DOCSLIB.ORG

The Kennedy Administration and the Use of Herbicides in South Vietnam

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Kennedy Administration and the Use of Herbicides in South Vietnam INTO THE WIND: THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND THE USE OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Evelyn Frances Krache Morris, AM Washington, DC April 12, 2012 Copyright 2012 by Evelyn Frances Krache Morris All Rights Reserved ii INTO THE WIND: THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND THE USE OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM Evelyn F. Krache Morris, AM Thesis Advisor: David S. Painter, PhD. ABSTRACT This study investigates the origins of Operation Ranch Hand, the United States’ aerial defoliation and crop destruction program in South Vietnam. Although Agent Orange is the best-known of the formulas employed, the decision to use chemicals in South Vietnam preceded Agent Orange’s 1965 debut by several years. President John F. Kennedy authorized defoliation missions in November 1961. At the behest of the United States military, the Ambassador to South Vietnam, and South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm, Ranch Hand expanded in 1962 to include crop destruction. The purpose of this research is to explore why the administration chose to use an untried and possibly illegal weapon in an undeclared war. The need for certainties in an increasingly ambiguous and frustrating conflict contributed to the belief that Ranch Hand was more practical and effective than it was. Even as Ranch Hand’s shortfalls became apparent, the administration adhered more and more closely to the agendas of the military and of Diệm who, for different reasons, promoted Ranch Hand as reassuringly successful. The chemicals most commonly deployed in Ranch Hand, 2,4- dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), were widely used domestically during the 1950s and 1960s. The persistent questions iii among scientists about how the chemicals worked and the continued difficulties in controlling their effects contrasted sharply with the beliefs held by the administration. The conflict between the administration’s idealization of science and the uncertainties and contingencies of the scientific process itself was never resolved and is a major theme of this research. Historians have frequently portrayed the Kennedy Administration as rational and unemotional, but the fears that ran through it promoted the adoption of a weapon that ultimately proved both militarily ineffective and politically disastrous. In their efforts not to ‘lose’ Vietnam, the administration embarked on a course that would help ensure that Vietnam was lost. The repercussions of chemical herbicide used during the Vietnam War, an effort launched by Kennedy, still reverberate in both the United States and in Vietnam. iv I am grateful for the friends and colleagues who helped me on this journey: Mytoan Nguyen Akbar, Ashley Augustyniak, David Biggs, Matt Bowman, Lisa Brady, Derren Connell and Alex Spring, John Corcoran, Ryan Edgington, Ben Francis-Fallon, Jeff Gardner, Peter Gelb, Toshihiro Higuchi, Alice Stone Ilchman, Richard Immerman, Anita Kondoyanidi, Richard Kuisel, Bob and Abby Levine, Charles MacKay, Chandra Manning, John McNeill, Jim Miller and Fynnette Eaton, Karl Mueller, Curtis and Amanda Murphy, Sophie Thao Nguyen, Meredith Oyen, Stephen Plotkin, Andy and Jen Ross, Maura Seale, Morgan Shaw, Col. Tracy Szczepaniak, Anand Toprani, Song Tran, Thuc Tran, Richard Tucker, Susan Walker, Dan Weimer, Salim Yaqub, and David Zierler. Georgetown University, the United States Department of Education, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Chemical Heritage Foundation provided generous financial support for this project. I have been blessed with a wonderful dissertation committee who challenged, encouraged, and informed my work during every step. Thank you, David Painter, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Joe McCartin, and Ed Russell, for everything. This work would not have been possible without the love and support of the Dickson, Krache, and Morris families, especially David and Kate. I dedicate it to them. Evelyn F. Krache Morris v “We would rather be ruined than changed. We would rather die in our dread Than climb the cross of the moment And let our illusions die.” ~ W.H. Auden, The Age of Anxiety TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography .................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: How Do We Get Moving ............................................................................ 34 Chapter 3: All-Purpose Men ......................................................................................... 66 Chapter 4: Tricky Business ........................................................................................... 98 Chapter 5: Simple Tools of Victory ............................................................................ 125 Chapter 6: Setting the Course ..................................................................................... 155 Chapter 7: A Wholly Normal Procedure .................................................................... 183 Chapter 8: True Problem is Peasants’ Hostility .......................................................... 216 Chapter 9: Conclusion: What Kind of Evidence Do They Want ................................ 