DOCSLIB.ORG

Vietnam August-December 1963

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Vietnam August-December 1963 II. PERIOD OF INTERLUDE, SEPTEMBER 7-OCTOBER 22: ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR, US. EFFORTS TO REFORM THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, THE MCNAMARA-TXYLOR MISSION TO VIETNAM AND REPORT, US. POLICY ON COUP PLOTTING IN VIETNAM 73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam’ Washington, September 7, 1963-12:43 p.m. 353. For Lodge and Country Team. Deptel 349.’ Herewith set of questions to which answers desired here soonest. Request all assets mission participate as required with Krulak and Mendenhall in provid- ing coordinated answers, reflecting your concerted judgment. General Krulak is carrying list of questions prepared by Defense, bearing generally on attitudes in Viet-Nam armed forces toward re- gime and progress of war as result present crisis. In providing answers to questions below you should be guided by fact our main concern here is determine extent to which current political crisis has already eroded, or is likely erode, will and determination of upper, middle and lower echelon Vietnamese bureaucracy and military to wage success- ful fight against Viet Cong. A. Following is list of groups whose attitudes we seek determine. Endeavor so far as possible distinguish target groups and give relevant answers for each: 1. Top Echelons GVN Govt. 2. Civilian Bureaucracy Saigon. 3. Province and District Bureaucracy. 4. Top level GVN military. 5. Division commanders; officers and noncoms in troop and com- bat units. 6. Police and Security officials. 7. Urban professionals, intellectuals, students. 8. Labor. 9. Organized religious groups including Buddhists. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kattenburg, cleared with Sarris in draft, and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Document 71. 133 134 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV B. Following are broad categories of questions which represent optimum. Realize however that in time available impossible cover all questions for each target group. These should therefore be considered guidelines. 1. Attitudes toward top GVN leadership: a) To what extent has confidence in Diem and Nhu been impaired by recent events? b) How is Diem regarded? Has he escaped most of oppro- brium for recent actions? How is Nhu regarded? Is he acceptable as dominant force? Are Diem and Nhu regarded predominantly as separate or as Siamese twins? c) What are attitudes toward Vice President? Key cabinet ministers? Other top leaders? d) To what extent are GVN handling of Buddhist crisis and present policies martial law and suppression regarded as exces- sively oppressive? e) Has discontent crystallized into disaffection? If so, how determined and militant is disaffection? At what levels in bureau- cracy and military is disaffection most serious and explosive? How serious is impact on efficiency and morale? f) Does each target group have feeling of stake and participa- tion in govt policies and programs? g) Do target groups believe situation will now stabilize under Diem-Nhu leadership or that significant political challenge by opposition to regime will occur? h) What if any alternative political leadership is mentioned by groups? 2. Attitudes toward top military leadership. How are generals regarded now? Are their actions viewed as having supported regime, and how is their failure move against regime appraised? Are generals viewed as strong, weak, or irrele- vant factor in political situation? 3. Attitudes toward VC and war: a) To what extent have developments last few weeks signifi- cantly affected war effort against VC? b) Is feeling now that war can be continued with reasonable prospect of success? Will Diem and Nhu be able to regain momen- tum and progress in the war? c) How has govt handling of Buddhist crisis affected attitudes toward VC? Is VC now increasingly regarded as only opposition to regime which has chance of success? d) Is there more thinking now than before about rapproche- ment with Hanoi? Period of Interlude 135 4. Attitudes toward external forces: a) What are current attitudes in target groups toward US, US policies and US advisors? b) Toward France and General de Gaulle’s viewpoint? Rusk 74. Telegram From the White House to the President, at Squaw Island, Massachussets’ Washington, September 7, 1963-I&43 p.m. CAP 63496. Cable to Lodge follows; per Hilsman, Rusk requests you clear this with the President for release. To Saigon, eyes only for Lodge: Review of Deptels raises possibility we have not been sufficiently precise in telling you our thoughts about the possible removal of brother Nhu. From the viewpoint of Vietnamese solidarity and world and do- mestic US opinion, it is important that Nhu not have a key role. What we are not yet clear about is whether the step of insisting that he depart the country for an extended period would be necessary to restore the Vietnamese peoples’ confidence in their government so as to permit a victory in the war. It is on this point that we hope the reassessment you are now engaged in will shed some light. End of message. ’ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Sent from the White House Situation Room to the President for delivery on the morning of September 8. The President did not clear the cable to Lodge; a note on the source text reads, “not sent to Saigon.” 136 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State’ Saigon, September 9,1963-S p.m. 450. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Deptel 354.’ Embassy believes would be preferable omit Tri Quang from discussion on re- lease of bonzes. His strong belief in importance of removing Ngo family (with possible exception Diem) from power render him enemy of regime, which will most probably feel action against him (at least long term detention) necessary for own security. Up to present GVN has not released other top level Buddhist leaders, and Quang may well be regarded by Ngo family as most dangerous of all. As reftel suggests, believe best course under current conditions would be for Quang to leave country. He himself has requested this (Embtel 399).3 As to feasibility, GVN may well believe that oppositionists out of country do not pose significant threat, although in case of Quang, his probable ability to aid in mobilization of international Buddhist opinion against GVN would be factor working against their willingness see him leave. As to Quang’s leadership potential, Embassy believes this to be considerable. At time of May 8 incident in Hue, Quang demonstrated his complete mastery of crowds on several occasions. In addition to this ability to speak effectively to the public he has impressed Embassy officers by the acuteness of his intelligence and his political awareness. He is in addition self-assured to point of conceit. While in Embassy he has made systematic effort to build himself in our eyes as well as to attempt persuade us to pursue policy conducive to his ends. While his goal has been replacement of key members of Ngo family he has maintained to date that he had not considered in detail how Buddhist tactics (popular agitation) would lead to result desired or whether forces Buddhists setting in motion might not result in overall change for worse. In response to questioning he has limited himself to general statement that in his view VC could not gain control of situation in ’ Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Immediate. Received at 5:54 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House. 2 In telegram 354 to Saigon, September 5, the Department of State informed the Embassy that it should not respond in writing to the Government of Vietnam’s request for release of the three Buddhist monks who had received sanctuary in the Embassy. If asked by Diem about release, Lodge should respond that before the United States would consider releasing them it had to be satisfied that South Vietnam was taking positive steps to assure religious tolerance and redress specific Buddhist grievances. The Depart- ment also asked if it would not be preferable in the Embassy’s view to exclude Tri Quang from the discussions and to arrange for him to leave South Vietnam. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 399, September 2, contained the text of a letter from Tri Quang to Lodge, dated September 1. (Ibid.) Period of Interlude 137 event of a change and that removal members Ngo family could only be considered change for better. (We are continuing to probe further on this subject.) Although he has disclaimed idea of himself assuming political leadership, believe it be quite possible that he has in fact entertained idea, but that he has given little or no systematic thought to problems which would be entailed. In short, as oppositionist, Quang possesses very considerable leadership powers; as potential member of govern- ment, he has given no basis for an evaluation of his ability, although his basic intelligence, courage, force of personality and political aware- ness would argue that his leadership potential could be utilized in fields other than religion. Should of course be borne in mind that both Quang’s physical presence in Embassy and his awareness of US importance as factor in situation lead him to concentrate his efforts on attempt to influence our policy. Therefore possible that many of his statements to us (e.g., anti-Communism, anti-neutralism) may reflect his tactical judgments rather than deeply held convictions. 4 Lodge ’ The Department agreed that Tri Quang should be left out of discussions with the Government of Vietnam and conceded that getting him out of the country would be best.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Murder in the Family
    A Murder in the Family Behind the tragic death of a prominent Viet couple BY SAUNDRA SAPERSTEIN AND ELSA WALSH Washington You are my baby," Nam Tran Tran Van Chuong told her then-60-year-old son one evening in tbe summer of 1986, kissing his hand at the dinner table. It seemed a portrait of tranquility, after years of upheaval, for this prominent Vietnamese family. Here in Washington, the parents -- a former ambassador and his wife -- appeared reconciled with their long-wandering son. In a Roman villa, their youngest daughter, the famous, Madame Nhu (Tran Le Xuan), was safely exiled, and another daughter was teaching at a small North Carolina college. One week later, on July 24, the mother and her husband, Tran Van Chuong, lay dead, crumpled one atop the other in their bedroom. Their only son, Tran Van Khiem, was arrested and accused of their murders. The charge of patricide and matricide, a charge that Khiem vehemently denies, shocked the Vietnamese and diplomatic communities. "The end did not match the beginning," said Khiem's sister Lechi Oggeri. "For such beautiful lives, it should have been a beautiful end. The more you tell about the glories of the past, the more horrible the end becomes," In passionate public letters and a six-hour telephone interview from St. Elizabeth's Hospital here, where he is being examined by psychiatrists, Khiem has talked of a global conspiracy that has come to focus on him. And he has alleged a conspiracy of a more intimate nature as well. Khiem said his sister Oggeri and her sons-in-law have conspired to paint him as a murderer to gain control of his parents' $650,000 estate.
