Imperial Camelot: John F. Kennedy and the Advisory Effort for Regime Change in South

Vietnam, 1962-1963

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Millersville University of Pennsylvania

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

By Shane M. Marino © 2018 Shane M. Marino May 2018

This Thesis for the Master of Arts Degree by

Shane Michael Marino

has been approved on behalf of the

Graduate School by

Thesis Committee:

Dr. John M, McLarnon III (Signature on file) Research Advisor

Dr. Tracey Weis (Signature on file) Committee Member

Dr. Abam B. Lawrence (Signature on file) Committee Member

May 10, 2018

Date

ii

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

IMPERIAL CAMELOT: JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE ADIVSORY EFFORT FOR REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1962-1963

By

Shane M. Marino

Millersville University, 2018

Millersville, Pennsylvania

Directed by Dr. John McLarnon

This thesis uses government documents, oral histories, and secondary sources to explore changes in the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policy to determine the factors that contributed to the decision to support a coup d’état in 1963 that overthrew the President of the Republic of Vietnam and subsequently led to his assassination. The thesis specifically looks to connect administrative changes in organization and personnel to changes in policy that ultimately determined the fate of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. In general, this thesis reveals that rejection of military intervention led to the adoption of a kind of political aggression that envisioned covert regime change as an acceptable alternative to the use of combat troops. Ultimately, this thesis raises the question of whether political aggression may, in the end, be just as destructive as military aggression.

Signature of Investigator: ___Shane M. Marino__ Date: __May 10, 2018__

iii Introduction

On the morning of January 28, 1961, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs Walter W. Rostow alerted President John Fitzgerald Kennedy to a report on Vietnam from United States Air Force Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale. After reading the memorandum, Kennedy remarked to Rostow that “This is the worst yet. Ike never briefed me about Vietnam.”1 The president then ordered Rostow to follow up on the report and summon

Lansdale to the White House. This brief exchange at the outset of the Kennedy presidency was instructive of circuitous nature of foreign policy in 1961-63: briefed on an issue by a representative of the National Security Council (NSC), Kennedy then requested that departments of State and Defense work cooperatively on a plan to save South Vietnam from being overrun by

Communist insurgents. That effort, however, would expose incompatibilities in outlooks of the military establishment and foreign service, as well as differences between the president and the men whom he entrusted to faithfully execute his vision for counterinsurgency. When Kennedy found his staff to be highly dysfunctional, he effected changes in organization and personnel that restored the State Department’s authority in foreign policy and ensured that the NSC would adhere to Kennedy’s preference for nonmilitary solutions. Yet, while Kennedy empowered certain elements in the Washington establishment, he failed control their excesses and indiscretions. Vietnam policy in the Kennedy administration testifies to the indispensability of strong executive leadership in crafting workable policies out of bitter controversies. The situation in Vietnam in the early 1960s would surely have tested the mettle of even the most experienced leaders, but Kennedy seemed to be either distant or absent from the policymaking process, creating a situation in which internal politics determined the character of foreign policy. With the

1 president on the sidelines, the various wings of the executive bureaucracy vied for influence

through and endless stream of proposals and counterproposals that simultaneously undermined

the effectiveness of policies that needed to carefully balance the interests of two nations whose

people lived worlds apart from each other. After failures in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia

damaged the reputation of military and intelligence community, the Department of Defense and

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) found themselves playing second fiddle in foreign policy to the NSC and State Department. By 1962, the latter were under the control of ambitious men emboldened by the president’s elevation of them to positions of dominance, creating a dangerous situation in which decisions of high international significance might be undertaken without executive approval. A study of the political and diplomatic history of the Kennedy administration vis a vis its Vietnam policy reveals that the decision to overthrow of the Saigon regime in Vietnam in

November 1963 was a direct product of Kennedy’s administrative style and geopolitical vision.

2 I

Points of Divergence

Two separate yet interrelated aspects of South Vietnam’s security and national

development came to sharply divide Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of the Republic of Vietnam, from his American allies in 1962-63. The first grew out of out a policy dispute that had emerged in 1961 as the central point of contention among both Diem and his allies as well as between

American leadership in the White House, State Department, and military establishment. In the

early fall of 1961, President John F. Kennedy dispatched a fact-finding mission under the

leadership of General Maxwell D. Taylor and Walter W. Rostow, Kennedy’s Deputy Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs. The main purpose of the Taylor-Rostow mission was to

consider, among other things, the advisability of military intervention on Saigon’s behalf.

Various schemes for deployment of combat forces had dominated policy discussions in the

spring and summer, as a wide cross-section of Kennedy’s advisors pressed the need for troops to

secure the Republic of Vietnam and ensure the Diem regime’s viability. Middle and high-level

authorities from the NSC and JCS, as well as the Defense and State departments, incessantly

advocated for an infusion of American military power into South Vietnam, either directly or

indirectly, unilaterally or multilaterally. Kennedy had always exhibited hesitancy to accept his

advisors’ militant prescriptions, and a steady stream of memoranda and position papers written in

support of such measures made the president even more determined to formulate a dynamic

approach to South Vietnam. With that view in mind, Kennedy dispatched an interdepartmental

study group to Saigon in the fall of 1961 for a frontline analysis.2

3 The Taylor-Rostow mission spent a week in Saigon during late October and submitted its

recommendations to Kennedy at the beginning of the following month. What emerged from the negotiations that formalized the mission’s policy as National Security Action Memoranda

(NSAM)-111 was a recurrent disagreement over the character of intervention. Running back to the previous administration, a debilitating degree of discord existed between officials in both

Washington and Saigon over whether to continue aid deliveries to the Republic of Vietnam

(RVN) on an unconditional basis. Although South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, had never enjoyed a truly stable position, a combination of external and internal crises invigorated certain elements in the State Department and intelligence community that believed Diem had to either be forced to reform or removed from power if the RVN was to survive. Over the course of

1959-1961, glaring deficiencies in leadership moved some American officials to seriously question Diem’s ability to unify his people and defeat the Viet Cong.

First, at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Workers’ Party of Viet-Nam (Đảng lao động Việt

Nam) in January 1959, the party’s Central Committee proposed Resolution 15, a revolutionary

policy of reunification that authorized political agitation and the use of military force to liberate

South Vietnam and adjoin it to its northern neighbor. Resumption of an armed struggle

suspended at Geneva in 1954 became official policy when the Central Committee approved

Resolution 15 in May 1959. Subsequently, at the Third National Congress in September 1960,

the party explicitly joined revolution in South Vietnam to the ongoing effort of building

socialism in the North. To lead this struggle, the party elected Lê Duẩn as its first secretary, a

party official who had spearheaded the push for a policy of reunification upon returning from a

secret inspection of South Vietnam the previous year. Finally, in December of 1960, the

Vietnamese Communists established the National Liberation Front (NLF), a secret organization

4 designed as the vehicle for the clandestine prosecution of armed uprising in South Vietnam

aimed at uniting disaffected Vietnamese and toppling the Diem regime. Through this, the

Communists sought to depose Diem and unify the two Vietnams while avoiding an open breach of the Geneva Accords, thus maintaining the perception that the conflict was a civil war. What

followed was a gradually expanding insurgency fueled by the infiltration of guerilla bands into

South Vietnam through neutral Laos. Much of this fighting force was comprised of refugees

from South Vietnam who had escaped to the North during the ceasefire of 1954. Over the course

of 1959-63, tens of thousands crossed the seventeenth parallel, returned to their homelands, and

renewed the war from which they had fled.3

The second factor that damaged faith in Diem’s viability was the reemergence of open hostility between the premier and his military leadership. Just as Ho Chi Minh and Lê Duẩn were inaugurating the insurgency, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) commanders were scheming to depose Diem on their own. The roots of discord between Saigon and the military ran deep, but the proximal cause stemmed from Diem’s autocratic tendencies and incompetence as a military administrator. In the first case, Diem had exhibited effectiveness in eliminating opponents within the political apparatus, government bureaucracy, and ARVN command structure during 1956-59. During this period, he systematically purged these elements while ruthlessly liquidating those groups who possessed social power and cultural influence, such as the militant religious sects of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, as well as the Binh Xuyen, a well- organized band of thugs who paid Diem for the privilege of controlling South Vietnam’s social life and police power. He then attempted to reconstruct the government and military establishment by appointing relatives and friends to positions of power, ruling through a brand of strict nepotism and centralized authority that merely exacerbated resentments that had been

5 brewing throughout Vietnamese society since the end of French colonialism. Fiercely protective

of his position and universally mistrustful, Diem furthered his control of the army and state

through micromanagement of his loyalist administrators. He also prosecuted a sweeping

campaign to root out communists or suspected fellow travelers at the village level through mass

incarceration, indoctrination, surveillance, and execution. The tendency of non-communists to

become ensnared in these maneuvers added a popular component to a resistance movement that

already had considerable backing from army leadership and the sects. Furthermore, shrewd

electioneering provided Diem with nearly total control of his government’s legislative and

judicial branches, thus reinforcing the popular perception of Diem as an autocrat. Combined with

the creeping insecurity created by a renewed communist offensive, Diem appeared little more

than a corrupt and incompetent dictator serving at the pleasure of the West. 4

As the rancor toward Diem expanded and multiplied, the Republic of Vietnam ripened

for insurrection. On November 11, 1960, a rogue detachment of the Airborne Division under the direction of disaffected paratroop commanders stormed Independence Palace before armored

reinforcements commenced a two-hour shelling of the presidential mansion. Diem narrowly

escaped assassination by inadvertently evading a stray bullet that pierced his bedroom window.

The Presidential Guard ultimately prevailed in the mêlée, but the rebels had gained a startling

degree of ground in capturing major government buildings. Additionally, after negotiations

stalled, the rebels broke the ceasefire and instigated a mob of angry civilians to charge the

palace. In response, Colonel Tran Thien Khiem’s 2nd Armored Division opened fire on the

crowd, leaving thirteen dead and scores more injured. With strength in numbers now in their

favor, Loyalist soldiers then assaulted the rebel encampment and recaptured key installations.5

6 Diem’s rule was preserved, but the already tense relationship with his generals had been further strained, and his image in the eyes of his allies had been irreparably damaged.

While President-elect John Fitzgerald Kennedy savored his electoral victory and basked in visionary dreams of a New Frontier, the Saigon regime tottered on the brink of collapse. The

State Department, and more specifically, the Ambassador to South Vietnam, Elbridge W.

Durbrow, determined that Diem must be compelled to undertake serious reform for the RVN to survive and defeat the Communists. Diem was fighting a losing battle on two fronts, against both

Communist infiltrators and domestic enemies. The external threat alone appeared to be more than Diem could handle, as evidenced by the steady increase in Viet Cong activity over the previous two years. Diem could hardly afford to fight an internal conflict. United States officials like Durbrow were haunted by the fear that Diem’s ineptitude would spell doom for the Republic of Vietnam, creating a power vacuum that would allow Ho Chi Minh’s Communists to overrun the entire peninsula and leave the Americans holding the bag.

Durbrow attempted to exploit Diem’s close call as an opportunity to leverage concessions from the premier. Hanoi’s resumption of hostilities had effected a deterioration in RVN security that engendered contentious debates over how to ameliorate deficiencies in the approach to war- making and nation-building. Generally, these two aspects of South Vietnam’s development were perceived as alternatives, and their proponents rationalized their preferences in manners characteristic of their professional identities. While military experts tended to emphasize tactics, logistics, and firepower as the nation’s most effective safeguards, foreign service officers more often viewed liberalization as the more attractive remedy. The two approaches were not seen as mutually exclusive, for both sides attached importance to a strong army and good government.

Their essential difference derived from how they understood the combinative relationship

7 between warfare and nationalism. Military men believed that more soldiers and equipment would

provide the ARVN with the necessary means to beat back the insurgency which, in turn, would

demonstrate Diem’s capacity for national leadership and endear the Vietnamese people to him.

Conversely, prominent figures at the embassy and State Department considered military might

alone to be an inadequate guarantor for a fledgling nation. Rather, good-faith democracy would

provide South Vietnam with the necessary morale to prosecute a successful counterinsurgency.

The essential question was a kind of political chicken-or-egg: did military power foster unity, or was unity a precondition for military success? Washington never resolved this dilemma, and the

Kennedy administration’s inability to do so ensured a chaotic future for the Republic of Vietnam.

I

8

A Fractured Relationship

Differences over policy existed prior to the 1960 coup, but the fallout from that crisis

made the issue a central point of division between American officials that threatened to

undermine the alliance. Since taking his post at Saigon in 1957, Durbrow was a stalwart for

political correctives over military expansion. He frequently found himself at odds with both

Diem and commanders of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Its chairman from

1955-60, Lieutenant General Samuel Tankersley “Hanging Sam” Williams resented Durbrow’s

intrusions of the military realm and recoiled at his dismissiveness toward Diem. Williams

thought Durbrow was so out of his league in Saigon that Williams once remarked that the

ambassador was “…better suited to be the senior salesman in a good ladies shoe store than to be

representing the U.S. in an Asian country.”6 The Eisenhower administration apparently did not share Williams’ concern, for Durbrow remained at the embassy until Kennedy decided that the

ambassador was indeed more of a liability than an asset. At the advice of Brigadier General

Edward G. Lansdale, Kennedy replaced Durbrow with someone who would play nice with Diem

in the spring of 1960.

The first signs of significant friction between Durbrow and Diem appeared in the summer

of 1957, when the former objected to the latter’s request for additional security forces to fend off

Viet Cong terrorists in the countryside who used kidnappings and assassinations to remove local

authorities and subjugate villagers.7 Diem had narrowly escaped assassination at the Ban Me

Thuot Economic Fair in February earlier that year.8 After the attempt on his life, he became

obsessed with security, treating his allies to incessant pleas for more money to augment his

9 armed forces. Durbrow thought that Diem’s request for funding to support a 60,000-man Self-

Defense Corps was excessive and believed that a force of 43,500 would be sufficient.9 When

Diem asked to expand the ARVN by 20,000 men, Durbrow took up a position that he would hold for the remainder of his tenure. Giving greater importance to politics over manpower, Durbrow told Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, “I took occasion to tell Diem I [am] not convinced larger forces [are] needed meet Viet-Cong threat since it appeared to me more important win confidence local population.”10 Such was the essential character of the

ambassador’s outlook that ran counter to that of the premier and MAAG. Whenever Durbrow repeated this assertion, he drove the wedge further between the State and Defense Departments on the one hand and between Diem and the United States on the other.

In Durbrow’s “Evaluation Report of Viet Nam: December 1957,” the ambassador laid down a handful of incisive criticisms that undergirded arguments advanced by him and other

State Department officials who advocated a tougher brand of diplomacy. Durbrow lauded the

‘miracle’ of political consolidation that Diem had performed, but he lamented that “As the year wore on more signs appeared indicating a slowing down of momentum and a reluctance to take the obviously necessary decisions.” South Vietnam had made little economic or social progress because “Diem made it clear in the late summer that he was still primarily concerned with security matters” as a result of increasing terrorist activity that was “undoubtedly encouraged if not perpetuated by communists.” Diem’s allies pressed him to accelerate nation-building in his realm, but he “continued to delay taking certain steps we strongly urged and which he had the means to accomplish.” As a result of Diem’s foot-dragging, U.S. officials “…began hearing more and more grumblings and expressions of discontent, which seemed to indicate that Diem was not increasing his prestige and appeal to the country.” Hanoi salivated at the thought of

10 promoting Diem’s downfall, for Durbrow noted that “increasing evidence has come to hand

which seems to point to a concerted, stepped-up communist campaign to try to throw the regime off balance by terrorism and intimidation.” The ambassador insisted, however, that the root of

the was political in nature. Consequently, it was “the consensus of most of the Country Team

that Diem would be in a better position to bolster security if he paid more attention to questions

other than security matters.” Williams, however, did “not subscribe to the inference in the paper as he reads it that President Diem is failing in his task or is on his way to failure.”11

The enclosure to Durbrow’s letter got down to specifics. Although Diem had “unified

free Viet Nam, brought it relative security and stability, and firmly maintain[ed] a pro-West,

anti-communist position…[he] avoided making decisions required to build the economic and

social foundations necessary to secure Viet Nam’s future independence and strength.”12 In

addition to shirking these responsibilities, Diem exhibited character defects of “suspiciousness

[suspicion?] and authoritarianism” that had “reduced the Government’s limited administrative

capabilities.” Ever the micromanager, Diem “assume[s] responsibility for the smallest details of

Government and grants his Ministers little real authority.” In the popular realm, Diem had weak backing, but “[his] regime might overcome such discontent and finally win over the loyalty of a majority of Vietnamese both in the North and South if it could show its ability to give the country stronger protection and create sound economic and social bases for progress.”13

Durbrow’s prescription for the malaise was one that he and future American officials

would repeat ad-nauseum for the next six years. To make South Vietnam a viable state, the

United States had to “bring strong pressure on the President to reach certain decisions basically

in the economic and social fields which have been before him for some months but on which he

has not acted.” Durbrow attributed this obstinance to Diem’s “lack of full perception of the inter-

11 relationship between military security and economic progress in safeguarding this country’s long range future.” Because of his paranoia and insecurity, Diem viewed his ministers with a mistrustful and exhibited an obsession with border security, the result of which was governmental inertia and neglect. As Durbrow explained,

He is inclined to be suspicious of others; he lacks an understanding of basic economic principles; and seems absorbed in pet ideas and schemes which detract from work on other urgent questions. For example, he has become absorbed, with considerable reason, with Viet Minh infiltration across his frontier with Cambodia and Laos. He believes this problem can be solved basically by the creation of settlements in the frontier areas and the construction of roads particularly in the highlands. Meanwhile, there are left pending such fundamental questions as seeing through the program of agrarian reform, laying the foundations for industrial development, monetary reform, building up an administrative and technical base needed if only to implement our aid programs.14

The ambassador accounted for Diem’s behavior with a cultural diagnosis that resonated widely

with the premier’s opponents: “While he honestly advocates democracy and probably equally

honestly considers himself a democrat, basically he remains a mandarin with the autocratic

attitude of ‘I know best.’”15

Durbrow admitted that no serious threat to the regime existed at the time, but a slowly

brewing disaffection within the general population gave him increasing cause for concern. The

ambassador declared that

The principal sources of discontent appear to be: an original economic and social dislocation ensuing from war and the problems brought about by the assumption of independence; failure to fulfill the sometimes unrealistic demand for progress; persistent and increasing lack of security in many areas over the past six months, particularly in the South and Southwest; a lack of vitality in the political parties; Diem’s resentment at even mild opposition; the regime’s rigidity and certain lack of tolerance which alienates a large proportion of the intellectuals; and the ineffective bureaucracy...16

The result was an alienated population spanning the business community, intelligentsia, and

peasantry. Either due to active discontent, ignorance of the national mission, or fear of

12 Communists, a wide swathe of South Vietnam’s people exhibited apathy or opposition to toward

the regime.17 In closing his report, Durbrow reiterated his preference for an inclusive nation-

building scheme for South Vietnam:

…our most immediate and essential task here is, I believe, to continue to strive to influence Diem and his regime to make sound decisions as soon as possible and move forward on a balanced broad economic, social and military program so that disillusionment with the regime may be minimized, hope in the future engendered, and Viet Nam retained as a positive example in Asia that a free, independent Asian nation, firmly allied to the West and opposed to communism, can succeed and prosper.18

These complaints were hardly the first manifestations of Durbrow’s cynicism. Just two

weeks earlier, the ambassador had reported that “Diem is so preoccupied with military security

problem due to increased internal subversion and Communist gains in nearby countries he shows

little interest in basic economic development for moment.”19 In July, the ambassador had

expressed regret that “the same old problems” had been “accentuated by Diem’s unwillingness to

delegate authority and the high standard of personal loyalty required of his subordinates”20 The

previous April, he had noted that Diem, “Although obviously respected,” did not “enjoy nation-

wide popularity.”21 Over the course of 1958-1961, Durbrow would double down on these

criticisms, while Diem’s unwillingness or inability to address these matters gradually drew more

Americans toward the ambassador’s pessimistic outlook.

The event that arguably made the strongest impression on Durbrow was a public critique

of the Diem government written by a group of Saigon élites at the Hotel Caravelle on April 22,

1960. An assortment of intellectuals made up heavily of doctors and former colonial officials, the

oppositionists delivered a statement to the international press that laid out a laundry list of

complaints, all of which expressed frustrations with the illiberal and undemocratic character of

South Vietnam’s government. Known as the Caravelle Manifesto, the appeal called on Diem to

13 guarantee civil rights, open up the government, and put an end to the nepotism that had come to

define the manner of choosing government administrators and military commanders.22

Ever the opportunist, Durbrow appropriated the statement as a validation of the criticisms

he had been levelling at the regime for the past three years. He spent the remainder of his time at

the embassy ceaselessly pleading for Washington to get tough with Saigon. In May 1960, he

reacted this with great irritation upon learning of Diem’s support for oppositionists of

Cambodia’s head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Seeing persuasion as futile, Durbrow

opted for the stick over the carrot in recommending that the United States withhold deliveries of

military equipment until Diem normalized relations with Cambodia’s Royal Khmer Government.

Diem did make an effort to spur economic development, improve local government, and bury the

hatchet with Cambodia, but in mid-September, Durbrow sharpened his demands with a list of measures that included broadening the government, devolving power to the legislature, and putting an end to the intrigue and intimidation being conducted by a secret political party known as the Can Lao, which acted under the direction of Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. South

Vietnam was rife with rumors of public demonstrations or a possible coup against the government, and the ambassador thought that only dramatic gestures by Diem could avert a crisis. 23 Durbrow thought the United States should continue to back Diem as the “best available

Vietnamese leader,” but he reminded the State Department that American policy was to ensure a

“strongly anti-Communist Vietnamese government which can command loyal and enthusiastic

support of widest possible segments of Vietnamese people, and is able to carry on effective fight

against Communist guerrillas.” Durbrow closed the September cable with a remarkable suggestion that exposed the limits of his patience, writing, “If Diem’s position in country continues [to] deteriorate as result [of] failure [to] adopt proper political, psychological,

14 economic and security measures, it may become necessary for US Government to begin

consideration alternative courses of action and leaders in order achieve our objective.”24

The coup rumors were validated on November 11, 1960. Aside from the demonstrating the RVN’s instability, it irrevocably soured relations between the United States and South

Vietnam in general and between Diem and Durbrow in particular. At first, Diem’s detractors generally took the position that South Vietnam could be secured and stabilized by making

American aid conditional on Diem’s enactment of economic and political reforms. They assumed that the regime was salvageable as an effective check to the expansion of what was widely perceived to be an international conspiracy managed by Moscow and Beijing. Vietnam was the most vulnerable ‘domino’ in the region, and if it fell, America’s Cold Warriors believed the whole of Southeast Asia and Oceania would follow in tow, thereby isolating America’s sympathizers in Japan, Formosa and placing the South Pacific at the mercy of the Red Menace.

U.S. national interest in Indochina laid in its effectiveness as anticommunist bulwark, not in any loyalty to the Diem regime per se. What Durbrow alluded to in his September cable was that, once Diem showed himself to be detrimental to the war effort against the Communists, his utility for the United States vanished, making him instead a liability to U.S. national security. What kept the Americans holding out hope that Diem would change his ways was the assumption that no better leader existed in Vietnam. The statement that Diem was the best man available for the job became a truism among American policymakers, an assumption reiterated without validation.

Durbrow brought the power and influence of the ambassadorship to the argument that Diem should be replaced, in effect raising the stature of oppositionist policy. At the same time, he exposed incompatibilities between the policies advocated by the foreign service and military, divisions that would upset policymaking for throughout Kennedy’s presidency.

15 Over the course of 1960-1963, changes in Kennedy’s staff and a growing insurgency made the State Department into a vocal advocate for more aggressive diplomacy and, failing that, Diem’s removal. Kennedy consistently opposed the introduction of U.S. ground troops to

South Vietnam, but he accepted virtually all actions short of deployments while holding out hope that pressure tactics would make Diem into a worthy ally. So, American intervention expanded in support of a regime that antagonized its population on a daily basis. By 1963, with the investment in Vietnam greater than ever, extrication became evermore difficult if the United

States was to preserve its reputation at home and abroad. Unable to stomach being the administration that ‘lost Vietnam’ after Cold War setbacks in Cuba, Berlin, and Laos, American officials thought they could salvage Indochina by manipulating the domestic politics of South

Vietnam through clandestine channels that maintained plausibly deniability. Kennedy’s continual reluctance to take control of Vietnam policy allowed his White House staff an inordinate amount of control over the nature of intervention. By declining to exercise executive authority in mediating between his staff and overruling reckless proposals, Washington’s anti-Diem faction enjoyed a preeminent position in making some of the most fateful, and ultimately disastrous decisions of the Vietnam war.

16 II

A Changed Demeanor

Kennedy took office remarkably ignorant of the situation in South Vietnam. When

Eisenhower briefed the President-elect ahead of his 1961 inauguration, he treated Kennedy to

admonitions about the exigencies of Laos, Cuba, and Berlin as the hot spots of the Cold War.

During the first week of his presidency, Rostow provided Kennedy with a copy of a fresh report

on the situation in South Vietnam. The assessment was the work of Brigadier General Edward G.

Lansdale, the Deputy Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense. Lansdale was

a retired Air Force colonel and former operative from the Office of Strategic Services. His

background in counterinsurgency preceded him, having made his name as head of the advisory

mission sent to Manila after World War II to assist Ramon Magsaysay’s campaign against the

Hukbalahap Communists, a guerilla resistance that had sought to overthrow the Republic of the

Philippines. Lansdale subsequently served in a similar capacity in Saigon, initially as part of the

Saigon Military Mission under Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel, and later as part of

MAAG.25 At Eisenhower’s request, Lansdale returned to South Vietnam in early January of 1961

to assess how the United States might make the regime a more into a more effective Cold War

ally. Lansdale brought an intelligence officer’s acumen to the region in order to devise a strategy

for defeating the Viet Cong.

Lansdale’s report clued Kennedy in for the first time to the rapid deterioration in the

RVN’s security. He noted that a significant Viet Cong presence in the countryside had been

achieved through massive infiltration, in turn straining the logistical capabilities and manpower

of the ARVN. Furthermore, and most significantly for the purpose of this paper, Lansdale also

17 lamented that diplomacy had lapsed into hostility as result of Durbrow’s pressuring Diem to enact political and military reforms.26 Lansdale criticized this conditional approach to aid as

destructive, arguing that Diem needed reassurance of his ally’s commitment through good-

natured diplomacy and robust military assistance. For Lansdale, the problem was essentially one

of morale, a crisis of confidence that ultimately hampered counterinsurgency; his answer was for

the United States to unequivocally support Diem and directly assist ARVN field operations. In

practice, this meant replacement of Durbrow with someone less aggressive and expansion of the

military component short of combat troop deployments.27

Over the course of 1961-62, Kennedy would rebrand Vietnam policy along the lines of

Lansdale’s recommendations. Although he never definitively ruled out the employment of

American soldiers in South Vietnam, his consistent hesitancy to do so revealed a genuine desire

to secure the RVN without sacrificing American lives. In May 1961, Kennedy replaced Durbrow

with Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., a career foreign service officer with no expertise relevant to

Southeast Asia. Nolting’s task was to rehabilitate relations with Diem in the wake of the failed

1960 coup and Durbrow’s campaign to leverage concessions from the premier. Except for a

couple of isolated, unsuccessful cases, the next two years of U.S.-Vietnam relations were

characterized by attempts to persuade rather than strongarm Diem to see the error of his ways

and make the changes necessary to stabilize his wobbly regime.28

Lansdale’s report, along with the recommendations of the U.S. Country Team in

Vietnam, piqued Kennedy’s interest in South Vietnam as a proving ground for Cold War

counterinsurgency. At the same White House meeting in which Kennedy met Lansdale for the

first time to discuss his findings, the Country Team’s J. Graham Parsons presented the “Basic

Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam” (CIP).29 The CIP drew many of the same conclusions at

18 which Lansdale had arrived: Diem’s political instability resulted from frustrations among South

Vietnam’s peasantry, intelligentsia, business community, and most recently, the government

bureaucracy and military. Popular discontent stemmed from resentment of Diem’s nepotism,

authoritarianism, and incompetence as a commander-in-chief, and the opportunistic Viet Cong

exploited this situation “…to discredit President Diem and weaken the government’s authority

through political subversion, as well as through military action.” The Country Team’s suggested

correctives, however, were different in kind from those advocated by Lansdale. While Lansdale

claimed that American expertise and good-natured diplomacy could put the Diem regime on a solid footing by enhancing security and accelerating national development, Parsons recommended a more conventional politico-military approach that included expansion of the

ARVN by 20,000 men, increased financial support of the Civil Guard, political liberalization, and streamlining the military command structure.30 The essential question was what was more of

a threat: internal or external opposition? Diem’s discontented populace or the Viet Cong?

Lansdale, a military man, saw the problem as essentially one of morale that could be overcome

by fully supporting Diem, both on the battlefield and in a program national development.

Alternatively, the Country Team took a position more in line with Durbrow’s: while accepting

that expansion of the RVN’s armed forces was necessary to counter infiltration, they believed

that domestic reforms were a precondition for long-term stability. For Lansdale, it was the other

way around: South Vietnam needed security and stability before democracy.

Kennedy responded to the two January reports with his first policy decisions on

Vietnam. These actions were essentially a combination of the two proposals that aimed to

increase assistance to the RVN while encouraging the development of positive diplomacy and

long-range counterinsurgency. He approved the CIP’s call for increased financial assistance to

19 the tune of $41.1 million and, at Rusk’s instigation, instituted a Vietnam Task Force to craft a comprehensive program to implement the CIP. 31 Furthermore, in two NSAMs, Kennedy requested that the Department of Defense explore means for developing and implementing counterguerrilla operations.32 Kennedy also acted on Lansdale’s criticisms of Durbrow by nominating Nolting as his replacement on February 17. Congress approved the nomination in less than a month’s time, and Nolting took his post at the embassy on May 10.33 After Durbrow’s tactics proved unsuccessful, the Kennedy administration hoped that persuasion and cajolery would be the magic pills for South Vietnam’s deep-seated crisis.

20 III

Reorganization

Changes in Washington attended changes in Saigon to make the State Department into the dominant entity of Vietnam policy in the Kennedy administration. The first of these was organizational in nature, as Kennedy sought to break the inertia that had beset policymaking in the postwar era. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Kennedy’s confidant and Special Assistant to the

President, asserted that the new president “wanted to end the faceless system of indecision and inaction which diffused foreign policy among the three great bureaucracies of State, Defense, and the CIA. But, to make coordination effective, it was necessary to strengthen the

Department’s instrumentalities of control.”34 With a view toward curtailing bureaucratic excess

and empowering the diplomatic establishment, Kennedy eliminated the Operations Coordinating

Board, a body responsible for ensuring interdepartmental compatibility and smooth

implementation of national security policies. To Kennedy, the board was a prime example of the

kind of dead weight that encumbered Washington’s foreign policy machinery, so he had its

responsibilities absorbed by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.35 Rusk, however, would not

provide the leadership needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of foreign policy.

The second measure Kennedy took to elevate the State Department was to similarly

empower American embassies. Acting on the advice of Under Secretary of State Chester

Bowles, Kennedy sent a circular letter to his ambassadors in May 1961 that instructed them to

‘oversee and coordinate all the [nonmilitary] activities of the United States Government’ in their

respective nations.36 Aside from reminding American diplomats of their responsibilities,

Kennedy sought to stop CIA operatives from acting independently of the State Department and

21 concealing the nature of its foreign adventures. At the time of Kennedy’s circular letter, General

Maxwell D. Taylor, the former Army Chief of Staff, was in the process of finalizing a report of the Cuba Study Group that, in part, blamed the intelligence community for its aloofness in

carrying out what was essentially a military operation at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Taylor

argued that, had Operation Zapata been fully vetted between the CIA, JCS, and State

Department, Washington might have crafted a successful operation.37 Kennedy’s circular letter

worked towards these ends by giving his ambassadors to information on the CIA’s multitude of

‘covert action’ schemes.

Along with making the State Department privy to CIA operations, Kennedy moved to

further undercut the agency’s power by reducing its budget and clarifying its responsibilities. A

series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) dictated in June 1961 formalized a

requirement for information exchange and mutual consultation between the government’s

military, intelligence, and diplomatic wings. NSAM-55 required the JCS to inform the president of their views pertaining to all ongoing operations, both military and nonmilitary in character.38

NSAM-56 required the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department to consult one another

and coordinate their analyses of paramilitary operations.39 Furthermore, NSAM-57 gave the

Department of Defense explicit authority over paramilitary operations, a direct response to the

CIA’s botched invasion of Cuba, which Taylor deemed to be outside the purview of the intelligence community.40

Although Kennedy’s executive actions enhanced the authority of the State Department,

the Defense Department initially enjoyed a commanding influence over Vietnam policy. As

Kennedy held the CIA and State Department in low esteem at the outset of his presidency for the

aforementioned reasons, he conversely put great stock in Pentagon. An ardent Cold Warrior,

22 Kennedy’s upset victory over Richard M. Nixon in November 1960 was due in no small part to

his campaign’s success in painting the youthful senator as a hardline anticommunist who would

act in accordance with his generals’ prescriptions. To that regard, Kennedy evinced a preference

for military guidance in his early foreign policy decisions. First, he welcomed Lansdale’s

recommendations for stronger support of the Diem regime. He also actively solicited Taylor’s

advice regarding the Bay of Pigs fiasco and subsequently made an effort to restore the

Pentagon’s role in carrying out interventionist schemes. Secondly, he approved the CIP’s call for

expansion and greater subsidization of South Vietnam’s military and security forces. Thirdly, in

setting up a Presidential Task Force on Vietnam to implement the CIP, Kennedy assigned its

chairmanship to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and made Lansdale its Project

Officer. Thus, in the spring of 1961, Kennedy appeared to be orienting Vietnam policy toward an

expanded American commitment, rather than disengagement and pressuring Diem to reform.

Despite evincing a preference for military opinion, Kennedy was basically opposed to

military intervention. Although he gave his generals prime seats at the conference table, he

hoped that they would integrate their views with those of civilians by devising alternative

solutions in concert with the State Department. The Presidential Task Force on Vietnam

exemplified this approach, with its Defense Department heads and its secondary representatives

drawn from the State Department and other administrative bodies. That structure was not for

long, however, as “State objected, successfully, to having an Ambassador report to a Task Force

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and with a second defense official (Lansdale) as

executive officer.”41 During the winter and early spring of 1961, Foggy Bottom waged a power

struggle against the Pentagon to wrest control of Vietnam policy from the military establishment.

The State Department succeeded in this effort, as the final form of the Task Force program did

23 not manifest the hawkish character of earlier proposals emanating from Defense circles. These early drafts produced by Lansdale and Gilpatric called for substantial enlargement of the ARVN,

Civil Guard, and MAAG, in addition to sending U.S. Special Forces, training officers, and combat troops to South Vietnam.42 In early May, the State Department rebutted the Gilpatric-

Lansdale proposal with one of its own that ultimately served as the basis for the final draft of “A

Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam.”43 In this version, the

Presidential Task Force was dissolved in favor of an Interdepartmental Task Force on Viet-Nam under the direction of State Department officials: Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

George W. Ball as Chairman, Assistant Secretary of State Walter P. McConaughey as Ball’s alternate, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Sterling J. Cottrell as Director, and Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Chalmers B.

Wood as Executive Officer. The only Defense Department man in an administrative role was

Lansdale who, as Deputy Director, was subordinate to Cottrell. 44 The final version also removed language regarding combat troops and the possibility of unilateral intervention in favor of a call for bilateral negotiations and further study of the troop question.45 Kennedy accepted the program with NSAM-52, which assigned study of the troop question to the Task Force. Since the

State Department had seized control of the Task Force, deployment was more unlikely than ever.46

Still, the troop question lingered, and it became more pressing as neutralization of Laos increased the threat of infiltration and raised the possibility that South Vietnam would eventually have to contend with a communist state on its western flank. Preoccupied with these threats,

Diem inflamed the controversy when he requested American troops in a June 1961 letter to

Kennedy.47 Kennedy trusted that Taylor would provide levelheaded analyses of issues relating to

24 U.S. force commitments. The NSC, State Department, and Joint Chiefs all advocated some kind

of troop deployment to Indochina in the spring of 1961; Ball, Rostow, and Army Chief of Staff

Lyman Lemnitzer differed only in terms of the size, composition, and location envisioned for

such a force.48 In the midst of this shrill militance, Kennedy appointed Taylor to the novel post of

Military Representative to the President.49 Along with Rostow, Taylor served Kennedy as a filter

through which the torrent of military and diplomatic opinion was analyzed and distilled for

president’s swift comprehension.50

The general’s first duty in this capacity was to consider Diem’s request to increase the

ARVN by 100,000 men with the support of U.S. forces ostensibly limited to training duties.

With the support of Rostow and the State Department’s Deputy Under Secretary of State for

Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Kennedy dispatched Taylor on a mission to Saigon to

““Review the planning on Vietnam and give me your comments thereon along with your views

on how to respond to President Diem’s request for a 100,000 man increase in his army’”51 From

the outset, it was clear that Kennedy hoped that the Taylor-Rostow mission would devise a strategy for South Vietnam that avoided the use of American troops. Taylor himself admitted this years later, and Kennedy’s final instructions to the general made his intentions eminently clear in asserting that “While the military part of the problem is of great importance in South Vietnam, its political, social, and economic elements are equally significant, and I shall expect your appraisal and your recommendations to take full account of them.”52 Ball likewise told Nolting

that “General Taylor will hope to receive suggestions on unconventional forms of assistance…”53

After a summer of arguments over military escalation, the Taylor-Rostow mission arrived in Saigon on October 18, 1961 for a week of tours and meetings. Despite Kennedy’s clear wishes for alternative solutions, Taylor’s initial November report advised sending an 8,000-man “Flood

25 Relief Task Force” to South Vietnam with the ostensible purpose of providing humanitarian

relief to those suffering from a recent natural disaster in the Mekong Delta.54 Their true purpose, however, was to provide a reserve defense force capable of undertaking offensive operations if further deterioration in RVN security necessitated it.55 Kennedy was unreceptive to the scheme.

With NSAM-111, he approved virtually the entire Taylor Report save the troop commitments.

Rusk and McNamara had worked together in drafting a program from Taylor’s recommendations

that was less militant and therefore acceptable to all concerned parties. This Rusk-McNamara

plan became the basis of NSAM-111.56

The internal political significance of NSAM-111 was similar to that of the final draft of

the Program of Action for the Vietnam Task Force. Over the winter and spring of 1961, the Task

Force plan and the institution itself underwent changes that eliminated provisions for combat

troops and reduced the role of Defense Department in Vietnam policymaking; Lansdale had

fought to control policy, but the State Department denied him the pleasure. Then, in early

November, Rusk and McNamara tempered the military character of Taylor’s plan in order to mollify those in the State Department who saw Diem as a losing horse. Under Secretary of State

Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs George Ball, and Ambassador at

Large W. Averell Harriman all staunchly opposed military intervention in South Vietnam.57 Rusk

was willing to commit force, but expressed similar apprehensions regarding the character of the

Diem regime.58 Diem’s domestic threats had become an increasingly common concern, for even

strong supporters of intervention had raised concerns about tying American prestige to his

regime. One of these was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs William P. Bundy. Although Bundy drafted a joint JCS-Defense Department

memorandum in response to the Taylor Report that called for combat force larger than 8,000

26 troops, he could not escape the creeping doubt that it all might amount to a vain attempt to save a

doomed tyrant. As a result, in the final draft of the memorandum, Bundy added the words

“inclined to” before the words “recommend that we do commit the U.S. to…the necessary

military actions,” indicating a palpable apprehensiveness.59 Subsequently, Bundy and U. Alexis

Johnson crafted a joint State-Defense memorandum to Kennedy that further moderated the program further by dropping the Flood Relief Task Force entirely and adding the affirmation that

“We must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields.”60

To that end, NSAM-11 called on the Government of Vietnam to take “Prompt and appropriate

legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing,” which included

“The vitalization of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies…” and making an “Overhaul of

the military establishment and command structure”61 So, as in the spring, the State Department

successfully opposed the Defense Department’s call for combat troops. Moreover, Foggy Bottom

managed to insert conditions for reform into the official program. This was the return of the quid

pro quo that had sunk Durbrow’s ambassadorship.62

Although the State Department succeeded in moderating the program that became

NSAM-111, the action nevertheless augmented and redefined the advisory effort in a way that

blurred the line between counsel and combat. United States officers were now assigned duties

that included conducting reconnaissance and border patrols, as well as piloting helicopters and

small airplanes.63 Taylor termed the expanded mission a “limited partnership,” which denoted a broadening of the American role in the both the war effort and South Vietnam’s national development. Indeed, the authors of the Pentagon Papers declared that Taylor’s plan “…was

designed to place U.S. advisors at many levels within the RVNAF and GVN [Government of

27 Vietnam] structure rather than merely at the top”64 It was an attempt to dominate military and

administrative decisionmaking. Even though Washington had rejected direct military

intervention, the emotional commitment may have been just the same. It would not be long

before Americans were dying at the hands of the Viet Cong.65 With American prestige thus at

stake, extrication became an even harder pill to swallow. The United States was less inclined

than ever to cut its losses in Vietnam, but Diem remained obdurate. If withdraw was not an option, a change in leadership increasingly seemed to be the only viable alternative.

28

III

Trading Places

Although the State Department successfully fended off the Pentagon’s hawkish policies

twice in 1961, Kennedy still found something to be desired in the foreign service. For one thing,

there was still dysfunction at the top. Rusk was essentially not on speaking terms with Chester

Bowles who, as Under Secretary, was second in charge at Foggy Bottom. According to

Schlesinger and Alexis Johnson, Bowles had become something of a whipping boy at the State

Department. He was brought into the administration primarily to help with ambassadorial

appointments. His embassy picks upset Foggy Bottom’s old guard, however, as he staffed the

embassies with unconventional choices and replaced seasoned foreign service officers with

young upstarts.66 Rusk, a southern Democrat and former Truman official, was himself cut from

the New Deal cloth and did not see eye-to-eye with Bowles on his vision for shaking up the State

Department. This vision was consistent with Kennedy’s, but it was a polarizing force at State.

Those who had been replaced or reassigned were left embittered by the experience, and they took to openly criticizing Bowles for his tendency to ruminate and lecture extensively on issues

requiring swift action.67 According to Alexis Johnson, “He would call a group into his office to

discuss a telegram of instructions he was drafting; after he delivered an hour’s lecture…about the

broad aspects of the problem or something tangential, the group would depart no closer to

resolving what should go on in the telegram.”68 This particularly irritated those dealing with

intelligence or national security, and understandably so, considering the time-sensitive nature of their work. Thus, the working relationship between Bowles, his superior, and his subordinates

29 was fractured from the outset of his tenure. Rusk preferred to discuss policy with Alexis

Johnson, thereby bypassing Bowles and working with his subordinate.69 Additionally, Rusk was

also not one to take bold stands, making it even more imperative to have a strong figure in the

number two slot if Kennedy was to get the kind of dynamic, forceful policies that he desired.70

Kennedy shuffled Bowles to the position of Ambassador-at-Large and tapped George

Ball, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to take over as Under Secretary of State

in November 1961. Ball was an outspoken critic of military intervention, an international lawyer

whose experience working with the French during the First Indochina War had left him highly

sensitive to the risks of Third World adventures.71 Kennedy then called on a man of similar

outlook, W. Averell Harriman, to replace Walter McConaughy as the Assistant Secretary of State

for Far Eastern Affairs while making McConaughy Special Assistant in the Office of the Deputy

Under Secretary of State for Administration. This move was a transparent maneuver to replace

Bowles with someone who thought like him but was decisive and unreluctant to exercise

authority. Schlesinger asserts that “The contrast between Bowles and Harriman was

instructive…Both men were experienced in government, and both held much the same view of

the world. But where Bowles dissipated his authority by diffusing his energy, Harriman seized

hold of one hard problem…Where Bowles tried to fight every battle on every front at once,

Harriman picked the battles he knew he could win, or affect, and for the rest bided his time. He

was one to whom power gravitated.”72 By these efforts, Kennedy inserted confident anti-military interventionists into top-level positions at the State Department.

Kennedy changed up the National Security Council in a similar manner. McGeorge

Bundy remained the top advisor on the NSC as Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, but Kennedy replaced Bundy’s deputy, Walt Rostow, with Carl Kaysen and

30 moved Rostow and his assistant, Robert Johnson, to the State Department’s Policy Planning

Council at the end of 1961. In January 1962, Kennedy brought Michael V. Forrestal onto the

NSC to fill a role in which he effectively served as Harriman’s representative. The moves to

bring Ball, Harriman, Kaysen, and Forrestal closer to the policymaking process mirrored one

another: they all contributed to recomposing Kennedy’s top civilian advisory bodies with men

who shared the president’s aversion to combat troops. Kaysen was a Harvard professor who

viewed the conduct of foreign policy as a delicate political undertaking; Forrestal was a lawyer

who could be an effective liaison between the White House and the Bureau of Far Eastern

Affairs.73

Kennedy’s organizational decisions in 1961 established the internal political relationships

that would determine the course of U.S.-Vietnam relations in 1962-63. First, he empowered

Foggy Bottom and the embassies with greater influence over the character of foreign

intervention. The State Department’s reputation for indecision and backwardness, combined with

the CIA’s insular mode of operation, moved the president to confer his ambassadors with the

explicit authority to oversee all nonmilitary aspects of international relations. Furthermore,

Kennedy allowed Bowles to fill the department’s offices with men who were less beholden to

traditional containment philosophies. Secondly, the unrelenting push for military intervention in

1961 forced Kennedy to change the makeup of the NSC and State Department leadership in a manner that undercut the influence of hardline interventionists. The foreign service had already gained a degree of control over policy by dint of the president’s earlier clarification of the responsibilities pertaining to Washington’s various departments, agencies, and advisory bodies.

Subsequent changes in staff ensured that powerful offices would be filled with self-assured men who would pursue alternatives to military intervention. Although Kennedy was judicious in

31 attempting to quell the cries for a combat mission, he underestimated the fact that alternatives could be disastrous in their own right.

32 IV

Loggerheads

The attempt to overtake the Republic of Vietnam’s functions was obviously a threatening

maneuver to a head of state who had never enjoyed true security. Since the mid-1950s, Diem had

contended with a barrage of internal and external opponents. In the period of consolidation

following the Geneva Accords, the regime ruthlessly crushed religious sects, organized crime,

and political dissidents. By the end of the decade, opposition within the military and at the

American embassy emerged as new antagonists. Simultaneously, Hanoi’s decision to undertake

clandestine infiltration and liberation of South Vietnam made Diem even more paranoid and

protective of his position. As the external threat multiplied, the Americans became more

demanding of Diem to conciliate the populace and permit his allies a direct role in the conduct of

warfare and government. These demands could only increase Diem’s obstinacy and obstinacy

could only intensify the opposition that had been steadily accruing at home and abroad.

Immediately after Kennedy promulgated NSAM-111, Nolting reported that Diem would

not comply with U.S. demands to delegate responsibility and permit political opposition.74 In a

November 20 meeting with the ambassador, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, South Vietnam’s Secretary of

State, reported that Diem was “‘very sad and very disappointed’” and “brooding” upon learning of the new policy worked out by U.S. officials following the Taylor mission.75 Diem’s

insecurities made him highly reluctant to broaden his government and permit a greater American

role in developing a national program for the RVN. After Nolting insisted that the new policy

was designed to stabilize the regime and not to make South Vietnam into an American

protectorate, Thuan continued his rebuff, declaring that because of the “paucity of people willing

33 to assume responsibility, the tendency to analyze and criticize rather than to act, he shared

President’s fear that public acceptance of our proposals would disastrously weaken strong Diem

leadership which he considers indispensable at this time.” Thuan believed that “‘Without

[Diem’s] determined and active leadership, we would collapse.’”76 In a meeting with Diem later

that week, the premier “continued to make references to the quid pro quo aspects of our

proposals, claiming that they played right into the hands of the Communists. He argued that we

are pressing him to give a monopoly on nationalism to the Communists.”77

Nolting’s cables spoke to the growing concern in Washington that attempts to make

Diem into a genuine democrat were a futile undertaking. The Taylor-Rostow mission had made the debate over Diem’s viability a front-and-center controversy. Although differences of opinion regarding the long-term prospects for the regime had existed among American officials for some time, and despite the fact that some Americans in Vietnam had sided or sympathized with the regime’s opponents’ during the failed coup of 1960, the issue came to dominate policy in the aftermath of Taylor’s trip to Saigon in October of 1961. Around this time, Kennedy asked his friend and confidant, John Kenneth Galbraith, to inspect the situation in Vietnam while he was returning to his ambassadorial post in New Delhi. Galbraith was one of the president’s

‘contemporary’ ambassadors, a New Frontiersman committed to Kennedy’s vision for dynamic diplomacy to address Cold War realities. His preference for direct communication with the president, rather than through official State Department channels, left a documentary record of unvarnished opinion on critical matters.78 Just as the final decisions were being made on the

McNamara-Rusk proposal, Galbraith wrote a letter to the president from his post in New Delhi,

in which he emphatically related he did not see the point of trying to reform South Vietnam’s

president while extending aid to Saigon. While admitting that military deficiencies were at play,

34 Galbraith argued that “The Key and inescapable point, then, is the ineffectuality (abetted

debatable by the unpopularity) of the Diem government,” which he ascribed centrally to the

premier’s “inevitable posture of the Asian mandarin.” He seconded the assertions of others in

recognizing that the war effort could be improved by better government, but he confidently

declared that “Diem will not reform either administratively or politically in any effective way.”

Because of the cultural outlook of his race, “It is politically naïve to expect it,” for Diem

understood that “he cannot let power go because he would be thrown out” once the popular

perception took hold that he was a weak leader under the influence of foreigners. Galbraith

asserted that the U.S. must seek “results and not promises since Diem is experienced in

promising without performing. Getting to the point, Galbraith concluded that “It follows from

my reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem,” but after exhibiting great

insightfulness in perceiving a cultural relevance to Diem’s behavior, Galbraith revealed his

ignorance in claiming that “dropping Diem will neither be difficult nor unduly dangerous.”

Perhaps this was because he rejected out of hand the nearly universal postulation within the

Washington establishment that Diem was the only man capable of executive authority in South

Vietnam. He rightly perceived that “It is a cliché that there is no alternative to Diem’s regime.”79

Galbraith was right to believe that someone could lead better than Diem could, but his own naiveté made him dangerously unappreciative of the grave risks involved in promoting a change in leadership.

Although Kennedy valued Galbraith’s opinion, Galbraith had little effective power in shaping Vietnam policy. Soon, however, similar lines of thought emerged from other corners of the administration and, in time, those who were most disaffected with the Diem regime would be in positions with the power to affect the course of diplomacy. A week after Galbraith’s letter,

35 Roger Hilsman, Jr., the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and another State

Department modernist, cabled Rusk to report on rumblings of coup plotting. After summarizing

a flurry of criticisms emanating from military and political circles, Hilsman signed off by noting

that “Some military and civilian officials may have also concluded that the Saigon press attacks have weakened US support of Diem, and their comments to the Army Attaché may be designed to elicit such information. Their estimate of US intentions could strongly influence a decision to undertake a coup.”80 Hilmsan’s personal views would come into focus over the next two years as he ascended to high authority in the State Department. His memorandum insinuated that the

Americans held the cards when it came to determining the character of South Vietnam’s

government.

Three days later, Robert H. Johnson, a concurrent member of the NSC and Vietnam Task

Force, contacted Taylor’s Naval aide, Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley, with a

memorandum titled “Possible Contingencies in Viet-Nam.” Johnson had ties to Harriman, but he

exhibited greater willingness to advocate bold policies among a department characterized by

inaction and apprehension to intervene in South Vietnam’s affairs. He had previously spoken out

in favor of combat troop deployments, and he was now willing to accept that the United States

should support Diem’s overthrow if a viable opposition emerged. 81 Although his paper listed four possible consequences of Diem’s obdurance, he explored only the one he perceived as possibly beneficial to the United States: “A coup led by experienced ARVN officers which might put [Vice President Nguyen Ngoc] Tho or Thuan at the head of the government.”82 In such a circumstance, Johnson thought the United States would bear little burden, since it could inconspicuously indicate approval to the generals in charge. Johnson naively believed the United

States could ensure a successful change in leadership by judging the worthiness of plotters and

36 insulate itself from criticism through plausible deniability. “If we can get the kind of coup we

want without evidence of overt U.S. involvement,” Johnson proposed, “we shall be better off

than if we are clearly identified with a coup group.”83 Remarkably, Johnson acknowledged that,

regardless of the worthiness of the rebels, association with a coup would be deeply damaging to

the international standing of the United States, but he dismissed the near impossibility of

concealing American support when the U.S. military had such a presence in South Vietnam that no change in leadership could occur without it standing aside. Indeed, he proposed that “We

might, at some crucial stage, let coup leaders know privately that we were prepared to fly in

forces, without putting such forces in a publicly visible position off the coast.”84 To that regard,

he thought that U.S. forces could be kept at the ready from a distance, possibly in the

Philippines. Surely aware of the CIA’s proclivities for clandestine intervention and sensitive to

the controversy that would arise should the wider administration get wind of new insurrectionary

adventures, Johnson advised soliciting the agency’s “appreciation” of the alternatives under

consideration, rather than requesting a formal intelligence estimate.85 Worth H. Bagley, Taylor’s

aide, forwarded Johnson’s exposé to Taylor, but throughout the Kennedy presidency, Taylor

remained an outspoken opponent to Diem’s overthrow and one who resented the State

Department’s readiness to dabble in military matters.

Hilsman and Johnson’s memoranda raised the possibility of U.S. support for Diem’s

ouster to a level of greater standing in the Kennedy administration. Johnson was ready to leave

the government and return to academia in 1961, but by the new year, he accepted reassignment

to the State Department’s Policy Planning Council.86 His change, however, did not eliminate the

influence of his line of thought on the NSC, for the incoming staff member, Michael V.

Forrestal, would show himself to be an ardent supporter of Diem’s removal. Along with

37 Harriman and Hilsman, and Forrestal would comprise part of a powerful anti-Diemist presence

in Washington in 1962-63.