248 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 283 vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY On November 30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy took the United States another step deeper into South Vietnam. On that date, less than 1 year after his inauguration, Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 115, “Defoliant Operations in South Vietnam.” It called for a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in Viet Nam starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created.1 Chemicals and C-123s were already in South Vietnam; the plans for Operation Ranch Hand, the Air Force name for chemical herbicide spraying, had been gaining momentum for months.2 The impetus came not only from advisors in the field, who were increasingly desperate to stop what they thought were waves of infiltrators and supplies coming from North Vietnam. It also came from members of Kennedy’s own administration, who were themselves more and more pessimistic about the government 1 National Security Action Memorandum 115, November 30, 1961, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Z8-vBiaBdEW2Cz9g6NUB7g.aspx (accessed on February 7, 2012). 2 Ranch Hand included only those spraying missions conducted by fixed-wing aircraft. The overall name for the entire aerial spraying effort, including those missions carried out by helicopter and by hand, was Operation Trail Dust. Operation Mule Train provided logistical support to US operations in South Vietnam. The association of these names with the ‘taming’ of the Western United States was probably not coincidental. Ranch Hand operations sprayed about 95% of all herbicides used in South Vietnam, according to a key recent article on Ranch Hand, written by a team of epidemiologists who modified and improved the Air Force’s own records of herbicide use to analyze the levels and effects of spraying operations from 1961 to 1971. Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., “The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam,” Nature 422, no. 6933 (April 17, 2003): 681. 1 of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm and its ability to both form a viable state and ward off Communist advances. Aerial herbicide spraying might address all of these concerns; at the very least it would provide evidence in Sài Gòn and in Washington that the administration was acting decisively and using the latest technology in its fight against global Communism. Operation Ranch Hand depended on chemicals that had been developed for use during World War II but were never used in combat.3 Phenoxy herbicides, which would include the bulk of the agents used in Ranch Hand, entered the civilian market for land clearing and weed control agents shortly after the war. They were an entirely new class, largely the product of American scientific research. These chemicals were one of a roster of “techniques and gadgets” that the administration considered and approved for use in South Vietnam.4 Ranch Hand lasted from 1961 to 1971. After the initial approval by President Kennedy in 1961, the Air Force began the aerial spraying of Agents Pink, Green and Purple, formulations containing the phenoxy herbicides 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T).5 The administration expanded the program in 1962 to include crop destruction, the “food denial” Kennedy referenced 3 For more detail on this history, see Barton Bernstein, “America’s Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1988): 292-317. 4 Walt W. Rostow memorandum to Kennedy, April 12, 1961, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963: Volume I: Vietnam 1961 (Washington DC: United State Government Printing Office, 1988), 68. 5 In 1962, the United States began using Agent Blue, an arsenical. Since this is not a phenoxy herbicide, it falls outside the scope of this study, but the larger strategic, logistical, and moral problems are quite similar. Stellman et al., 682.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • PLANT SCIENCE BULLETIN a Publication of the Botanical Society of America, Inc
    PLANT SCIENCE BULLETIN A Publication of the Botanical Society of America, Inc. Plant ldioblasts: Remarkable Examplesof Cell Specialization ADRIANCEs. FOSTER University of California (~~TE: Th!s paper,slightly a,bbreviat~d,is the ad~ress.of the chyma tissues, the remarkable cystolith-containing cells retiring president of the Botan,lcal SOCIety of. A?,enca gIVen ~t of the epidermis of Fiscus and Urtic d th ft - the annual banquet of the SOCIety, held at MIChIgan State Um- .,. a an e 0 en gro versity on September8, 1955. Dr. Foster'saddress was illus- tesque ramIfied sclerelds found In the leaves of many trated with a seriesof excellentslides of mixed botanicaland plants. Unicellular trichomes are epidermal idioblasts psycho-entomologicalnature.) and the guard cells of stomata might be regarded from One of the privileges-and certainly one of the pen- ~~ ontogenetic point of view as "paired" or "twin" alties--of having 'served as President of the Botanical IdlOblasts. Society is the delivery of a retiring addressat the culmi- My own interest in this motley assemblageof idio- nation of our annual meeting. In your present well-fed blastic cells arose during my early years as a teacher of and relaxed state, some of you may be resigned to listen- plant anatomy. It seemedto me then-as it does now ing to a historical and soporific resume of some special- -that any decision as to the suitable criteria to be used ized area of modern botanical research. A number of in classifying and discussing cell types and tissues in you perhaps may anticipate-probably with dismay- plants must consider the disturbing frequency of oc- a much broader non-technical type of discourse in- currence of idioblasts.
