HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020

“An International Law with Teeth in It”: The Baruch Plan and American Public Opinion

Amir Rezvani1 1Yale University

Abstract

In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the American representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, introduced the United States’ proposal for international control of atomic energy, known as the Baruch Plan. It suggested a regime under which the United Nations would enforce an international ban on atomic weapons. The proposal, which stated that the United States would destroy its atomic arsenal only once the plan were fully implemented, was blocked in the United Nations by the Soviet Union. This paper argues that domestic public opinion played a significant role in the development, negotiation, and failure of the plan, but that

the sentiments of the public were partly shaped by Baruch at the same time. Public opinion affected the formulation of the

proposal, which Baruch based in part on what he believed the American populace favored. By helping discourage negotiations, public opinion also indirectly contributed to the eventual failure of the plan.

On June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch, the fear. Let us not deceive ourselves; we must elect world American representative to the United Nations Atomic peace or world destruction.”iii Following this dramatic Energy Commission, presented the United States’ plan opening, Baruch introduced his proposal, which for international control of atomic technology at the recommended the creation of an Atomic Development commission’s inaugural meeting.i With World War II Authority to oversee the use of atomic energy and to having ended less than a year prior, the United States inspect atomic facilities to ensure they were used and the Soviet Union were drifting into a period of solely for peaceful purposes. He based his plan on the geopolitical tension that would soon become known as recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the Cold War. At the time, the United States had a issued in March 1946 by a State Department advisory monopoly over atomic weapons; the Soviet Union committee headed by Dean Acheson, Under Secretary would not test its first until 1949.ii of State, and David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Baruch prefaced his speech with a somber Tennessee Valley Authority. However, Baruch’s warning of the importance of the moment: “Behind the proposal differed from that report in that he charged black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, the United Nations Security Council with enforcing the seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we plan by using sanctions to punish nations that violated fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of it. Controversially, he proposed that in regards to

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 atomic matters, all members of the Security Council World War II, it was evident that the American public should forfeit their veto power. Additionally, Baruch wished that their government continue to maintain declared that only once the plan were fully exclusive control over atomic secrets and the bombs implemented would the United States destroy its they bore. In a September 1945 poll conducted by the atomic arsenal. Because the Soviet Union strongly National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 85% of opposed both of these requirements and the plan’s respondents stated that they wanted the United States passage required unanimous approval in the Security government to keep secret the information that led to Council, disagreement on these two provisions was the the development of atomic weapons.v In the same poll, proximate cause of the failure of the proposal, which respondents were asked what country they thought was came to be known as the Baruch Plan.iv most likely to attack the United States with an atomic Public interest in, and media coverage of, the weapon in the future. A plurality, 36%, believed the plan was widespread given the exceptionally high Soviet Union posed the greatest threat, followed by stakes involved. Combined with the importance that Japan at 25% and Germany at 16%.vi Despite the war Baruch himself placed on the attitudes of the American having ended just weeks earlier, Americans were people, this led public opinion to play a significant part already more suspicious of their erstwhile ally than of in the rise and fall of the plan. This paper examines the their recently-defeated enemies. extent of that role. Because Baruch formulated the But by the beginning of 1946, Americans’ contents of the plan in part based on his perception of views on international atomic control seemed to have the populace’s beliefs, public opinion helped shape the tempered somewhat. Public attitudes softened as the development of the plan. Public sentiments also extreme vigilance that accompanied the war receded reinforced Baruch’s confidence in the proposal and and post-war demobilization took effect. In a poll contributed to his intransigent refusal to alter its conducted by NORC in March 1946, 72% said they elements. Consequently, public opinion was partly would support action by the United Nations prohibiting responsible for the ultimate fate of the plan because it production of atomic bombs anywhere in the world if encouraged Baruch to rule out the possibility of the United Nations were given the power to enforce negotiations. Public opinion thus played a considerable this ban. Of this 72%, 78% were in favor of the ban role in the development of the Baruch Plan, helped even if it would require the destruction of all extant engender a dearth of negotiation, and indirectly atomic bombs.vii Americans seemed not to be bent on contributed to the failure of the proposal. ensuring that their nation maintained its atomic Domestic public sentiments guided the weapons, but rather open to a proposal for international development of the plan. In the immediate aftermath of control of atomic energy, provided that it would be