The links to past diplomacy in Johnson’s paper were apparent. In late October, the

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter McConaughy, cabled Nolting with a

draft titled “Suggested Contingency Plan.” McConaughy related that it was an updated version of

a position paper originally written for Durbrow by McConaughy’s predecessor, John Steeves. In

this memorandum, McConaughy advanced claims similar to those made by Robert Johnson in

determining that “If in the best judgment of the Chief of Mission the situation arises where Diem

has lost effective control, the United States should be prepared to quickly support the non-

Communist person or group who then appears most capable of establishing effective control over

the GVN. The nature of U.S. support in such a situation should be strong enough to achieve rapid

results but no so blatant as to make such a person or group appear as a US puppet.”87

McConaughy advised continuing to seek Diem’s compliance with essential reforms, specifically

the formation of an “effective Internal Security Council” that would review all government

business, as well as improvements in South Vietnam’s intelligence operations. McConaughy

noted that these measures were components of the Counterinsurgency Plan that Diem had

previously accepted.88 This protocol for how the United States would respond to scheming by

Diem’s enemies existed at least as early as 1960, but the popularity of such a policy had grown over the previous two years, while its proponents had been installed in positions of influence.

Losses on the battlefield and Diem’s obstinacy galvanized the anti-Diem cabal to forcefully advocate his overthrow over the course of 1962-63.

McConaughy’s position agreed with Rostow’s. On November 24, one of his last days as

Kennedy’s Deputy Special Assistant on the NSC, Rostow responded to Galbraith’s recent letter.

38 Rostow wholeheartedly agreed with Galbraith “that if Diem does not perform we be prepared to

indicate in the proper way to the proper people that we would prefer a successor.”89 Even if the

United States could improve the “critical problem” of his “administrative weakness,” Rostow hoped this might just actually it easier to achieve a stable change in leadership. He posited that

“we shall get a lift of confidence which would, among other things, make it more safe to help induce a coup.”90 Living up to his status as Kennedy’s most belligerent civilian advisor in 1961,

Rostow went a step further than his colleagues at the State Department in not only supporting

U.S. complicity in Diem’s overthrow but advocating American instigation of his deposition.

The takeaway from these initial policy positions in favor of a coup is that the supposedly

intended consequences of Kennedy’s personnel were neutralized. Even though Rostow was

shuffled off to the Policy Planning Council and McConaughy relegated to an unglamorous

position in the Office of Administration, Forrestal and Harriman would show themselves to be

interventionists in their own right. Kennedy failed to appreciate that Harriman’s opposition to an

American combat role was so resolute that he would support a coup as a means of avoiding

military commitment. By 1963, Hilsman would join Harriman at the State Department to, along

with Forrestal, form a high-level administrative triumvirate of anti-Diemists who spoke for a

wider opposition element dispersed throughout the Washington establishment. Two more

changes in Saigon would seal the deal in the late summer of 1963, when Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

took over for Nolting at the embassy and subsequently forced the replacement of the CIA’s Chief

of Station at Saigon, John Richardson, with David Smith, who thereafter demonstrated a hardline

commitment to a coup.

39 V

Self-destruction

Two major stumbling blocks fed the deteriorating relationship between Diem and his

sponsors. Among both his foreign and domestic opponents, the primary reason for disaffection

was Diem’s conduct of the war, which was the determining factor for the eventual decision to assent to his removal. While political and humanitarian concerns arising from repressive actions taken in mid to late 1963 contributed much to the overall desire for disassociation from the regime, the executive and military rationale for approving the mutiny was that it was necessary to salvage the war effort. To that regard, the dominant issue of 1962 was how to get Diem to implement basic administrative and tactical reforms in order to prosecute an effective

counterinsurgency.

The renewal of calls for Diem’s ouster by American officials in the fall of 1961 were

spurred on by revelations gleaned from Taylor’s meetings with South Vietnam’s leadership. In

separate memoranda, Taylor described his discussions with senior military commanders and the

Vice President Tho. In the first encounter, Taylor had an extended conversation with Major

General Duong Van Minh. “Speaking as a solider, he wanted General Taylor to know that he

considered the situation to be extremely grave.” Five years ago, the South Vietnamese “…were

full of enthusiasm and the spirit of cooperation,” but now, reported Minh, the wider population

was disaffected by the Catholic regime’s air of cultural superiority, political favoritism, and

micromanagement of the military and security forces.91 Minh had not completely lost faith in the

government, but he confided in Taylor that “There was a general feeling that they were on a

40 plane in a dive, and that they would soon reach a point where it would have to be levelled off or

it would be too late.”92

Later that day, Taylor met with Tho. South Vietnam’s Vice President treated the general

to biting criticisms of the regime’s failure to secure the countryside. Taylor then asked Tho how

to address the problem, to which the Vice President replied with the ominous suggestion “…that

the US should ‘intervene’ quickly and intelligently.” Tho “…eluded questions directed at

producing specific recommendations,” but he made subtle indications that he “…was pointing

the finger at Diem’s methods of government and administration.”93

Expressions of internal opposition added to an atmosphere of instability already well

established by a gradually intensifying insurgency. According to the Pentagon Papers,

During the first half of 1961, terrorists and guerrillas had assassinated over 500 local officials and civilians, kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,500 RVNAF personnel. The VC had gained the upper hand in most of the countryside and were drawing an increasingly tight cinch [clinch?] around Saigon. Viet Cong regular forces were now estimated to number 25,000 and were being organized into increasingly large regular formations. The terrorist-guerrilla apparatus had grown to embrace an estimated 17,000. The operative question was not whether the Diem government as it was then moving could defeat the insurgents but whether it could save itself.94

The recent murder of a Saigon official was a spectacular display of just how bad the security situation had deteriorated. On October 1, guerillas kidnapped Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, Chief of South Vietnam’s Liaison Mission to the International Control Commission. On October 17, the day before the Taylor mission arrived in Saigon, Nam’s rotting corpse turned up in a part of the Saigon River located within the northernmost reaches of the city. As his body lay in state, the

Saigon government took its outrage to the international stage by condemning Hanoi for incident

and seeking redress from the ICC, but these officials declined to even investigate the matter until

the RVN provided solid evidence of North Vietnam’s involvement.95

41 The external threat fed the internal one. On October 22, the Counselor for Political

Affairs in Vietnam and Chairman of the Country Team Staff Committee, Joseph A. Mendenhall,

submitted a draft paper under the title “How Stable is the Diem Government?” Mendenhall

related that “Major Viet Cong incidents…have revived…long-standing dissatisfaction with

Diem’s lack of efficient organization and failure to rally broad political support among the

masses and the educated class.”96 This had produced “an atmosphere bordering on panic in

Saigon” that raised the possibility of Diem’s removal by means of “a palace revolution…a

military coup…[or] Communist overthrow.” Of these three potential uprisings, Mendenhall

concluded that “Only the military has the power to carry out a coup aimed at removing Diem

from power,” adding that “The possibility of such a coup is proportionate to the degree of

success or failure in the war…which in turn depends on proper governmental organization and

extent of political support for the government. Coup mutterings are on the rise because of the

recent deterioration in security.”97

Nolting concurred. On October 25, he reported to Rusk that “There has been a noticeable

rise in Saigon’s political temperature during the past week…[that] contributed additional

unsettling elements to [a] growing atmosphere of uneasiness.”98 Nolting added that “considerable

Cabinet level criticism,” combined with popular disaffection and military frustration to create a

situation of “insecurity, uneasiness and emergent instablitity.” The best remedy would be “A

genuine and important military victory.” Otherwise, “…further deterioration of [the]

situation…might well bring [the] situation to [a] head.”99 Like his American counterparts,

Nolting ascribed primary importance to war conditions in determining Diem’s viability. Unlike his colleagues, however, he did not acknowledge any benefit to a military insurrection.

42 As a result of such deficiencies, 1962 would be a year of interminable wrangling over

Diem’s refusal to make the changes demanded by his allies and countrymen. Back in

Washington, the basic argument centered on whether improvements in security could break

Diem’s resistance to reforms or if reforms needed to be implemented to provide true security.

From his new post at the Policy Planning Council, Rostow wrote to Harriman just before

Christmas that ARVN commanders needed greater freedom of action in order to take the initiative against the Viet Cong, but Diem’s paranoia had led him to restrict his generals from taking decisive actions “in order to minimize the chances of a coup.”100 By his refusal to

delegate, Diem had hamstrung his army; “Diem’s practices, intended to guard him against a

military coup, thus help create frustrations driving the military to stage one.”101 Rostow asserted

that “The vicious cycle needs to be broken,” and while “It could be broken by a successful coup,” American instigation of one would “involve grave risks.”102 Otherwise, “The alternative is to provide Diem with more personal security” through “units to be hand-picked by diem himself, with their officers subject to only his direction,” but the ARVN adamantly objected to further enhancements of Diem’s personal power.103 For the next year, advisors in Washington and

Saigon tried to provide security through a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan. For this purpose, Kennedy established the Special Group, Counterinsurgency (CI) under the direction of

General Taylor. One of its main undertakings was supervision of the Strategic Hamlet Program, a network of fortified villages whose inhabitants were tasked with defending their self-contained community from the Viet Cong. As in many other instances, however, the regime did not follow the prescribed methods for instituting the program, particularly in dispersing the settlements in a piecemeal manner throughout the countryside, rather than systematically expanding them from a central point tied to Saigon. A March 1962 report of the Special Group (CI) declared that South

43 Vietnam was undertaking civic action in a manner “not guided by a strategic plan” and that

“Their primary source of advice and guidance in the civic action field does not appear to be our

Country Team.”104 The result was that many hamlets were woefully inadequate, and instead of checking the Communist advance, they offered easy pickings for the Viet Cong. This merely

intensified an atmosphere of terror that prevailed throughout South Vietnam’s rural communities.105

Adding to the creeping insecurity, on February 26, 1962, a pair of rogue ARVN pilots

assaulted Independence Palace with bombs and gunfire in a failed attempt to foment a general

uprising. It turned out that the pilots had little to no wider backing, but this did little to assuage

Diem’s paranoia, nor did it reassure his allies. To the contrary, it increased Diem’s suspicion and

protectiveness of his position while enlivening calls for military intervention or backing a coup,

depending on the individual’s outlook. Diem temporarily grounded the Air Force (RVNAF) and

tightened security around Saigon.106 His interrogation of Bien Hoa Airfield’s Base Commander revealed the kind of frustrations that existed throughout the ARVN. Although “All expressed

their grief over the incident…They admitted that there had been some griping about the lack of

conveniences” compared to those of other air forces. Additionally, “There had been complaints

about the dangers involved in their operations, the hardship of being assigned away from their

families…and the overwork produced by the fact that there were too few pilots and planes…,”

while “Ground crew personnel were particularly unhappy over the fact that, as in most other

countries, they could not advance beyond the rank of Master Sergeant.”107 These were the

essential grievances of the ARVN officer corps: insufficient compensation, inadequate

provisions, and limited opportunities for advancement. Diem, however, largely dismissed them, believing that “…the pilots were young, excitable and immature.” The problem was an issue of

44 personnel rather than administration, for Diem thought that “…there should have been more

careful selection made prior to training and that family, education and background should be

more meticulously examined.”108 The great irony was that Diem’s solution was basically the contagion of rebelliousness itself: resentment in the military had generally sprung from perceptions of inequitable treatment derived from a system of selection and promotion that elevated status and loyalty over merit. In the face of hostilities borne of restrictiveness and discrimination, Diem entertained more of the same.

Military matters were the major preoccupation of American officials in 1962, but as stated previously, the war played into political arguments advocating a change in leadership. As deterioration continued in rural security and battlefield performance, the United States pursued a contradictory policy of expanding the nature of intervention as a route to extrication. This is the basic thesis advanced by Howard K. Jones in Death of a Generation. Kennedy and his military sold themselves the delusion they could stabilize the regime to prepare for withdrawal by assuming a greater role in prosecuting the war while concealing its actions from an American public and Congress that increasingly favored an end to the Saigon mission. In a fatal irony, the

United States attempted to reduce its commitment by expanding it, but Washington failed to appreciate that, the deeper American involvement went toward sustaining a reckless and unpopular regime, the harder it became to give up on the effort once it became clear that the

RVN leadership was utterly devoid of political and military wisdom. While the Americans and

ARVN fought for a nation, the Ngo family fought in the interest of self-preservation. Thus, the administration’s outlook was essentially incompatible with the objectives of the United States and the ARVN, as well as South Vietnam’s bureaucrats, intelligentsia, peasantry, and business community.

45 In such an atmosphere of futility, calls for Diem’s removal grew louder and acquired a bluntness previously absent in such proposals. Galbraith took up the issue again. This time, in proverbial undertones, he asserted that anyone was preferable to Diem, for “When the man in power is on the way down, anything is better.”109 Even the programs intended to build up the regime’s base of support instead increased popular fear and loathing of the regime. Programs are rarely executed in strict accordance with official policy, but Diem and Nhu managed to turn counterinsurgency on its head by reimagining schemes that were designed to meet the specific conditions of South Vietnam. The Strategic Hamlet program had an attractive theoretical foundation, but it could easily produce the opposite effect if it was conducted with insensitivity and carelessness. If the hamlets were not adequately constructed, its people were insufficiently armed, and its support network was ineffective, the inhabitants would come to see the government as endangering their safety and livelihoods by exposing them to Viet Cong aggression. Furthermore, forced relocation is inherently antagonistic to a populace, especially to one whose identity is so tied to the land and kinship. Diem and Nhu did not appreciate the emotional and physical stresses incurred by the rural population in being ripped from their homelands, and they failed to understand the need to clearly communicate the purpose of the program so as to cultivate national pride in the undertaking. At the very least, sufferings and inconvenience should be compensated by those in charge, and Saigon did little to repay the people for razing their communities and compelling them to construct entire villages and defense structures under the threat of violence and imprisonment.110 Administrators gave only cursory attention to security and communications needs, their foremost concern being the rapid erection of a hamlet so that it could move on to others as quickly as possible, leaving the people vulnerable to Communist incursions. They were also disinclined to communicate with the people

46 they were relocating or consider the geographical limitations to their work.111 In this manner, the

provincial administrators reflected the style of leadership emanating from Gia Long Palace.

The problem all came back to Diem’s authoritarianism. RVN officials were apt to behave in manners that concorded with Diem’s personalist rule, a political philosophy that valued discipline, loyalty, and hard work as the basis of nationalism, rather than democracy or civil liberty. In this worldview, powerful leadership is required for modernization of underdeveloped societies in a postcolonial world. The hamlets were conceived as a means of both providing security and cultivating national consciousness, but Diem’s brand of nationalism tended to ignore the emotional component of a successful revolution. In this way, Diem was obsessively focused on security and loyalty at the expense of instilling his countrymen with knowledge of and pride in nation-building. At the root of Diem’s misguided project was the fact that his undertakings were based primarily on self-interest rather than goodwill. Paranoia made Diem govern with a reckless disregard that undermined even his own objectives.

Wherever Diem failed to faithfully execute the national plan agreed to with his allies, the

United States attempted to pick up the slack. Much like Diem’s promises to reform rang hollow,

American threats of a cessation or suspension of aid were similarly without force, for they had repeatedly relented in giving Diem what he demanded without holding him to his promises. As with the decision to drop expectations for undertaking the measures included as Diem’s part of the bargain struck following the Taylor mission, when Diem failed to adhere to Hillman’s vision for counterinsurgency, the United States subsidized the creation of social services for the hamlets. In “A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam,” Hilsman declared that “The single most important element in eliminating the Viet Cong is the so-called Civic Action team,” each of which attended to a particular aspect of public service, social security, self-defense, or

47 infrastructure. Among these was a medical team to oversee sanitation and provide treatment to

the ill or wounded. As part of the social dimension of the counterinsurgency effort to which

Diem gave short shrift, medical services in the hamlets were either insufficient or non-existent.

To fill this void, NSAM-155 provided for an Emergency Medical Program for Vietnam. This

included recruiting foreign talent and supplying resources through the United States Operations

Mission (USOM) and the Agency for International Development (AID).112 Why would Diem

bother using up his time and resources on developing services that the Americans would provide

if he declined to do so? Diem may have been maddeningly uncooperative, but the United States

often undercut his motivation to make good on his compacts.

Washington exhibited its own shortcomings in policy discussions that drew out

conflicting criteria by which policymakers analyzed progress in the war effort. Civilian and

military authorities naturally perceive national security in different, often mutually exclusive manners that result in stalled efforts to craft effective policies. Hilsman and Lansdale seemed an incompatible pair on the surface given one’s background as an intelligence officer and the other’s reputation as a career diplomat known for his skilled negotiation of major settlements between bitter enemies. Yet they both astutely perceived the unique nature of revolution in the

Third World in appreciating that firepower and manpower offered little assurance of long-range security if the people did not stand behind the government. They both pressed the administration and Diem to respect the social, political, and economic dimensions of the RVN national plan, but their pleas fell on death ears at Gia Long Palace and the Pentagon. A conversation between

Lansdale and McNamara is instructive on this point. McNamara’s success owed to his expertise in business management. He made his reputation as a “Whiz Kid” at Ford Motor Company by systematizing a logistical and statistical approach to industrial administration in the auto

48 industry. McNamara brought his numbers games to the Pentagon, attempting to judge the war

according to quantifiable aspects of battlefield conditions: casualty figures, force size, population

density, property damage, etc. These methods helped put the destructive capacity of modern

armies into perspective, but when considered at the exclusion of intangible factors, they gave

disingenuous impressions that could prove disastrously misleading if adhered to religiously.

When McNamara showed Lansdale a massive ledger of battlefield statistics that he was using in

an attempt to computerize military analysis, Lansdale informed McNamara that he had an

incomplete list because he had “…left out the most important factor of all.” Befuddled,

McNamara looked at looked up at Lansdale and asked, “What is it?’ Lansdale responded matter- of-factly, “Well, it’s the human factor. You can put that down as the X factor.’ Not perceiving the facetiousness of Lansdale’s remark, McNamara acted on the sarcastic advice and proceeded to write down ‘X factor.’ Still not following Lansdale, McNamara asked “‘What does it consist of?” Lansdale’s response encapsulated the central misunderstanding responsible for the tragedy of the Vietnam War: the failure to consider “What the people on the battlefield really feel; which side they want to see win and which side they’re for at the moment. That’s the only way you’re ever going to have this war decided.” McNamara then went to erase the ‘X factor’ notation, but his colleague deterred him. Lansdale recalled that he was “pleading with McNamara not to codify the war and then believe what the figures were telling him.”113 McNamara was not alone

in his ignorance. Scores of other officials in the multiple administrations that managed the war

repeatedly failed to recognize that the Vietnam War was, above all, a battle for hearts and minds.

By the spring of 1962, the United States was deeply enmeshed in South Vietnam’s

domestic affairs. American planes flown by American airmen assaulted the countryside with

bombs, bullets, and chemicals that denuded agricultural lands and devastated traditional

49 communities. American vessels patrolled coastal waters beyond the demilitarized zone, and U.S.

officers returned fire against Communists as they accompanied ARVN battalions in field

operations. While technically not a combat mission, American commitments to Saigon ran deep

enough that virtually no high authority in Washington or Saigon proposed an unconditional withdrawal. The common hope was that the United States could “reduce its visibility without forgoing its commitment,” which in reality was a simply concerted effort to deceive the

American people and international community.114 Few were willing to accept the worldwide

humiliation that would result from throwing in the towel. Even those who were resolutely

opposed to combat troop deployments tended to argue for a negotiated settlement as a means to

save face. Galbraith took this position, but he believed that an acceptable settlement producing a

viable South Vietnamese state would have to be concluded with a rational government in Saigon.

To that regard, he asserted that “We cannot ourselves replace Diem. But we should be clear in

our mind that almost any non-Communist change would probably be beneficial, and this should

be the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area.”115 Galbraith had always been

one of the more aggressive advocates for a change in leadership, but as the second year of the

Kennedy presidency wore on, more American officials adopted the view that, rather than Diem

being the only man capable of leading South Vietnam, anyone else would be more effective.

As the insurgency intensified and spread from the backcountry into the villages, Kennedy

directed the Defense Department to plan for a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. Although the

president had consistently demonstrated his aversion to military adventures in Indochina, and

despite the fact that his desire to pull out was genuine, the sting of another Cold War defeat was

so unbearable that plans for withdrawal were always couched with the condition that they would

be activated by suitable improvements in the war and RVN government that would allow the

50 ARVN to stand and fight on its own to a final victory. For Washington to accept withdrawal, they needed reassurance that South Vietnam would remain non-Communist. Civilians in the administration came to see a coup as the only way to preserve South Vietnam’s indispensable strategic value as a bulwark against the Sino-Soviet bloc. Impatience in Washington had become palpable. Forrestal admonished the State Department to get tough with Diem. Exasperated by the steadily worsening situation, Forrestal stated, “I sense, without having the facts, that we have been pussy-footing Diem for too long. I don’t think we have much time to decide whether to stay with SVN [South Vietnam] on our terms or get out.”116

Even Diem’s top administrators took to alarming Washington. In June 1962, Senator

Mike Mansfield’s Legislative Assistant, Frank Valeo, reported to his boss on a conversation with the South Vietnamese ambassador, Tran Van Chuong. Choung confided to Valeo “That the

Diem government is in very deep trouble and has little prospects for survival” due to his proud nepotism and continued “obliviousness to the realities around him.” It was “implicit in [the ambassador’s] remarks…that a coup was imminent.” Valeo believed that Choung was trying to feel out Mansfield’s position on a coup, since the Senator had previously lobbied for a cessation of aid unless Diem was removed from power.117 Choung expected the coup to be undertaken by

“…a combination of the military and the presently dispossessed intellectuals.” It would turn out that Choung was not far off the mark. Although the rebellion that deposed Diem in November

1963 was wholly a military endeavor, the operation was influenced by widespread protest and civil disobedience on the part of intellectuals and political dissidents. Once Diem lost the support of South Vietnam’s elites, the military had little hesitation to oust Diem when it accorded to the national will.

51 Less than two weeks after Choung delivered his revelations to Valeo in Washington, Tho

revealed his frustrations with the regime to Mendenhall in Saigon. Tho was dismayed by the

implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. He understood that the project’s success

depended on its popularity, but the government’s methods were alienating the peasantry with the

abusive and careless manner by which communities were relocated. Tho also acknowledged

Diem’s meddlesome nature as the primary reason for the RVN’s administrative ineffectuality.

Mendenhall concluded his memorandum with a disclosure that begged for commentary beyond a parting statement of fact, writing, “…a reliable American told me two weeks ago that Vice

President Tho had just said to him in conversation that, if another coup attempt comes which appears likely to eliminate President Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu will see to it that the Vice President is eliminated through assassination during the attendant confusion.”118

The prospect that Nhu would try to activate a succession crisis by which he would be

installed as premier was entirely unacceptable to Mendenhall, the recently departed Counselor

for Public Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. If there was an alternative to Diem that

American officials could not accept, it was putting Nhu in charge. One of the central concerns among U.S. advisors and Diem’s subordinates was Nhu’s domineering presence at the palace.

Some questioned who was really in charge.119 Furthermore, Nhu was the subject of much popular

hatred for his use of the underground Can Lao party to distribute propaganda and harass political

dissidents, and he made additional enemies as the chief administrator of the Strategic Hamlet

Program. With little hope of improvement in South Vietnam’s security or political situation,

Mendenhall advised the State Department to “Get rid of Diem, Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and the rest of

the Ngo family.”120 Like Robertson, Mendenhall was beholden to the delusion that the United

States could maintain plausible deniability, but at least he disclaimed his ignorance:

52

(I have never carried out a coup, and am no expert in this field. I am suggesting a possible means of doing it—but there may be better ways.) It would be desirable to keep the U.S. hand in the coup concealed to the maximum extent feasible. We would want to avoid any public connotation that the new government was out puppet. However fear of exposure should not deter our discreet involvement. We shall always be accused by some of involvement (just as we were with respect to the November, 1960, coup attempt and the February, 1962, palace bombing). The cardinal rule would be not [italics in original] to admit involvement publicly.121

Mendenhall envisioned a process in which

U.S. officials would quietly sound out a few carefully selected Vietnamese (such as Tho or Minh) about a coup possibility, and would if indicated make known its readiness to support a coup at the proper time. With this encouragement these few Vietnamese would contact other Vietnamese about participation. U.S. contacts would be kept very limited to restrict knowledge of our role. We would advise behind the scenes on organization, and let the Vietnamese do all of the implementing.122

The memorandum went on to explain that the ideal circumstance for a coup would be a time when the entire Ngo family was absent. This included Diem, Nhu, Nhu’s wife (“Madame Nhu”), and the other two Ngo brothers, Ngo Dinh Thuc (Archbishop of Huè) and Ngo Dinh Luyen

(Ambassador to the United Kingdom). Futhermore, Mendenhall thought that Thuan and Tran

Kim Tuyen (chief of the secret police) should be “detained to prevent counter-plotting.”

Mendenhall thought that ARVN personnel should be examined to determine who would support a coup in order to assess who could be relied upon for backup. He was even willing to countenance the intervention of U.S. combat forces to deny Hanoi the opportunity to capture more territory in the midst of the chaos.123 Finally, Mendenhall declared that

Timing of a coup would be extremely important. Preferably the coup should be carried out when there is [a] publicly clear trend against the VN in the war with the Communists since many more Vietnamese would be psychologically prepared to support a coup under these circumstances. It would be preferable also to keep the interval between widespread planning and execution short because of the danger of leaks. This does not mean,

53 however, that the U.S might not discreetly work with selected Vietnamese on the development of coup plans well in advance of widespread contacts and execution.124

Although these plans would pass over several layers of personnel, the character of the November

1963 coup that toppled the regime was remarkably similar to the kind of operation that

Mendenhall conceived.

One year before General Doung Von Minh conspired with his disillusioned colleagues to smash the Diem regime, the State Department began to heat up with longings for just such an occurrence. Major policies often reach the upper administrative echelons by permeating through

the bureaucratic recesses where one finds those obscure, faceless officials who, lacking a public

reputation to risk, are more willing to champion bold solutions for delicate controversies. In this

fashion, Mendenhall returned to an argument had sporadically circulated the front lines of the

foreign service and CIA in a basic form for some time before Kennedy took office. As the war

worsened and Diem’s public standing withered to that of a hated demagogue, vague notions

transformed into detailed schemes for producing Diem’s downfall. When these ideas bubbled up

to the surface, high authority ultimately determined that a violent revolution was the only way to

save South Vietnam.

54 VI

Irreconcilable Differences

Diem’s intransigence intensified with the formal neutralization of Laos in July 1962. He

told Harriman point blank that “If you put that government in Laos, and put a communist

government next to my borders, I'm going to withdraw my ambassador from Vientiane.”125 In

September, he backed up his threat his threat with a message to the American embassy stating

that his government was “obliged to revise its whole diplomatic position and all its international

commitments regarding Laos.” 126 Diem recalled his ambassador, but convinced Diem to stay on if North Vietnam maintained only a chargé in Laos.127 The following month, however, Hanoi

instead sent its ambassador to Vientiane. Harriman instructed Nolting to tell Diem that his

“…stubbornness and personal feelings are understood, but there comes a time when being a good

ally requires laying them aside and cooperating to make joint policies work. This is such a time,

and you should now put the matter to Diem in such terms.”128 Nolting declined to oblige his

superior, arguing that such a position would undermine Kennedy’s prestige and American

influence in Saigon. “To take the position set out in your telegram would, in my judgment defeat

our purposes here—on an issue which in itself cannot compare in importance to the United

States with that of maintaining an independent, non-Communist Vietnam.”129 Years afterwar,

General Paul Harkins, commander of the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV) remembered this moment as the flash point of the push to excise the regime, with Harriman coming to the determination, “Okay. We'll start the cry ‘We've got to make some changes. We've got to get rid of [Diem].’”130

55 Thus, the lines were drawn for the disharmony that consumed U.S.-Vietnam relations and the policymaking that went along with in the final year of the Diem regime. On the one hand, neutralization appeared to Diem an abandonment of American promises to save South Vietnam, since a Communist Laos posed a grave threat to Saigon. Without the assurance of a total

American commitment, Diem felt little compunction to adhere to American conditions for his government. On the other hand, the subject of whether to drop Diem and seek his replacement became a highly divisive force among U.S. officials. The disagreement between Harriman and

Nolting was instructive of a basic division within the Washington establishment. Nolting’s opposition to a coup and insistence that the United States maintain aid to Saigon accorded generally to the position taken by the military under Taylor, who became the Chairman of Joint

Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 1962. Conversely, many in the foreign service and intelligence community wanted the United States to seek a change in leadership.

Hilsman sided with Harriman. From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, he offered a somber view of the situation in research memorandum RFE-59. Although many in Saigon and

Washington were imbued with optimism that the ARVN was gaining the upper hand against the

Viet Cong, Hilsman saw things differently. “At best, it appears that the rate of deterioration has decelerated with improvement” While South Vietnam had improved its security, “the ‘national liberation war’ has not abated nor has the Viet Cong been weakened.” At the same time,

“important military and civilian officials continue to participate in coup plots.” Hilsman believed that “The coup most likely to succeed would be one with non-Communist leadership and support, involving middle and top echelon military and civilian officials.” In his mind, the

United States held the cards for determining the nature of a power transfer and should do all that it could to ensure the resumption of counterinsurgency and prevent infighting.131 Even though

56 Diem had made some administrative changes, top level officials remained shuttered from

influencing policy while “There are reports from officials…that Diem continues to run the war

himself or through his inner circle…and that coup plotting persists and only the fear of

Communist exploitation and the belief that the US would not tolerate a coup keep it from

materializing.”132 In the event of a coup, Hilsman thought that the U.S. role should be to

“restrain the coup plotters from precipitous action” or, if the United States could not avert such

action, Americans might prevent the outbreak of “widespread fighting and a serious power

struggle which would lead to excessive bloodshed and weaken the fight against the Viet Cong.”

Finally, “The United States could also be helpful in achieving an agreement among the coup

leaders as to who should head the government.”133

While Hilsman finalized his report, Senator Mansfield was in Saigon getting a fresh take

on the situation there. In October, Kennedy had asked Mansfield to head up a bipartisan group of

Senators on a trip to several Cold War hot spots to conduct policy reviews. The team arrived in

Saigon on December 1 for a meeting with Nhu at Gia Long Palace just before noon, the new seat

of the government since the air assault on Independence Palace in February had left it uninhabitable. Nhu treated the Mansfield group to an exposition on the theory and practice of the

Strategic Hamlet Program in which the president’s brother brushed aside complaints that the regime was not pursuing democratization in the countryside. Nhu explained that Vietnam suffered from a threefold disadvantage of disunity, humiliation, and subversion. These circumstances made the Vietnamese people naturally unprepared for democracy, as “All

governments in underdeveloped countries that have tried democracy have been overthrown and

replaced by military regimes.” Nhu professed that what the hamlet’s needed most was structure

and discipline, contending that “The West pays too much attention to winning the sympathy of

57 the population, and not enough to organizing it. If the population is not organized, the

Communists will be able to mobilize it against the government overnight.”134 Turning to

concerns about publicity, Mansfield asked Nhu what could be done to improve international

reporting of the war. Again, Nhu was dismissive in claiming that “The free world is not adapted

to subversive war…The Western press, especially the American press, is not adapted to

subversive war and lags in the world evolutionary process.” He thought American reporters were

too inexperienced to provide fair coverage. They lacked “minimum standards of intellect and of

emotion in order to grasp the problems in Vietnam.” They failed to understand “that the

Vietnamese were conducting an impassioned war not subject to reason.”135

Mansfield was not impressed. On December 18, he completed a report on his experience in South Vietnam. The introduction offered a sobering view of South Vietnam’s political vitality.

“One thing is reasonably clear,” declared Mansfield, “From somewhere about 1956 or ’57, the unusual set of factors which had resulted in the establishment of the Republic under Ngo Dinh

Diem began to lose its impulse.” Although American aid had sustained South Vietnam in the fight against the Communists, it did not “stimula[te] the growth of indigenous roots for the political structure in Saigon.” Consequently, the Republic of Vietnam was more dependent on the United States than ever: “If Vietnam is the cork in the Southeast Asian bottle then American aid is more than ever the cork in the Vietnamese bottle.” The regime’s endless excuses had worn thin on Mansfield, as he’d heard them all before. “[I]t was distressing…to hear the situation described un much the same terms as on my last visit although it is seven years and billions of dollars later.” Despite generous aid and American expertise, Vietnam was still largely under Viet

Cong control, with “The government in Saigon still seeking acceptance by the ordinary people.”

South Vietnam had gotten nowhere in nearly a decade of independence. “In short, it would be

58 well to face the fact that we are once again at the beginning of the beginning.” Mansfield found

little comfort in the optimistic reports of enemy casualties or successes in winning over the

indigenous highlanders known as Montagnards because, although positive indicators, were “not

yet conclusive as to trends.” The most important factor was “the development of the theory of

the strategic hamlets” and “the injection of new energy” in the rural population. Mansfield

thought the Saigon leadership was too traditionalist to prosecute such a modern revolution. Their

administration was ill-suited for the task at hand, because “The difficulties in Vietnam are not

likely to be overcome by a handful of paid retainers and sycophants.” This required a “diffusion

of political power, essentially in a democratic manner,” which the regime had repeatedly refused

to undertake, thus lacking the “vigor and self-dedication” needed for success. Mansfield was resolutely opposed to military intervention, asserting that “Our role is and must remain secondary…It is their country, their future which is most at stake, not ours.”136

Nolting once again found himself up against an increasing tide of negative opinion about

the regime. In his memoirs, he accused Mansfield of being unfairly critical in charging that Diem

was out-of-touch with his people. “I found his comments unfair and decidedly unhelpful to our

relations with the South Vietnamese government.” Nolting implied that Mansfield was either

blinded by bias or beholden to political preoccupations: “I have no idea whether Mansfield came

to Saigon as an objective observer or whether his mind was set on American politics rather than

on the actual situation in Vietnam. I do feel that his appraisal reflected Frank Valeo’s influence

and the uneasy politics of Washington.”137 Nolting accused Mansfield of not understanding the nature of Asian political legitimacy. Diem “continued to be not popular because that’s the wrong

expression out there. No political leader is popular. He was respected in the sense of a good

59 mandarin…political leadership is whether the man is just and whether he rules well. It’s not

whether he reflects popular opinion.”138

The Mansfield report alarmed Kennedy. On December 26, the president and senator met

on Kennedy’s yacht in West Palm Beach. According to New York Times reporter David

Halberstam, Kennedy reacted with visible disgust to reading the report. ‘“Do you expect me to

take this at face value?’” Mansfield replied that Kennedy had asked him to take the trip, to which

the president sharply responded ‘“Well, I’ll read it again!’”139 Kennedy’s anger reflected not

disappointed in Mansfield but frustration with the continued deterioration of South Vietnam. His

personal assistant, Kenneth P. O’Donnell, recalled a decade later that Kennedy confided, “I got

angry with Mike for disagreeing with our policy so completely, and I got angry with myself for

agreeing with him.”140

Kennedy sought confirmation of Mansfield’s dire assessment from Hilsman and

Forrestal, two men whose recent messages had presented clearly their negative impressions of

the regime.141 They immediately set off on a mission that lasted from December 31 to January 9.

The trip came at a major turning point in the war. On January 2, U.S. advisors accompanied a

battalion of ARVN and Civil Guard troops to attack a Viet Cong stronghold at Ap Bac. Although

holding a dramatic advantage in weapons and manpower, the allied force suffered heavy

casualties, including the loss of three American advisors and five helicopters. The assaulting

force intended to destroy a nearby radio installation at Tan Thoi, but the operation was plagued

by miscalculation from the outset. The Viet Cong force was much stronger than anticipated, and

the advancing Civil Guard force came under heavy fire from well-positioned guerillas concealed by the terrain. Backup was slow to arrive, and when it did, it also became pinned down by heavy enemy fire at close range. Many of the arriving troops became stuck in the mud of a wide rice

60 paddy, left defenseless against a barrage of Communist fire. An armored rescue force under

Captain Ly Tong Ba waited nearly an hour to move in to assist paratroopers who were pinned

down by the enemy. Later on, American captain, Kenneth Good, pleaded for General Huynh Van

Cao to send in supporting infantry, but Cao refused, preferring instead to use artillery and

airpower to assault the enemy force. Good decided to take matters into his own hands and

charged the enemy himself, but the ARVN did not follow his lead and Good was mowed down

by the Viet Cong. Ensuing air strikes were also ineffective, as the Viet Cong had effectively

concealed their positions, and an additional helicopter was shot down trying to rescue soldiers

stuck in the paddy. By nightfall, the Viet Cong fell back and retreated as the ARVN

reinforcements arrived hours late. 142

In the strict sense that the allied force ultimately dislodged the Viet Cong from their

entrenched position, Ap Bac was a tactical victory, but heavy losses sustained in the face of a

much smaller and less well-equipped force—much of it the product of poor planning and bad

judgment in the field—made the event a watershed moment that seriously damaged American

confidence in the ARVN. Hilsman was more to the point in terming the battle “a stunning defeat

for the government forces,” since “They had the mobility of helicopters. They had the superior firepower of artillery. They had support from the air. They had the awesome might of the armored personnel carriers. Yet they had been badly beaten.”143 The battle put on full display the

military deficiencies that had plagued South Vietnam’s fighting force during the insurgency:

poor intelligence and bad decisionmaking by hesitant commanders. It exposed the lack of morale

and confidence that had repeatedly prevented the ARVN from making inroads against a

seemingly inferior enemy.

61 Coming on the heels of the Mansfield report, the battle of Ap Bac seemed to confirm the

senator’s sobering prognosis. In this regard, the Hilsman-Forrestal report also added to the

sagging image of the regime. While in Saigon, the team dispatched their on-site impressions to

Kennedy with a series of memoranda. At the outset of their trip, Hilsman reported, “I have the

impression that things are going much better than they were a year ago, but that they are not

going nearly so well as the people here in Saigon both military and civilian think they are.”144

While the Vietnamese had endless resources at their disposal, “progress and movement is highly

uneven.” Counterinsurgency required a high degree of coordination, but “this coordination is not

really being accomplished.” Hilsman also reported that “the military is still too heavily oriented

towards sweep-type operations,” while a continued emphasis on air power undermined the

government’s civic action campaigns since “Almost every operation…still begins with an air

strike which inevitably kills innocent people and warns the Viet Cong.”145

Hilsman did not understand why Nolting and Deputy Chief of Mission William C.

Trueheart were so optimistic. He attributed their rosy outlooks to the good feelings induced by

the flood of men, arms, and supplies to the countryside.146 The actual scene on the battlefield was not so encouraging. In one of his January memoranda, Hilsman described a conversation with

Major General Edward L. Rowny, the U.S. officer in charge of providing training and supplies to the South Vietnamese. Rowny described a normal day to Hilsman:

The troops are scheduled to move at a certain hour in the morning. Usually there is a considerable delay waiting for a previous air strike. The air strike is then made on a village at which the Viet Cong is reported to be ensconced. The helicopters then move out, the troops are landed outside the village and they start forward. After a little while there is a flurry on the right and someone drags a peasant out of a rice paddy…The peasant is bound and taken prisoner…Some time later another flurry appears on the left and a man runs toward the jungle. He is shot and killed and marked down as Viet Cong since he ran.

62 They then proceed to the village which is deserted except for an old man or perhaps an addlepated girl…Under interrogation [he or she] points toward some spot in the jungle, or some cellar or something. The troops go there and drag out a man who is hiding who is then bound and captured as a “suspected VC.” The operation has now reached noon. Everyone sits down, cooks their rice and meal. Patrols are sent out and around finding nothing and then an hour or so later the helicopters come back to pick the troops up and take them back to their regular billets.147

Rowny hardly described the image of a highly active, precise counterinsurgency effort designed

to win the hearts nad minds of the rural population. Worse yet, the methods themselves seemed

counterproductive. Hilsman did not understand why “[there are] such elaborate operations,

which are preceded by bombing, warning the VC and proceeding so slowly as to give the VC

ample time to escape.”148 Rowny believed the reason was that the ARVN was hesitant to engage

the enemy because “they do not really want to tangle with the enemy, they want to be completely

safe and not have any serious fight.”149 They were also sensitive to “Diem’s attitude towards

‘defeats.’ Diem’s cold propaganda line…is that there must never be a defeat, even a small one,

but only one long series of victories.”150 On top of this, “The Air Force is reluctant to provide

escort aircraft for helicopter missions. They put ‘interdiction’ on a higher priority…and

‘retaining command of the air’ at an even higher priority. There is, of course, no air opposition so

it is hard to justify failure to support the helicopters.”151

Meshed with the Mansfield report, the war effort seemed to be little more than a bungled

mess of discombobulated operations obstructed by commanders preoccupied with self-

preservation. Hilsman’s reporting on Diem was no more encouraging. One of the memoranda

mentions a conversation over four hours in length with the premier that left Hilsman with the

impression that “It is perfectly obvious that Diem regards these long conversations as a form of

amusement. He schedules them when he has plenty of free time and it is a substitute for bridge, movies, music, or social evenings.”152 A later dispatch containing some basic questions about the

63 situation spoke to the exasperation felt by Hilsman: “Is there a plan? There answer is no. There are five or six plans many of which are competing. There is, consequently, great confusion.”153

Again, Hilsman referenced the disjointed implementation of the various counterinsurgency programs, asking “Are the military and political action coordinated? The answer is—Imperfectly at best. There are huge gaps in what people are doing…the police program has not even begun to get off the ground, and this raises the possibility that the strategic villages will be built around

Communists and will rot from within which could bring the whole thing down in shambles.”154

Finally, “Is the U.S. effort coordinated? Is it guided by a clear conception which permits effective meshing of our various efforts? Answer—Individual agencies are doing a superb job…But it cannot really be said that there is wide understanding of [or?] a clear conception though some individuals do have a clear conception.”155

As for the Strategic Hamlets, Hilsman noted numerous problems in defense, supply, and administration. These included “lack of weapons for hamlet defenders” and a lack of funding for intelligence, “psychological warfare,” “village self-help projects”156 that were necessary to stave off Viet Cong assassinations and terrorism. As a result, “It is still impossible to move around the provinces safely without escorts.”157 There was also a “failure to get weapons down to the villagers” since the government wanted to make sure villagers are loyal to the regime before arming them.158 The combined impression of the Hilsman memoranda was that, in every direction, counterinsurgency was being hamstrung by the Diem government.

The CIA confirmed much of Hilsman’s preliminary findings in holding the regime primarily responsible for the deterioration in RVN security and stability. A Current Intelligence

Memorandum of January 11, 1963 noted that, although the ARVN had somewhat been able to check the flow of Communist infiltrators, “the tide has not yet turned,” for “The Viet

64 Cong…continue to expand the size and effectiveness of their forces, and are increasingly bold in

their attacks. Furthermore, “Diem’s political improvements have not kept pace with purely

military achievements.”159 Although enemy casualty figures were impressive for the most recent period, the CIA thought either they were exaggerated, the Viet Cong was able to maintain a

remarkable replacement rate, or a combination of both factors existed to produce misleading

numbers.160 Additionally, while the number of ARVN assaults had increased, “all too frequently

the Viet Cong are gone when the strike force arrives.”161 The report did note some progress in the

realm of local security and political awareness in countryside, but “The overall effectiveness of

the counterinsurgency effort…continues to be blunted by the government’s political modus

operandi.”162 This was because “Assorted control measures designed to guard against disloyalty in the military forces hobble their combat effectiveness,” creating a situation in which “Recent military appointments have removed some competent officers from responsible positions and replaced them with others deemed more loyal.” 163 Furthermore, the report declared that

“Provincial administration remains a major weakness; in some areas counterinsurgency programs have been carried out in such a way as to antagonize the peasantry further. Insensitivity to real or

fancied popular grievances or to issues of popular interest such as corruption has done little to

enhance the regime’s popular image.”164

The CIA intelligence memorandum asserted that the heart of the problem was, above all,

the Diem government, because “The Viet Cong actively exploit the government’s domestic

political shortcomings. The Viet Cong-controlled National Front for the Liberation of South

Vietnam purports to combine all shades of political opinion and works vigorously to identify

itself with the populace.”165 This last point was remarkable in that it basically said the Viet Cong had were achieving what the Diem regime had failed to do all along, in large part because of

65 Diem’s refusal to fully execute the counterinsurgency plan worked out with the United States.

His refusal to delegate authority, disregard for a systematic construction plan for the Strategic

Hamlets, and disinterest in finding a way to clearly communicate the regime’s nationalist vision

to the populace had left the door open for the Communists to fill the void, and they appeared to

be rising to the occasion. Consequently, the best the CIA could say about the situation in South

Vietnam was that “On balance, the war remains a slowly escalating stalemate.” This was hardly

an encouraging assessment. It fixed harder in the minds of some that Diem had to go.

On January 25, Hilsman and Forrestal submitted a formal report of their trip to President

Kennedy. The report begins with some positive developments in mentioning a boom in Strategic

Hamlet construction (despite the fact that “many of these are nothing more than a bamboo fence”), training of the Montagnards, expanded security, isolation of the Viet Cong, and deeper penetration of American aid and assistance.166 The rest of the report is decidedly negative. It

notes that “The Viet Cong continue to be aggressive and are extremely effective,” and that they

have increased their force strength by approximately twenty-eight percent in the previous year.

Hilsman and Forrestal warned that “it is ominous that in the face of greatly increased

government pressure and U.S. support the Viet Cong can still field 23,000 regular forces and

100,000 militia, supported by unknown thousands of sympathizers” from which they draw fresh

recruits.167 Despite better border security, the insurgency continued to supply this expanding

force with sufficient provisions to make war, leading Hilsman and Forrestal to state, “Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet Cong could continue the war effort at the present level, or perhaps increase it, even if infiltration routes were completely closed.”168

The key to combatting the insurgency, argued Hilsman and Forrestal, was “the attitude of

the villagers,” although, “It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess how the villagers really

66 feel.”169 While some village sentries admirably defended their hamlets, there were many cases in

which “the villagers have merely let the Viet Cong in or supplied what they wanted without

reporting the incident.” Furthermore, while the rural population exhibited irritation with the

guerillas over taxation, “there may be just as much resentment and suspicion directed towards

the government.” The most significant factor in this regard, which no one could accurately

calculate, was “how many of the 20,000 ‘Viet Cong’ killed last year were only innocent, or at

least persuadable villagers, whether the Strategic Hamlet program is providing enough

government services to counteract the sacrifices it requires, or how the mute mass of villagers

react to the charges against Diem of dictatorship and nepotism.” Hilsman and Forrestal reasoned

that “At the very least, the figures on Viet Cong strength imply a continuing flow of recruits and

supplies from these same villages and indicate that a substantial portion of the population is still

cooperating with the enemy.” It was difficult to tell whether it was fear or loathing that produced

abetment of the insurgents, but “the net impression is one of some encouragement…overlaid by

a shadow of uneasiness.”170 From these points, both men reached the conclusion that South

Vietnam was “probably winning, but certainly more slowly than we had hoped. At the rate it is now going the war will last longer than we would like, cost more in terms of both lives and money than we anticipated, and prolong the period in which a sudden and dramatic event would upset the gains already made.”171

Assessing the overall strategic concept of the program, Hilsman and Forrestal asserted

that, since the rural population was naturally politically apathetic, “they are likely to remain or

even become pro-Communist if the government does not show concern for their welfare in the

way it conducts the war and in the effort it makes to provide at least simple government

services.”172 What prevented the government from doing so was the “lack of an overall plan,”

67 which led to “the proliferation of strategic hamlets that are inadequately equipped and defended,

or that are built prematurely in exposed areas.”173 Failures in coordination also prevented Saigon

from effectively distributing its manpower and ensuring coordination between the military and

political aspects of the program. An example of this was the disproportionate use of ‘“clear and

hold’ as opposed to ‘hit and withdraw’ operations,” the former of which was essential to the

expansion of secure areas.174 Additionally, a preference for “elaborate, set-piece operations” that were “expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to keep secret.” Their most significant disadvantage was the potential for “maximizing the chances of killing civilians.”175 Air strikes possessed a similar capacity for damaging the regime’s popularity.176

Then there were the administrative shortcomings that had long plagued the alliance.

Hilsman and Forrestal criticized the regime for its stubborn refusal to implement an amnesty

program to help siphon off some Viet Cong recruits by ensuring that enemy deserters would not

tried for treason. Instead, the regime wanted what amounted to a ‘“surrender policy.’” Another

problem was the regime’s failure to “organize its economy on an emergency basis” with

measures that included deficit spending and targeted disbursements. Instead of meticulously

planning the allocation of funds and resources, Saigon “permitted too large a part of the

country’s internal and external resources to go to non-essential purposes.” 177 The regime also

neglected to reinforce the hamlets once they were constructed.178 In domestic politics, Hilsman

and Forrestal thought that the Diem’s authoritarianism probably had little effect on the

peasantry’s views toward the regime. This did, however, play a role in “alienating the middle and

higher level officials on whom the government must depend to carry out its policies.”179

In closing, Hilsman and Forrestal recommended

68 that the United States push the Diem government harder on the need for an overall plan, on a reduction in the number of different military organizations, on the foreign policy questions…on an effective police program, for a greater emphasis on military operations extending and securing government control as opposed to large-scale offensives and air interdiction, on a meaningful amnesty program, on planning for the post-war economy, and on a realistic effort to get a more favorable press.180

They recognized, however, that the United States had been trying to push Diem on these matters

for a long time going back to the previous administration. Considering this, they believed that the

basic question was “how to increase our leverage in the face of Diem’s biases and general

resistance to advice.” In their judgment, “the time has probably come when we can press our

views on Diem more vigorously and occasionally even publicly.”181

Hilsman and Forrestal had more to say, however, which they did in an “Eyes Only”

annex to their report for President Kennedy. In the attachment, they noted that “some of the

criticisms of the Vietnamese also apply to the Americans.” These included a lack of planning and

a tendency of middle and high-level officials to ignore the civil and political dimensions of counterinsurgency. Getting to the heart of the matter, Kennedy’s advisors regretted that “In general, we don’t use all the leverage we have to persuade Diem to adopt policies which we espouse.” 182 One might naturally assume that Hilsman and Forrestal meant that dangling aid in

front of Diem as an enticement for reform might get him to make the changes necessary to

increase his popularity. They were prepared to go much further than the old carrot-and-stick method, however, for they lamented that the United States had “virtually no contact with meaningful opposition elements and…made no attempt to maintain a U.S. position independent of Diem.”183 Hilsman and Forrestal wanted “a more outspoken U.S. attitude on public policies” by a more assertive U.S. mission that would “push harder for a gradual liberalization of the authoritarian political structure.”184 What stood in the way of this was the fact that “the rather

69 large U.S. effort in South Vietnam is managed by a multitude of independent U.S. agencies and people with little or no overall direction. No one man is in charge…The result is that the U.S. effort…is fragmented and duplicative.”185 Therefore, the two men recommended that that United

States “give authority to a single, strong executive, a man perhaps with a military background but who understands that this war is essentially a struggle to build a nation out of the chaos of revolution.”186 Hilsman and Forrestal thought that this could be done either by appointing a general as ambassador or appointing an ambassador who was “a civilian public figure whose character and reputation would permit him to dominate the representatives of all other departments and agencies.”187 Seven months later, this is precisely happened.

70 VII

Second Thoughts

The significance of the Hilsman-Forrestal report was twofold. First, its recommendations portended the turn toward a more aggressive kind of diplomacy that U.S.-Vietnam relations took over the course of 1963. In drawing attention to the Diem regime’s perpetual obstinance to reform, and by directly connecting administrative failures to disappointments in counterinsurgency, Hilsman and Forrestal activated a sense of urgency to concerns about the political liabilities of the Diem-Nhu power structure. Second, by detailing the insurgency’s growth and the comparative shortcomings in the regime’s campaigns for security and civic action, Hilsman and Forrestal imbued Washington with a deep uneasiness about the war’s progress and a greater willingness to undertake drastic measures to check the Communist advance. In combination, these preoccupations brought Vietnam to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in 1963, paving the way for a series of momentous decisions that would accelerate the deterioration in South Vietnam’s domestic conditions and set the course towards an American tragedy of unrivalled proportions.

The combination of RFE-59, the Mansfield report, the Battle of Ap Bac, the January CIA memorandum, and the Hilsman-Forrestal report catalyzed disillusionment among American officials. Preoccupation with Vietnam in general and the Diem regime in particular took on a dramatic character as Washington confronted the disturbing reality that it was losing control of

South Vietnam. Forrestal noted that Kennedy in particular exhibited heightened anxiety over situation. “The thing that bothered him the most,” Forrestal told the Congressional Research

Service, “was that we were fighting a war, or helping Diem fight a war, with massive military

71 means in a situation which was essentially a civil war—an elephant trying to kill a fly sort of

thing. We were killing lots of other people at the same time we were trying to kill Viet Cong.”188

Concern over the Diem regime was widespread by early 1963. In addition to those in the

State Department, influential figures at the CIA and in the halls of Congress also thought well of

dropping Diem. Additional support came from respected academics and news correspondents.

