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Vietnam January-August 1963 VIETNAM I. REASSESSMENT, JANUARY l-MARCH 14: HILSMAN-FORRESTAL REPORT, WHEELER MISSION, MANSFIELD REPORT, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, THOMPSON REPORT ’ 1. Editorial Note On January 2, 1963, regular army and civil guard forces of the Republic of Vietnam engaged a Viet Cong battalion at the village of Ap Bat in Dinh Tuong province, 35 miles southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. The South Vietnamese forces enjoyed a 4-l numerical advantage in the battle, and, unlike the Viet Cong, were supported by artillery, armor, and helicopters. Despite the disparity of numbers and weapons, the Viet Cong battalion inflicted heavy casualties on the government forces and escaped with minor losses. Three American advisers were killed in the fighting and five helicopters were shot down. The United States Army Command in the Pacific reported the battle to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as “one of the bloodiest and costliest battles of S. Vietnam war” and noted that the battle “will provide enemy with morale-building victory”. (Summary telegram 677 from ARPAC to JCS, January 4; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, l/63) Lieutenant Colonel John l? Vann, se- nior United States adviser to the Seventh Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, filed an after-action report on the Ap Bat opera- tion which concluded that the operation was a failure. Vann attributed the failure to the poor state of training of the South Vietnamese units, a system of command which never placed a Vietnamese officer above the rank of captain on the battlefield, a reluctance to incur casualties, an inability to take effective advantage of air superiority, and a lack of discipline in battle. (After-Action Report by Senior Adviser 7th Infan- try Division, January 9; JCS Files) Information obtained from a cap- tured Viet Cong assessment of the battle indicated that the Viet Cong attributed their success at Ap Bat to preparation, motivation, and ’ For previous documentation on U.S. relations with Vietnam, see volumes I and II. 2 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III discipline in the execution of small-unit tactics. (SACSA Briefing, April 24; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, ORG-3 WG/VN Mtgs with Other Agencies) The battle of Ap Bat was reported in the press in the United States as “a major defeat” in which “communist guerrillas shot up a fleet of United States helicopters carrying Vietnamese troops into battle”. (The Washington Post, January 3, 1963; The New York Times, January 4, 1963) On January 7, The Washington Post printed a front-page assess- ment of the battle by Neil Sheehan in which he wrote that “angry United States military advisers charged today that Vietnamese infan- trymen refused direct orders to advance during Wednesday’s battle at Ap Bat and that an American Army captain was killed while out front pleading with them to attack.” An assessment done in the Department of State on January 15 of press reaction across the country to the battle of Ap Bat noted that “since Ap Bat the complaint has been increas- ingly heard that the American public is not ‘getting the facts’ on the situation in Viet-nam, even at this time when American casualties are mounting.” (“Alert” on Viet-Nam: Current American Concern and Misunderstanding; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Files of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, U.S. Policy on S. Vietnam, April-Dec. 1963) The Department of State and the White House expressed concern over the reports printed in the press on the battle of Ap Bat. (Telegram 662 to Saigon, January 7; Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/1-763) On January 3, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ros- well Gilpatric forwarded to the White House a memorandum prepared for the President by the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which suggested that the press was painting the battle in misleading colors: “It appears that the initial press reports have distorted both the impor- tance of the action and the damage suffered by the US/GVN forces. Although unexpectedly stiff resistance was apparently encountered, contact has been maintained and the operation is being continued.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 1/ 63) On January 7, President Kennedy expressed concern about the Sheehan article published that day which indicated that the South Vietnamese troops involved in the battle lacked courage. (Telegram CAP 63037 from General C.V. Clifton at the White House to General Godfrey T. McHugh with the President at Palm Beach, January 7; ibid.) A copy of a report on the battle prepared on January 4 by General Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, was forwarded to President Kennedy on January 7 in re- sponse to his concern. (Attached ibid.) General Harkins noted that the South Vietnamese forces at Ap Bat had made a number of errors, but he characterized them largely as errors of courage rather than coward- ice. “It took a lot of guts”, he wrote, “on the part of those pilots and Reassessment of U.S. Policy 3 crews to go back into the area to try to rescue their pals.” “Like any engagements in war”, Harkins concluded, “there are days-and there are days. This day they got a bear by the tail and they didn’t let go of it. At least they got most of it.” Harkins’ assessment closely paralleled that of Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, who sought to put the battle into perspective in telegram 1009102 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 10. Felt noted that it was “important to realize that bad news about American casualties filed immediately by young reporters representing the wire services without careful check- ing of the facts.” He conceded that the South Vietnamese forces had made mistakes at Ap Bat based upon faulty intelligence and inexperi- ence, but he added “along with the bad news of damage to helicopters and three Americans lost, there is good news which you may not read about in The Washington Post.” He pointed to a number of other military operations being undertaken successfully by South Vietnamese forces, and concluded: “It also hurts here when irresponsi- ble newsmen spread the word to American public that GVN forces won’t fight and, on the other hand, do not adequately report GVN victories which are occurring more frequently.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-182-67) On January 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler to lead a team of officers to Vietnam to investigate conflicting reports on military problems and report on fu- ture prospects for the war. For text of the Wheeler report, submitted to the Joint Chiefs at the end of January, see Document 26. 2. Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)’ Saigon, January 2,1963. At this point some thirty-six hours after having arrived in Saigon, I have the impression that things are going much much better than they were a year ago, but that they are not going nearly so well as the ’ Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Country Series-Vietnam. Confiden- tial. Hilsman and Forrestal visited Vietnam from December 31, 1962, to January 9, 1963, during a fact-finding trip which began on December 28 with a stop in Honolulu for consultations with Admiral Felt, and concluded with stops in Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia before returning to Washington on January 15. According to Hilsman, the trip was undertaken at President Kennedy’s request “to see if there was anything more that might be done” to improve the situation in Vietnam. (Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 453) This memorandum is excerpted in Hilsman’s memoirs. (Rid., pp. 453-454) It is one Continued 4 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III people here in Saigon both military and civilian think they are. They have a concept in the strategic hamlet program. * They have aid and they have lots of people and this inevitably gives a sense of movement and progress. The trouble is, however, that the progress and the move- ment is highly uneven. One would wish that this is the fault of the Vietnamese, and it is to a considerable extent. But I am afraid that a great share of the responsibility belongs with the Americans. We have the impression that any one of these programs such as the strategic hamlet program or really any of the others requires precise and effi- cient coordination of the different activities of many different Ameri- can agencies. And you also have the impression that this coordination is not really being accomplished. One example is the failure to provide a police program that even remotely is phased in with the provision of wire for the strategic hamlets and radios for the strategic hamlets. Thus you have strategic hamlets going up enclosing Communists inside their boundaries with no provisions for wrinkling [winkling?] out those Communists. Other things are similar. You have also the impression that the military is still too heavily oriented towards sweep-type oper- ations. There is still the same emphasis on air power as there was before. Almost every operation so far as I can tell still begins with an air strike which inevitably kills innocent people and warns the Viet Cong that they should get moving for the troops will be coming soon. I think it justifies [signifies?] that the Americans are as much to blame for this as the Vietnamese. That MACV has requested an augmenta- tion of the Farmgate group.
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