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 enforceable. However, the observation that Americans’ Nations. When asked in a September 1946 NORC poll attitudes towards international atomic control had whether the United States should “try to keep ahead of softened must be qualified with the fact that at the other countries by making more and better atomic same time, an April 1946 poll by the American bombs” or “make the United Nations organization Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) demonstrated that a strong enough to prevent all countries, including the majority, 61%, still wanted the United States to United States, from making atomic bombs,” two-thirds continue manufacturing atomic bombs.viii This series of of respondents chose the latter option.x polls indicated that most Americans favored strong Baruch was acutely aware of public opinion enforcement mechanisms, were suspicious of the and considered winning over the public to be important Soviet Union, and wanted for securing an enforceable the United States to “This series of polls agreement on international atomic maintain, or even expand, its indicated that most control. In a speech he gave to a atomic arsenal in the Americans favored strong meeting of the United Jewish meantime while an Appeal in February 1946, four enforcement mechanisms, international plan for atomic months before presenting the plan, control was still developing. were suspicious of the he stated, “Public opinion cannot These views Soviet Union, and wanted be bought, but it can be deserved. persisted over the course of the United States to A people who are eyed the year. A November 1946 maintain, or even expand, suspiciously must live so as to be AIPO poll indicated its atomic arsenal…” the more deserving – not by continued opposition to cringing; not by handwashing; not unilateral cessation of production and destruction of by appeasement, for these have always failed, but by existing atomic weapons. Distrust of the Soviet Union keeping our heads up and our shoulders back, ready to seemed to lie at the heart of these beliefs; 72% of help and to lead in those causes that build mankind.” respondents stated that they did not believe that, were He also urged that American military dominance and the United States to unilaterally disarm, the Soviets international leadership were key to maintaining world would then agree to allow a United Nations committee peace: “Don’t let us be the first to disarm! … Don’t let to verify that they were not producing atomic weapons us dodge the duty which lies upon us of helping to either.ix But despite being opposed to unilateral keep the world’s peace. We must be strong!”xi disarmament, Americans still seemed open to the Baruch’s speech suggests that he was keenly notion of an international ban enforced by the United attuned to public sentiments. Furthermore, his criticism

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 of unilateral disarmament and appeasement, though not truth to the public would be a gigantic error. … That unique in the post-war period, foreshadowed later policy is to set a goal for which we should strive.” statements in which he denounced proposed Hinting at the United States’ impending loss of its modifications of his plan as appeasement of the atomic monopoly and underscoring the urgency of Soviets that would be received negatively by the enacting an effectual plan, Baruch warned that “our American people. Baruch delivered this address in secrets are not as secret as we think they are.” He front of supporters of the United Jewish Appeal, a emphasized that above all the proposal must include Jewish philanthropic group that raised funds to support the possibility of enforcement, ranging from an initial Jews in Europe and Palestine. He shrewdly connected punishment, sanctions, to the ultimate penalty, war: past appeasement of Nazi Germany to possible future “[Here] lies the essential difference between the appeasement of the Soviet Union, thereby constructing Acheson-Lilienthal Report and my own position.” an analogy that he used to paint a negative picture of Whereas the former constituted a mere “basis of the Soviet Union in the minds of the American Jews he negotiations,” the latter provided “a formula of a addressed. secure peace.” In the months following this speech, Baruch Baruch’s memo also emphasized the carefully crafted the contents of his proposal, in part importance of “bringing to the attention of the based on what he believed the American public would American people … the necessity of adding consider conducive to international security. He enforcement,” suggesting that he favored a two-way described his thinking in a memo to President Truman relationship between himself and public opinion.xii He on June 6, 1946, eight days before he presented the expressed that while the contents of the proposal plan at the United Nations. Given the intended should fit the wishes of the public, the former should audience of the document, it serves as an especially also suggest to the latter what to prioritize. revealing source indicating Baruch’s views on the role Furthermore, archival evidence indicates it is of public opinion. Unlike in a speech, in this classified possible that Baruch utilized his connections in the communication Baruch did not intend to impress a news media to obtain favorable coverage. In an broader audience; rather, he directly addressed the October 1948 telegram to Under Secretary of State President (with an expectation of privacy) in hopes of Robert Lovett, Baruch discussed his secret convincing Truman of the need to provide the collaboration with editors. The message concerned the populace with a practical proposal. Baruch wrote he American press’s response to comments that the Soviet was “deeply convinced” that “any expression which permanent representative to the United Nations, Andrei falls short of bringing a sense of security and a sense of Vishinsky, made during continuing United Nations