One of these was Henry Morgenthau, a professor of political science and consultant to the State

Department. In an article written for Commentary in the spring of 1962, Morgenthau laid out a

rationale for regime change that is essentially a synopsis of the logic entertained by Diem’s

opponents. It also offers a prescient warning on the dangers of intervention. Morgenthau worried

that Diem’s “political weakness compels us in the end to commit ourselves militarily beyond

what our national interest would require.” By propping up an unpopular figure in South Vietnam,

Morgenthau feared that the United States would ultimately be trapped in a “Korean-type war, fought under political and military conditions much more unfavorable than those that prevailed in Korea and in the world a decade ago.” Sensitive to the pitfalls of such misadventures,

Morgenthau admonished readers of the reality that “Such a war cannot be won quickly, if it can be won at all, and may well last, like its Greek and Malayan counter parts, 5 or 10 years, perhaps only to end again in a stalemate, as did the Korean war.” This would undoubtedly “have a profound impact upon the political health of the Nation…The American people are bound to be at least as deeply affected by the frustrations of a Vietnamese War.”189

Morgenthau was deathly afraid of American entanglement in an Asian civil war, but his

Cold War sensitivities made withdrawal, and with it, the near-certain loss of Vietnam to

communism, an entirely unacceptable course of action. In the anticommunist mind, the U.S.

mission in Saigon was always about much more than Vietnam; it was about keeping the entirety

72 of Southeast Asia, and by extension, the subcontinental lands and waterways neighboring it, out

of communist hands. Kennedy cogently iterated these concepts at a press conference in March

1963, when he maintained that withdrawal was not an option: “I don’t see how we are going to be able, unless we are going to pull out of Southeast Asia and turn it over to the Communists . . . to reduce very much our economic programs and military programs in South Viet-Nam, in

Cambodia, in Thailand.” The president thought that those advocating withdrawal should consider the economic costs “as opposed to having the Communists control all of Southeast Asia with the inevitable effect that this would have on the security of India and, therefore, really begin to run perhaps all the way toward the Middle East…[W]hile we would all like to lighten the burden, I

don't see any real prospect of the burden being lightened for the U.S. in Southeast Asia in the

next year if we are going to do the job and meet what I think are very clear national needs.”190

Beholden to the same logic, Morgenthau determined that backing a coup was a reasonable option

to avoid a large-scale military commitment while maintaining South Vietnam as a Southeast

Asian anticommunist bulwark. This would imply “the subordination of our military

commitments to, and thus their limitation by, our political objectives in South Vietnam.”191 If the

United States wished to maintain the Republic of Vietnam without the use of American soldiers, then the United States must seek “the restoration of a viable political order, which constitutes the only effective defense against Communist subversion”192 Morgenthau believed that “such a

political order can be established only through American intervention.” Those who opposed

intervention were “infantile,” because if the United States “had not intervened consistently since

1954 in the affairs of South Vietnam, Mr. Diem would not be its President today and South

Vietnam itself would not exist.” The decision to make was “not between intervention and

nonintervention, but between an intervention which serves our political interests and thereby

73 limits our military commitments, and an intervention which supports to the bitter end the powers

that be, even if their policies…jeopardize the interests of the United States.”193 Morgenthau believed that a military figure would be well-suited to lead South Vietnam. In statement remarkably similar to one made by Galbraith in a letter to Kennedy nearly eighteen months earlier, Morgenthau asserted that “The idea that there is no alternative to Diem is in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There appears to be no alternative to Diem only because we have placed all our bets on him.”194

The one group still in Diem’s corner was the U.S. military. Around the same time that

Hilsman and Forrestal were conducting their review, General Earle Wheeler led a team of U.S.

commanders on an inspection tour of South Vietnam. At the end of January, the team sent an

extensive report to the president that determined, despite the “continuity of Vet Cong strength,

the growth in quantity of Chinese Communist weapons…and the increased size and

sophistication of the Viet Cong communications system,” his team believed that the

“Government of Vietnam is making steady and favorable progress…Every Vietnamese corps

commander, and many United States advisors, attest to a growth in confidence in the government

which the common people are now demonstrating by providing useful intelligence.”195 The

optimism went further, for the Wheeler group argued that “This favorable trend is self-

regenerative. The more good intelligence that is forthcoming, the greater the number of

successful operations that can be undertaken. These successes, in turn, provide for more

tranquility and confidence in the countryside, with the result that there is still greater willingness

on the part of the people to support the government cause with information.”196 The great irony

was that, even though the Wheeler report documented an insurgency of much greater strength

74 and capability than had been acknowledged in previous estimates, this was taken as evidence of

progress due to the enhanced system of intelligence collection that had exposed it.

On political points, the Wheeler report could not have been more at variance with the one

by Hilsman and Forrestal. Wheeler’s team argued that “The basic problem now is to restore law

and order, particularly in the rural areas, so that measures for the development of political and

economic strength can take hold.”197 Where Hilsman and Forrestal took concern at glaring

weaknesses and inconsistencies in the civic action program, Wheeler’s men took heart, claiming

that “The strategic hamlet program is perhaps the greatest single case for this encouraging

development. It is a program aimed directly at the people that not only provides them with an

elementary system of defense against, and isolation from, the Viet Cong, but also is the vehicle

by which the Government of Vietnam can carry forward a political, economic, and social

revolution.”198 The report noted with pride that “More than 4,000 hamlets have been completed,” conveniently ignoring the serious inadequacies that made many of the hamlets a sham. Overall, the team concluded that “victory is now a hopeful prospect” and that “the current support

program in Vietnam is adequate…This view derives from the conviction that we are winning

slowly in the present thrust, and that there is no compelling reason to change.”199 Rejecting out of

hand the option of “complete disengagement,” Wheeler’s advice was to “make the North

Vietnamese bleed” by a “coordinated program of sabotage, destruction, propaganda, and subversive missions against North Vietnam.”200 Wheeler insisted the United States would

“remain wholly in the background” while conducting this campaign. However, this would be a

“powerful military endeavor rather” than an “ancillary” one. To undertake expanded clandestine

operations, Wheeler and his men requested that the MAAG to be absorbed into MACV.201

75 Thus, the State and Defense departments were worlds apart in their analyses. To that regard, Forrestal told Kennedy that “The meeting with General Wheeler on Friday was a complete waste of your time for which I apologize. It was intended to provide you an opportunity to initiate action on some of the problems in South Vietnam described in the Eyes

Only Annex to Hilsman’s and my report. The rosy euphoria generated by Wheeler’s report made this device unworkable.”202 Toward this end, Forrestal offered to team up with Harriman on “a quiet campaign in the appropriate departments” which, among other things, included an effort

“to develop gradually a more independent posture for the U.S. in South Vietnam and very carefully to dissociate ourselves from those policies and practices of the GVN of which we disapprove with good reason.”203 He also thought the president should consider replacing Nolting in the coming spring and volunteered himself and Harriman to undertake the search for a successor.204 This was the first step down the road toward a coup, the aftermath of which would make South Vietnam’s current troubles seem like minor discomforts in comparison to the total chaos that would soon envelop the fledgling nation.

76 VIII

The End of the Line

In March of 1963, Kennedy effected another change in personnel that reflected his desire

for political solutions to Vietnam’s hindrances. Hilsman took over for Harriman as Assistant

Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, with the latter being moved up to Under Secretary of

State for Political Affairs. The move accompanied those made in the winter of 1961-62 that

transferred both weak-willed and hawkish State Department officials to positions of secondary

influence in exchange for those who were politically inclined but overzealous in their own right.

With these changes, the number two and three men on Vietnam policy had acquitted themselves

as Vietnam interventionists. Along with Forrestal at the NSC, these men formed an anti-Diem

triumvirate that worked directly at variance with the Defense Department in forcefully

advocating for Diem’s overthrow.

Forrestal explained to Harriman that there were “two major reasons” for “expanding the

contacts between U.S. personnel in Saigon and non-communist elements of the Vietnamese

opposition.” The first of these was this would be part of a larger effort to “establish a somewhat

more independent U.S. position” in South Vietnam. Secondly, Forrestal thought this would

provide reassurance of “increas[ing] our alternatives in the event of an accident which results in

a shift in the government.” He suggested contacts might be established through disgruntled trade

unions by telling Americans in Saigon “to be available to non-governmental personalities and to

listen to their problems.”205

Nolting found himself up against the anti-Diem cabal. In late February, he told Harriman that, despite “the implication that we are living in cocoons here,” the embassy had maintained

77 communication with a wide range of oppositionists. The ambassador would have introduced

Forrestal to these elements when he was in Saigon, but he could not see “what good this would

have done—outside of demonstrating a point and possibly stimulating a coup.” Nolting reminded

Harriman that “There is…a great difference between being accessible to oppositionists and

giving them encouragement. Many of them tend towards radical solutions and we give them no

encouragement” since this might “stimulate revolution.” He closed with the assertion that, if

Forrestal was really seeking “an alternative to the present government…I am opposed, for

reasons: (1) that I see no viable or better alternative; (2) that any such attempt would ruin the

carefully built base of our advisory and supporting role here, which must rest on persuasion and

on confidence in our integrity.” 206 Three weeks later, Nolting adamantly told Harriman that open

criticism of the Diem government was counterproductive, for it “made the govt here tighten up

rather than liberalize, and has encouraged the enemy.”207 The following month, he reiterated the

warning that pressuring Diem “will not move Diem but on contrary lead to retaliatory action and

descending spiral our relations and…might light coup fuse. (We continue have no grounds to

believe that coup would bring to power a government more likely to win the war than Diem. On

contrary, we think a coup…would weaken chances of preserving independence of SVN.)”208

Forrestal, however, found Vietnamese encouragement for his views. In early March, he had a private conversation with Ambassador Choung, who remarked that “the Diem regime…was not only a dictatorship, but worse—an inefficient one.” Choung “said he realized

the United States had brought all sorts of pressures on Diem to liberalize the regime but that such

pressures were doomed to failure, since running a totalitarian regime was like riding a tiger—you

could not get off its back.” He went on to note declare that “Nhu was the intellectual force

behind Diem and would never give up his power willingly. Indeed it was largely because of Nhu

78 that the Vietnamese Government was deprived of the services of its most able people” since

“There has been a deliberate policy of forcing any person of competence out of his job and into

exile.” Worse yet, Choung judged that “within six months it would become obvious that the

Diem regime could not possibly win the war.” He insisted that the only solution “was to bring

about a change in government, which could probably only be done with violence.”209

Nhu embodied personalist authoritarianism. He asserted that “in developed societies with

a tradition of democratic control…such institutions as a free press, free association and

assembly, democratic political institutions, and free universities contribute to democratic control

of political institutions.” South Vietnam was not one of these societies, however, which meant

that “other forms of control are necessary.”210 Furthemore, Nhu “said that for us to understand

President Diem we should recall that Diem had spent a great part of his life in reaction against

reaction and resistance to French domination.”211 Considering this, Nhu requested that his allies

understand that Diem’s rebuffs were necessary to demonstrate independence and protect himself

from accusations of being a puppet. Madame Nhu had recently told the Women’s Solidarity

Movement (WSM) that the United States was attempting to eliminate “‘to make lackeys of

Vietnamese and to seduce Vietnamese women into decadent paths.’”212

The manner by which Nhu dismissed American complaints was representative of regime’s general disposition: authoritarianism and obstinance were excusable because South

Vietnam lacked democratic traditions and was sensitive to the re-appearance of colonial power dynamics. As such, the regime had to force the Vietnamese people to adopt a civic-minded

approach to nation-building while constantly guarding against the appearance of foreign

domination. The Saigon government’s position was obviously discouraging. An April National

Intelligence Estimate (NIE) declared that “the situation remains fragile” and reasoned that “the

79 government’s capacity to embark upon the broader measures required to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable.” Even if the ARVN gained the upper hand,

“political stability would be greatly threatened if disappointment with the regime’s performance mounted among important sectors of the population and if the conviction deepened that legal avenues to change remained blocked.”213

Forrestal wanted to get planning underway for either forcing Diem to reform or instigating his removal. Charles Heavner, Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group thought that the embassy should press for a list of reforms that included “recognition of a legal opposition, delegation of presidential authority, acceptance of addition U.S. direction of the economic and social aspects of the strategic hamlet program, land reform, and measures to increase income for Vietnamese farmers.” Beyond reforms, the foremost concern was “what to do if Diem passes from the scene.” Heavner agreed the Nhu was entirely unacceptable as a successor, because “He is so cordially hated by all and sundry that I think he could not possibly lead the Vietnamese to victory against the VC. Moreover, his anti-American bias seems much stronger than that of Diem; I doubt that we could work with him even as well as we do with the old boy.”214

By the early spring of 1963, the United States appeared destined for a final break with the

Diem regime. For more than two years, the official posture of persuasion had failed to establish pillars of democracy in South Vietnam. At the same time, counterinsurgency lagged well behind the point at which Americans had envisioned in 1961 that the RVN would be two years eighteen months after Kennedy’s inauguration. If anything, it seemed that South Vietnam’s domestic and international conditions had regressed: the insurgency was stronger than ever, the populace was brewing with resentment, and the regime appeared to be more assertive than ever in its

80 reluctance to implement major reforms. Even avowed nationalists and genuine patriots had expressed deep misgivings over the decisions being made at the palace. These factors combined to firmly fix the impression in American minds that the Diem regime was doomed and that the war would soon be lost if it remained in power. If hatred for the Saigon government became widespread among the general population to the point that the national will could be said to accord with that of influential figures in the military and bureaucracy who insisted that a change in leadership was necessary for national survival, American officials would accept the necessity of a coup to preserve noncommunist government south of the seventeenth parallel.

81 VIII

Road to Disaster

On May 8, 1963, unrest broke out in the central Vietnamese city of Hué when its Catholic province chief invoked a rarely-observed ban on religious flags known as Decree Number 10.

Ngo Dinh Thuc, Diem’s brother and the archbishop of Hué, had recently compelled the Saigon government to issue a circular letter reminding provincial officials of the flag ordinance. His reason for doing so is unclear, but explanations typically center on personal resentment of more popular Catholic leaders or irritation over the political assertions of Hué’s heavily Buddhist population. In the early years of the republic, Ngo Dinh Can had administered the province as a paternalistic authoritarian whose power derived from personal ties to Vietnamese cultural and social networks. High on the list of Can’s patronage system were Hué’s Buddhists, and when

Can felt his local authority slipping to Saigon in the early 1960s, he tried to exploit the Buddhists to maintain his influence by encouraging them to make themselves heard to the central government.215

Emboldened, the Buddhists resented enforcement of the flag law, as the law was “never observed;” Catholics had been allowed to display their own religious banners just a week earlier, but now that Buddhists wished to display their own banners to commemorate the Buddha’s birthday, the law was suddenly important to the government. This decision caused long- simmering religious tensions to boil over. Gathering in front of Tu Dam pagoda, the Buddhists were treated to a speech by the head Buddhist monk (bonze) of Central Vietnam, Thich Tri

Quang, who denounced the government as oppressive and made an impassioned plea for religious equality. As the day wore on, the crowd grew larger and more restive, making the local

82 authorities anxious. The Buddhists told the director of the local radio station to broadcast Tri

Quang’s speech from earlier that day. He refused. Faced with a rowdy mob and fearing for his safety, the director phoned the deputy province chief, Major Dang Sy, who, at Thuc’s advice, arrived at the radio station with a company of Civil Guardsmen to disperse the crowd two hours after being informed that a riot had broken near the pagoda. Sy’s men arrived in armored vehicles, wielding rifles and MK III grenades. At this point, one or a series of explosions went off in the crowd. Sy panicked, ordering his men to open fire, and in the ensuing chaos, a barrage of grenades and bullets ripped into the crowd. Some who attempted to flee were crushed under

Sy’s armored vehicles, their mangled corpses setting the scene of the carnage. When the dust settled, there were nine dead and fourteen wounded civilians strewn about the plaza, including six children and one woman.216 Saigon claimed that Viet Cong terrorists had detonated plastic

explosives, causing Sy’s men to return fire, but this has never been corroborated.217 Regardless of

how the event went down, it opened up the Diem regime to a firestorm of public criticism that

ultimately spelled its demise.

In the aftermath, Tri Quang called on the growing crowd to dissemble and await further

instructions. On May 10, the crowd at the pagoda swelled to 6,000 while Tri Quang roused them

with an impassioned speech against the Diem government.218 A group of Buddhist leaders

subsequently took to the streets and pressed the government to repeal the flag law, end arbitrary

arrests, and grant religious equality to Buddhists, but Diem remained largely unresponsive and

insensitive to their complaints. They also requested for families of the May 8 victims to be

indemnified and for a memorial to be held in their honor at every pagoda across Vietnam.219

Instead of mollifying the Buddhists, Diem further antagonized them by arresting their leaders,

denying the legitimacy of their protest, and blocking their access to the pagodas, but the

83 Buddhists planned to employ hunger strikes and further agitations to secure redress of their grievances.220 Throughout the crisis, the State Department advised Diem to placate the Buddhists by acceding to all of their demands, but he continued to evade, dismiss, and equivocate when confronted about the grave damage he was doing to his regime’s political base.221

In the midst of this chaos, Forrestal continued to demand Nolting’s replacement.222 The disconnection between Washington and the ambassador was completely exposed by the Buddhist affair. On May 17, Nolting reported on the heartening experience of trips to the countryside with

Diem that had left him with the impression that “important improvements were unmistakable:” there was an “enthusiasm among peasants and officials alike in progress to date towards permanent security;” there was an “evident goodwill and cooperation existing between U.S. advisors…and their GVN opposite[s];” there existed an “obvious purpose of President Diem to show Americans…his appreciation of American help;” and, “perhaps most striking,” Diem demonstrated his “touch with the people.” Nolting admitted that “there continue to be snafus,” but he was certain that “the general average of internal performance is improving constantly.”223

Nolting had his first meeting with Diem after the massacre on May 18. The ambassador

“sought to impress on him [the] need for further GVN action and specifically suggested public declaration by him and/or appointment [of a] commission” to study the events of May 8. Diem would not commit to the idea, however, and insisted that the Buddhists and Viet Cong were to blame for the violence. Overall, Nolting reported that “Diem appears to feel that the whole affair is far less serious matter than we do”224

Diem responded to the Buddhist demands by simply insisting that religious freedom had already been guaranteed by the RVN constitution, taking little concrete action to provide reassurance.225 Diem maintained that the banner displays had been ‘disorderly.’ 226

84 Demonstrations again erupted in Hué on June 1, the day after bonzes had begun hunger strikes.

Despite Diem’s decision to remove three province chiefs as punishment for the deaths of May 8,

this did little to quell the unrest.227 In fact, the protest spread to Saigon, where on June 3, three

hundred troops clashed with protestors in a mêlée of rocks and teargas. Fleeing demonstrators

were prevented by barbed wire barricades from retreating to the pagoda. Shortly thereafter, a

false alarm came that Tri Quang, inspirational leader of the movement, had died from his hunger

strike.228

On May 23, Nolting forwarded Hilsman the new contingency plan drafted Chalmers

Wood, Director of the Vietnam Working Group. Although Forrestal had requested the report

before the unrest in Hué broke out, Wood’s plan matched the current situation well, setting the

tenor of U.S. policy in the lead-up to Diem’s overthrow. Wood asserted that a change in

government was “inevitable.” In this circumstance, “The U.S. role should, if possible, be limited

to indicating discreetly, but clearly the conditions under which the U.S. would recognize and

support a new government.” Furthermore, “In a situation which is likely to be chaotic and

dangerous prompt decisions and actions by the ambassador must not be inhibited. He will be

expected to seek instructions from Washington if, in his judgment, time permits.”229 The White

House approved the plan on June 6, and as the Buddhist crisis drug on, it became clearer by the day that the contingency would soon become reality. While the plan stated that “U.S. personnel should under no circumstances discuss with any Vietnamese the position which the U.S. might take in the event of a government crisis,” it essentially gave the ambassador a blank check in the event of a crisis.230 This was good for Diem as long as Nolting was in charge, but if the embassy changed hands, Diem’s hold on the presidency could not be assured.

85 On the same day that Nolting forwarded the contingency plan, he sent a cable to the State

Department that summarized his take on the ongoing crisis. He continued to defend the Ngo

family, declaring that Nhu espoused “nothing inconsistent with U.S. objectives” and insisting

that he sought “to promote a genuine revolution among the people” by seeking to make the army

an independent entity. Nolting also reported a discussion with Tho in which the vice president

expressed that “he thought things were going well internally in the struggle against VC.”

Considering what Tho had confided to his allies in earlier meetings, this was, at best, half of the

story. The following day, Nolting departed Vietnam on a six-week leave that included both vacation and consultations with his superiors in Washington before returning to Saigon in July.

During Nolting’s absence, his deputy, William Trueheart, served in his stead.231

Trueheart had quite a situation on his hands. By the end of May, the Buddhists had still

received no satisfaction from the government. To the contrary, they had been further antagonized

by Diem’s dismissal of their demands. The perception of insensitivity and hostility on the part of

the government gained reinforcement from a May 29 New York Times article by David

Halberstam that reported “Diem had told Buddhist leaders on May 15 that they were ‘damn

fools’ to ask for religious freedom when it was guaranteed by Vietnan’s Constitution.”232 In

response, the Buddhists planned to ratchet up their protest with hunger strikes and memorial

services. Rusk advised Trueheart to “make continuing effort [to] move [Diem]” and “persuade

him to take further actions to meet Buddhist demands,” such as “public reassurance…that

Constitutional provision…for religious freedom will be enforced.”233 Diem acted on this with a

May 29 decree “affirming freedom of religion in Vietnam and reiterating that national flag must

be given supremacy.” The statement also declared “that regulations for display of national flag

86 intended to emphasize it as [a] symbol of national unity and not intended to be discriminatory

toward any religion.”234

Talk was cheap. On May 31, Trueheart reported that hunger strikes continued and that it

was “quite clear that feeling continues to run deep among [the] Buddhists.” He added that it was

also “equally clear that problem facing GVN goes well beyond issues [of] religious freedom and

discrimination.”235 Trueheart understood that the regime had backed itself into a corner with its

initial reaction to the protest. The “psychological moment to do so has long passed in any event,”

wrote Trueheart, believing that it was “too late for GVN concessions…to halt Buddhist

agitation.” The “May 29 GVN communiqué…appears to have had no effect on militants.” Even

more concerning, Trueheart believed that non-Buddhists would exploit the crisis as an

opportunity to attack the government. He also expressed concern that Buddhists predominated in

the ARVN and that a “serious cleavage in their ranks would of course be most serious for

prosecution of CI [counterinsurgency].” There was also the possibility that, if the Buddhists

became more aggressive, they might end up clashing with police. Trueheart was not hopeful that

Diem could resolve the crisis, for he “became quite agitated during…conversation with him [on]

May 18…this is a subject on which he is disposed to not take U.S. advice.”236

Thus, Diem responded to the Buddhists by doing little more than simply insisting that religious freedom existed, taking no concrete action to provide reassurance. Demonstrations again erupted in Hué on June 1, the day after bonzes had begun a round of hunger strikes, from a crowd expected to crest at ten thousand. A small group of protestors in Danang also marched to the mayor’s office to press their demands. These crowds were confronted with M-113 armored vehicles, as well as soldiers clad in riot gear and wielding submachine guns. Despite Diem’s decision to remove three province chiefs as punishment for the deaths of May 8, the move did

87 little to quell the unrest.237 In fact, after police dispersed the Hué demonstrators, the protest

resumed and intensified two days later, when, on June 3, three hundred troops clashed with

protestors in a mêlée of rocks and teargas. A mass of retreating demonstrators that included Boy

and girl scouts was obstructed by barbed-wire barricades from seeking safety in Tu Dam pagoda.

Shortly thereafter, the Buddhists were again told that Tri Quang, the inspirational leader of their

movement, had died from his hunger strike. He was actually still alive but in serious condition.238

The situation in Hué rapidly deteriorated on June 3. Upon hearing of Tri Quang’s death,

thousands of demonstrators flooded Hué and made multiple attempts to reach Tu Dam Pagoda.

On multiple occasions, ARVN troops “utilized tear gas and/or other irritant chemicals to disperse

Buddhist demonstrators on six occasions.” The situation intensified around 6:30, when soldiers

emptied vials of liquid over demonstrators’ heads, reportedly causing chemical burns.

Additionally, the embassy reported that sixty-seven hospitalizations and up to three deaths occurred as a result of tear gas, many of them high school and college-age youths.239 By

midnight, Hué was effectively under martial law.240

Reports of what amounted to a government-sponsored chemical attack caused a sensation back in Washington. Rusk told Trueheart that “Due [to] very serious situation in Hue and grave implications for future, appears here that immediate GVN action required.” Washington requested “that GVN make quick conciliatory announcement…of willingness [to] discuss

Buddhist grievances.” Furthermore, it declared that Diem should replace the ARVN troops in the streets with police or gendarmes.241 Rusk also requested that the embassy to determine whether

ARVN troops did, indeed, employ poisonous chemicals in Hué. Some victims had exhibited

blistering and respiratory difficulties consistent with the effects of noxious gas.242 Portending the

manner in which the embassy would eventually signal its break with Diem, Rusk told the acting

88 ambassador that, if the reports were true, the embassy should “consider [the] best means [of] indicating our thorough disapproval while at [the] same time not appearing to withdraw general support.243

The CIA had nothing positive to say about the situation developing in South Vietnam, painting a bleak scene in its Current Intelligence Memorandum of June 3. The report declared that Diem refused to take the appropriate actions to subdue the opposition. What had begun as a campaign for religious equality had since expanded to an umbrella movement encompassing all kinds of political dissidents. It provided a forum for the expression of long-simmering frustrations over Diem’s favoritism, nepotism, and deference to the West. To many, Diem seemed a caricature of mandarin authoritarianism and colonial subservience, exhibiting the many of the worst characteristics of Asian political culture with few of the good. Diem refused to acknowledge the government’s culpability in the unrest. Even though the CIA determined that the explosion in Hué resulted from cannon fire and not a terrorist grenade, Diem offered only the barest of concessions to the maimed and bereaved, such as minimal monetary compensation and the replacement of three provincial officials. He continued to refuse to negotiate with the

Buddhists and repeated his assertions that the protest was part of a communist conspiracy. This only worked at variance with his desire to root out the opposition, for the Viet Cong appropriated his indiscretions for their propaganda, and some Buddhists even considered seeking communist support in their struggle against the regime. The CIA concluded that Diem had allowed a relatively constrained religious movement to hemorrhage into a general uprising. Looking for a way out, the intelligence community disclosed that prominent civilian and military officials were seeking to remove Diem from power if the capital erupted with violence.244

89 Trueheart met with Thuan on June 4. Thuan told Trueheart that the government would

seek to re-establish contact with the Buddhist leadership. Trueheart responded that he was “glad

to hear contact would be reestablished,” but he added that it was “equally essential…that the

population in Hue know of what [the] government was doing and that in our view more dramatic

action was called for.” The acting ambassador also hoped that Diem would personally travel to

Hué to make a “prompt and public announcement…of his readiness to discuss Buddhist

grievances further.” When Trueheart broached the mater of poison gas, Thuan was taken aback

as if it was the first he had heard of the accusation. Rusk warned the secretary of state that,

unless the government disavowed the gas attack and punished those responsible, the United

States “would probably be forced to condemn the action publicly.” Finally, Trueheart asked

whether the troops could be removed from Hué in favor of police, but Thuan revealed that the

police had not been trained in riot control.245 Laboratory tests later showed that the gas was, in

fact, tear gas, but of a liquid form that underwent a change of state once released from a glass

ampoule. The stocks used were old French supplies left over from World War I and failed to

activate correctly. Those with skin blisters likely received burns from being close to an

exploding gas canister.246

Nearly a month after demonstrations first erupted in Hué, it seemed like peace with the

Buddhists might be at hand. Trueheart met Thuan for breakfast on the morning of June 5. The secretary told Trueheart that he had been mediating negotiations between Diem, Nhu, and a highly respected Buddhist, Thich Thien Minh. The discussions had succeeded in securing a

preliminary agreement on five conditions that would allow the government to remove its troops

in good conscience. If the Buddhists would “cease all demonstrations and agitation,” the

government would “remove not only all troops but all uniformed personnel from [the] vicinity of

90 [the] pagodas.” Both sides agreed to end their propaganda campaigns. Additionally, the

Buddhists agreed “to recognize the superiority of the national flag.” Regarding Decree Number

10, the Government of Vietnam “disclaim[ed] responsibility for this law” and encouraged the

Buddhists to request that the National Assembly amend it. Another condition recognized the

“right to worship and propagate creed” and declared that the government would investigate all reported cases of violations of this right. Finally, the RVN promised to stop arbitrary arrests

(even though it denied having made any) and compensation families of the May 8 victims, including the punishment of those local officials held responsible for their deaths. However, in the regime’s typical manner, “Thuan was vague about just how agreement would be implemented.”247 Later that day, Thuan reached a similar agreement with a representative of the

southern Buddhists, Thich Thien Hoa.248 Adding to the atmosphere of accord, on June 6, Diem

gave a radio address admitting that “Mistakes have been committed on both sides” and asking

for “calm and time to settle the problem.”249

A series of events combined to shatter the fragile peace of June 4. At that time, Tu Dam

Pagoda was the center of attention. Inside, a group of devout monks led by Thich Tinh Khiet and

Tri Quang continued their fast in protest of the government that had recently sealed off the

pagoda with military and police. Adding to the confrontation, Nhu’s National Revolutionary

Movement issued statement imploring the populace to back Diem against the Buddhists.250 Then,

on June 7, ARVN planes blanketed Hué with leaflets that denounced Tri Quang and demanded to

know “who was really in charge” of the protest, once again insinuating that the demonstrations

were nothing but another communist front. To the Buddhists, this seemed to be a government

violation of the condition against propaganda. Saigon responded by turning the tables: it accused

Saigon Buddhists of violating the agreement by distributing literature that encouraged protest.251

91 On that same day, Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu, gave a speech before the Women’s

Solidarity Movement in which she denounced the Buddhists as neutralists who practiced

“passivity in the face of evil.” She complained that their leaders made “false utterances” and

assumed an attitude “not only unacceptable from part of honest citizens but more so

incompatible with their presumed state of holy men.” Since Vietnam could not “afford to be a

tool of subversion,” Mme. Nhu laid out the following conditions for peace: the bonzes could “no

longer brandish fasting as blackmail;” they must also root out “those who seek to use Buddhism

only to sow disorder” and “unmask enterprises of…seditious persons.” On its part, the

government should “cease allowing itself to be defamed by [the] idle clamor of political

inspiration and immediately expel all foreign agitators whether they wear monks’ robes or not.”

In a thinly veiled threat to the Americans, Mme. Nhu declared that the government should also

“keep vigilance on all others, particularly those inclined to take Viet Nam for [a] satellite of foreign power or organization,” and it should “treat as deserved, those who seek to disrupt public order.” She insisted that these measures were intended ensure that the “monk’s robe regain all its dignity and can…no longer be ignominiously exploited by faithless and lawless or by merely unreasonable individuals.” If these measures were undertaken, the Buddhists would “no longer risk being mistaken for small anti-nationalist branch of dubious international association, exploited and controlled by communism, and oriented toward sowing of disorder of neutralism.”252

Madame Nhu’s incendiary speech was disquieting to those Washington officials who

were already on edge over the situation. In a cable authorized by Hilsman, Rusk told Trueheart to

publicly criticize the speech if the acting ambassador thought it would deter similar utterances in

the future. He also requested that Trueheart inform the regime that it needed to make “some

92 immediate and concrete move” that would “counteract [the] regrettable effect [of] Madam [sic]

Nhu’s statement.” Furthermore, Trueheart was to personally convey to the government that “in official U.S. view Madame Nhu’s intolerant statement has seriously weakened GVN’s position as defender of freedom against Communist tyranny and has greatly increased difficulty of U.S. role as supporter of GVN.” In such an atmosphere, the “U.S. government cannot be expected to continue aid.”253 The State Department instructed Trueheart to warn Saigon that “Any more statements by her of this nature may irreparably damage US-GVN cooperative effort.”254 In a second cable, Washington proposed that the embassy press Diem to invoke emergency powers to repeal the flag law “by decree without waiting for action by National Assembly”255

Trueheart’s meeting with Diem on June 8 was not encouraging. The acting ambassador reported that he had “no reason to believe that anything I said to him moved him.” On Madame

Nhu’s speech, Trueheart noted that it seemed to be a violation of the truce and requested that it be disavowed. In response, “Diem said at once that he could not disavow the WSM resolution,” for he believed that “it was necessary to warn people against extremists who were misusing [the] affair to further their own interests.” The president then denied that the Buddhists holed up in Tu

Dam Pagoda were being denied access to food and medical supplies, and he disclaimed any knowledge of the leaflet drops in Huè. As the meeting dragged on, Diem expounded on his reasons for adopting a hard line: the Buddhists were the ones who violated the stipulation against propaganda, and their disruptive behavior was the reason for “ineptitude of local GVN officials.”

Trueheart “used every argument [he] could muster” to convince Diem that “the only satisfactory solution, at least from US point of view, was [a] peaceful one.”256 Meanwhile, the regime went about organizing memorial services for the recently deceased pope, which the State Department

93 had already advised against, and attempted to fabricate counterdemonstrations by “‘false bonzes’” drawn from Nhu’s Republican Youth and “hoodlum elements from Cholon.”257

Thuan had little luck in getting Diem to accede to the State Department’s requests.

Although agreeing to not permit a papal ceremony and to offer assurances against “arrest or other reprisals,” he nevertheless refused to repeal the flag law by decree, denied the significance of Madme Nhu’s speech, claimed that he sought only to isolate those Buddhist who were

“extremists.”258 Time and again, Diem demonstrated that he would make only the barest concessions to his opponents, but in such a highly charged atmosphere, words rang hollow and superficial gestures were an affront to those elements that were already highly offended.

Years later, Forrestal recalled that “just before the Buddhist problems in Hue, we were at what everybody thought was the high point, the high-water mark, of our success in Vietnam…

When the Diem business started the worst that we contemplated happening was that there would be a terrible vacuum, a political vacuum.”259 Rufus Phillips, the U.S. Mission’s Assistant

Director for Rural Affairs, likewise termed the event a “watershed” moment for the regime in that it assured Diem’s alienation of the army, while Taylor asserted that the Buddhist protest magnified South Vietnam’s characteristic deficiencies.260 Speaking of Kennedy’s reaction,

Hilsman recalled that, in the spring of 1963, the president decided that “‘The Vietnamese can't do it; they haven't got the capacity. They probably won't succeed!’”261 However, the realization that Diem could not hold South Vietnam together did not mean Washington was prepared to admit defeat in Indochina. For all of Kennedy’s talk of withdrawal, he repeatedly hesitated to make that commitment. In the end, the administration could not accept another stinging loss to the communists. To make South Vietnam an effective communist outpost on the other side of the world, the Kennedy administration determined that, if Diem could not be made to behave, then

94 the only acceptable course of action was to manipulate a change in government south of the seventeenth parallel.

95 IX

Freefall

Just after 11:00 a.m. on June 12, 1963, a Thich Quang Duc, a middling bonze from Nha

Trang approached the intersection of Le Van Duyet and Phan Dinh Phung streets in downtown

Saigon. Large crowds had gathered that morning to witness a planned demonstration of the

Buddhists, but the scene soon turned into a grislier affair than anyone could have imagined. The holy man perched himself in prayer while two companions doused him in gasoline dispensed from a plastic container. Quang Duc then sparked a match and touched its flame to his robe, turning his body into a living, breathing fireball before a throng of stupefied spectators. For what must have seemed like ages, the bonze maintained his lotus pose while fellow Buddhists blocked anyone from coming to his rescue until he finally collapsed in his death throes. As a procession of nearly four hundred bonzes carried the charred corpse to a nearby pagoda, a fellow devotee announced through a loudspeaker that “Quang Duc had died to emphasize the five demands made upon the South Vietnamese Government after the May 8 incidents in Hué.” A group of students joined them in spirit by forming a defensive ring around Xa Loi pagoda and displaying a banner that read “‘This Buddhist Priest cremated himself for five items demanded of the government.’” 262

The event’s significance laid in its effect of raising international awareness to South

Vietnam’s sorry state of affairs. Malcom Browne of the Associated Press was one of the few reporters who heeded a message distributed to reporters that something was about to go down in

Saigon that morning. With his camera, he snapped a picture of the enflamed monk in what became the most famous image of the early Vietnam War, one that the Counselor for Public

96 Affairs in Saigon, John Mecklin, later described as having “had a shock effect of incalculable value to the Buddhist cause, becoming a symbol of the state of things in Vietnam.”263

The Diem regime reacted with characteristic callousness. As the crowd swelled to two thousand, a thousand police moved in to maintain order. To back up the security forces, Colonel

Le Quang Tung ordered two Ranger companies of his Special Forces to move into the area outlying Saigon. The Seventh Airborne Battalion was also put on alert. Later that day, the police arrested thirty-five praying Buddhists who had refused orders to take their practice inside the pagoda.264 At 7:00 in the evening, Diem addressed the nation by radio, claiming that negotiations with the Buddhists were ongoing. He further inflamed the movement by returning to the assertion that “extremists have distorted the facts” and declaring in authoritarian fashion that the

Buddhists “‘can count on the Constitution, in other words, on me.’”265 Diem could not get out of his own way.

Trueheart told Thuan that recent events had made it necessary for the government make more dramatic gestures than had been proposed in their earlier meeting. The circumstances had been “drastically changed by [the] self-cremation of [a] bonze in Central Saigon.”266 If Diem refused to conciliate, “he might well be faced with a public US Government disassociation of itself from the whole affair with quite possibly a strong overtone of disapproval of GVN handling [of the] Buddhist problem since May 8.”267 Trueheart informed Washington that a CIA contact had received word from South Vietnam’s Air Force Chief of Staff “that he and other senior officers were fed up with [the] situation and that he could not understand why Americans stood by and lost [a] golden opportunity to rectify situation in Vietnam, by which he clearly meant overthrow of [the] government.”268 In another cable to the State Department, Trueheart noted that the demonstrations “began as [a] reaction to specific limitations on religious

97 expression,“ but “By now Buddhist actions have taken on [a] political significance.” Even though they were “still seeking largely religious demands,” their leadership did not trust the regime’s “intentions and sincerity” to the extent that they were “beginning to question whether

GVN as presently constituted will ever bring them satisfaction.” Trueheart informed Washington that the Buddhists, too, longed for a change at the palace, writing, “Some Buddhists are reportedly talking about bringing about overthrow of GVN.”269

Trueheart’s implication that the time was ripe for a coup foreshadowed the changed demeanor that would thereafter take place at the Saigon embassy a few months later. Nolting had always rejected out of hand arguments favoring Diem’s removal from power, and he interpreted

Washington’s decision not to consult him during the crisis as an indication of its desire to adopt a more confrontational attitude toward the Saigon regime. Nolting told Ted Gittinger years later that, during his six-week absence from the embassy, “all hell broke loose…the thing was out of hand” and laid blame on his colleagues, stating, “This I will never cease to blame the State

Department for and my deputy, because they both knew exactly where I was every day and could have notified me if they had wanted me back as a mediator.”270 With remarkable candor, Nolting averred, “I think the person principally in charge of this in the State Department, Averell

Harriman, wanted me out of there because I thought that President Diem was the best bet for achieving the United States’ interests. I think he wanted me out of there so that Diem would have enough rope to hang himself.”271 Likewise, Harkins declared that “under Trueheart things just started to go wrong” and that “Trueheart was more or less of the opinion that it was good for

Diem to be gone.”272

Sympathy for Trueheart’s view existed in Washington. Rusk cabled the embassy with a message drafted by Wood and Hilsman and cleared by Harriman: “In our judgment the Buddhist

98 situation is dangerously near the breaking point. Accordingly, you [are] authorized to tell Diem that in the United States view it is essential for the GVN promptly to take dramatic action to regain confidence of Buddhists and that the GVN must fully and unequivocally meet Buddhist demands.”273 Additionally, Washington requested that the regime issue a joint communiqué with the Buddhist leadership that recognized the legitimacy of the five Buddhist demands, requested that religious groups refrain from “public processions or demonstrations” until the situation calmed, and established an elective, “permanent National Religious Council…which will have the right and duty of consulting with the Government on all matters affecting religious freedom.”274 The cable stated that Trueheart was “further authorized to tell Diem that unless

GVN is willing to take effective action along the above lines within the next few days that US will find it necessary publicly to state that it cannot associate itself with the GVN’s unwillingness to meet the reasonable demands of the Vietnamese Buddhist leaders.”275 More to the point, “FYI—If Diem does not take prompt and effective steps to reestablish Buddhist confidence in him we will have to reexamine our entire relationship with his regime.”276

Trueheart met with Diem on June 12, seeking to impress upon him the gravity of the situation. In light of the Rusk cable, Trueheart had “now received new instructions which went somewhat further” that the original demands. He handed Diem a paper containing a paraphrase of the Rusk memorandum. The president soberly perused the document and then turned to Thuan for a brief discussion in Vietnamese. The secretary of state said that “any statement by the

United States at this juncture would be disastrous for the negotiations with the Buddhists.” Diem then indicated that he did not wish to suspend all religious processions because the following day was Corpus Christi and Catholics would deeply resent the decision. Regarding the memorandum,

“There was, rather surprisingly, no further discussion…Diem said he would have to reflect on it

99 and would not, in any case, wish to take a decision until discussion with Buddhists had begun.”

At the end of the meeting, Trueheart informed Diem of several concerning revelations: arbitrary arrests were continuing in Hué, “some Vietnamese authorities…were considering prosecuting for murder [those] who had” abetted the self-immolation, and provincial monks had been denied entry to Saigon. Diem said he would “look into” the arrest report, that he believed others had set the monk on fire, and that monks had been barred from Saigon because it was “dangerous to public safety to permit bonzes to converge on Saigon at this particular time.” Trueheart reminded

Diem “that the public safety was of course his responsibility [but] did not press the point.” In closing the record of this meeting, Trueheart told the State Department that their updated instructions “could not have been more timely” and that “They are of course very strong medicine and will be very hard for Diem to take.” Taking solace in a sense of absolution, the acting ambassador declared, “I believe we can be satisfied that we have done everything reasonably possible to get President Diem to save himself.”277

The circumstances of this threatened break with Diem are instructive of the dynamics that affected Vietnam policy. Rusk was more or less a medium through which the embassy received policies drafted primarily by subordinates like Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal, and, to a lesser extent, Wood and Mendenhall. Moreover, Nolting’s absence from the embassy established that the mechanisms for pursuing Diem’s removal worked quite smoothly when a like-minded individual held the ambassadorship, rather than someone who sympathized with Diem in thinking that the demonstrations were led by communists.278 The final element in this smooth operation was Kennedy’s impotence. The Rusk memorandum authorized a major policy modification, but the president had no say in the matter, for he was “unaware of the memorandum conveyed to Diem by Trueheart on June 12.” Astoundingly, Kennedy did not learn

100 of the new instructions “until it was summarized by the CIA in the President’s Intelligence checklist on June 14” 279 Chester Clifton of the CIA noted that “The President noticed that Diem

[had] been threatened with a formal statement of disassociation. He wants to be absolutely sure that no further threats are made and no formal statement is made without his own personal approval.” 280 With the president out of the loop and the oppositionists in control of the State

Department and embassy, there was little to stand in the way of the upstarts. Policymaking was no longer paralyzed by the form of bureaucracy. For better or worse, things got done when the power balance was heavily skewed.

101 X

False Hope

The wheels kept on spinning in Saigon. Ahead of a meeting with the Buddhist delegation,

Thuan told Trueheart that there were basic obstacles to the speedy implementation of the conditions agreed to in principal with the Buddhists at their prior meeting on June 5. Thuan stated that the government could not honor the precondition that Saigon guarantee the agreement ahead of the meeting, since repeal of the flag law entailed complications of legislative protocol and could therefore not be repealed by decree. He was also unsure about the demand that the pagodas be administered by the Buddhists. Trueheart bluntly told Thuan that he “did not think this was nearly good enough,” what the embassy wanted was a “dramatic, conciliatory move.”281

On the afternoon of June 14, Thuan, “obviously in a jubilant mood,” phoned Trueheart to tell him that the meeting with the Buddhists had been a success: “full agreement” had been reached on the flag issue. Following the meeting, the head bonze of the delegation called for his fellow Buddhists to refrain from “all manifestations and incidents,” while Diem told the authorities to “suppress all barriers around temples.”282 By the evening, the two sides came together on the matter of revising Decree No. 10.283 On June 15, negotiations concluded and the combined delegation issued a joint communiqué the following day. The agreement recognized the superiority of the national flag, called on the National Assembly to draft new regulations for

Decree No. 10 in conjunction with religious associations, authorized the pardoning of demonstrations and the establishment of an investigative committee to examine civil rights abuses, recognized the right to religious practice in established religious buildings, and proclaimed an “investigation to determine responsibility for the incidents since May 8.”284

102 Resolution seemed to be at hand, but encouraging sings merely produced false hopes in those with deep yearnings for satisfaction. At the conclusion of the negotiations, Diem could not help himself from essentially restating that the agreement was a triviality. He affixed his signature to the document under a qualifying paragraph that read “The articles written in this joint communique have been approved in principle by me from the beginning.”285

Despite the seeming rapprochement, tensions remained high. On the final morning of the joint conference, a riot broke out in downtown Saigon near the site of the recent monk burning among a crowd of approximately 2,000 people “when students made [a] rush on police cordoning off area around Xa Loi Pagoda.” The students pelted the police with “thousands of rocks,” and the police volleyed tear gas in return. Although no demonstrators were seriously injured, thirty police were, some requiring hospitalization. Both the Buddhists and the government blamed the outburst on “extremist elements” and pleaded with the people to cease their agitations. All Saigon military unites were subsequently put on high alert for immediate deployment to put down further unrest.286

The scene that morning indicated just how far out of hand the situation had gotten, with apparently religiously unaffiliated youths attacking police while the Buddhists and the regime pleaded in tandem for them to stop. The political movement had grown so large that the cause extended beyond religious motivations, and as result, the demonstrations escaped the control of religious authorities. At the same time, Washington’s drive for a coup seemed to also have gained an uncontrollable momentum. While negotiations with the Buddhists were ongoing,

Washington continued to press the embassy to discreetly inform Tho that the United States would back him as successor in the event that Diem was “definitely unable to act as President.”

Despite the fact that official policy was still to support Diem,287 the State Department wanted to

103 be fully prepared for a coup. In the same cable, one that was again drafted by Wood and cleared by Hilsman and Harriman, Rusk suggested that Trueheart “consider steps [for] gradually increas[ing] covert and overt contacts with non-supporters [of the] GVN” if he felt that “contacts with those who might play major roles in [the] event of [a] coup are now inadequate.”288

Trueheart responded that he thought the embassy should delay contacting Tho to see if the recent agreement with the Buddhists produced the desired effect, but he reassured Foggy Bottom that

“there are no bars whatsoever on contacts and we are receiving just now a surfeit of coup talk and anti-regime comment…we have all the lines out that we know how to put out and have had for some days.” Trueheart added that, if Diem appeared unwilling to “move forward,” then the

U.S. mission should “begin to make moves” for his removal. 289 Thus, while maintaining a façade of support for the regime, American coup-backers were primed to strike when the iron was hot.

104 XI

Confronting Reality

Following the joint communiqué, Trueheart pressed the regime for additional concessions, while Hilsman showed himself to be the most ardent American supporter of Diem’s overthrow. On June 18, Trueheart told Tho that the recent concessions “should be regarded by

[the] government as [the] point of departure, rather than [the] conclusion of a difficult episode” since the “events of May 8 had left deep and widespread scars and [the] government had suffered severe loss of support in all important segments of [the] population.”290 In similar fashion,

Hilsman replied, “this line must now be followed by very hard-hitting approach to Diem.”

Apparently unaware that he had reported back in January that the war effort was in dire straits, he stated that “Until May 8 incident U.S. public and official opinion [was] increasingly impressed by GVN success against [the] Viet Cong.” Now, however, “This favorable trend has…been dangerously reversed.” Because of the regime’s violent crackdown on demonstrators

“Hilsman and other U.S. officials who must defend in current Congressional hearings [on] U.S. aid and assistance programs for Viet-Nam are finding their position increasingly difficult.”

Hilsman insisted that there was “room to be generous in dealing with the Buddhists and such dealing is necessary to rebuild the prestige of the Vietnamese Government in America.” Madame

Nhu’s incendiary remarks had raised “serious questions in Washington as to the sincerity of the

GVN’s intentions.” To demonstrate good faith, Hilsman recommended that the regime “carry out free parliamentary elections in August” that allowed “opposition candidates to run without harassment.” Furthermore, he asked that the government “broaden the Cabinet” and uphold due process for those who had been arrested during the recent disturbances.291

105 Hilsman’s former colleagues at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and

Research agreed with the gloomy picture that he painted. In, late June, a research memorandum compatible with this view made the rounds through Washington. Under the subject heading of

“Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam,” Thomas Hughes argued in RFE-55 that the joint communiquè was likely intended to distract the Buddhists while the government schemed a retaliation. Reports had surfaced that “local officials have been instructed to be firm in dealing with the Buddhists and that any government concessions constitute nothing more than a tactical retreat.”292 If the government’s bad faith re-ignited the controversy,

Disaffection within the bureaucracy and the army, coupled with popular discontent and disorders, would almost certainly give rise to coup efforts. Such an effort if led, as it probably would be, by top and middle-echelon military and civil officials, would probably have good prospects of success. A successful coup, while posing real dangers of major internal upheaval and a serious slackening of the military effort against the Viet Cong, could draw upon a reservoir of trained and experience personnel for reasonably effective leadership of the government and the war effort.293

Hughes presumed that another Buddhist crisis would likely activate “an open revolt within the bureaucracy and the military establishment.”294 Such a crisis might be “potentially a more serious threat to the Diem regime than the present communist insurgency.”295 In these circumstances, past experience had indicated that pleas for conciliation would be futile; “In any event, Diem would probably not listen to such advice, particularly to any recommendations that suggest removing the Nhus or even restricting their authority.”296 Hughes asserted that “The public reaction of the United States might well determine the success or failure of any armed revolt.”

To that regard, “Diem will…expect…strong support,” but “The rebels and the fence sitters too would be looking for some indication of the United States position…Our silence over any period or indications that we regarded the revolt as an internal problem which we hoped to see quickly

106 resolved would probably be taken as support for the rebels.” A public statement of support would likely discourage a coup from going forward. Conversely, any indication that Diem had lost

American backing “would probably inspire broader participation in the rebel effort, and if it were successful, enable the United States to influence the formation and policies of the successor government.”297 The essential message was that the United States held all the cards, and if Diem could not restore order, then it was an American responsibility to find someone who could.

Trueheart met with Diem for an hour in the early evening of June 22 to see if he could not inspire him to adopt a more conciliatory disposition. The premier hardly reacted to

Trueheart’s conveyance of Washigton’s request that the palace undertake “gestures of good faith…to win back the Buddhists.”298 Regarding a report that Madame Nhu intended to release a white paper on the Buddhist crisis, Diem also had no response. Things became “slightly heated,” however, when Trueheart asserted his “belief that [a] deliberate effort was being made by [the]

Nhus to sabotage [the] agreement of June 16.” In response, “Diem stated flatly that GVN intended to honor [the] agreement.”299 Trueheart stood firm in “saying that available information had convinced me and my colleagues that a deliberate effort was afoot to destroy the agreement.”

He furthermore “felt obliged to tell [Diem] that, if [the] agreement did break down and demonstrations resumed, I thought my government would as matters stood put the blame on

GVN.” Trueheart then reminded Diem that the Buddhists were waiting for a sign of good faith, such as the release of prisoners, but the president insisted that this was being done as quickly as possible. Diem wanted to make sure no Communists were released, but he even felt hesitation to let go “people who had thrown rocks at police.” Trueheart told Diem that he was “speaking as a friend” and that he “had to tell [Diem] that he was in a very grave position…and had to take drastic measures, going beyond religious questions, if confidence in his government was to be

107 restored.” Before departing, Trueheart asked Diem to consider “that he was under [a] most virulent editorial attack in [the] US and that political pressure on US government was intense.”300

The message was clear: The United States could not continue to back a world leader who was a domestic and international public relations nightmare. The cost in political capital was too great.

In a meeting with Thuan on June 25, the secretary told Trueheart that Diem was

“disturbed” by what the acting ambassador communicated in their discussion three days earlier.

Trueheart repeated his assertions: that the U.S. to impress the “gravity of the situation” on the regime, that their present attitude resulted from “serious concern” about the “loss of the country,” that they sought to make Diem understand the political liability of the crisis back in the United

States, and that Diem had to go beyond “simply...carrying out the agreement [to] convincing

Buddhists of GVN good faith.” Thuan quietly considered these issues before expressing his own concern “over the attitude of Diem in [the] face of pressures being exerted on him and of appointment of [a] new Ambassador,” Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Diem rightly “thought a new

American policy was involved and an effort to force him to do our bidding or unseat him.”

Thuan commented that Diem’s natural response to these suspicions “was one of extreme stubbornness” and recalled that Diem had told him that “They can send ten Lodges, but I will not permit myself or my country to be humiliated, not if they train their artillery on this palace.”

Trueheart advised Thuan “that the way to avoid confrontation was...that move immediately.” It was a thinly veiled ultimatum, and Lodge would soon lift that veil.301

Rusk proposed the idea of Lodge as Ambassador to South Vietnam with Kennedy’s full support. In Lodge, Kennedy saw an Army Reserve Officer who had voluntarily spent his most recent tour of duty in South Vietnam writing policy papers. He was also fluent in French, having served as a liaison officer in the French Army during World War II, and an experienced Foreign

108 Service officer from his days as Eisenhower’s Ambassador to the United Nations (UN). Perhaps his most attractive quality, however, was his Republican affiliation, for his selection to the

Saigon embassy divided political liability between both parties in the event that Diem was overthrown, thereby denying the public relations coup that would have accrued to the Republican

Party ahead of the 1964 election. Furthermore, Hilsman and Forrestal had alluded to the need for a strongman to replace Nolting in their January report, and Lodge was preceded by a reputation for iron-willed, independent action. To that effect, Madame Nhu referred to Lodge as a

“proconsul.” For Americans, he was an American answer to the stolid mandarin statesmen of the

Far East.302

On June 26, George Ball transmitted a reply from Hilsman stating that the Lodge appointment had been under consideration since before the recent crisis and that there was “no change in consistent U.S. policy” of supporting Diem. The United States simply wished to

“demonstrate...the importance which the U.S. attaches to its support of Viet-Nam,” and the “Peril of the present situation dictated that...we present our views with utmost frankness.” The embassy was to make Diem understand that the onus was on him to settle the storm.303 Diem saw past the ruse, however, telling Nolting that he did not trust the State Department’s official word.304

It seemed like the palace might be slowly but surely responding to the embassy's admonitions. On June 27, Thuan told Trueheart that the government would soon publish the June

16 agreement and that Diem would travel to Huè “with the object of talking directly to people there.” Diem was also considering "a major address” that reiterated the government's commitment to implementation of the Buddhist accords. Additionally, Thuan declared that two student protest leaders had been released from jail as a result of Diem's personal intercession.305

The State Department took little solace in these minimal gestures by the RVN government. It

109 informed Trueheart later that day that “intelligence reports still indicate [that the] GVN [is] not living up to [the] spirit of [the] agreement.”306

Indeed, on June 28, the CIA released an “Appraisal of the Ngo Dinh Diem Regime as of

26 June 1963.” It explained that "The Government of Vietnam...is now waging what it considers to be a war for survival with its difficulties expanded by the deteriorating military situation in

Laos.” Fiercely protective of its power, it was “therefore unlikely that the GVN will accept any advice which...might undermine its control of the internal political situation.” Consequently, the

CIA believed that the embassy's efforts were in vain: “Efforts to effect any changes, such as broadening the government to include selected oppositionists, relegating the President’s brother,

Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife to less prominent roles, and permitting opposition delegates in the

National Assembly, are not believed feasible at this time.” This was because Diem exhibited “a strong traditional sense of family loyalty” and he bought into the timeless American outlook in being “convinced that he is the only person of sufficient stature to lead his country in the battle for survival.” On top of this, Diem “almost surely reasons that reforms...would probably give oppositionists the opportunity they need to effect his downfall.” The recent crisis had expanded this restless segment of the population to include a wider portion of political and religious idealists. This group would likely be spurred on to further agitation if, as the agency estimated that “certain elements of the GVN have no intention of accepting the agreement as permanently valid.” The Vietnamese press made repeated intimations that Communist elements were behind the demonstrations, and there had been “disturbing reports of efforts to start agitation to revise the agreement 'by popular activism.” Specifically, Nhu's Republican Youth Organization reportedly had been working toward this end with Diem's blessing. The report noted that

“Buddhist leaders who are watching the situation...have stated that they are especially attentive

110 to the problems of the students who are still in jail” and that “failure to fulfill the agreements in any way will result in further Buddhist agitation.” In view of this, the CIA warned that “A GVN attempt to subdue the Buddhists by force is likely to fail in the long run because of broad popular discontent over the problem and support for the Buddhists. The use of force would also possibly start a chain of events relegating religious aspects to the background and supplanting them with cumulative political developments directed at toppling the regime.”307

Trueheart's next meeting did little to refute this raw assessment. Diem “made no direct comment on...the Buddhist problem, except in a very superficial way.” In typical fashion, Diem treated the acting ambassador to an extemporaneous “monologue” on random topics that he attempted to connect to the “fundamental social and political revolution” intended to

“democratize the country from the bottom up” through the authority of Nhu's Republican Youth and his wife's Women's Solidarity Movement. If all went according to plan, “Diem said that...one could look forward to full democracy and liberty in two or three years.” Trueheart told the State

Department that he could not discern whether the president's words were “merely a defense of what Diem has been doing all along...or whether it is a forecast of some new and perhaps fairly spectacular steps along [the] same lines.”308 The meeting had done little to clear the air. It was a scene that would be repeated for the next four months.