    [Show full text]
  • GSBS News, Summer 2009
    GSBS NEWS Summer 2009 Coming Soon... Two Specialized Masters Programs— TABLE OF CONTENTS Evoluti on, Progress, and Philanthropy 2 SPECIALIZED MASTERS PROGRAMS Geneti c Counseling Celebrates 20th Anniversary A celebrati on will be held October 3, 2009 marking the 20th anniversary of the start 3 DEAN’S NOTES of the UT Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences Geneti c Counseling Program. Founded by Jacqueline T. Hecht, Ph.D., and medical director Hope Northrup, M.D., 4 COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS (both are GSBS faculty at UT-Medical School)—the program is rich in its collabora- MICHAEL J. ZIGMOND, PH.D. ti ve structure with faculty at several Health Science Center Schools, M. D. Anderson Cancer Center and Baylor College of Medicine. The initi al graduati ng class in 1991 COMMENCEMENT PHOTOS included a single person. Today the Program, lead by Director, Claire Singletary, 6 MS, graduates 6 annually; it is the only accredited program of its kind in the state of Texas and only one of 31 in the country. Its dedicated purpose is to train health 8 COMMENCEMENT care professionals who provide supporti ve and educati onal counseling to families with geneti c condi- GREETINGS ti ons, birth defects, and geneti c predishpositi ons such as Achondroplasia, Down syndrome, cleft lip GIGI LOZANO, PH.D. and palate, spina bifi da, and hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. FACULTY PRESIDENT Geneti c Counseling graduate students do not receive tuiti on or sti pend support because it is a ter- minal Masters degree program; however, winning a competi ti ve scholarship provides a modest sum 9 GRADUATING CLASS and triggers in-state rather than out-of-state tuiti on for the student (about four ti mes as much).
    [Show full text]
  • The Diem Coup After 50 Years – John F
    The Diem Coup After 50 Years – John F. Kennedy and South Vietnam, 1963 By John Prados Region: Asia Global Research, November 04, 2013 Theme: History The National Security Archive 1 November 2013 Washington, D.C. – Continued investigation of the presidency of John F. Kennedy further strengthens the view that the origins of U.S. support for the coup which overthrew South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem 50 years ago today traces directly to President Kennedy, not to a “cabal” of top officials in his administration. As thedocuments posted by the National Security Archive in 2009 and new material posted today indicates, the often- told story that a “cabal” of senior officials, in combination with U.S. ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge, were responsible for the coup is a myth. The 2009 posting (below) used the then-newly released audiotapes of President Kennedy’s discussions on South Vietnam in late August 1963, combined with the declassified documents on the same meetings, and the State Department cables to Saigon bearing instructions for Ambassador Lodge, to show that Washington officials acted in unison in determining the U.S. approach. Additional evidence presented here supports this conclusion. The additional evidence combined with the 2009 evidence demonstrates: Senior officials who, in a widely-held standard view, were supposed to have come together to excoriate the “cabal” for making an “end-run” around the bureaucracy in securing approval for the coup policy, did not act any differently after revelation of the maneuver than before. If anything, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), by the traditional account the most steadfast opponent of a coup, cooperated more closely with State Department members of the cabal after the NSC meeting where the coup policy had supposedly been denounced (Document 17).