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 debate over international control of atomic energy. disseminated well after his plan had already failed, it Vishinsky pushed for immediate American atomic also suggests the possibility that he may have done so disarmament and argued that the United States’ refusal during the time when it was still a live proposal. to cease production of atomic bombs indicated it was Although it was probable that the editors involved preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. Baruch’s truthfully expressed their beliefs, clearly they were not telegram read in part, neutral observers; rather, they consciously attempted to As to stimulating sentiment on the soundness of shape public opinion, with some of them spurred to do the American position and supporting it in the so by Baruch. In this sense, although the attitudes of face of the attacks made by Vishinsky, that is the public constrained Baruch’s behavior, he also already under way. No sooner had I heard … utilized his influence to sway public sentiments. than I began to work with various elements of When he presented his plan at the first meeting the press and radio so that the American of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on position would be strongly supported by June 14, 1946, Baruch claimed that global public American public opinion. That effort is already opinion provided him with a mandate. Before an bearing fruit. Editorials of the type that the international audience, he declared, “In this crisis, we Herald Tribune printed yesterday, Tuesday, represent not only our governments but … the peoples and reprinted in Paris, Wednesday, are being of the world. We must remember that the peoples do published throughout America. So are not belong to the governments but that the supporting commentaries on the air. The governments belong to the peoples. We must answer counter-propaganda is well under way.xiii their demands; we must answer the world’s longing for peace and security.” He went on: “Public opinion Token discussion of the possibility of international supports a world movement toward security. If I read control of atomic energy was ongoing at the time, the signs alright, the peoples want a program not despite the fact that the Baruch Plan’s failure to pass composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable the Security Council two years prior had made the sanctions – an international law with teeth in it.”xiv issue effectively moot. Nonetheless, the telegram Baruch’s words suggest that public opinion played a informs analysis of the link between public opinion major role in the development of the plan, as he and the Baruch Plan by indicating that Baruch was specifically cited the opinion of “the peoples” in his both able and willing to deploy his connections in the justification for the inclusion of enforcement media to produce favorable editorials. While the provisions, echoing the message of his June 6 memo to document concerned counter-propaganda that Baruch Truman.

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American public opinion also played a notable New Journal and Guide cited a NORC poll showing role in the negotiation process, or the lack thereof. that 75% of respondents favored Baruch’s inspection Early on, even before presenting his plan, Baruch regime when it was described to them (though they realized the possible adverse impact that the public’s were not asked about the plan by name given that it understanding of official government policy might was not yet widely known).xvi Another NORC poll, have had on the strength of the United States’ conducted in September 1946, showed that 65% of negotiating position. In a March 1946 letter to those polled believed the best course of action to President Truman, Baruch deplored the public release preserve peace would be to strengthen the United of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, as he felt that the Nations so it could enforce a ban on atomic bombs.xvii close association of the committee with the State In a November 1946 poll by AIPO, the majority of Department gave the impression that the report was respondents opposed unilateral disarmament. official government policy. He wrote, “This situation Specifically, 65% disagreed with the suggestion that has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the “the United States should stop making atom bombs press announcements of the [Acheson-Lilienthal and destroy those already made to prove our good Report]. I do not underestimate the effect of this intentions in asking for international control of atomic publication in the United States or in the world at bombs.”xviii This finding was affirmed by a Gallup poll large. … This brings the report pretty close to the published on December 26, 1946, just four days before category of the United States Government policy.” the Security Council voted down the Baruch Plan. The Baruch’s concerns about this issue were serious Atlanta Constitution reported the results of that poll, enough that he asked Truman to “postpone any action which found that 72% of Americans surveyed said the on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a United States should not cease production of atomic little more time to think things over.”xv Baruch seemed bombs and destroy its existing arsenal. The article determined to ensure that he, not Acheson, Lilienthal, commented, “Public sentiment continues to oppose a or another member of their committee, would be the Russian suggestion that, to show our good faith in one shaping policy and thus public opinion regarding international disarmament, we stop making atom the government’s position. bombs and destroy those already on hand.”xix Opinion polls conducted shortly after Baruch Polls like these indicated that in the weeks and introduced his proposal reflected broad support among months before the final vote on the Baruch Plan, the Americans for the elements of the plan. A newspaper American public seemed to support inspections, which article from July 1946 reported the results of a poll were part of the plan, and opposed unilateral about the inspection system proposed by Baruch; the disarmament, which was part of the Soviet Union’s