    [Show full text]
  • Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project THEODORE J. C. HEAVNER Interviewed By: Char
    Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project THEODORE J. C. HEAVNER Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: May 28, 1997 Copyright 2 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born and raised in Canton, O io Nort western University and (Case) Western Reserve University of Iowa Harvard University U.S. Army - ,orean War Entered Foreign Service - .900 UNESCO .900-.901 Duties State Department - Foreign Service Institute - .902 3ietnamese 4anguage Training Cornell University - Sout east Asia Program .902-.908 Nort versus Sout 3ietnam Saigon, 3ietnam - Political Officer .908-.909 Diem and private armies Relations wit government officials Cinnamon production Ambassador Durbrow 3iet Cong t reat Consular district Duties Ngo Din Can Reporting Cat olic C urc role Diplomatic colleagues Environment 7ontagnards Pleiku 3ietnamese military 1 Tran 3an Don Saigon, 3ietnam - Political Officer .910-.91. 4yndon B. 9o nson visit Ambassador Ale:is 9o nson and Diem ,ennedy;s 3ietnam policy State Department - 3ietnam Working Group .91.-.913 Averell Harriman Counterinsurgency U.S. policy re Nort 3ietnam Strategy options Ot er agency programs Diem regime 3ietnamese loyalties T ieu ,y regime President ,ennedy interest Defoliants Roger Hilsman C ina role State Department - Foreign Service Institute (FSI) .913-.914 Indonesian 4anguage Training 7edan, Indonesia - Consul and Principal Officer .914-.911 Ambassador Howard 9ones Ambassador 7ars all Green Sukarno and communists Anti-U.S. demonstrations Sumatra groups
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Situation in Vietnam, Weekly
    /~"‘“~=\ ,_. Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786609 I - \ ( ,Z"‘\ et Q s.5(¢) *\ @LLIG€ 1 '| I ‘<1 17>‘/2 '% CJ~;:}.\1TRA¢ 'r9N:~19 -_ s.5(¢) 4'1;F Eq_\‘-' DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE The Sititettion in Soitt/0 Vietnam (Weekly) §ecr€ - G s.5(¢) 12 F e b ruar% l9 68 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786609 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786609 {W (' \ SEGRZET . s.5(¢ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN CY Directorate of Intelligence THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (5 February — ll February 1968) C O N T E N .T S Section POLITICAL SITUATION I Difficulties of civilian task force; National Assembly developments; Reaction from influential nongovernment figures. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II Impact of the Communist offensive on pacification; Binh Dinh Province; Ninh Thuan Province; Quang Tri Province; Situation in Saigon; the IV Corps senior officials. ~ ECONOMIC SITUATION III Economic effects of Tet offensive. s.5(¢) \ EB?’ \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786609 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786609 ,_ <' I _sseR-ET" s.5(¢) I. POLITICAL SITUATION The task force established to cope with civilian aspects of the current n crisis is apparently beset with serious difficulties because of internal bickering - and the insistence of many members on .u tying up operations in bureaucratic red tape. There appears to be an increasing groundswell in favor of amending the constitution to allow Vice President Ky to serve concurrently as prime minister, but Ky is turning aside for the moment any consideration of consolidating his power. The National Assembly is showing a willingness to cooperate with the government in clearing up the crisis, after an initial round of severe criticism from the Upper House.
