower. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972.

Transcript, George Ball Oral History Interview I, 7/8/71, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.

Winters, Francis. The Year ofthe Hare. Athens, Ga.: University ofGeorgia Press, 1997. Acknowledgements

First and foremost, thank you to Professor James McAllister, who has been a constant source ofsupport and inspiration for this project, and a great advisor. His government document collections were an invaluable resource, and I hope I put them to good use. Trust me, Prof. McAllister; I guarded those binders with my life. I am grateful for your advice at all stages, from begilming to end, and I hope that I have done Roger Hilsman justice.

Thanks also to my readers, Professor George Marcus and Professor Eiko Maruko. Their suggestions were enormously helpful in refining my final argument and sharpening my analysis.

The men (and woman) of the political science thesis seminar deserve special thanks as well. I'll remember fondly that by the second semester our classes had begun to resemble addiction support meetings: the denizens strung out and fidgeting, looking around with guilty glances as another deadline passed with nothing turned in. Thanks to the Sheriff, Professor James Mahon, who had the thankless job ofenforcing those deadlines, and who, in all seriousness, is one ofthe nicest professors I have known here; and ofcourse to my compadnis.

On a more personal note, I have incurred a series ofdebts, some obvious and some not so obvious, in the conception, research, writing, and completion ofthis project.

Liz, I've said this before, but I'll say it again so you know I really mean it: I couldn't have made it through this without you. Thank you for everything.

To the friends who have kept me on the straight and narrow this year, helped me stay sane, and all have bright futures to look forward to: "Thanks" doesn't nearly do the trick.

To the Oxford group: Thank you for the memories, and for lighting the way.

To Martin Marks, my first mentor in the study ofhistory: This thesis owes a lot to your example. I sincerely hope you will read it, and let me know what you think.

To John Yang: Thank: you for being a role model and a friend.

Finally, to my family: You've been there with love and support, and a kick in the butt when I needed it, at all times and in all places. This thesis is dedicated to you.