    [Show full text]
  • The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945-1965
    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette College of Communication Faculty Research and Publications Communication, College of 9-1-2018 The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945-1965 Gregory R. Olson Marquette University George N. Dionisopoulos San Diego State University Steven R. Goldzwig Marquette University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/comm_fac Part of the Communication Commons Recommended Citation Olson, Gregory R.; Dionisopoulos, George N.; and Goldzwig, Steven R., "The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945-1965" (2018). College of Communication Faculty Research and Publications. 511. https://epublications.marquette.edu/comm_fac/511 The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945–1965 Gregory A. Olson, George N. Dionisopoulos, and Steven R. Goldzwig 8 I do not believe that any of the Presidents who have been involved with Viet- nam, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, or President Nixon, foresaw or desired that the United States would become involved in a large scale war in Asia. But the fact remains that a steady progression of small decisions and actions over a period of 20 years had forestalled a clear-cut decision by the President or by the President and Congress—decision as to whether the defense of South Vietnam and involvement in a great war were necessary to the security and best interest of the United States. —Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY), Congressional Record, 1970 n his 1987 doctoral thesis, General David Petraeus wrote of Vietnam: “We do not take the time to understand the nature of the society in which we are f ght- Iing, the government we are supporting, or the enemy we are f ghting.”1 After World War II, when the United States chose Vietnam as an area for nation building as part of its Cold War strategy, little was known about that exotic land.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pulitzer Prizes 2020 Winne
    WINNERS AND FINALISTS 1917 TO PRESENT TABLE OF CONTENTS Excerpts from the Plan of Award ..............................................................2 PULITZER PRIZES IN JOURNALISM Public Service ...........................................................................................6 Reporting ...............................................................................................24 Local Reporting .....................................................................................27 Local Reporting, Edition Time ..............................................................32 Local General or Spot News Reporting ..................................................33 General News Reporting ........................................................................36 Spot News Reporting ............................................................................38 Breaking News Reporting .....................................................................39 Local Reporting, No Edition Time .......................................................45 Local Investigative or Specialized Reporting .........................................47 Investigative Reporting ..........................................................................50 Explanatory Journalism .........................................................................61 Explanatory Reporting ...........................................................................64 Specialized Reporting .............................................................................70
    [Show full text]
  • The Gordian Knot: Apartheid & the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 1960-1970
    THE GORDIAN KNOT: APARTHEID & THE UNMAKING OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER, 1960-1970 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Ryan Irwin, B.A., M.A. History ***** The Ohio State University 2010 Dissertation Committee: Professor Peter Hahn Professor Robert McMahon Professor Kevin Boyle Professor Martha van Wyk © 2010 by Ryan Irwin All rights reserved. ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the apartheid debate from an international perspective. Positioned at the methodological intersection of intellectual and diplomatic history, it examines how, where, and why African nationalists, Afrikaner nationalists, and American liberals contested South Africa’s place in the global community in the 1960s. It uses this fight to explore the contradictions of international politics in the decade after second-wave decolonization. The apartheid debate was never at the center of global affairs in this period, but it rallied international opinions in ways that attached particular meanings to concepts of development, order, justice, and freedom. As such, the debate about South Africa provides a microcosm of the larger postcolonial moment, exposing the deep-seated differences between politicians and policymakers in the First and Third Worlds, as well as the paradoxical nature of change in the late twentieth century. This dissertation tells three interlocking stories. First, it charts the rise and fall of African nationalism. For a brief yet important moment in the early and mid-1960s, African nationalists felt genuinely that they could remake global norms in Africa’s image and abolish the ideology of white supremacy through U.N.