    [Show full text]
  • Phỏng Vấn Monique Brinson Demery: Bén Gót Rồng Mụ Đinh Từ Bích Thúy
    Phỏng vấn Monique Brinson Demery: Bén Gót Rồng Mụ Đinh Từ Bích Thúy Lời Giới Thiệu: Hình ảnh bà Nhu đã cuốn hút Monique Demery từ lúc cô còn bé, lần đầu cô nhìn thấy bức ảnh nổi tiếng của nhiếp ảnh gia Larry Burrow chụp Bà Nhu năm 1962 "với mái tóc đen bới cao và móng tay sơn đỏ," trong trang phục áo dài bó sát người, đang cầm khẩu súng lục. Đây cũng là hình bìa cuốn tiểu sử của Monique Demery về cựu Đệ nhất Phu nhân của miền Nam Việt Nam, tựa đề Finding the Dragon Lady: The Mystery of Vietnam’s Madame Nhu (nxb Public Affairs: 2013). Tuy lúc còn bé Demery bị sắc đẹp của bà Nhu thu hút, dần dà cô có một cảm nhận sâu xa về vấn đề mà nhiều người đàn bà thông minh và nhan sắc kết hôn với những chính khách thế lực vẫn phải đương đầu ngày hôm nay: làm thế nào để một phụ nữ không được dân bầu xử sự đúng cách, trong trường hợp bà từ chối đóng vai trang điểm – mà người Mỹ gọi là “kẹo tay” (arm candy) – bên cạnh ông chồng? Hơn năm mươi năm trước đây, bà Ngô Đình Nhu, dân biểu Quốc hội và em dâu của Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm, là một nhân vật gây nhiều tranh cãi và chia rẽ trong dư luận báo chí Mỹ. Trần Lệ Xuân, hay "mùa Xuân đẹp," đã nổi tiếng ở phương Tây qua danh từ không được trân trọng là "Dragon Lady," ám chỉ một femme fatale quyến rũ nhưng hiểm độc.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics, Protest and Revolution: the Origins and Evolution of the Urban Networks of the NLF and the Communist Party in Central Vietnam, 1930-1975
    Politics, Protest and Revolution: The Origins and Evolution of the Urban Networks of the NLF and the Communist Party in Central Vietnam, 1930-1975 Aaron Lillie A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2021 Reading Committee: Christoph Giebel, Chair Laurie Sears Raymond Jonas Program Authorized to Offer Degree: History ©Copyright 2021 Aaron Lillie University of Washington Abstract Politics, Protest and Revolution: the Origins and Evolution of the Urban Networks of the NLF and the Communist Party in Central Vietnam, 1930-1975 Aaron Lillie Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Associate Prof. Christoph Giebel, International Studies and History This project combines political history, social history and memory to convey a perspective of the war through the eyes of the people of Central Vietnam who participated in the urban movement of the Vietnamese Revolution. It is intended to address conspicuous gaps within the historical record through an examination of how and why urban networks of the Communist Party, the Việt Minh and the NLF evolved and attracted new members in Huế and Central Vietnam in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Beginning with the inception of the Communist Party in Huế in 1930, this project tracks the various affiliated underground network’s development and evolution through World War II, the French War of decolonization, the Diệm government, the Struggle Movement and the Tết Offensive, concluding in the early 1970s. It offers a view of the Vietnamese revolution and the iv Vietnam Wars (1945-1975) from the perspective of the people in Huế and Central Vietnam who joined the, the Communist Party, the NLF and the student and Struggle Movements.
    [Show full text]
  • Central Intelligence Bulletin
    Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 'wl \J ~ -1L____ ___j 3.5(c) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central IntelligenceBulletin 3.5(c) C 199 16 January 1968 Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 Approved for Re~e: 2018/07/26 C031865O4S(c) ,_~nuKnJL ~--~ •w .. 3.5(c) 16 January 1968 CentralIntelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) I NR NR 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 .;;proved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186~ ·-~ \. .. '\. NOR T H ""\ '• VIETNAM '.) ' --\ i ·< 'l._'"'l~~~ Demilitarized Zone ,t I . .'.· '-Q_· UANGFTRI '.·.- . F · Hue• \. ' \ .. ·· : 0 ·.· fHUA THIEN -,.__, l r--7 · . ··'- -~ •oeNana rJ, (~UANGNAM . : , CORPS THAILAND ·t . ·. ,.,,!; CAMB · II CORPS _,- . ./ ~ .. i .10 .r----, ·. -""V •'°'\ BI N H ', _ ..TA Y (N l NH ·. •Ta \..,~inh ·,:.. \ r·,11,; t•HlJl)UO'. IV CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM XUYEN 69311 1-68 CIA 3.5(c) ! I 16 Jan 68 Map Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186504 3.5(c) ,-.,,~RET ~ ~ ~ ,.._, *South Vietnam: More sympathy strikes appear imminent unless the government acts quickly to break the impasse. A spokesman for the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor announced on 15 January that affiliated unions had been given a go-ahead for new walkouts today and that some categories of workers had already gone on strike . There are, however, some indications that the gov­ ernment may agree to release the six labor leaders arrested on 11 January. This could pave the way for settlement of the strikes.