Trueheart worried that the regime's foot-dragging would bring about a “renewal of demonstrations.” Thuan's letter to the Buddhist describing the regime's manner of implementation did “not go far enough” toward restoring popular confidence. Trueheart wanted

Saigon to publish the “actual text of orders to provincial officials,” as well as a “balance sheet

[of] persons arrested and released, the names of the officials responsible for the violence on May

8, and the text of “Diem's speech reaffirming [the] five points.” Trueheart noted that Diem did

111 not, as he had earlier indicated that he would, “any public appearances in Hue,” but the Nhus had recently travelled there for what Trueheart ascertained was “a major session of the family council” from which “There may well be new decisions;” the acting ambassador was “not optimistic about them.” Trueheart also revealed that the “latest reports from [Buddhist] contacts are ominous and that there were indications that the chief of South Vietnam's secret police, Tran

Kim Tuyen, was attempting to organize a coup.” The regime had also returned to the old line of claiming that “VC and oppositionists were now behind the Buddhists.” Trueheart told the vice president that if outsiders were trying to exploit the crisis, then the government would do well to

“make public moves such as those enumerated...with [a] view to satisfying moderate elements and isolating the rest.” Trueheart reported that the Buddhists were sufficiently united and motivated to create a major disturbance for the regime, and he believed that there was “very solid evidence” that the Nhus were "bitterly opposed to [the] agreement" and seeking to undermine it.309

Washington approved of Trueheart's handling of the situation. Forrestal told him that

“Everyone thinks you are doing a great job. Keep up the good work.”310 He also cabled

McGeorge Bundy in Rome to tell him it was likely that the Buddhists would renew their protest in light of reports that Nhu intended to sink the agreement. Forrestal wanted Nolting back at the embassy within a week and to move Lodge's arrival up by a month. He was concerned about indications that the Buddhists intended undertake another self-immolation, which would “cause a

“domestic U.S. reaction which will require [a] strong public statement despite [the] danger that this might precipitate [a] coup in Saigon.” Forrestal thought the embassy should order Diem go send Nhu and his wife out of the country to remove them as the regime’s primary source of popular resentment.311

112 Meanwhile, Hilsman told Trueheart that another self-immolation would obligate the

United States to “make [a] public statement [of] disassociation.” Although “fully aware” that such a statement would further weaken the Saigon government, the State Department saw “no alternative.” American public opinion held that “religious persecution does now exist in Viet-

Nam and that both U.S. and GVN need [to make a] dramatic and sincere public move to counteract this widely held opinion.” Such actions might include publicizing the government actions taken toward implementation of the agreement and establishment of a National Religious

Council, an invitation for the Buddhists to meet with Diem, the insertion of Buddhist chaplains into the ARVN, and a promise that the upcoming national elections will be completely free and open.312

Trueheart met with Thuan before receiving the cable from Hilsman. He told the secretary that he was disappointed in a recent Times of Viet-Nam article presumably written by Madame

Nhu, which “contained veiled criticism” of Tho and Thuan over their efforts to moderate the

Ngos' stance, in addition to an accusation that Thich Quang Duc was drugged for the self- immolation and a statement that the absence of subsequent burnings indicated that the Buddhists had been mollified. Thuan did not refute Trueheart's interpretation and told the acting ambassador, who felt “helpless in this affair,” that Diem would not understand the necessity of

American dissociation in the event of another burning unless Trueheart himself told Diem. On his part, Trueheart thought such statements would “not have any positive effect,” for he had already communicated this Diem on multiple occasions to no effect.313

Washington insisted that they did not want Trueheart “simply to threaten Diem with old threats,” but to tell him that a public statement would allow the U.S. to maintain support for the regime in the face of future criticism. Trueheart was also instructed to tell Nhu that recurrent

113 articles in the Times of Viet-Nam constituted challenges to Americans and Buddhists that must be stopped. Hilsman, Harriman, Forrestal, and Ball understood that such demands “may seriously impair your further ability to influence Diem.” However, they believed that “strong medicine [is] needed to clear his vision.” Forceful statements might harden Diem's stubbornness, but “The fact is...if he is so incapable of rational consideration...and can only behave emotionally,” then

Washington could “have no confidence in his ability to lead an effective fight against the Viet

Cong.”314

This last statement was the kernel of the official rationale for backing the Diem government. Recriminations against authoritarianism and illiberalism did well to preserve the idealistic character of popular notions as to the purpose of U.S. intervention. In South Vietnam, but the Cold War reality was that the RVN's critical value lay in its anticommunism. Whether this came in a fascist form mattered little. State Department officials believed that liberalism was the key to popularity, and that successful military campaign had to be prosecuted by a popular government. The United States could accept a strongman, as they had elsewhere, so long as he demonstrated the capability to maintain order and military authority. However, if he could not hold the nation together, either by force or persuasion, he was a useless ally in view of American interests. The collapse of South Vietnam’s social and political order would open the door for an ultimate victory by the Communists that would bring the entirety of the Southeast Asia under red domination, thereby threatening the entire U.S. position in the South Pacific and the Middle East.

Trueheart met with Diem again on July 3, providing him with a letter containing suggestions for a possible speech to the nation as well as a threat of disassociation should Diem refuse to do so and another disturbance arose. Once more, Diem “said that he would consider

[the recommendations].” He then expounded upon the “difficulties of the Buddhist problem,

114 giving no hint of what if any action he has in mind.” Diem worried that acceding to the demands would encourage his opponents to subsequently press for more drastic concessions. Trueheart repeated that “What was needed was for [the] President personally to take actions which would firmly establish good faith in government and leave isolated those who still cavilled,” but “Diem did not react.” He then blamed media irresponsibility for the degeneration of American public opinion and asserted that the “U.S. government should “set [the] record straight.” Trueheart replied that this could not be done until Diem took “further action” and stopped the Nhus’ inflammatory newspaper articles. Diem said he would “study” this last matter.315

Forrestal decided the bring the issue before higher authority. Ahead of the long holiday weekend, he sent Kennedy a memorandum under the title “Far East Round Up,” in which he declared, “We have received various reports from Buddhist circles that they are not satisfied with the manner in which the Government is implementing the agreement, particularly with respect to the release of prisoners, instructions to the province chiefs and rumors that the Government does not intend” to honor the agreement. He added that Washington had “also received reports of coup plotting among the Buddhists and threats to resume demonstrations and incidents of self- destruction.” Forrestal believed the rumors, for he stated that there was “fairly reliable information that Brother Nhu has been actively working to stir up phony popular demand that the truce agreement be disavowed by the Government, using his Republican Youth for this purpose.”

Regular conferences at the palace had made little headway because of “increasing recalcitrance on Diem's part has almost reach the point where communication with him has become difficult.”

Forrestal, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman thought that “the situation is now more serious than ever,” and that a statement of disassociation might soon be necessary, despite Nolting's objection to one. Nolting could not return to Saigon earlier than originally scheduled, but Forrestal hoped

115 Lodge could still arrive early.316 The effort to radically change the embassy's official outlook was in full swing.

Despite Trueheart's repeated pleas for sensibility, Thuan told him that Diem "was probably going to do nothing.” South Vietnam's Secretary of State had nearly lost all hope, telling the American charge that “he and I had used all our ammunition.” The only prospect remaining for a breakthrough was that Nolting, as a personal friend of the premier, might be able to moderate him.317

An Independence Day meeting at the White House reviewed the situation in South

Vietnam. The conference was an occasion for the anti-Diem cabal to push hard for regime change: Ball, Harriman, Hilsman, Forrestal, and McGeorge Bundy were all in attendance.

Hilsman's notes indicate that there occurred a “discussion of the possibility of getting rid of the

Nhus in which the combined judgment was that it would not be possible.” Furthermore, those present judged that “no matter what Diem did there will be coup attempts over the next four months.” Even though it was “impossible to say” whether these attempts would be successful,

Hilsman thought “everyone agreed that the chances of chaos in the wake of a coup are considerably less than they were a year ago.” Forrestal added that General Victor Krulak believed that “even if there was chaos in Saigon, the military units in the field would continue to confront the Communists.” Hilsman did not agree with Nolting that a civil war was the likely result of a coup. Kennedy said that Hilsman could determine when Nolting would return to the embassy, but Lodge should arrive in Saigon “as soon as possible.”318

Nolting remained the lone man of stature at the State Department who stood by Diem.

He maintained that “when Diem gave his word, he followed through although sometimes this was handled in his own way.” Notwithstanding Diem's obstinacy, “The GVN would be able to

116 come through this one slowly.” Regarding a possible coup, Nolting told his colleagues that it would likely produce two warring factions. If the United States publicly broken with Diem on the Buddhist issue, “his government would fail.” Ever the contrarian, he went on to deny that

Diem gave preferential treatment to Catholics and stated his belief that “Viet-Nam had been a country in which there was a great degree of religious tolerance.”319

A CIA information report of July 8 described similar circumstances to those of report from ten days earlier. It noted that both sides were “continuing to exchange charges of bad faith,” making the “coup atmosphere...perceptively heavier.” The CIA could not determine whether the plotters had resolved to move forward or would wait to see if Diem made the necessary gestures, but Tri Quang had “indicated his intention to not cease agitation until the government falls.”

There were three principle groups organizing an overthrow: “one headed by Lieutenant Colonel

Pham Noc Thao, former chief of Kien Hoa Province, and then Ngo Dinh Nhu’s special investigator for Strategic Hamlets, another characterized as the Tran Kim Tuyen group, and a third, primarily military in composition,” led by Major Generals Tran Van Don and Duong Van

Minh, two senior commanders who were already embittered toward the regime after being passed over for important posts and instead stuck in “meaningless jobs” where they lacked the authority to control the war but had plenty of free time in which they could plot Diem’s demise.

The generals were fed up with the regime’s war strategy, seeing “that every day the National

Liberation Front was making further gains because of the disgust of the common people with the government.” Even the high-ranking officers could not get through to Diem and Nhu, who replied to the generals’ entreaties “with vague promises or…simple silence.” At this point, the group got serious about overthrowing the government.320

117 The CIA lacked sufficient information to adjudge which group carried the best chance for success, but the military seemed to be most advanced in the planning of an overthrow. Regarding the Buddhists, the report asserted that they seemed to exhibit assurance that the Diem government would not provide them satisfaction: “Buddhist spokesmen…convey the unmistakable impression that, even if the government can satisfactorily refute these charges, the

Buddhists will raise new charges and the militant wing indicate they intend to keep up the pressure until the Diem regime is overthrown.” The Buddhists were “consciously transferring their struggle to the political realm,” while the regime was caught up in an internal disagreement over “whether to adopt more repressive tactics against the Buddhists or to make further conciliatory gestures toward them.” 321

If public statements were any indication of which course the regime intended to take, it seemed to be opting for the former. Nhu told a reporter that “If anyone is oppressed in this affair, it is the government which has been constantly attacked and whose mouth has been shut with

Scotch tape.” Another press release asked for “vigilance against political speculators and

Communists who may abuse the Joint Communiqué.” The Republican Youth also released a study that criticized the joint communiqué as a concession to “superstition and fanaticism.”

Additionally, the timing of a trial for the conspirators who undertook the 1960 coup seemed to indicate that the government wanted to make an example of dissidents for the whole nation to see. During the course of the trial, the prosecution accused the United States of complicity in the plot, which the embassy staunchly denied.322 Furthermore, on July 7, Diem announced that the

“problems raised by the General Association of Buddhists have just been settled.” Any further petitioning was ascribed to the “underground intervention of international red agents and

Communist fellow travelers who in collusion with fascist ideologues disguised as democrats

118 were surreptitiously seeking to revive and rekindle disunity at home while arousing public opinion against us abroad.”323

With the regime more unaccommodating than ever, conspiracy manifested. As of June

26, the CIA had reported that Dai Viet, a secret society that had worked with the French against

Diem until he liquidated his political opponents in the late 1950s. A CIA officer recommended that the conspirators contact the U.S. mission in Saigon. The initial response from the embassy was the United States would stand by the regime. The Dai Viet contact replied that “Diem’s handling [of the] Buddhist affair had removed whatever remained of popular support for the regime. If Diem continues in power, [an] eventual VC take-over [is] inevitable.” The contact insisted that the Dai Viet had popular backing, as well as the “support of many middle and lower-grade ARVN officers.” This was the “last chance for [a] non-communist political solution,” but the group found it difficult to move without reassurance “at least that U.S. would not assist Diem in [a] repressive coup.”324 Thus, the United States did not have to give explicit support to the plotters to play a decisive role in Diem’s downfall. By merely indicating that it would not defend the palace, the United States would implicitly throw its lot behind the conspiracy.

In a remark that spoke to the Cold War dimensions of the alliance, Forrestal cautioned

“that the United States must avoid allowing its own interests to be confused with those of the regime in Saigon.” Diem was useful insofar as he could keep South Vietnam out of Communist hands. Considering the Diem’s tenuous hold on power, Forrestal thought the United States was

“entering a period in which our policy must be one of fence sitting” in which the ambassador should “encourage Diem to feel that he continues to enjoy our support” while waiting for a viable alternative to appear.325 An interdepartmental Special National Intelligence Estimate

119 (SNIE) of July 10 reinforced this outlook in noting that “If the Diem government moves effectively to fulfill its 16 June commitments, much of the resentment aroused by the Buddhist controversy could be allayed,” but if “the regime was dilatory, inept, and insincere in handling

Buddhist matters, there will probably be renewed demonstrations, and South Vietnam will probably remain in a state of domestic political tension.” In the latter circumstance, the SNIE determined that “the chances of a non-Communist assassination or coup attempt against Diem will be better than even.” Although “A non-Communist successor regime might prove no more effective than Diem in fighting the Viet Cong,” American officials thought it advisable to back the mutiny, for there was “a reasonably large pool of under-utilized but experienced and trained manpower not only within the military and civilian sectors of the present government but also, to some extent, outside.” Washington thought that “These elements, given continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort.”326

Three days later, a new CIA Information Report added further confusion to the situation.

According to “four reports from Vietnamese generals,” Nhu met with top ARVN generals and asked them for “personal support” in exchange for “legitimate responsibilities” and “a more active role in the war.” He criticized the government’s handling of the Buddhist crisis and told his commanders that he would join them in a coup. There was superficial validity to the scheme, because three weeks earlier Nhu had declared to an American that, “if he believed the government, meaning Diem, was becoming servile to the United States, he himself would lead a coup d’état.” However, Nhu’s meeting with the generals was likely a ploy to expose mutineers within the general officer corps. Subsequent CIA reports lent further credence to increasing indications that top-level administrative officials and military commanders were seriously scheming to overthrow the government.327

120 In the midst of these revelations, Nolting returned to embassy and immediately undertook a campaign aimed not at leveraging concessions from the premier but toward “Restoration of

Diem’s confidence in US intentions.” South Vietnam’s president was “hurt by what he considers misrepresentations and calumnies…torn by conflicting advice, resentful of US pressure, and not completely in control of his government’s actions.” Nolting stood by Diem, judging that “his motives and intentions are still good” and that “some of his resentments and suspicions concerning the Buddhist agitation are well-founded.” The ambassador desired “to work quietly along existing guidelines” and “not reiterate our threat of disassociation.” He insisted that the

United States “should not try to blueprint” Diem’s policies; the ball should be in his court to

“work out his own accommodation.”328

By this point, accommodation was a pipe dream. On July 16, over one hundred Buddhist priests assembled outside the ambassador’s house to demand that the “US Government pursue any possible means [to] solve [the] Buddhist problem” by putting an end to the regime’s

“terrorizing, kidnaping, and arresting [of] Buddhist monks and nuns.” The Buddhists threatened to continue its demonstrations, including self-immolations, until the government made good on the joint communiqué.329 Nolting, however, adopted the regime’s line, dismissing the movement as “predominantly controlled by activists and radical elements.” He maintained that the United

States should maintain support for the regime, regardless “of what appear to be repressive police actions,” which Nolting admitted would “generate a good deal of heat.”330

In his subsequent telegram to the State Department, Nolting reported that “a series of

Buddhist demonstrations in and around Saigon…had twice led the police to take demonstrators away in trucks to the outskirts of the city.” In Cholon, the scene turned ugly as, “without any apparent provocation from [the] crowd, police kicked, slugged, and clubbed bonzes and lay

121 people and loaded them forcibly in trucks. Beatings continued while people [were on the] floors of the trucks.” Adding to the scene of war zone, “Police then proceeded to strip loud speakers and banners from [the] pagoda and sealed off [the] pagoda with barbed wire.”331 Nevertheless,

Nolting asserted that “there is enormous potential for stretch in [the] Vietnamese body politic.

Events which normally would indicate imminent downfall of a government would not necessarily do so here.” Nolting took heart at Thuan’s indication that Diem would soon deliver a public speech that was purportedly “sufficiently forthcoming and conciliatory.”332

On July 18, Diem addressed the nation, informing the people that the government’s

Interministerial Committee had decided to recognize the right of all Buddhist sects to fly the

Buddhist flag. Formerly, the government had only permitted the General Association of

Buddhists to do so. Additionally, the ministers agreed to cooperate with the Buddhists in ensuring proper implementation of the joint communiqué and required “all cadres of the public and private sectors” to work towards this end.333 Nolting praised the gesture, but Diem’s declarations amounted to little more than what Diem had already done to no avail: he simply promised to follow through. The ambassador acknowledged, however, that Xa Loi pagoda remained sealed off and protestors continued to languish behind bars. In the face of such damning indictments of the regime’s bad faith, Nolting’s optimism was indefatigable. He continued “working urgently to get GVN to open pagodas and release persons arrested.”334

Washington did not know what to make of the situation. Mixed signals abounded. The

Buddhists demanded “concrete steps to implement the June 16 agreement, such as the release of all Buddhists arrested since May 8, punishment of those responsible for Buddhist deaths on May

8, and indemnification of the families of those injured.” Diem seemed to be moving in the right direction when he called for the removal of Saigon’s barricades, but he continued to sequester Xa

122 Loi Pagoda.335 Rusk repeated with tired resignation that “We do not know whether Diem really will do the things he must if his regime is to survive.” Nolting’s instructions remained the same: press Diem to accede to all Buddhist demands.336

Nolting could no longer hide his aversion to the State Department’s policy. On July 20, he told Rusk that he was “very disappointed” in his instructions, asserting that “It gives us nothing to work with…A wait-and-see attitude on our part at this juncture will lead to further jeopardizing U.S. vital interests.” He admitted that “Experience has shown that GVN can be counted on to be slow, sticky, and uncoordinated in adopting and implementing any policy,” but he adhered to the argument that “Nevertheless, our best bet still lies in encouraging and prodding and helping [Diem] to accept and follow through on policies that look reasonably good.” Nolting insisted that “Diem has come out with something that looks good (and has already taken certain concrete actions to back it up),” he simply needed the United States to help him follow through on his promises.337 The State Department held firm; there would be no public statement of support for the regime unless Diem took actions to demonstrate his sincerity.338 Nolting, however, continued to advocate for Diem through the end of July, insisting that the “atmosphere has perceptively calmed” and that the Diem regime “stands the best chance…of carrying to [a] successful conclusion the counterinsurgency here.339 He even took to the press. In an interview with United Press International (UPI) on July 28, the ambassador asserted, “I say this very frankly, after almost two and one half years here, [I] have never seen any evidence of religious persecution, in fact I have the feeling that there is a great deal of religious toleration among

Vietnamese people at all levels.”340 The UPI story infuriated Harriman, who told Hilsman that

Nolting should be barred from making any more public statements without Washington’s approval.341

123 Despite Nolting’s assurances, Hilsman gave short shrift to prospects for reconciliation.

On July 23, he told the embassy that the “odds favor [an] attempted coup within the next few months if not weeks” and that the “Odds also seem to favor success of such [a] coup.” Hilsman declared that “In these circumstances” the United States had four options: make “public statements [of] disassociation,” which would likely stimulate a coup; directly encourage “certain military leaders” to install Tho as Diem’s successor; discourage coup plots through public statements of support for Diem; or continue to “hold to [the] present posture of watchful waiting while continuing privately to press GVN to demonstrate [the] proper spirit” to fully resolve the crisis. Given these options, Hilsman declared that the State Department was “inclined to favor the last course,” since it was uncertain who the available alternatives were and since plausible deniability would allow the United States to not be put “in the position of having backed [the] loser.”342

The CIA maintained that Diem could defeat the Viet Cong only if “the Buddhist crisis is resolved satisfactorily…The Buddhist crisis has placed an increased strain on the Diem regime and raises the possibility of jeopardy to future progress in counterinsurgency operations. Much will depend on the manner in which the crisis is resolved.”343 Thus, it was critical that the regime take positive steps toward ingratiating itself to the people. Any further antagonism of the populace could be devastating for the war effort. The State Department likewise worried that the increasing power of the Nhus would allow them to “put into practice the bigotry [Madame Nhu] had put into words. If that should happen, [the] United States would be confronted with [a] moral

Dien Bien Phu of tragic dimensions.”344

At a time when her words could not have been any more damaging, Madame Nhu returned to the fore. At a speech before the Women’s Paramilitary Youth on August 3, she

124 lambasted the Buddhists as “seditious elements, in the name of a pretended ‘propagation of the faith’, applying the most odious of the communist tactics.”345 She implored her feminine audience to resist the “ridiculously reactionary men, imbued…with an unbearable idealistic pride, irritated by the fact that they can not rule us by their own whims.” 346 Madame Nhu dismissed the bonzes as “so-called ‘holy men’ who have never considered the interests of the nation” who were “resorting to fraudulent means” and “taking recourse to dealings derived from the bases[t] of tricks.” She carped that the Buddhists “do their utmost to arouse disorder with unfounded claims or with claims which cannot possibly be satisfied,” adding that this “proves better than anything else the negativeness of their behavior.” They had applied the communist tactic of “‘thief crying thief” by accusing others of their own misdeeds.” 347 This was a

“comportment,” which, according to Madame Nhu, “revolts us beyond words.”348 Madame Nhu implored her compatriots to be “merciless to obscurantism and the abuses it engenders” and “be content to ignore the purveyors of flabby ease.”349

Washington reacted with understandable irritation to the speech, calling it “inflammatory and most unwise,” but Diem defended his sister-in-law’s “right to [speak] as a private citizen.”350

The State Department responded “that while we recognize Madame Nhu is [a] private citizen rather than [a] GVN official it [is] clear we cannot ignore such destructive and insulting statements by a person so clearly identified with [Diem].” Calling to question the premier’s virility, Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal declared that “Diem cannot overlook [the] effect [that] this has of undercutting his authority and creating image abroad that he [is] being led around by apron strings.”351 The group demanded public statements by Diem and Nhu confirming their support for a policy of conciliation, but they added that the best thing to do “would be to remove

Mme Nhu from [the] scene.”352

125 Madame Nhu was undeterred by American recriminations. Amid rumors that Ngo Dinh

Nhu was planning a crackdown on the Buddhists at Xa Loi Pagoda, the protests resumed and intensified with another self-immolation at noon on August 4 near the Monument aux Morts in

Binh Thuan province.353 The opportunity to launch a few more barbs was irresistible to Madame

Nhu, for on August 8, Times of Viet-Nam interviewed the “Dragon Lady,” asking her “Do you think the Buddhists want to topple this government?” She replied that “only a few so-called

‘Buddhist leaders’ want to topple this government. But, between wanting to and being able to, there is a difference.” The tone apparently not condescending enough, she raised a rhetorical question: “Indeed, facing this government…what have those so-called ‘Buddhist leaders’ done?...All they have done is barbecue a bonze, and that even not with self-sufficient means, since they had to use imported gasoline.”354 Stressing her deep loathing for the Buddhists, she declared “Let them burn! And we shall clap our hands!”355 Later that month, she declared in the

New York Times that “I may shock some by saying ‘I would beat such provocateurs 10 times more if they wore monks’ robes,’ and I would clap hands at seeing another monk barbecue show.”356

Forrestal believed this was the writing on the wall for the regime. “The principal recent development in the situation in South Vietnam,” he argued, “has been the growing number of contradictory statements made by official and semi-official Vietnamese on the Buddhist question.” He pleaded to Kennedy to “take into consideration a growing domestic and international body of opinion which is becoming more and more critical of our intimate association with Diem.” Hilsman opposed a public statement of disapproval at current time, but

Forrestal believed the embassy should issue “the kind of U.S. statement which will tread the difficult line between accidentally precipitating an upheaval in Saigon and affirming publicly the

126 U.S. position on questions of religious tolerance.” Time was of the essence, since it was the

“estimate of the intelligence community that the possibilities of a successful coup in the next 3 months are about even.”357 In the game of intervention, these were tempting odds.

The situation had become exasperating for even Diem’s most supportive allies. Nolting asserted that the “Fact is Madame Nhu is out of control of everybody—her father, mother, husband and brother-in-law. The ambassador had “pulled no punches” in trying to get Diem to silence her, but the best he could offer was to “‘consider’ what he could do about her.’” So far, the results had been “worse than negative.” Nolting was sure to balance these complaints by noting what he considered successes: “reaffirmations by Diem, as well as Nhu, that GVN through [the] Tho committee intends faithfully to pursue policy of conciliation.” Apparently, he still bought into the delusion that Diem would do something, and he seemed oblivious to the critical state of Diem’s public relations, for he averred that the president’s empty promises were

“having…[a] noticeable effect on Vietnamese public opinion, despite Madame Nhu.” Still,

Nolting insisted to Diem “when he said that she spoke only as a private citizen, that this would not wash in the outside world and I did not think it would wash in Viet-Nam.” The ambassador even went so far as to level the threat to which he had earlier objected: “I told [Diem} he could not expect to maintain [his] present relationship with [the] US Government if he would not take this matter into his own hands.” Nevertheless, Diem merely “promised to consider what he could do.”358

The following evening, Thuan called on Nolting at the ambassador’s residence. South

Vietnam’s Secretary of State confided the belief “of most cabinet members and his own by saying that it was the 11th hour for Diem to take charge of the government and to act as

President.”359 Thuan also told Nolting that “he was convinced Madame Nhu had organized a

1 27 secret police squad of her own, headed by her brother, and that already ‘illegal arrests’ have been made by his group.”360 Later, Nolting passed on the State Department’s challenge to Diem’s mandarin manhood, telling him that “not only abroad, but here in Viet-Nam, it seemed clear that

Madame Nhu, with the support of his brother, was usurping his prerogatives and control.”361 The ambassador determined that “nothing would now eradicate this impression except vigorous and positive public action by him, demonstrating his control over his own government and repudiating Madame Nhu.” Diem felt that “it was not so much what Madame Nhu said but how she said it that gave him trouble.” Nolting tried to convince Diem of his sister-in-law’s impropriety, but “he reverted again and again to bad faith of the bonzes, their sabotage of the war effort, etc. He also mentioned the pressure he was under from ‘good people’ in the provinces and elsewhere not to knuckle under to the false monks. He complained that nobody in the outside world recognized the falsity of the religious issue or the fact that it was being used for subversive action”362 Finally seeming to sense Diem’s remoteness from reality, the ambassador

told him that what he had just said confirmed my suspicion that his policy was in fact schizophrenic, that he had entrusted a policy of conciliation to the Vice President to implement and was himself condoning public attacks upon the Buddhists, which made that policy impossible to implement; that he had to choose to do so decisively; that so far as the US was concerned he had to stick to and implement fully the policy of conciliation, and had to make certain public demonstrations that he was doing so. Otherwise, we could not support him.363

Nolting also conveyed the rumor from Thuan, but the president “flatly denied that there was any substance to it.364 Diem then stated that Tho would reiterate the government policy the following day, expecting that “after talks with certain bonzes…they would agree to [a] joint investigations.” Nolting strongly advised Diem “to make that public declaration himself.”365 The

State Department concurred.366 Meanwhile, the burnings continued. On the afternoon of August

128 12, Thich Thanh Tue committed fiery suicide in front of Phuc Duyen pagoda in front of a thousand spectators.367

Tho’s much-anticipated press conference on August 13 did nothing to assuage American anxieties about the regime. South Vietnam’s Vice President essentially adopted the same line as

Diem: there had been “some unfortunate events,” but the government was in communication with the Buddhists and believed that “both sides may come to [a] better mutual understanding.”

To do so, however, would demand “much effort and patience.” Additionally, he claimed that

Madame Nhu’s words were valid as her personal opinion, comparing her statements to

Mansfield’s criticisms of the regime. Tho asserted that “those arrested before June 16 may be granted clemency as President Diem has declared;” he insisted that religious freedom was being observed and that the flag demands had been met “since GVN has received no complaints,” but the decree could not be implemented until the next legislative session; investigation into the May

8 incident would require the Buddhists to prove abuse by the government; finally, “were it not for reasons of national security…no Buddhists would be arrested, and while “GVN leniency toward the Buddhists [has been] demonstrated, their actions were “clear violation[s] of law.”368

Washington was not amused. The State Department responded to the press conference with the assessment that it “Appears here that Tho press conference projects [an] essentially unbending and non-conciliatory policy which is in flat contradiction to Diem[‘s] promise to take our advice.” Rusk inquired if “there is any chance that Diem would be willing to take a

‘vacation’ together with [the] Nhus at this time?”369 Nolting reported back that Diem had again claimed he would soon “issue a declaration conciliatory to the Buddhists” and “implied, without actually saying it, that his declaration would repudiate Madame Nhu.”370 He thought Tho’s statements were “wholly inadequate” and there was no “chance of Diem’s taking a vacation at

129 this time in company of [the[ Nhus.”371 The next day, Nolting reported “delay and much hard negotiation on issuance of [a] statement by Diem.” He regretted that Diem “had slipped back into postponement and vacillation, which he attributed to Buddhist attacks.” The president’s

“Ministerial Council had advised him not to issue another conciliatory statement,” but Nolting

“told him bluntly that we could not accept this.” Diem stood his ground, maintaining “that neither the American press nor apparently the American government understood the real dimensions or all [the] complexities of the Buddhist problem, nor did we understand the true situation concerning the Ngo family and their individual contributions…He went into great detail on this, stressing the absolute selflessness of Ngo Dinh Nhu’s contribution to the cause.” Nolting

“stuck to the position [that] it would be impossible for the US Government to continue our present relationship to him and his government if he did not promptly make a declaration which would show clearly who was running the country.” Diem promised to do so, but his statement in the The Herald Tribune was more of the same: he claimed that “‘the policy of utmost conciliation is irreversible,’” and his statement regarding Madame Nhu came in the form of a nebulous claim that “it is only because some have contributed, either consciously or unconsciously, to raising doubts about this government policy that the solution of the Buddhist affair has been retarded.”372

Washington appreciated the article but remarked that “It took more pressure from ambassador Nolting during their final meeting yesterday to get Diem to issue any statement at all reaffirming his government’s policy toward the Buddhists.” Furthermore, the implied disavowal of Madame Nhu’s statement was merely “an answer to a question from Marguerite

Higgins…Thus it could be disavowed if need be, and few Vietnamese are likely to be aware of it anyway.” Evidence of this existed in Hué, where the atmosphere remained tense while “more

130 Buddhist monks and nuns were volunteering to sacrifice themselves.”373 Diem had to go further.

Positive statements helped, but to be truly effective, they “must be backed up with action.”374

The CIA agreed with the White House and State Department. In a meeting with Brigadier

General Tra Tu Oai, head of South Vietnam’s Department of Psychological Warfare, the general told the agency that “A political crisis…had developed under the guise of Buddhist agitation,” which had been caused by declining standards of living and overall fatigue with the regime after eight years of disappointments. Oai advised that the regime do the same as his allies has suggested: “Deal with the Buddhists in a moderate and conciliatory fashion,” and “take some action which will produce a psychological shock in order to rally the population back to support the government,” such as taking action against abusive government officials.375 Meanwhile, the

Buddhists seethed, coup plotting continued, and rumors of a government reprisal circulated.376

On August 14, the CIA reported that two days earlier, a twenty-year-old bonze set himself on fire in Phan Thiet.377 On August 16, the CIA reported two more self-immolations on that day and the previous one. The first was a Buddhist nun in Khanh Hoa Province, a coastal town about two hundred miles north of Saigon. Following the protest, “small demonstrations took place in the province capital, Nha Trang, demanding return of the body to the Buddhists and implementation of government promises…One of the demonstrations was broken up by troops with firehoses.” The following day in Hué, “A 71-year old Buddhist monk burned himself to death before dawn…The suicide took place in the courtyard of the city’s main pagoda, Tu Dam.”

In response, “The government issued a 14-hour curfew…Troops surrounded the pagoda and stood guard at key points throughout the city.”378 The government response met with further

Buddhist agitation. In Saigon, Buddhist leaders sent a letter to Diem demanding that the Hué protestor be given the right to a full burial ceremony, but troops had already violently seized the

131 body from the Buddhist ‘honor guard’ and buried it at an undisclosed location. The government then attempted to secure the city by issuing a curfew, while “Barbed wire blocked off access to government offices and correspondents were warned they would be arrested if they took photographs. Subsequently, “About 500 Buddhist boys and girls staged a sitdown strike in front of the province headquarters for several hours but were later dispersed.379

Nolting’s work was done; Trueheart would fill his shoes until Lodge’s arrival. On

August 15, Kennedy met with Lodge at the White House. Two years later, Lodge recalled that he found the president “very much concerned by what was going on in Vietnam. He referred particularly to the famous Associated Press picture of the Buddhist monk, Quang Duc, burning himself alive. I suppose that no news picture in recent history had generated as much emotion around the world as that one had.” Kennedy left Lodge with the impression that that the regime had entered its “terminal phase.”380 Before departing, Lodge also met with “a very eminent

Vietnamese,” presumably Ambassador Chuong, Madame Nhu’s estranged father, who declared,

“‘Unless they leave the country, there is no power on earth that can prevent the assassination of

Madame Nhu, her husband Mr. Nhu, and his brother Mr. Diem;’ that the oppressive acts of the regime—the arbitrary arrests, imprisonments and executions, and the general reign of terror that was going on—would make assassination inevitable in any country.”381 Thus, when Lodge arrived in Saigon at the end of the month, he came with a strong impression that any solution to

Vietnam’s troubles would be predicated on demise of the dynastic power structure embodied by the Ngo family’s arbitrary rule.

132

133 XII

Betrayal

Diem’s troubles snowballed during the interim between Nolting’s departure and Lodge’s arrival. On August 19, the American consulate in Hué reported that, on the previous day, a cadre of five hundred university students deposed their student organization leaders and proclaimed a boycott pending reinstatement of the schools’ rector, whom Diem had dismissed on August 15 at the insistence of Ngo Dinh Can. Thousands flocked to the city’s two main pagodas while their leaders demanded that the government release the bodies of those Buddhists who had committed suicide and divulge the names of those responsible for the violence on May 8. Consul John

Helble stated his belief that the “lid is off the kettle in Hue and additional political religious eruptions [are] likely at any time.”382 The State Department considered whether resolution might be effected through international mediation of negotiations between Tho’s government commission and the Buddhists.383

This fragile optimism was shattered, however, by the events of August 21. Three days earlier, a massive crowd of between fifteen and twenty thousand people had gathered at Xa Loi

Pagoda to hear Tri Quang and his compatriots make an impassioned speech in which they harangued the government and called for its overthrow.384 At 11:00 p.m. on August 20, Diem declared nationwide martial law in a national radio address. Early the next morning, he made a series of military appointments that included installing the loyalist General Ton That Dinh as the military governor of Saigon.385 ARVN troops and combat police then descended on pagodas throughout South Vietnam, forcing their entry to the temples in a maelstrom of searches, seizures, and arrests. Just after midnight, South Vietnamese police clad in riot gear rolled up in

134 armored vehicles and occupied Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon. Once inside, an explosion rocked the structure. The police used bullets, tear gas, and bayonets to subdue and arrest those inside. Once the Buddhists were under police guard, the security forces ransacked and looted the pagoda in an exhibition that must have seemed to symbolize the cultural warfare that many had accused the regime of waging. 386 At Tu Dam Pagoda in Huè, nine soldiers attempting to search the building were injured when a mob attacked them with rocks and pointed sticks. These scenes were repeated at numerous locations throughout the republic as over 1400 Buddhists jailed.387

The pagoda raids heralded the Diem regime’s final act. Its significance laid not so much in alienating the Buddhists; their leadership had already resolved to seek a change in government. Nor was it in souring interallied relations, for American leadership was already disillusioned to the regime and merely biding time until an acceptable alternative appeared. The primary effect of the pagoda raids was alienation of Diem’s only source of power: the military.

The reprisals left many middle and high-level officers disgusted by the government’s handling of the operation and affronted at having been manipulated to undertake it. The generals had come to the realization that such a debased regime could not legitimately assume the mantle of popular government and prosecute a successful counterinsurgency.

The official story said that the generals asked that Diem instate martial law to restrain the discontented masses. The weeks leading up to the raids had seen multiple self-immolations coupled with massive, raucous demonstrations led by zealous votaries in open defiance of the government.388 The military was “beginning to tire of the issue,…becoming concerned over [the] impact of [a] prolonged impasse on morale of [the] troops, and beginning to fear that Buddhists had escalated [the] dispute to [the[ point where it posed [a] possibly grave threat to [the] security of the country and [the] struggle against the VC.”389 The previous Sunday, August 17, had been

135 particularly disturbing in this regard: enormous crowds had gathered at Xa Loi to hear inflammatory speeches, students in Huè rose up in protest, and Buddhist sympathizers attacked an ARVN officer in Danang. Bui Van Luong, South Vietnam’s Minister of the Interior, claimed that the “generals confronted Diem in [an] all day session 20 August with urgent request that he give them power to deal with [the] situation.”390 This obviously meshed with Nhu’s plans to snuff out the agitators, but Trueheart thought that the scheme had value for Diem as well in spreading the association with repression to include the army and in presenting Lodge with a fait accompli upon his installation at the embassy.391 The acting ambassador told Washington that the most serious concern now was “that various elements of [the] military…may begin [to] maneuver for power.” He was particularly worried about General Tran Van Don, since he was

“much hated and distrusted by senior officers.”392

In reality, it seems most likely that the generals initiated plans for martial law, but Nhu exploited the situation for a power grab. On August 18, a group of between ten and fifteen senior commanders held a meeting in which they decided to ask Diem to declare martial law so that they could remove from Saigon those Buddhist monks who had travelled from outlying provinces and were now ensconced in the city’s pagodas. This group of generals included two

Diem loyalists, the commander of III Corps, General Ton That Dinh, and the commander of IV

Corps, General Huyn Van Cao. One of these men likely tipped off Diem and Nhu to meeting. On

August 20, they offered their plan to Nhu, who then told the generals to take their proposal to

Diem. The decree was subsequently published under Don’s name to assign responsibility for the raids to the army. Meanwhile, Nhu had Tung’s Special Forces and the Saigon combat police at the ready to undertake a brutal, large-scale crackdown that extended well beyond what the generals intended. To conceal the scheme, Dinh and Tung took their orders directly from the

136 palace. Additionally, to keep the Americans in the dark, Nhu had the phone lines to the embassy and homes of U.S. officials cut shortly after the raid began.393 Nhu made a fatal mistake, however, in appointing General Don as Chairman of the Joint General Staff (JGS).394

Don’s memoirs shed much light on the subject in what comes across as a very candid account of those heady days. “Dinh was not at all the opportunist portrayed in [The Pentagon

Papers],” averred Don, maintaining that “He and I were in constant touch during that trying period and never did his loyalty to us waver.” Don and Dinh met at the latter’s house the month before the raids, where they “discussed the increasing activities of the National Liberation Front, various incidents with the Buddhists, and the overall indignation of the people against the government.” They worried that “unless the Buddhists could be appeased, the NLF would take advantage of the situation and further exploit the population.” Their suggestion was to “put the army clearly in control of the military situation: to remove the office of the president from military decision-making.” With this view in mind, Don “openly advocated that a temporary condition of martial law be imposed throughout the country so that essential military actions could proceed without political interference.” Diem and rejected this argument on several occasions, so the generals were naturally caught off guard by Diem’s August 20 declaration.

“But, as it turned out,” recounted Don, “we were duped by Ngo Dinh Nhu who had a most devious plan up his sleeve.” Nhu endeavored to suppress the Buddhists, but he “designated only special forces and secret police under his direct command to carry out the operation.” When Don and Khiem visited Xa Loi Pagoda following the raids, they were “disgusted” by the scene: “the place was a [in?] shambles. Most monks who normally served the people at the pagoda had been arrested by the secret police on the pretext that arms were present in the building. The official report stated that three weapons were seized there, but these had actually been brought to the

137 scene by the police.” At this location alone, more than thirty people were wounded and many more were missing. Don asserted that “Nhu’s decision to attack the pagodas and implicate the army with myself as its temporary head turned out to be his and his brother’s ultimate downfall.”395

The State Department declared that the regime had “instituted serious repressive measures against Vietnamese Buddhists” and asked Trueheart for an appraisal.396 The crackdown was not only a bad public look for the regime but also for the Americans who had backed the government. In Huè, the people “could not understand why [the] US did not stop [the soliders] using US equipment.” The U.S. consul, John Helble, noted that “anti-US feeling in Hue [is at] an all-time peak.”397

Trueheart concurred with the State Department’s initial impressions and set about investigating the events. He met with Thuan first. The secretary of state seemed “a beaten man,” and he “made no effort to explain or justify last night’s action or declaration of martial law.”398

He then met with General Khiem, who blamed the assaults on “civilian security components” and told Trueheart that he would have to get specific information from Don.399 Conversely,

Minister of the Interior Luong claimed that it was wholly an ARVN undertaking.400

The State Department worried that the army “may begin [a] maneuver for power.”401 The

Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated on August 21 that there was no hard evidence of

Communist collusion with the Buddhists, but the realization that the government would never honor its compact was leading many to desire a change in government.402 Hilsman, seeking to better understand the prospects for a coup, asked William Colby, the Director of the CIA’s Far

East Division, to compile information “on the status of Nhu and the relationship between Diem and the military.”403 The next day, Hilsman, Harriman, and Ball cabled Lodge ahead of his

138 arrival in Saigon asking for the new ambassador to submit his assessment of the situation and reminding him that, while current policy dictated continuation of the effort to persuade Diem to reform, the situation might soon arise where it became “useful to throw our influence toward eliminating the power of the Nhus,” which was unlikely to be achieved by any means other than a coup.404 On August 23, Lodge replied that the palace was still in control and that the military was cooperating, but he cautioned, “we do not believe that [the] military should be regarded as monolithic…Specifically, we believe that there are at least three power elements in [the] army represented by General Don, General Dinh, and Colonel Tung. Further, Dinh and Tung…have military forces in Saigon. Should [the] regular Army decide to take over in earnest, i.e., depose

Diem, [the] possibility of serious fighting in Saigon would be considerable.”405

On August 24, Lodge reported a conversation between Thuan and Rufus Phillips in which the secretary stated that “it would be difficult to split the Nhus off from the President but he felt strongly that the U.S. should attempt this.” He added that “the U.S. had to exercise leadership and must be very firm…Under no circumstances, he said, should the U.S. acquiesce in what the Nhus had done. This would be disastrous. At the end of the meeting, Thuan voiced his concern that “Nhu was in a dangerously triumphant mood. Nhu believed himself in full control of the situation and was contemptuous of the Americans…Nhu had been very successful in tricking the Army, and in dividing it into three commands.” Thuan concluded that “Nhu had very little real support in the Army and that the Army would turn firmly against Nhu if it knew that the U.S. would under no circumstances support a government with the Nhus in control.”406

A conversation between Phillips and General Le Van Kim lent credence Thuan’s statements. Kim “opened the conversation by saying, bitterly, that [the] Army is now acting as

[a] puppet of Counselor Nhu, who tricked it into establishing martial law.” He then accused the

139 army of planting weapons and explosives in the pagodas. Kim also worried that renewed student protests, which were “on the verge of violence,” would spread across the nation and transform into riots that would inevitably lead to clashes with security forces. The general then got down to business: would the Americans back a coup? He assured Phillips that “If [the] US took [a] clear stand against [the] Nhus and in support of Army action to remove them from government, the

Army (with the exception of Colonel Tung) would unite in support of such an action and would be able to carry it out.” Although many of the generals had recently signed a loyalty oath to

Diem, Kim declared that they had been forced to do so. “He said [the] US must not be fooled by this document, that [the] vast majority of Army and most of [the] Army and most of [the]

Generals who signed [the] document did not approve of repression of Buddhists but had to sign at this time or expose themselves to individual elimination by Counselor Nhu.”407

Even the most devoted loyalists had exhibited a critical view towards the government.

Paul Kattenburg, the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, reported that Vo

Van Hai, the chief of Diem’s private cabinet, told him that the raids were a “carefully stage- managed by Nhu,” whom Hai thought was a liar who never intended to honor the policy of conciliation. He confirmed that Nhu intended the operation as a fait accompli. Diem believed in the policy, but Nhu had “completely dominated the president for the past two years.” His foremost concern was that the regime’s best men would resign their posts and collaborate with the Viet Cong, as some had said they were considering. Hai believed he was under government surveillance, but he hoped that Nhu could be removed while Diem was retained.408

Back channels soon confirmed the military’s disgust with the regime. On the day of

Lodge’s arrival, the CIA reported “That a group of high-ranking officials of the government of

Vietnam would attempt a coup d’etat against the Diem regime on 25 August.”409 The following

140 day, August 23, Don contacted Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein of the CIA to request a meeting with him at the general’s office later that day. Don trusted Conein as a political realist and secret operative who had been heavily involved in Vietnam’s domestic affairs since 1945. A former member of the French Foreign Legion and OSS operative during World War II, he spoke fluent French and could be counted on to accurately mediate Don’s dealings with the

Americans.410 From this point forward, Conein would be the lifeline between the conspirators and American officials.

Lucien E. Conein was a fascinating character, an old friend of General Don from the days fighting the Viet Minh. A French native, Conein enlisted in the French Army just as World War

II broke out. After France fell to Hitler’s blitzkrieg, Conein escaped to the United States and joined the U.S. Army, which placed him in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS assigned Conein to an elite paratroop division and was regularly deployed behind enemy lines.

Following the liberation of France in the spring of France in December 1944, Conein returned to the United States, where he underwent more training for the purpose of operations in Southeast

Asia, he was transferred to a French-Vietnamese commando unit based in southern China. This special force was designed to harass the Japanese Imperial Army, with Conein engaged in more drops into enemy territory to rehabilitate, train, and redeploy scattered French forces. The French units were to establish a base of operations in northern Indochina. Conein was caught in Hanoi in

1945 when the Viet Minh assumed power. Conein came back to the United States in 1946, whereupon he served in Strategic Services Unit (SSU), what soon become the Central

Intelligence Group (CIG) and, eventually, the CIA. From there, he was sent to Europe to lay sabotage behind the Iron Curtain, and then to Iran for work toward overthrowing Mohammad

Mossadeq. After a brief return stateside for a desk job in the CIA, he returned to Vietnam in late

141 1954 to serve in the Saigon Military Mission under Lansdale. Conein was initially satationed in

North Vietnam, but once the Viet Minh regained power, he left for Saigon by way of Haiphong.

Once below the seventeenth parallel, Conein worked to establish a stable base of government for the early Diem regime. Conein left Vietnam and the CIA in 1956 for the U.S. Special Forces.

Three years later, he was transferred to work under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army, returning to Iran for another two years. In 1961, Conein then left the military for good and returned to the CIA. The agency immediately sent Conein to Vietnam, where he would remain until the summer of 1967.411

The CIA determined that Nhu was the “main force behind the plan to declare martial law…and the attacks on the pagodas.”412 Furthermore, the army was “discouraged and frustrated” by the regime because “many officers wanted changes made but were afraid to suggest them to Americans because of full American support of President Diem.”413 Airborne officers expressed similar dismay over the government’s crackdown.

A tense situation became more so when, on August 23, approximately one thousand students gathered in protest in Saigon before being “rapidly dispersed when [an] armored car pointed [a] .50 caliber machine gun and ordered them to go.” Three hundred students returned to the scene later that day to hear the dean of medicine announce his resignation and tell the students that it was up to them to “decide what to do and to follow [their] own conscience.”414

The students returned to protest again the next day. Some staged a sit-down strike and pressed professors to communicate their views to the government.415 Elsewhere, a group of Buddhist women approached the embassy and asked to meet with the ambassador. An embassy officer spoke with them, listening to their pleas for the embassy to seek the release of the thousands of prisoners whom had been arbitrarily arrested in the raids. The women insisted that they were

142 “ordinary Buddhist believers, not bonzesses, and were wives and mothers mostly of civil servants.” Many other women and students had wished to accompany them but were too afraid of being picked up by security forces. They further revealed that “thirty students had planned to burn themselves on August 26 at Tan Son Nhut Airport to ‘show the new ambassador how oppressive the government is’” When the women left, police cars followed them.416 Additionally, a later cable reported that newsmen had been detained in Saigon and their photographs were confiscated by police.417 No one was safe from the Ngos’ wrath.

Conein spent three hours with Don in his office at Joint General Staff Headquarters on the evening of August 23. The ARVN commander stated that “President Diem is in control through Ngo Dinh Nhu; that the martial law plan was presented by the general to Nhu on 20

August and then discussed with Diem, who made the decision after the generals recommended it.

Don also claimed that things could not revert back to what they were before; that some of the ministers had to be changed.”418 Don went on to explain that governing was foreign to Diem when he took over in 1954. Because of this, Dem “would have to have people around him who think.” Thus, “He turned to his brother Nhu who is a thinker, an individual who has theories, a philosophy.” However, “As time went on, Diem has allowed Nhu to do most of the thinking.”

Nhu’s wife “uses her privileged position with the president to make him say yes when he wants to say no.” Don thought “it would be practically impossible to get rid of the Nhus because of special positions they hold; Ngo Dinh Nhu being the president’s thinker and Madame Nhu his platonic wife.”419

Don stated that the generals’ intention was to remove bonzes who came from outside of the city and return them to their hometowns. They worried that “if the Buddhist leaders assembled a large enough crowd they could order a march toward Gia Long Palace and the army

143 would not stop them.” In presenting the plan to Diem, the generals complained that the “morale of [the] troops was deteriorating, and in fact they feared that one military post was near [a] state of desertion.” They also declared “that wives of soldiers and junior officers were getting upset.”