    [Show full text]
  • A Chemical War Without End: Agent Orange in Vietnam
    A Chemical War without End: Agent Orange in Vietnam Marie-Hélène Lavallard* The Vietnam War (1961-1975) is known for the massive bombings of North Vietnam. More insidious, however, yet less well-known to the general public, was the chemical war waged from 1961 to 1971against South Vietnam. An immense environmental disaster and a human catastrophe taking numerous forms: health, economic, socio-cultural …, it had dramatic consequences which are still felt today. The American government and the chemical companies involved have eluded their responsibilities. For years, a conspiracy of silence has obscured the toxicity of the defoliants used. Those responsible have the effrontery to continue denying it today. Humanitarian aid is incommensurate with the needs. It is at the government level that support for Vietnam must be organized and the demand for just reparations must be made. During the Vietnam War, from 1961 to 1971, American aviation sprayed defoliants over Southern Vietnam to chase from the jungle the combatants taking shelter there, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail by which weapons, supplies and medication came down from the North, to facilitate surveillance of roads, coastlines and waterways and to destroy the rice paddies, forcing villagers into "strategic hamlets" and thus depriving the guerillas of food and aid1. More than 77 million2 liters of defoliants were released by plane (95%), by helicopter, by boat, by tanker truck, and by men with backpack sprayers. More than 2,500,000 hectares were contaminated by these defoliants, the best known of which is Agent Orange. It contains dioxin, one of the most violent and most indestructible poisons known.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is a Science Diplomat?
    The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15 (2020) 409-423 brill.com/hjd What Is a Science Diplomat? Lorenzo Melchor Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT), Madrid, Spain; former FECYT Science Adviser in the Spanish Embassy in London, United Kingdom [email protected] Received: 22 May 2020; revised: 4 July 2020; accepted: 21 July 2020 Summary The COVID-19 crisis has shown how countries initially responded to a global chal- lenge on their own, instead of relying on a multilateral science diplomacy — based response. Although, science diplomacy has received great attention for the past de- cade, its meaning and the nature of the diverse practitioners involved remain elusive. Science diplomacy is a transboundary field sitting across national borders, policy frameworks and stakeholders of all natures and professional backgrounds. But what is a science diplomat? What science diplomacy roles formally exist? Who can become a science diplomat? What knowledge and skills are required? This practitioner’s essay proposes a typology of science diplomacy practitioners who bring science, technology, innovation, foreign policy and the international political system altogether closer in either institutionalised or non-institutionalised roles, and it also provides guidance for pursuing a career in science diplomacy. These science diplomats may promote na- tional competitiveness but also facilitate multilateral responses to global challenges. Keywords science diplomacy – science diplomat – science counsellor – science attaché – science adviser – science advice – science-policy interface – knowledge diplomacy – COVID-19 © Lorenzo Melchor, 2020 | doi:10.1163/1871191X-bja10026 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded license. from Brill.com10/01/2021 11:43:18AM via free access 410 Melchor 1 Introduction1 The COVID-19 outbreak has caused a profound global public health and socio- economic crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • MA Political Science Programme
    Department of Political Science, University of Delhi UNIVERSITY OF DELHI MASTER OF ARTS in POLITICAL SCIENCE (M.A. in Political Science) (Effective from Academic Year 2019-20) PROGRAMME BROCHURE Revised Syllabus as approved by Academic Council on XXXX, 2019 and Executive Council on YYYY, 2019 Department of Political Science, University of Delhi 1 | Page Table of Contents I. About the Department ................................................................................................................ 3 1.1 About the Programme: ............................................................................................................. 4 1.2 About the Process of Course Development Involving Diverse Stakeholders .......................... 4 II. Introduction to CBCS (Choice Based Credit System) .............................................................. 5 III. M.A. Political Science Programme Details: ............................................................................ 6 IV. Semester wise Details of M.A.in Political Science Course....................................................... 9 4.1 Semester wise Details ................................................................................................................ 9 4.2 List of Elective Course (wherever applicable to be mentioned area wise) ............................ 10 4.3 Eligibility for Admission: ....................................................................................................... 13 4.4 Reservations/ Concessions: ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Fact Sheet 8: the Use of Defoliants – Agent Orange
    Fact Sheet 8: The use of defoliants – Agent Orange A highly controversial aspect of the Vietnam War was the widespread use of herbicides by the United States military. These chemicals caused the leaves of trees in the jungle to die. This made it easier to detect enemy positions and activities, especially from the air. Crops were also sprayed to deprive the enemy of food. These chemicals included the ‘Rainbow Herbicides’ – Agent Pink, Agent Green, Agent Purple, Agent Blue, Agent White and, most famously, Agent Orange. The US Air Force sprayed approximately 75 million litres (of which Agent Orange accounted for about 45 million litres) of concentrated herbicides, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam's land. Humans exposed to Agent Orange were at risk of poisoning. Some estimates suggest that there were as many as 4 million victims of dioxin poisoning in Vietnam. Veterans of the war observed an increased risk of various types of cancer, while birth defects among their children were cited as evidence of the long-term harm caused by Agent Orange. The US government denied any conclusive scientific links between Agent Orange and health problems experienced by those exposed. In 1984 US veterans obtained a $180 million settlement from companies which produced Agent Orange. A small trust fund for New Zealanders who had been exposed was established as part of this settlement, but the fund was exhausted before the health problems of many veterans became apparent. The New Zealand government initially stated that no New Zealanders were deployed in areas where defoliants were used. A 2001 report found no evidence that exposure to defoliants had affected the health of veterans' children, although it did bring new evidence of exposure.