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 counter-proposal, the Gromyko Plan. That proposal, as much in a letter to Lewis Douglas, the American named for Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Osborn wrote, Andrei Gromyko, was in many ways the antithesis of “Any serious weakening of the proposals would not the Baruch Plan. It called for immediate American only be unacceptable to the United States Government, atomic disarmament and eventual international atomic but also to American public opinion. … It seems clear control, with no international role in verification, no that any attempt to ‘mediate’ between the United sanctions or other enforcement, and preservation of States and the Soviet now … would be resented by the Security Council members’ ability to veto resolutions American public as an attempt at appeasement.”xxiii on atomic matters.xx This specific mention of appeasement harkened back Although the aforementioned polls may give to Baruch’s speech to the United Jewish Appeal and the impression of widespread American support for the revealed a dynamic in which Baruch both attempted to Baruch Plan, they should not necessarily be construed mobilize the public against appeasement at one point, as evidence of such a consensus. In fact, public and then later cited this same aversion to appeasement awareness of the Baruch Plan shortly after it was felt by the public to justify his decision not to negotiate introduced was quite low. In a June 1946 NORC poll, with the Soviets. Clearly, Baruch and his team were only 29% said that they had heard or read about it.xxi keenly aware of public opinion and understood that if Awareness of the plan had increased by early 1947, but they weakened inspection and enforcement provisions, the majority of the public remained unfamiliar with it; or pushed up the United States’ hypothetical atomic a February 1947 NORC poll found that 45% of disarmament date, they would risk alienating the respondents had heard or read about the plan.xxii American people. Like Baruch’s aforementioned While the available evidence makes it difficult memo to Truman, Osborn’s letter was classified, to definitively determine the influence (relative to increasing its reliability as a source given the relatively other factors) that public opinion had on the high likelihood that it accurately reflected the thinking breakdown of negotiations or to prove a causal link, of Baruch and his team. evidently the sentiments of the public constituted a significant factor. Baruch’s awareness of polls showing that the American populace favored the elements of his plan over those of the Gromyko Plan likely strengthened his confidence and may have encouraged him to remain obstinate in his rejection of the latter proposal. Baruch’s deputy Frederick Osborn indicated

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Truman himself stated that Baruch placed newspaper accounts were even more laudatory than much importance on public opinion. In his 1956 this in their praise. He added, “Nor was Baruch memoir Years of Trial and Hope, Truman wrote that unmindful of or indifferent to the paean of enthusiasm Baruch “had, of course, full knowledge of the with which his plan was greeted. A survey of President’s responsibility for national policy. His newspaper editorials by his staff claimed to show that concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would 98.5 percent of press opinion was favorable to the receive public recognition. He had always seen to it report.”xxv Baruch’s instruction to his staff to sample that his suggestions and recommendations, not always media coverage (despite possibly having influenced requested by the President, would be given some of those editorial positions himself) indicates the publicity.”xxiv Given that value he placed on the “In his 1956 memoir Years Truman had frequent contact sentiments of the populace. and candid conversations with of Trial and Hope, Truman Herken’s analysis supports the Baruch, the book provides wrote that Baruch ‘had, of idea that popular opinion was important insights into course, full knowledge of indirectly influential in the Baruch’s purpose and the President’s negotiations process, as positive motivations. Baruch’s responsibility for national reception of the proposal likely preoccupation with public contributed to Baruch’s policy. His concern, in my opinion thus may have led him increasingly headstrong attitude to prefer gaining the favor of opinion, was really whether and refusal to compromise on the populace over seriously he would receive public the terms of his plan. negotiating and obtaining an recognition.’” Ultimately, the Soviet international pact. Union blocked the proposal in the United Nations Gregg Herken’s research reinforces the notion Security Council. Two years later, in his book that public support for Baruch’s proposal bolstered his Uncommon Sense, Robert Oppenheimer reflected on self-assurance. In The Winning Weapon, Herken wrote the failure of the plan. Oppenheimer, who during the that Baruch gained a “public vote of confidence” from war had been director of the Manhattan Project, which the reception his plan received. Herken explained that produced the atomic bomb, was at this time chairman American reaction to the proposal was of the General Advisory Committee of the newly- “overwhelmingly favorable,” citing a New York Times created United States Atomic Energy Commission. article that described it as “’thoughtful, imaginative, Expressing concern about the catastrophic potential of and courageous.’” Herken commented that most the weapons he had helped create, Oppenheimer stated