Diem approved the plan. The “president insisted however that none of the bonzes be hurt,” and

“Don said this touched him very much that the president should insist on their not harming the

Buddhists.” Although Don was technically Dinh’s superior, Don did not have command over

Dinh. Nor did Dinh, as Military Governor of Saigon-Cholon, have command over Tung and his

Special Forces. Both of these men took their orders directly from the palace, but Don said that the other generals supported him aside from a handful of young upstarts who, as the majority were Buddhist, had criticized Don for the raids. Don swore that “he was not aware that the

Buddhists were going to be attacked by the police and Vietnamese Special Forces.” He asserted that Dinh and Tung’s orders to sack the pagodas came from Nhu. Don also stated that he was upset that the military was being blamed for the indiscretions committed due to the fact that the

United States had implicated the military on a Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcast when this was really the work of the police and Special Forces.420

Don disclaimed any ambition for the presidency, vowing that he accepted command of the army to maintain the unity of the commanders. He thought no one in the military could effectively fill that office, and he objected to installing an expatriate politician in the role. Don did not state whether he personally wished to retain or drop Diem, but he did say that “if he had to choose between President Diem and Nhu, he would choose the president.” He “indicated that he wants assurances one way or another for the U.S. govt…It seems Don himself feels he does not have the power of enough influence over the generals to overthrow the president.” Ideally, he hoped that the government could “conciliate the Buddhists and said that the military should

144 restore the pagodas and the holy statues that were destroyed.” This seemed unlikely, however, for Don stated that the recent events were only phase one of a multistage plan to suppress the regime’s antagonists.421

On the following day, Don met with his colleagues to discuss South Vietnam’s security amid the growing student protest movement. The commanders were hesitant to reduce force numbers in such a tense atmosphere, but Don said he would try do so in order to reduce the “aura of suppression” fostered by martial law. The generals also decided to issue an edict recalling all privately held weapons. They lamented that the recent evens had caused the government to suffer a loss of international prestige. Diem had rejected the use of violence against student demonstrators, but he offered no suggestions as to how the army should handle the situation if things got out of hand. Major General Duong Von Minh (Big Minh) said that Don should tell

Diem that the army could not guarantee that it could maintain order, leaving Don visibly disturbed by the suggestion. Big Minh also doubted Don’t claim that he could control Dinh, since Dinh was a personal adjunct to Diem and Nhu.422

Lodge, according to Trueheart “simply hit the ground running” when he got to the scene of the crime. On the same day of Conein’s meeting with Don, Lodge transmitted his first cables to Washington. Arriving in Saigon on August 22, he was unable to present his credentials until four days later. A minor crisis had arisen when South Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Vu Van Mau, suddenly resigned in protest against his government. Nevertheless, Lodge was undeterred from getting down to business.423 In addition to his preliminary reporting on the military and political situation, he related what Madame Nhu had recently expressed to a New York Daily News correspondent. She despised Tri Quang, the Buddhist firebrand, and believed that he was one of the monks who had taken refuge in the United States Operations Mission (USOM)

145 administrative building. She intimated that, if she knew this was certain, she would condone a violation of diplomatic immunity in having the army forcibly remove the controversial bonze.424

Lodge also detailed the strict press censorship imposed by the military government.425

By the evening of August 24, the Lodge cables were getting juicy. From the reports on discussions with Hai, Kim, and Thuan, the ambassador concluded that, while the generals had real security concerns were easy to exploit, Nhu spearheaded the raids and was becoming an ever more domineering presence at the palace. He accepted that the “Regular Army was not cut in fully on [the] planned action against [the] pagodas,” but he declared that “Don’s statement that

[the] Army planned simply to return bonzes to their own pagodas is disingenuous,” since, “if he meant to do this [it] could be done peacefully.” Additionally, Lodge was skeptical that a coup could succeed, because he did not think that “any of the officers with actual military strength in

Saigon is at this point disaffected with [the] president or with Nhu.” Although the “Suggestion has been made that [the] U.S. has only to indicate to the ‘Generals’ that it would be happy to see

Diem and/or Nhus go, and deed would be done,” Lodge asserted that the “Situation is not so simple…we have no information that officers with troops in Saigon are disposed to act in this way. Moreover, there I no showing that [the] military have agreed among themselves on a leadership.” Thus, the embassy argued that “Action on our part in these circumstances would seem to be a shot in the dark…I believe we should bide our time, continuing to watch [the] situation closely.426

A meeting between Don and Harkins on August 24 validated Lodge’s concern. Don revealed that the power structure of the military had effectively divided the officers, as the loyalists Dinh and Tung had significant forces at their disposal, creating “a neatly engineered stalemate.” Don declared that the “stalemate could be broken by the U.S.” by making Diem

146 recompose and reorganize his government. Don stressed that Diem wanted to end martial law, but the disorder in the streets was delaying this. He hoped that the “U.S. will truly try to bear down on Diem—and try to show him how to run government—by delegating authority [to] ministers and broadening his narrow outlook.” Don recognized that this had been previously attempted to no avail, but he thought his allies should keep trying. He also asserted that the war against the Viet Cong had not been halted by the crisis, but Harkins noted in the memorandum that, althought this was technically true, operations were being conducted at a “reduced tempo.”427

One of the factors that made the Americans less apprehensive about supporting a coup was the revelation that Nhu was attempting to settle with North Vietnam through a Polish intermediary at the UN, Mieczyslaw Maneli. On the afternoon of August 25 in Saigon, Brigadier

General Nguyen Khanh asked to speak with a CIA contact. Khanh related that some of his fellow officers were “determined to stop taking orders from [the palace] the very minute South

Vietnam’s anticommunist stand comes into question. These generals now fear that the politicians are now thinking in the direction of an arrangement with the DRV [Democratic Republic of

Vietnam].” The army was ready to make a move, but it lacked assurance of allied support, for

“the United States has not taken any stand over recent events beside bland public statements of disapproval.” Khanh wanted to know very soon if the Americans would back a mutiny against the regime, but, if it had to, “the Army would go it alone should it become clear that the politicians were heading for any softening on anticommunism.” The generals could not accept neutralization and would “definitely revolt” if this were attempted. Khanh desired to know what the U.S. response to such an action: would it stand by a corrupt government, or would it back the army with whom Americans have “fought side by side?” Khanh would not divulge the names of

147 his co-conspirators, but insisted that he had the necessary support. The CIA representative asked about the generals’ political vision. Khanh replied that “they were only a military trying to keep the country from being turned over to communism: it was up to the United States to take care of the political part.” He reiterated that “the Generals would go down fighting if the politicians now in power moved in the wrong direction, which the Generals now fear is the case.”428

Washington took Khanh at his word. Ball replied to Lodge that Khanh was “one of the best Generals, both courageous and sophisticated. His analysis seems to confirm other evidence indicating [a] need for speed in making [the] US position clear to [the] Generals.” The State

Department thought that the ambassador should be the one to decide the manner of communicating U.S. policy to the conspirat3ors.429 Nolting had for some time been informing

Washington for some time of secret interactions between Nhu and Communists at the palace, insisting that they were merely attempts to restrict the scope of the war, so the State Department decided to let the negotiations proceed. By summer of 1963, however, revelations of high-level exchanges between Diem and Ho Chi Minh through Roger Lalouette, the French Ambassador to

Saigon, and Maneli, the Polish delegate to the International Control Commission (ICC), were particularly disquieting to Americans. The discussion centered on the prospect of a federated, neutral state based on an agreement that both sides would expel their allies’ armed forces from

Vietnam. To ardent nationalists like Nhu, the Lodge appointment seemed an omen portending much more forceful intervention into Saigon’s affairs. It was no coincidence that, on August 25, the day before Lodge officially assumed his post, Maneli became the first communist to attend a diplomatic reception in Hanoi, where he and Nhu had their first face-to-face interaction.430

Meanwhile, Lodge’s report of the Khanh meeting arrived in Washington on a Saturday afternoon when most top officials were away for the weekend. For those seeking to seize on any

148 pretext for regime change, the cable substantiated their worst fears and legitimated their proposals a radical course of action. Hilsman declared in is memoirs that the Lodge cable was arguably the most definitive evidence of the army’s dissatisfaction with the government.431 Going against Lodge’s suggestion to delay action until the situation was clarified, Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal, with Mendenhall’s assistance, came up with a dramatic reorientation in policy that they urged the president to immediately approve from Hyannis Port.432 The result was transmission of the administration’s most significant State Department telegram to Saigon: cable

243. The instructions contained within were prefaced by the declaration that “whether [the] military proposed martial law or whether Nhu tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its imposition to smash [the] pagodas.” Nhu had “maneuvered himself into a “commanding position,” and the United States could not “tolerate [a] situation in which power lies in Nhu’s hands.” More directly, Lodge was to give Diem the “chance to rid himself Nhu and his coterie,” but, “If, in spite of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.”433

The cable recommended that “immediate action must be taken to prevent Nhu from consolidating his position further.” This included demanding that Saigon cease its repressive actions, informing “key military leaders that [the] US would find it impossible to continue support [for the] GVN militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Nhus from the scene.” Moreover, the drafters gave

Lodge permission “to tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown [in the] central government mechanism.” The cable also declared the need to absolve the army of blame for the pagoda raids and blame Nhu, suggesting that Lodge might do so through a nationwide statement through VOA radio. Finally, the drafters

149 ordered Lodge to cooperate with the U.S. Country Team to “examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem’s replacement.”434 The final version of cable 243 added three paragraphs: one instructing Lodge to consult Harkins on how to protect Americans in Vietnam during a coup, another demanding strict secrecy to prevent leaks, and, more remarkably, a statement declaring, “You will understand that we cannot from

Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this operations should proceed, but you will also know that we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives.”435 In short, the anti-Diem triumvirate of Roger Hilsman, Jr., Michael Vincent Forrestal, and William

Averell Harriman, wrote Lodge a blank check with Washington’s full backing.

With so many top officials away from the office, the naturally circuitous nature of policymaking acquired additional complications. Kennedy was on a weekender in Hyannis Port;

Rusk was at a baseball game in New York; McNamara and McGeorge Bundy were vacationing out West; and John McCone, the Director of the CIA, was at home in California. There are multiple conflicting accounts of what took place that day, but the general sequence of events can be reasonably established. It seems likely that the cable was Hilsman’s brainchild, but it was written in a spirit that accorded to the views of Harriman, Forrestal, and Ball. Following its composition, Forrestal contacted Kennedy at his family villa in Hyannis Port. In an interview with William Rust, Forrestal later recalled telling the president “that at this time the only people who had functioned on it were with the Department of State.” Kennedy was hesitant to approve such a major policy decision without a formal conference, but Forrestal pressed him to accede, reasoning that Harriman and Hilsman “really want to get this thing out right away.” With an overtone of apprehension, Kennedy replied, “Well, go and see what you can do to get it cleared.”

Forrestal then caught up with Victor Krulak, the JCS Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, at

150 the Chevy Chase Club Golf Club. Krulak perused the memorandum “and realized it was a very important one that I wouldn't touch.” He insisted on conferring with the JCS chair, General

Taylor before offering an opinion.436

Meanwhile, Harriman and Hilsman rode out to another golf course to find George Ball who, with Rusk out of town, was the Acting Secretary of State. At the ninth hole, the two pulled

Ball aside from U. Alexis Johnson, the number two State Department authority in the

Washington area at the time. Johnson later recalled that he thought it “curious” that the two designed to keep him ignorant of their discussion. He later realized that this was because the telegram under discussion provided the 'green light' to Diem's opposition and, since Johnson's colleagues knew that he would oppose such a provocation, they sought to deny him the opportunity.437 Harriman, Hilsman, and Ball then blew off Johnson and went back to Ball's house to edit the memorandum, where Ball suggested modifications in the language of the cable that moderated its implicitly militant tone. Ball later said that he fully realized this would activate the generals to depose Diem, but that he agreed with the cable in principal, believing that

“Unless [Diem] got rid of the Nhus and straightened up, [I felt] that it was impossible to go forward. If we were prepared to get out, that was one thing, but I had found no sympathy with my general views that we ought to get out of Vietnam.” Nevertheless, Ball refused to sign off on the policy until it had the president's blessing.438

The order in which Ball obtained presidential approval is somewhat hazy due to Ball’s contradictory accounts of that day. Rusk recalled that Ball phoned him in New York and, after reading him the cable “in rather guarded tones,” told the secretary that “Kennedy agreed with this cable.” Seeing no point in objecting to a policy that had apparently already been cleared by the highest authority, Rusk simply concurred with the cable and added the provision for

151 continued aid to South Vietnam.439 The memoir that Ball wrote in 1981 is consistent with Rusk's version of events, explaining that he called Kennedy and “read him the relevant passages,” before Kennedy indicated that he was “favorable to our proposed message.” Although the president recognized that there was no guarantee that South Vietnam's next president would be better, Kennedy told Ball that "If Rusk and Gilpatric agree, George, then go ahead.”440

Alternatively, in an oral history interview conducted ten-year earlier, Ball stated that he called Rusk Before contacting Kennedy, telling the secretary that he would speak with the president next. Ironically, Ball's later recollections seem more accurate than those from a decade earlier. Adding to this confusion, the oral history contains a much more detailed account of the conversation between Ball and Kennedy, with Kennedy asking where McNamara was and then asking Ball to only get ahold of Gilaptric. The conversation is worth quoting in full:

So I called Kennedy at Hyannis Port, and I went over the whole thing. He asked me what I really thought. I had told him that Averell and Hilsman very much wanted to do this. I had made some changes in the telegram; I had watered it down myself actually over their earlier version. I read him the critical paragraphs. I told him that this would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup. But I said I thought that, in my judgment, the situation with Diem was becoming an enormous humiliation to the United States, that we were supporting a regime which was behaving in the most unconscionable and cruel, uncivilized way toward a significant minority of the population. Madame Nhu was making the most outrageous statements, and Nhu was a very devious and unreliable fellow. I thought to send this telegram to Lodge, who had just arrived there, was probably all right. So he approved it.

He said, “Where's Bob?” I said, “He's away.” He said, “Get hold of Ros Gilpatric and see that it's cleared with him.” So I left it with the Pentagon people to prepare and get out. I notice the accounts now say that Ros says he cleared it because he understood the President had cleared it. Well, that wasn't exactly what the President did, and that wasn't the instructions I gave. The instructions were that the President said that if it's agreeable to Gilpatric, to go ahead.441

The subsequent passage in this account is unclear, but it gives the impression that Ball then contacted Gilpatric, with Ball claiming, “So I left it with the Pentagon people to prepare and get

152 out. I notice the accounts now say that Ros says he cleared it because he understood the President had cleared it. Well, that wasn't exactly what the President did, and that wasn't the instructions I gave. The instructions were that the President said that if it's agreeable to Gilpatric, go ahead.”442

Ball's memoir, however, does not indicate that he contacted Gilpatric, while Gilpatric's oral history flatly contradicts this. Gilpatric recalled that Forrestal contacted him on Saturday evening at his home, a farm in Eastern Shore, Maryland. Forrestal gave Gilpatric the same impression that Ball gave Rusk: that “not only Ball had cleared it for State in Rusk's absence, but that it had been cleared with the president.” Gilpatric told Victor Krulak, who was with Forrestal in the White House Situation Room at the time, that the cable seemed to be outside his purview, stating, “Well, I think, under the circumstances, we've got to treat this as a White House or State

Department political move, and we just don't take a position on it,” because I frankly thought it was an end run.”443 A memorandum by Krulak also states that Forrestal contacted Gilpatric about the cable and subsequently informed Krulak that Gilpatric “was in accord with it”444

This statement by Gilpatric points to the most significant and controversial aspect of the manner in which cable 243 was approved. While inconsistencies in the sequence of events do much to call into question Ball's credibility and speak to the great confusion surrounding the issue, Gilpatric made an accusation of chicanery and underhandedness at Washington's highest levels. Regarding this, there is no debate: Harriman, Hilsman, Forrestal, and Ball declined to secure the approval of certain elements in the Washington bureaucracy because they knew their cable would be held up and likely rejected or watered down. The group railroaded the cable through the bureaucracy by either deceiving the relevant parties into believing Kennedy had already approved the message—rather than predicating his approval on that of his subordinates—or by simply not contacting them. Neither the head of the CIA, John McCone, nor

153 the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had his view solicited. The secretary of defense was reportedly hiking in the Rocky Mountains at the time, so he may have, in fact, been unreachable. McCone, however, was at home in California and could have been contacted, but

Forrestal instead cleared the cable with McCone's subordinate, Richard Helms, and Helms, believing that it “time we bit this bullet,” chose not to seek McCone's concurrence.445

As with Ball-Rusk exchange, there are conflicting accounts of how Taylor was or was not contacted about cable 243. Forrestal gave Krulak a copy of the cable, and Krulak stated that he would go find Taylor to get his views. Krulak’s record of the that day’s proceedings notes that he called Taylor at his residence in the early evening of August 24 and left a message for the general to contact him when he returned. Hilsman’s book claims that Krulak found Taylor at a restaurant, but it’s more likely, Krulak was unable to reach the general because he was out to dinner. This Ball’s version of events. Hilsman also claimed in his memoir that all relevant agencies and departments had cleared the cable, but that was, at best, a half-truth. In general,

Hilsman’s memoir seems largely an apology piece, an attempt to put his and his colleagues’ misdeeds in the best light possible.446

Krulak’s notes state that “At about 2145, not having been called, I called General

Taylor’s quarters, found him there and took the enclosure to him.” Krulak then brought a copy of the memorandum to Taylor’s residence at Fort Myers. It is not clear when Krulak arrived at

Taylor’s home. Krulak’s memorandum only records the time he called Taylor, but it seems to imply that he left immediately, and the distance from Washington to Arlington was not considerable. John Newman gives a more straightforward version of events for that evening, stating that Krulak called Taylor at 11:45 p.m., reached him there, and then left for the General’s residence, arriving there around midnight, but this paragraph seems to lack a citation. This

154 conflicts with the Krulak memorandum printed in the State Department’s documentary history of the time. Taylor looked over the document and remarked “that it reflects the well-known compulsion of Hilsman and Forrestal to depose Diem and, had McGeorge Bundy been present, he would not have approved the message. Finally, he stated that the message had not been given the quality of interdepartmental staffing it deserved, and that he would be prepared to say so at a proper time.”447

Forrestal declared with certainty in his oral history interview that Krulak called him back that evening, and when Forrestal asked if Taylor had read the message yet, Krulak responded,

“Yes, he has seen it, and it's all right with him if everybody else is in agreement.” In a later interview with William Rust, Forrestal altered his account by stating that Krulak had told him that “Although General Taylor had not liked the telegram, he would raise no objections.” Adding to this confusion, Krulak told Rust that he never made the phone call to Forrestal, instead claiming that he described the contents of the cable to the general, and then Taylor “took it from there.”448 Taylor’s version of events conflicts with both of these accounts. According to him, he knew nothing of the cable until Gilpatric phoned him late Saturday night in a state of disturbance, yet Gilpatric does not mention such a phone call in any interview. Taylor claimed that at this point, he called Krulak to request a copy of the memorandum. One way or another,

Forrestal called Kennedy and told him all had consented to the message before Taylor had even had a chance to digest the memorandum. “Send it out,” replied Kennedy. Regardless of who contacted whom at what time, the result of such haste and confusion was that Washington telegram left Washington at 9:36 p.m. EDT, before Taylor had responded to the draft and with everyone else either in the dark or mislead to believe that their consent was a mere formality to a measure that had already received executive approval. Taylor actually waited through the

155 weekend as he thought over the instructions. The Pentagon Papers state that Taylor approved the cable, but more than likely, this was because Krulak had misinformed Forrestal that Taylor had done so while Taylor was actually withholding his view. Either way, Forrestal had dispatched a policy to the president for final authorization when it had not been approved the heads of the

JCS, CIA, and Defense Department. Passing over Taylor was a particularly bold move because, unlike the other two, he was actually within reach of consultation.449

Taylor agreed with Gilpatric’s assessment that the State Department had put one over the military. In his memoir, Taylor bitterly declares that “As if some of the conspiracy-laden atmosphere of Saigon had found its way back to Washington, a small group of anti-Diem activists picked this time to perpetuate an egregious ‘end run’ in dispatching a cable of the utmost importance to Saigon without obtaining normal departmental concurrences.” In an administration beset incessant infighting and discord, this was “an action which created extremely hard feeling among President Kennedy’s advisers at a time when he badly needed their harmonious cooperation.” Making his feelings known for sure, Taylor states on the same page that his “first reaction was that the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances.”450

McCone shared Taylor’s outrage. William Colby, the CIA’s director for the Far East, got into touch his boss in California to let him know what had transpired. In his book, Colby recalled that “At McCone’s request, I flew that day to California to brief him in his splendid home there…When I showed McCone the text and explained that no one at the staff levels of the various departments had been consulted before it was sent, he was furious. He was, as always,

156 outwardly calm, but his calm was now exceptionally icy. His brief vacation was abandoned. ‘I’ll return to Washington with you tonight,’ he said.”451

Upon its receipt, Lodge did not think the instructions were sufficiently assertive. His reply to cable 243 stated that the “chances of Diem’s meeting our demands are virtually nil. At

[the] same time, by making them we give Nhu [a] chance to forestall or block action by [the] military. Risk, we believe, is not worth taking, with Nhu in control [of] combat forces [in]

Saigon.” Lodge’s proposal was to “go straight to [the] generals with our demands, without informing Diem.” In such a meeting, Lodge designed to tell the generals that the United States was “prepared to have Diem without [the] Nhus but it is in effect up to them whether to keep him.” He closed by declaring that Harkins concurred with this plan.452 Astoundingly, the State

Department made one more show of disregard for interdepartmental protocol: Ball approved the modification without the prior approval of Rusk, Kennedy, or anyone outside of the conniving triumvirate. Suspiciously, this cable was unsigned.453 An end run, indeed.

157 XIII

Inherent Incompatibilities

The final days of August 1963 were a time of heated discord in Washington. While division and resentment had always persisted beneath the veneer of cerebral debate and harmonious comradery that formed the administration’s idealistic self-image of a contemporary

Camelot, these differences broke out into open discord over the ramifications of cable 243. It exposed the mutual exclusivity between diplomatic and military perspectives on South Vietnam that alternatively prioritized political ideology or physical security as the safeguards of U.S. Cold

War interests. The summer and early fall of that year were defined by interminable arguments at the White House over competing visions for the long-term viability of Vietnam as an anticommunist outpost. While the State Department maintained a dominant influence over

Vietnam policy for the rest of the Kennedy presidency, policy continued to be crafted in a combinative or compromising manner, leading to inconsistencies in the methods applied to the

Republic of Vietnam. The result was the worst of both worlds: while the military mission expanded, the internal and external security situations continued to deteriorate as a result of political chaos; while the United States poured dollars, soldiers, and weapons into the prostrate nation, it continued to undermine its government. It was the recipe for a quagmire.

Within the reorganized State Department as it stood in 1963, the basic division between top officials was the relative perception of Diem’s redeemability. At one end was Nolting’s insistence that Diem was the best Vietnamese nationalist available for the job and that he could succeed with strong allied support; at the other was the view of Harriman, Hilsman, Forrestal,

Mendenhall, and Ball, which deemed Diem a hopeless case whose tenure of office became more

158 destructive by the day, thereby necessitating his immediate removal from the scene. In the middle were those who thought Diem could be an effective ruler if the United States applied targeted pressure to his government to ingratiate and endear his constituents. More or less, both of the extremes had been attempted to little avail: advisory provisions and material assistance had expanded dramatically in 1961-62, and while the Viet Cong had been subdued somewhat during that period, the regime’s domestic liabilities remained. On the other hand, when the

Americans began to pressure Diem to conciliate during the Buddhist crisis, this exposed his obstinate and reactionary tendencies, which disillusioned the populace while aiding Communist propaganda and subversion. In the fall of 1963, the Kennedy administration applied both methods: while threatening disassociation and categorically reducing, thereby destabilizing the nation, it continued to become more deeply enmeshed in South Vietnam’s domestic affairs by attempting to manipulate the composition of a successor regime. The administration tried to have it all, but the results were wasted money, resources, and American lives. The great irony is that, for all of the administration’s concern with political vitality at home and national prestige abroad, its policy had the makings of a domestic and international public relations disaster.

Cable 243 exemplified the kind of schizophrenic policy that is the natural product of a deeply divided democratic administration. Taylor’s criticism of the telegram seized on the unworkable nature of an approach that was at once both aggressive and indecisive. These two paragraphs are slightly repetitive, but Taylor’s repetition offers a sort of dialectical insight into the absurdity of the administration’s policy:

Lodge was told that the U.S. government could no longer tolerate Nhu in the government but that Diem was to be given a last chance to get rid of him. Presumably, the Ambassador was to convey this point as a kind of ultimatum prior to moving against Diem himself. However, the cable contradicted this concept of the sequence of events

159 elsewhere by stressing that immediate action must be taken to prevent Nhu from further consolidating his position; hence, Lodge was authorized to inform key Vietnamese officials at once that the U.S. government could not accept the repressive actions of Nhu and his collaborators and that prompt remedial action must be taken to repeal martial law and release the arrested bonzes. Concurrently with this approach to the civilian officials, Lodge was to inform key generals of our position and to point out that, while we wanted Diem to have a reasonable time to remove Nhu, we could no longer support him if he proved obdurate. If at any point the generals took action against Diem, they were to receive “direct support” from us, although the cable gave no explanation of what “direct support” meant. The cable ended with instructions to Lodge to draw detaile plans to bring about Diem’s replacement and with an assurance of complete Washington support for actions taken under this cable.

In summary, as I read the cable, our Ambassador was to serve an ultimate to Diem while, at the same time, establishing a conspiratorial relationship with Diem’s officials and generals to whom he would make clear our disenchantment with the regime and would promise our active support to Diem’s overthrow, if this was undertaken.454

Armed with this logic, Taylor attacked the policy and the underhanded tactics that produced it as the military fought to regain a degree of influence over U.S.-Vietnam relations. Regardless of one’s position on a coup, cable 243 was ill-conceived. Its provisions worked at cross-purposes which, in the end, imparted greater dysfunctionality to South Vietnam’s endemic instability. By extension, while Diem’s downfall is certainly rooted much deeper than the infamous State cable—or, for that matter, beyond anything that happened in late 1963—the frenetic and deceptive manner in which the policy was crated certainly hastened Diem’s demise.

When the high authorities returned to the nation’s capital on Monday, August 26, those of the military establishment were primed for a showdown. There are varying descriptions of

Kennedy’s demeanor at that meeting, but they mostly describe surprised concern at the extent of the memorandum mixed with vocal irritation at the bureaucratic shenanigans Krulak’s notes record the president’s first question as whether the United States was “prepared for protecting and/or evacuating U.S. citizens in Vietnam.” The military replied that a battalion of ground troops would be off the coast of Saigon in twenty-four hours, expressing political anxiety over

160 the decision with an election year on the horizon, Kennedy demanded that his policymakers not allow themselves to be “unduly influenced” by David Halberstam. This was obviously an implicit reprimand of the State Department, so Harriman candidly defended the improperly vetted instructions as an opportunistic reaction to a situation, one that was exploitable for their desires to unseat Diem. Harriman “interjected the opinion that in this case we have acted at the first opportunity; that at an earlier moment we could not have accurately located the sources of strength and support.” Kennedy then stated the common recognition that Diem was “repugnant” in some aspects, but rather than returning to the tired argument of no one better existed, he reasonably judged that Diem and Nhu “have done a great deal along the lines that we desire” and reiterated his insistence that his staff not succumb to “New York Times pressure.”455

Taylor then raised his concern about the military feasibility of the coup policy. He sensed disunity among the ARVN command and believed that the effort should be toward changing

Dem’s ways. Ball then considered whether Diem was oblivious to the fact that Nhu was

“undermining him,” to which Kennedy responded with the question of whether Nhu was looking for a power grab. Ball acknowledged this concern by volunteering the support of Admiral Harry

D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), noting that the military man had expressed alarm over “what would happen unless the Nhus were removed…saying that unless the Nhus were eliminated the middle level and enlisted men would soon lose their interest in fighting.”

Hilsman went on to state that Felt had confidence in the generals but insisted that they would need assurance of American backing in order to take the plunge. Hilsman was insistent, adding that Felt had expressed these thoughts over the phone.456 Taylor was disgusted. In response to

Kennedy’s question about the odds of success for such a plan, Taylor hotly retorted “that in

Washington we would not turn over the problem of choosing a head of state to the military.”457

161 McNamara identified three dilemmas arising from the cable: who are the conspirators, what qualifies as “direct support,” and what Lodge would say to Diem in their first meeting.

Hilsman stated there were three known rebels among the commanding officers: General Tran

Thien Khiem, Major General Duong Van Minh, and Major General Nguyen Khanh. Then, displaying his naiveté of geography and military logistics, Hilsman casually asserted that direct support would entail supplying the South Vietnamese military by using an alternate point of entry to Saigon. Rusk, with Taylor’s concurrence, pushed back, noting the extreme difficulty of such an operation. The Secretary of Defense then suggested asking the embassy for an appropriate interpretation of “direct support.” No one offered a reply to the third question, so

Kennedy broke the silence by expressing resignation at the fact that Diem would not expel his brother from the government. Rusk challenged this assumption, “while Hilsman said that the

Country Team believes that Diem and Nhu will rise or fall together.” Nevertheless, Rusk lamented that “unless a major change in GVN policy can be engineered, we must actually decide whether to move our resources out or to move troops in.”458

When Kennedy subsequently queried about attitudes of the Vietnamese towards the

Americans, Hilsman applied this to his ends as well by averring that “we may be suffering slightly, but mostly the people seem to want to get rid of the Nhus but clearly need U.S. support to do so.” He added that it was “imperative that we act.” Kennedy adjourned the meeting until the following day and asked his staff to compile personal profiles of important Vietnamese persons. Taylor suggested inviting Nolting to the follow day’s conference. To Hilsman’s dismay,

Kennedy agreed. The assistant secretary raised the objection that Nolting was “emotionally involved in the situation,” to which Kennedy tersely replied, “Maybe properly.”459

162 Taylor’s infuriation was justified. The cable’s provision for being divulged to only the

“minimal essential people” was clearly an attempt by anti-Diemists to avoid blame for shirking protocol.460 The President was shocked at his administration’s misbeavhior. “My God,” Kennedy told Charles Bartlett, “My government is coming apart!”461 In another exasperated remark, he complained to a friend “This shit has got to stop!”462 Kennedy’s anger with Forrestal was particularly intense in light of his premature release of the instructions. He thought that McCone of all people should have been notified of what was essentially a clandestine undertaking. At the end of the August 26 White House meeting, Forrestal offered to resign, but Kennedy shot back at him: “You’re not worth firing. You owe me something, so you’re going to stick around.”463

Kennedy looked around the room and individually asked his staff if they wanted to rescind the instructions.464 To a man, they all declined to advocate retraction.

Considered from a distance, the meeting was an ironically odd scene: the State

Department wishing to foment precipitous military action and violent revolution, while the head of the United States Armed Forces rejected intervention as an act that was unfaithful to

American political ideals. Thee Secretary of Defense also questioned the semantics of a State cable. While foreign service officers demanded aggression, military commanders and administrators advocated for a more delicate foreign policy. Furthermore, the division within the

State Department was indicative of the cultural transformation that Kennedy had initiated when he recomposed the diplomatic corps in the spring of 1961. Rusk, a paragon of Foggy Bottom’s old guard, had declined to offer any counterarguments to the policy when Ball called him before the cable was dispatched. The following Monday, he tried to delay the implementation of the policy for further study and considered the use of the American ground troops to save South

Vietnam. Hilsman, representing a contemporary movement in diplomatic realpolitik, argued

163 forcefully for regime change as a way to secure American interests abroad without incurring the risks of unilateral military intervention. Senior officials in the Defense Department and careerists in the State Department argued from neoconservative perspectives in believing that the international projection of military superiority and expertise was the most effective means for ensuring national security. Alternatively, the young upstarts at Foggy Bottom adopted a primordial neoliberal outlook in arguing that limited military assistance mixed with clandestine manipulation of domestic politics provided an effective means of securing U.S. interests that was significantly less costlier in American lives, dollars, and prestige. Kennedy had sought to increase the State Department’s influence by reducing the inaction and inefficiency that had traditionally obstructed U.S. diplomacy, in addition to conferring his ambassadors with the official privilege of overseeing the activities of the CIA. Thus, he streamlined the bureaucracy and elevated the State Department’s authority while replacing unassertive foreign service officers with inexperienced and ambitious diplomatic theorists who would not hesitate to take decisive action in the face of international contingencies. The State Department was now efficient and decisive, but the institution had acquired the same kind of proclivity for independent action that the president had tried to deny to the CIA in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.

On the other hand, Taylor took his own advice in adamantly expressing his disapproval of the new policy, rather than withhold his reservations and let a doomed plan be put into action, as the

JCS had fatefully done in the planning for Operation Zapata in 1961.

164 XIV

A New Sheriff in Town

When Lodge came to Saigon in late August of 1963, he did so with a subjectively distorted mental image of the regime. As detailed above, both Kennedy and Chuong had left

Lodge with the strong impression that the regime was doomed. In an interview conducted two years later, Lodge expressed a sense of inevitability regarding the government’s demise. Reading history backwards, he stated that “There wasn’t any doubt that that Pagoda incident marked the beginning of the end of the Diem regime…it was just a matter of time before they would be through.” Lodge determined that the government’s “insane policies” were “laying the basis for assassination.” If Americans did not stand up to the palace, then the Vietnamese people would blame their allies for not stopping Diem’s “reign of terror.”465 Perhaps most significantly, Lodge believed that the regime had produced too much “bad publicity which is the one thing which a government like that of the United States…cannot stand.” Lodge averred that “The United States can get along with corrupt dictators who manage to stay out of the newspapers. But an inefficient

Hitlerism, the leaders of which make fantastic statements to the press is the hardest thing on earth for the U.S. Government to support.”466 While that logic is flawed, it is hard to fault Lodge for being so transparent in acknowledging the harsh reality of U.S. international relations, rather than advancing the apocryphal claim that U.S diplomacy is guided by Wilsonian altruism.

Lodge came to Saigon with a bone to pick, and he wasted no time in asserting his desire to dump Diem. He immediately set about compiling information on government abuse, negative press, and disaffection in the military. Although he remained unconvinced of the military’s

165 commitment to regime change, he was more than willing to offer his support for cable 243. In fact, he made the instructions more aggressive by asking for them to be modified to allow him inform the generals of the new U.S. policy without first giving Diem a chance to make amends.

Towards this end, the final week of August was filled with numerous meetings between the

Lodge and Harkins, as well as between Conein and the ARVN generals.

This effort got off to a rocky start, however, when, on the morning of August 26, an unauthorized VOA broadcast exposed American machinations. Telegram 243 permitted the ambassador could employ the radio station to announce that that Nhu was responsible for the pagoda raids in an attempt to absolve the ARVN from being implicated in the crackdown. The broadcast was to be restricted to this announcement and executed only when the ambassador had ordered it. The State Department was playing a delicate game of trying to assure the conspiring generals of U.S. support and express disapproval at the government while, at the same time, preserve the illusion of full support for the regime. Diem and Nhu, already paranoid by nature, had real reasons be protective of their positions and fear for their safety in late 1963. Even the slightest indication that their allies were wavering would be taken as evidence that the Americans intended to abandon them to the Communists, as they had done to Phoumi Nosavan in Laos a year earlier. Thus, it was particularly disturbing to hear over the airwaves that the Americans not only blamed Nhu for the raids, but that “America may cut its aid to Vietnam if President Diem does not get rid of the police officials responsible.”467

Lodge had not approved the broadcast. The day before, Hilsman caught up with Stewart

Hensley of UPI to provide him with a press guidance. Typically, VOA broadcasts were essentially press reports derived from newspaper articles. Often, reporters would write articles based off of a press guidance that contained their personal thoughts on the significance of

166 government communications. Hilsman asked Hensley to not speculate in his upcoming article on the raids, but the reporter thought it was his right to editorialize as a media member. Lacking confidence in Hensley’s ability to not leak or exaggerate U.S. policy, Hilsman called the staff at

VOA and demanded that only the press release portions of Hensley’s article be broadcast.

Nevertheless, the radio crew did not cross-reference the article with the release and instead broadcast the whole report. Rusk termed the slip-up a “failure of machinery” and declared that the station would “broadcast only hard news for the next few days.”468

Lodge worried that the report had “eliminated the possibility of the generals effort achieving surprise.” Public expressions of sympathy with Diem’s enemies would be the “kiss of death” to the conspirators. Still, Lodge thought the error might nevertheless provide a useful opportunity for his purposes, stating, “[The] Possibility [is] inherent [that] VOA broadcast will tend to increase [the] chance of bloodshed…This is a time which calls for action and very few words.” This last sentence could describe Lodge’s style in general. While Nolting regularly attempted to stall Washington’s policy modifications on Diem’s behalf, Lodge offered encouragement to Diem’s detractors back in Washington, attempting to accelerate regime change. On numerous occasions, he objected or complained when the State Department instructed him to meet with Diem and try to work him over. Lodge had no interest in talking; the regime was already dead to him. He was merely waiting for the right time to act, not holding out hope for reconciliation.469

Lodge was right to be upset over the broadcast. As expected, Nhu believed it was an obvious sign “that the U.S. government desires Nhu’s removal from any position of influence.”

In response, he ordered more arrests of suspicious civilians.470 Nhu seemed to be making moves to secure himself in the government. The CIA reported that Big Minh believed Nhu “would in

167 effect take over as head of government within the next three days.”471 Tung, confident in his newfound authority, would back him up with the Special Forces as his personal police guard.

With a grin across his face, he told an American operative that “there would be no further trouble from students.”472

With Nhu seemingly primed for a dramatic move, Lodge and the CIA’s Chief of Station in Saigon, John Richardson, worked on different ends of the conspiracy. Lodge worked with

Harkins and the Country Team to maintain the deception of American support for Diem while

Conein and Al Spera engaged the conspirators according to the embassy’s talking points. Much like the clearing of cable 243 demonstrated the elevation of the State Department’s power over policy, the conspiracy arrangement spoke to the interdepartmental dynamics of intervention under Kennedy. Both circumstances resulted directly from the administrative changes made by the new president in early 1961. Instead of the CIA planning and executing a regime change, as it had done in Cuba to disastrous results, the State Department called the shots while the agency was merely a powerful tool at its disposal.473 Considering this, McCone and Colby were perhaps most reasonable in their outrage over the State Department’s choice to bypass certain officials in the clearance process. If the CIA was at the State Department’s disposal, if it was, in effect, a vehicle for carrying out militant diplomacy, it was only logical to have the agency’s experts review plans for manipulating a foreign government. Foreign service officers lacked the knowledge and experience necessary to make informed judgments about espionage and political manipulation. Foreign service officers and administrators were typically scholars and lawyers, not soldiers and spies. Their judgments regarding military insurrections were as useless as a general’s thoughts on the linguistic and legal factors affecting diplomacy. When Kennedy gave

168 the State Department the right to supervise CIA operations, he certainly did not intend to deny the agency the chance to influence the planning of such delicate undertakings.

Consequently, Lodge ran the show in Saigon, and, unlike typical State Department officials, he evinced no apprehension to take charge. Quite the opposite, Lodge was always pressing to push forward faster than Washington felt comfortable doing. He met with Harkins,

Trueheart, and John Mecklin of USIA on August 26. Harkins was to make no contract with the conspirators: this was the be sole responsibility of the CIA station. Following Hilsman’s advice, the group decided to have Conein seek out Khiem for the purpose of clarifying the U.S. stance in the event of a coup. Simultaneously, Spera was to meet with Khanh in Pleiku. The group also instructed Conein to ask Khiem if he could contact Don. These were the only three generals that

American agents were to engage. Conein’s guidelines were thus: solicit the generals’ opinion on what should be done, express agreement that Nhu had to be removed, inform them that retention or expulsion of Diem is their choice, demand the release of the incarcerated and immediately implement the June 16 communiqué, promise “direct government support during any interim period of breakdown [in] central government mechanism,” notify them that the United States would not bail out generals if they come under duress, express desire for a bloodless overthrow, press the importance of maintaining good relations throughout the drama, and, most significantly, declare to the generals that, if Nhu remains in power and the Buddhists are not placated, the United States “would find it impossible to continue military and economic support, express hope for a bloodless overthrow.”474

Conein spoke with Khiem later that day. Khiem expressed satisfaction with the points described above and promised that they would not be divulged to Don in order to maintain secrecy. This was because Nhu had planted moles among Don’s staff at ARVN headquarters. For

169 the same reason, Khiem did not want Conein to meet with Don. Instead, he suggested that the operative speak with General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh). Khiem also approved of Conein’s meeting with Khanh, promising to inform Khanh of the conditions accepted.475

Later that day, Spera reported back from Pleiku that Khanh was apprehensive. He wanted to wait for Nhu to make a direct appeal to Hanoi, thereby providing a legal pretext for deposing

Diem. The hope was to avoid an insurrection by applying U.S. economic pressure to force

Diem’s hand to remove Nhu. Continuing on, Khanh delivered exhortations on the indispensability of stealth and secrecy. He also requested that the United States “guarantee safe haven and support to families in case the Generals fail.”476

Also on that day, Lodge met with Diem for the first time. The ambassador took the opportunity to impress upon Diem the significance of American public opinion in determining acceptable foreign policy. He stated bluntly, “without the support of public opinion you can not get the support of Congress and without the support of Congress you can not get funds.” He explained the damaging effects that the Buddhist affair had had on popular support for the U.S. mission. To that regard, he singled out Madame Nhu for her tasteless remarks to the press. In his natural manner, Diem responded with equivocation, reasoning “that he had done his best to get

Madame Nhu to keep quiet…but that she was a member of the Assembly and had a right to make speeches. Lodge declined to press the matter. He then told Diem that “a dramatic gesture such as liberating the Buddhist prisoners would have a good effect on American opinion.” Diem claimed to have already “liberated” most of the prisoners and insisted that Buddhists were a small minority of the Vietnamese population. The rest of the meeting was largely unremarkable as a result of Diem’s infamous idiosyncrasies: he treated the ambassador to long, rambling monologue about everything from the Ngo family, Vietnam’s underdevelopment, and the

170 supposed appropriation of the Buddhist crisis by the Communists. He defended police violence by claiming that “agitators” had necessitated the use of force on the demonstrators. Furthermore,

Diem claimed that instating martial law was a reasonable response in light of rumored plans of his opponents to use unrest in the countryside as a way to draw the armed forces away from the capital and leave it vulnerable to attack. In closing, Diem made a veiled reprimand to his ally, stating that “he hoped there would be discipline, particularly as regards the United States’ activities in Saigon and that there would be an end to reports of diverse activities interfering in

Vietnamese affairs by various United States agencies.”477

Back in Washington, Forrestal sent a memorandum to Kennedy in response to his question about Vietnamese attitudes at the meeting earlier that day. Possibly more than any of his fellow anti-Diemists, Forrestal was on the defensive for the policy after being primarily responsible for the miscommunication led to its premature authorization. He noted the inadequacy of Diem’s replies to Lodge’s inquiries and commented that “The problem in Vietnam is rapidly becoming an operational one, and it is of the utmost importance that the execution of your decisions be lodged in one person, in one office. Mac [McGeorge Bundy] that Roger

Hilsman is the logical person and office for this, for the time being.”478

Playing on Kennedy’s political preoccupations, Forrestal attached separate cable to the memorandum that summarized the state of Vietnamese public opinion. It was a cable from

Lodge that described a people harboring increasing resentment toward the U.S. mission. From two angles, the cable implicitly offered support for a change in government. In the first place,

Nhu’s Special Forces and the riot police were supplied with American arms and equipment; it was because of continued U.S. support that a corrupt regime in an impoverished nation had the resources necessary to institute a police state. Secondly, by allowing the regime to continue

171 persecution of a helpless nation, Diem’s subjects were losing faith in the United States as the defender of democracy. South Vietnam’s people asserted that only the United States could relieve them from oppression by ensuring a change of government. Stressing the significance of the popular outcry, Forrestal asserted that such statements were notable coming from the

Vietnamese, “who [are] normally quite careful about discussing political topics.” He then tried to reassure the president that there was still time to effectively intervene if it did so promptly. The longer the Americans waited, the more blame they would be assigned for their national agony, and warned that “Some Vietnamese [are] tending to equate US equipment and US ‘handsoff’ stance as acquiescence in GVN suppression of [the] populace, which is only one step removed from placing share of [the] blame on US shoulders.”479

From Saigon, Harkins relayed to the Pentagon his judgment that “direct support” entailed “Full military backing, military counsel and advice,” the “Use of US communications and unarmed aircraft for troop transport, supply, recon and command liaison,“ and the “Denial of further funds, equipment, advice, communication and aircraft to opposing military and paramilitary forces.” He only had minimal insight into the plot, but his breakdown suggested that the conspirators had strength in numbers.480 A CIA report helped clarify the composition of the conspiracy. Khiem reported to Conein that a committee under the leadership of Big Minh had recently agreed to launch an insurrection within a week’s time. The group planned to eliminate

Tung and neutralize his forces at the outset to deny military support to the palace. Following

Diem’s removal, they would implement a mixed government of military and civilian officials with Vice President Tho at its head, but Khiem insisted that this successor regime would not technically be a military government because the generals feared that would invite greater instability. Khiem then requested that Conein refrain communication with any of the conspirators

172 until the coup ended. He also asked that the American media stop mentioning the threat of aid suspension, stating that this was undermining support for the coup. Finally, he reiterated his earlier request the United States government take care of the generals’ families in the event of failure.481

On the diplomatic front, Lodge visited Nhu, who started off by complaining that the

American press was “injuring Vietnam’s standing with foreign countries” with false statements.

Lodge must have been lying when he told Nhu that he “did not know the details of the statement,” before asserting that “no long range foreign policy could be carried out by the U.S.

Government without the support of Congress and public opinion.” He stressed the significance of the Buddhist crisis and Madame Nhu’s vitriol. Nhu maintained his sunny demeanor throughout the bombardment of criticism. He dismissed concerns about the Strategic Hamlet program by claiming that relocation would be completed by the end of the year and the Viet Cong would be defeated. Regarding suppression, he claimed that “There have been no more suicides since July

20” due to the imposition of law and order. He explained that “Occidental people should understand that these suicides are brought about within the pagoda where in an atmosphere filled with incense and incantation, an individual is hypnotized, intoxicated, and intimidated.” Pushing back against the popular judgment that he launched the raids during an interregnum at the

American embassy in order to present Lodge with a fait accompli, he insisted that he did so in order to “clear up the matter” before Lodge arrived. Lodge tried to pin Nhu down on this subject, declaring that “it would be very helpful in the U.S. if there could be some dramatic gesture here regarding the liberation of Buddhist prisoners.” Nhu insisted that this was being done but he could not do so precipitously in order to maintain order. As he saw Lodge to the door, he told the ambassador that “he hoped there would be no more statements out of Washington.” Lodge

173 replied with his characteristic gruffness that he “hoped there would be no more inflammatory speeches out of Vietnam.”482

Several hours later, on the other side of the world, a follow-up meeting at the White

House commenced in the late afternoon. In accordance with Taylor’s suggestion at the previous day’s gathering, Nolting returned to the White House to provide an alternative State Department perspective. Earlier that day, Forrestal sent a primer of discussion topics to Kennedy. Since June, but especially after August 21, memoranda from Forrestal appear with increasing frequency in the State Department records. They seem to increase and accelerate in direct proportion to South

Vietnam’s rising turmoil. In the later summer and early fall of 1963, Forrestal regularly volunteered briefings to the president. While this certainly has something to do with the intensification of the crisis in Saigon, it is hard to escape the feeling that, more than simply trying keep the president apprised of an international situation, he was endeavoring to keep the president on board with the radical course conceived by him and his counterparts at the State

Department. With this message, Forrestal provided Kennedy with a list of suggested responses for the president to apply toward steering the discussion toward the policy of cable 243: re- assertion of U.S. refusal to continue support for a government with Nhu in it, allowing the generals to choose what to do with Diem, and re-statement of the policy’s objective as creating the conditions for defeating the Communists. Finally, in a comment indicating remarkable lack of self-awareness, Forrestal suggested, “You may wish to emphasize the great importance of highly controlled collective action by the government officials and agencies involved here in

Washington. Where was this respect for professionalism and protocol three days earlier? Then,

Forrestal had exhibited little heed for such principles. The reason was a change in circumstances: administrative cooperation had become useful for his purposes.

174 Opening the meeting, Rusk suggested holding daily meetings through an NSC Executive

Committee along the lines followed during the Cuba invasion. Colby then offered his assessment of the situation in Saigon: the city was quiet with no apparent signs of instability. Regarding the recent meetings with the generals, he reported their judgment that “the situation for a coup was favorable and [that] one would take place in the next week.” At this point, Nolting stepped up to fill his characteristic role as Diem’s apologist. Regarding the recent postponement of elections to the RVN National Assembly, Nolting dismissed them as “not significant.” Setting his sights on the conspiracy, Nolting confidently declared “that the Vietnamese generals haven’t the guts of

Diem or Nhu. They will not be a unified group but will be badly split. They do not have real leadership, and they do not control the predominant military force in the country.” McNamara lent credence to this by noting that South Vietnam’s “military forces were few and scattered.”

Krulak then told Kennedy that the effect of the Buddhist debacle on the war effort had been minimal. Recognizing another chance to defend Diem, Nolting interjected with the specious claim that “the effect of the unrest was limited to the cities…whatever happened in the city of

Saigon would have little effect in the rural areas in the long run because the peasants were uninformed and interested primarily in obtaining food,” as well as because they were not a traditionally Buddhist segment of the population.483

Kennedy then asked why Diem had not made good on his promises. Nolting shot back that “Diem had kept his promises…[he] should be given an ‘E’ for effort.” Nolting apparently forgot that one week earlier he had scolded Diem in a letter that disappointingly stated that the attack on the pagodas was the first time Diem had gone against his word to Nolting. Nolting then averred that Diem and Nhu felt they had no other option but to employ the armed forces and police to subdue the protests because the Buddhists had refused to cooperate following Madame

175 Nhu’s public chastisement of the Buddhist demonstrators as debased troublemakers and fraudulent nationalists. Nolting also asserted that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and that, for all of Nhu’s faults, he “could see Nhu in a position of authority because Nhu can command people and the Vietnamese are respectful of those who can command.” As to the indiscretions committed by the soldiers and police, Nolting blamed this on the security forces, refusing to believe that Nhu ordered them to employ such tactics.484

Rusk then raised the issue of divided loyalties among the commanding officers, or, alternatively, the possibility of Diem defeating his opponents. Nolting repeated his earlier claim that “military support for a coup did not now exist,” but he admitted that many generals would rally to such a cause if the United States clearly indicated its support. Nolting then astutely reminded those in the room that the state of U.S.-Vietnam relations had come full circle since

1961: Durbrow’s aggressiveness had given way to Nolting’s persuasion, which was then succeeded by Lodge’s propensity for bold action in the midst of another political crisis. Nolting advised avoiding getting too caught up in Vietnam’s domestic politics, focusing instead on the war front. He did not agree with the many government officials who had determined that the war could not be won with the fraternal tandem in the palace. Nolting then considered the risks of supporting a conspiracy that lacked a satisfactory degree of cohesion and commitment, predicting that “If we go back on these generals now, we will lose them.” Nolting posed the question, “why should we jump unless we have some place to jump[?]” Kennedy buffered against Nolting’s anxious thoughts, stating that the situation had not progressed beyond the point of changing course.485

Hilsman took the stand for the defense, asserting that “If the general officers decided they could not live with the Diem regime, then the senior officers would move forward to a coup.”

176 McNamara wanted an on-site assessment from Harkins and Lodge as to the prospects for success, arguing that, if the analysis proved unfavorable, then the United States should move to dissuade the generals. Hilsman found this unacceptable, insisting that the longer the delay, the more difficult the operation. Kennedy asked what Harkins thought about the plot. Taylor, clearly still irritable over the previous week’s dysfunction, retorted that “General Harkins had never been asked for his views—that he merely got orders.” Rusk asked another nervous question about whether “the existing unrest make[s] it impossible to carry out the war against the Viet

Cong?” Bundy supported the calls for additional vetting of the generals’ plans, recommending that Harkins and Lodge be asked to report on the exact operational situation.” McGeorge Bundy wanted assurances that the American hand in the undertaking could be concealed in the event of failure by the generals. Kennedy ordered a cable sent to the embassy along these lines, including an inquiry of how damaging it would be “to cut our losses.” Nolting again urged the use of persuasion to make Diem reduce Nhu’s authority and Madame Nhu’s influence. Kennedy closed the meeting with a statement that showed his continued respect for Nolting’s judgment: he accepted “that the generals interested in the coup were not good enough to bring it about.”486

While the reliability of the Vietnamese generals was debatable, the attitude of the civilian population was clearly negative. Nolting’s claim that the unrest was limited and contained did not hold water. The diplomatic cables flooding into the White House communications center testified to daily manifestation of unrest, violence, and popular disgust. Martial law had cleared the streets, but animosity brewed in barracks, private residences, and jail cells. Martial law also compounded the original controversy by expanding its social dimensions. The pagoda raids were accompanied by dismissals and arrests of university faculty and student demonstrators, many of whom were the sons and daughters of lower and middle-level administrative officials and

177 soldiers. As the human scope of the reprisal expanded, the degree of civil rights violations followed suit. By now, the flag decree was probably the least egregious transgression committed by the regime since May 8; there were thousands of citizens held without charges or bail; there was tight government control of the press; there were scores of dead and maimed individuals that the government had irrationally accepted as the price of security in a free nation. Now, the disenchanted masses had military representation. Diem’s relationship with the ARVN had always been tense, but with the country coming apart at the seams as a consequence of what most thought was a solvable problem, military disaffection finally coalesced into an effective gang of miscreants for seizing the reigns of a weak government. By expanding the rationale for opposition to the government, Diem and Nhu gave the military something it did not enjoy in

1955, 1960, and 1962: broad support from those removed from the internal political animosities that existed between the military bureaucracy and the executive.

Popular opposition to the regime also encompassed the administrative ranks. Throughout

1963, the State Department was treated to voluntary lamentations of the government’s ineptitude by former and current South Vietnamese officials. Vice President Tho was unique in displaying genuine admiration of Diem together with a critical outlook on his style of governing. Tho seemed to evince a kind of dour resignation to Diem’s presidential insufficiencies shortcomings

He often attributed Dem’s oversights and missteps to his character. The most perceptive internal

Vietnamese critic of regime was probably Nhu’s father-in-law—South Vietnam’s former

Ambassador to the United States—Tran Van Chuong. Having resigned in protest over Nhu’s raids, Chuong, along his wife, took to publicly and privately lobbying for regime change. Chuong was remarkably discerning in his judgments of the regime. From an early point, he recognized the inherent incompatibility of American political philosophy with the vision of a naturally

178 authoritarian head of state.487 If Diem ceded authority, it would signal weakness to both supporters and opponents. This would simultaneously undermine confidence in Diem’s leadership on the part of his fellow nationalists while also providing avenues for liberal revolution. In a fledgling nation with diverse cultural and political traditions, Diem likely should have straddled the middle ground between authoritarian and liberal styles of government in order to keep both political extremes subdued. Leaning too radically in either direction of the political spectrum ran the risk of alienating significant portions of Vietnamese society. In fact, it was

Diem’s paranoid death-grip on power that was the overall cause of his demise. While his willingness to disregard basic civil rights antagonized the general public, his administrative style of micromanagement and control made enemies within the military and government.

When Chuong lamented to Forrestal that his government’s failings were the result of “a deliberate policy of forcing any person of competence out of his job and into exile,” he spoke for both administrative officials and the officer corps. 488 Diem felt threatened by decisive, outspoken, and strong-willed personalities. After suppressing his natural opponents in the religious sects, organized crime, and underground political movements in the 1950s, Diem nevertheless remained obsessed with his public standing and personal security. He harbored suspicion toward generals and ministers who challenged his methods and commanded respect among their peers. Without a pretext for jailing loyal servants, he instead shuffled them off to the bureaucratic margins to wallow in monotony and boredom. As these formerly influential public servants came to detest the meaninglessness of their work, they consequently came to loathe their president for stripping them of their dignity and worth.

