II. PERIOD OF INTERLUDE, SEPTEMBER 7-OCTOBER 22: ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR, US. EFFORTS TO REFORM THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, THE MCNAMARA-TXYLOR MISSION TO VIETNAM AND REPORT, US. POLICY ON COUP PLOTTING IN VIETNAM 73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam’ Washington, September 7, 1963-12:43 p.m. 353. For Lodge and Country Team. Deptel 349.’ Herewith set of questions to which answers desired here soonest. Request all assets mission participate as required with Krulak and Mendenhall in provid- ing coordinated answers, reflecting your concerted judgment. General Krulak is carrying list of questions prepared by Defense, bearing generally on attitudes in Viet-Nam armed forces toward re- gime and progress of war as result present crisis. In providing answers to questions below you should be guided by fact our main concern here is determine extent to which current political crisis has already eroded, or is likely erode, will and determination of upper, middle and lower echelon Vietnamese bureaucracy and military to wage success- ful fight against Viet Cong. A. Following is list of groups whose attitudes we seek determine. Endeavor so far as possible distinguish target groups and give relevant answers for each: 1. Top Echelons GVN Govt. 2. Civilian Bureaucracy Saigon. 3. Province and District Bureaucracy. 4. Top level GVN military. 5. Division commanders; officers and noncoms in troop and com- bat units. 6. Police and Security officials. 7. Urban professionals, intellectuals, students. 8. Labor. 9. Organized religious groups including Buddhists. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kattenburg, cleared with Sarris in draft, and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Document 71. 133 134 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV B. Following are broad categories of questions which represent optimum. Realize however that in time available impossible cover all questions for each target group. These should therefore be considered guidelines. 1. Attitudes toward top GVN leadership: a) To what extent has confidence in Diem and Nhu been impaired by recent events? b) How is Diem regarded? Has he escaped most of oppro- brium for recent actions? How is Nhu regarded? Is he acceptable as dominant force? Are Diem and Nhu regarded predominantly as separate or as Siamese twins? c) What are attitudes toward Vice President? Key cabinet ministers? Other top leaders? d) To what extent are GVN handling of Buddhist crisis and present policies martial law and suppression regarded as exces- sively oppressive? e) Has discontent crystallized into disaffection? If so, how determined and militant is disaffection? At what levels in bureau- cracy and military is disaffection most serious and explosive? How serious is impact on efficiency and morale? f) Does each target group have feeling of stake and participa- tion in govt policies and programs? g) Do target groups believe situation will now stabilize under Diem-Nhu leadership or that significant political challenge by opposition to regime will occur? h) What if any alternative political leadership is mentioned by groups? 2. Attitudes toward top military leadership. How are generals regarded now? Are their actions viewed as having supported regime, and how is their failure move against regime appraised? Are generals viewed as strong, weak, or irrele- vant factor in political situation? 3. Attitudes toward VC and war: a) To what extent have developments last few weeks signifi- cantly affected war effort against VC? b) Is feeling now that war can be continued with reasonable prospect of success? Will Diem and Nhu be able to regain momen- tum and progress in the war? c) How has govt handling of Buddhist crisis affected attitudes toward VC? Is VC now increasingly regarded as only opposition to regime which has chance of success? d) Is there more thinking now than before about rapproche- ment with Hanoi? Period of Interlude 135 4. Attitudes toward external forces: a) What are current attitudes in target groups toward US, US policies and US advisors? b) Toward France and General de Gaulle’s viewpoint? Rusk 74. Telegram From the White House to the President, at Squaw Island, Massachussets’ Washington, September 7, 1963-I&43 p.m. CAP 63496. Cable to Lodge follows; per Hilsman, Rusk requests you clear this with the President for release. To Saigon, eyes only for Lodge: Review of Deptels raises possibility we have not been sufficiently precise in telling you our thoughts about the possible removal of brother Nhu. From the viewpoint of Vietnamese solidarity and world and do- mestic US opinion, it is important that Nhu not have a key role. What we are not yet clear about is whether the step of insisting that he depart the country for an extended period would be necessary to restore the Vietnamese peoples’ confidence in their government so as to permit a victory in the war. It is on this point that we hope the reassessment you are now engaged in will shed some light. End of message. ’ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Sent from the White House Situation Room to the President for delivery on the morning of September 8. The President did not clear the cable to Lodge; a note on the source text reads, “not sent to Saigon.” 136 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State’ Saigon, September 9,1963-S p.m. 450. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Deptel 354.’ Embassy believes would be preferable omit Tri Quang from discussion on re- lease of bonzes. His strong belief in importance of removing Ngo family (with possible exception Diem) from power render him enemy of regime, which will most probably feel action against him (at least long term detention) necessary for own security. Up to present GVN has not released other top level Buddhist leaders, and Quang may well be regarded by Ngo family as most dangerous of all. As reftel suggests, believe best course under current conditions would be for Quang to leave country. He himself has requested this (Embtel 399).3 As to feasibility, GVN may well believe that oppositionists out of country do not pose significant threat, although in case of Quang, his probable ability to aid in mobilization of international Buddhist opinion against GVN would be factor working against their willingness see him leave. As to Quang’s leadership potential, Embassy believes this to be considerable. At time of May 8 incident in Hue, Quang demonstrated his complete mastery of crowds on several occasions. In addition to this ability to speak effectively to the public he has impressed Embassy officers by the acuteness of his intelligence and his political awareness. He is in addition self-assured to point of conceit. While in Embassy he has made systematic effort to build himself in our eyes as well as to attempt persuade us to pursue policy conducive to his ends. While his goal has been replacement of key members of Ngo family he has maintained to date that he had not considered in detail how Buddhist tactics (popular agitation) would lead to result desired or whether forces Buddhists setting in motion might not result in overall change for worse. In response to questioning he has limited himself to general statement that in his view VC could not gain control of situation in ’ Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Immediate. Received at 5:54 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House. 2 In telegram 354 to Saigon, September 5, the Department of State informed the Embassy that it should not respond in writing to the Government of Vietnam’s request for release of the three Buddhist monks who had received sanctuary in the Embassy. If asked by Diem about release, Lodge should respond that before the United States would consider releasing them it had to be satisfied that South Vietnam was taking positive steps to assure religious tolerance and redress specific Buddhist grievances. The Depart- ment also asked if it would not be preferable in the Embassy’s view to exclude Tri Quang from the discussions and to arrange for him to leave South Vietnam. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 399, September 2, contained the text of a letter from Tri Quang to Lodge, dated September 1. (Ibid.) Period of Interlude 137 event of a change and that removal members Ngo family could only be considered change for better. (We are continuing to probe further on this subject.) Although he has disclaimed idea of himself assuming political leadership, believe it be quite possible that he has in fact entertained idea, but that he has given little or no systematic thought to problems which would be entailed. In short, as oppositionist, Quang possesses very considerable leadership powers; as potential member of govern- ment, he has given no basis for an evaluation of his ability, although his basic intelligence, courage, force of personality and political aware- ness would argue that his leadership potential could be utilized in fields other than religion. Should of course be borne in mind that both Quang’s physical presence in Embassy and his awareness of US importance as factor in situation lead him to concentrate his efforts on attempt to influence our policy. Therefore possible that many of his statements to us (e.g., anti-Communism, anti-neutralism) may reflect his tactical judgments rather than deeply held convictions. 4 Lodge ’ The Department agreed that Tri Quang should be left out of discussions with the Government of Vietnam and conceded that getting him out of the country would be best.