    [Show full text]
  • An Oral History of the South Vietnamese Civilian Experience in the Vietnam War Leann Do the College of Wooster
    The College of Wooster Libraries Open Works Senior Independent Study Theses 2012 Surviving War, Surviving Memory: An Oral History of the South Vietnamese Civilian Experience in the Vietnam War Leann Do The College of Wooster Follow this and additional works at: https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy Part of the Oral History Commons, and the Social History Commons Recommended Citation Do, Leann, "Surviving War, Surviving Memory: An Oral History of the South Vietnamese Civilian Experience in the Vietnam War" (2012). Senior Independent Study Theses. Paper 3826. https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/3826 This Senior Independent Study Thesis Exemplar is brought to you by Open Works, a service of The oC llege of Wooster Libraries. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Independent Study Theses by an authorized administrator of Open Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. © Copyright 2012 Leann Do The College of Wooster Surviving War, Surviving Memory: An Oral History of the South Vietnamese Civilian Experience in the Vietnam War by Leann A. Do Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Senior Independent Study Supervised by Dr. Madonna Hettinger Department of History Spring 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ii List of Figures iv Timeline v Maps vii Chapter One: Introduction 1 The Two Vietnams Chapter Two: Historiography of the Vietnam War 5 in American Scholarship Chapter Three: Theory and Methodology 15 of Oral History Chapter Four: “I’m an Ordinary Person” 30 A Husband and
    [Show full text]
  • Agent Orange Review
    Agent Orange Review Vol. 9, N0. 3 Information for Veterans Who Served in Vietnam September 1992 National Academy of Sciences Project Secretary Edward J. Derwinski Advances on the Agent Orange Issue: VA was cast as the enemy of the veteran. VA had absolutely no credibility on this issue. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is making Finally, in recent months, substantial progress on the Agent Orange project undertaken on we began to defuse much of the behalf of VA early this year. NAS officials have been gathering criticism and suspicion by herbicide literature from VA (including VA's 18-volume granting service connection for literature review) and other sources, making contact with conditions science tells us may scientists and other interested parties throughout the country, have been caused by exposure to and assembling a committee of experts to complete the project Agent Orange--such as non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and soft envisaged by Congress in Public Law 102-4, the "Agent tissue sarcomas. Orange Act of 1991." We're still being criticized by some who think we haven't gone far enough, and by some who feel there's not sufficient scientific proof for the decisions we have made. The public reaction~and the general lessening of Initial Committee Meeting tensions~seems to indicate we're right. This may be an important lesson for VA... The NAS Institute of Medicine's Committee to Review Committee Membership the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides held its first meeting on June 26, in Washington, DC. The Committee is chaired by Harold Fallon, M.D., Chair The morning session, which was opened to invited guests and of the Department of Medicine of the Medical College of speakers, was devoted to providing Committee members with Virginia in Richmond, Virginia.
    [Show full text]