Choung admirably represented this segment of disillusioned public servants. While the

White House was preoccupied with the prospective coup, the Chuongs looked to impress

179 American officials with the need to force a change in South Vietnam’s government. The couple invited Lansdale to their home in the late summer of 1963, where they insisted that “The US must act firmly and quickly to replace both Diem and Nhu with a new government. The

Vietnamese people are aroused far more than ever before, and it is too late even to save Diem as a figure-head.” In their view, not even the most generous concessions could avert a political revolution. Instead, Diem’s allies should try to limit the damages incurred in the course of regime change. The longer the Ngos stayed in Saigon, the more violent and disruptive their removal would be. Even if they willingly gave up power, they could not remain in the country due to the widespread and deeply felt resentments of the Vietnamese. On this point, Madame

Chuong minced no words, hysterically imploring Lansdale to “go to Saigon fast and tell Diem and the Nhu’s to leave the country now. The people hate them and they shouldn’t stay for the people to kill them. They will surely be killed if they stay, and nobody at the Palace now is telling them how the people really feel. They are cut off from reality. Why do they need power, after nine years of it, if the family is killed?” American commitment to the regime confused

Madame Chuong because it seemed inconsistent with U.S. Cold War methods. “The US told

Syngman Rhee to leave,” she exclaimed, “Why not Diem and Nhu?” Lansdale thought that the

Chuongs validated the claims by Forrestal and Hilsman that the ongoing crisis was substantially damaging U.S. prestige. He forwarded his record of the meeting to Forrestal, who subsequently passed it on to McGeorge Bundy.489 Confirming this assessment of the regime’s public standing, a State Department American Opinion Summary of August 27 declared that, although the population was not united around a particular vision for their government, they were predominantly in accord in their outlook for the current regime: it was “beyond repair.”490

180 Lodge had determined that it was time to act. On August 28, he gave an extensive reply to Rusk’s request for an assessment of the factors affecting the likelihood of success for the coup currently at hand. Lodge thought that the conspirators were the “best group that could be assembled in terms of ability and orientation.” Furthermore, he reported that some loyalists were considering crossing over to the conspiracy, while the combat forces responsible for defending the palace lacked the cohesion necessary to be effective. Overall, Lodge concurred with Harkins in determining that the balance of forces favored the conspirators. He also though that American intervention could decisively break a stalemate.491 At the end of this report, Lodge added a note regarding a recent conversation with Tho. When Lodge arrived, Tho seemed enjoy a little banter with the American ambassador. Lodge proceeded with the typical niceties, telling Tho “how honored I was to be in Viet-Nam” before continuing on to discussions about Tho’s personal life,

Vietnam’s economy, and international relations. In the midst of this casual conversation, a wave of sobriety came over the vice president. He broke off his narrative and, in a noticeably sullen tone, declared, “It can’t go on in this way. We absolutely must get out of the state we are in.

Emotions are rising so high that it is very dangerous.” Showing the kind of comprehension of

American politics that Diem could never quite grasp, he noted that “Relations between the U.S. and Viet-Nam are becoming [a] question of internal politics both here and in your country.” The fate of the nation rested in the hands of U.S. officials. Tho expressed his appreciation for

American involvement in South Vietnam, recognizing that “You have a very great responsibility as Ambassador. People expect much from you. I don’t know how to do it but it absolutely must be done.”492

On August 28, the CIA reported that the “Situation here has reached [the] point of no return. Saigon is [an] armed camp. Current indications are that Ngo family have dug in for last

181 ditch battle.” The agency declared that the balance of forces was, indeed, in the generals’ favor, and with sufficient unity among the group, “they have no alternative but to go forward.” Putting this in terms that played on military concerns, the report determined that “If the Ngo family wins now, they and Vietnam will stagger on to final defeat at the hands of their own people and the

VC.”493 Everyone seemed to be falling in line with the new policy, but one holdout remained.

Taylor had never concealed his displeasure with the coup plan, but now he was prepared to actively oppose. Just before a White House meeting on August 28, he sent a cable to Harkins requesting CINCPAC’s assessment of the coup plot and stating that he was having “second thoughts” on cable 243.494

The White House meeting on August 28 was perhaps the most acrimonious conference of

Kennedy’s entire presidency. In the opening briefs, Taylor rose to give his analysis of American and Vietnamese preparedness for a coup. Still seething from the from the shady actions of

Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal, the general had come armed with more than a sharp tongue at this day’s gathering. The JCS boss declared that current resources allowed for the evacuation of between three thousand and four thousand Americans, hardly a sufficient capability considering that the number of U.S. civilian and military personnel in Vietnam would surpass sixteen thousand by the end of 1963. There were more than four thousand Americans in Saigon alone.495

Taylor continued on to question the relative strength of coup forces, stating that “Vietnamese forces loyal to Diem in the Saigon area outnumbered two to one forces we believed would follow rebel generals.” Although he recognized that the overall number of rebel-controlled troops might outnumber those commanded by Loyalists, Taylor cautioned that the superior manpower might still be subdued by higher quality soldiers, as he assumed would be stationed in the capital.

Hilsman thought that Dinh’s support was crucial in this regard, while Nolting warned the room

182 that he was sure Diem and Nhu were aware of the conspiracy. McNamara suggested working to convince fence-sitters to join the rebels in order to ensure success. Ball spoke next, re-affirming his absolute opposition to the regime. He asserted that any government with Nhu in it was unacceptable and that there was “no option but to back a coup” because the situation was

“already beyond the point of no return.” Colby agreed. For Ball, the issue at hand was “how do we make this coup effort successful?” McNamara reiterated that the United States should only back a movement that could win.496

At this point, President Kennedy repeated his assertion that they could still retract support for the generals. He, too, lacked confidence in the plan, noting that “The generals talking about a coup did not appear to be very enthusiastic.” Seconding McNamara’s suggestion, McGeorge

Bundy wanted to decide how they could inspire the generals to act. Ball contended that some generals were apprehensive to take the leap unless they had the reassurance of contact with

American generals, to which Kennedy noted that both Lodge and Harkins had affirmed their support for the generals. Nolting objected on the grounds that supporting the conspiracy would be a demonstration of bad faith in breaking prior commitments. He stated that they should not expect that another government will be more cooperative and effective. Nolting believed there were three choices: assist the generals in building up their force strength, back off supporting them, or avoid contact with them and provide support only when “they have the guts to attempt a coup.”497

Next, Bundy made the distinction between providing emotional support as opposed to taking operational control. Ball seemed to support the latter. He had no reservations about breaking past agreements with Diem. He scoffed Nolting’s defense of the regime, for “Diem had broken promises he had made to us. The actions they are taking are in violation of good faith.”

183 He then repeated his arguments for robustly supporting the generals.” Ball thought that the current policy did not go far enough to ensure victory, arguing that “If we merely let the generals proceed and then, if they fail to overthrow Diem, we have lost as well. This outcome is half- baked and no good.” Ball wanted to “do the job right” and throw full American backing behind the conspiracy. Harriman stood with his superior. Treasury Secretary Dillon offered restrained support, admitting that the coup would “be labeled a U.S. show from the very beginning.”

Concealment was pointless and self-defeating. This would not ensure American absolution, but it would deny psychological and material support to officers on which the United States had staked its reputation. McNamara again questioned the strength of the conspiracy, recommending that

Loge should try to prevent any coup that he thinks will fail and that the embassy should consider ways of increasing their support.498

Bundy asserted that most generals were on the side of the conspirators, while Harriman added “that we have lost Vietnam if the coup fails…we cannot win the war with the Nhus.” If the generals did not follow through, the United States would have to withdrawal. In an obvious rebuttal to Nolting, Harriman declared that “We put Diem in power and the doublecrossed us.

Diem and his followers have betrayed us.” Hilsman seconded Ball in stating that backing down was not an option. Diem was hopeless, and the generals were doomed if they did not go forward.

Harriman argued in terms of Cold War objectives, stating, “we had been winning the war with

Diem because the generals were with him. The generals are defecting now because of the recent actions.” Kennedy seemed unmoved by the State Department arguments, directing his staff to

“go back to Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins again, telling them that…it was clear that

Diem held the balance of power.” Ball advised the president to consider the criteria for such an evaluation, implying that strength in numbers was not a predictor of success.499

184 Nolting then raised the reasonable question of “what conditions Vietnam would be in if a coup is successful.” On this point, he had pinned down the anti-Deimists on a glaring defect in the policy, for none of the coup-backers had seriously considered the prospects for good government in the aftermath of a military insurrection. Hilsman offered a shallow and unfocused response, claiming that a hybrid military regime like that in Korea should be good enough and then acknowledging the dearth of reliable information available about the generals’ political plans. Lacking a better answer, Hilsman reflexively reiterated that Diem and Nhu had to leave the country. 500

Armed with his own platitudes, Nolting reaffirmed that “only Diem can hold this fragmented country together.” It was unlikely Diem would drop Nhu; the Americans were likely stuck with him, but he thought it was worth trying to convince the premier to do so. Harriman had heard enough of Nolting’s tired defense of the regime. In a comment that epitomized the animosity that pervaded exchanges over Vietnam policy, the assistant secretary browbeat

Nolting, charging “You’ve been wrong from the beginning. No one care’s what you think.” He proceeded to attack Nolting’s record as ambassador, charging him with failing to uphold U.S. interests by rejecting Washington’s instructions and advice. Gilpatric remembered the exchange as “the only time I remember in the presence of a president where anybody took [that kind of] tongue-lashing.” Harriman thought Nolting’s faith in Diem was utterly misplaced: “The political situation in Vietnam will blow up sometime,” and when it did, “The political forces in Vietnam will rally quickly against Diem.” Kennedy then called for a two-hour recess.501 Harriman never hid his displeasure with Nolting. Years later, he would assert that Nolting was guided by personal loyalty to Diem. He thought Nolting acted impertinently in reprimanding Trueheart for his critical disposition toward the regime while Notling was on leave. Harriman judged Nolting’s

185 record “very bad” and declared that “In any event, I don’t think he’s a man that I’d give full marks for loyalty, number one, or judgment, number two.”502 The heated interaction demonstrated the two major elements in of the administration’s dysfunction: one the one hand, it showed just how far the overall professional atmosphere had degenerated, and on the other, it revealed Harriman and company’s disdainful and defensive attitude towards those who challenged the questionable rationale of their policy. Polarization cut two ways: across the departments and within them. Harriman’s verbal assault of Nolting was merely a dramatic example of the strong feelings produced by the issue among all involved in the debate. In another example of intradepartmental tension, just two days earlier, Taylor issued a formal reprimand to

Felt for recommending support for a coup to Hilsman. CINCPAC had acted improperly by making statements directly to Hilsman and thereby bypassing communications protocol.503

The Defense Department, however, could not claim the moral high ground on these matters. Infuriation over the State Department’s impropriety impelled Taylor to act in the same manner. Taylor’s admission to having second thoughts about cable 243 had been sent directly to

Harkins, which kept the rest of Kennedy’s advisors unaware of his opposition. Taylor’s memorandum prompted Harkins to re-examine the policy and state his view that the circumstances were not adequate for justifying support for the generals. Harkins now advocated returning to a policy of persuasion with Diem, thinking that his inevitable refusal to reform would eventually spur the generals to act anyway. To the outsider, it would appear that Harkins had a change of heart, but he had at least been prompted to reconsideration by Taylor’s secret cable. Suspicious that someone else might be playing his own game. Hilsman accused Taylor of playing “dirty pool” by sending “back door” cables to secretly enlist support for his views.504

186 When the meeting resumed, Kennedy told his staff that he would be sending three messages to the Saigon embassy: one requesting that Harkins to provide a personal assessment of the coup situation and that Lodge make a final appeal to Diem for conciliation, a second informing Lodge that all instructions to the embassy had received full clearance in Washington, and a third in the form of a joint State-Defense memorandum telling Lodge and Harkins that they may decline to support a coup in which they did not have confidence. Since the revelation of

Harkins’ opposition to backing the generals, Kennedy wanted a fresh appraisal to clarify the situation. These cables were designed to give the embassy the authority necessary to protect U.S. prestige to the greatest extent possible, which derived from the president’s concern over public relations. Kennedy had made his political preoccupations known on multiple occasions at the

White House, and these cables provided a modicum of insurance against international embarrassment. While the State Department’s argument that the point of no return had been reached was questionable, Kennedy’s insistence that the United States could back out at any time and save face comes across as wishful thinking. Whether consciously or subconsciously,

Kennedy, like Hilsman and Harriman, promoted a judgment that satisfied a personal desire, that used fictional or questionable logic to rationalize a radical policy. For the State Department interventionists, claims to have reached the point of no return made backing a coup seem the only reasonable course. For Kennedy, the illusions of control and plausible deniability allowed him to reason that the radical course could be taken with minimal political risk. While both arguments contained underlying logic, they were presented as truisms, rather than possibilities worthy of careful consideration.505

Lodge responded to the latest cable with an impassioned plea for unequivocal support to the ARVN conspiracy, stating that “We are launched on a course from which there is no

187 reasonable turning back: The overthrow of the Diem government.” American prestige had already been “publicly committed” to the generals, while Diem had already substantiated his incapacity for good government. The success or failure of a coup was not totally within U.S. control, Lodge admitted, but he judged that “it depends at least as much on us” as it did on the generals. Unresponsiveness would undermine confidence in American anticommunism.

Therefore, he requested permission to have Harkins communicate U.S. policy to his counterparts in the ARVN. Lodge tried to activate Washington’s sense of national pride to draw support for his proposal, asserting that “Vietnamese Generals doubt that we have the will power, courage, and determination to see this thing through. They are haunted by the idea that we will runout on them.”506 Ironically, this was an appropriation of the same argument made by Nolting and others who were apprehensive to back the generals. In either usage, such reservations were based on previous disappointments. For the Americans, their lack of confidence in the generals owed to the fact that ARVN officers had failed to unseat Diem on multiple occasions. Additionally, there was a general anxiety over these kinds of operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which had exposed the inherent difficulty and unpredictability of clandestine intervention. For the

Vietnamese, their suspicions were borne out of feelings of betrayal arising from the neutralization of Laos and continued American support for the regime long after it had demonstrated its irredeemability.

In response to Kennedy’s military inquiry, Harkins attempted to clarify his views. In his cable expressing uncertainty about the current policy, he had claimed that “the die is cast,” which seemingly implied that Harkins also believed the point of no return had been reached. Harkins explained that he meant that the generals had already been promised American support if the conspirators managed to break the government. While the United States could technically back

188 away at any time, doing so would destroy Vietnamese confidence in the United States. Harkins insisted that the group would not commence operations without American assurances. He also thought that the embassy could still press Diem to reform without enraging the generals, so long as it informed them of the final attempt to extract concessions from the palace. Finally, Harkins was opposed to directly contacting the rebels for fear that it may blow their cover.507

On the same day of the Lodge-Harkins replies, August 29, Lodge reported on a meeting between Diem and Paul Kattenburg. Kattenburg joined Lodge in puzzlement and exasperation at the president’s dismissiveness toward American concerns and at his contradictory mental character of high intellect coupled with profound ignorance. Kattenburg supposed that Diem was

“in full possession of his faculties” but beset by a “growing neurosis.” Diem resorted to his standard defenses: the Buddhist movement was a Communist front; Nhu was a righteous man who had been unjustly vilified by the American press; Madame Nhu had delivered venomous speeches, but she was provoked by critical newsmen; American political models were not applicable to a backward nation like South Vietnam; the Buddhist crisis had already been solved; the generals were responsible for martial law and the pagoda raids; the government’s public image had deteriorated because American advisors were conspiring with the media to wage a public relations war against the regime. Kattenburg barely got a word into the conversation. The one question Diem did answer directly, that of convoking the National Assembly, received the standard Diem response that he was “studying the possibility.” For Kattenburg, his first meeting with Diem seems to have been the kind of frustrating experience for which only Nolting had the patience to endure. When Kattenburg “was finally able to break [the] monologue and leave,”

Diem asked his guest to “try [to] help us.” Kattenburg spoke for most Americans when he replied, “please try to do the same for us.”508

189 Back in Washington, Kennedy’s men gathered for another meeting on August 29. Debate centered on the reliability of the generals and the extent of American involvement. Harkins had requested one last chance to get Diem to dump Nhu, while Lodge desired that Harkins communicate the policy of cable 243 to his Vietnamese colleagues. Nolting supported this move, although he admitted that it was unlikely to work. Kennedy asked his staff once more if anyone wanted to back away from the conspiracy. No one advocated this course; the main debate was whether to give Diem a final opportunity to change his government. McNamara, Gilpatric, and

Nolting supported this, while Rusk, Hilsman, and Bundy opposed it. Taylor stood with his

Defense Department colleagues in not making a hard commitment to either side and instead cautioned that they should be assured of a plan’s worthiness before backing it, unlike the current situation where they were in the dark as to how the operation would be carried out. On announcing aid suspension, McNamara, Hilsman and Harriman opposed this, but others in support of a coup saw it as an effective signal to the generals. At the end of the meeting,

Kennedy decided to authorize Harkins to back up the CIA in providing assurances to the generals, instruct Lodge to announce aid suspension at Washington’s discretion, and confer the ambassador with full authority “over all overt and covert operations.”509

At this juncture, circumstances conspired to break the generals’ resolve. Ever since the ill-conceived VOA broadcast of August 26, the generals were increasingly anxious that their conspiracy would be busted by Nhu’s henchmen. Two days later, Tung reportedly intercepted

Kennedy’s cable to Lodge informing the ambassador to take all necessary measures to ensure a successful change in government. The generals had also learned that they could not count on airborne support for their maneuver.510 On August 29, the agency reported that Minh and Khiem expressed uncertainty as to what posture the Americans would take when the rebels mobilized.

190 They were also worried because Americans had betrayed dissidents in the past by reporting them to Nhu’s secret police. The generals put their concern bluntly: “If [the] USA is now really ready to take [a] different position, [the] Generals want some evidence to that effect.” They suggested cessation of economic aid as a signal that the Americans “mean business.” The generals refused to provide any details to their scheme, but they seemed to have not considered a plan of succession, for they requested that the U.S. mission develop a political framework for the new government. Conein reported that he sensed the generals were still paranoid that these meetings might be a trap to turn them over to Nhu.511 From these meetings, the CIA believed “the generals have had for some time fundamental distrust of U.S. govt unity and resolution in backing their efforts.” The agency also judged that a positive signal from the Americans was more important than a reckless maneuver by Nhu as a incitement to commence the coup.512 In a meeting between

General Kim and Rufus Phillips, Kim confirmed that the generals only needed assurances to act.

At the same meeting, Big Minh requested American assistance in planning the operation, which the ambassador approved.513

With the conspiracy losing steam, Rusk called the administration’s top officials to Foggy

Bottom for an interdepartmental conference on the “apparent inertia on the part of the generals.”

McNamara and Hilsman shared a mutual suspicion of Thao, postulating that a dinner meeting between him and the conspirators may have been a setup to expose mutineers. Rusk’s reaction to the lost opportunity was similar to how he received news of supporting the coup. He had always displayed nervousness and dread at the thought that the United States might back a losing committee, but he clearly was tired of the Diem regime. At the State Department meeting, he now seemed as dismayed by the prospect of Diem remaining in power as he was anxious about supporting the generals. Rusk asked the group “‘If the Generals do not intend to move and Diem-

191 Nhu return to the August 20 posture, can we live with it?’” Colby responded in the negative.

Nolting tried unconvincingly to assuage those in the room that “Nhu was undoubtedly a shifty character but that he could assure everyone that Nhu would not really negotiate with Ho Chi

Minh.”514

Hilsman was confident that any government with Nhu in it would be inherently inimical to the population, thus creating a “slow but steady deterioration downwards in which apathy in the army, a drifting off of junior officers and noncommissioned officers, [and] possibly student and labor strikes would slowly but surely degrade the war effort.” Nolting called for reducing

Lodge’s authority, but no one supported this measure. Hilsman’s next comment was one of the most remarkable moments in the administration. No serious policy discussion had ever considered American stimulation of a coup; the debate had been restricted to whether to stand by

Diem or let him be overthrown. Now, however, Hilsman asked his colleagues “to look at the question of whether we should cross over from assuring the generals to a policy of forcing them into a position in which they had to take action, i.e., whether we could precipitate action by the

Generals.” Forget not thwarting a coup; Hilsman was prepared to inspire one! With it looking less likely than ever that the army would make a move, this option went from being unacceptable to the only conceivable means for changing South Vietnam’s government. To that effect, Rusk cabled Lodge later that evening. The secretary of state thought the chances of a wholly

Vietnamese effort to change the government were “very thin,” and warned that Nhu seemed to be ready to make a power move that would crush his enemies. Consequently, Rusk declared that it was likely that “if there is to be a change, it can only be brought about by American rather than

Vietnamese effort.”515

192 Lacking confidence in their American sponsors, the generals’ plans were stifled once news broke that Nhu was planning to arrest those general suspected of disloyalty. There were indications that generals were under surveillance and their phone calls were being monitored.516

On August 30, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao reported that, at a dinner attended by Khiem, Khanh, and Minh, the generals seemed to have lost determination to act. The conspirators now said they would act if another group initiated a coup. Khiem rationalized that the generals had “too much to lose.” In the event of a coup launched by others, the generals stated that they would join following Diem’s assassination.517 On that same day, Harkins attempted to meet with Khiem to discuss the coup plans, but Khiem said that he was “too busy.”518 The following day, the CIA reported what could have been anticipated: “This particular coup is finished.” The agency reported that Khiem was not confident in the balance of forces. Instead of overthrowing Diem, the generals intended to request that he install senior ARVN officers in the cabinet with Nhu as its chairman.519

Harkins agreed that the generals backed off because of insufficient forces. In a meeting with Khiem on the same day that the CIA reported that the coup had stalled, Harkins reported that Khiem was unusually taciturn, declining to answer questions with the statement that “he was just a junior officer.” Khiem suggested that Harkins should put his questions to Big Minh.

Harkins said he would be more than willing to do just that, but Khiem shut this down by declaring that Minh “had stopped planning at this time, and was working on other methods.”

Khiem added that the other generals followed Minh in suspending the conspiracy, as they respected his judgment. His stated reasons for the decision was insufficient forces and the fact that “Big Minh and others could not put too much backing on [Conein’s] word as representing

U.S. because he was [in] a low position in CAS [CIA].” Harkins related that “it would take

193 someone like myself or Ambassador Lodge to give them complete confidence.” At the end of the meeting, Khiem informed Harkins that the generals’ next move would be to present a list of demands to Diem that called for placing ARVN commanders at the head of the ministries of

Interior, Defense, and General Information. Nhu would be the Chief of Cabinet. In closing his cable, Harkins described the situation as “an ‘organization de confusion’ with everyone suspicious of everyone else and none desiring to take any positive action as of right now.” In an

Orientalist fashion typical of his era, Harkins proclaimed, “You can’t hurry the east.”520

194 XV

Square One

During the interlude of August 31 to November 1, 1963, the United States reverted to its prior policy of pressuring Diem to reform his government and placate his people. The original demands to mollify the Buddhists had been accepted but not implemented. Arrests of student protestors, university purges, pagoda raids, and martial law compounded what was already an extreme political crisis. In these circumstances, South Vietnam’s government essentially ceased to function. Diem and Nhu were just trying to hang on, while the Americans resumed the Lodge posture of biding their time until a satisfactory coup plot could be hatched. Until then, the United

States increased the forcefulness of obligations levied on the Republic of Vietnam. The strategy moved from persuasion to coercion. This was the approach that Durbrow had championed, but his attempt to get tough soured his relationship with Diem and the U.S. military. Nolting’s arrival at the embassy in the spring of 1961 signaled a second turn in U.S.-Vietnam relations by returning to an unconditional basis of assistance and expanding the scope of American aid. By contrast, Lodge’s nomination in the summer of 1963 portended a second turn—a reorientation back toward the more aggressive tactics of the early 1960s. Like Durbrow, Lodge sought to keep a firm posture toward Diem until a change in government could be had. He would oversee the formal implementation of Durbrow’s basic policy when the United States instituted selective aid cuts. Diem’s response to the aggressive diplomacy was underwhelming. To Lansdale and

Nolting’s credit, Diem reacted in an insecure and defensive manner, just as they had predicted.

In his unpublished memoir, Lodge asserts that cable 243’s instructions were canceled on

August 30, that Washington had told him that “the instructions to support the generals had been a

195 mistake and not to work on the basis of it any more.”521 At best, this was half true. The instructions of cable 243 remained in full effect; if another coup came along, they were the instructions to be followed. They were merely set aside until the opportunity arose. Either way,

Lodge would do as he saw fit. Authoritative by nature, he had been given full authority to call the shots from the embassy, and he would do so. Before the coup fell apart, Lodge’s last instructions from Washington had been to try to see if he could convince Diem to drop Nhu, but

Lodge refused to even visit the president, claiming it was pointless to do so. “This surely cannot be done by working through Diem. In fact Diem will oppose it. He wishes he had more Nhus, not less,” Lodge claimed. “I am contemplating no further talks with Diem at this time,” he declared.522 Until another coup appeared on the horizon, Lodge suggested the following approach: seek a trip out of the country by Madame Nhu and Archbishop Thuc, limit Brother

Nhu’s power to manage the Strategic Hamlets, install Thuan as prime minister, repeal Decree

Law 10, repair the pagodas, and make additional “conciliatory gestures” to the Buddhists.523

These accorded to a State Department cable drafted by Hilsman and Forrestal and approved by

Kennedy that called for tough diplomacy to maintain U.S. leverage to secure Diem’s compliance.524

On September 2, the CIA released a postmortem report on the stalled coup. General Kim had told Rufus Phillips that “Nhu clearly expected [a] coup attempt” and had put Tung’s Special

Forces on high alert. Kim assured Phillips that the generals would continue to scheme, albeit “on a tightly compartmented basis for security reason[s]” Both Kim and Minh assured Conein that the planning had been suspended or curtailed, not canceled, and that Nhu was a completely unacceptable alternative to Diem. They “were confident that if [the] US indicated firm disapproval of [the] Nhus they would be overthrown.” The Americans only had to “indicate by

196 actions, as well as words, that they…do not support the Nhus or their creatures.”525 The CIA also reported that the generals met with Nhu on August 30. Nhu complained that CIA was a nuisance that he wanted “out of the way,” and he asserted that “There now exists a mobilization aimed at

[the] overthrow of GVN supported by secret elements of [the] U.S. Govt.”526 Nhu was on to

Conein. At a September 4 meeting with General Dinh, the general made a number of accusations that some Americans in Vietnam were traitors to the regime. Dinh boasted that he had a figurative atomic bomb to drop on the Americans and would soon be a national hero. He asked

Conein to pose for photograph with him and told him he would return the picture to Conein later

“after all had been accomplished.” He then told Conein that he would have a direct telephone line installed in Conein’s home and that Dinh’s body guards would be stationed at Conein’s residence.527

On September 2, Lodge reported that Nhu had agreed to “resign, leave the government service for good and move to Dalat after he has lifted martial law.” Furthermore, Nhu accepted a reorganization of the cabinet and stated that Madame Nhu would leave the country on September

17 for a meeting in Yugoslavia. Nhu said that he, however, could not leave South Vietnam because doing so would give the Viet Cong hope when they had recently been “extremely discouraged and ready to give up.”528 Hilsman, Forrestal, and Ball thought these were empty promises designed to stall until Nhu could strike back at the Americans. They instructed Lodge to cease discussions with Nhu and go straight to Diem. In addition to the stipulations listed above, they wanted Lodge to demand “release of remaining students and bonzes…removal of press censorship; restoration of damaged pagodas by GVN; repeal of decree 10; and honest negotiation between GVN and through Buddhist leadership on outstanding issues.” If these measures were accepted, Lodge was to press further on the matters of “revitalization of GVN,

197 possible Thuan as PM, generals in posts of Defense and Interior…improvement of relations with

Cambodia covering border incidents, Mekong rights…[and] redefinition of role of U.S. advisers to give them broader scope.”529 Considering how obstinate Diem had been any time his allies had made even the most basic demands, these additional obligations would surely be rejected by

Diem and likely increase his resistance to and suspicion of his allies. They were a ruse, a carefully constructed ploy by Diem’s staunchest enemies in the U.S. Government designed to make Diem’s accommodation impossible and his overthrow inevitable. The White House approved the cable with only minor modifications in the language and the addition of instructions telling Lodge to negotiate with Diem rather than Nhu and that Americans should not seek to instigate a coup. The generals should make the first move.530

At this point, Lodge showed that he considered negotiations as a mere formality. If the recent instructions reflected Washington’s hope that the regime could yet be salvaged, Lodge’s cynicism was the counterbalance. The White House had said the key to a settlement was whether there was substance behind Nhu’s offers. Lodge replied to the White House the following day, asserting that “Nhu’s proposals…have very little substance” For Americans, “Our leverage is very slight.” Vu Van Mau, South Vietnam’s former foreign minister, had recently reported to

Chester Bowles that the Nhu’s were “now the dominant power in Vietnam.” Thuan made the same assertion five days later. Lodge saw little point in talking to Diem: Nhu would at least discuss relevant matters; Diem would ignore the issues raised and launch into extended monologues covering everything from Vietnamese culture to degenerate media.531 Supporting this argument, a recent article in the Times of Viet-Nam accused the CIA of financing a coup, and the agency later reported that Madame Nhu was behind the report. When one of its agents brought up the matter with Ngo Dinh Nhu in a meeting with him on September 6, Nhu

198 disclaimed any knowledge of it, asserting that “he did not hide himself behind [the] backsides of

a woman.”532

In his subsequent cable, Lodge sounded even more resolute in his determination that

negotiation would be a fruitless endeavor, proclaiming,

I do not believe their word is good; Nhu’s resignation would surely mean very little; Madame Nhu’s departure is obviously intended to be a triumphant lecture tour; the broadening of the membership of the government will realistically change nothing; and the placating of the Buddhists, as far as GVN is concerned, is largely done. I intend…to tell Nhu that we are really not interested in his package; that is, his resignation, Madame Nhu’s lecture tour, etc., and see if they can get something better. If…nothing substantial, I would then see Diem and request the departure of both Nhus, the broadening of the composition of the government, the placating of the Buddhists, etc. Believe this will be for the record only but, of course, I will try. 533

Lodge seemed to be engaging in talks with the regime simply in deference to policy. Talk was cheap, especially with those who had made saccharine promises for so long. One can hardly blame Lodge for feeling like such talks were futile, but he appeared to be walking a line between discharging his ambassadorial duties and negotiating in bad faith. His unabashed disdain for the

Ngo family reflected growing cynicism at home that the Diem regime was morally bankrupt and politically incompetent. Rusk reported that the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee had expressed its intention to withhold aid to Saigon due to an increasingly negative public opinion of the advisory effort.534 He insisted that Lodge see Diem as soon as

possible.535 Nhu, it was known, continued to seek a settlement with the Communists, and the U.S.

Congress would soon consider a resolution by Senator Frank Church to cut off all aid to Saigon.

Harriman and Hilsman reported that the resolution would reduce aid by up to $100 million. If the

bill failed, the State Department indicated that it could apply leverage by having the president

withhold aid deliveries.536

199 International opinion had also turned against South Vietnam, with the United Nations

taking up a resolution condemning the Diem regime.537 Harkins reported that ARVN

effectiveness was deteriorating, and McGeorge Bundy asserted that Diem could not beat the Viet

Cong. Taylor believed the war was progressing. McNamara was also skeptical of the gloomy

reports, but he reserved judgement pending more information. The most important figure in

Vietnam foreign policy, Rusk, also desired a clear view of the military situation, but he

resolutely affirmed that continued misdeeds on the part of Diem and the Nhus’ would ultimately

doom the war effort.538 Regardless of the military’s condition, more detailed and verifiable

information had surfaced to substantiate suspicions that Nhu was engaged in talks with Hanoi.

He had bragged to a room full of generals that he could negotiate a relaxation in hostilities with

North Vietnam, telling them not to worry about a loss of American assistance, which in reality was a subtle hint to the generals that he was on to their scheming.539 To that effect, the CIA reported on September 7 that “Top Vietnamese generals are still considering a coup, but they have thus far failed to take action because they want to be almost completely certain of success before acting. Conein had recently provided the generals with an ordinance list and sketch of

Camp Long Thanh to help them plan for their attack on Tung’s encampment. They had even

contacted Thuan about joining the conspiracy, but the foreign minister declined to get involved,

fearing he was being set up. The Government and its programs were at a standstill, but relief was

not in sight. The basic problem for the generals remained the level of forces available. 540

While the generals waited for an opportunity to strike, restlessness and agitation resumed

in Saigon. On September 9, approximately one thousand high school students staged a public

demonstration following similar protests the previous day in Cholon. They intended to

memorialize a female student who had been killed by police a week earlier during a

200 demonstration near a public market. In response, General Dinh, the Military Governor of Saigon, ordered that any student absent from school without good reason would be summarily and permanently expelled. Student protestors over twenty years of age would be drafted into the army, and those “who commit violent acts” would be sent to a “special education center, where room and board will be paid by their parents.” In response, a unified organization of Vietnamese students announced that they would shut down the schools.541

At a White House meeting on September 6, the discussion centered on how to leverage concessions from Diem and Nhu. Hilsman introduced his plan for selective aid cuts. Taylor tried to hold up the move to impose sanctions on the regime. He reminded those in the room of the fundamental objective of U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, recalling that ‘“three weeks ago we were winning the war. ‘Have events changed this?’” To get a fresh assessment of the war front, the White House took up Taylor’ suggestion to send Krulak to Saigon for a survey of the situation there.542

South Vietnam had clearly become a liability for the United States, but since Cold

Warriors placed such high strategic and political value on Indochina, withdrawal was not considered as a means of extrication. All talk of withdrawal in the Kennedy administration was predicated on the RVN becoming capable of prosecuting the war on its own, thereby ensuring containment. If the government was the problem and South Vietnam was vitally important to national security, then the only reasonable action was to remove the cancer to spare the body; the

Diem government had to be toppled to spare South Vietnam and all of non-communist Southeast

Asia, for that matter. Withholding aid would jeopardize the war effort, meaning that the

American trump card was not the gamechanger that Washington desired. The goal of all of this was to put South Vietnam on a footing to win the war. Severance of military assistance and

201 commodity imports would be countervailing. Thus, aid suspension would have to be carefully

tailored in a manner that did not undermine military effectiveness or social welfare. Using the

same logic, Rusk counseled that, if withdrawal was likely to precipitate South Vietnam’s

collapse, the United States would do well to try promoting a coup before cutting ties.543 Strategic concerns ruled the day.

On September 7, Lodge cabled Rusk to validate his lack of faith in Nhu’s good intentions. He reported on a meeting between Nhu and a CIA agent in which Nhu was indignant over news of the Senate’s intention to deny further appropriations for Saigon. He insisted on negotiating the conditions of his departure before launching into an emphatic proclamation of his superiority, in which he declared himself “‘the wining horse,”’ asserted that his absence would devastate the Strategic Hamlets, and condemned the ARVN for underhandedness. Nhu refused to vacate the country; he would only resign.544 In a subsequent cable to Washington, Lodge

described South Vietnam as a nation dotted by “cities of hate,” whose residents live in fear of

government repression. Many of the students arrested and abused by the authorities are the

children of soldiers and provincial officials, making enemies of the state out of its best and

brightest. Schools and pagodas remain closed, despite officials claims to the contrary, while

security forces perpetually patrolled the city streets, striking fear in urban denizens.545

That same day, Lodge reported a conversation between Felt and Diem. Felt described to

Diem the domestic and international controversy surrounding the RVN, explaining that the

United States would have to suspend aid unless there was a clear change in South Vietnam’s

policies. Diem, however, rejected Lodge’s proposal for Nhu’s departure, charging that his

brother was a national treasure and a poorly understood man. If American opinion was negative,

it was because they were given the wrong impression by an unscrupulous press and hostile

202 members of the American mission. Diem claimed that only a minority of the country’s 4,700 pagodas had been raided and Xa Loi was the only one that had been damaged. The dissident students were a pack of Communist agitators; the United States was suspicious, too, as he was well aware of their efforts to undermine his rule. Diem also continued to insist that repealing the flag law entailed “complications” that necessitated delay.546

Reports from Saigon described continued deterioration. Mendenhall cabled Hilsman with a field report describing a cloud of fear hanging over South Vietnam’s major cities, which “have been living under [a] reign of terror which continues.” The government abuse continued, and its targets were particularly significant. Mendenhall noted that “Most families of government officials (civilian and military) in cities have felt the government’s oppressive hands on their children…Growing number of students themselves are talking of Viet Cong being [the] preferred alternative to [the] existing government.” Mendenhall believed that the “Course of [the] war appears to be taking [a] downturn” in the countryside. The government’s concessions had become meaningless in light of additional arrests.547 Supporting Mendenhall’s assessment, on

September 10, the State Department reported more student arrests in response to a protest at one of the government’s all-girl high schools.548

On September 10, Kennedy heard two reports on the situation in South Vietnam: one from Krulak and the other from Mendenhall. The two reports conflicted with each other in a manner that accorded to the fundamentally different perspectives of the State and Defense departments. One side considered the situation in terms of social and political stability, while the other only considered physical security. According the latter perspective, Krulak described an encouraging scene: casualty figures were favorable, commanders were competent and faithful to the cause, and the advisory relationship was unaffected by recent discord between the allied

203 leadership. Regardless of the regime’s failings, Krulak believed the ARVN was on the path to ultimate victory.549 Turning to Mendenhall, Kennedy heard his UN advisor describe the scene in

Saigon as “…a pervasive atmosphere of fear and hate arising from the police reign of terror and the arrests of students.” The people saw the government as their true enemy; “The war against the Viet Cong has become secondary to the ‘war’ against the regime.” Mendenhall noted similar conditions in Hué and Da Nang, ominously noting that the Viet Cong had recently gained ground in those cities. In rural provinces, Diem’s reprisals against the Buddhists incurred the villagers’ disgust in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, causing them to also turn to the Viet Cong.550

The stark contrast in the two reports was hardly lost on those in the room. Kennedy probably spoke for all in attendance when he rhetorically queried, “The two of you did visit the same country, didn’t you?” Nolting, ever the contrarian, reasoned that the unrest was not much of a concern, given the fact that South Vietnam had dealt with bleak circumstances just two years earlier and managed to pull out of the malaise. McGeorge Bundy, however, astutely countered this attempt to minimize the crisis by noting “…that in 1961 we overcame the paralysis by strengthening the effort against the Viet Cong; now it was the government that was causing the fear and paralysis and it was a little difficult to strengthen a war against the government.”

Phillips clarified Bundy’s interpretation, noting that “Nhu has lost the confidence and respect of both the officers and the civil servants…Everyone is looking to the US and here we stand. The

Vietnamese do not lack the guts to move against the government once they are sure of the US position.” Rufus Phillips’ analysis was remarkably similar to explanations for why the generals had failed to move against the regime in late August. There was a “…crisis of confidence in

Viet-Nam not only between the Vietnamese people and their government but between the

Vietnamese and the Americans.”551 Harriman assessed the situation bluntly: “Diem has created a

204 situation where we cannot back him.”552 The message was clear: regime change was needed, and regime change could be had, if only the United States would stand up and directly confront the authoritarianism at Gia Long Palace. It was all a matter of winning hearts and minds.

Phillips suggested that selective aid cuts could be used to apply pressure directly on the

RVN leadership by denying funds to Colonel Tung’s Special Forces or the propagandistic

Motion Picture Center. This would both be effective in undercutting the monetary power of

terrorist police and its bad publicity. At the same time, it would be psychologically influential by

targeting those specific institutions that the United States deemed deleterious. The policy was a

controversial one. Rusk worried that such a measure would strain an already debilitated nation to

the breaking point. He wanted Lodge to continue to press Diem to reform the government.

Gilpatric said that any reduction in military aid would stymie the war effort. Taylor also opposed

aid cuts, denying the importance of politics and civil liberties in a civil war. Hilsman suggested

cutting aid to Tung’s Special Forces. Bundy added that funds to Nhu should be halted, and he

proposed that United States begin direct distribution of aid to the Vietnamese people, rather than

channeling it through the government. Later that day, Bundy asked Hilsman to draft two policy

papers, one on Vietnam objectives, and the other on possible means of pressuring Diem.553

While Washington considered a severance of aid, Lodge continued to ruminate on regime

change. His cable of September 11 was one of his most impassioned pleas for a coup. Lodge

implored his superiors to depose Diem before the war was lost. The military was languishing as

its soldiers either lacked faith in Saigon’s leadership or resented the government over abuses

suffered by their own brothers, sisters, and children at hands of police. Lodge assailed American

inaction, noting that, not had the war effort been damaged, but “…will not the popularity of the

US inevitably suffer because we are so closely supporting a regime which is now brutalizing

205 children, although we are clearly able, in the opinion of the Vietnamese, to change it if we

wanted to?” Lodge offered his support for aid suspension conducted in a manner that spared the

Vietnamese people from undue suffering, and he advised that “Renewed efforts should be made

to activate by whatever positive inducements we can offer the man who would take over the

government…We do not want to substitute a Castro for a Batista.” If the United States did not

act, “the future leadership of Viet Nam, the educated classes—already completely out of

sympathy with the regime, and disillusioned with and distrustful of us as the instruments of

change—will lose heart.” Lodge warned Washington that there was a desperate need for action,

stating, “the ship of state is slowly sinking.”554

As Washington hammered sanctions for the Diem regime, Rusk told Lodge to keep

talking with Diem. Lodge, however, saw this as utterly pointless, arguing that no matter what

reforms Diem made, the Nhus’ continued presence deny legitimacy to the government.555 Lodge

would do whatever it took get the generals moving again. To prepare the way for a coup, Lodge

requested that the CIA station chief in Saigon, John Richardson, be replaced by Lansdale, since

Richardson had raised the generals’ suspicions due to his personal friendship with Diem.556

Lodge did not think that threats to cut aid would be effective, because this would not remove

Brother Nhu from the government or silence Madame Nhu.557 Even Hilsman had doubted their

likelihood of success, and Harriman thought aid cuts would do little if the government could not

inspire and endear its people, while McNamara continued to look at things from a sheer numbers

standpoint.

Divisions in the administration cut so many ways, making every policy a controversy.

Forrestal wished for Kennedy to exercise leadership and set the course in Vietnam, but Kennedy

had been conspicuously distant from the policymaking process from the beginning, leading to

206 interminable arguments at the White House while the president just looked on and asked

questions to which he rarely proposed an answer of his own.558 When these questions exposed

essential differences in perception among his staff, he frequently declined to ameliorate their

divergent views, instead merely acknowledging the disagreement and asking the responders to

rationalize the contradictions. For all his expressed interest, Kennedy was too hands-off on

Vietnam. He left momentous, complicated foreign policy decisions in the hands of hot-heads,

philistines, and idealists who generally lacked familiarity with the region. Time and again, when the chips were down in Southeast Asia, Kennedy seemed to be sitting quietly in the middle of the room while multiple factions verbally duked it out, sometimes descending to personal attacks.

The same question the White House asked about Saigon could be asked about the White House:

who was in charge?

On September 16, Hilsman presented McNamara, Gilpatric, and Taylor with a paper

describing a list of actions to force Diem to reform. The plan was subdivided into two parts: one

labeled the “Reconciliation Track” and another called the “Pressures and Persuasion Track.” As

the titles indicated, “The difference is in public posture.” Hilsman told Rusk up front that he

believed reconciliation would not work. It was essentially the Nolting approach of using

“sympathy combined with understanding,” as well as an offer to “restore Diem and GVN image

at home and abroad.” In making this effort, Lodge was to make “Diem think deeply and

sincerely about the role of members of his family.” The aim was to make him “consider making

their role more open and less susceptible to charges they are conspiratorial and therefore

nefarious in their activities.” As part of this effort, Nhu was to turn the secret Can Lao party into

a “broad association of supporters engaged in a common, winning cause.” The plan also called

for “free” and “widely observed” elections, in addition to convoking the National Assembly for

207 an emergency session to ratify necessary legislation. Diem also had to change his public

demeanor in order to “get everyone back to work and get them to focus on winning the war.”

Diem was to be “broadminded and compassionate in his attitude toward those who have, for

understandable reasons, found it difficult under recent circumstances fully to support him.”

Finally, Diem was to restore civil liberties by permitting a free press, releasing and leaving alone

the incarcerated students and Buddhists, and by minimizing the activities of his civil security

forces. In addition to these general stipulations, the paper made over a dozen specific demands

that were based on what the United States had heretofore pressed for Diem concede in respect to

religious equality, restitution, and administrative reorganization. Among these were a few new

provisions including providing scholarships for “inimical elements” to use abroad in the United

States, and acceptance of an international investigation of the Buddhist crisis.559

The second paper was divided into two phases. The first phase was persuasive. Lodge was to present a letter from Kennedy to Diem that offered recognition of South Vietnam’s difficulties and an explanation of the American position. The letter gave reassurance that the

RVN’s independence would be respected but comments that changing circumstances require a new approach. It made an indictment of the government’s abuses with carefully chosen words so as not to upset Diem. Kennedy admitted that media distortion was a real problem, but he suggested that re-instituting freedom of the press would help to improve Diem’s image, arguing that the negative reporting was at least in part cultivated by Diem’s censorship and harassment of journalists. Kennedy levelled with Diem that the United States was “gravely troubled the danger that some of the methods used by some members of your Government.” The central point of the letter was a warning from Kennedy that unless Diem changed his government’s methods, then the United States could no longer continue to assist the regime.560

208 The second phase of the second track is comprised of selective aid cuts. These cuts were

carefully chosen in order to minimize the impact on the war effort. Some of these were to be

disclosed and others were not. The disclosed actions largely dealt with suspensions in subsidies

and loans provided through the Agency for International Development (AID). These included a

$5.5 million in funds for the Commodity Import Program (CIP), as well as suspensions in

surplus food deliveries under the PL-480 program. In general, the cuts denied funding to public

works projects and withheld the provision of American. The most significant construction

projects affected were the Saigon-Cholon water treatment plant and the Saigon electric power

plant, while main food items concerned were cotton, flour, and condensed milk. The undisclosed

actions were designed to deny funding and supplies to certain elements known for abusive

tactics. Toward this end, the plan included provisions to suspend funding to Tung’s Special

Forces and acquire Vietnamese currency for the purpose of providing direct support to civilians

rather than funneling dollars through the Saigon treasury to the business community in the

manner that the CIP typically worked. Furthermore, the ambassador was authorized to institute

additional sanctions at his discretion that included requisitioning vehicles and other items used

by the police in repressive actions, suspending American involvement in training the hamlet

militia unless Tung was removed as its director, and withholding an upcoming $25 million payment to South Vietnam’s Department of Psychological Warfare.561

According to the information received by U.S. officials, the prospects looked bleak for a

rapprochement. The CIA reported in mid-September that ARVN generals were increasingly

concerned about Nhu’s dealings with the DRV. They were also frustrated by Diem’s efforts to

delay the agreed-to appointments for the ministerial posts of Defense, Interior, Psychological

Warfare, and Education. Khiem reiterated to Conein that the generals would not go along with

209 Nhu if he sold out to North Vietnam.562 On September 17, Mendenhall provided Hilsman with an

official report of his visit to Vietnam earlier that month. He repeated at length what he had told

Kennedy: arrests had alienated the educated and professional class, the Strategic Hamlets were

disorganized and insecure, and the Central Coastal provinces were rife with Buddhist angst.

Mendenhall’s conclusions and recommendations were blunt: If Nhu remains in power, people

will defect en masse to the Viet Cong. The most effective response to this rapidly deteriorating

situation would be Nhu’s removal by whatever means necessary.563 As this perception gained

hold in Washington, a coup became an increasingly more attractive remedy for South Vietnam’s

debilitation.

Probably the most disturbing recent development was the disaffection of civilian

administrators and urban professionals. The crackdown on universities and student protestors had

alienated that segment of the population that was essential to the effective function or a large

government bureaucracy. Lodge sent long cables to the State Department throughout September

that described the growing disaffection of these people. “The top echelons of government are

significantly impaired” and worried that “Nhu has the power to move against them at any

time.”564 Some of the disenchantment stemmed from disgust at government repression, but they

were also angered by administrative mismanagement. One telegram from the embassy declared

that “there is feeling that civilian ministries now participate less in policy formulation, have less

control over [their] own affairs, and are progressively becoming implementors of policies

determined elsewhere.”565 Local administrators also complained that the government neglected

critical programs.566 Furthermore, many of the student protestors who had been arrested and assaulted were the sons and daughters of middle and upper-class professionals, a segment of the

population was more “sensible to family responsibilities.”567 Labor groups had also expressed

210 concern with the government.568 An embassy telegram put the matter succinctly: “the future

leadership of Viet Nam, the educated classes” were “completely out of sympathy with the

regime,” as well as “disillusioned and distrustful” of the United States.569 CIA reports backed up

these assessments.570 Although martial law was finally lifted on September 14, the agency reported that the cities remained under tight surveillance and control of soldiers and police, with armored cars patrolling the streets.571

The U.S. Country Team corroborated what the embassy and agency had been reporting to

Washington. On September 19, Hilsman forwarded their response to a State Department request

for “an assessment of attitudes of a wide cross section of the Vietnamese population.” The group

reported that, since the fateful events of May 8, “discontent” had transformed into “disaffection”

as resentment toward the government spread through all levels of society. The general population

felt that Nhu was the dominant figure in the government and that he and his wife were most

responsible for the national crisis. However, while the Vietnamese people were highly offended

by their government the Country Team believed that “talk will be transformed into action only if

the US encourages this and takes the lead…The feeling is widespread that the US must provide

stimulus and backing for the overthrow of the regime and construction of a new one.” Because of

American hesitation to forcefully intervene, “The US is regarded with hope, disappointment,

and, more recently, with criticism and resentment.” The Vietnamese held the United States

responsible for enabling “the continued tenure of the Ngo family.” The same applied to the

generals: “They are considered the group most likely to be able to bring about a change in

government; but even they will move only if the US prods them to do so.” The regime was so

degenerate that the Vietnamese were considering going over to the Viet Cong if the Americans

refused to stand up for them. Above all, the police action was the most detestable abuse, having

211 “alarmed Vietnamese officials and military more than any other evidence of popular

disaffection.”572 In consideration of these concerns, the dual-track program proposed by Hilsman

was designed to specifically target issues that would relieve, protect, and empower these

elements of the population and, in turn, uphold U.S. prestige as the arsenal of democracy.

Hilsman’s program of reconciliation and persuasion dealt a blow to Lodge’s dreams of a

coup. The telegram communicating the new policy justified it by asserting that there existed “no

good opportunity for action to remove [the] present government in the immediate future.” This

must have disappointed the ambassador, but what really dismayed Lodge was a paragraph

toward the end of the cable that stated “there is increasing concern here with strictly military

aspects of the problem, both in terms of actual progress of operations and of need to make [an]

effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort. To meet these needs, [the]

President has decided to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor to Vietnam.”

Distressed by this revelation, Lodge promptly dispatched a cable directly to Kennedy, grousing

that “This will be taken here as a sign that we have decided to forgive and forget.” Indirectly

referencing himself, Lodge declared in the third person that the McNamara-Taylor mission

“would certainly put a wet blanket on those working for a change in government.” The White

House telegram also expressed the hope that by providing the ambassador “full control of U.S. assistance” he would no longer exhibit “reluctance to continue dialog with Diem.” Lodge also

defended his absence from Gia Long by explaining that “I have been observing a policy of

silence which we have reason to believe is causing a certain amount of apprehension and may

just be getting the family into the mood to make a few concessions.” He then attempted

manipulate this matter to forestall the military mission, adding that “The effect of this will

212 obviously be lost if we make such a dramatic demonstration as that of having the Secretary of

Defense and General Taylor come out here.” 573

Lodge apparently had a lot on his mind, because he drafted a second letter to Kennedy

that elaborated on his objections to the new policy. The language used seemed to be intended to

complain and criticize without being insubordinate. Lodge opened the second letter stating that

he agreed with the premise that pressure should be applied until a good chance to change the

government appeared, but then he proceeded to snipe at the policy’s essential components. He

reminded the president that “Virtually all topics under paragraph 4, letters a to m [possible actions], have been taken up with Diem and Nhu at one time or another, most of them by me personally.” He repeated that “There are signs that Diem-Nhu are somewhat bothered by my silence.” Then he attacked the underlying premise of reform, stating, “I doubt that a public relations package will meet needs of situation which seems particularly grave to me.” Lodge declared that the Viet Cong were gaining strength from disaffected elements crossing over to the insurgency in response to the creeping police state. He also noted corruption in the government and referenced a cable from earlier that day that described a meeting with Thuan in which he confided his desire to flee the country and stated that the war was deteriorating because the

“heart of the army is not in the war.” Getting to the point, Lodge professed that “whatever sanctions we may discover should be directly tied to a promising coup d’etat and should not be applied without such a coup being in prospect.” The ambassador wanted to “pursue contact with

Big Minh and urge him along if he looks like acting.” Toward the end of the message, Lodge

warned that it was “not even within the realm of possibility” that selective cuts would be

effective, and “In fact, to threaten them with suppression of aid might well defeat our purposes

and might make a bad situation very much worse.” He continued on to state that he doubted

213 Diem and Nhu even grasped the concept of popular rule. Returning to the matter of his

disinterest in meeting with the premier, he once again declared agreement before defending his

negligence, stating, “I have, of course, no objection to seeing Diem at any time that it would be

helpful. But I would rather let him sweat for awhile and not go to see him unless I have

something really new to bring up.”574

Yet, there was more to say. Lodge wrote another repetitive cable to the president in which he reiterated that the enumerated actions were “not possible of attainment” because “They involve a leopard’s changing his spots. He then proceeded to list every demand individually with an accompanying reason for why each action would be ineffectual: The air could not be cleared because Diem just wanted everyone to move on and forget what the government had done; press restrictions had been removed; calling off the police would hamstring the nation’s security; new ministers would likely be just as impotent; elections would not be meaningful; legislative actions will go unnoticed; disbanding the Can Lao would just lead to a succeeding organization of similar disrepute; the pagodas were being restored; rejection of forming a religious council was the right decision; freedom of movement would likely be opposed and if accepted would work against U.S. interests by allowing the regime’s enemies to leave the country; the regime would not accept an outside investigation of the Buddhist problem. The only measure Lodge saw any

value in was the flag law. “Possibly something can be done about this,” he admitted.575

Luckily, Hilsman could rationalize the program in a manner that Lodge could appreciate.