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HumanitiesSocial Sciences | International Law VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 that it was impossible to know “in what context, and in opinion, in which the former actively shapes the latter, what manner of the world, we may return again to the while the latter constrains the behavior of the former. It great issues touched on by the international control of also serves as an example of the role that domestic atomic energy.” Yet he remained hopeful: “Even in the affairs play in the two-level game of international arms history of recent failure … we may discern the control; public opinion has the potential to influence essential harmony, in a world where science has arms control proposals, negotiations, and outcomes. extended and deepened our understanding of the common sources of power for evil and power for good, of restraining the one and of fostering the other. This is seed we take with us, travelling to a land we cannot see, to plant in new soil.”xxvi But despite Oppenheimer’s eloquent optimism, the failure of the Baruch Plan spelled the end of any serious attempts at international control of atomic energy in the post-war period and paved the way for the atomic arms race of the Cold War. Declassified government documents, paired with contemporary polling data and media publications, demonstrate that public opinion played a significant role in the development, negotiation, and eventual failure of the Baruch Plan. Its author devised its contents in part based on his perception of public opinion. The sentiments of the public also affected negotiations by helping solidify Baruch’s refusal to compromise with the Soviet Union, thereby contributing to the ultimate fate of the plan. This case is noteworthy due to the fact the destructive capability of atomic weapons raised the stakes of the Baruch talks to a level unseen in any prior arms control negotiations in history. Additionally, this case sheds light on the complex relationship between elites and public

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Bibliography William Slany, S. Everett Gleason Primary Sources (Washington: Government Printing Office, Baruch, Bernard M. “Statement at the United Nations 1975). Atomic Energy Commission.” Bulletin of the Gromyko, Andrei A. Speech on June 19, 1946. The Atomic Scientists, July 1, 1946. International Control of Atomic Energy: https://books.google.com/books?id=RAwAAA Growth of a Policy. United States Department AAMBAJ&source=gbs_all_issues_r&cad=1. of State (Washington: 1946). Baruch, Bernard M. “Baruch Address for United https://books.google.com/books?id=aV4gAAA Jewish Appeal.” New York Herald Tribune, AMAAJ. February 25, 1946. “Opinion Poll: Public Supports Inspection System for https://search.proquest.com/docview/12911446 Atomic Control.” New Journal and Guide, July 63?accountid=15172. 13, 1946. Erskine, Hazel Gaudet. “The Polls: Exposure to https://search.proquest.com/news/docview/567 International Information.” The Public Opinion 758441/342522B22DFF4F37PQ/4?accountid= Quarterly 27, no. 4 (1963): 658-62. 15172. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747109. Oppenheimer, J. Robert. Uncommon Sense (Boston: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; Birkhauser, 1984). the United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. https://books.google.com/books/about/Uncom Goodwin, Neal H. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, mon_Sense.html?id=o0jUBwAAQBAJ. William Slany, S. Everett Gleason “Public Votes Save A-Bombs.” The Atlanta (Washington: Government Printing Office, Constitution, December 26, 1946. 1972). https://search.proquest.com/news/docview/153 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; 2732850/D51812F588C2473EPQ/4?accountid the United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. =15172. Goodwin, Neal H. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, Strunk, Mildred, comp. Public Opinion 1935-1946. William Slany, S. Everett Gleason Edited by Hadley Cantril (Princeton: Princeton (Washington: Government Printing Office, University Press, 1951). 1973). http://www.archive.org/details/publicopinion19 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; 300unse. the United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope (Garden Goodwin, Neal H. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, City: Doubleday, 1956).