    [Show full text]
  • ORAL HISTORY Lieutenant General John H. Cushman US Army, Retired
    ORAL HISTORY Lieutenant General John H. Cushman US Army, Retired VOLUME FOUR TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Title Pages Preface 1 18 Cdr Fort Devens, MA 18-1 to 18-18 19 Advisor, IV Corps/Military Region 4, Vietnam 19-1 to 19A-5 20 Cdr 101st Airborne Division & Fort Campbell, KY 20-1 to 20-29 Preface I began this Oral History with an interview in January 2009 at the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Subsequent interviews have taken place at the Knollwood Military Retirement Residence in Washington, DC. The interviewer has been historian Robert Mages. Until March 2011 Mr. Mages was as- signed to the Military History Institute. He has continued the project while assigned to the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, DC. Chapter Title Pages 1 Born in China 1-1 to 1-13 2 Growing Up 2-1 to 2-15 3 Soldier 3-1 to 3-7 4 West Point Cadet 4-1 to 4-14 5 Commissioned 5-1 to 5-15 6 Sandia Base 6-1 to 6-16 7 MIT and Fort Belvoir 7-1 to 7-10 8 Infantryman 8-1 to 8-27 9 CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1954-1958 9-1 to 9-22 10 Coordination Group, Office of the Army Chief of Staff 10-1 to 10-8 11 With Cyrus Vance, Defense General Counsel 11-1 to 11-9 12 With Cyrus Vance, Secretary of the Army 12-1 to 12-9 13 With the Army Concept Team in Vietnam 13-1 to 13-15 14 With the ARVN 21st Division, Vietnam 14-1 to 14-19 15 At the National War College 15-1 to 15-11 16 At the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY 16-1 to 16-10 17 Cdr 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam 17-1 to 17-35 18 Cdr Fort Devens, MA 18-1 to 18-18 19 Advisor, IV Corps/Military Region 4, Vietnam 19-1 to 19A-5 20 Cdr 101st Airborne Division & Fort Campbell, KY 19-1 to 19-29 21 Cdr Combined Arms Center and Commandant CGSC 22 Cdr I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea 23 In Retirement (interviews for the above three chapters have not been conducted) For my own distribution in November 2012 I had Chapters 1 through 7 (Volume One) print- ed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense : Robert S. Mcnamara
    The Ascendancy of the Secretary ofJULY Defense 2013 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Cover Photo: Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and President John F. Kennedy at the White House, January 1963 Source: Robert Knudson/John F. Kennedy Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense July 2013 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Contents This study was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The study is an official publication of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreword..........................................vii but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be construed as descriptive only and does Executive Summary...................................ix not constitute the official position of OSD on any subject. Restructuring the National Security Council ................2 Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line in included.
    [Show full text]
  • Interview with Roger Hilsman
    Library of Congress Interview with Roger Hilsman Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project ROGER HILSMAN Interviewed by: Paige E. Mulhollan Initial interview date: May 15, 1969 Q: Let's begin by identifying you, Sir. You're Roger Hilsman, and your last official position with the government was as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs which you held until of 1964. Is that correct? HILSMAN: No, March 15th. I actually resigned earlier than that, but the President asked me to stay till March 15th while he got a replacement. Q: And you had been director of the INR [Intelligence and Research]from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration until 1963? HILSMAN: Right. Q: So you served about a year in the Far East post. HILSMAN: Just a little over. Q: Did you know Mr. Johnson at all prior to the time you came intthe Kennedy Administration? Had you ever had any contact? Interview with Roger Hilsman http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000512 Library of Congress HILSMAN: I had had some indirect contact with him when he was on Capitol Hill. I was chief of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service, and then I was deputy director of the Service. And though I didn't know him personally, I had done some things with some of his staff. It was funny about this, because William S. White, you know, Bill White, was a great friend of the President's. And he's a great friend of mine.