Since Forrestal was part of the McNamara-Taylor mission, Hilsman gave him a letter to deliver

to Lodge upon arriving in Saigon. Hilsman tried to hearten the ambassador by insisting that

things would soon move in the direction they both wished to take. With the kind of transparency

that would only appear in private correspondence, the assistant secretary spoke directly about the

214 factional struggle that he was helping to lead back in Washington. Hilsman acknowledge that he

and Lodge were part of a group on the defensive in a divided administration, but he tried to

hearten Lodge by professing, “I have the feeling that more and more of the town is coming

around to our view and that if you in Saigon and we in the Department stick to our guns the rest

will also come around. As Mike [Forrestal] will tell you, a determined group here will back you

all the way.” Hilsman thought that Lodge was correct in judging that selective cuts would fail to

moderate the regime, but he saw their utility in “putting starch in the spaghetti,” i.e., impelling

large numbers of the regime’s enemies to take action. Economic pressure was the leavening

agent for insurrectionary movements. As Hilsman explained,

generals are not going to move until the forces below them—the middle-grade officers— generate enough pressure to convince the generals that they must act first. The only way to generate this broad pressure from below, it seems to me, is for the U.S. to maintain its posture of public disapproval and to make this disapproval real and credible by cuts directed at what we disapprove [italics in original].576

The italicized sentence was probably the true inspiration behind Hilsman’s pressure plan: it was

designed to both satisfy those in the Defense Department who insisted on exhausting all options

before seeking a change in government while also supplying a pretext for backing a conspiracy.

Hilsman expounded a valid theory. On September 26, the CIA reported a meeting with

Khiem that had been set up by Big Minh. It seemed like the conspiracy might have revived, but

Khiem had actually called on the CIA to inform the agency that the generals would not move until Diem responded to their requests for cabinet seats. So far, the only organizational change

Diem had made was transferring command of Tung’s Special Forces to the ARVN’s Joint

General Command, but the generals were optimistic that Diem was “now accepting [the] grave

danger posed by [the] VC.” They were hopeful that he would soon honor their request for a

215 reorganized cabinet, believing that the measure would provide them full control of the war effort

and put the nation on a solid footing to defeat the insurgency. The CIA dismissed his optimism,

concluding, “We do not share Khiem’s belief that Diem will accept and introduce

recommendations made by the General Officers to the extent hoped for by Khiem.577

There was another reason that Hilsman could have mentioned in defense of the

McNamara-Taylor mission. Aside from allowing Hilsman and company to make the argument that the United States had explored all avenues before supporting a coup, the trip would expose senior Defense Department officials to the realities of Vietnam that had so disturbed those the

State Department. Whether from their own travels to South Vietnam or simply from reading the

torrent of diplomatic cables pouring into Foggy Bottom, these men worked in closer proximity to

the struggles of the Vietnamese people. Those who worked at the Pentagon were less likely to be

sent abroad, and when they were, their assignments were usually restricted to military

assessments that left them little opportunity to explore cities and hamlets, engage the common

people, and observe the dysfunctionality of society and government. The McNamara-Taylor

mission, however, would go far in revealing the extent of dysfunction in South Vietnam.

The McNamara-Taylor mission met with Diem for three hours on September 29, four

days after their arrival. They were treated to Diem’s brand of one-way conversation, full of

evasions and accusations, the diplomatic style that had frustrated numerous officials before them

and for which Lodge had no patience. The team questioned Diem on Saigon’s recent

disturbances and his government’s debilitating unpopularity. On the first matter, “Diem ascribed

all this to inexperience and demagoguery within Viet-Nam and to misunderstanding in the

United States of the real position in Viet-Nam because of the vicious attacks of the American

press on his government, his family and himself.” On arrests of students, the premier denigrated

216 the youths and their instructors as “…most immature, untrained and irresponsible.” He then

proceeded to defend Madame Nhu’s outbursts, asserting that she was a parliamentarian and had

the right to speak her mind., to which McNamara replied that his answer was unsatisfactory.

Turning to the Buddhist controversy, Diem proceeded to decry alleged pagoda orgies and general

depravity of the Buddhists, carping that “‘anyone could become a bonze (priest) who shaved his head and acquired a yellow robe.” Then, Diem pointed the finger at his allies and accurately accused “‘some American services in Saigon’” of being engaged in anti-regime plots. Diem informed his guests that he was “‘preparing a dossier”’ on the subversive activities. He subsequently resumed his Buddhist diatribe, describing them as a disorganized community of radicals. Diem offered to help the Buddhists establish a national registrar of bonzes, either woefully ignorant or sinisterly aware of the provocation of attempting catalog members of a persecuted minority in a name registry. Finally, Diem declared that he held the Buddhists culpable for the worsening war, claiming that their actions played into the Viet Cong’s hands. At this point, Taylor reminded Diem of the crisis of confidence that he was fostering and urged him to respond to U.S. demands. In response, “Diem offered absolutely no assurances that he would take any steps in response to the representations made to him by his American visitors. In fact, he said nothing to indicate or acknowledge that he had received even friendly advice.” 578

The following day, Lodge transmitted a cable to Rusk detailing a conversation with Tho

in which the Vice President nervously criticized the Diem-Nhu police state tactics for inciting the

urban masses. When asked to comment on widely-circulated claim that discontent was restricted

to the cities, Thuan responded that, in the countryside, the main problem was security and

inequality. They felt exploited by the village administrators who forced them to provide long

hours of hard labor for minimal pay. They also had to contend with the Viet Cong, who

217 demanded the tribute payments from the villagers. Taylor remarked that Communists should not

have access to the hamlets, but Thuan exclaimed that there were between only twenty to thirty

effective Strategic Hamlets. Taylor then posed the question of why the Viet Cong is so popular.

Thuan’s response was a damning indictment of the Diem regime: he affirmed that some villagers felt content to remain Viet Cong soldiers because of their extreme disregard for the government.579 The Viet Cong did not necessarily appeal to the villagers. Many simply held the

Diem regime to be more repugnant.

The McNamara-Taylor report landed on Kennedy’s desk on October 2. It did nothing to

bolster U.S. confidence in Diem’s viability. The paper explained that, while there was military

progress, there was also an extremely volatile political situation in South Vietnam. Its authors

expressed little faith that pressure and persuasion would succeed in taming Diem, but they were

willing to exhaust the policy as a last resort. McNamara and Taylor proposed a variety of aid

sanctions that included subsidies for imports and utilities development. They also consented to

denying funds to Tung’s Special Forces, unless Diem transferred command of the force to the

ARVN Joint General Staff.580

For the immediate future, the report advised vigilance in monitoring Diem’s moves and

stated that the United States would have to decide over the next two to four months whether to

move for a change. Nevertheless, the team declared that there be no coup encouragement at the

current time. McNamara and Taylor judged that the prospects were not high, but they left the

door open for choosing this path in the event that Diem refused to make the desired changes. For

this reason, they recommended that American advisors continue to pursue contacts with

alternative leadership. The political situation was a serious hazard that required ongoing reviews

of U.S. policy. Altogether, they deemed the prospects for improvement to be about even. In such

218 an unpredictable environment, McNamara and Taylor recommended “…an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador’s direction, to establish necessary contacts to allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects.” However, they maintained that the prospects for success

were unfavorable, judging that the generals lacked the organizational mettle to undertake the

project. After considering three basic options for handling the crisis, the team determined that

reconciliation would be ineffective, a coup would be too risky, and selective aid cuts would

eventually impair the war effort. They recommended continuation of the selective cuts with

resumption tied to specific actions on the part of the Diem government.581

The McNamara-Taylor report was damning in its conclusions. In a way, it was

characteristic of the Department of Defense in its rosy assessment of the war and advocacy for

strong diplomacy. On the other hand, two of the administration’s most prominent opponents of a

coup now left it open for future consideration. Taylor had been brought into the administration in

January 1961 for his views on counterinsurgency, part of which criticized the American

Embassy’s heavy-handed treatment of Diem under Durbrow. Taylor essentially saw the war effort as distinct from the political development of South Vietnam. Relatedly, McNamara

assessed the war effort according to quantifiable data. They generally disregarded political

considerations when assessing what to do to help South Vietnam, instead focusing on providing

physical security through overwhelming force and firepower. It is likely for this reason that

McNamara and Taylor were bypassed in the authorization of cable 243. Presumably, Harriman,

Hilsman, and Forrestal did not believe the military would approve the policy.582 In their

September 1963 report, however, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff inserted the option of a coup d'état into official Defense Department policy. The mere

acknowledgement of it was a clear sign that something had made them reconsider their

219 perspective on Diem regime. The strong opposition that had so far militated against strident calls for regime change had been dramatically weakened, if not neutralized. Kennedy was content to let boardroom call the shots. Despite the official U.S. position of pressuring Diem to reform, it seemed inevitable that a coup would eventually happen, and the Americans would support it.

220 XVI

Final Days

As fate would have it, news of a renewed conspiracy arrived just one day after Kennedy received the McNamara-Taylor report. Sure enough, on October 2, 1963, Colonel Lucien Conein and General Tran Van Don had a random encounter at Tan Son Nhut Airport. Don told Conein that he had been trying to contact him and asked if he would meet him in Nha Trang. Trueheart approved the meeting and provided the basic instructions of telegram 243: that he neither encourage nor discourage a coup. During their meeting, Don told Conein that General Duong

Van Minh (Big Minh) wanted to meet the colonel alone and in uniform for a conversation. He also told Conein that General Ton That Dinh had recently joined their group after feeling betrayed by Diem. He noted that the generals were still requesting five cabinet positions and the appointment of a Military Governor for Saigon-Cholon. He would provide no more details on the plans, telling Conein to talk to Big Minh. He did mention, however, that a Vietnamese civilian had informed Nhu that Americans were contacting Vietnamese in order to encourage a coup, but

Conein’s name was not on the list.583 Lodge, as Conein’s direct superior, authorized the second meeting with Minh.584

The day before Conein’s scheduled meeting with Don, Lodge had finally succeeded in replacing the CIA’s Chief of Station in Saigon, John Richardson, with someone lacking personal ties to Diem, David Smith. This was the final significant personnel change in a long line of major departmental reorganizations. 585 It was another part in a philosophical trade-off in the art of diplomacy. Over a two-and-a-half-year period, Kennedy had systematically removed conservatives, war haws, and appeasers from influential secretarial and ambassadorial posts. He

221 replaced them with spirited and strong-minded upstarts who exploited weaknesses in his administrative style to force an aggressive policy into action. Some did not fit this mold, but the common trait possessed by most of Kennedy’s appointments was their strong will, decisiveness, and outspoken commitment to settling international disputes with diplomatic skill to avoid the heavy costs of war. Kennedy tried to navigate the perils of the Cold War with dynamic thinkers and passionate idealists who conducted foreign policy according to his vision for a more active and effective diplomatic corps by stabilizing and interlinking the international community through negotiated relationships. The drawback to having strong personalities in positions of power, however, is that they tend to act independently, even insubordinately, especially when the boss is disinclined to exercise supreme authority in circumstances requiring leadership. In

Washington as well as Saigon, this proved to the fatal flaw in Kennedy’s administrative style.

While David Smith was still warming his desk chair at the CIA Station in Saigon, he drew up a remarkable cable to Lodge. Having learned of the plans revealed to Conein on October

3, Smith endeavored to urge the embassy to give to hesitation due to their murderous content. On

October 5, Smith insubordinately advised Lodge that “we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle.” The cable was received by Director John McCone. Shocked by the bold and reckless suggestion, McCone sent a telegram to Saigon that the United States “certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge.” Shortly thereafter, McCone had a private meeting with Kennedy and his brother over the U.S. attitude toward a coup. The three agreed that the embassy and CIA were to “assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the

222 appropriate authorities.” McCone’s direct advice was the old line that Diem was the only man in

South Vietnam who could do the job of president. Speaking in metaphor, McCone told the president that “if I was [the] manager of a baseball team, [and] I had one pitcher, I’d keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not.” Curiously, McCone did not bring up the possibility of assassination to Kennedy, confident in the believe that the president supported

McCone’s policy of noninvolvement.586

On the day of the first contact with Minh, McGeorge Bundy cabled the embassy to report that President Kennedy had “approved [the] recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active encouragement to a coup. There should, however, be [an] urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of ambassador to build contacts with possible alternative leadership.” Additionally, the instructions stipulated that it was “Essential that this effort be totally secure and fully deniable.” This was repeated: “this effort is not to be aimed at active promotion of [a] coup but only at surveillance and readiness.”587 It is unclear whether this message arrive before or after Conein met with the head conspirator, but the Pentagon Papers note that the engagement likely took place “before receipt of the foregoing message” from

Bundy.588 Conein, however, was an elite spy and always said only what words had been previously dictated to him. At the October 5 meeting, Conein joined General Duong Van Minh met at his Saigon headquarters. Big Minh requested assurance of U.S. backing but insisted that he did not want American participation in a planned coup d’état. Minh clarified that what he meant was that the United States not thwart the action, but Conein provided no assurances at this time. Minh then disclaimed any political ambitions and outlined three possible schemes: assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can with retention of Diem, encirclement of

Saigon, or direct military engagement between loyalist and rebel units. Minh explained that the

223 generals felt the need to act soon in order to seize the initiative from other rebel conspiracies whose plans were ill-conceived. At the end of the meeting, Minh requested to meet with Conein soon to review the specific plan, but Conein offered no commitments.589

On October 9, apparently in response to the Minh-Conein meeting of October 5, the CIA reaffirmed Kennedy’s instructions to the embassy. These proceeded according to the conditions of the president’s instructions of October 5 and their source, State Department cable 243 to

Saigon of August 24: “While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working relations with U.S.” The cable also instructed Lodge to seek out detailed information establishing a high chance of success.590

On or around October 10, Conein met with Minh a second time, in which the operative provided assurance that the United States would not thwart a coup of demonstrated merit. 591

Documentation of this meeting appears to have either been lost, destroyed, or remained classified. Don mentions it in his memoir, as does the Defense Department in the Pentagon

Papers, but it only cites the columnist Richard Shaplen’s account of the war. Even more curiously, there is no corresponding document printed in the appropriate FRUS volume or contained in any archives, and there is an unusual gap in the Meetings on Vietnam container of

Kennedy library’s remarkably complete National Security Files, which spans a period covering the dates immediately preceding Minh’s first meeting with Conein and immediately preceding commencement of the mutiny. In his testimony to a Senate committee in 1975, Conein disclosed that, at this second meeting with Minh, Conein delivered a message from Lodge that the

Americans were resolutely opposed to supporting any assassination effort. The reaction of the

224 Vietnamese generals was dismissive, according to Conein. Describing the impression made,

Conein stated, “The reaction was just, okay. We’re not talking about a businesslike way of doing

things. All right, you don’t want it like that? We’ll do it our own way anyway.” Conein fumbled

over who he passed the message to, but he settled on stating that it was Don. However, there was

no mention of it in the postmortem that he composed immediately following the coup.592

One can imagine that things might be forgotten or intentionally stricken from the record in the exigency of a rebellion. It seems odd, however, for something that so concerned top

officials in Washington—implication in an assassination plot—to be left out of the record. It

seems reasonable to expect that the CIA would want a record of objecting to this. Then again,

mentioning that Conein objected to assassination would accordingly imply that the Americans

were aware of the generals’ nefarious scheming and, while not supporting such violence,

nevertheless declined to take any action to prevent the murder of a key ally. Conein insisted he

communicated this to Don but provided a rather unconvincing reason for leaving this out of his

after-action report, telling the committee, “I never thought I’d come up here, sir, to tell you

truthfully. I never thought I’d come up here and be asked that specific question, so there are

some things left out of my after action report, such as when we drank beer together or something

like that. I left a few things out.”593

On September 17, the first round of selective aid cuts went into effect when General

Richard Stillwell told Thuan that funding for the RVN Special Forces would be suspended.594 On

October 19, Rusk reported that the government was claiming to have solved the Buddhist crisis,

even though many were still imprisoned. Rusk noted no action on civil liberties, no broadening

of the government, and no significant land reform or improvements in the Strategic Hamlet

program. He also divulged that, in a recent speech, Diem had delivered in “…xenophobic

225 overtones, a catalog of national accomplishments, and an effort to blame negative factors on

Communists and other machinations from outside SVN”595 The next day, Air Force Colonel

Nguyen Khuong of the and two unidentified Vietnamese companions, contacted a U.S. Army

colonel. Khuong rhetorically queried the colonel whether he thought the war could really be won

by 1965 and if he knew why the ARVN failed to take the initiative against the insurgents.

Khoung supplied the response that that the soldiers “have the equipment, knowledge, and ability

to win but don’t want to win and will not win war so long as present government remains in

power.” The airman then disclosed the conspiratorial planning that was underway. Attempting to

elicit an endorsement from the American, Khoung confidently stated that “A small, powerful,

group [of] military officers who can control sufficient forces are prepared to launch a coup

against [the] Diem government.” He added that the rebels could easily assassinate Diem and meet all U.S. criteria for an effective successor regime. Khuong wanted to know if the United

States would extend recognition and support immediately following the operation.596

On October 22, Don ran into Harkins at a British military reception. The Commander in

Chief of MACV was aware of Khuong’s disclosure and urged Don to not undertake a coup at

this time.597 Don contacted Conein the following day, irritated by Khuong’s unauthorized contact and confused by the Harkins’ advise. Harkins’ dissuasion conflicted with what Conein had reported to Minh earlier that month. They met the following day, at which point, Conein reassured Don that Minh had been correctly informed. Lodge told Harkins that he had supplied incorrect information to Don, while Don reported that Khuong had been reprimanded for his improper contact. Conein requested specific information on the coup plot, but all Don could say was that he might be able to supply more details in the days immediately preceding the coup.598

226 Harkins’ error could be understood when considering the contradictory nature of the

administration’s policy, which was to offer Diem a chance to reform while assuring the generals

of noninterference. More recently, the McNamara-Taylor program had stated that the Americans not stimulate a coup but continue to monitor proposals in case an attractive group of conspirators appears. The drafters had also judged that the war was going well and that current prospects for a coup were bad. Harkins was correct to perceive that, by guaranteeing noninterference during and

assistance after a coup, he would incite the rebels. Proponents of a coup had written passionately

that all the generals needed was American support in order to act. But this also meant that

objecting to a plot would have the opposite effect of stifling it. The least restrictive way to

approach potential conspiracies was the manner in which Conein had conducted himself: initially

refrain from any opinionated statements in response to rebel overtures until their plans could be

properly evaluated. Harkins, however, viewed the war from a fundamentally different

perspective from those in the state department: He took McNamara and Taylor’s judgment that

the war was going well as the sole indicator of progress, ignoring the reality that nationalist

struggles are often won by the side with inferior resources but superior morale.

Don and Conein met twice on October 24. The first meeting took place at Tan Son Nhut

Airport during in-flight discussion. Don informed Conein that Harkins had discouraged the conspiracy in a meeting two days earlier. Harkins apologized the following day for misstating

policy. Don and Conein resumed communication at Conein’s dentist’s office on October 24. The

general informed the colonel that the coup committee had denied the American’s request to

receive plans on that day. They did, however, offer to divulge the full scheme to the CIA two

days before commencing the operation, which would occur sometime before November 2. Don

also assured Conein that the succeeding regime would be a civilian government and that none of

227 the conspirators would hold a top administrative position. Don then promised that the new

government would release noncommunist political prisoners, hold free elections, and ensure a

robust legislative branch to ensure civil equality. Don assured Conein that he would be in contact

with him while the coup was in progress. Finally, Don declared that the committee “had come to

the conclusion that the entre Ngo family had to be eliminated from the political scene in

Vietnam.”599

Lodge then met with Diem on October 27. South Vietnam’s president replied to Lodge

that he was “gradually” complying with the “very complicated”600 conditions of American aid.

Diem then criticized American activities in Vietnam, accusing John Mecklin, the Counselor for

Public Affairs in Vietnam, of distributing propaganda. Lodge tried impress upon Diem the significance of American public opinion and international opinion. Lodge asked Diem directly what he could do for the United States, to which he premier replied, “not give in” and commented that “Vietnamese do strange things if they’re resentful.” He then rebuffed Lodge’s complaint about recent violence against American journalists by asserting that “newspapermen shouldn’t go into the center of a riot.”601 Diem called the press liars and defended Nhu as misunderstood, claiming that his brother “…was so good and so quiet, so conciliatory and so compromising.” Lodge declined to debate the matter. Diem then accused the State Department of organizing “the whole damn pack of lies.” He complained that the former South Vietnamese ambassador’s daughter was a known whore but received no bad press back in Washington.

Lodge then closed the meeting by saying, “Mr. President, every specific suggestion I have made, you have rejected. Isn’t there some one thing you may think of that is within your capabilities to

do and that would favorably impress U.S. opinion?” Nothing: “As on other previous occasions

when I asked him similar questions, he gave me a blank look and changed the subject.”602

228 On the morning of October 28, Don had a brief exchange with Lodge at an airport before

departing on day trip with Diem. Don needed confirmation that his contacts were legitimate,

pulling the ambassador aside and inquiring whether Conein was authorized to speak for the

ambassador. Lodge confirmed that he was. Don then insisted that the coup be a wholly

Vietnamese affair, to which Lodge also concurred. The general exhibited a sense of urgency, stating, “we must win before you Americans leave.” Lodge shook his head in the affirmative and asked Don when the rebels would take the plunge, but the commander replied that it was too soon to reveal specifics.603

Later that evening, Don called on Conein. Conein raised the issue of an upcoming trip by

Lodge to Washington on October 31. Conein advised Don to permit Lodge to review the coup

plans before his departure. Don countered that plans would likely not be available until four

hours before the attack began. Don insisted that Lodge keep his schedule so as not to arouse

suspicion. Conein tried to dig more out of Don about the project. The commander relented to a

degree. He explained that Minh had operational supervision; Kim managed political planning;

and he, Don, was liaison officer. Don further divulged that Dinh would be neutralized by being

surrounded by coup supporters and that General Do Cao Tri and Major General Nguyen Khanh

were also involved in planning. General Tran Thien Khiem was not involved in planning because

he was currently under government surveillance. In his history of the coup, Don also recalled

that, at this meeting, Conein “offered us money and weapons, but I turned him down, saying that

we still needed only courage and conviction, which we had abundantly.”604

Lodge sent an updated appraisal of coup prospects to the State Department on the

evening of October 29. The ambassador’s foremost concern, as well as that of his counterparts in

Washington, was “the apparent lack of detail furnished by General Don” in consequence of the

229 generals’ preoccupations with security. They continued to monitor Dinh, ever suspicious that the duplicitous field commander might defect a second time and cross back over to the loyalist camp. Lodge also raised concern over “The possibility of a premature, unrelated and precipitate coup” by other groups who were much less capable of such an undertaking. Furthermore, he

worried that “the existence of an imminent coup atmosphere would reduce the element of

surprise.” Yet there were also hopeful signs. Lodge was encouraged that “To date the Generals

have repeatedly demanded the least possible American involvement. On the contrary, the

Generals have repeatedly demanded the least possible American involvement. He also noted that

selective aid cuts were working towards fomenting a coup, which was the only real value that

many State Department officials saw in the selective cuts. Lodge concluded that “it would appear

that a coup attempt by the Generals’ group is imminent; that whether this coup fails or succeeds,

the USG [U.S. Government] must be prepared to accept the fact that we will be blamed, however unjustifiably; and finally, that no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing Diem and Nhu.”605

Back in Washington, interdepartmental divisions and rivalries continued to engender

administrative dysfunction. On October 29, Taylor cabled Harkins to complain about a

“continued lack of effective communication between you and Ambassador Lodge.” His

determination that there existed an interdepartmental “relationship that lacks the depth and

continuity required by the complex circumstances in Saigon” could suffice as an accurate

description of the overall administrative deficiencies of the Kennedy presidency. “Are we correct

in believing that the Ambassador is forwarding military reports and evaluations without

consulting you?” Considering the underhanded manner that the State Department had been

conducting official business, it was certainly believable. Taylor’s perception was the reality.

230 Later that day, Lodge cabled the CIA and the departments of State and Defense with his assessment of the situation regarding the civilian opposition group, the Dai Viet, and its leader,

Bui Diem. Lodge relayed Bui Diem’s suggestion that he act as intermediary between Conein and the generals. The Dai Viet were a traditional noncommunist opposition group that had gone underground since Diem crushed all political parties in the 1950s.606

Ahead of a White House meeting on the developing situation, Hilsman drafted a paper of talking points on relevant issues to consider. He posed three topics for discussion: transporting

American troops from the South China Sea and Okinawa, making a military plane available for

Lodge so that the ambassador could take a direct flight from Saigon to Washington for his scheduled trip, and a statement that “on coup planning we suggest Washington leave the matter in Lodge’s hands.” Hilsman added that “Any action from here [Washington} may gum up the matter.”607

Following this were two attachments, both of them papers drafted by Mendenhall. One described the various military personalities in the coup group, while the other provided a breakdown rebel military forces. A third attachment titled “Civilian Leadership of Coup Group” was actually a memorandum from Kattenburg to Edward Rice, Hilsman’s deputy at the Far East

Bureau.608 Finally, there was a briefing paper prepared by all of the major State Department players providing various recommendations. The most significant portion of the document is the official U.S. position on a coup. The drafters noted that “Lodge has told the coup group repeatedly…that we would not thwart a coup.” They ascertained that “This is the best chance for a successful coup we are likely to have” and warned that “Any attempt to thwart now would leave a great legacy of bitterness and distrust on the part of the generals toward the U.S.” Finally, they described the talk of prospects a triviality, since “…any other course of action or inaction

231 involves risks equally as great or greater. Another recommendation declared that the United

States should offer no support to Diem during the operation but that the coup group should be provided assistance if they requested it, while another called for declaring total ignorance of the operation when questioned about it, refusal to reaffirm recognition of the Diem government.

Finally, the group decided that “if asked whether we are continuing aid to the Diem Government, we should reply we continue to support the Vietnamese people in their efforts to defeat the

Communist enemy and to build a better future.”609

At 4:30, the responsible parties gathered in the White House. The meeting began with

Colby providing a breakdown of pro- and anti-diem forces, noting that each side had approximately an equal number of available soldiers. There were about as many neutrals as the combined force of rebels and loyalists. Colby added, however, that Diem had much better capabilities for stopping the coup than he had in during the previous insurrection three years earlier. Rusk noted that Diem and Nhu were surely aware of the coup. He raised the question of

“whether we think there is enough prospect of a successful coup to make the decision to keep silent.” Worried that things might get out of hand, Rusk wondered if the United States should place conditions on how generals conducted the operation. This brought out the central dilemma of the administration’s policy: “If we support Diem, then we will disrupt the war effort because we will be acting because we will be acting against those Generals who are now fighting the war against the Viet Cong. If we support the rebel Generals, then we will have to guarantee that they are successful in overthrowing the Diem government.” Kennedy wanted Harkins to take charge in Lodge’s absence. He was not very confident in the operation, noting that “the odds were against a coup.”610

232 In response to Colby’s estimate that the forces were about even, the president asserted that “it always looks this way until the coup actually begins.” Taylor added to Kennedy’s caution, telling the room to stop “looking at the Vietnam situation as if it were a football game,” declaring that “a few key people are crucial to the success of a coup and are more important than total numbers.” Kennedy wanted to find out “who these key people are.” Trying to preserve the role of the military in the operation, McNamara suggested that Trueheart, Harkins, and Smith from a State-Defense-CIA panel to “jointly decide what our agent Conein would say and do and…hear all of Conein’s reports.” McCone, however, opposed such a “troika,” thus preserving

Lodge’s singular control of the American role in the rebellion.611

The president’s brother exhibited the greatest apprehension, claiming that “The situation now is no different than that of four months ago when the Generals were not able to organize a coup. To support a coup would be putting the future of Vietnam and in fact all of Southeast Asia in the hands of one man not now known to us. Diem will not run from a fight or quit under pressure. A failure of a coup risks so much. The reports are very thin and the information is limited…We can’t go half way. If the coup fails, Diem will throw us out.” Rusk responded that backing off would be just the same, since “the coup-minded military leaders will turn against us and the war effort will drop off rapidly.” Taylor chimed in to state that “even a successful coup would slow down the war effort because the new central government would be inexperienced.”

Rusk then argued that “the important question is whether the rebel generals could achieve quick success. He felt that in the long run, if the Diem government continued, the war effort would go down hill.” Harriman replied that “We cannot predict that the rebel Generals can overthrow the

Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the country to victory over the Viet Cong. With the

233 passage of time, our objectives will become more and more difficult to achieve with Diem in control.”612

Kennedy then stated that if the forces were actually even, “any attempt to engineer a coup is silly.” If the ambassador agreed with this assessment, Kennedy wanted Lodge to dissuade the generals from acting. McGeorge Bundy then suggested sending a military plane to the area so that Lodge could stay in Vietnam longer and leave for Washington at a moment’s notice, while

McNamara correctly observed that telling Lodge to discourage a coup would constitute a change of instructions. The secretary of defense also noted that that it was unlikely that the embassy would follow protocol. “The draft instructions tell him to call in General Harkins, which would be difficult to do in view of the fact that Lodge is not now keeping General Harkins informed of developments.”613

The group met again at 6:00 to discuss a draft of instructions for Lodge. Kennedy told those assembled that “the burden of proof should be on the coup promoters to show that they can overthrow the Diem government…We can discourage a coup in ways other than telling Diem of the rebel Generals’ plans.” The president wanted to inform Lodge “that from here we can see that a disaster could take place and that if the rebels can’t win, it would not be sensible for them to go ahead.” In a statement of startling ignorance, Kennedy argued that “Lodge feels that the coup is comparable to a stone rolling down hill which can’t be stopped. If this is so, then no one can say that we are to blame for the coup, no matter what we do.” The generals had to prove that they could win. If not, “it would be a mistake to proceed. If we miscalculated, we could lose our entire position in Southeast Asia overnight.”614

The instructions resulting from this meeting indicated significant apprehension in

Washington. The cable stated that the United States possessed the ability to forestall the

234 operation without betraying the conspirators. Lodge was to collaborate with Harkins and Smith in analyzing the prospects. With the opposing forces apparently of equal strength, Washington was concerned about the “substantial possibility [of] serious and prolonged fighting or even defeat,” warning that “either of these could be serious or even disastrous for U.S. interests.” The

White House also wanted Conein to “find [the] earliest opportunity [to] express to Don that we do not find [that the] presently revealed plans give clear prospect of quick results.” The cable expressed concerns that Don might be spy for the government. Washington also told Lodge that he should adhere to his regular schedule but informed the ambassador that it was readying a military plane to arrive in Saigon on October 31, providing the Lodge with the ability to leave

Saigon on Saturday afternoon and be in Washington by Sunday. In closing, the instructions stated: “We reiterate [that the] burden of proof must be on coup group to show a substantial possibility of quick success; otherwise, we should discourage them form proceeding since a miscalculation could result in jeopardizing [the] U.S. position in Southeast Asia.”615

Back in Saigon, final preparations were underway for the coup. Diem and Nhu were, indeed, on to the conspiracy. To defeat the rebels, Nhu hatched a fantastic scheme involving a fake coup code-named “Operation Bravo.” The plan involved having police remove Diem and

Nhu from Gia Long Palace while General Dinh’s III Corps lie in wait at a distance from Saigon as rebel mobs rampaged through the city, leaving a trail of dead Buddhists and students in their wake. Colonel Tung would then declare a revolutionary government composed of some of the regime’s most prominent opponents. In the midst of the chaos, a radio address would denounce the oppositionists as enemies of the people in a nationwide call to arms. After a day of fighting and uncertain power struggles, Dinh’s soldiers would triumphantly return to the city and put down the ‘rebels’ to demonstrate the glory and loyalty of the ARVN.616

235 The real rebels, however, were aware of this fabrication and did what they needed to do to stop it: they bought off the necessary element in pulling off the charade, General Ton That

Dinh. They encouraged Dinh to ask Nhu for an appointment as Minister of the Interior, knowing that Dinh’s request would be rejected and his honor insulted. The generals then promised Dinh the position, finally drawing him over to the rebel camp. On October 29, the conspirators leaked their plans to officers at the Seventh Division headquarters. As expected, the plans then made their way to the palace by way of an informant. Diem and Nhu summoned Dinh to the palace and told the general he was aware of treachery in the army. Displaying his flair for the dramatic,

Dinh broke down in tears, declaring himself a broken man and pledging allegiance to Diem. The ruse worked: instead of being interrogated, tortured, and executed, Dinh was promoted to Major

General and ordered by Diem to infiltrate the real coup on November 1. Diem then worked to sabotage the regime’s defense by ordering Tung to send his Special Forces to Saigon’s outskirts as Dinh moved tanks into the city. This was explained to Diem and Nhu as designed to avoid

American charges that the ARVN was again declining to fight the war. Diem approved the action

October 30, in effect, signing his own death warrant.617

That evening, Lodge cabled Washington with his thoughts that he did not believe the

United States had “the power to delay or discourage a coup. Don has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair.” The only way to do so was to disclose the plot to Diem, but this

“would foreclose any possibility of change of the GVN for the better.” This would be suicidal for

U.S. policy, because “Diem/Nhu have displayed no intentions to date of a desire to change the traditional methods of control through police action or solidarity of the Ngo family.” Lodge warned the White House that “If our attempt to thwart this coup were successful, which we doubt, it is our firm estimate that younger officers, small groups of military, would then engage

236 in an abortive action creating chaos ideally suited to VC objectives.” Lodge then continued to defend shutting out Harkins. In doing this, Lodge appropriated the interventionist creed, claiming, “time has not yet permitted substantive examination of this matter with General

Harkins. My general view is that the U.S. is trying to bring this medieval country into the 20th century politically and that can only be done either by a thoroughgoing change in the behavior of the present government or by another government. The Viet Cong problem is partly military but it is also partly psychological and political.” In Lodge’s judgment, “It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of a matter which is so profoundly political as a chance of government.” Lodge also judged that evacuation of key personalities would be tantamount to supporting the regime, but providing money to the rebels to “buy off the opposition.” Finally,

Lodge insisted no proof of success could be obtained, professing, “I do not know what more proof can be offered than the fact [that] these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and that they want nothing for themselves. If I am any judge of human nature, Don’s face expressed sincerity and determination on the morning that I spoke to him…We also run great risks by doing nothing.” Unsurprisingly, Lodge singed off noting “Gen Harkins has read this and does not agree.”618

The White House responded later that evening that it did not “accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup.”619 By this point, however, it was clear that Lodge would do it his way. He was also told to “reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U.S.-controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.”620

The coup began on the afternoon of November 1. The generals captured Colonel Tung.

They then unsuccessfully tried to contact the palace. Failing that, they transmitted a radio

237 broadcast ordering the Ngos to surrender, guaranteeing their safety, and announcing that the

palace would be shelled if they did not comply. Nhu had arranged a fake coup with General Dinh

to put down the insurrection, but Dinh defected, and Nhu thought that Big Minh’s coup was the

fake one. The generals then proceeded to seize key installations. The CIA was unsure of the

likelihood of success but conjectured that the circumstances were favorable.621 Lodged reported

that the generals wanted the U.S. embassy to relay an ultimatum to Diem. Conein revealed that

the JGS refused to negotiate with Diem: he must either surrender or fight. Big Mihh called Diem

twice in the early evening of November 1. He told the premier to vacate the palace or be bombed

in five minutes. Minh then called a second time, but Diem hung up. Shelling of the palace began

at 5:15 PM.622

On the morning of November 1, Diem met with Felt and Lodge. The President of South

Vietnam launched into one of his patented monologues, blaming junior CIA officers for

disseminating coup rumors. He then called Lodge, requesting the American position. It was too

early for Washington’s opinion, replied Lodge, and he did not have enough information about

the scheme currently underway. Diem also complained about the aid sanctions and asserted that

the dissident bonzes had been spurred on by Americans. He denounced the student protestors as

Communist puppets and complained about Harkins’ advisors. Diem insisted that he would

change the government at the proper time. He asked Lodge to help people better understand Nhu

and insisted that he was a reasonable person. He also hoped that Lodge would tell President

Kennedy that he is a “good ally.”623 At the White House, Bundy and Forrestal were impressed by the effectiveness of the coup. In ominous fashion, Bundy announced that Diem was holding out in the palace, remarking that no one wanted to “go in for the kill”624 From approximately 10:00

AM to 12:15 PM, Washington time, Kennedy held an off-record meeting, and later that day,

238 Rusk informed Lodge that the White House would review U.S. posture and determine its

rationale for backing a military dictatorship. The American justification would rest on the

argument that this was a popular coup; Diem was the one who lacked the will of the people. The

U.S. should expose Nhu’s dealings with Hanoi and declare that military government would end

repression and soon transfer power to the people. Diem had simply yielded to a national consensus.625

239 Conclusion

On November 2, Kennedy received news of Diem and Nhu’s assassinations following their escape through a tunnel underneath Gia Long Palace on the evening of November 1 and subsequent capture at a Catholic church the next morning. They were initially reported as suicides, but it soon became clear by their bound hands and backside gunshot wounds from inside an armored vehicle that they had been murdered. Kennedy was visibly shocked when he received the news, somberly commenting that Diem had done much good for his country.

Kennedy never believed that two devout Catholics would have committed suicide.626 The deaths really should have come as no surprise. Assassination schemes had been mentioned as part of coup plots multiple times in 1962-1963. Most envisioned sparing Diem and only killing Nhu, but anyone with an understanding over how government overthrows sometimes go, no one’s safety can be fully guaranteed. Even less so for a controversial president and his demagogue brother.

The 1963 Saigon coup was a direct product of the internal political dynamics of the

Kennedy administration. Throughout Kennedy’s presidency, foreign policy was beset by interminable arguments resulting from incompatibilities in the theoretical outlooks of the military and foreign service. The Cold War had raised serious questions about the limits of what could be achieved through military superiority alone; mutually assured destruction had led many contemporary diplomats to advocate political and quasi-political solutions to communist aggression. For these modernists, Harriman’s negotiation of Laotian neutrality was a paradigm of what could be achieved when people laid down arms, picked up pens, sat down, and listened to each other at the negotiating table. Conversely, Defense Department officials and military

240 commanders largely continued to view firepower and manpower as the determinants of success in international relations.

Kennedy’s vision for a revived State Department to pursue a dynamic, activist foreign policy led him to place strong-minded, resolute individuals into powerful positions in the State

Department. Foggy Bottom had a longstanding reputation for boondoggle of bureaucratic excess, a place where good ideas went to die in the circuitous passage that policy took through the chambers of secretaries, deputies, and their assistants before ever reaching the upper echelons of government. Kennedy wanted action over discussion, boldness rather than indecision and timidity. After his inauguration, Kennedy attempted to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the State Department by giving ambassadors full authority over the CIA’s activities in their domains. He then sought to get his kind of people into influential posts in Washington and around the world, those who would vigorously and passionately pursue Kennedy’s New Frontier.

To find these forward-thinking minds, Kennedy looked to bring outsiders into the government who were modern visionaries. In the words of Schlesinger, Kennedy “canvassed the universities, the foundations, the press and politics.”627 This search brought in many of the men who would play fundamental roles in turning U.S. policy in support of a coup in 1963. Roger Hilsman was a

West Point graduate turned political scientist. Michael Forrestal was a graduate of Harvard Law and a New York City lawyer when he was tapped to join the NSC by Kennedy in 1962. George

Ball was another lawyer and one that also held a strong background in economics. There were many more of these throughout the administration, like John Kenneth Garlbraith, Edward R.

Murrow, and Ted Sorensen, all well-educated, upper-class individuals who were brought in from outside the government primarily because of the alternative perspective on the world that those kinds of individuals held. Harriman was one of the few men in the administration that was a

241 government careerist, but he fit well into the mold of the others in his liveliness, his passionate

commitment to diplomacy over war, and his independent nature.

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy looked to revive the role of the State

Department in the planning and execution of interventionist policy. Combined with the loss of

Laos, the young president was preoccupied by the political liabilities that were accruing from his

seeming losses to communism on the world stage. His advisors repeated suggestions for military

intervention disturbed the president, however. Calls for combat troops came not only from the

Pentagon but from the State Department as well. In the fall of 1961, Rostow joined Taylor in

advocating a massive expansion of the military mission in Saigon. Kennedy, however,

desperately wanted to avoid troop deployments, so he made more changes in personnel at the end

of 1961 that brought men with a much more aggressive foreign policy vision into positions that

significantly affected the character of Vietnam policy. Most notably, he installed Harriman as

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, removed Rostow from the NSC, and installed

Michael Forrestal in his place as Harriman’s representative on the Council. Kennedy also promoted George Ball to Undersecretary of State. One year later, he promoted Hilsman to

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and again promoted Harriman, this time to

Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Finally, in the summer of 1963, there were two more essential changes that sealed South Vietnam’s fate. Once Kennedy grew exasperated with

Nolting’s efforts to cajole and persuade Diem to reform, he installed Lodge as ambassador, and then Lodge proceeded to change the CIA’s station chief in Saigon with someone who did not have personal affinity for Diem, as John Richardson, the station chief at the time of Lodge’s arrival, was known to have.

242 The changes in personnel were part of the overall Kennedy philosophy that envisioned

‘political’ solutions to Cold War contingencies over the use of military force. In seeking to parrot this new kind of foreign policy, Kennedy drew on men who were highly intelligent yet inexperienced in the regions to which they were assigned. Furthermore, since they were often youthful outsiders drawn from the most prestigious institutions, they were out to make names for themselves in government and supremely confident in their abilities to solve whatever challenges they were presented in ways that differed from the traditional approaches to national security in the Cold War era. However, this band of ambitious upstarts showed that ‘political’ solutions, when crafted with an underlying military character, could, in the long run, be just as risky and destructive as overt military intervention. Harriman, Hilsman, Ball, and Forrestal no doubt took a more academic and cerebral approach to international relations than most before them did, but the results their methods could be just as forceful, violent, and provocative as landing troops on the ground. If these men were to form part of the mythical Camelot that Kennedy aspired to revive at the White House, in the case of Vietnam, it was an imperial Camelot in that it accepted the manipulation and suffering of other people and cultures for assumed benefits to American interests.

Ironically, the same problems that plagued the administration in 1961 continued to undermine foreign policy at the end of 1963. Policymaking was still plagued by underhanded behavior coupled with a lack of interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. The only difference was who was responsible for ignoring proper bureaucratic protocol. When Taylor provided his postmortem on the Bay of Pigs, he had told Kennedy that one of the primary reasons for the failure was the lack of teamwork between the JCS, CIA, and State Department. It was at this point that Kennedy gave the State Department control over covert activities and

243 explicitly told the JCS that he expected to hear their views on all matters, whether military or

nonmilitary in nature. Yet, the same problems persisted. Kennedy’s advisors in the State

Department showed themselves to be just as willing to shut out the other government

departments from the planning and execution of policy, just as the CIA had been during the spring of 1961. While the CIA was guilty of shutting out the other departments and advisory bodies from planning Operation Zapata in 1960-61, the State Department evaded the Pentagon in drafting and transmitting cable 243, which remained official policy all the way through the coup that toppled Diem the following November. In 1961, Kennedy had worried about the independent, reckless behavior of the CIA, but in 1963, he got the same kind of deception and underhandedness from the State Department. In 1961, Kennedy had wanted to avoid damaging

U.S. prestige in committing ground troops to Vietnam in support of a regime of questionable merit, yet the reckless policy pursued at the end of 1963 was nevertheless a blight on U.S. international reputation. The problem was the subordinates seemed to be running the show.

Kennedy needed to get his house in order by providing firm guidance and leadership, by taking personal command of situations that often degenerated into tense arguments that sometimes became personal attacks. Kennedy failed to provide that leadership in critical moments, however, most notably in the summer and fall of 1963. Despite expressing deep misgivings about the policies advocated by the State Department, and despite the conflicting information that he was receiving, Kennedy did little more than ask questions and then ultimately leave final decisions up to his hardliners in the State Department.

South Vietnam’s government would never achieve the security and tranquility that the

Kennedy administration had envisioned for South Vietnam. The war would continue to escalate, and popular hatred for the government would continue to simmer on the surface of Vietnamese

244 life for years to come. The story of Kennedy in Vietnam is one of intrigue, deception, and cultural ignorance. He expanded U.S. commitment to unprecedented levels, placing American lives in harm’s way and tying American national reputation to the fate an underdeveloped, divided, and culturally-alien nation. Kennedy’s greatest fault in the affair is his considerable lack of involvement in or influence over the most fateful policy decisions. He offered little resistance to the initial instructions to Lodge that directed the ambassador to back the generals. He expressed dismay at the deceptive tactics of Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal in ramming the cable through to Saigon, but he never called for retraction. Finally, he largely sat on the sidelines while his advisors crafted the program of selective aid cuts. Kennedy was also content to let

Lodge run the show in Saigon, and anyone who understood the shared character of opinion between the intelligence and diplomatic wings of the White House staff knew that Lodge would ensure the execution of the aggressive policy championed by men like Harriman, Hilsman,

Forrestal, Mendenhall. The check on those who wanted to meddle in South Vietnam’s political dynamics had been removed; Nolting’s recall revealed Washington’s desire to get tough on

Diem. Lodge’s successful lobbying for replacement of Richardson at the CIA’s Saigon station was just one more nail in Diem’s coffin that had begun with Nolting’s loss of favor at the White

House. Once the administration lost all faith in Diem and Nhu’s ability to prosecute the war against the Viet Cong, Diem was no longer valuable as a Cold War ally and was, in fact, a domestic and international liability. The debacle of Saigon in 1963 is arguably the greatest failure of American intervention, both in the sense that Vietnam was more populous and modernized than any other site of American nation-building, and in the sense that it accelerated the United States down the road to its most devastating military failure and national tragedy.

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1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 291. 2 W. W. Brubeck, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 11 Oct. 1961, in Ronald D. Landa, Charles S. Sampson, and John P. Glennon, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 [hereafter referred to as FRUS], Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), 339-40; Roswell Gilpatric, Memo for the Record, 11 Oct. 1961, United States Department of Defense, United States- Vietnam Relations, 1946-1967: Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Task Force [USVR], pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 322-23, RG 330, National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD; McGeorge Bundy, NSAM-104, 13 Oct. 1961, ibid., 328; Maxwell D. Taylor, Draft Instructions from the President to his Military Representative, 11 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 345; John F. Kennedy to Taylor, 13 Oct. 1961, printed in Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 225-26 and USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 327; George W. Ball to Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., 12 Oct. 1961, 7:33 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 360; Lyman Lemnitzer to Harry D. Felt, 13 Oct. 1961, ibid., 362-63; Estimate Prepared in the Department of Defense and Other United States Agencies, 15 Oct. 1961, ibid., 377; W. Averell Harriman to Dean Rusk, 13 Oct. 1961, 6 p.m., ibid, 363. 3 Howard K. Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 14-18; Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83, 87-90, 97, 103-04. 4 Moyar, 21, 34, 41-47, 50-51, 54-55, 64-67, 71-72, 74-76, 80, 99. 5 Moyar, 108-13 6 David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration in Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 185-86. 7 Thomas J. Corcoran, Memorandum of a Conversation at Blair House, 9 May 1957, 4:30 p.m., in Edward C. Keefer, David W. Mabon, and John P. Glennon, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. I: Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 800; John Foster Dulles to Saigon, 25 July 1957, 6:10 p.m., ibid., 828; Elbridge W. Durbrow to Dulles, 3 Aug. 1957, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 837-38; Durbrow to Dulles, 6 Aug. 1957, 8:00 a.m., ibid., 839-40; Durbrow to Dulles, 12 Dec. 1957, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 885-86; Durbrow to Christian A. Herter, 10 Mar. 1960, 11:00 p.m., in Glenno, Keefer, and Mabon, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. I: Vietnam (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 320- 21; Moyar, 69-70. 8 Daniel V. Anderson to Dulles, 27 Feb. 1957, 7:00 p.m., FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. I: Vietnam, 764 n. 2; Durbrow to Dulles, 29 Apr. 1957, 6:00 p.m., ibid, 787-88; Moyar, 66-67. 9 James I. Muir, Memorandum for the Record, 5 Nov, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. I: Vietnam, 859-60 n. 6; Durbrow to Dulles, 6 Aug. 1957, ibid., 839-40. 10 Durbrow to Herter, 10 Mar. 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. I: Vietnam, 325-26. 11 Durbrow to Dulles, 5 Dec. 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. I: Vietnam, 869-870. 12 Ibid., 870. 13 Ibid, 872-73. 14 Ibid., 873-74. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 876-77. 17 Ibid., 876-78. 18 Ibid., 882-83. 19 Durbrow to Dulles, 25 Nov. 1957, 7:00 p.m., ibid.,865-66. 20 Durbrow to Dulles, 1 July 1957, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 825-26. 21 Durbrow to Dulles, 29 Apr. 1957, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 787-88. 22 Durbrow to Herter, 19 Apr. 1960, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. I: Vietnam, 404-06. 23 Durbrow to Herter, 3 May 1960, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 433-34; Durbrow to Herter, 9 May 1960, 6:00 p.m., ibid, 448- 49; Donald Q. Coster, Memorandum of a Conversation, 24 June 1960, 4:00 p.m., 506-07; Durbrow to Herter, 25 Aug. 1960, ibid., 410-11; Durbrow to Herter, 5 Sept. 1960, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 560-63; Durbrow to Herter, 16 Sept. 1960, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 572-75; Moyar, 105-108. 24 Durbrow to Herter, 16 Sept. 1960, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. I: Vietnam, 578-79. 25 Edward G. Lansdale, interview by Ted Gittinger, 5 June 1981, transcript, Oral History Program, LBJL, http://web2.millercenter.org/lbj/oralhistory/lansdale_edward_1981_0605.pdf, 1-15; Lansdale, interview by Dennis J.

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O’Brien, 11 July 1970, transcript, p.1-2, Oral History Program, JFKL; Schlesigner, 320; Jones, 5, 13, 18-19; Moyar, 38-40. 26 Ibid., 100-118. 27 David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 50-62, 68-77; Jones, 15-21; John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1992), 3-7, 24-41; Lansdale to James Douglas, 17 Jan. 1961, in United States Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1946-1967: Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Task Force [USVR], pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 1-4, 8, 11, RG 330, National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD. 28 Schlesinger, 541; Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., interview by Joseph E. O’Connor, 14 May 1966, transcript, JFKL. 29 Country Team Staff Committee, “Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961, 1-12. 30 Lansdale to Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 17 Jan. 1961, in United States Department of Defense, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 1-4, 8, 11, RG 330, National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD; Country Team Staff Committee, “Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam,” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I., 1-12; USVR, pt. IV.A.5, 86-94; J. Graham Parsons, Summary Record of Mtg. at the White House, Washington, 28 Jan. 1961, 10 a.m.-12:15 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 13-15, n. 6. 31 Parsons, Summary Record of Mtg. at the White House, Washington, 28 Jan. 1961, 10 a.m.-12:15 p.m., ibid., 13- 15, n. 6; Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, 30 Jan. 1961, ibid., 18; Kennedy to Rusk and Robert S. McNamara, 30 Jan. 1961, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. 1, 13; Rusk to Saigon, 3 Feb. 1961, ibid., 14-16. 32 M. Bundy to McNamara, 3 Feb. 1961, NSAM-2, ibid., 17; M. Bundy to McNamara, 9 Mar. 1961, NSAM-28, ibid., 18. 33 M. Bundy to Chester V. Clifton, 14 Mar. 1961, ibid., 46 n. 2. 34 Schlesinger, 426. 35 Executive Order 10920, 18 Feb. 1961, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58858; Taylor, 198-99; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics and Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), 23-24. 36 Quote from circular letter in Schlesinger, 426; ibid., 427. 37 Taylor to John F. Kennedy, 13 June 1961, Memorandum No. 2, “Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group,” in Louis J. Smith, and David S. Patterson, eds., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. X: Cuba, January 1961-September 1962 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), electronic copy, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10, 891-94; Taylor to Kennedy, 13 June 1961, Memorandum No. 3, “Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group,” ibid., 895-98; Taylor, 180-90. 38 M. Bundy to Taylor, et al., 25 June 1962, NSAM-55, “Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations,” Papers of John F. Kennedy (POF), Presidential Papers, National Security Files (NSF), Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM), JFKNSF-330-005, JFKL. 39 M. Bundy to Taylor, et al., 28 June 1962, NSAM-56, “Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements,” POF, Pres. Papers, NSF, Mtgs. and Memos, NSAMs, NSAM-56, JFKNSF-330-006; USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 174; Jones, 81. 40 M. Bundy to Taylor, et al., 28 June 1962, NSAM-57, “Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations,” POF, Pres. Papers, NSF, Mtgs. and Memos, NSAM, JFKNSF-330-007; Jones, 81. 41 USVR, pt. IV.B.1, 35-36. 42 Ibid., 31-32. 43 Ibid., 32-36. 44 Gilpatric to Kennedy, 3 May 1961, Draft of “A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961, 113-114; Lansdale, Memorandum, Final Draft of “A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam,” 8 May 1961, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 85-86. 45 USVR, pt. IV.B.1, 36-39; USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 75. 46 McGeorge Bundy, NSAM-52, 11 May 1961, printed in USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 136-37 and FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 132-134. 47 Ngo Dinh Diem to Kennedy, 6 June 1962, USVR, pt. IV.B.1, 59-60; USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 168-69. 48 Worth H. Bagley, Memo for the Record, 6 Nov. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 533-34; Rostow to Kennedy, 29 Mar. 1961, POF, Staff Memoranda, box 64a, JFKL; Gilpatric, oral history interview by Dennis J. O’Brien, 5 May 1970, transcript no. 1, pp. 12, 19-20, Oral History Program, JFKL; Lyman Lemnitzer to JCS, 8 May 1961, in FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 126-27; Memo of Conversation between U. Alexis Johnson and Rostow, 21 June 1961, encl. Sterling Cottrell to Walter McConaughy, 8 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 201-202, n. 2. 49 Taylor, 195-99; Newman, 96-97.