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https://archive.org/stream/yearsoftrialandh0002 34mbp/ yearsoftrialandh000234mbp_djvu.txt.

Secondary Sources “The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946.” In Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. United States Department of State. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945- 1952/baruch-plans. Endowment for the United States Institute of Peace. “Counterproposal: The Gromyko Plan.” United States Institute of Peace. 2010. http://online.usip.org/negotiation/4_1_4.php. Graham, Thomas Wallace. “The Politics of Failure: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control, Public Opinion, and Domestic Politics in the United States, 1945-1980” (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989). hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13981. Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). http://muse.jhu.edu/book/34515. Lebovic, James H., Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

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Endnotes

i I am grateful to Dr. John Maurer for his patient and thoughtful (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), document 419, research guidance. I also thank Josh Hano for his insightful https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v01/d419. critiques of earlier drafts of this paper. xvi “Opinion Poll: Public Supports Inspection System for Atomic ii This paper uses the term atomic as opposed to nuclear for the Control,” New Journal and Guide, July 13, 1946, sake of consistency and also because the former was the term https://search.proquest.com/news/docview/567758441/342522B2 predominately used during the period in question. 2DFF4F37PQ/4?accountid=15172. iii Bernard M. Baruch, “Statement at the United Nations Atomic xvii Strunk, Public Opinion, 25. Energy Commission,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1, xviii Ibid. 1946, 3, xix “Public Votes Save A-Bombs,” The Atlanta Constitution, https://books.google.com/books?id=RAwAAAAAMBAJ&source December 26, 1946, =gbs_all_issues_r&cad=1. https://search.proquest.com/news/docview/1532732850/D51812F iv “The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946,” in Milestones 588C2473EPQ/4?accountid=15172. in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, United States xx Andrei A. Gromyko, speech on June 19, 1946, The Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945- International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, 1952/baruch-plans. United States Department of State, (Washington: 1946), 209, v Mildred Strunk, comp., Public Opinion 1935-1946, edited by https://books.google.com/books?id=aV4gAAAAMAAJ; Hadley Cantril, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 21, Endowment for the United States Institute of Peace, http://www.archive.org/details/publicopinion19300unse. “Counterproposal: The Gromyko Plan,” United States Institute of vi Ibid., 22. Peace, 2010, http://online.usip.org/negotiation/4_1_4.php. vii Ibid., 24. xxi Strunk, Public Opinion, 27. viii Ibid., 25. xxii Hazel Gaudet Erskine, “The Polls: Exposure to International ix Ibid. Information,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 27, no. 4 (1963): x Ibid. 658-62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747109. xiBernard M. Baruch, “Baruch Address for United Jewish xxiii Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; the Appeal,” New York Herald Tribune, February 25, 1946, United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, Neal H. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1291144663. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, William Slany, S. Everett Gleason, xii Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), document 301, United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, Neal H. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v01/d301. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, William Slany, S. Everett Gleason, xxiv Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), document 445, Doubleday, 1956), 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v01/d445. https://archive.org/stream/yearsoftrialandh000234mbp/ xiii Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the yearsoftrialandh000234mbp_djvu.txt. United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, Neal H. xxv Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, William Slany, S. Everett Gleason, Cold War, 1945-1950 (Princeton: (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), document 243, Princeton University Press, 2014), 173, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p1/d243. http://muse.jhu.edu/book/34515. xiv Bernard M. Baruch, “Statement at the United Nations Atomic xxvi J. Robert Oppenheimer, Uncommon Sense (Boston: Energy Commission.” Birkhauser, 1984), 10, xv Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the https://books.google.com/books/about/Uncommon_Sense.html?id United Nations, Volume I, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, Neal H. =o0jUBwAAQBAJ. Petersen, Marvin W. Kranz, William Slany, S. Everett Gleason,

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