    [Show full text]
  • Possibility of Future Viet Cong Attacks and Tet Offensive Related Problems
    2019/04/17 002797876 » ~ - A <1 r R | ; . PRIORITY C%pPH0T/$iA(Nr |eNe‘?%e|-|-|G ENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable ‘N 54115 PAGE ‘I OF 7 PAGES Wncs E STATE/INR om NMCC/MC (SECDEF ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA. s|:>o om-: cns - -~» DD wauw w»»a~~w»vam>w1zwm".“vam»‘.w> _ _ EXO This material contains information aflecting the National Defense 0! the United States within the meaning or the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. G§'°UP T ExcuI d ad omuumr ‘:t:,::';é'.".'i::‘3,-5(°) \ THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. S 1920202 ¢ITE T3-5(0) \ DwT1 19 FEBRUARY 1968 A '_ COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM DOT 18 FEBRUARY 1968 SUBJECT III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBI= LITY OF FUTURE VIET CONG ATTACKS AND ON PROBLEMS RELA- TING TO VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON <18 FEBRUARY 1968) 34“hX%) SOURCE )(2) WW; —-up. 7___ SUMMARY: ON 17 FEBRUARY, VICE PRESIDENT KY, III CORPS COMM— ANDER GENERAL KHANG, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL VIEN AND MAJOR GENERAL THANG URGED PRESIDENT THIEU TO TAKE A STRONGER .5=E-e-R=r=11-' 3"5(°) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02797876 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C0279787\6 s.5(¢ ‘ PAGE OF PAGES 2 7 s.5(¢) (classification) (disaem controg) f * .....n STAND AND TO SHOW MORE LEADERSHIP. KHANG ALSO OFFERED HIS RESI- GNATION ON GROUNDS HE DID NOT NANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A WEAK GOVERNMENT AS THE PRESENT ONE.
    [Show full text]
  • HELP from ABOVE Air Force Close Air
    HELP FROM ABOVE Air Force Close Air Support of the Army 1946–1973 John Schlight AIR FORCE HISTORY AND MUSEUMS PROGRAM Washington, D. C. 2003 i Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schlight, John. Help from above : Air Force close air support of the Army 1946-1973 / John Schlight. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Close air support--History--20th century. 2. United States. Air Force--History--20th century. 3. United States. Army--Aviation--History--20th century. I. Title. UG703.S35 2003 358.4'142--dc22 2003020365 ii Foreword The issue of close air support by the United States Air Force in sup- port of, primarily, the United States Army has been fractious for years. Air commanders have clashed continually with ground leaders over the proper use of aircraft in the support of ground operations. This is perhaps not surprising given the very different outlooks of the two services on what constitutes prop- er air support. Often this has turned into a competition between the two serv- ices for resources to execute and control close air support operations. Although such differences extend well back to the initial use of the airplane as a military weapon, in this book the author looks at the period 1946- 1973, a period in which technological advances in the form of jet aircraft, weapons, communications, and other electronic equipment played significant roles. Doctrine, too, evolved and this very important subject is discussed in detail. Close air support remains a critical mission today and the lessons of yesterday should not be ignored. This book makes a notable contribution in seeing that it is not ignored.
    [Show full text]
  • An Nbc News White Paper Vietnam Hindsight Part Ii
    AN NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT PART II: THE DEATH OF DIEM BROADCAST: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1971 10:00 - 11:00 CREDITS Opening Title: NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT PART II: DEATH OF DIEM Credits: NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT Copyright c The National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 1971 All Rights Reserved Produced and Written By FRED FREED Directed by PAMELA HILL Associate Producers ALVIN DAVIS PAMELA HILL Researcher HELEN WHITNEY Production Assistant BARBARA SPENCE Film Researcher JACK GOELMAN Unit Manager KLAUS HEYS Supervising Film Editor DARROLD MURRAY Film Editors MARY ANN MARTIN STUART M. ROSENBERG DAVID J. SAUL JEAN BAGLEY Cameramen STEVE PETROPOULOS WILLIAM RICHARDS Sound JAMES ZOLTOWSKI JOSE VALLE JOHN SINGLETON JEROME GOLD HENRY ROSSEAU IRVING GANS SHELLY FIELMAN Still Pictures by JACQUES LOWE BLACK STAR MAGNUM GEORGES TAMES - THE NEW YORK TIMES THE JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY YOICHI CKOMOTO HORST ?HAAS PEOPLE WHO WERE INTERVIEWED FOR VIETNAM HINDSIGHT IN ORDER OF THEIR APPEARANCE AND POSITION HELD AT THE TIME GEORGE BALL Under-Secretary of State 1961-1966 MAXWELL TAYLOR- Military Adviser to JFK 1961 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1962- 64 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH Ambassador to India 1961-63 DAVID HALBERSTAM Correspondent - New York Times - Vietnam 1962-63 WALT M. ROSTOW Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security 1961-64 MME. NHU Wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of Ngo Dinh Diem ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Special Assistant to the President 1961-64 PAUL HARKINS US Military Commander - Vietnam 1962-64 • JOHN VANN American Military Adviser in Vietnam MICHAEL FORRESTAL Senior Member - White House National Security Staff 1962-66 ROGER HILSMAN Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 1963-64 ■ RUFUS PHILLIPS American AID Mission - Vietnam -2- FREDERICK NOLTING U.S.
    [Show full text]