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50 Ibid., 96. 51 Kennedy to Taylor, 26 June 1961, Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 185. 52 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 61-62; Kennedy to Taylor, 13 Oct. 1961, printed in Taylor, 225-26 and USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 327. 53 Ball to Nolting, 12 Oct. 1961, 7:33 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 360. 54 Taylor to Kennedy, 1 Nov. 1963, BAGU0006 and BAGU0005, Top Secret, Eyes Only for the President, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 333-343. 55 Taylor to State Department, 25 Oct. 1961, 1 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 430. 56 Rusk and McNamara to Kennedy, 11 Nov. 1961, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 359-66; Bundy to Rusk, “First Phase of Viet-Nam Program,” NSAM-111, 22 Nov. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I, 656-57. 57 William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II: 1961-1964 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 80-82, 88; George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 366-67; Chester Bowles to Rusk, 5 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol I: Vietnam, 1961, 322-25; W. Averell Harriman, “Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador at Large,” encl. Harriman to Kennedy, 12 Nov. 1961, ibid., 580-82. 58 Rusk (in Hakone) to Department of State, 1 Nov. 1961, 5 p.m., ibid., 464-65; Gibbons, 88; Mike Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Vol. II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 105. 59 McNamara to Kennedy, 8 Nov. 1961, in Gravel, 108-09; William P. Bundy to Kennedy, 7 Nov. 1961, in Gibbons, 83-84; Gibbons, 86-88. 60 Rusk and McNamara to Kennedy, 11 Nov. 1961, USVR, pt. IV.B.1, 126, 129-33. 61 M. Bundy to Rusk, NSAM-111, “First Phase of Viet-Nam Program,” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 657. 62 Ibid.; Rusk and McNamara to Kennedy, 11 Nov. 1963, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 360-65; Michael V. Forrestal, interview by Joseph Kraft, 14 Aug. 1964, JFKL oral history program, transcript no. 3, 132. 63 Jones, 148; Forrestal, interview by Joseph Kraft, transcript no. 3, 126-27. 64 USVR, pt. IV.B.3, iii. 65 Ibid., 142. 66 Ball, interview by Robert R.R. Brooks, 2 Feb. 1965, interview no. 1, transcript, 17-18, 21, JFKL. 67 Schlesinger, 437-439; Ural Alexis Johnson and Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984), 314-16. 68 Ibid., 315. 69 Johnson, 315; Schlesinger, 437. 70 Schlesinger, 436-38; Johnson, 320. 71 Gibbons, 88; Ball, 366. 72 Schlesinger, 443. 73 Gibbons, 119; Newman, 140-41; Johnson, 121-22; 1-11; Forrestal, interview by Joseph Kraft, 8 Apr. 1964, transcript no. 1, 1-7, JFKL. 74 USVR, pt. IV.B.3, 5. 75 Nolting to Rusk, 22 Nov. 1961, noon, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 649-50. 76 Ibid., 650. 77 Nolting to Rusk, 25 Nov. 1961, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 667. 78 Schlesinger, 152, 414, 425. 79 Galbraith to Kennedy, 21 Nov. 1961, USVR, pt. V.B.4, bk. I, 411, 413-16, 418. 80 Hilsman to Rusk, 28 Nov. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 681-82. 81 Robert Johnson to Rostow, 14 Nov. 1961, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, box 195, JFKL; Jones, 127-128. 82 Paper Prepared by R. Johnson, 28 Nov. 1961, encl. Bagley to Taylor, 30 Nov. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 683. 83 Ibid., 685. 84 Ibid., 686. 85 Ibid. 86 Robert H. Johnson, interview by William W. Moss, 29 Aug. 1974, transcript no. 1, JFK Library Oral History Program, 30; Gibbons, 118. 87 Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, “Suggested Contingency Plan,” 20 Oct. 1961, encl. Walter McConaughy to Nolting, 21 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 408. 88 Ibid., 411.

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89 Rostow to Kennedy, 24 Nov. 1961, ibid., 661. 90 Ibid., 662. 91 Memorandum for the Record, Mtg. held at ARVN Cmmnd., 19 Oct. 1961, ibid., 396-97. 92 Ibid., 398. 93 Memorandum for the Record, Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, 20 Oct. 1961, ibid., 399-400. 94 USVR, pt. IV.B.3, 14. 95 Nolting to Rusk, 18 Oct. 1961, midnight, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 393-94. 96 Joseph A. Mendenhall, draft paper, “How Stable is the Diem Government?” 22 Oct. 1961, ibid., 416-17. 97 Ibid., 417. 98 Nolting to Rusk, 25 Oct. 1961, 9:00 p.m., ibid., 433. 99 Ibid., 434. 100 Rostow to Harriman, 22 Dec. 1961, ibid., 755. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., 755-56. 104 Paper Prepared for the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 7 Mar. 1962, in John P. Glennon, David M. Baehler, and Charles S. Sampson, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam 1962 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 201. 105 Theodore J.C. Heavner to Chalmers B. Wood, 19 Mar. 1962, ibid., 248. 106 CIA Saigon to CIA, 27 Feb. 1962, 7:35 a.m., ibid., 181; Nolting to Rusk, 27 Feb. 1962, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 181-82; Howard K. Eggleston, Memorandum for the Record, Mtg. at Gia Long Palace, 1 Mar. 1962, ibid., 188-89, 191; Nolting to Rusk, 2 Mar. 1962, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 195. 107 Eggleston, Memorandum for the Record, Mtg. at Gia Long Palace, 1 Mar. 1962, ibid., 188-89. 108 Ibid., 189. 109 Jones, 165; See footnote for JFKL info. 110 Heavner to Wood, 19 Mar. 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 247-50; William C. Trueheart to Rusk, 23 May 1962, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 418-26; Rusk to Nolting, 22 May 1962, 1:47 p.m., ibid., 414-15; Nolting to Rusk, 4 June 1962, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 435. 111 Sterling Cottrell to Harriman, 6 Apr. 1962, ibid., 311-12, 315; Trueheart, Memorandum of a Conversaton Between the Vietnamese Secretary of State and the Chargè in Vietnam at Gia Long Palace, 24 May 1962, ibid., 428- 30. 112 McGeorge Bundy to Rusk, NSAM-155, “Emergency Medical Program for Vietnam,” 22 May 1962, ibid., 417. 113 Lansdale interview, 19 Nov. 1982, in Gibbons, 107. 114 Jones, 173. 115 Galbraith to Kennedy, 4 Apr. 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 298. 116 Forrestal to Kaysen, 6 Aug. 1962, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, box 196, JFKL; Jones, 191. 117 Frank Valeo to Mike Mansfield, 15 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 457. 118 Mendenhall, Memorandum for the Record, 26 June 1962, ibid. 119 Hilsman to Rusk, 28 Nov. 1961, encl. Lucius D. Battle to M. Bundy, 29 Nov. 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961, 682; Paper Prepared by R. Johnson, 28 Nov. 1961, encl. Bagley to Taylor, 30 Nov. 1961, ibid., 683. 120 Mendenhall to Edward Rice, 16 Aug. 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 598. 121 Ibid., 599-600. 122 Ibid., 600. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid., 600-01. 125 Paul D. Harkins, interview by Ted Gittinger, 10 Nov. 1981, transcript, LBJ Library Oral History Project, Library of Congress online, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004har05/2004har05.pdf, p. 17. 126 Ibid.; Nolting to Rusk, 20 Sept. 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 663 n. 2. 127 Editorial note, ibid., 668 n. 3. 128 Harriman to Nolting, 18 Oct. 1962, 8:24 p.m., ibid., 707. 129 Nolting to Harriman, 20 Oct. 1962, 10:00 a.m., ibid, 717. 130 Harkins, interview by Gittinger, 17. 131 Hilsman to Rusk, 3 Dec. 1962, RFE-59, “The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam,” Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers, 690-91. 132 Ibid., 706, 708. 133 Ibid., 716.

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134 Mike Mansfield, Memorandum of a Conversation, Gia Long Palace, 1 Dec. 1962, 11:30 a.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam, 1962, 750-757. 135 Ibid., 750, 755-56. 136 Mansfield to Kennedy, 18 Dec. 1962, ibid., 779-87. 137 Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1988), 86. 138 Nolting, interview by O’Brien, 6 May 1970, transcript no. 2, 78, JFKL. 139 Halberstam’s account printed in Gibbons, 133. 140 Ibid., 133-34; Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye (New York: Pocket Books, 1973), 15. 141 Hilsman, 453. 142 Moyar, 186-94; Jones, 223-26 143 Hilsman, 449. 144 Hisman, Memorandum for the Record, 2 Jan. 1963, in John P. Glennon, Edward C. Keefer, and Louis J. Smith, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 3. 145 Ibid., 4. 146 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, ibid., 5. 147 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, ibid., 8. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid., 9. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid., 10. 152 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, “Conversation with President Diem,” ibid., 14. 153 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, ibid., 16. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, “Mr. Trueheart’s Strategic Hamlet Coordination Committee,” 2, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3, Vietnam: Hilsman trip, December 1962-January 1963: Basic report and “Eyes Only” annex, JFKL. 157 Ibid. 158 Hilsman, Memorandum for the Record, January 1963, “Weapons for Hamlet Militia,” Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3, Vietnam: Hilsman trip, December 1962-January 1963: Memoranda for the record, p. 15, JFKL. 159 Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Memorandum, 11 Jan. 1963, “Current Status of the War in South Vietnam,” 1, NSF, Countries, box 197, Vietnam: General, 10 Jan. 1963-30 Jan. 1963, JFKL. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid., 2. 162 Ibid., 3. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Forrestal and Hilsman, 25 Jan. 1963, “A Report on South Vietnam,” Hilsman Papers, box 3, Vietnam: Hilsman, trip: December 1962-January 1963: Basic report and “Eyes Only” annex, p. 1-3, JFKL 167 Ibid., 3-4. 168 Ibid., 4. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid., 5. 171 Ibid., 6. 172 Ibid., 7-8. 173 Ibid. 9. 174 Ibid., 9-11. 175 Ibid, 13. 176 Ibid., 14. 177 Ibid., 11-12, 178 Ibid., 15. 179 Ibid., 15-16.

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180 Ibid., 16. 181 Ibid., 17-18. 182 Hilsman and Forrestal, 25 Jan. 1963, “Eyes Only Annex: Performance of U.S. Mission,” ibid., 1. 183 Ibid., 1-2. 184 Ibid., 2. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., 3. 187 Ibid. 188 Forrestal quote in Gibbons, 138. 189 Hans J. Morgenthau quoted in Gibbons, 141. 190 Kennedy quote in Gibbons, 137. 191 Morgenthau quote in Gibbons, 142. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Earle C. Wheeler to Taylor, January 1963, “JCS Team Report on South Vietnam” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 79-80. 196 Ibid., 79. 197 Ibid., 81-82. 198 Ibid., 82. 199 Ibid., 91. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid., 92. 202 Forrestal to Kennedy, 4 Feb. 1963, 1, NSF, Countries, box 197, Vietnam: General, February 1963, JFKL. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid.; Forrestal to Kennedy, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 95. 205 Forrestal to Harriman, 8 Feb. 1963, ibid., 105-06 and Hilsman Papers, box 3, folder 15, JFKL. 206 Nolting to Harriman, 27 Feb. 1963, ibid., 127. 207 Nolting to Harriman, 18 Mar 1963, ibid., 162. 208 Nolting to Rus, 7 Apr. 1963, 1:00 a.m., ibid., 214. 209 Forrestal to Harriman, 8 Mar. 1963, ibid., 142-43. 210 Memorandum for the Record of Conversation with the Presidential Counselor, 12 Apr. 1963, ibid., 222 211 Ibid., 224. 212 Nolting to Hilsman, 13 Apr. 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 225. 213 NIE 53-63, “Prospects in South Vietnam,” 17 Apr. 1963, ibid., 233-34. 214 Theodore J.C. Heavner to Chalmers B. Wood, 2 May 1963, ibid., 262. 215 Tran Van Don, Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 70; Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 108-110. 216 Ibid., 113-14; Don, 70; Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1988), 106; John Helble to Dean Rusk, 9 May 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 277-78. 217 Ibid., 277 n. 2; Hammer, 114-15; Nolting, 106; Don, 70; Jones, 248-53. 218 Helble to Rusk, 10 May 1963, 2:00 a.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 284-85; Helble to Rusk, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 285-86. 219 “Manifesto of Vietnamese Buddhist Clergy and Faithful,” 10 May 1963, ibid., 287, ibid., n. 3; Nolting to Rusk, 18 May 1963, ibid., 309-10. 220 Ibid., 310. 221 Ibid., 311-12; Nolting to Rusk, 22 May 1963, ibid., 314; Rusk to Saigon, 1 June 1963, ibid., 337-40; Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, ibid., 343-45; USVR, pt. IV.B.5, 4-6; Hammer, 114. 222 Forrestal to Kennedy, 10 May 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 291. 223 Nolting to Rusk, 17 May 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 306-07. 224 Nolting to Rusk, 22 May 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid., 314. 225 Trueheart to Rusk, 30 May 1963, ibid., 336-37. 226 Nolting to Rusk, 18 May 1963, 4:00 p.m., 309- 227 Trueheart to Rusk, 1 June 1963, ibid., 340 n.3, 341 n.4. 228 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, ibid., 343-44; Trueheart to Rusk, 4 June 1963, ibid., 346-47.

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229 Nolting to Hilsman, 23 May 1963, encl., Contingency Plan Drafted by Director of the Vietnam Working Group, “Eventual Change of Government in Viet-Nam,” undated, ibid., 317-18. 230 Ibid., 317-318. 231 Nolting to Rusk, 23 May 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid., 324-26, n. 2. 232 Editorial note, ibid., 335 n. 3. 233 Rusk to Trueheart, 29 May 1963, 7:07 p.m., ibid, 335-36. 234 Trueheart to Rusk, 30 May 1963, 4:00 p.m., 336-37. 235 Trueheart to Rusk, 31 May 1963, 7:00 p.m., 337. 236 Ibid., 338. 237 Trueheart to Rusk, 1 June 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 339-340, 304 n.3, 341 n.4. 238 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, ibid., 343-44; Trueheart to Rusk, 4 June 1963, ibid., 346-47. 239 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid., 346 n. 3; Trueheart to Rusk, 4 June 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 346- 47. 240 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, mindight, ibid., 348 n. 2. 241 Rusk to Trueheart, 3 June 1963, 5:30 p.m., ibid., 348. 242 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 June 1963, midnight, ibid., 348 n. 2; Trueheart to Rusk, 4 June 1963, noon, ibid., 349 n. 2. 243 Rusk to Trueheart, 3 June 1963, 6:46 p.m., ibid., 349. 244 CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, OCI 1561/63, “Buddhist Demonstrations in South Vietnam,” ibid., 344- 46. 245 Trueheart to Rusk, 4 June 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid., 349-51. 246 Trueheart to rusk, 4 June 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 352-353; Trueheart to Rusk, 6 June 1963, ibid., 353 n. 3. 247 Trueheart to Rusk, 5 June 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 356-67. 248 Trueheart to Rusk, 6 June 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 359. 249 Ibid., 360. 250 Hammer, 142. 251 Hammer, 137-38. 252 Trueheart to Rusk, 8 June 1963, 8:00 p.m., 1-3, NSF, Countries, box 197a, Vietnam: General, June 1-5, JFKL. 253 Rusk to Trueheart, 8 June 1963, 12:55 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 363. 254 Ibid., 364. 255 Rusk to Trueheart, 8 June 1963, 5:37 p.m., 1, NSF, Countries, box 197a, Vietnam: General, June 6-15, JFKL. 256 Trueheart to Rusk, 9 June 1963, 1:00 a.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 366-68. 257 Trueheart to Rusk, 9 June 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 370-71; Rusk to Trueheart, 8 June 1963, 5:37 p.m., 1, NSF, Countries, box 197a, Vietnam: General, June 6-15, JFKL. 258 Trueheart to Rusk, 10 June 1963, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 371-72. 259 Forrestal, interview by Paige E. Mulhollan, 3 Nov. 1969, transcript, 15-16, LBJL; 260 Taylor and Phillips quotes in Jones, 267. 261 Hilsman, interview by O’Brien, 14 Aug. 1970, transcript, 21, JFKL. 262 Hammer, 144; Jones, 267-70; Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January- August 1963, 374; COMUSMACV to JCS, 12 June 1963, ibid., 374 n. 3; Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, noon, ibid., 375. 263 John Mecklin, Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 157. 264 Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, noon, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, Januaryp-August 1963, 375-76; Trueherat to Rusk, 11 June 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 375 n. 2. 265 Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, 9:59 p.m., ibid., 377 n. 3 266 Truehearat to Rusk no. 1148, 11 June 1963, ibid., 376 n. 2. 267 Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, 5:00 p.m., ibid., 376-77. 268 Ibid., 378. 269 Trueheart to Rusk, 11 June 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 378-79. 270 Nolting, oral history interview by Ted Gittinger, 11 Nov. 1982, transcript, 14, LBJL. 271 Ibid. 272 Harkins oral history, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004har05/2004har05.pdf. 273 Rusk to Trueheart, 11 June 1963, 11:03 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 381. 274 Ibid., 382. 275 Rusk to Trueheart, 11 June 1963, 11:03 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 381. 276 Ibid., 383.

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277 Trueheart to Rusk, 12 June 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid. 385-87. 278 Nolting oral history, 15. 279 Editorial note, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 386 n. 2. 280 Ibid. 281 Trueheart to Rusk, 13 June 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 388. 282 Trueheart to Rusk, 14 June 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 391 283 Ibid., 391 n. 3. 284 Editorial Note, ibid., 397-98. 285 Ibid. 286 Trueheart to Rusk, 16 June 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid. 396-97. 287 Rusk to Trueheart 14 June 1963, 4:43 p.m., ibid., 393. 288 Rusk to Trueheart, 14 June 1963, 11:00 p.m., ibid., 394-96. 289 Trueheart ot Rusk, 16 June 1963, 5:00 p.m., ibid., 398-99. 290 Trueheart to Rusk, 19 June 1963, noon, ibid., 400-401. 291 Rusk to Trueheart, 19 June 1963, 8:28 p.m., ibid., 402-03. 292 Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk, 21 June 1963, RFE-55, “Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam,” 3, NSF, Countries, box 197a, Vietnam: General, June 16-21, JFKL. 293 Ibid., 6. 294 Ibid. 295 Ibid., 5. 296 Ibid., 6. 297 Ibid., 8-9. 298 Rusk to Trueheart, 19 June 1963, 8:28 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 403; Trueheart to Rusk, 22 June 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 411. 299 Ibid. 300 Ibid., 412. 301 Trueheart to Rusk, 25 June 1963, ibid., 413-14. 302 Schlesinger, 988-89; Jones, 280, 306; Forrestal and Hilsman, 25 Jan. 1963, “A Report on South Vietnam,” p.3, Hilsman Papers, box 3, Vietnam: Hilsman, trip: December 1962-January 1963: Basic report and “Eyes Only” annex, JFKL; Hammer, 170; Trueheart, oral history interview by Ted Gittinger, 2 March 1982, transcript, 28-29, LBJL, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Trueheart,%20William.toc.pdf. 303 Ball to Trueheart, 26 June 1963, 12:51 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 415-16. 304 Nolting, 117. 305 Trueheart to Rusl, 27 June 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 422-23. 306 Ibid., 423 n. 4. 307 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), CIA Information Report, TDCS DB-3/655,301, “Appraisal of the Ngo Dinh Diem Regime as of 26 June 1963,” 28 June 1963, ibid., 423-25. 308 Trueheart to Rusk, 28 June 1963, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 427-28. 309 Trueheart to Rusk, 29 June 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 429-30; Trueheart to Rusk, 29 June 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 430- 31. 310 Forrestal to Trueheart, 29 June 1963, ibid., 431 n. 4. 311 Forrestal to M. Bundy, 1 July 1963, 1:34 p.m., ibid., 432. 312 Ball to Trueheart, 1 July 1963, 8:52 p.m., ibid., 433-34. 313 Trueheart to Rusk, 2 July 1963, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 441-43. 314 Ball to Trueheart, 2 July 1963, 2:33 p.m., ibid., 443-44. 315 Trueheart to Rusk, 3 July 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 445-46; Trueheart to Diem, 3 July 1963, ibid., 446-47. 316 Forrestal to Kennedy, 3 July 1963, ibid., 447-49. 317 Trueheart to Rusk, 4 July 1963, 3:00 p.m., ibid., 449-450. 318 Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation at the White House, 4 July 1963, 11:00-11:50 a.m., ibid., 451-53. 319 Wood, Memorandum of a Conversation at the Department of State, 5 July 1963, ibid., 466-67. 320 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., TDCS-3/552,770, “Situation Appraisal of the Political Situation as of 1200 Hours on 6 July,” 8 July 1963, ibid., 473-78; CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., TDCS-3/553,822, 8 July 1963, ibid., 474 n. 2; Don, 84-85, 87. 321 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., TDCS-3/552,770, “Situation Appraisal of the Political Situation as of 1200 Hours on 6 July,” 8 July 1963, ibid., 473-78. 322 Hammer, 152-55; Jones, 286.

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323 Ibid., 157. 324 CIA to Forrestal and Bundy, 26 June 1963, NSF, Countries, box 197, Vietnam: General, June 25-30, JFKL. 325 Forrestal to M. Bundy, 9 July 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 481-82. 326 SNIE 53-2-63, “The Situation in South Vietnam,” 10 July 1963, ibid., 483-85. 327 Edward Rice to Rusk, 15 July 1963, encl. CIA Info. Rpt., TDCSDB-3/655,524, “Comments on Reports of Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Coup Plotting,” 13 July 1963, ibid., 488-91. 328 Nolting to Rusk, 15 July 1963, ibid., 487-88. 329 Nolting to Rusk, 16 July 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 492. 330 Nolting to Rusk, 17 July 1963, 11:00 a.m., ibid., 493-94. 331 Nolting to Rusk, no. 96, 17 July 1963, ibid., 494 n. 4. 332 Nolting to Rusk, 17 July 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid, 495. 333 Editorial Note, ibid, 515. 334 Nolting to Rusk, 19 July 1963, 5:00 p.m., ibid., 516. 335 Nolting to Rusk, no. 111, 19 July 1963, ibid, 517 n. 3. 336 Rusk to Nolting, 19 July 1963, 8:53 p.m., ibid., 517-18. 337 Nolting to Rusk, 20 July 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 521-22. 338 Rusk to Nolting, 20 July 1963, 2:58 p.m., ibid., 523. 339 Nolting to Rusk, 25 July 1963, 8:00 p.m., 528-30; Nolting to Rusk 28 July 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 546-47. 340 Nolting to Rusk, 1 Aug. 1963, ibid., 550 n. 2. 341 Eleanor G. McGann, Memorandum of Phone Conversation between Harriman and Hilsman, 1 Aug. 1963, 9:55 a.m., ibid., 550; Rusk to Nolting, no 144, 1 Aug. 1963, ibid., 550 n. 3. 342 Rusk to Nolting, 23 July 1963, 6:51 p.m., ibid., 524. 343 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., 2 Aug. 1963, TDCS-3/655,589, ibid., 551-552. 344 Ball to Nolting, 9 Aug. 1963, 4:18 p.m., Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Series 01. Countries, Box 198, Folder: “Vietnam: General, August 1963: 1-20,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA. 345 Nolting to Rusk, 3 Aug. 1963, 4:50 p.m., sec. two of five, p. 1, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, box 198, JFKL. 346 Ibid., sec. two of five, pp. 2-3. 347 Ibid., sec. three of five, p. 1. 348 Ibid., sec. four of five, p. 1. 349 Ibid., p. 2. 350 Ball to Nolting, 5 Aug. 1963, 3:03 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 553; Nolting to Rusk, 7 Aug. 1963, 9:00 p.m., ibid., 557. 351 Ball to Nolting, 8 Aug. 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 557. 352 Ibid., 558. 353 Nolting to Rusk, 5 Aug. 1963, 4:00 p.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 1963: 1-20, box 198, JFKL. 354 Nolting to Rusk, 8 Aug. 1963, 9:27 p.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 1963: 1-20, box 198, JFKL. 355 A.J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 216. 356 Mme. Nhu quote in Jones, 292. 357 Forrestal to Kennedy, 9 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 559-60. 358 Nolting to Rusk, 10 Aug. 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid., 560-61. 359 Nolting to Rusk, 12 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 562-63. 360 Ibid., 563. 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 Ibid. 364 Ibid. 365 Ibid., 563-64. 366 Rusk to Nolting, 12 Aug. 1963, 12:13 p.m., NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, JFKL. 367 Nolting to Rusk, 13 Aug. 1963, 3:54 a.m., ibid. 368 Nolting to Rusk, 13 Aug. 1963, 9:47 a.m., ibid. 369 Rusk to Nolting, 13 Aug. 1963, 7:20 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 564-65. 370 Nolting to Rusk, no. 220, ibid., 564 n. 2.

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371 Nolting to Rusk, 14 Aug. 1963, 7:00 p.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, Box 198, JFKL. 372 Nolting to Rusk, 14 Aug. 1963, 8:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 565-66; ibid., 566 n. 3. 373 Ibid., 566-67 n. 4. 374 Rusk to Nolting, 15 Aug. 1963, 8:02 p.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, Box 198, JFKL. 375 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., 12 Aug. 1963, “Analysis of the Buddhist Crisis by General Oai,” ibid. 376 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., 15 Aug. 1963, “Possible Coup D’etat on 15 August 1963,” ibid.; CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 158, 14 Aug. 1963, CIA Records, Series 2: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Box 26, JFKL. 377 CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 158, 14 Aug. 1963, p. 2, CIA Records, Series 2: FBIS Daily Reports, Box 26, JFKL. 378 CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 160, 16 Aug. 1963, p. 3, ibid. 379 CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 159, 15 Aug. 1963, p. 2, ibid. 380 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Oral History Interview by Charles Bartlett, 4 Aug. 1965, transcript, p. 4-5, Oral History Program., JFKL. 381 Ibid., 5-6; Jones, 305. 382 Hammer, 164; Helble to Rusk, 18 Aug. 1963, 10:13 p.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, Box 198, JFKL. 383 Trueheart to Rusk, 19 Aug. 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid.; Ball to Hilsman, 19 Aug. 1963, 6:19 p.m., ibid. 384 Hammer, 164-65; Moyar, 231. 385 CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 163, 21 Aug. 1963, p. 1-2, CIA Records, Series 2: FBIS Daily Reports, Box 27, JFKL. 386 Ibid., p. 7. 387 CIA, Daily Reports: Far East, No. 164, 22 Aug. 1963, p. 1, ibid; Trueheart to Rusk, 20 Aug. 1963, unnumbered, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 1-20, Box 198, JFKL; Trueheart to Rusk, 20 Aug. 1963, no. 268, 6:22 a.m., ibid.; Trueheart to Rusk, 20 Aug. 1963, no. 268H, 10:50 p.m., ibid.; Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, no. 268G, 5:40 a.m., ibid.; Trueheart to Rusk, 20 Aug. 1963, no. 268F, 10:36 p.m., ibid; COMUSMACV to State Department, 21 Aug. 1963, 1:17 p.m., NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963, 21-23, Box 198, JFKL; Gravel, ed., 232-33; Hammer, 166-68; Jones, 297-300; CIA, President’s Intelligence Checklist, 21 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January 1961-1963, 597-98; Department of State Daily Staff Summary, 21 Aug. 1963, ibid., 598-99; Joseph F. Carroll to McNamara, 21 Aug. 1963, ibid., 600-01; USVR, pt. IV.B.5, p. 12. 388 Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, 10:00 p.m., ibid., 595. 389 Ibid., 596. 390 Ibid. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid. 393 USVR, pt. IV.B.5, 12. 394 Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, no. 268J, NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, JFKL. 395 Don, 88-90. 396 Ball to Trueheart 21 Aug. 1963, 2:42 a.m., NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, JFKL. 397 Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, noon, ibid. 398 Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid; Trueheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid. 399 Trueheart to Rusk, no. 292, 21 Aug. 1963, 9:00 p.m., ibid. 400 Trueheart to Rusk, no. 293, 21 Aug. 1963, 9:00 p.m., ibid. 401 Tureheart to Rusk, 21 Aug. 1963, 10:00 p.m., ibid. 402 Hughes, RFE-75, 21 Aug. 1963, p. 3-4, ibid. 403 Victor H. Krulak, Memorandum for the Record, 21 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January- August 1963, 602. 404 Ball to Lodge, 22 Aug. 1963, 7:56 p.m., NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, JFKL. 405 Lodge to Rusk, 23 August 1963, 8:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 603-04. 406 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 11:00 a.m., ibid., 611-12.

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407 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 613-14. 408 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 10:00 a.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 24-31: State Cables, Box 198, JFKL; Jones, 309. 409 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., “Indication of a 25 August Coup D’etat,” 22 Aug. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, Box 198, JFKL. 410 Don, 90-91. 411 Lucien E. Conein, testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 20 June 1975, p. 13-16, NARA Record No. 57-10014-10094, internet resource, https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1460; Tim Weiner, “Lucien Conein, 79, Legendary Cold War Spy,” The New York Times (New York, NY), 7 June 1998, accessed 2 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/07/world/lucien-conein-79-legendary-cold-war-spy.html. 412 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., “Background on Establishment of Martial Law and Problems of General Don,” 23 Aug. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, Box 198, JFKL; CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., “Frustration and Discouragement among Vietnamese Army Officers,” ibid. 413 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., “Airborne Officers’ Disapproval of the Government’s Actions on 21 August 1963,” 23 Aug. 1963, ibid. 414 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, noon, NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 24-31: State Cables, JFKL. 415 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 9:00 p.m., ibid. 416 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid. 417 Lodge to Rusk, no. 322, 24 Aug. 1963, ibid. 418 CIA Info. Rpt., 24 Aug. 1963, p.1-2, ibid. 419 Ibid., p. 3-4. 420 Ibid., p. 5-10. 421 Ibid., p. 11-14. 422 CIA Info. Rpt., “General Officers’ Meetings on 23 and 24 August 1963,” 26 Aug. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, 8/24/63-8/31/63, TDCSs, JFKL. 423 Lodge to Rusk, 23 Aug. 1963, 1:00 p.m., p. 1, NSF, Box 198, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 21-23, JFKL. 424 Lodge to Rusk, 23 Aug. 1963, 3:00 p.m., pp. 1-2, ibid. 425 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 9:00 p.m., ibid. 426 Lodge to Rusk, 24 Aug. 1963, 11:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January 1961-August 1963, 620- 21. 427 Felt to JCS, 25 Aug. 1963, 10:58 a.m., ibid., 632. 428 CIA Saigon to CIA, 25 Aug. 1963, ibid., 633-34. 429 Acting Secretary of State to Lodge, 25 Aug. 1963, ibid., 635. 430 Jones, 311-14; Langguth, 232-33; Francis X. Winters, The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam January 25, 1963-Feburary 15, 1964 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999.), 43-44, 61. 431 Hilsman, 485, n. 1. 432 Forrestal to Kennedy, 24 Aug. 1963, 4:50 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January 1961-August 1963, 627; Gilpatric, oral history interview by Gittinger, 2 Nov. 1982, Oral History Collection, LBJL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/gilpatric_r/GilpatricR.PDF. 433 Hilsman, draft of cable 243, 24 Aug. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 24-31: State Cables, JFKL. 434 Ibid. 435 Ball to Lodge, 24 Aug. 1963, ibid. 436 William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), 112-16. 437 Johnson, 412. 438 Ball, oral history interview by Paige E. Mulhollan, 8 July 1971, transcript no. 1, pp. 3-4, Oral History Collection, internet copy, LBJL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/ball_g/BALL-G1.PDF. 439 Dean Rusk, Daniel S. Papp, ed., As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), 437-38. 440 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 371-72. 441 Ball, oral history interview by Mulhollan, transcript no. 1, p. 4. 442 Ibid. 443 Gilpatric oral history, 3-4; Forrestal, oral history interview by Joseph Kraft, 14 Aug. 1964, transcript no. 3, 152- 53, Oral History Program, JFKL.

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444 Victor H. Krulak, Memorandum for the Record, 24 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January- August, 1961-1963, 630-31. 445 Rust, 116; William E. Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 210; 446 Ball, 372; Hilsman, 487-88. 447 Krulak, Memorandum for the Record, 24 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August, 1961-1963, 630-3; Newmann, 348-49. 448 Forrestal oral history, 153; Rust, 115-16. 449 Newman, 349-51; Taylor, 292; Rust, 116. 450 Taylor, 292. 451 William E. Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), 138. 452 Lodge to Rusk and Hilsman, 25 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August, 1961-1963, 634. 453 Acting Secretary of State to Lodge, 25 Aug. 1963, 635. 454 Taylor, 292-93. 455 Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, 26 Aug. 1963, noon, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 638-39. 456 Ibid., 639. 457 Ibid. 458 Ibid., 640-41. 459 Ibid., 641; Rust, 120. 460 Ibid., 116. 461 Schlesinger, President Kennedy and His Times, Vol. II (Boston: Mariner Books, 1978), 714. 462 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 567. 463 Forrestal quoted in Rust, 119. 464 Rust, 120. 465 Lodge, oral history interview by O’Brien, 6 May 1970, transcript no. 2, 5-12, Oral History Program, JFKL; Lodge, oral history interview by O’Brien, 7 May 1970, transcript no. 3, 81-82, ibid. 466 Lodge, “Vietnam Memoir,” pt. II, ch. II, p. 1, P-373, Reel 26, Part VII: Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. II, Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS), Boston, MA. 467 Ball to Lodge, 24 Aug. 1963, 9:36 p.m., ibid., 627; United States Information Agency (USIA), Voice of America broadcast, Saigon, 26 Aug. 1963, 8:00 a.m., 636. 468 Hilsman, 491-92; Rusk to Lodge, 26 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 636 n. 5 469 Lodge to Rusk, 26 Aug. 1963, ibid., 636-37. 470 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., 28 Aug. 1963, NSF, Box 198A, Countries: Vietnam, General, 8/24/63-8/31/63, TDCSs, JFKL. 471 CIA to Forrestal, 26 Aug. 1963, 3:47 p.m., ibid. 472 CIA to Forrestal, 26 Aug. 1963, ibid. 473 Jones, 330. 474 CIA Saigon to CIA, 26 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 642 475 CIA Saigon to CIA, 26 Aug. 1963, ibid., 643. 476 CIA Saigon to CIA, 26 Aug. 1963, ibid., 647. 477 Lodge to Rusk, 26 Aug. 1963, 10:00 p.m., ibid., 644-45. 478 Forrestal to Kennedy, 26 Aug. 1963, ibid., 649-50. 479 Lodge to Rusk, no. 335, 26 Aug. 1963, 5:49 a.m., NSF, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 24-31, JFKL 480 Rusk to Lodge, 26 Aug. 1963, 8:18 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963., 646; Harkins to Taylor, 27 Aug. 1963, 8:05 p.m., ibid., 656. 481 CIA Saigon to CIA, 27 Aug. 1963, ibid., 653-55. 482 Lodge to Rusk, 27 Aug. 1963, 5:00 p.m., ibid., 650-51. 483 Bromley K. Smith, Memorandum of a Conversation at the White House, 27 Aug. 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 659-60. 484 Ibid., 662. 485 Ibid., 662-64. 486 Ibid., 664-65. 487 Mendenhall, Memorandum for the Record, 26 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I: Vietnam 1961, 457; Memorandum for the Record, Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, 20 Oct. 1961, ibid., 399-400; CIA, CIA Info.

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Rpt., 12 Aug. 1963, “Analysis of the Buddhist Crisis by General Oai,” NSF, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 1963: 1-20, box 198, JFKL; Valeo to Mansfield, 15 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II: Vietnam 1962, 457; Forrestal to Harriman, 8 Mar. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam January-August 1963, 142-143; Nolting to Rusk, 10 Aug., 1963, ibid., 561 n. 4; Jones, 292, 293, 303. 488 Forrestal to Harriman, 8 Mar. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 143. 489 Lansdale, Memorandum for the Record, 27 Aug. 1963, ibid., 665-66, 665 n. 1. 490 U.S. Department of State, American Opinion Summary: Viet-Nam, 27 Aug. 1963, NSF, Box 198A, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 1963: 24-31, Memos and Miscellaneous, JFKL. 491 Lodge to Rusk, 28 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam January-August 1963, 668-670. 492 Ibid., 671. 493 CIA Saigon to CIA, 28 Aug. 1963, ibid., 671. 494 Taylor to Harkins, 28 Aug. 1963, 10:02 a.m., ibid., 675. 495 Vietnam War Statistics on U.S. Personnel, https://worldhistoryproject.org/1963/10/11/president-kennedy-issues- nsam-263-ordering-the-withdrawl-of-1-000-military-personnel-from-vietnam-by-the-end-of-1963, accessed 29 Apr. 2018; Walter Nicklin, “Leaving College, Going to War,” New York Times (New York, New York), 5 May 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/opinion/leaving-college-going-to-war.html, accessed 29 Apr. 2018; Bromley K. Smith, Memorandum of a Conference with the President at the White House, 28 Aug. 1963, noon, in John P. Glennon and Edward C. Keefer, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August- December 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1-2. 496 Ibid., 2, 7. 497 Ibid., 3. 498 Ibid., 3-4. 499 Ibid., 4. 500 Ibid., 5-6. 501 Ibid.; Rust, 123; Reeves, 572; Gilpatric oral history, 31. 502 Harriman, oral history interview by Schlesinger, 6 June 1965, transcript no. 3, p. 104-05; Oral History Program, JFKL. 503 Taylor to Felt, 26 Aug. 1963, JCS 2219, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam January- August 1963, 639 n. 7. 504 Harriman, oral history interview by O’Brien, 14 Aug. 1970, transcript no. 1, p. 34, Oral History Program, JFKL. 505 Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, 28 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963 August-December 1963, 12-13; Rusk to Lodge, 28 Aug. 1963, 9:32 p.m., ibid., 15-16; Rusk to Lodge, 28 Aug. 1963, 9:33 p.m., ibid., 17; Kennedy to Lodge, 29 Aug. 1963, ibid., 35. 506 Lodge to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 21. 507 Harkins to Taylor, 29 Aug. 1963, 5:30 p.m., ibid., 23-24. 508 Lodge to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, 1:00 p.m., ibid., 18-20. 509 Smith, Memorandum of a Converstaion, 29 Aug. 1963, noon, ibid., 26-31; Rusk to Lodge, 29 Aug. 1963, 5:03 p.m., ibid.,32-33; Rusk to Lodge, 29 Aug. 1963, 8:17 p.m., ibid., 33-34;.Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, 29 Aug. 1963, noon, Roger Hilsman Personal Papers, Box 4, Folder 18, Vietnam: White House Meetings, State Memcons, 1963: 26 August-29 October, JFKL. 510 CIA to White House Situation Room, 29 Aug. 1963, NSF, Box 198A, Countries: Vietnam, General, August 1963: 24-31, CIA Cables, JFKL. 511 CIA to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, ibid. 512 CIA to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, 12:51 p.m., ibid. 513 CIA to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, 1:44 p.m., ibid. 514 Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 30 Aug. 1963, 2:30 p.m., Hilsman Papers, Box 4, Folder 18, Vietnam: White House Meetings, State Memcons, 1963: 26 August - 29 October, JFKL. 515 Rusk to Lodge, 30 Aug. 1963, 8:30 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963., 63. 516 Saigon to Rusk, 29 Aug. 1963, 4:54 a.m., NSF, Box 198A, Countries: Vietnam: General, August 1963: 24-31, CIA cables, JFKL. 517 Saigon to Rusk, 30 Aug. 1963, 1:59 p.m., ibid. 518 Saigon to Rusk, 30 Aug. 1963, 2:13 p.m., ibid. 519 CIA to Rusk, 31 Aug. 1963, 4:47 a.m., ibid. 520 Harkins to Taylor, 31 Aug. 1963, 1:45 p.m., ibid., 64-66. 521 Lodge, “Vietnam Memoir,” pt. II, ch. II, p. 4, P-373, Reel 26, Part VII: Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. II, MHS. 522 Lodge to Rusk, 30 Aug. 1934, 6:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963., 38-39.

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523 Lodge to Rusk, 31 Aug. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 67. 524 Hilsman to Bundy, 31 Aug. 1963, ibid., 75-76. 525 CIA to Rusk, 2 Sept. 1963, ibid., 86-88 526 CIA to Rusk, 2 Sept. 1963, ibid., 90-92. 527 CIA to Rusk, 4 Sept., 1963, 11:59 a.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam: General, September 1963: 1-10: CIA Cables and TDCS, JFKL. 528 Lodge to Rusk, 2 Sept. 1963, 10:00 p.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 84-85. 529 Bundy to Lodge, 2 Sept. 1963, ibid., 95-97. 530 Smith, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 3 Sept. 1963, noon, ibid., 100-103; Rusk to Lodge, 3 Sept. 1963, 9:35, ibid., 104-106; Rusk to Lodge, 3 Sept., 9:36 p.m., ibid., 106. 531 Lodge to Rusk, 4 Sept. 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 107-08. 532 Lodge to Rusk, 2 Sept. 1963, 5:00 p.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part I, JFKL; Bowles to Lodge, 4 Sept. 1963, 10:00 p.m., ibid.; Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 6:41 a.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part II, JFKL; CIA Info. Rpt., “Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Claim that the American CIA Planned a Coup D’etat and that Ambassador Lodge is Planning to Have Her Removed from South Vietnam,” 5 Sept. 1963, TDCSDB-3/656, 445, NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: CIA Cables and TDCS, JFKL; CIA to Rusk, 6 Sept. 1963, ibid. 533 Lodge to Rusk, 5 Sept. 1963, 3 p.m., ibid., 109-10. 534 Rusk to Lodge, 5 Sept. 1963, 8:42 p.m., ibid., 113. 535 Rusk to Lodge, 5 Sept. 1963, 9:10 p.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part I, JFKL. 536 Rusk to all posts, 6 Sept. 1963, 1:10 p.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part II, JFKL; Hilsman to Rusk, 6 Sept. 1963, 1:54 p.m., ibid; Harriman and Hilsman to Rusk, 7 Sept. 1963, 6:40 p.m., ibid. 537 Smith, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, 6 Sept. 1963, 10:30 a.m., FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 117. 538 Ibid., 117-20. 539 CIA Saigon to CIA, 2 Sept. 1963, ibid., 89-90. 540 Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 6:41 a.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part II, JFKL; Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 7:00 p.m., ibid; CIA Saigon to CIA, 30 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 42; CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., “Coup Plans and Hesitations of Generals,” 7 Sept. 1963, NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: CIA Cables and TDCS, JFKL. 541 Rusk to Lodge, 9 Sept. 1963, 8:00 p.m., NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part II, ibid. 542 Smith, Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, White House, 6 Sept. 1963, 10:30 a.m., FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 117-121; Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, 6 Sept. 1963, 10:30 a.m., Hilsman papers, Box 4, Folder 18, JFKL. 543 Smith, Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, White House, 6 Sept. 1963, 10:30 a.m., FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 120. 544 Lodge to Rusk, 7 Sept. 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid. 131-32. 545 Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 144-45. 546 Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 11:00 p.m., ibid., 140-43. 547 Lodge to Rusk, 9 Sept. 1963, 8:00 p.m., ibid., 144-45. 548 Lodge to Rusk, 10 Sept. 1963, NSF, Box 199, Countries: Vietnam, General, September 1963: 1-10: State Cables: Part II. 549 Hilsman, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 10 Sept. 1963, 10:30 a.m., FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963., 161-62. 550 Ibid., 162. 551 Ibid., 162-66. 552 Smith, Memorandum of a Conversation, 10 Sept. 1963, 5:45 p.m., ibid., 170. 553 Ibid., 164; Smith, Memorandum of a Conversation, 11 Sept. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 185-90. 554 Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid., 172-74. 555 Rusk to Lodge, 12 Sept. 1963, ibid., 195-96; Lodge to Rusk, 13 Sept. 1963, ibid., 203. 556 Lodge to Rusk, 13 Sept. 1963, ibid., 205.

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557 Lodge to Rusk, 16 Sept. 1963, 5 p.m., 215-16. 558 Forrestal to Bundy, 16 Sept. 1963, ibid., 235. 559 Hilsman to Rusk, 16 Sept. 1963, attachment no. 1, ibid., 221-225. 560 Hilsman to Rusk, 16 Sept. 1963, attachment no. 2, ibid., 227; Draft letter from Kennedy to Diem, 16 Sept. 1963, ibid., 231-34. 561 Ibid., 228-30. 562 CIA Saigon to CIA, 17 Sept. 1963, ibid., 239-40. 563 Mendenhall to Hilsman, 17 Sept. 1963, ibid., 243-49. 564 Lodge to Rusk 11 Sept. 1963, 1:00 p.m., NSF, Box 199A, Vietnam: General, September 1963: 11-17: State Cables, JFKL; 565 Ibid., section two. 566 Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 3:00 p.m., no. 472, ibid; Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 3:00 p.m., no. 471, ibid; Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 3:00 p.m., no. 474, ibid. 567 Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 4:00 p.m., no. 475, ibid. 568 Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 4:00 p.m., no. 476, ibid. 569 Lodge to Rusk, 11 Sept. 1963, 2:00 p.m., no. 478, sec. two, ibid. 570 CIA, CIA Info. Rpt., 17 Sept. 1963, “Deterioration in the Morale of the People of Hue as a Result of the Government Repression of the Buddhists,” NSF, Box 199A, Countries: Vietnam, General: September 1963: 11-17: CIA Reports, JFKL; CIA to Bundy, 11 Sept. 4:00 p.m. NSF, Box 199A, Vietnam: General, September 1963: 11-17: State Cables, JFKL; CIA to Bundy, 11 Sept. 5:00 p.m., ibid. 571 Lodge to Rusk, 14 Sept. 1963, 2:00 p.m., ibid.;CIA to Bundy, 18 Sept. 1963, 5:00 p.m., NSF, Box 199A, Countries: Vietnam, General: September 1963: 18-21: State Cables, JFKL. 572 Hilsman to Rusk, 19 Sept. 1963, encl., Kattenburg, “Country Team Assessment —Viet-Nam Situation,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam August-December 1963, 269-71. 573 Kennedy to Lodge, 17 Sept. 1963, 9:28 p.m., 254. 574 Lodge to Kennedy, 19 Sept. 1963, 4:00 p.m., ibid., 260-62. 575 Lodge to Rusk, 19 Sept. 1963, 4:00 p.m., no. 545, ibid., 262-64. 576 Hilsman to Lodge, 23 Sept. 1963, ibid., 282-83. 577 CIA Saigon to CIA, 26 Sept. 1963, ibid., 291-92. 578 Frederick Flott, Memorandum of a Conversation, Gia Long Palace, Saigon, 29 Sept. 1963, 2:30-5:30 p.m., ibid. 317-21. 579 Memorandum of a Conversation by McNamara, 30 Sept. 1963, ibid., 322-23. 580 McNamara and Taylor to Kennedy, 2 Oct. 1953, “Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam,” ibid., 336-39. 581 Ibid., 339-46. 582 628 n. 1; Krulak Memorandum for the record, 2 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January- August 1963, \ 630-631; Jones, 314-19 583 CIA Saigon to CIA, 3 Oct. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. IV: Vietnam, August-December 1963, 354-55. 584 Lucien Conein, testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 20 June 1975, p. 24-25, NARA Record No. 57-10014-10094, https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1460. 585 Jones, 388; Don, 97-98. 586 United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rpt. No. 94-465, 94th Cong, 1st sess., 20 Nov. 1975, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 220-21. 587 Bundy to Lodge, 5 Oct. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 379. 588 USVR, pt. IV.B.5, xxii. 589 Conein testimony, pp. 24-27. 590 Rusk to Lodge, 9 Oct. 1963, ibid., 393. 591 Gibbons, 125, USVR, pt. IV.B.5, 43; Don, 97. 592 Conein testimony, 34-36. 593 Ibid., 34-38. 594 Alleged Assassination Plots, 222. 595 Lodge to Rusk 19 Oct. 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. III: Vietnam, January-August 1963, 413. 596 Raymond Jones to Rusk, 22 Oct. 1963, ibid., 419-20. 597 Editorial Note, ibid., 427-28; Don, 98; USVR, pt IV.B.5.

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598 CIA to Forrestal, 23 Oct. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, October 1963: 15-28: CIA Reports, JFKL. 599 CIA Saigon to CIA, 25 Oct. 1963, ibid. 600 Lodge to Rusk, 28 Oct. 1963, 6 p.m., ibid., 442. 601 Ibid., 444. 602 Ibid. 445. 603 Lodge to Rusk, 28 Oct. 1963, 6:57 p.m. ibid., 449; USVR, pt. IV.B.5, 45-46; Lodge to Rusk, 28 Sept. 1963, 12:27, 23 Oct. 1963, NSF, Countries: Vietnam, General, October 1963: 15-28: CIA Reports, JFKL; Don, 98. 604 Don, 98; Alleged Assassination Plots, 222. 605 Lodge to Rusk, 29 Oct. 1963, 6:40 p.m., ibid., 453 606 Lodge to Rusk, 29 Oct. 1963, 6:30 p.m., ibid., 457-59. 607 Paper prepared by Hilsman, 29 Oct. 1963, ibid., 459-60. 608 Attachments 1 and 2, Papers prepared by Mendenhall, ibid, 460-62; Kattenburg to Rice, 29 Oct. 1963, ibid., 462- 63. 609 Briefing paper prepared by Rusk, Harriman, Johnson, and Mendenhall, 10 Oct. 1963, ibid., 463-65. 610 Smith, Memorandum of a Conference with the Preident, White House, 29 Oct. 1963, 4:20 p.m., ibid., 468-69. 611 Ibid., 469-70 612 Ibid., 470-71. 613 Ibid., 470. 614 Smith, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, 29 Oct. 1963, 6:00 p.m., ibid., 472-73. 615 Bundy to Lodge, 29 Oct. 1963, 7:22 p.m., ibid., 473-75. 616 Jones, 398-99. 617 Ibid., 399-400; Don, 102. 618 Lodge to Rusk, 30 Oct. 1963, 6:30 p.m., ibid., 484-88. 619 Bundy to Lodge, 30 Oct. 1963, 5:49 p.m., ibid., 500. 620 Ibid., 504. 621 Lodge to Rusk, 1 Nov. 1963, 3 p.m., ibid., 506-07; CIA Saigon to CIA, 1 Nov. 1963, ibid., 507-10. 622 Lodge to Rusk, 1 Nov. 1963, 4 p.m., ibid., 510; CIA Saigon to CIA, 1 Nov. 1963, ibid., 511; CIA Saigon to Gordon Blake, Dir. NSA, 1 Nov 1963, 5 p.m.; 623 Lodge to Rusk, 1 Nov. 1963, 3 p.m. ibid., 514-17. 624 W.Y. Smith, Memorandum for the Record of Discussion, 1 Nov. 1963, ibid., 518 625 Smith, Memorandum for the Record, White House Staff Meeting, Washington, 1 Nov. 1963, 8 a.m.; Rusk to Lodge, 1 Nov. 1963, ibid., 519-20; Rusk to Lodge, 1 Nov. 1963, 12:04 p.m., ibid., 521; Rusk to Lodge, 1 Nov. 1963, 8:47 p.m. 626 Rusk to Lodge, 2 Nov. 1963, 8 p.m., ibid., 527; Lodge to Rusk, 2 Nov. 1963, ibid., Editorial Note, ibid., 533. 627 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 151-52.

261

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Lucian E. Conein. Testimony to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 20 June 1975. NARA Record No. 57-10014- 10094. Internet resource. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1460.

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Memoirs

Colby, William E and Peter Forbath. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.

Don, Tran Van. Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam. San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978.

———. and James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989.

George W. Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982.

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics and Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967.

Nolting, Jr. Frederick E. From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1988.

O’Donnell, Kenneth P. and David F. Powers. Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. New York: Pocket Books, 1973.

Reeves, Richard. President Kennedy: Profile of Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.

———. President Kennedy and His Times. Volume II. Boston: Mariner Books, 1978.

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972.

Oral Histories

Ball, George W. Interview by Robert R.R. Brooks. 2 Feb. 1965. Interview No. 1. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Forrestal, Michael. Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan. 3 Nov. 1969. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum. https://discoverlbj.org/item/oh-forrestalm-19691103-1-79-47.

4 ———. Michael V. Forrestal. Interview by Joseph Kraft. 8 Apr. 1964. Interview No. 1. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Gilpatric, Roswell. Interview by Dennis J. O’Brien. 5 May 1970. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Harkins, Paul D. Interview by Ted Gittinger. 10 Nov. 1981. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum. Library of Congress Online. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004har05/2004har05.pdf, p. 17.

Hilsman, Jr., Roger. Interview by O’Brien, 14 Aug. 1970. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Johnson, Robert H. Interview by William W. Moss. 29 Aug. 1974. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

Lodge, Jr., Henry Cabot. Interview by Charles Bartlett. 4 Aug. 1965. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Nolting, Jr., Frederick E. Jr. Interview by Joseph E. O’Connor, 14 May 1966. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Lansdale, Edward G. Interview by Ted Gittinger. 5 June 1981. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum. http://web2.millercenter.org/lbj/oralhistory/lansdale_edward_1981_0605.pdf.

———. Interview by Dennis J. O’Brien, 11 July 1970. Oral History Program. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Trueheart, William C. Interview by Ted Gittinger. 2 March 1982. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum. https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Trueheart,%20William.toc.pdf.

Secondary Sources

David L. Anderson. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration in Vietnam, 1953- 1961. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987.

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Johnson, Ural Alexis and Jef Olivarius McAllister. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984.

Jones, Howard K. Death of Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University press, 2003.

Krepinevich, Anderw. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1992.

Rust, William J. Kennedy in Vietnam. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985.

Winters, Francis X. The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam January 25, 1963-Feburary 15, 1964. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999.

World History Project Online. “President Kennedy Issues NSAM 263, Ordering the Withdrawal of 1,000 Military Personnel from Vietnam by the End of 1963.” Accessed 2 May 2018. https://worldhistoryproject.org/1963/10/11/president-kennedy-issues-nsam-263-ordering- the-withdrawl-of-1-000-military-personnel-from-vietnam-by-the-end-of-1963.

Newspaper Articles

Weiner, Tim. “Lucien Conein, 79, Legendary Cold War Spy.” The New York Times. 7 June 1998. Accessed 1 May 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/07/world/lucien-conein- 79-legendary-cold-war-spy.html.

Nicklin, Walter. “Leaving College, Going to War.” The New York Times. 5 May 2017. Accessed 29 Apr. 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/opinion/leaving-college-going-to- war.html.

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