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On the Making of U. S. China Policy, 1961-9: a Study in Bureaucratic Politics Author(S): James C

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On the Making of U. S. China Policy, 1961-9: a Study in Bureaucratic Politics Author(S): James C On the Making of U. S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics Author(s): James C. Thomson, Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source: The China Quarterly, No. 50 (Apr. - Jun., 1972), pp. 220-243 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/651908 . Accessed: 17/05/2012 23:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press and School of Oriental and African Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The China Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics James C. Thomson Jr. When the history of Sino-American relations since 1949 is written in years to come, it will very likely lump together much of the two decades from the Korean War to the Kissinger-Chou meeting as a period of drearily sustained deadlock. Korean hostilities will be blended rather easily into Indochina hostilities, John Foster Dulles into Dean Rusk. The words and deeds of American East Asian intervention, of the con- tainment and isolation of China, will seem an unbroken continuity. And at the end, under most improbable auspices but for commonsense balance-of-power reasons, will come the Zen-like Nixon stroke that cut the Gordian knot and opened a new era. It is no denigration of the Nixon-Kissinger achievement to suggest that the China policy initiatives of 1969-72 did not in fact spring full-blown from the Republican presidency. Some seeds were sown in the previous decade, and their origins and fate may well deserve a chapter, or at least an extended footnote, in the history of the Sino-American relation- ship. The necessarily personal and episodic account that follows makes no claim to completeness. Unless and until a China-policy Daniel Ellsberg surfaces (unlikely, given the materials to expose) - or the Federal Government drastically reforms its declassification procedures (also un- likely) - a full account must await the passage of 25 years or more. In the meantime, however, this effort by one participant and observer will, I hope, encourage correction, elaboration, and rebuttal from others whose bureaucratic and scholarly perspectives differ from mine. As for my perspective: it is that of a student of modem Chinese history who served as a Far East specialist in the State Department from January 1961 to July 1964 and on the National Security Council staff from July 1964 to September 1966. Before that, I was brought up in the Yangtze Valley as a missionary offspring; I left China for the last time as a 17-year-old in April 1949. Context: Washington and China Policy in 1961 John Kennedy's narrow electoral victory in November 1960 brought back to power a party that had lost the presidency eight years earlier On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9 221 largely, though not exclusively, on an issue of Far Eastern policy, the unpopularand frustratingKorean War. Caught up with this issue was the antecedentmatter of China's"loss" to communism,a development that had poisoned the second Truman Administration with charges of incompetenceand treason and had producedthe multipleinvestigations by Senators McCarthy and McCarran and assorted loyalty-security boards. Not surprisingly, China policy was barely mentioned in the 1960 pre- sidential campaign.Only once, in answer to a newsman'squestion in the second of the televised debates, did Kennedy venture an opinion on a related matter: whether the Chinese Nationalists should be persuaded to evacuate the offshore isles lest another crisis like that of 1958 drag the U.S. into war. Kennedy's affirmative response spurred Nixon to the offensive; and in the next debate, with Nixon still pressing, Kennedy successfully "fuzzed" the issue and claimed no disagreement between the two men. Clearly, any prospect of a China battle made Republicans sniff success, Democrats run for cover. And the lesson was confirmed for the President-elect when General Eisenhower told him that any change in China policy by the incoming Administration would bring Ike out of retirement fighting. The political climate, then, of January 1961 was not one that en- couraged China policy innovation at the White House. The electoral margin was too narrow. The Republican leadership stood ready and waiting for telltale signs of Democratic "appeasement." The bitter charges of the early '50s still echoed. As Kennedy was to confide with regret to more than one White House aide and visitor, China was a matter that would probably have to await his second term in office. A presidency, however, like its party, is to some degree a coalition. And the coalition that elected Kennedy and joined him in office con- tained elements that had become increasingly critical, after the Korean armistice, of the Dulles policy of containment and isolation of the Chinese People's Republic. Academic specialists had early questioned the thesis of China's satellite status as a permanent member of Moscow's "bloc." To many analysts, Chinese communism's "Chineseness" loomed larger, in the long run, than its communism. In 1959 one sena- torial voice, that of California's Clair Engle, had finally called for the development of a new and more conciliatory approach to China. Later, academics and senators had combined forces in the Conlon Associates report on alternatives in U.S.-China relations, prepared by Berkeley's Robert A. Scalapino at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee. In December a Rockefeller Brothers Fund report also urged a change in China policy. And in 1960 the Eastern Establishment's Mother Church, the Council on Foreign Relations, had issued a comprehensive study of possible approaches to accommodation with China.' It was therefore inevitable that the new Democratic Administration I. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). 222 The China Quarterly would contain, at upper and lower levels, outside critics who shared the evolving liberal consensus that the Dulles China policy should be aban- doned or at least gradually altered. Most visible of these critics were Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, and Chester Bowles - also, eventu- ally, Ambassadors John Kenneth Galbraith in New Delhi and Edwin O. Reischauer in Tokyo; and they brought in their retinue others of similar persuasion. The long-term goal of their consensus was Sino-American accommodation; and while specifics as to intermediate steps differed from person to person, a widely-supported first move was some modification of the State Department's ban on the issuing of passports for travel by Americans to mainland China. In January 1961 John Kennedy and his newcomers inherited a sprawl- ing foreign affairs apparatus, the multiple bureaucracies of the National Security Council staff, the State Department (or "State" as it is ines- capably called), the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and assorted other bodies. At the heart of that apparatus, in the making and sustaining of Far Eastern policy, was State's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (renamed, late in the decade, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). It was clear, from earliest days, that any modification of U.S. policy with respect to Communist China would require the acquiescence, and ideally the support, of the Far East Bureau at State. Yet in January 1961 "FE" was notorious for its rigidity and its resistance to policy change. For the Bureau had been one of McCarthyism's central targets; and the endless Congressional and Executive Branch investigations of the early '50s had largely destroyed, through harassment and dispersal, the China career pro- fessionals of the wartime and pre-war years. From 1953 onwards Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson and Security Administrator Scott McLeod had methodically purged the ranks, with the full backing of Secretary Dulles. And by 1961 FE was a Bureau dominated by Cold Warriors and staffed largely by the cowed. Under Robertson's successor and former deputy, J. Graham Parsons, the architect of rightist (and disastrous) U.S. policies in Laos, the Bureau clung tenaciously to the doctrine of con- tainment and isolation. Although Parsons was "exiled" as ambassador to Sweden in the spring of 1961, his successor Walter McConaughy was an amiable career officer who was allergic to policy change. One small insight into the 1961 FE outlook will suffice. Early that year the Under Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, asked me to draft a rather general speech on world problem areas in which - in the course of reviewing the disasters that had befallen the people of China over the past century and a half - he expresed his regret about whatever role the United States might have played, inadvertently, in producing those disasters. When I took that particular page to the FE press officer for routine "clearance," I was told that the paragraph must go: in the first place, we had referred to the mainland Chinese capital as Peking instead of Peiping; and second, "that stuff about the western humiliation of On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9 223 China" was, he said, "the Communist line." "But it's also Chiang Kai-shek's line," I said hopefully. As I recall, we agreed to trade off: Peking was changed back to Peiping; but Mr.
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